I am not sure I would say that the hard problem is the crux of the problem - if anything, the hard problem probably presupposes indirect realism. It's also an interesting question whether indirect realism is a construct that can be applied to things that don't have experience. — Apustimelogist
guess under that definition I could equally ask whether anything could count as direct which seems quite difficult imo under modern understandings of science and partly why I wasn't sure what people were meaning by direct realism. — Apustimelogist
I'd believe that if we recreated the conditions for creating perception then we'd produce the same results — Moliere
A lot of people take this line, but it seems plainly available to deny that there's any necessity between awareness and experience. — AmadeusD
Then where is the mediation of our perception of visual objects by the perception of some other entities such as sense-data?
— Luke
We feel pain – a mental phenomenon – and it is in feeling this pain that we feel the fire. We taste a sweet taste – a mental phenomenon – and it is in tasting this sweet taste that we taste the sugar. We see shapes and colours – mental phenomena – and it is in seeing these shapes and colours that we see the cow. — Michael
P1. We are acquainted with the phenomenal character of experience.
P2. According to the naive realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of distal objects and their properties.
C1. Therefore, according to the naive realist, we are acquainted with distal objects and their properties.
P3. According to the indirect realist, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted of mental phenomena.
C2. Therefore, according to the indirect realist, we are acquainted with mental phenomena.
Note that the term "mental phenomena" is impartial to property dualism and eliminative materialism.
Note also the technical term "acquainted", as described here.
And as explained above, for the phenomenal character of experience to be constituted of distal objects and their properties it requires that perceptual experiences "literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of". — Michael
To mediate is to arbitrate or condition; that which is a perception cannot arbitrate or be arbitrated by, another perception. Perception mediated by perception is improper and confusing;
Sense data just is the unmediated empirical affect the object has, that data, that affect, conditioned by something very different, is the subsequent mediated representation of the perceived object. This is indirect realism. — Mww
(2) that our visual perception of […] material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part) — Michael
Sense data just is the unmediated empirical affect the object has, that data, that affect, conditioned by something very different, is the subsequent mediated representation of the perceived object. — Mww
In terms of perception I'd say AI demonstrates some of the more dry and functional ways of putting "perception", but I don't believe the internet is conscious for all that. — Moliere
Is that not different to your mind? — Moliere
So how does the indirect realist account for error about perception, if not another intermediary? — Moliere
To me it seems like it's much more elegant to simply say we can be fallible — Moliere
I'd believe that if we recreated the conditions for creating perception then we'd produce the same results, but I don't believe anyone really knows those conditions. — Moliere
though it's not all that satisfying to me to say that the hard problem presupposes anything. — AmadeusD
If there's no conscious experience, there's nothing to compare with mind-independence. — AmadeusD
That consciousness literally extends outside of the head and touches the world is kind of why the problem of consciousness is a big deal for some. — Moliere
I think it does. If you are like an idealist and the world of experience is just the world, then I don't think there is a hard problem for them in the way you imply. For there to be a hard problem I think there must be a kind of dualism where what is going on outside the head differs from inside the head (presupposing indirectness that would not be there for the idealist where the nature of the world as it is is right before their very eyes). — Apustimelogist
Why can't I just talk about some kind of representations an A.I. has? — Apustimelogist
I agree that this “perception of a perception” is confusing and unnecessary. It’s a large part of the reason why I am not an indirect realist. — Luke
And if one rejects this? — AmadeusD
I don't think this is true, personally. Consciousness does not extend at all.. It couldn't, on any account of it i've heard.
That some pretend that consciousness is something even capable of 'literally' touching the world is probably one of the more embarrassing aspects of human theorizing.
2.The act of processing visual data: To perceive --> causes
3. Having the resulting conscious experience: To see. — AmadeusD
Do you hold the view that we must perceive mental phenomena in order to perceive real objects? If so, then this is where our positions differ and we have more than a grammatical dispute, since it is not my position that we must perceive mental phenomena in order to perceive real objects. If not, then you are not an indirect realist. — Luke
I don’t understand how you get from “unmediated empirical affect” to “mediated representation”. — Luke
Are you talking about the mediation of our perceptions of objects? — Luke
What is being mediated here? — Luke
What are they mediated by? — Luke
…..I am not an indirect realist. — Luke
This topic finds agreement between us. — creativesoul
….whether or not cows can have experience…. — creativesoul
Biology looms large. — creativesoul
Yes, when you put them side-by-side but I am still not sure what the latter really means in terms of being aquainted with the world. — Apustimelogist
We said above that what distinguishes the classical, Russellian notion of acquaintance is, minimally, that (i) it is a non-intentional form of awareness: acquaintance with something does not consist in forming any judgment or thought about it, or applying any concepts to it; and (ii) it is real relation requiring the existence of its relata; one cannot be acquainted with some thing, property or fact that does not exist.
In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs — first sentence of the SEP article on intentionality
...There are consistent ways to accept acquaintance theory without accepting classical foundationalism. some might agree that we do have some knowledge by acquaintance and appeal to such knowledge in the dualism debate in the philosophy of mind
To me, there are basically just sequences of experiences and we can be erroneous about what experiences will happen next, or what experiences accompany each other. That is all. And recognizing errors itself involves some sequence of experiences. — Apustimelogist
What if two people see the same object in two different ways due to an illusion, yet they are both directly aquainted with that object? — Apustimelogist
So I'd claim that I am aware of my toe — Moliere
If it's all just experience then wouldn't that be a kind of direct realism? There wouldn't even be a self as much as a local bundle of experiences which gets in the habit of calling itself "I", erroneously. — Moliere
I think objects have affordances more than distinct properties. — Moliere
And sometimes people do see features which are not actually there from some other person's perspective, like hallucinations. Someone on an LSD trip might see motion in the carpet where another person sees none at all. (Though I guess you might say motion and non-motion are both there?) — Apustimelogist
Help me understand what agreement we’re having here? — Mww
but hallucinations like one experiences on hallucinogens or when they don't have enough sugar to make the brain function as it normally does. — Moliere
if we do not analyze them using Cartesian assumptions, are evidence that our mind is a part of the world because the world influences it, rather than the other way about — Moliere
No theory has an explanation of why experience compliments activity. Idealism still cannot answer the hard problem. It just shifts from having experiences of 'the world', to having experiences of one's mind. But the problem of experience remains. — AmadeusD
therefore there is no hard problem. Experience is a brute fact of reality.
The bolded, appears to me, an absolute fact as long as one is not an Idealist. There is the world. There is inside the head. — AmadeusD
I'm not entirely sure what's being suggested here. AI doesn't have conscious experience, that we know of. — AmadeusD
For hallucinations I simply note that in every case we can find some physiological reason why they are hallucinating -- — Moliere
It's the direct perception part we agree on, I think? — creativesoul
We differ when it comes to what all is involved in/for experience. — creativesoul
I am not sure I see a profound difference tbh. Disruption of normal functioning is what the indirect realist sees as disruption of normal representations. — Apustimelogist
I don't think that undermines the point, though. Hallucinations show that the mind can create experience. Once you notice that, reality will always be taken with a grain of salt. — frank
In the case of starvation, for instance, sometimes people's experiences have been interpreted as religious visions of a truth beyond the everyday -- what is colloquially called "hallucination" can be interpreted as another layer of reality which our normal functioning has been trained to ignore (and which is why the disruption of normal functioning turns the mind on itself -- which is what I'd say hallucinations are. — Moliere
Right. For me this almost implies some form of idealism where the object of my toe is just the experience of my toe, without anything more. I think I would also be open though toward some kind of notion of direct awareness of information or something like that which I
think is similar to this comment here you made: — Apustimelogist
But to clarify I wasn't trying to necessarily imply anything about the universe being just experiences. I don't believe sufficiently clear notions of fundamental metaphysics are accessible so I don't bother with that. — Apustimelogist
But to clarify I wasn't trying to necessarily imply anything about the universe being just experiences. I don't believe sufficiently clear notions of fundamental metaphysics are accessible so I don't bother with that.
I was just saying that I am having what I call experiences and they flow and any time I recognize errors, that is just encompassed in types of experiential flow. And yes, what I would call the self is enacted in the flow too just like you said.
It might not be apt to call it direct realism though because I wouldn't say it conflicted with the idea of mediational processes and a chain of causes originating outside of what is experienced. It is more appropriately, and perhaps trivially, a direct awareness of what is going on in my head which I think is then not the same as the kind of direct realism described on wikipedia or something. It would be quite weakened and I would even push back against the notion of there being a fact of the matter about the sense that these experiences are about objective objects out in the world in the same kind of way I push back against scientific realism. As an analogy, I would say what we perceive is closer to a notion of an instrumentalist science where we construct theories that predict data, as opposed to theories being objectively real. — Apustimelogist
But what does it mean for a color itself to be an affordance? — Apustimelogist
Tbh I think the affordance/J.J.Gibson-kind of direct perception is closer to my "direct awareness of information" than it is to more literal direct realism. — Apustimelogist
But I suspect maybe that interpretation may be particular to me.
The idea of affordances definitely was a significant input, among others, to what led me to the idea that our experiences are fundamentally just about "what happens next?" and enacting that... which I see as pretty much just a more general view of affordances. So affordances is an important concept to me but I have gone away from the idea that the kind of qualities I directly experience are literally affordances. If sensory information arises from patterns on sensory boundaries like the retina, then the connection to affordances must come in afterwards.
For me, I don't think it makes sense to say the dress can be two colors without loosening realism and directness, arguably both. But again, I don't think that contradicts my "direct awareness of information" thing imo.
Eh, not other dimensions, no. Just the mind interacting with itself -- something the mind is trained to ignore to pay attention to the important things. (EDIT: Or, even more abstractly, it's really just a local, ontic interpretation of experience, which we have been taught to treat in a certain manner in an industrial society with a division of labor, etc.) — Moliere
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