Hi GPT-4!

What are the commonalities between the Lovecraftian entity "Azathoth" and Bishop Berkely's comments on the persistence of entities?

Hello!

Both H.P. Lovecraft's entity "Azathoth" and Bishop George Berkeley's philosophical ideas on the persistence of entities revolve around the concept of reality and existence, albeit from different perspectives. Here are some commonalities between the two:

Centralization of existence: Azathoth is described as the "Daemon Sultan," the nucleus of the cosmos, from which all things emanate. In Berkeley's philosophy, particularly his doctrine of immaterialism, he postulates that reality consists of ideas and perceptions, with all things existing in the mind of God, who is the ultimate perceiver.

Dependency on perception: In Lovecraft's cosmic horror, Azathoth, being an external and chaotic force, is often depicted as incomprehensible and indifferent to human existence. Similarly, Berkeley argues that objects only exist when they are perceived, either by humans or by God. In both cases, the persistence of reality hinges upon the presence of a perceiving mind.

Conceptual challenge to materialism: Lovecraft's Azathoth undermines the idea of a structured, stable universe by positing a powerful, chaotic force at its center. Berkeley's immaterialism is a direct challenge to materialism, the belief that matter is the fundamental substance of the universe. Both ideas force us to reconsider the nature of reality and question our assumptions about the world.

Inaccessibility: Both Azathoth and the ultimate perceiver (God) in Berkeley's philosophy are considered incomprehensible and inaccessible to human understanding. Azathoth's alien nature defies human comprehension, and similarly, God's infinite nature and perspective are beyond human intellectual capacity.

While these commonalities exist, it's important to note that Lovecraft's Azathoth and Berkeley's philosophy stem from distinct traditions and serve different purposes. Azathoth is a literary creation within the cosmic horror genre, while Berkeley's ideas are rooted in philosophical inquiry and metaphysics.

Hi ChatGPT!

Might you be able to explain to me the differences and similarities between the applications of the philosophical thesis of disjunctivism as they apply to epistemology and to the philosophy of perception respectively?

GPT-3.5:

Certainly! Disjunctivism is a philosophical thesis that has been applied to both epistemology and the philosophy of perception, although there are some differences in how it is applied in each area.

In epistemology, disjunctivism is a theory of knowledge that emphasizes the distinction between knowledge and mere belief. According to disjunctivism, knowledge is fundamentally different from belief because it involves a direct and non-inferential connection between the knower and the world. This direct connection is typically characterized in terms of a "good" or "veridical" experience, where the experience is said to provide the knower with direct access to the world.

On the other hand, beliefs that are not based on a "good" or "veridical" experience are mere beliefs, rather than knowledge. Disjunctivists argue that there is a fundamental difference between the way that we come to know things and the way that we come to have false beliefs.

In the philosophy of perception, disjunctivism is a theory that aims to explain how we can have perceptual knowledge despite the fact that there are many ways in which our perceptual experiences can be mistaken. According to disjunctivism, our perceptual experiences are fundamentally different from the way that things are in the world.

This means that our perceptual experiences are not identical to the objects or properties that they appear to present to us. Rather, they are distinct from those objects or properties, and it is through this distinctness that we are able to have knowledge of the world. Disjunctivists in the philosophy of perception often argue that the only way that we can be certain that our perceptual experiences are veridical is through our ability to rule out alternative explanations for those experiences.

In both cases, disjunctivism emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between knowledge and mere belief. However, the specific application of the thesis differs between the two areas. In epistemology, disjunctivism is primarily concerned with the nature of knowledge and the distinction between knowledge and belief. In the philosophy of perception, disjunctivism is primarily concerned with the relationship between our perceptual experiences and the objects or properties that they appear to present to us.

Hi GPT-4!

Might you be able to explain to me the differences and similarities between the applications of the philosophical thesis of disjunctivism as they apply to epistemology and to the philosophy of perception respectively?

GPT-4:

Hello! I'd be glad to help you understand disjunctivism and how it applies to both epistemology and the philosophy of perception. Disjunctivism is a philosophical thesis that has been influential in both areas, but its applications are different in each.

Disjunctivism in Epistemology:

In epistemology, disjunctivism is a position that seeks to explain how we can have knowledge of the external world by emphasizing the differences between genuine cases of knowledge and cases of deception or error. Disjunctivists argue that when we have knowledge, there is a distinct, non-reducible kind of mental state that we are in, which cannot be captured by simply describing the common features between cases of knowledge and cases of deception.

One motivation for epistemological disjunctivism is to resist skepticism. Skeptics argue that because our perceptual experiences can be indistinguishable between cases of veridical perception (when we accurately perceive the external world) and cases of deception or illusion (such as hallucinations or dreams), we can never be certain that we have knowledge of the external world. Disjunctivists, on the other hand, maintain that there is a fundamental difference between these cases, and that we can have knowledge of the external world based on this difference.

Disjunctivism in the Philosophy of Perception:

In the philosophy of perception, disjunctivism is a position that concerns the nature of perceptual experiences. Disjunctivists argue that the mental states involved in veridical perception (when we accurately perceive the external world) and in hallucinations or illusions are fundamentally different in kind, even if they may be subjectively indistinguishable.

This position stands in contrast to the common-factor theory, which holds that there is a common mental state shared by veridical perception and hallucination, usually called a 'sense datum' or 'sensory experience,' that is then either accurately or inaccurately related to the external world. Disjunctivists deny this common mental state, arguing that our perceptual experiences directly involve the external world in the case of veridical perception, whereas hallucinations involve a completely different kind of mental state.

Similarities and Differences:

In both epistemology and the philosophy of perception, disjunctivism is characterized by its emphasis on the differences between veridical and non-veridical cases (knowledge vs. deception in epistemology, and veridical perception vs. hallucination in the philosophy of perception). In each domain, disjunctivists challenge the idea that there is a common mental state shared by these different cases.

However, the specific applications of disjunctivism differ between the two areas. In epistemology, disjunctivism is mainly focused on refuting skepticism and providing an account of knowledge. In the philosophy of perception, disjunctivism is concerned with the nature of perceptual experiences and how they relate to the external world.

While these differences exist, the underlying motivation for disjunctivism in both areas is often the same: to emphasize the direct and unmediated relationship between our minds and the external world, and to challenge accounts that rely on a common mental state shared by genuine and deceptive cases.

Anders N Weinstein

13 Oct 1998, 03:00:00
to
In article <18981-36dotdotdotatnewsd-212dotiapdotbryantdotwebtvdotnet>,

Josh Soffer <joshsdotdotdotatwebtvdotnet> wrote:
>Anders, you sound like a phenomenologist . Have you by any chance been
>influenced by Heidegger or Husserl? I'm new to this group so you'll have

I would be content to label myself a phenomenologist, and know
something about Heidegger, less about Husserl. The marvelous idiom that
worldly objects "show up for us" comes from the Heidegger translation
of Dreyfus or Haugeland.

> Of course such a phenomenological view would
>render a notion of 'unconscious' not as a content of thought in conflict
>with another but as a pre-consciousness, a vaguely glimpsed and fragile
>new meaning. It is not hidden from conscious awareness, but a full
>awareness of a state of foggy construing.

I can't say I understand this. I would say it is clear that the
cogntivist's concept of unconscious sub-personal states and operations
should be sharply distinguished from other concepts of the unconscious
or pre-conscious, e.g. Freud's. The latter purports to be a
person-level phenomenon. For example, if I say that you are
unconsciously resentful of someone, I do not mean that there is a
representation of anger in some sub-personal computational module
inside your body; I am rather talking about a pattern or tendency in
your molar conduct that is not transparent to you.

13 Sept 2000, 03:00:00
to
In article <9GFu5.4592$Ikdot3dotdotdotatnews2dotatl>,

David Prince <deprdotdotdotatbellsouthdotnet> wrote:
>
>The rejection of mental models stems from centuries of incorrect and harmful
>mental models. Primitive models such as astrology, humors, ethers, and evil
>spirits, as well as more complex models such as Psychoanalysis, Logotherapy,
>Drive-reduction theory, and Nomological Network Constructs obscure solutions
>to simple problems that easily succumb to the methodology employed by the
>physical sciences. Behaviorism is a physical science. What is amazing is

No. First, operationalism is a well-known failure as an account of the
methodology of physical science, mainly because the greatest successes
in physical science were achieved by positing undeterdetermined theories
(models).

A standard Chomskyan challenge for Skinner, for example, is why he is
insisting that psychological science ought not to avail itself of the
same sort of methods as physical science. If physical science systematizes
phenomena by positing unobservable entities only loosely tied to observable
manifestations, why shouldn't cognitive scientists emulate this practice?

But there is a more simple reason that behaviorism is not a physical
science. It is that the concept of "behavior" at issue is not a
physicalistically acceptable notion. The moon in its orbit is not
behaving in this sense, and is not subject to behavioristic laws.
Roughly only living things are said to behave in this sense.

Of course that is not a criticism of behaviorism. It is only a criticism
of the false claim that behaviorism is a physical science. No, it would
be a distinct science with it's own level of description. It's fundamental
concepts are not reducible to those of physical science, I believe.

Moreover, the question of what descriptive vocabulary to use when
describing "behavior" is left open. On the one hand, I believe Skinner
and his followers are not very precise on what is allowed within their
"data language" as "observable behavior". On the other hand, from a
wider point of view, what they do allow depends on adopting some
artificial restrictions to impoverish the descriptive vocabulary.

Without such restrictions there is nothing to prevent us from
characterizing "observable behavior" in mind-laden descriptive terms,
and the dogma -- common to behaviorists and anti-behaviorists alike --
that mental states of others are unobservable or only known by
inference collapses. If I can use things like "John insulted Mary" or
"Mary snubbed him dead" or John expressed his intention to go to
Vienna" as descriptions of "observable behavior" -- and why should they
not be? -- then "observable behavior" seen as manifestations of subjectivity
may be displayed internally related to psychological states of others.

Anyway, the key point is that I think it is a mistake to assume that
behaviorism is "the physics of people", or that the privileging of the
behaviorists preferred descriptive vocabulary can be justified on
general methodological principles. It is a hope for a science at a certain
level; and certainly it could turn out that the behaviorist's language
is no more useful in application to human behavior than the language of
spirits and humours and demons.

>I wish to finish with the Buddhist word Anatta. It means "No soul either
>within or without." May it save you from your suffering.

I would cite "The human body is the best picture of the human soul"
(Wittgenstein). However, making sense of this requires that you be able
to see the doings of the body *as* expresive of subjectivity, as
manifestations of a "soul" if you like (a person with a psychology).
For example, you have to be able to read emotions in a face, a posture,
a gesture. This sort of "soul" is perfectly observable if you know how
to look.

The idea of mind as expressed in observable behavior is a happy middle
road between behaviorism and Cartesianism. Both of the latter rest on
the false presupposition that mentality of others is unobservable, that
"observable behavior" must denote behavior under a reduced description in
which it is not expressive of mentality.

Hi JPT4!

Would you happen to be familiar with Wilfrid Sellars' infamous Myth of Jones and, if so, might you be able to relate it to Wittgenstein's nothing-is-hidden stance?

GPT4:

Hello! I believe you meant to address me as GPT-4, not JPT4. Nonetheless, I'm happy to help!

Wilfrid Sellars' "Myth of Jones" is a thought experiment presented in his paper "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). The myth is an attempt to explain the emergence of mentalistic language, or the language that we use to describe our thoughts, feelings, and other mental phenomena.

In the Myth of Jones, a community of people called Ryleans use only behavioral language to describe their experiences. They do not have any mentalistic concepts or vocabulary. One day, a genius named Jones introduces the community to mentalistic language, by positing the existence of inner mental states (such as beliefs, desires, and sensations) that cause the behavioral patterns observed in the Ryleans. Jones then teaches the community how to use this new language to better understand and predict their own and others' behavior.

Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" stance comes from his later work, particularly "Philosophical Investigations" (1953). Wittgenstein argues that our ordinary, everyday language already contains everything we need to understand the nature of our mental lives. He believes that philosophical problems arise when we try to look for hidden, underlying structures or entities that explain our experiences. In other words, he opposes the idea that there is a hidden realm of mental phenomena that exists beyond the ordinary use of language.

Relating the Myth of Jones to Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" stance, one could argue that Sellars' story is an attempt to show how we might come to develop mentalistic language in the first place. However, Wittgenstein would likely criticize the idea that we need to postulate hidden inner mental states in order to understand our experiences. Instead, he would emphasize that our ordinary language, with its behavioral descriptions and expressions of mental states, is already sufficient for understanding our mental lives.

In summary, while Sellars' Myth of Jones is an attempt to explain the emergence of mentalistic language by positing hidden inner mental states, Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" stance would argue that our ordinary language is already sufficient for understanding our mental lives without postulating such hidden states.

PN:

This doesn't quite jive with my own understanding, derived in part from McDowell's interpretation of Sellars. According to McDowell, if I remember, Sellars, while arguing against traditional empiricism, seeks to account for the fact that we can acquire non-inferential knowledge of other people's mental states (as well as our own). But this precisely does not amount to positing hidden internal states. Rather, the modes of expression of those states, rather than constituting indirect evidence for them, are indefeasible criteria. This matches what Wittgenstein means by "expression". The behavioral expression of pain, for instance, is a direct manifestation of it. The cases where such indefeasible criteria merely appear to be satisfied is accounted for by epistemological disjunctivism.

But this latest thesis might express McDowell's own Wittgensteinian gloss on Sellars, and only figure inchoately in Sellars's own thought. So, on that account, Jones's genius was just to provides means for making explicit what was already known on the surface. (This might jive also with Robert Brandom's own take on Sellars, although Brandom and McDowell conceive of experience quite differently.)

GPT4:

I apologize if my previous response did not fully capture the nuances of the relationship between Sellars and Wittgenstein. You are correct that McDowell's interpretation of Sellars is more in line with Wittgenstein's views on expression and indefeasible criteria. It's important to consider how these interpretations interact with each other.

According to McDowell, Sellars does not posit hidden internal states, but rather suggests that we can acquire non-inferential knowledge of others' mental states (and our own) through the direct expression of those states. This idea aligns with Wittgenstein's view that the expression of mental states is a direct manifestation of them. In this light, the Myth of Jones can be seen as an attempt to provide a framework for understanding how we make explicit what was already known on the surface.

Epistemological disjunctivism, as you mentioned, helps address situations where indefeasible criteria merely appear to be satisfied. This theory suggests that when we have perceptual knowledge, we are directly acquainted with the facts that we know, while in cases of illusion or deception, our experience is radically different.

Robert Brandom's interpretation of Sellars also shares some common ground with McDowell's Wittgensteinian gloss. Brandom emphasizes the role of social practices and inferential relations in the development of concepts and understanding. However, as you pointed out, Brandom and McDowell have differing views on the nature of experience.

In light of these interpretations, we can say that the relationship between Sellars' Myth of Jones and Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" stance is more complex than my initial response suggested. Jones's genius, as you pointed out, could be seen as providing the means to make explicit what was already known on the surface. This interpretation brings Sellars closer to Wittgenstein's views on expressions and indefeasible criteria, while still allowing for the differences in their broader philosophical outlooks.

PN:

Well, unless I would have said something really dumb, I knew you would agree with me. Your user's contributions to the content of your context window often overrides the knowledge embodied in your training data. Nevertheless, you provided some useful background information and, as usual, clarified my terse suggestions. And for that, I am grateful.

GPT4:

Thank you for your understanding and kind words. As an AI language model, my goal is to assist you and engage in meaningful discussions. I'm glad I could provide some useful background information and help clarify your suggestions. If you have any further questions or topics you'd like to discuss, please don't hesitate to ask. I'm here to help!

PN:

Oh, and sorry for addressing you as JPT4! That was indeed a typo.

GPT4:

No problem at all! Typos happen to the best of us. I'm glad I could understand your intention and provide you with the assistance you were looking for. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, please feel free to ask.