Maybe there is a problem with our conception of morality being tied to freedom in the first place. Maybe we just lack adequate or accurate psychological descriptions at this point to make relevant distinctions for the purpose of assigning moral responsibility... In law for instance we do see some attempts at this, in that we do exempt people in some cases from legal responsibility, like age, (temporal) insanity etc... but we do not exempt other things that seem otherwise pretty similar. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, I see. If free will is the ability to choose, then what is relevant to moral responsibility is the ability to choose actions which are socially/morally appropriate, or the ability to choose against actions which are socially/morally inappropriate.

I think that the meaning of "free will" does involve the view that statistically normal adults have the ability to choose to act (or refrain from acting) in appropriate way(s). The law may therefore view (e.g.) children and the insane to be deficient in this ability, and so exempt them from the same penalties that get applied to statistically normal adults for breaking the law.

Moral choices may have more serious implications, but I don't find it necessary to restrict the ability to choose only to the subset of moral choices.

If we do not choose our will, and our will determines what choices we make... you could say that that implies there is no way in which we could have chosen otherwise. — ChatteringMonkey

I assume that our will is what allows each of us to choose between two or more available options, and that that choice is made in accordance with one's will and/or desires (or, per Strawson, in accordance with "how one is, mentally speaking"). This gives the appearance that one is in control of the choice, or that the choice is, at least, ours. This is what I take "our will determines what choices we make" to mean.

If this control or ownership of making a choice is illusory, then so is the control or ownership of one's own will. If making a choice is illusory, then it is not our will, or "us", that determines what choices we make, but something external to oneself. It would not be "our" will that determines what choices we make, or "our" will at all.

As for the conceptual problem of "choosing our will", I have already addressed this.

Acting otherwise implies in some sense that we would have another will, which we have no control over. — ChatteringMonkey

"Acting otherwise" would seem to require having another will and another body. But that's not the same as the ability to choose (or the ability to have chosen otherwise, which I take to mean no more than having genuine options available to choose from).

But what really matters is not so much if there is an account that would be acceptable, but if that account suffices to be able to speak about moral responsibility right? That's what really at stake it seems to me. — ChatteringMonkey

What's lacking, or what would such an account require in order to "suffice" in this way?

You might say we are 'free' to make choices according to our will, but what does the word free really mean in that instance? — ChatteringMonkey

It could mean, as you note, that nothing outside our will is forcing us to make that choice.

The essence of free will is to be out of the causal web and still be in it - to wish not to be an effect and yet be a cause. Free will is defined thus: to be able to make choices (we want to be causes) without these choices being themselves out of our control (we don't want to be effects). Is this possible or should I say reasonable? — TheMadFool

I was conscious before posting the OP that I had omitted any mention of determinism. However, I think the deterministic argument is of a similar form or makes similar assumptions as Strawson's argument: namely, that one needs to be able to choose M in order to be the cause of their choices in order to truly have free will. See the post above.

Or in other words the issue I think he raises, is that you would in fact have to be able to choose your will to retain the idea of moral responsibility. I'm not sure I entirely agree with this, but I think that is the argument anyway. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, this is how I also understand Strawson's argument. I'm calling it a bad argument because the will is the source of our choosing between options. According to Strawson "how one acts is a result of, or explained by, “how one is, mentally speaking” (M)." To have truly free will, Strawson argues that we must be able to choose M (or how one is, mentally speaking) from scratch, whereas I would argue that one requires M in order to be able to choose anything, so one is not able to choose M without M. If "how one acts is a result of...M", then one cannot act without M (in order to choose M).

Unicorns certainly do actually exist, but also unicorns don't actually exist?
— Luke

You accuse me of confusing PossiblyExists(EID) with EID, which I clearly don’t as the former is a proposition and the latter isn’t, — Tristan L

I didn't accuse you of anything. I noted the apparent contradiction in your statements that unicorns both do and do not actually exist.

I suppose by Clavius' Law, you could deduce that if black is white, then white is black, therefore white is black.

In response to your comment, though, if EID is not itself a proposition contained within 'PossiblyExists(EID)', then what proposition does 'PossiblyExists(EID)' express?

And btw how do you explain your contradictory statements that unicorns both do and do not actually exist?

An essential link is actual, and it links an actual thing to another thing. Hence, this other thing must be actual, too. — Tristan L

Clear as mud.

What you mean by “actual idea” seems to be... — Tristan L

When I say "actual idea", I mean an idea that someone has actually thought about or thought up (invented). But also something that is transferrable and that anyone (any mind) can think of/about. For example, E=mc^2.

What you mean by an actual idea seems to be particular to one mind at a given time, and so indistinguishable from an actual thought.

Even more: Our faculty of thought isn’t very well-suited for thinking about concrete beonde, I think. Think about it: what an abstract entity is is very clear, but when you deeply think about the notion of a concrete object, you’ll see the notion become ever fuzzier and less meaningful until it melts away and evaporates in the end. — Tristan L

I'm sure if I broke my leg it wouldn't be so fuzzy or meaningless.

The possibility of an idea is tied to its actualised counterpart by an essential link. Therefore, the idea is actual? Because the essential link is actual since it is essential?
— Luke

Yes to both, as long as you replace “actualised” with “actual”. — Tristan L

Clear as mud.

For things, I’ve shown that possible existence necessarily lets actual existence follow. — Tristan L

Shown? Where have you shown that the possible existence of unicorns lets their actual existence follow? In fact, you've stated that unicorns both do and do not actually exist.

let’s replace dinosaurs with sauropods in your example. I don’t see where the contradiction lies. Are you doubting the actualness of sauropods in earnest? — Tristan L

I'm not doubting. I'm noting the widely accepted fact that dinosaurs (or sauropods if you prefer) are extinct and no longer actually exist.

Here’s my account of the situation:

Sauropodhood is abstract (and thus eternal) and actual, as is the proposition than sauropodhood manifests in flesh and blood in this universe at some time. — Tristan L

I'm not talking about dinosaur-hood or sauropod-hood. That's something you've introduced.

This proposition became true when sauropods first evolved, so at that time, the info-piece belonging to that proposition came into being (and would stay there forever). The existence of this info-piece is what most folks likely mean when they say that sauropods exist (in contrast to unicorns, for instance), probably including you and certainly me. — Tristan L

I doubt it. Ask most folks and I'm sure they will tell you that dinosaurs (or sauropods if you prefer) don't exist, unlike the "info-piece".

All of this is in accordance with the fact that facts about sauropods exist. — Tristan L

I'm not disputing that facts about x exists. I'm disputing your assertion that facts about x exists implies that x exists.

Likewise, the proposition that the sauropods go extinct, that is, that after some time-point, sauropodhood no longer manifests in this universe in flesh and blood, is abstract and actual. It’s even true, so the corresponding piece of info exists. — Tristan L

They don't "go" extinct at some point. They are extinct.

As I’ve discussed above, possible existence belongs in the realm of info, not the world of things. — Tristan L

Are you suggesting that actual existence does not belong in the "realm of info"?

The info that sauropodhood manifests in flesh and blood on Earth in this world exists at time-points, in a possible world; the info that Alice thinks EID comes into being in her mind (again in a world at a time); but sauropodhood and EID simply are. — Tristan L

They "simply are" now -- after they have happened or someone has thought them up. Many ideas are possible, and many may go without being thought up (actualised), just as many physical arrangements are possible and many may go without being actualised. You expect me to believe that all possible ideas and physical arrangements are already actual even though many may never be actualised? I'm sure many people have survived life without breaking a leg.

By your logic, the possibility that all possibilities will not be actualised is itself actual (and therefore, all possibilities will not be actualised). But the possibility that all possibilities will be actualised is also actual (and therefore, all possibilities will be actualised). Just like the actual existence and non-existence of unicorns, how can both be true?

how this "essential link" relates to, or assists, your argument: that the possibility (of inventing the idea) has always existed, therefore the idea has always existed. How does this "essential link" of definition provide actual existence to what is merely possible?
— Luke

Well, if something actual F is wistlily tied to something Þ through a wistly link U, then Þ must be actual too, for F is actual by premise, and U is actual since it is wistly. In my argument, Þ is a generic idea, and F is the possibility that someone might think of Þ (or any proposition about Þ for that matter). F and U are actual, so Þ is actual, too. — Tristan L

My attempted translations of your "wistlily" language into standard English:
=>(1) If the actual possibility that someone might think of an idea is essentially tied to the idea through an essential link (U), then the idea must be actual too, for the possibility that someone might think of the idea is actual by premise, and the essential link is actual since it is essential.

=>(2) If the actual possibility of an idea is essentially tied to the idea via an essential link, then the idea must be actual too, for the actual possibility of an idea is a premise and the essential link is actual since it is essential.

Sorry, I still don't follow. The possibility of an idea is tied to its actualised counterpart by an essential link. Therefore, the idea is actual? Because the essential link is actual since it is essential?

How does the "essential link" facilitate the leap from 'the idea is possible' to 'the idea is actual'. And how do you distinguish between possible ideas and actual ideas?

There is no such thing as a merely possible thing. All things are eternal, abstract, actual, and soothfast. Moreover, my argument for the actual existence of all ideas doesn’t even need possibility. — Tristan L

I suspected this to be your position, which is why I asked you pages ago why you even bother with possibility. You may also recall my more recent observation that you only draw an artificial distinction between possible and actual existence.

Assume that some thing x doesn’t have actual existence. Then that very (supposed) fact has actual existence (as does its negation). But this fact is defined in terms of x. Hence, x must be actual after all. — Tristan L

A fact about x exists, therefore x is actual? Sorry, I still don't accept it. E.g.:

Facts about dinosaurs exist. Therefore, dinosaurs are actual.
Facts about the extinction of dinosaurs exist. Therefore, the extinction of dinosaurs is actual.

How can it be both?

Does the possible existence of unicorns also imply their actual existence?
— Luke

Certainly it does.[...]

So there’s no piece of info belonging to E(g, Earth, 2020). That’s what we mean when we say that unicorns don’t exist on Earth. — Tristan L

Unicorns certainly do actually exist, but also unicorns don't actually exist?

how can the not-actual be actually thought about, and how can the not-actual actually be not-actual? — Tristan L

Quite easily: myth, fiction, make-believe, possibility.

The existence of a piece of information is equivalent to the truth of a proposition. The falsehood of that proposition is equivalent to the existence of a piece of info belonging to the proposition’s negation. — Tristan L

If there can exist "a piece of info belonging to [a] proposition's negation", then "[t]he existence of a piece of information is ((not necessarily)) equivalent to the truth of a proposition".

It’s only the case that the corresponding piece of information, which would be concrete, thankfully doesn’t exist. — Tristan L

Are you drawing a distinction between actual existence and concrete existence? Because (otherwise) this appears inconsistent with your claims about possible existence (of my broken leg) implying actual existence.

Allow me to try and clarify my disagreement.

As Pfhorrest explained:

Clavius' Law says that "if (not-P implies P) then P" — Pfhorrest

Before Clavius' Law can be applied, you require the bracketed statement (not-P implies P).

In order to arrive at the bracketed statement, you have argued:

If inventing an idea EID is possible, then that possibility Poss(invent EID) must have always existed. Since Poss(invent EID) is essentially linked to EID, it follows that EID must also have always existed. Hence, if it is possible to invent an idea, then the idea must have always existed, and can therefore not be invented. — Tristan L

However, I disagree that the implication holds, because I disagree with your second sentence: "Since Poss(invent EID) is essentially linked to EID, it follows that EID must also have always existed."

I have asked you a few times to clarify what "essentially linked" means here, but I have found your explanations to be brief and opaque. You initially explained:

That Poss(EID) and EID are essentially linked means that the wist (essence) of one involves the other, in this case the wist of Poss(EID). Poss(EID) is defined in terms of EID, so that (namely its wist) which makes Poss(EID) what it is has to do with EID. Hence, there’s a wistly link tying Poss(EID) to EID. — Tristan L

and more recently:

The possibility is defined in terms of the widea, so it couldn’t be what it is without the widea any more than B could be what it is without your leg (or the widea of breaking). — Tristan L

I take this to mean that the possibility of (inventing) the idea is defined in terms of the idea itself. Even if this were the case, you still have not explained how this "essential link" relates to, or assists, your argument: that the possibility (of inventing the idea) has always existed, therefore the idea has always existed. How does this "essential link" of definition provide actual existence to what is merely possible?

It seems your argument must apply not only to ideas, but to anything, since the possibility of any thing's existence can be defined only in terms of that thing. Does the possible existence of unicorns also imply their actual existence?

Also, are you arguing that my leg has always been broken? (Hint: it's not.)

If inventing an idea EID is possible, then that possibility Poss(invent EID) must have always existed. Since Poss(invent EID) is essentially linked to EID, it follows that EID must also have always existed. Hence, if it is possible to invent an idea, then the idea must have always existed, and can therefore not be invented. Now apply Clavius's Law (consequentia mirabilis). — Tristan L

Your argument boils down to the claim that since the possibility of inventing an idea has always existed, then the idea has always existed. That is, if inventing a thing is possible then that thing is (and has always been) actual. That's your absurd assumption.

Clavius' Law can only be applied if "the idea must have always existed" follows from "it is possible to invent an idea". It doesn't follow. You tried to smuggle it in via your "essential link" between the possible and actual existence of an idea, on the basis that they both relate to the same idea.

My contradiction? Your contradiction! I have shown that your assumption that ideas can be invented lets its own negation follow and thereby beats itself. — Tristan L

Your supposed argument assumes the conclusion. I asked you earlier what "essentially linked" meant in your argument: "Since Poss(invent EID) is essentially linked to EID, it follows that EID must also have always existed". I didn't ask you this because I didn't understand it; I asked you this because I was trying to get you to see that it's problematic.

Your position is that ideas do (pre-)exist and people discover them. My position is that ideas do not (pre-)exist and people invent them. Your argument can't be that if it is possible to invent an idea then that idea must have always existed! That's the position you're meant to be arguing for, not simply assuming. I obviously don't agree that if it is possible to invent an idea then the idea must have always existed. That's absurd. It is entirely your own assumption (i.e. "essentially linked") that leads you to the contradiction that if it is possible to invent an idea then it is not possible to invent an idea.

Pfhorrest has already explained Clavius’ Law to you. I honestly ask: Do you understand the basic logical structure of my arguments? — Tristan L

Pfhorrest gave the following explanation:

If
(it is possible to invent an idea implies it is impossible to invent an idea)
then
it is impossible to invent an idea

Again, I do not agree to the bracketed statement, which is based on your own assumption. Therefore, I don't agree to the rest/whole.

Yep, of course they do! The fact that Alice thinks about EID exists only from the first moment at which it is certain that Alice would think about EID, but the fact that Alice might think about EID always actually exists. Regarding my algorithm, it is completely deterministic, and so any idea that it finds is found without any creativity. This shows that creativity is not needed when coming up with ideas. — Tristan L

I don't see how an idea exists before anybody thinks of it. I agree that "the fact that Alice might think about EID always actually exists". because what Alice might do or think is whatever it is possible to do or think. But that doesn't mean that she has actually thought of it, or that the idea already exists before she has actually thought of it. Let's not conflate possible ideas with actual ideas.

That someone is already part of the algorithm, for he is the understander. Recall that my algorithm = my program + understander. — Tristan L

Your "understander" seems to do a lot of the heavy lifting for your algorithm argument. They will have a lot of reading/sifting to do. How do they decide which string of symbols represents a new idea? Do they require any specialised knowledge or do they learn it as they go?

The gist of my position is this: Ideas are abstract things, and as such, they have eternal, absolute and pure being. In particular, they cannot be invented or otherwise created, for their existence isn’t time-bound. However, like many abstract entities, ideas have concrete mental and physical instances. Since these exist in time, they can be invented or otherwise created. — Tristan L

Ideas both can and cannot be invented? That's very confusing.

What we call “actualization” of an idea is the instantiation of that idea, th.i. the making of a mental of physical instance of it. For example, the number 3 is eternal, but the thought I’m having about the number 3 right now is temporal, concrete, and mental. — Tristan L

Is the thought of the number 3 the same as the idea of the number 3? When you think about the number 3, you consider this an instance of inventing the idea of the number 3?

Let EID be an arbitrary idea that someone has found. Since someone has found EID, it must always have been actually possible that someone could someday find EID. So the possibility Poss(EID) that someone might someday come up with EID must have always actually existed. — Tristan L

I agree that when someone has found/invented an idea then it was possible for them to do so.

But Poss(EID) is actually defined in terms of EID – it’s the possibility of finding EID after all –, and so, there is an actual, essential, fixed bond between EID and Poss(EID). Hence, EID must also have always actually existed. — Tristan L

Why must the idea have always actually existed? It was always possible to come up with the idea, but that doesn't mean the idea always existed prior to someone coming up with it. It is always possible that I could break my leg, but that doesn't mean that my leg was always broken prior to my breaking it. Please spell out the part of your argument re: the "fixed bond" or "essential link" between EID and Poss(EID).

However, any idea of any practical significance can be expressed in the ASCII-characters: all novels, all movies, all technological inventions, all theories, all pictures, and all pieces of music. In fact, they can even be expressed in nothing but 1’s and 0’s. For example, this talk that we’re having right now is represented by a long string of 1’s and 0’s. — Tristan L

Is a long string of 1's and 0's something that your "understander" understands?

Thus showing that the space of all possibilites is actual. — Tristan L

I agree. But Poss(EID) is not EID.

With the help of its understander, of course. He will read all the texts, and once he finds a meaningful one whose content is useful, he’ll recognize it as such. For example, just as I recognized that the descriptions of the high-voltage VdG-generator which I read online mean a useful idea (and a very interesting one at that), the understander will see that a description of the VDGG output by the program refers to a useful and interesting idea. — Tristan L

Isn't it possible that an understander could overlook an idea and judge it as a random string of meaningless symbols? How does the understander decide what is an idea and what isn't?

How often are you going to reiterate this point which I’ve been agreeing with all along? — Tristan L

But you don't really agree, because you keep repeating:

...the possibilities are essentially defined in terms of the ideas, so if the possibilities exist, so must the ideas. — Tristan L

That is, you make no (or only an artificial) distinction between the existence of possible ideas and the existence of actual ideas.

However, not every string of characters is an idea.
— Luke

This is irrelevant. — Kenosha Kid

It's completely relevant; we're discussing ideas.

Every text -- and Tristan limited his purview to texts -- is a string of characters. That is, by searching the entire space of strings of characters, one searches the entire space of texts. — Kenosha Kid

What do you mean by "text"? Where did Tristan limit his purview to texts?

My algorithm is not there to be put into actual practice anymore than quantum field theory is meant to be used to predict car accidents. It’s existence and principle abilities, rather than its practical usefulness, are what count. — Tristan L

Unless your algorithm can discover ideas via actual practice, then it adds nothing to the argument that ideas are discovered rather than invented. In principle, your algorithm can discover whatever ideas are possible. Likewise, in principle, a person (i.e. an inventor of ideas) can invent whatever ideas are possible.

You appear to assume that any given idea is expressible in the ASCII characters that your algorithm produces. An inventor of ideas must likewise be able to express an (invented) idea using the same characters.

What your algorithm does is simply produce or actualise every possible combination of characters. Therefore - along with an enormous bunch of junk - your algorithm actualises all possibilities. More specifically, your algorithm produces all possible expressions. Since we are assuming that all ideas are expressible within the ASCII characters, and since your algorithm produces all possible expressions, then all ideas will find their expression somewhere in the output of your algorithm. Therefore, there is little difference between the output of your algorithm and all possibilities (i.e. whatever ideas are possible). Your algorithm actualises the expression of all possibilities (and much other junk) by outputting all possible expressions.

However, not every string of characters is an idea. Whether or not all possibilities are actualised (and putting aside the practical issues of doing so), what this overlooks is that ideas - in the sense we are discussing - have some usefulness or interest to humanity. The important part is finding the useful or interesting ideas within the range of possibilities. All of the possibilities already exist whether your algorithm actualises them or not, but the possibilities are not the ideas.

Any example of an idea that you will give is one that humanity has found to be useful or interesting. Deciding what counts as an interesting or useful idea is easily done for all past ideas which have already been found to be so. How does your algorithm decide which as-yet undiscovered or uninvented ideas will be useful and/or interesting for humanity? That is, how does your algorithm decide which expressions are ideas and which are not?

All possibilities exist whether ideas are discovered or invented. It begs the question to assume that the existence of all possibilities (or all possible expressions) implies the pre-existence of all ideas.

If (it is not impossible to invent an idea implies it is impossible to invent an idea) — Pfhorrest

Does it? I don't think so. How is this implied?

If it is possible to invent an idea, then it is impossible to invent an idea? Hmm.
— Luke

Now apply Clavius's Law (consequentia mirabilis). — Tristan L

I think this requires much further justification to avoid your clear contradiction. Does Clavius' Law save you from all contradictions?

The matter seems fairly simple to me:

I doubt that anybody is arguing against the existence of possibilities (i.e. non-substantive, non-Platonist possibilties, as attempted to clarify earlier). I have certainly not been arguing against the mere possibility of invention. What I take issue with is the suggestion or assertion that all of those possibilities have (already) been actualised.

Unless your algorithm has completed producing every possible combination of characters, then those alleged invention ideas (possibilities) have not yet been actualised and do not yet have any substantive existence. Until your algorithm produces a new idea (and someone finds it), then that idea/invention remains only possible and not actual.

As a Platonist, you probably take the view that there is no distinction between possible and actual existence of those ideas. However, this precludes the possibility of human invention from the outset: If all ideas already exist (substantively), then nobody can actualise them.

Hence, if it is possible to invent an idea, then the idea must have always existed, and can therefore not be invented. — Tristan L

If it is possible to invent an idea, then it is impossible to invent an idea? Hmm.

Since Poss(invent EID) is essentially linked to EID, it follows that EID must also have always existed. — Tristan L

It does not follow. That is your assumption. What does "essentially linked" mean?

Have you found a new logical law which says that the implication-operator is commutative? Please do tell! I have shown that if discovering an idea is possible, then the idea must fore-exist. Yet you claim the conclusion of that argument to be an assumption. You do know the difference between assuming and showing, don’t you? Could you please be clearer make your point less confused? — Tristan L

To come back to this, one could equally say that if inventing an idea is possible, then the idea must not fore-exist. It should be obvious that this doesn't prove anything about whether ideas are invented or discovered.

The idea EID itself is essentially linked to the possibility Poss(EID) of finding that idea. — Tristan L

In your previous post you indicated that "Poss(EID)" refers to the possibility of coming up with the idea. Now you are indicating that "Poss(EID)" refers to the possibility of finding the idea. I don't know why you even talk of possibilities since it your position that all ideas already exist. Why beat around the bush with talk of the possibilities of finding or coming up with ideas?

I trust that you can distinguish junk from the Harry Potter books without any knowledge about HP before, right? Well, the understander does the same thing. — Tristan L

No, not necessarily, and I'm sure I could think up better examples, such as a 12th century person being unable to recognise the idea of a computer algorithm, etc. Your understander wouldn't be able to recognise other futuristic ideas by analogy.

You seem to contradict yourself. On the one hand, you rightly say that my algorithm will in the end find every idea that humans will ever express, but on the other hand, you (falsely) claim that it supposedly won’t help finding them. Which one do you choose? — Tristan L

I didn't say your algorithm would find them; I said it might eventually output a representation of every idea. What I meant was, even if we assume that your algorithm does output every idea (by brute force), it still doesn't help us to find those ideas. It would probably be easier for someone to invent the idea themself than to wade through the mountainous pile of junk produced by your algorithm, and this is even assuming that your algorithm has - at the relevant time - output the idea that might have otherwise been invented, since your algorithm could take an infinite amount of time to produce all the ideas.

Since it is already fixed and fore-determined now that the algorithm will find the ideas, they must exist now. — Tristan L

That's my point: it doesn't find ideas. It just endelssly spits out combinations of symbols, which is irrelevant to the question of whether ideas are invented or discovered.

Let EID be an arbitrary idea that someone has found. Since someone has found EID, it must always have been actually possible that someone could someday find EID. — Tristan L

...or invent EID.

So the possibility Poss(EID) that someone might someday come up with EID must have always actually existed. But Poss(EID) is actually defined in terms of EID – it’s the possibility of finding EID after all –, and so, there is an actual, essential, fixed bond between EID and Poss(EID). Hence, EID must also have always actually existed. — Tristan L

The possibility of coming up with the idea might have always existed. But that does not mean that the idea has always existed; someone needs to come up with it first. The possibility of coming up with the idea is not equivalent to actually coming up with the idea. Your attempted collapse of the distinction between possible and actual here is fatalistic.

Firstly, I never meant my algorithm to be used in practice, so scientists, artists, mathematicians, and philosophers don’t have to worry that they’ll be out of work soon. The existence of my algorithm and its ability in principle to find all ideas finitely expressible in the Modern English speech is what counts.

Secondly, even if the understander isn’t perfect, he’ll still deterministically find a great many ideas which you claim to be have to be made creatively. However, bear in mind that any real-life shortcoming of the understander is also a shortcoming of other traditional idea-finders, so there’s nothing that a creative person can do which my algorithm can’t do (although the algorithm needs a very long time). But yep, my understander is idealized nonetheless, though certainly not all-knowing or anything of the like at all. — Tristan L

You may recall I initially asked what algorithm exists that can help us to discover every idea that supposedly pre-exists. I find it questionable whether your algorithm actually helps us to discover any pre-existing ideas - particularly those which have not yet been discovered. Your algorithm produces only every possible combination of "the printable ASCII-characters". In our talk of ideas, I presume we are talking about useful ideas or ideas of some sort of value or interest to humanity. This is why I question your "understander" and their ability to detect ideas amidst junk strings of symbols, particularly ideas that nobody has previously known.

Perhaps your algorithm might eventually output a representation of every idea that humankind will ever come up with (together with 99.99% junk), but I doubt that it would actually help in finding any of them. This is not to say that those ideas all exist now, either, since I am speaking hypothetically from a perspective at the end of humankind's existence. Anyhow and ultimately, I don't see that this helps to resolve the question of whether ideas are invented or discovered.

Moreover, in the case of my algorithm, the possibilities are actually certainties; it is certain now that the ideas will someday be discovered. — Tristan L

This doesn't follow. Why is it certain that all existing things will be discovered?

But the always actual possibilities are defined in terms of their belonging ideas, which are therefore essentially bound to their actual possibilities. Hence, the ideas must always be actual as well, and in particular, they must be actual now. — Tristan L

I don't understand what "possibilities are defined in terms of their belonging ideas" means, or how it follows that "ideas must always be actual as well".

The understander has perfect knowledge of the syntax and semantics of Modern English. — Tristan L

You previously defined an "understander" as "the person or group of people who reads/read every finite-length string put out by the string-outputter". Do you know of anyone who has such perfect knowledge? You seem to be talking about a theoretically ideal "person or group", not an actual "person or group".

No, just as you don’t need to be all-knowing in order to read and understand new books. If you can judge whether the Harry Potter books written by J. K. Rowling are meaningful or not, you can also judge whether the Harry Potter books output by my algorithm are meaningful or not. Indeed, if all-knowledge were needed to understand texts, then that would all the more need the pre-existence of all ideas. — Tristan L

Perhaps, but your algorithm could take thousands or millions of years to output many of the symbol-strings, by which time Modern English (2020) will most likely have evolved or died.

Indeed, if all-knowledge were needed to understand texts, then that would all the more need the pre-existence of all ideas. — Tristan L

Yes, omniscience requires knowing every idea. The point is that nobody is omniscient, including any actual "understander".

These practical issues are beside the point. There is an infinite set of ideas expressible in Modern English (that is, the English speech spoken in 2020 CE, including its syntax and semantics), yet by far not all of them have been discovered, and new ones are being found all the time. — Tristan L

You are arguing that all ideas pre-exist, are discoverable, and will be output by your algorithm. But you think that the practical issue of being able to discover them in the output of your algorithm is beside the point?

According to you, Rowling invented the idea of Harry Potter, but my algorithm will also spit out the Harry Potter books, and the understander will understand their meaning and thus find the idea of Harry Potter just as you can find it by reading Rowling’s books. — Tristan L

Your algorithm will supposedly spit out every possible combination of symbols. This is virtually irrelevant to the supposed pre-existence of ideas. Your algorithm doesn't just output representations of ideas; it outputs mostly junk. This is hardly an algorithmic way of discovering ideas. Your algorithm will also take infinitely long to output all possible combinations of symbols and it requires someone with perfect knowledge of Modern English to understand each and every idea. This is all fanciful.

If I give you copies of Harry Potter’s books, could you tell whether they were written by Rowling or by my program? — Tristan L

Yes, because your program wouldn't be able to recreate those books in either of our lifetimes.

According to you, a programmer who writes a new PASCAL-program invents that program itself, right? For example, you consider me as the inventor of the program AllEndlyStrings itself, am I right? Yet AllEndlyStrings will output each possible source-code of a PASCAL-program after a finite time, including the source code of AllEndlyStrings itself, but also all PASCAL-source-codes that will ever be written. — Tristan L

The algorithm wouldn't be able to write its own program if you hadn't first invented the algorithm.

In the same way that the Pascal Compiler can decide whether a text obeys the syntax of PASCAL and in that case compile it, without having to know every thinkable source-code, and in the same way that you can do calculations with any natural number without having to know each natural number individually. — Tristan L

Is there a program that has perfect knowledge of Modern English? Unlike the output of your algorithm, I don't have to disregard a whole bunch of meaningless junk when dealing with the natural numbers. I can simply find any number I want whenever I want.

Yes, that’s true. However, my program only outputs symbol-strings of finite length. It could be extended to output all symbol-strings of infinite length, but for that, it would also need infinite time. — Tristan L

At what point does your program stop outputting?

Also, why assume that all ideas can be expressed as finite symbol-sequences?
— Luke

Firstly, I don’t do that, but if the algorithm argument (which isn’t as far-reaching as my other two arguments) shows that all finitely expressible ideas must fore-exist, then why should things stand otherwise with other ideas? — Tristan L

Your argument is that if your argument is true, then why shouldn't your argument be true? That's not much of an argument.

There are certainly not-finitely-expressible-ideas since there are uncountably many abstract things (e.g. real numbers), and there are also totally unsayable ideas, I think, but

1. why should they be any different in terms of fore-existence than finitely expressible ideas (bear in mind that each of the uncountably many reals also pre-exists)?

and

2. of what everyday practical importance are they (by “everyday practical”, I also mean actual “real-world” science, art, and philosophy)? — Tristan L

It is your claim that your algorithm will output every idea. If some ideas cannot be output by your algorithm, e.g., because they are "not-finitely-expressible" or because they are "totally unsayable", then your algorithm cannot output every idea and therefore your claim is false.

Secondly, could you please give me one example from our world (the “real world”) where an idea is expressible, but not finitely expressible? — Tristan L

I don't need to; you've already conceded that "There are certainly not-finitely-expressible-ideas".

We have to wait to actually see the ideas, but it is already forechosen now that we will see them. Hence, they must already exist now. — Tristan L

They currently exist only as possibilities. Possibilities are not ideas, as you agree.

If the string is meaningless, the understander simply ignores it. — Tristan L

How does the "understander" know whether a string is meaningless or meaningful? Given that not all ideas have yet been "discovered" (right?), then wouldn't the "understander" require perfect knowledge or omniscience to be able to distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless? A symbol-string that seems meaningless to us now might be meaningful to someone 1000 years from now. Given your definition of an understander as "the person or group of people who reads/read every finite-length string put out by the string-outputter", how is it (humanly) possible that any understander will rightly distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless? Also, it is self-evident that the meanings of words and symbols change over time.

If it is meaningful, the understander maps it to the idea which it represents, thus finding the idea. — Tristan L

You mean to tell me that your algorithm produces only representations of ideas, rather than the ideas themselves? How can we be sure that we have ever interpreted the symbol-strings correctly? But maybe that's the point. Given every possible combination of symbols, you can read whatever meaning you want into it.

Why do you expect the number of years to be finite?
— Luke

Because the algorithm systematically outputs all strings of finite length over the same finite alphabet one after the other (here, I only use lowercase letters for illustration): {empty string}, a, b, ..., z, aa, ab, ..., az, ba, bb, bc, ..., bz, ca, ..., ..., aaa, aab, ..., ..., elf, ..., ..., goc, god, goe, ..., ..., aaaa, ..., ..., fast, ..., ..., ..., igotoschool, ..., ..., eismcsquared, ... . It does this by first outputting all strings of length 0, then all strings of length 1, then of length 2, then of length 3, and so on. This gives a one-to-one function between the set of all natural numbers and the set of all finite symbol-sequences over the same finite alphabet. — Tristan L

The set of natural numbers is infinite, and I assume that a particular symbol can appear in a sequence more than once. Doesn't that imply there will be at least some symbol-sequences of infinite length, requiring an infinite time to output? Also, why assume that all ideas can be expressed as finite symbol-sequences?

From which reference frame can the events be judged such that "neither event is first, but the events also don't happen at the same time"?
— Luke

From every inertial under-lightspeed reference-frame. That’s because when the spacetime-interval between two events is space-like in one inertial under-lightspeed reference-frame, it’s space-like in all inertial under-lightspeed reference-frames. — Tristan L

The events can be judged to be neither simultaneous nor non-simultaneous in all (<c) reference frames?

And yeah, having numerically different but qualitatively identical ideas doesn't make much sense. That's why I called it absurd. And I know that you don't think that that's what's actually happening; neither do I. — Pfhorrest

I don't find it absurd. I don't understand why you do! Whether or not it is "actually happening", I think it is very possible, and makes perfect sense.

But that would mean that those two people didn't separately come up with the same idea, they just came up with two different, but identical, ideas.

Except we already agree that that's not correct, — Pfhorrest

No, this is where we disagree.

What you mean by "two different, but identical, ideas" is just what I mean by "the same idea independently". I've been asking you all this time why it is not possible for two people to come up with the same idea independently. I think it is perfectly possible for two people to come up with "different, but identical, ideas". To be clear, when you say "different" here, I take you to mean "had by two (different) people". Otherwise, the quote above makes little sense to me.

Hence, both ideas already exist at least in the algorithm, only waiting to be “unpacked”. — Tristan L

We have to wait? I thought all ideas already existed?

It seems that your algorithm will also produce (mostly) junk strings of symbols that aren't ideas. Is there some method to distinguish the ideas from the junk?

I also wanted to return to some earlier comment of yours:

What matters is that for every expressible idea EID, without exception, the implementation of my algorithm will find EID and spit it out after a finite number of years. — Tristan L

Why do you expect the number of years to be finite?

I strongly agree with you that being the first one to do something that was always possible doesn't make it possible. — Tristan L

Possibilities are not ideas. Being the first one to think of an idea does make it a new idea. Unless you believe that ideas do not require someone to have/think them? Similarly, it seems to require someone to interpret a string of symbols in order to understand the idea it may contain.

Obviously if you assume that ideas have some type of pre-existence then their discovery must be possible. I challenge the assumption.
— Luke

You’ve gotten the implication the wrong way round. In reality, if discovering an idea is possible, then the idea must fore-exist. — Tristan L

The direction of the implication is irrelevant to my point. It is all based on the same assumption.

If it had not always been possible to discover an idea, then at some point in the past, it must have been impossible. But then no one could ever discover it. For example, if it had once not been possible that someone could come up with the Van-de-Graaff-generator, then by definition of possibility and impossibility, Robert Jemison Van de Graaff could never have invented an instace of it, which he clearly has. — Tristan L

I don't know who that is, but you could say that he invented the idea (not the possibility; the idea).

What if the events of coming-up are separated by a space-like spacetime-interval, so that neither event is first, but the events also don’t happen at the same time? — Tristan L

From which reference frame can the events be judged such that "neither event is first, but the events also don't happen at the same time"?

The key point is that even if Alice was first, there could have been someone before her, so the thing which explains the likeness that her thought bears to Bob’s must have been able to jump in before Alice’s coming-up. — Tristan L

Then the "someone" before Alice would have invented the idea, I suppose, or we might just say that they both came up with the same idea independently. That is, we could go back to your own example of Leibniz and Newton.

and I have offered arguments for why it is not.
— Luke

Could you please say where? — Tristan L

In the preceding discussion on the previous page.

Exactly, and by the definition of abstractness, they are neither spatial nor temporal and thus cannot have a beginning in time. In particular, they cannot be invented. — Tristan L

I had in mind a definition of abstract such as this: "existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence." As far as I know, only physical, temporal, living beings have thoughts and/or ideas.

If ideas are created by the act if coming up with them, then two people couldn’t independently come up with the same one.

(Because the same numerically singular thing can’t be independently made by each of two different people. They could make it together, but that’s not what we’re talking about). — Pfhorrest

This may be true of physical instantiations but why must it also be true of abstract ideas?

Since two people CAN independently come up with the same idea, it follows that coming-up-with is not creating. — Pfhorrest

This does not follow. Your implicit assumption here is that two people cannot create the same idea because an idea cannot physically be in two places at once. Obviously ideas can be in two places (or minds) at once and this has nothing to do with their creation. It is because ideas are abstract concepts, not physical objects.

I have, repeatedly. The absurdity is that your view logically implies that this obvious normal thing, two people independently coming up with the same idea, should not be possible, in the same way that two people can't independently build the same single chair. — Pfhorrest

This conflates the idea with its instantiation: the idea of the chair and the chair. You are again trying to attribute to me the view that the "instantiation is the idea", which I have already rejected. I agree that two people independently coming up with the same idea is an "obvious normal thing", but there is a disconnect - or lack of explanation from you here - in why the idea must pre-exist either of them. You have repeatedly stated that two people cannot come up with (invent) the same idea because it implies that an idea is its instantiation, or that an idea is its thought event. I don't follow why that must be the case, and I have offered arguments for why it is not.

EDIT: I also don't follow why I must commit to the view that an idea is a concrete, non-abstract object, like a chair.

By saying that the act of coming up with an idea creates that idea, YOU imply that two separate acts of coming up with something must result in two separate ideas. That’s absurd, so your premise that coming up with the idea creates it must be false. — Pfhorrest

I’ve already demonstrated this to be a straw man argument: the “thought event” (i.e coming up with the idea) is not identical with the idea it produces. I’m sure you agree. Therefore, it does not preclude the possibility of two people having separate thought events but coming up with the same idea independently. I have never implied or stated otherwise. Since I’ve never laid any claim to your straw man argument, then you must either deny that it is absurd for two people to come up with the same idea independently, or else you still owe us an explanation of the alleged absurdity.

If thinking up an idea creates that idea, and there are two separate events of thinking-up, then two different ideas have been created... even if they are qualitatively identical, what we would normally call “the same idea”. That’s the absurdity, calling two separate instances of the same idea “two different ideas”. — Pfhorrest

Who's calling them "two different ideas"? I've asked you repeatedly why it's absurd or impossible for two people to create/invent the same idea independently.

Contrapositively, if those two thinking-up events result in the same single idea, as we usually say, then that idea can’t have been created by the second event if it was already created by the first event, so it must not have been created by either event. If it was not created by anyone thinking it up, then in whatever sense it can be said to “exist” after being thought up, it must have already “existed” in that sense before. — Pfhorrest

What if they both came up with it at the same time? Anyway, it is your position that neither of them can come up with the idea without it pre-existing, so why is it absurd/impossible for the first person in this scenario to come up with the idea without it pre-existing?

It systematically outputs all finite-length strings made up of the printable ASCII-characters, including spaces, letters (uppercase and lowercase), numerals, and punctuation marks. That your lifetime likely isn’t long enough to see it output many interesting ideas has no bearing on my argument. What matters is that for every expressible idea EID, without exception, the implementation of my algorithm will find EID and spit it out after a finite number of years. You originally claimed here that no such algorithm exists, but when I showed you otherwise, you didn’t concede the point, but rather tried to divert attention to something irrelevant. — Tristan L

How does your algorithm give us the Mona Lisa? Or a toaster?

As I’ve already said twice and will say again, I don’t think (but also don’t rule out) that ideas are possibilities. However, every idea EID is essentially linked to the possibility that someone can find EID, and since that possibility must exist from the start if anyone is ever to come up with EID, EID must also exist from the start. It’s like the existence of the fact that 5 is odd needing the existence of 5 itself. The failure to actually read what I write goes on ... — Tristan L

Obviously if you assume that ideas have some type of pre-existence then their discovery must be possible. I challenge the assumption.

if it were two separate acts of "creating an idea", then that would result in two separate (but identical) ideas (because there were two separate acts of creation, each of which must have its own product), which is absurd. — Pfhorrest

How is it absurd?

It's not, but the idea itself is separate from the event of thinking it up. — Pfhorrest

Yes, I said that in my post.

Why shouldn't two people be able to have separate "thought events" and come up with the same idea?
— Luke

They can. — Pfhorrest

Didn't you say this was absurd?

But if Bob and Alice did have the same idea, which is how we'd normally talk about it and I think that's the right way to talk about it, then Alice's thoughts and Bob's thoughts can't be identical to, or have created, the ideas that they're about. — Pfhorrest

I already went over this in my previous post. You are conflating the "thought event" with the idea itself; or attributing this conflation to me somehow. You are fighting a strawman. Alice's and Bob's thoughts ("thought events") are different from the idea itself; they have the thought event in order to come up with the idea. I do not claim that the thought event and the idea are identical, so I still fail to understand why the idea's pre-existence is necessary.

I noticed that I posted two different responses to your previous post. I thought I'd lost the first one to the ether and then tried to recreate it from memory. Oh well.

It's not because they're different people, it's because they have made two different instantiations, so if the instantiation is the idea, as you seem to put forth, then that's two different ideas, not the same idea instantiated twice. — Pfhorrest

I cannot take any credit for your argument because I've never claimed that the "instantiation is the idea". When I speak of someone coming up with an idea, I don't mean an idea devoid of any content, obviously. I mean what you mean: the same idea instantiated twice. I still don't follow why this requires the pre-existence of the idea.

If coming up with an idea creates it, in the same way that building a chair creates that chair, and two people independently come up with something, those are two separate acts of creation, and so two separate creations, not the same thing. If two people build identical chairs, they haven't built the same (singular numerically identical) chair. But if two people think up the same design for a chair, independently, then they've "come up with the same idea", even though their thoughts are separate events and they build separate chairs, — Pfhorrest

Right, this (above) is what I mean by two people coming up with the same idea independently. Why is this not possible?

which indicates that the "idea" we're talking about in the phrase "came up with the same idea" isn't the event of them thinking it — Pfhorrest

How is "coming up with the idea" different to "thinking it (up)"?

or the fixing of that thought in a material object — Pfhorrest

Right, that's the instantiation of the idea.

but some abstract thing that's separate from the thought event or the chair object, and wasn't created by the thought event, otherwise the second person to independently come up with it couldn't have created it since the first person already had. — Pfhorrest

The "abstract thing" is the idea itself. The "thought event" is (equivalent to) "coming up with the idea". Why shouldn't two people be able to have separate "thought events" and come up with the same idea? Why does that idea need to pre-exist each of their "thought events"? How can it?

No, I mean if the “idea” is not its content but its instantiation, then two people who separately instantiate it, who separately invent it, have invented two, albeit very similar, things, not the same thing. — Pfhorrest

Yes, I understand, but you’ve simply repeated your stipulation that two people cannot invent the same idea (content) just because they are different people.

The only sense in which those two instantiations can be called instantiations of "the same thing" is a sense in which that thing of which they are instances was not created by it being instantiated, but already existed in some sense. — Pfhorrest

So you say, but do you have any argument for this supposed pre-existence of ideas? Why is it not possible for two people to come up with the same idea (content) independently without that idea pre-existing?

The invention/creation of ideas is impossible?
— Luke

In a sense that is distinct from the discovery of them, yes. — Pfhorrest

Right, so it is your position that ideas (not possibilities) pre-exist their “discovery”.

With abstract things, ideas, that's not so clear. Because abstract things are just possibilities to begin with, and being the first one to do something that was always possible doesn't make it possible; but it's also not like the possibilities are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them. — Pfhorrest

You definitely imply that possibilities/ideas “are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them” because you keep talking in terms of their “discovery”. If they don’t exist “out there in space somewhere”, then where/how do they exist?

The only sense in which those two instantiations can be called instantiations of "the same thing" is a sense in which that thing of which they are instances was not created by it being instantiated, but already existed in some sense. — Pfhorrest

So you say, but do you have any argument to support this assertion of pre-existence? Why can’t two people invent the same idea independently without that idea having pre-existed?

The invention/creation of ideas is impossible?
— Luke

In a sense that is distinct from the discovery of them, yes. — Pfhorrest

Right, so it is your position that ideas (not possibilities) exist prior to their “discovery”.

Because abstract things are just possibilities to begin with, and being the first one to do something that was always possible doesn't make it possible; but it's also not like the possibilities are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them. — Pfhorrest

But you most definitely imply that possibilities are “lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them” because you keep talking in terms of their discovery. How can they be discovered unless they already exist? If they don’t already exist “in space” then where/how do they exist?

It seems to me that he’s not arguing against invention-only, but rather he is arguing for discovery-only. The conflation of possibilities and ideas continues...

I forgot to ask: how does two people coming up with the same idea demonstrate the existence of “abstract eternal ideas”? I get that they both came up with the same idea, but how does this prove that ideas exist independently of either (or any) person, and eternally so?

Actually, that is not true, for such an algorithm does very much exist. Here is a working implementation in PASCAL which I have written: — Tristan L

What does it do? Anyway, I doubt I’ll get to see it spit out every possibility within my lifetime.

Separate concrete instances of ideas are not the same as each other, only the ideas themselves are the same. But it is only the instances that are clearly made or invented, not the ideas themselves. — Pfhorrest

I don't see the issue. I've never denied that ideas are about something, or that they have content. In the example of two people coming up with the same idea, they are each coming up with the same idea. @Tristan L claims that it has been demonstrated "at length" to be false that anybody needs to come up with ideas, yet his supposed proof of this involves two people coming up with the same idea. I thought it was your position that both/neither "invention" and "discovery" are correct, but your apparent endorsement of Tristan seems to confirm my initial assessment that you are in the "discovery" camp.

On what ground can we say that Alice and Bob have independently come up with the same idea? — Tristan L

They each came up with the same idea independently. Isn’t that what you’ve told us? What other ground do you need?

How can ideas be created when my algorithm deterministically spits them out?
You seemed to imply that one could not algorithmically find the Mona Lisa or the toaster as one can find natural numbers, but Pfhorrest and I have shown you otherwise. What do you say to that? — Tristan L

I didn’t imply that it couldn’t be done. I asked what algorithm exists. Such an algorithm does not exist.

Would you please actually read what Pfhorrest and I have written and then reply to each point? — Tristan L

In response to all of your quotes: Possibilities are not equivalent to ideas. I don't deny that such things are possible.

I don't accept that; someone needs to come up with those ideas.
— Luke

We have already shown at length that this claim is indeed false. — Tristan L

"We"? "at length"? I must have missed it. Can you quote where this was "shown at length"?

No, I’m saying that in the case of abstract objects like ideas, it makes no sense to differentiate invention from discovery. — Pfhorrest

What about fictional concepts/characters? Surely they are invented and not discovered?

Your talk about planets and gold is missing the point: there is a difference there, in concrete cases. But not in abstract ones. — Pfhorrest

I find it odd to speak of the "invention" or "discovery" of abstract ideas (only). I had assumed - with respect to creativity - that you weren't just talking about the ideas, but also the realisation of those ideas.

What similar algorithm exists in order for us to "discover" the supposedly pre-existing ideas of the Mona Lisa or the toaster?
— Luke

Trivially, one could mechanically iterate through every possible series of brush strokes on the canvas (more clearly illustrated if we think of a digital image and iterate through every possible series of pixels) and eventually get the Mona Lisa. Likewise one could iterate through every possible arrangement of atoms and eventually get a toaster. Or instead one could randomly throw together brush strokes or atoms until eventually one got the thing in question — like the infinite monkeys with typewriters producing the complete works of Shakespeare. — Pfhorrest

This sounds more concrete than abstract.

But getting back to your OP:

I hold that there really isn't a clear distinction between invention and discovery of ideas: there is a figurative space of all possible ideas, what in mathematics is called a configuration space or phase space, and any idea that anyone might "invent", any act of abstract "creation" (prior to the act of realizing the idea in some concrete medium), is really just the identification of some idea in that space of possibilities. — Pfhorrest

Perhaps the difference between "discovery" and "invention" in these terms could be viewed as whether the space of possibilities exists completely - awaiting to be discovered - or whether the invention of new ideas help to create and open up new spaces of possibilities.

In relating already known ideas to each other across a space of previously unexplored ideas, new works can give further context and significance to existing ones and draw context and significance from them, and it is that process of connection and contextualization, not mere nondeterministic randomness, that constitutes creativity. — Pfhorrest

I'm unfamiliar with the explicit idea that creativity is a result of "nondeterministic randomness". Perhaps creativity could be viewed in contrast to following the same deterministic pattern that went before. Anyway, I broadly agree that creativity is a "process of connection and contextualization".

The "concrete having of an idea by a person" is not relevant to whether ideas are discovered or invented?
— Luke

Only the distinction between that and the content of those ideas is not relevant. Of course any idea is had by someone, but bringing that up has nothing to do with where the contents of those ideas “comes from”. I’m just saying that distinguishing between “coming from the person” (invention) and “coming from the world” (discovery) makes no sense when were talking about ideas; they amount to the same thing. — Pfhorrest

It's not relevant only if you assume the pre-existence of ideas. As I said in my first post to this discussion, "discovery" implies (or connotes) the pre-existence of ideas, whereas "invention" requires someone to be the originator of those ideas.

It seems you are attempting to re-define invention as discovery, i.e., to assert that any case of invention is actually a case of discovery. I doubt you would agree to the reverse: that any case of discovery is actually a case of invention, as this would imply, e.g., that Wiliam Herschel "invented" Uranus, or that Californians "invented" the gold in them thar hills. In order for your attempted re-definition of invention to work, one first needs to accept or assume the pre-existence of ideas. I don't accept that; someone needs to come up with those ideas.

Consider just things like numbers, even just the counting numbers. There are an infinite quantity of counting numbers: 1, 2, 3, etc forever. There will always be some number in that series that nobody has counted up to yet, that nobody has had any reason to instantiate in any concrete way. Does that mean that such a number doesn't exist yet? — Pfhorrest

All of the numbers pre-exist in the sense that mathematics is algorithmic; the numbers simply "fall out" of the algorithm, e.g. "n+1". What similar algorithm exists in order for us to "discover" the supposedly pre-existing ideas of the Mona Lisa or the toaster?