I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?
— creativesoul

I think it is right as you have done to distinguish words within exclamation marks to refer to thoughts and language and words not in exclamation marks to refer to things in the world. — RussellA

:smile:

Are they seeing Cypress trees or are they seeing the way the Cypress trees appear to them? Are they smelling fresh ground Kona coffee, or the way fresh ground Kona coffee smells to them? Are they tasting cauliflower, or the way cauliflower tastes to them? — creativesoul

We're not smelling our subjective individual conscious experiences. We're not tasting the way coffee appears/interacts to/with our biological machinery. Our sense of taste is equivalent to the way the world appears to our tastes.

If it were the case that the object of our rational attention was the way the world appeared to us, then we would already be knee deep in metacognitive content. For we cannot be captured by the way the world appears to us until we draw a distinction between the world and how we see it. Until then...

We're captured by the world.

Terms of evolutionary progression.  

I can’t justify receiving the lawful effects of light refraction while at the same time blaming my eyes for giving me blatant distortions. — Mww

I agree, but before a scientific understanding of what is going in it may have been puzzling, All I think these cases amount to are circumstances in which things appear to be different than they are when not found in the said circumstances.

Nice stuff recently!

Cheers, I have also resonated with your recent explanations. I hope we are not in danger of finding ourselves with nothing to argue about! :smile:

Not all discussion requires argument. I like to think we've helped one another in some way.

If it weren't for you and other folks like you, Idah been arguing with myself. I appresheeightcha.

:wink:

I would say that "I am conscious of seeing the colour green", "I am conscious of tasting something bitter", "I am conscious of an acrid smell", "I am conscious of a sharp pain" or "I am conscious of hearing a grating noise".

Therefore, in my mind I am conscious of perceiving a sight, a taste, a smell, a touch or a hearing. — RussellA

If we draw enough meaningful correlations between green things and other stuff, we can become conscious of green things. That's not the same as being conscious of seeing green things. The apple is green. We can become conscious of green things before we know it. Being conscious of seeing the colour green is knowing how to group things by color and being aware of doing it. Being conscious of a big green monster does not require being conscious of seeing a green monster.

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it.

There's a very odd use of "inference" in Michael's account. — Banno

@Michael's usage seems entirely appropriate. The knowledge that there is a tree in front of me is not a given, transmitted directly into my brain. The only thing about the environment that is a given to any organism is the sensory information it receives from it. What else can an organism do with this information but infer things (consciously or otherwise) about its environment?

I think we see (if we are close enough to identify them) what the distant objects are. The way you are putting it seems confused to me, and liable, if taken seriously, to breed further confusion — Janus

What seems confused to me is this strange instance that seeing is this primordial thing, resistant to all analysis, such that "I think we see what the objects are" is somehow remotely adequate. Never mind what we actually understand about perception, that is

scientism — Leontiskos

Michael's usage seems entirely appropriate. The knowledge that there is a tree in front of me is not a given, transmitted directly into my brain. The only thing about the environment that is a given to any organism is the sensory information it receives from it. What else can an organism do with this information but infer things (consciously or otherwise) about its environment? — hypericin

Good. I was going to lump you with Michael, so I'm glad you agree.

I think the reason this seems appropriate to many is because they assume that humans are like machines. <Machines make inferences from sense data; humans are like machines; therefore humans make inferences from sense data>. I think the mechanistic premise is behind this sort of thinking, and I think that the petitio principii in @Michael's claim about "science" already does all of the work before the science even begins.

Now I don't really have time to do this topic justice, but if I did this would be my point of entry:

I think direct realism is the prima facie (naive) view. Indirect realism responds, throwing it into question. — Leontiskos

Or in other words, do we agree that indirect realism has the burden of proof, and that direct realism is the default or pre-critical position?

---

To me it is crystal clear. Only by way of the sounds and sights coming from the viewing device do you experience the on screen action of the film. And only by experiencing and interpreting the on screen action do you construe the story. This seems indisputable. — hypericin

Well, if you plop a child down in front of a Disney movie, do they require special skills of interpretation and inference to enter into the story? A word is a sound, and so without the sound there is no word, but it does not follow that (conscious) interpretation or inference is occurring. It is the same, I say, for images and other sensory inputs.

No, not a window.

You said my view is not realism because it terminates at sensory experience, not the real. But rather, the real lies on the other side of the stack. Hence, indirect realism, where the stack of sensory experience, and all the indirection that may lie on top of that, sits between the knower and the known. — hypericin

Okay, and so it is not a window, but is instead a set of data that, if interpreted correctly, can lead to knowledge of the real?

The only thing about the environment that is a given to any organism is the sensory information it receives from it. — hypericin

The sensory information that an organism receives from its environment is a perception. You are basically saying that our perceptions are direct.

What else can an organism do with this information but infer things (consciously or otherwise) about its environment? — hypericin

In that case, the inference must occur after the perception. If we perceive first and infer later, then how could the perception be indirect? The inference does not precede the perception, so it cannot come between the perception and the environment.

But we don't want a strange world of nothing but particles arranged x-wise or one undifferentiated process either. We'd like to say cats exist on mats (and just one at one time and place), that lemons are yellow, that rocks have mass and shape, etc. I am just unconvinced that these can be properly be dealt with fully on the nature side of the Nature/Geist distinction. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think @Banno and I share a suspicion of all metaphysics, though I welcome correction from him if I'm wrong.

I don't think science parses to Nature/Geist or most philosophies at all.

I think they are different, or if not, it's not easy to trace the connections.

The sensory information that an organism receives from its environment is a perception. You are basically saying that our perceptions are direct. — Luke

There are (at least) two parts to perception; sensation and cognition. The sensation is the body's response to stimulation (e.g. photons interacting with the eyes or chemicals interacting with the tongue). The cognition is the brain's intellectual processing of that sensation.

Given these facts about the mechanics of perception, in what sense is perception of some distant object "direct"?

The SEP article on the problem of perception offers these definitions:

Direct Realist Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of ordinary objects.

...

Direct Realist Character: the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary objects.

What does "direct presentation" mean if not literal presence? Given the actual mechanics of perception, conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain/body, and so distant objects and their properties are not present in conscious experience, and so in no meaningful sense does conscious experience involve the "direct presentation" of those distant objects or their properties.

The IEP article on objects of perception offers this account:

There are, however, two versions of direct realism: naïve direct realism and scientific direct realism. They differ in the properties they claim the objects of perception possess when they are not being perceived. Naïve realism claims that such objects continue to have all the properties that we usually perceive them to have, properties such as yellowness, warmth, and mass. Scientific realism, however, claims that some of the properties an object is perceived as having are dependent on the perceiver, and that unperceived objects should not be conceived as retaining them.

...

Scientific direct realism is often discussed in terms of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The Primary qualities of an object are those whose existence is independent of the existence of a perceiver. Locke’s inventory of primary qualities included shape, size, position, number, motion-or-rest and solidity, and science claims to be completing this inventory by positing such properties as charge, spin and mass. The secondary qualities of objects, however, are those properties that do depend on the existence of a perceiver.

Physics, neurology, and psychology have refuted naive direct realism. Secondary qualities like colour and taste are the body's response to certain kinds of stimulation; they are not properties of the stimuli.

The scientific direct realist may be right in the sense that primary qualities are properties of the stimuli, but given the mechanics of perception it is clear that any primary qualities in conscious experience are only of the same type, not also of the same token. As has been mentioned above, conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain/body, and so distant objects and their properties are not present in conscious experience. Anything like "sense-data"/"qualia" that explains secondary qualities also explains primary qualities, albeit any primary quality sense-data can be considered an accurate representation of the stimuli's properties.

So, again, in what meaningful sense can we still say that perception of distant objects is "direct"? I think, as Robinson argues, many so-called "direct" realists here have retreated from the debate regarding the mechanics of perception to an unrelated and irrelevant argument about grammar, which has no bearing on the substance of indirect realism or on the epistemological problem of perception.

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it. — creativesoul

Exactly, it is a question of linguistics.

As an Indirect Realist, I can say "I can see a green object", and everyone knows exactly what I mean. Even the ordinary man in the street knows what I mean.

The ordinary man knows exactly what I mean, because even the ordinary man knows what a figure of speech is.

If I said to the ordinary man "I see that your future is looking bright", even the ordinary man wouldn't assume that they were talking to a seer having supernatural insight.

If we draw enough meaningful correlations between green things and other stuff, we can become conscious of green things. That's not the same as being conscious of seeing green things. The apple is green. We can become conscious of green things before we know it. Being conscious of seeing the colour green is knowing how to group things by color and being aware of doing it. Being conscious of a big green monster does not require being conscious of seeing a green monster.

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it. — creativesoul

To repeat an earlier comment:

For the Rays, to speak properly, have no Colour. In them there is nothing else than a certain power and disposition to stir up a sensation of this Colour or that. — Isaac Newton

This is what physics, neurology, and psychology recognise.

The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the sensation ordinarily caused by such wavelengths seems to be leading you and others to equivocate.

The sensation is distinct from and different to the stimulus, even if we often use the same word to refer to both.

I find that mereological nihilism (i.e. the denial that wholes like trees and cats really exist) tends to have two problems. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see your two problems as problems, more part of the road to a solution.
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There is plenty of work in the philosophy of physics and physics proper that claims to demonstrate that "particles" are just another of those things that don't really exist "independently of humans." They are a contrivance to help us think of things in the terms we are used to. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. My understanding at the moment is that the true nature of a mind-independent world consists of fundamental particles and fundamental forces in space-time. But that said, I haven't the foggiest idea about the true nature of fundamental particles, fundamental forces, space and time.

However, given a choice, I find it more likely that the true nature of a mind-independent world is more like fundamental particles, fundamental forces in space-time than trees, apples, beauty, governments, chairs and tables.
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mathematized conceptions of the universe, ontic structural realism, tends to propose that the universe as a whole is a single sort of mathematical object......................Everything seems to interact with everything else — Count Timothy von Icarus

Accepting that there are different versions of Ontic Structural Realism, I agree that the idea that objects, properties and relations are primitive have been undermined by science.
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How do we resolve the apparent multiplicity of being with its equally apparent unity? — Count Timothy von Icarus

In Kant's terms, the transcendental unity of apperception, a feature of the mind rather than a feature of things-in-themselves.
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Where exactly do you see the trees, cats, and thunderstorms as coming from? — Count Timothy von Icarus

From the same place that beauty, ghosts, bent sticks and unicorns come from, from the mind.
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But this presents a puzzle for me. If the experience of trees is caused by this unity, then it would seem like the tree has to, in some way, prexist the experience. Where does it prexist the experience? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, the concept of a "tree" pre-exists not only my experience of a tree but also pre-exists my existence.

Prior to my existence, the concept of "tree" was stored partly in writing and partly in the minds of the users of the language.

If I didn't have the concept of a "tree" prior to looking at the world, I wouldn't know when I was looking at a tree.
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1. It doesn't really make sense to declare that "human independent" being is more or less real. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I am stung by a wasp, I could say "my pain is real". As an adjective, "my pain is real" means I am being truthful when I say that "I am pain". As a noun "my pain is real" is more metaphysical, in that in what sense does pain exist. It cannot have an ontological existence in a mind-independent world, but can only exist as part of a mind.

I could say "100 million years ago the Earth was real". As an adjective, this means I am being truthful when I say "the Earth was real". As a noun, "the Earth was real" is more metaphysical, in that in what sense was the earth real.

As with "my pain is real", where "real" is being used as a noun, my belief is that the "Earth was real" doesn't refer to an ontological existence in a mind-independent world, but rather refers to an idea in the mind.
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2. Notions like tree, cat, tornado, etc. would seem to unfold throughout the history of being and life, having an etiology that transcends to mind/world boundary — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree that notions like tree, cat, tornado, etc unfold throughout the history of English speakers, presumably all human, but not throughout the history of non-English speakers, nor other forms of life, such as cats and elephants.

As Wittgenstein pointed out, the possibility of a private language is remote, and that all language is a social thing requiring an individual speaker to be in contact with other users of the language.

For me, part of my world is other people and the language they use. These words, tree, cat, tornado, cannot exist solely in my mind as a private language, but must transcend the boundary between my mind and my world.

However, although these words do transcend the boundary between my mind and my world, this does not mean that they transcend the boundary between the mind and a mind-independent world.
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3. Self-conscious reflection on notions, knowing how a notion is known, and how it has developed, would be the full elucidation of that notion, rather than a view where the notion is somehow located solely in a "mind-independent" realm, which as you note, has serious plausibility problems — Count Timothy von Icarus

The notion of a tree to an Icelander is presumably different to the notion of a tree to a Ghanaian, though they probable agree that a tree is "a woody perennial plant having a single usually elongate main stem generally with few or no branches on its lower part" (Merriam Webster)

Everyone, because of their different life experiences, educations, professions, childhoods and lifestyles, most probably has a different concept of what a "tree" is. Though even though their particular concepts may be very different, this wouldn't stop them having a sensible conversation about trees.

I would hazard a guess that no two people on planet Earth thinks of a "Tree" in exactly the same way, meaning that no-one on planet Earth can know a "tree" as it is.

So, again, in what meaningful sense can we still say that perception of distant objects is "direct"? — Michael

First and foremost, because this….

There are (at least) two parts to perception; sensation and cognition. — Michael

….would seem impossible to justify. There is no cognition in perception; the senses don’t think. That being the case, the meaningful sense in which we can say perception of distant objects is direct, is given from the fact the purely physiological operational status of sensory apparatuses is not effected by the relative distances of their objects. For your eyes the moon is no less directly perceived than the painting hanging on the wall right in front of you.

There are two parts to experience, sensation and cognition; perception is not experience but only the occasion for it.

Anyway….two cents. I found that “two parts to perception” comment particularly noteworthy, is all.

the senses don’t think. — Mww

That's why I specified the senses as being the second part to perception. The senses don't think and cognition doesn't sense. But perception involves both the senses and cognition. Take the duck-rabbit. Whether you see a duck or a rabbit involves more than just the raw sense data; it involves rational interpretation of that sense data.

That being the case, the meaningful sense in which we can say perception of distant objects is direct, is given from the fact the purely physiological operational status of sensory apparatuses is not effected by the relative distances of their objects. For your eyes the moon is no less directly perceived than the painting hanging on the wall right in front of you. — Mww

Simply saying that they're direct isn't explaining what it means to be direct. I offered the definitions from the SEP article above. The known mechanics of perception make clear that objects outside the body and their properties are not present in conscious experience (which does not extend beyond the body), and so in no meaningful sense are "directly presented".

Maybe you misunderstood what I meant by "distant". I just meant "situated outside the body".

What sits between the lemon and the creature's smelling?
— creativesoul

A necessary relation, and some means by which it occurs. (??)
— Mww

Causal. Biological machinery(physiological sensory perception). — creativesoul

Pretty much what I had in mind, yep. The object, lemon, is given, the means for the occurrence, smelling, is necessarily presupposed, but neither of them by itself tells us anything we didn’t already know.

There are (at least) two parts to perception; sensation and cognition. — Michael

Right, sensation and cognition are both part of perception; they are both involved in our perception of an object. As you say, these are "facts about the mechanics of perception". The dispute is over whether our perception of an object is direct (i.e. whether we perceive the object itself) or whether our perception of an object is indirect (i.e. whether we perceive an intermediary representing the object itself).

If sensation and cognition are both parts of the perception of an object, then the putative intermediary (of indirect realism) can be neither a sensation nor a cognition as these are both part of "the mechanics of perception". Neither a sensation nor a cognition can be the perceived object if these are the mechanisms behind the perception, which generate the perception. If the intermediary is neither a sensation nor a cognition, then what could this intermediary possibly be that is situated between the perception and the object?

What does "direct presentation" mean if not literal presence? — Michael

What do you mean by presence?

Given the actual mechanics of perception, conscious experience does not extend beyond the brain/body, and so distant objects and their properties are not present in conscious experience, and so in no meaningful sense does conscious experience involve the "direct presentation" of those distant objects. — Michael

Why must conscious experience extend beyond the brain/body? Must an object be touching a brain in order to be directly perceived; to be a "direct presentation"? It sounds like you want to eliminate perception altogether.

I think @Banno and I share a suspicion of all metaphysics, though I welcome correction from him if I'm wrong.

I don't think science parses to Nature/Geist or most philosophies at all.

I think they are different, or if not, it's not easy to trace the connections.

I'm not sure I understand you. What is different, Nature versus Mind or science vs a Nature/Mind distinction?

IDK, science seems to make mention of the divide between subjective experience and nature all the time. It's partly what divides the social sciences, and it comes up in psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, AI, etc. continuously.

I use "Geist" because Hegel's frame is the totality of minds, which would seem to be where truth and falsity is adjudicated, as opposed to "individual kind"/nature.




Well, thanks for the long reply. I guess we are coming from very different places. I'll reply where I find the biggest variance in my own thought:

In Kant's terms, the transcendental unity of apperception, a feature of the mind rather than a feature of things-in-themselves.

I've had an increasingly hard time seeing Kant's noumenal as anything but a sort of dogmatism, a bare posit. He certainly spends a lot of time trying to justify it, but I don't can't see how it cashes out. Anything acting solely in-itself cannot make any difference for anything else, and the entire presupposition of discrete things, as noted in the last post, appears to itself be an anthropomorphizing move (this is partly Hegel's criticism of Kant, but I think modern philosophy of physics gives it credence).

But of course the noumenal isn't actually said to to only act/exist in-itself, it's said to act on us, to cause. So we know it through its acts, but then this is said to not be true knowledge. How so? I don't see how it makes any sense to say "things are what they are, not what they do." Things only reveal their properties through what they do, a static isolated thing essentially sits alone, outside being. So the noumenal is what it does, and what it does is quite knowable, making "noumenal" a bad lable/concept.

I'm inclined to agree with the minority of Kantians who say that Kant's thought simply is, whether he personally liked it or not, subjective idealism ala Berkeley, with the noumenal playing the role of the mind of God for us, making it so that all minds are the same and communication is possible. I tend to disagree with them that this is what Kant actually intended, which seems like a stretch (to say the least).

From the same place that beauty, ghosts, bent sticks and unicorns come from, from the mind.

But this can't be the whole story. Because the Rocky Mountains and Mordor don't have the same ontological status. There has to be a way to distinguish between fantasy and fiction, between Narnia and Canada. So, to simply say that dragons and gorillas both come from mind is to miss something that differentiates them.

Moreover, wouldn't this imply that the apparent multiplicity of different minds itself only exists in mind? Do discrete minds have ontological status, or is the mind-dependent judgement that there are many minds in the world not true knowledge that other minds exist "in-themselves?"

If I am stung by a wasp, I could say "my pain is real". As an adjective, "my pain is real" means I am being truthful when I say that "I am pain". As a noun "my pain is real" is more metaphysical, in that in what sense does pain exist. It cannot have an ontological existence in a mind-independent world, but can only exist as part of a mind.

I am not sure if I understand you here. Is the claim that something only has "ontological existence" if it is "mind independent?" Wouldn't everything that exists have ontological existence?

I agree that notions like tree, cat, tornado, etc unfold throughout the history of English speakers, presumably all human, but not throughout the history of non-English speakers, nor other forms of life, such as cats and elephants.

So the concept cat only has to do with humans and nothing outside them? I just don't find this plausible. This would seem to lead to an all encompassing anti-realism.

As Wittgenstein pointed out, the possibility of a private language is remote, and that all language is a social thing requiring an individual speaker to be in contact with other users of the language.

Wittgenstein pointed out that if language is defined as something used to communicate between two or more people, then, by that definition, you can't have a language that is, in principle, impossible to communicate to other people. If X is Y and Z is not-Y, then Z is not X.

I don't think that demonstrated much, it's a tautology. It didn't stop Language of Thought theories from taking off again because those theories simply define language differently.

For me, part of my world is other people and the language they use.

Sure, but don't they exist only in mind? But if they exist only in mind, does this mean that other people also lack mind-independent ontological status? If they don't, what saves them from the status of cats and dogs?

For my part, it's clear that animals have something like concepts. Dogs and cats have no difficulty recognizing their owners and being scared of strangers, recognizing different types of animals, etc. Human language evolved on top of prior perceptual and behavioral systems, it isn't sui generis.

For me, the human mind doesn't create ex nihilo. Thus, concepts of cats can't spring into human thought uncaused. Nor can tornados and shrubs burst into our world (and thus the world) due to the creative power of speech acts. They are caused by the same sorts of causes that affect everything else, which causes the world to evolve in a determinant way. But if the world evolves in a determinant way, then mind can't emerge and have certain concepts due to causes that are unique to mind.

If mind's causes lie outside mind, they are knowable, because an effect is a sign of its cause.

For example, if someone is watching a film it is not at all clear that the sounds are more direct than the story — Leontiskos

To me it is crystal clear. Only by way of the sounds and sights coming from the viewing device do you experience the on screen action of the film. And only by experiencing and interpreting the on screen action do you construe the story. This seems indisputable. — hypericin

In phenomenal experience, it’s crystal clear to me that when I hear spoken language, I directly hear words, questions, commands, and so on—generally, people speaking—and only indirectly if at all hear the sounds of speech as such (where “indirect” could mean something like, through the intellect or by an effort of will). Our perceptual faculties produce this phenomenal directness in response to the environment and our action in it.

Maybe an example from vision is less controversial. When you walk around a table, you don’t see it metamorphose as the shape and area of the projected light subtending your retina changes. On the contrary, you see it as constant in size and shape.

I'll just quote the Wikipedia article on perception:

Perception (from Latin perceptio 'gathering, receiving') is the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory information in order to represent and understand the presented information or environment. All perception involves signals that go through the nervous system, which in turn result from physical or chemical stimulation of the sensory system. Vision involves light striking the retina of the eye; smell is mediated by odor molecules; and hearing involves pressure waves.

...

Perception depends on complex functions of the nervous system, but subjectively seems mostly effortless because this processing happens outside conscious awareness.

...

The process of perception begins with an object in the real world, known as the distal stimulus or distal object. By means of light, sound, or another physical process, the object stimulates the body's sensory organs. These sensory organs transform the input energy into neural activity—a process called transduction. This raw pattern of neural activity is called the proximal stimulus. These neural signals are then transmitted to the brain and processed. The resulting mental re-creation of the distal stimulus is the percept.

To explain the process of perception, an example could be an ordinary shoe. The shoe itself is the distal stimulus. When light from the shoe enters a person's eye and stimulates the retina, that stimulation is the proximal stimulus. The image of the shoe reconstructed by the brain of the person is the percept. Another example could be a ringing telephone. The ringing of the phone is the distal stimulus. The sound stimulating a person's auditory receptors is the proximal stimulus. The brain's interpretation of this as the "ringing of a telephone" is the percept.

There are many intermediaries between the distal stimulus and conscious awareness. In the case of sight there is light, the eyes, and the unconscious processing of neural signals.

I am consciously aware of percepts like colours and sounds and tastes. These percepts are not the distal stimulus or its properties.

This is what I understand by indirect realism.

On percepts, a useful case to consider is blindsight, in which the eyes are functional and most of the brain is functional, but the parts of the brain that involve visual percepts are not functional.

There is no cognition in perception; the senses don’t think. — Mww

I suppose it depends on what one categorizes under "thinking", but I'd say there is ample evidence of perception and thinking being entangled.

There are many intermediaries between the distal stimulus and conscious awareness. — Michael

Do we perceive the intermediaries or the distal stimulus? The intermediaries are part of the "mechanics of perception"; they are not the perceived object.

I have basically less than zero sympathy for the positions of @Michael, @hypericin and their ilk. I’m aware there are still some philosophers around who tend to kind of agree with them, and I know that there do exist non-stupid ways of arguing for indirect realism. Even so, the position seems really weird to me. What I have the most trouble with are four things:

1. Their notion of directness, seldom stated and even seldomer relevant or coherent.
2. Their notions of “as it is” and “what it's really like.”
3. Their constant appeals to science, which are bewildering.
4. Their motivation: where they’re coming from is really unclear.

I’m on holiday without a computer so posting to TPF is a struggle, and yet this debate always has the power to draw me in. I’ll say something about (1) and might come back to the others some other time, when I can read and quote papers etc.

1. Directness

Here’s an argument…

Directness at its most abstract is the lack of an intermediary between two connected things. Directness in perception can mean two things: the lack of an intermediary in the physical process of perception, or the lack of an intermediary in phenomenal experience. The relevant context is phenomenal experience, and perception phenomenally lacks intermediaries between experiencer and object of experience, therefore perception is direct.

The relevant context is phenomenal experience, and perception phenomenally lacks intermediaries between experiencer and object of experience, therefore perception is direct. — Jamal

There are many intermediaries between phenomenal experience and, say, a painting on the wall. There's light, the eyes, and the unconscious processing of neural signals.

And, most importantly, the features of phenomenal experience (colour, smell, taste), are not properties of those distal objects, contrary to the views of naive realism.

There are many intermediaries between phenomenal experience and, say, a painting on the wall. There's light, the eyes, and the unconscious processing of neural signals. — Michael

Is your phenomenal experience of the painting on the wall, or is it of the light, the eyes, and the unconscious processing of neural signals?

There are many intermediaries between phenomenal experience and, say, a painting on the wall. There's light, the eyes, and the unconscious processing of neural signals. — Michael

Maybe I wasn’t clear enough. I meant phenomenal intermediaries.

Maybe you misunderstood what I meant by "distant". I just meant "situated outside the body". — Michael

Yeah, I did. Sorry. Distant to me means far, so I just took that and ran with it.
————-

The known mechanics of perception make clear that objects outside the body and their properties are not present in conscious experience (which does not extend beyond the body), and so in no meaningful sense are "directly presented". — Michael

And I agree with that, iff it is the case the human intellect is strictly a representational system, which is to say there are no real objects nor are there properties supposed as belonging to them, as content of experience. But it remains, that something must be an effect on that system, in order to initiate its systematic procedure, whatever that may be. Pardon me, but I just gotta do this:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd….”

What if conscious experience itself doesn’t extend to that by which objects are sensed? If such were the case, external objects could directly appear to the senses without contradicting the predicates of a strictly representational system.
————-

Simply saying that they're direct isn't explaining what it means to be direct. — Michael

Should be obvious, given its complement, re: indirect. Direct simply indicates that which is unmediated, hence, regarding perception, direct perception merely indicates that which is perceived is not mediated by anything. There’s nothing between the thing perceived and the perception of it.

I guess what it means to be direct could reduce to….the effect one thing has on another, and affect on the other the one thing causes, are altogether indistinguishable.
————

Take the duck-rabbit. — Michael

HA!! You mean that perception where the cognitive part can’t make a decision? Or, can make two valid decisions given a single perception? But wait, he said!! If cognition belongs intimately to perception, why can I not cognize BOTH manifestations at the same time?

While it is of course necessary that perception and cognition work together to facilitate experience, it does not follow that one belongs to or is contained in or part of, the other. If sensation and cognition both belong to perception, it would then be impossible to cognize an object that wasn’t first a sensation. Which is exactly the same as saying I could never imagine an object that I’ve never seen. It goes without saying, we all can do exactly that.

All that is so obvious, I must not have the whole picture. Or, more likely, I don’t have the whole modern picture. (Sigh)

And, most importantly, the features of phenomenal experience (colour, smell, taste), are not properties of those distal objects, contrary to the views of naive realism. — Michael

Nobody has ever thought that fire engines are red in the dark; colour can be seen as relational or dispositional, compatibly with direct realism.