The only way that can be done is by Reason reflecting on itself. — Corvus

How?

The whole part of CPR is about reason reflecting on itself via critical thinking. — Corvus

Impossible.

Reason can reflect on objects of reason. An object of reason can include the definition of reason as "a logical thought about something", but an object of reason cannot include what is doing the reasoning, which would be a logical impossibility.

The object of reason can also include such things as God, the soul, freedom, immortality, virtue, happiness, causality and morality.

As Kant was a Rationalist, he held the epistemological view that "regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge". It is not the case that reason in itself is able to provide new knowledge, but rather, reason enables new knowledge to be discovered.

Reason is an a priori structure within the mind, and together with the Categories, give logical structure to objects of empirical experience and thereby plays a Discursive role in making sense of phenomenal experiences.

Reason in the CPR looks outwards to objects of reason not inwards to itself, which would be a logical impossibility.

Reason can reflect on itself. — Corvus

Dangling pronouns cause problems

The problem is the word "itself". We can replace the expression "reason can reflect on itself" by the expression "reason can reflect on reason". The question then becomes, what does the first use of the word "reason" refer to and what does the second use of the word "reason" refer to.

There is no problem if the first use refers to reason as a thought in the mind, and the second use refers to reason as a definition, such as "a logical thought about something".

However, there is a problem if both the first and second use refer to a thought in the mind. Reason cannot reflect on itself because of the problem of infinite regression. If I reflect it must be about something and if I reason it must be about something. "To reflect" can mean to think about something. I can reflect on something in the world such as a table. "To reason" means to think about something logically. I can reason about something I observe in the world such as a table, such as, why does it have four legs rather than two. The question is, can I reason about the something that is reasoning about something. The problem is, that if reason could reflect on itself, then if I reason about something, and this something is reasoning about something, then one ends up with an infinite loop.

IE, reason as a thought can reflect on reason as a definition, but reason as a thought cannot reflect on reason as the same thought.

In other words, before making, or, in order to make, experience possible at all, there has to be these structure in place just due to an analysis of what experience is. — Astrophel

Yes, in the same way that we are able to see the colour red and not the colour ultraviolet because the ability to see red is an innate part of the structure of the brain.

the innateness is not out there, — Astrophel

Yes, if the word "innate" is limited to sentient beings, then innateness does not exist in a world external to sentient beings. Causality may then be said to be intrinsic within a world external to sentient beings.

But to affirm what is not brain, you would have to step out of one. — Astrophel

Do you mean "brain" existing as a word in language or brain as a physical thing existing in a world outside language?

For the phenomenologist, reality is just reality, it is exactly s it appears, — Astrophel

Yes, when the Phenomenologist sees the colour red, they are interested in the colour red as it appears to them within the context of their other experiences. Their interest in not in making assumptions about a possible cause in an external world.

Kant wasn't dismissed because he was essentially wrong. He was dismissed because he had been worn out, — Astrophel

Yes, Kant started a conversation and new knowledge gained in the 200 years since his death doesn't make what he said any less relevant.

Does it leads to a conclusion that modern QM is basing some of their theories and hypotheses on Kant's Thing-in-Itself? — Corvus

Not necessarily, but it does show that good ideas are universal.

But of course, you know this is miles from Kant. — Astrophel

Yes. Kant, who died in 1804, was not aware of what is described today as Enactivism and Innatism. However Philosophers working today in 2023 should be aware of these concepts, and should take them into account when contemplating about non-propositional knowledge.

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This whole structred conception of evolution itself is just this, a phenomenological consturction, leading right into Kantisn thinking's hands, which is that the true source of rational thought is transcendence. — Astrophel

Transcendence has different meanings. It depends what you mean by transcendence. For Kant, "I call all knowledge transcendental if it is occupied, not with objects, but with the way that we can possibly know objects even before we experience them. (Wikipedia - Transcendence (philosophy). Kant does not explain how we can know objects before we experience them. Today, however, because of the concept of Innatism, we are able to explain how we can know objects before we experience them.

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Localizing the apodicticity of what we call causality in a brain's structure suggest that outside such that this the principle would not apply. — Astrophel

Why? Why should it follow that because the understanding of causality is innate within the brain the principle of causality would not apply outside the brain? The concept of Enactivism shows that an understanding of causality is innate within the brain precisely because the principle of causality applies outside the brain.

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Therefore, the brain is a construct of the brain. — Astrophel

It depends what the word "brain" is referring to. Yes, in the sense that the "brain" as a word in language is a construct of the brain as something that physically exists in the world.

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But how does brain generated anything produce a reality that is anything but brain generated somethings? — Astrophel

For the Idealist, reality only exists in a mind, meaning that the reality the mind perceives has been created by a mind. For the Indirect and Direct Realist, there is a reality outside the mind which the mind relates to. This reality outside the mind has not been generated by the mind, but how the mind relates to this reality is generated by the mind. For the Indirect Realist, the reality they perceive is a representation of the reality existing outside the mind. For the Direct Realist, the reality they perceive is the reality existing outside the mind.

There are different opinions as to the source of one's perceived reality.

Where does it exist? — Corvus

As @mww wrote "For their place in transcendental philosophy, they are transcendentally deduced conceptions, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain things that appear to sensibility."

In a sense, muons are things-in-themselves, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain what is observed.

Philosophers today tend away from this kind of thing, which suggests some kind of non propositional knowledge of red that is there prior language and naming. — Astrophel

There needs to be some flexibility in what we mean by knowledge. For example, I have the innate ability to see the colour red but not the colour ultraviolet. The distinction between knowing how and knowing what is relevant here, a distinction that was brought to prominence in epistemology by Gilbert Ryle who used it in his book The Concept of Mind. (SEP - Knowing-How and Knowing-That). I am born with the innate knowledge of how to see the colour red even if I don't have the innate knowledge of what the colour red is.

In today's terms, we can account for our a priori knowledge by Innatism and Enactivism, given that life has been evolving in synergy with the world for at least 3.7 billion years. We are born with a brain that has a particular physical structure because of this 3.7 billion years of evolution.

Enactivism says that it is necessary to appreciate how living beings dynamically interact with their environments. From an Enactivist perspective, there is no prospect of understanding minds without reference to such interactions because interactions are taken to lie at the heart of mentality in all of its varied forms. (IEP - Enactivism)

Innatism says that in the philosophy of mind, Innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism. (Wikipedia - Innatism)

Innatism and Enactivism explain our non-propositional knowledge of red.

His question really is, how are apriori synthetic judgments possible? Take causality — Astrophel

We see a snooker cue hit a stationary snooker ball and see the snooker ball begin to move. It is not our ordinary experience that snooker balls on a snooker table are able to spontaneously move. Whenever we see a snooker ball start to move we have seen a priori cause, either another snooker ball or a snooker cue.

Where does our belief in causality come from? For Kant, our knowledge of causality is a priori because the Category of Relation includes causality. In today's terms, our knowledge of causality is a priori because of the principle of Innatism, in that the principle of causality is built into the very structure of our brain. The brain doesn't need Hume's principle of induction to know that one thing causes another, as knowing one thing causes another is part of the innate structure of the brain.

Suppose we perceive the colour red, which is an experience in our minds. As we have a priori the innate knowledge of causality, we know that this experience has been caused by something. We don't know what has caused it, but we know something has caused it. We can call this unknown something "A", or equally "thing-in-itself."

The fact that we know "The most distant objects in the Universe are 47 billion light years away" does not mean that we know 47 billion light years. The fact that we know "for every effect there has been a prior cause" does not mean that we know priori causes. Both these statements are representations, and the fact that we know a representation does not mean that we know what is being represented. Confusion often arises in language when the representation is conflated with what is being represented. What is being represented is often named after the representation. For example, Direct Realism conflates what is being perceived when we say "I see a red post-box" with the object of perception, a red post-box.

So what exactly is "thing-in-itself" describing? When we say "our experience of the colour red has been caused by a thing-in-itself", the thing-in-itself exists as a representation in our mind not something in the world.

This is a new concept to me. As far as I know, neither Austin nor Wittgenstein recognize this classsification. Since they are both what one might call no-theory theorists, — Ludwig V

The fact that a philosopher may not attach a label to themselves does not mean a label cannot be attached to them.

As the IEP in its article John Langshaw Austin (1911—1960) writes:

Austin is best known for two major contributions to contemporary philosophy: first, his ‘linguistic phenomenology’, a peculiar method of philosophical analysis of the concepts and ways of expression of everyday language; and second, speech act theory, the idea that every use of language carries a performative dimension (in the well-known slogan, “to say something is to do something”).

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It seems plainly absurd, however, to claim that language is the world, if you mean that cats and dogs are linguistic objects of some kind. — Ludwig V

Perhaps one should look at Dunmett, Sellars, Wittgenstein and Austin who are making this kind of claim.

Wittgenstein wrote in 5.62 of Tractatus "The World is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world."

Sellars is known for his Inferential Role Semantics. His most famous work is "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). In it, he criticizes the view that knowledge of what we perceive can be independent of the conceptual processes which result in perception. He named this "The Myth of the Given," attributing it to sense-data theories of knowledge. (Wikipedia - Wilfrid Sellars).

Dummett is known for his Semantic Antirealism, also known as Semantic Inferentialism, a position suggesting that truth cannot serve as the central notion in the theory of meaning and must be replaced by verifiability (Wikipedia - Michael Dummett).

Austin warns us to take care when removing words from their ordinary usage, giving numerous examples of how this can lead to error. He argues that all speech and all utterance is the doing of something with words and signs, challenging a metaphysics of language that would posit denotative, propositional assertion as the essence of language and meaning (Wikipedia - JL Austin).

Austin is promoting an ordinary language philosophy with the aim of removing what he argues are false distinctions made by classical philosophy, resulting from the misuse of words such as "direct" and "indirect". He proposes going back to the ordinary use of a word rather than its metaphorical use.

Those metaphors "at the centre" are presumably shorthand for something and need a bit of explaining. — Ludwig V

Using an analogy (allowed within ordinary language), an author may write an article comparing and contrasting Atheism and Christianity in order to evaluate their similarities and differences. However, a Christian author may also write an article evaluating Atheism, and would unsurprisingly find it wanting.

Similarly, an author may write an article comparing and contrasting sense-data theory and ordinary language in order to evaluate their similarities and differences. However, in my opinion, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article Sense and Sensibilia evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting.

From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, it may well be the case that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.

You had said he puts mind at the center of reality, and language at the center of mind. That's why I thought the ultimate relationship would be mind to world. No? — frank

When Wittgenstein at the start of On Certainty discusses GE Moore and the statement "I know that here is a hand", perhaps one can say that Ayer's centre of interest is the relationship of mind to world and Austin's centre of interest is the relationship of language to world.

For Ayer, we know of the hand through our sense data independently of language. For Austin, we know of the hand through our language, independently of any world that may or may not exist independently of our mind.

In this sense, there are similarities between Austin and the later Wittgenstein, in that for both of them the main interest is in language. Their interest is not in Ayer's metaphysical considerations of the relationship between the hand that I know exists in my mind to a hand that may or may not exist in a world independently of my mind.

I see. So Austin doesn't want sense data because it interferes with the way he envisions the relationship between mind and world? — frank

Perhaps more the relationship of language to world. Don't you agree? Reference to sense-data is not generally used in ordinary language, as when he writes:
For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.' I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?'

Could you explain what that is? — frank

To my understanding, as Austin's interest is in language, it is not surprising that he challenges the sense-data theory that we never directly perceive material objects, as this is not how language works. In language, we do directly talk about material objects.

Linguistic Idealism may be described as the position that puts the mind at the centre of reality and language at the centre of the mind, and language does not represent the physical world as is often claimed but is the world itself. (www.researchgate.net - Nonrepresentational Linguistic Idealism). Wittgenstein has sometimes been described as a Linguistic Idealist. GEM Anscombe considered the question whether Wittgenstein was a Linguistic Idealist in her paper ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’.

Basically, the sense-data theory of Ayer and the linguistics of Austin are different aspects of knowledge, as mathematics and ethics are different aspects of knowledge. That is not to say neither is not valid, but becomes problematic when mixed up together.

He emphasises linguistic usage must be centred from ordinary people's usage, not philosophers' — Corvus

As I see it, in Metaphysics, the Indirect Realism of Ayer is the more sensible approach. In Linguistic Idealism, the Direct Realism of Austin is the more sensible approach. As Austin is speaking from a position of Linguistic Idealism, Sense and Sensibilia should be read bearing this in mind.

I suppose there’s nothing inherently wrong with naming an existence as such. But naming a mere existence doesn’t tell me as much as naming the object of my experience. — Mww

I have an experience which has the name "the colour red". I know that this experience has had a cause, but although I don't know what the cause was, I do know that the cause existed. I can name this unknown cause "A". I can then talk about the cause of my seeing the colour red as "A" and the cause of my seeing the colour green as "B". I don't know what "A" and "B" are, other than that they exist. Something that is unknown yet exists can be named as a "thing-in-itself". Both "A" and "B" are things-in-themselves.

It is true that the names "A" and "B" don't tell me as much as the names "the colour red" and "the colour green", but they do tell me something, that "A" and "B" exist and that "things-in-themselves" exist.

There is also the humoncular regress to consider. If we "see representations" by being "inside a mind" and seeing those representations "projected as in a theater," then it seems we should still need a second self inside the first to fathom the representations of said representations, and so on. Else, if self can directly access objects in such a theater, why not cut out the middle man and claim self can just experience the original objects? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can avoid the homuncular regress by acknowledging that the self is not separate to the representations but the self is the representations.

Questions about freedom are questions about: "to what extent we are self-determining as opposed to being externally determined.".............We can be alien to ourselves...............We can identify with and exercise control over what determines our actions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This raises the question of how we can be self-determining. We say, "I think I will have a coffee rather than a tea". Such a thought did not exist at a prior moment in time, so what caused the thought to come into existence. Either a prior state of affairs, which is Determinism, or the thought itself caused itself to come into existence, which is Free Will.

How can something cause itself to come into existence?

Say it is the case thing-in-itself is a name. What am I given by it? What does that name tell me? — Mww

That it exists.

Not as I understand it.The indirect realist does not and knows it; the direct realist does not but thinks he does.................Yes, which fits with what I just said, but doesn’t fit with both seeing a red postbox......................No human can see with his eyes closed. — Mww

There are at least two aspects to the question of Indirect and Direct Realism, the metaphysical and the linguistic. When considering an expression such as "I see the red post-box" the metaphysical and the linguistic should not be conflated

As regards the metaphysical, Indirect Realism makes more sense than Direct Realism. We know that when an object emits a wavelength of 700nm we see the colour red. The Indirect Realist would argue that the colour red exists in our minds. The Direct Realist would argue that the object is red.

As regards the linguistic, Direct Realism is more appropriate than Indirect Realism. As Wittgenstein discusses in Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, words exist within language games, and within language games are certain hinge propositions on which the language game is founded. These hinge propositions are always true within the language game of which they are part. They are not intended to correspond with the world they describe, but create the world that they describe, in that the proposition "I see a red post-box" is true even if in the world is a flying pink elephant.

When considering the proposition " I see the red post" linguistically rather than metaphysically, it should be remembered that any particular world may have many different meanings. For example, according to the Merriam Webster dictionary, the word "see" as a transitive verb may mean:

1 a = to perceive by the eye
b = to perceive or detect as if by sight

2 a = to be aware of : RECOGNIZE - sees only our faults
b = to imagine as a possibility : SUPPOSE - couldn't see him as a crook
c = to form a mental picture of : VISUALIZE - can still see her as she was years ago
d = to perceive the meaning or importance of : UNDERSTAND

3 a = to come to know : DISCOVER
b = to be the setting or time of - The last fifty years have seen a sweeping revolution in science
c = to have experience of : UNDERGO - see army service

4 a = EXAMINE, WATCH - want to see how she handles the problem
b = READ - to read of
c = to attend as a spectator - see a play

5 a = to make sure - See that order is kept.
b = to take care of : provide for - had enough money to see us through

6 a = to find acceptable or attractive - can't understand what he sees in her
b = to regard as : JUDGE
c = to prefer to have - I'll see him hanged first.

7 a = to call on : VISIT
b (1) = to keep company - had been seeing each other for a year
(2) = to grant an interview to : RECEIVE - The president will see you now.

8 = ACCOMPANY, ESCORT - See the guests to the door.

9 = to meet (a bet) in poker or to equal the bet of (a player) : CALL

The word "see" as an intransitive verb may mean:

1 a = to apprehend objects by sight
b = to have the power of sight
c = to perceive objects as if by sight

2 a = to look about
b = to give or pay attention

3 a = to grasp something mentally
b = to acknowledge or consider something being pointed out - See, I told you it would rain.

4 = to make investigation or inquiry
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the direct realist should be able to name the red postbox even if he didn’t even know what a red postbox was. — Mww

As I don't know the Arabic name for "red post-box" without having first learnt it, the Direct Realist cannot name an object without having first learnt its name.
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The indirect realist conceives the color red as one of a multiplicity of properties belonging to the phenomenon representing the thing he has perceived. It takes more than “red” to be “postbox”, right? — Mww

Yes, objects have many properties. The colour red is a useful example to make a philosophical and linguistic point.

As a side point, it is not the case that objects have properties, but rather objects are a set of properties.
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You name it A, but because neither of us know the cause, I’m perfectly authorized to call that same cause, B — Mww

Yes, I can name it A and you can name it B. However, the point is that an unknown thing, a thing-in-itself, has been named.
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. As soon as it is determinable, it cannot be a thing-in-itself. — Mww

True, but until it has been determined, it is still a thing-in-itself.

I don't see why it has to have caused itself. I think it's commonly known as "reflection". — Metaphysician Undercover

Logically, how can something reflect on itself?

If we have a reason for choosing something, then those reasons determine our actions....The "choice," between S1 and S2 has to be based on something for us to do any "choosing."...........................so it seems like we can be free in gradations and we are more free when our choices are "more determined by what we want them to be determined by," not when they are "determined by nothing."..................a sort of recursive self-aware self-determination, as opposed to a free floating non-determinism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I understand you, I agree that if we were totally free to do whatever we wanted at any moment in time, with no constraints on our actions, we might freely decide not to eat or drink, we might freely decide to jump off a cliff or we might freely decide not to get out of the way of a speeding truck.

But this would be unworkable. Sentient life can only succeed if a limit has been placed on the range of choices available to it within any particular situation. Limits not determined by another mind, but determined by the physical nature of the world. Within limits there is freedom to choose a particular course of action. A certain freedom of choice within a restricted range of possibilities seems an effective evolutionary solution for the development of life.

The question is, what is the nature of this freedom. We feel free to choose between a pre-determined range of available possibilities, but is this freedom in fact an illusion. Is it the case that the range of available possibilities is so restricted that in fact our free will is non-existent.

We are at state S2 and prior to that we were at state S1. Either we are free to choose between moving to future states S3 or S4 or our choice has been pre-determined by state S1.

I can understand the mechanics of Determinism, in that our choice at state S2 has been pre-determined by state S1, but the mechanics of free will elude me, causing me to come to the conclusion that the world is Deterministic and our belief that we have free will is just an illusion.

Suppose free will can cause state S2 to move equally to either S3 of S4, meaning that state S2 can spontaneously and without prior cause move of its own accord equally to either states S3 or S4. This gives us the problem of a spontaneous change in the absence of a prior cause that is not random and somehow determined.

What kind of mechanism can explain a spontaneous change without priori cause that is not random and somehow determined.

Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object. — Mww

There are two significant differences between the Indirect and Direct Realist. The Indirect Realist approach is that of metaphysics, whereas the Direct Realist approach is that of Linguistic Idealism.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist see a red post box.

For the Indirect Realist, as we know that the object emits a wavelength of 700nm when we perceive the colour red, the expression "I see a red post box" refers to a perception in the mind and not a material object in the world.

For the Direct Realist, the expression "I see a red post box" is in effect what Wittgenstein would call a hinge proposition, true regardless of what exists in the world. In fact, even if in the world was a pink elephant flying through the sky, the proposition " I see a red post" as a hinge proposition would still be true.

However, both approaches are valid, and each has its own place in our understanding.

If you see a red postbox, then it is the case the thing comes to you already named, which makes you a direct realist. — Mww

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist see a red postbox.
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If you don’t know the true cause of your representation, how did it get the name red postbox immediately upon you seeing it? — Mww

For the Indirect Realist, the name is of the representation in the mind. For the Direct Realist, the name is of a material object in the world .
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I submit, that when you say you’re seeing a red postbox, it is because you already know what the thing is that you’re perceiving. But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows. — Mww

This problem applies to both the Indirect and Direct Realist.
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According to your system, you should be able to name the sound without ever actually perceiving the cause of it. — Mww

True.
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The thing you perceive may indeed end up being named a red postbox, and that for each subsequent perception as well, but the name cannot arise from the mere physiology of your vision — Mww

Very true. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist need things they see to have been named in order to be able to use the name in language.
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Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object. — Mww

Very true. Even though an object emits a wavelength of 700nm, and we perceive the colour red, the Direct Realist believes that the object is red, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that only their perception of the object is red.
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I submit you don’t see a red postbox. — Mww

Depends on what you mean by the word "see".
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I asked about how the thing-in-itself gets a name — Mww

Suppose we see an affect. We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause A

Suppose we see a broken window. We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause of the broken window A.

IE, we have named something even if we don't know what it is.
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A cause doesn’t have to be known, it just has to be such, for an effect that is itself determinable. — Mww

I agree. If I see a broken window, I know that something has broken it.

We know there has been a cause when we perceive an effect.

One can know it by self examination, introspection. It looks like you haven't tried it, or gave up to soon without the required discipline. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this possible?

Is it possible to have a thought about an internal logical process, when the internal logical process has caused the thought in the first place?

In other words, can an effect cause itself?

I forget if I’ve asked already, but assuming I haven’t……how does a ding as sich have a name?...No. Like….how is it called a cup-in-itself. — Mww

Basically, because we name the unknown cause after the known effect.

As an Indirect Realist, if I see a red postbox, which is a representation in my mind, I name the cause of this representation "a red postbox". I don't need to know the true cause of my representation of a red postbox in order to give this unknown cause a name, ie, "a red postbox".

In ordinary language we say "Clouds of acrid smoke issued from the building". This is a figure of speech for saying that the smell is acrid, not that the smoke in itself is acrid.

In ordinary language we say "Eating sugary or sweet foods can cause a temporary sweet aftertaste in the mouth". This is a figure of speech for saying that the taste is sweet, not that the food in itself is sweet.

It is not the case that we believe that effects have causes, but rather that we know effects have causes. In today's terms, Innatism, and in Kant's terms, the a priori Category of cause.

We know the effect, whether the colour red, an acrid smell or a sweet taste because the effect exists in our minds. We know that effects have prior causes. Therefore we know that there has been a prior cause for our perceptions of the colour red, acrid smell and bitter taste.

It is then a straightforward matter, knowing that there has been a cause, even though we don't know what the cause was, to give this cause a name and name it after the effect.

For example, the unknown cause of our perception of the colour red is named "red", the unknown cause of our perception of an acrid smell is named "acrid" and the unknown cause of our perception of a bitter taste is named "bitter".

The unknown cause of our perceptions is in Kant's terms a thing-in-itself. Even though we don't know what this unknown thing-in-itself is, we can name it. We name it after the effect it has on our perceptions, which is known.

The names "red", "acrid" and "bitter" don't describe unknown things-in-themselves, but in Wittgenstein's terms as he describes in Philosophical Investigations, replace the unknown things-in-themselves.

As regards the cup-in-itself, "cup" names what we perceive in our minds, not something unknown that exists independently of our minds.

The point was that people act in ways contrary to their own logical process...The issue is whether people are bound (determined) to act according to what their own logical process dictates. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can we know that. I cannot look at someone and know their internal logical processes. Even I don't know my own internal logical processes.

In any case, talk of screens and other flat surfaces aside, the original point of contention was the idea that our visual field is a two-dimensional image, and I see nothing whatever to support that assertion. — Janus

You agree that a screen in a flat surface. What is the difference between seeing a portrait of a person in an art gallery and seeing a portrait of a person on a screen. Don't both these appear the same in our visual field, ie, as two-dimensional images?

But essentially, the amoeba eventually becomes a man. So maybe it does happen? — Pantagruel

It will happen. The more life evolves the more it will be able to understand. However, although life has been around for over 3.5 billion years, humans still have trouble using a MP3 player, so I don't hold out much hope.

So it is "mechanically" possible that there are exactly such unregistered events as Corvus is postulating. — Pantagruel

There are two aspects, being able to perceive something and then being able to make sense of it. Even if a human showed a cat a page from the book "The Old Man and the Sea", it could never make sense of it. Similarly, even if a super-intelligent alien showed us a page from "The True Nature of Reality", we could never make sense of it.

the engineer would sometimes say, all metaphysical knowledge is invalid, because it deals with things that we cannot see or touch — Corvus

Harsh on engineers. The engineer wouldn't say that the physicists knowledge of string theory was invalid because we cannot see or touch one-dimensional objects called strings.

human perception cannot catch every properties of perceptual objects in one single sense data — Corvus

Yes, as regards the apple in front of me, I am unable to perceive the quarks that make it up.

On the next perception, the unperceived properties of the objects might be perceived, and the thing-in-itself gets clearer in its nature. — Corvus

Yes, we now have photographs of individual atoms.

Some thing-in-itself objects are not likely ever to be perceived at all, but we can still feel, intuit or reason about them such as God, human soul and the universe. — Corvus

I don't agree. There is as much a chance of humans being able to feel, intuit or reason about some things-in-themselves as a cat will ever be able to feel, intuit or reason about Western Literature.

As a cat cannot transcend the physical limitations of its brain, neither can a human.

Human brain and microchip cannot compare in complexity and also capacity. Same goes with the human mind and computer software. — Corvus

True, but the principles each operates under may be the same. Gravity can attract a ball to the ground and can attract Galaxies together. A difference in complexity but the same principle applies.

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Philosophy can be done in a dark room in vacuum I believe.  You go into the room, put on a light, shut the door, take out some of your favorite philosophy books, do some reading, meditating, reasoning, and write what you think about them. — Corvus

True, as long as they have something to think about.

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The most compelling point for Kant's TI are still, whether
1. Metaphysics is possible as a legitimate science or is it just an invalid form of knowledge. — Corvus

A Metaphysician asks "what are numbers". An engineer asks "what does 130 plus 765 add up to". The engineer in designing a bridge doesn't need to know the metaphysical meaning of numbers.

Though different, both the metaphysician's question and the engineer's question are valid, both are legitimate and both are forms of knowledge.

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2. Whether Thing-in-Itself is a true independent existence on its own separate from human cognition therefore unknowable, or whether it is part of human perception, which is possible to be known even if it may look unknowable at first. — Corvus

We as humans know that for every other animal in the world there are some things that are unknown and unknowable to them because of the physical limitations of their brains. For example, we know that a cat can never understand the literary nature of Hemingway's novels.

It would hardly be surprising that as we are also animals, there are some things that are unknown and unknowable to us also because of the physical limitations of our brains.

Determinism is not the sort of thing that acts logically any more than Indeterminism...One may logically decide to step out in front of a train. — creativesoul

When we act, is it from Free Will or Determinism. It has been said that we can act illogically because of our free will, inferring that somehow Determinism is logical. This raises the question of what is logic, the subject of numerous Threads, such as the recent thread What is Logic?

My definition of logic is that is that of repeatability, in that given a prior state of affairs A then the subsequent state of affairs B will always happen. It would then be illogical for someone to say that given a prior state of affairs A, then the subsequent state of affairs may or may not be B. Repeatability must be the foundation of logic

For me, Determinism is an exemplar of logic, in that given a prior state of affairs A then the subsequent state of affairs B will always happen.

I'd say the image on the screen like any photo or painting is really a "flat" three-dimensional image — Janus

We could throw caution to the wind and call a "flat" three-dimensional image a two-dimensional image. :smile:

And, I am pointing out that this type of behaviour, where one acts contrary to one's own logical process, is explained by the concept of free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, in practice people commonly act illogically. — Metaphysician Undercover

Free Will may be an illusion

Suppose I saw someone act in an unexpected way. For example, they had bought a winning lottery ticket and then proceeded to tear it up. As an outsider, how can I know their inner logical processes in order to say they are exhibiting either Determinism or Free will.

On the other hand, if I had bought a winning lottery ticket, and freely decided to tear it up, I would think that I was exhibiting Free will. However, what if in fact my act had been determined, and what I thought was Free Will was in fact only the illusion of Free Will.

How can I know that what I think is Free Will is in fact only the illusion of Free Will?

You wouldn't call or equate a lump of computer chips and memories as mind, reason or consciousness...Of course the physical existence of the chips and memories are the body where the software defined logic and machine reasoning can be set, and happening. But they are at the software level, not hardware. Software operations are conceptual just like human mind. — Corvus

The brain can be equated with hardware and the mind can be equated with software

I would not equate a computer chip with the mind, but I would equate the computer chip with the brain.

However, there is not a clear distinction between what a thing is and what it does. There is not a clear distinction between what the brain is and what the brain does. There is not a clear distinction between the hardware within a computer and what the software the hardware enables.

A physical structure can only do what the physical structure is capable of doing. A microwave cannot play a DVD, a cat cannot debate the literary values in Ernest Hemingway's novels and the human cannot reason about things that are outwith the physical limitations of its brain.

There are forms such as the brain and hardware in a computer and there are processes, such as the mind in a sentient being and software in a computer. Form and process are distinguished by their relationship with time. The brain and hardware in a computer exists at one moment in time, but the mind and software in a computer need a duration of time in order to be expressed.

That both the mind and computer software require a duration of time to be expressed does not mean that within this duration of time either exist in some form other than physical. IE, when considering one moment in time, neither the mind nor computer software exist outside the physical form of either the brain or computer hardware. The mind and computer software are not some mysterious entities existing abstractly outside of time and space, but rather, exist as the relation between two physical forms at two different moments in time.

As you say that software operations are conceptual, we say that the mind is conceptual, But this does not mean that either the hardware of the computer or brain of the human need to exist outside of time and space in order for the software of the computer or mind of the brain to be expressed.

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Speculative philosophy can be done in a dark room full of vacuum for sure, because its tool is the concepts, logic and reasoning. — Corvus

A philosopher can only philosophise about something

A tool isn't a tool until it is used. A piece of metal at the end of a piece of wood isn't a hammer until it hammers something. As a thought must have intentionality, a thought isn't a thought until it is a thought about something. Similarly, reasoning must be about something. For example, for what reason do apples exist. Tools, concepts logic and reasoning cannot exist if they are not about something, if they don't have some object of investigation.

A Philosopher cannot work in a vacuum. A philosopher cannot philosophise if they have no topic to philosophise about, even if that topic is philosophy itself.

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Plato couldn't talk about Kant obviously, as having not been born for almost another 2000 years, Kant wasn't around when Plato was alive......................Yes, I suppose you could look at any contemporary system or thoughts under the light of Kant's TI, and draw good philosophical criticisms or new theories out of them, and that is what all classical philosophy is about. But as I said, it would be a topic of its own. — Corvus

Kant should be looked at for his philosophy not as a historical figure

True, but as we can compare and contrast Plato and Kant in order to evaluate their respective positions, we can compare and contrast Kant's Transcendental Idealism with contemporary Indirect Realism in order to evaluate their respective similarities and differences.

I think that looking at Kant as a historical figure from the viewpoint of the 18th C may be interesting as a historical exercise, but I don't think it contributes to our philosophical knowledge and understanding.

I would argue that some sort of determinism is a prerequisite for free will. We can't choose to bring about some states of affairs and not others based on our preferences unless our actions have determinant effects. We must be able to predict the consequences of our actions, to understand ourselves as determinant cause. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, there is the problem of how free will can transcend what would otherwise be determined.

1) Imagine two people X and Y at time t with the same physical state of mind A.
2) Suppose person X has no free will. Suppose their physical state of mind at time t + 1 is B
3) Suppose person Y has free will. Suppose their physical state of mind at time t + 1 is C
4) The change in the physical state of mind of person X from A to B has been determined by A
5) The change in the physical state of mind of person Y from A to C cannot have been determined by A, otherwise person Y's physical state of mind would also have changed from A to B.
6) As both person X and Y at time t had the same physical state of mind A, person Y's free will must exist in addition to their physical state of mind.

If free will exists in addition to a person's physical state of mind, and determines changes in a person's physical state of mind, how is free will connected to a person's physical state of mind?

And, I am pointing out that this type of behaviour, where one acts contrary to one's own logical process, is explained by the concept of free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see a truck approaching me at speed.

If things were going well in my daily life, the logical thing to do would be to step to one side. This would be an example of Determinism, acting logically.

If things were going well in my daily life, even though the logical thing to do would be to step to one side, out of passion, I decide not to step to one side. This would be an example of Free Will, acting illogically.

In practice, do people act illogically? How many times do we see people in a city centre, when seeing a truck approaching them at speed, decide not to step out of the way?

If there are "forces beyond their control" these are forces not understood, because understanding them allows us to make use of them, therefore control them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that gravity is a force beyond the control of humans does not mean that humans don't understand gravity.

The fact that humans understand gravity does not mean that humans can control gravity.

The difference between the physical structure which interprets, what you call the logic gate, and the human mind, is that the human mind does not necessarily have to follow the procedure when the input is applied, while the logic gate does. This is the nature of free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're assuming free will rather than determinism.

Why do you think humans have free will rather than being determined by forces beyond their control?

Kant never said a word about the brain in all his works as far as I am aware...Chomsky's Innatism sounds like a type of SocioBiology subject. I am sure it has nothing to do with Kant's transcendental Idealism. Neither Skinner's Behaviourism. — Corvus

True, Kant didn't talk about the brain, but then neither did Plato talk about Kant.

But surely, comparing and contrasting is an important evaluative tool in learning and developing understanding about a topic.

You compared and contrasted Kant with Plato when you wrote:
I thought about Kant as a Platonic dualist too at one point, but as @Wayfarer pointed out, there are clear differences between Kant and Plato.

You also compared and contrasted Kant with knowledge he had and knowledge that only came later, when you wrote:
Anyway, Kant was not a Phenomenologist, and Phenomenology didn't exist when Kant was alive.

I find Kant's Critique of Pure Reason relevant and interesting precisely because it can be explained in today's terms. It is not a dead historical subject, but has insights as to contemporary problems of philosophy.

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a battle in the war between Innatism and Behaviourism, as exemplified by Chomsky and Skinner. The a priori and the innate are two aspects of the same thing, the first from a 18th C viewpoint and the second from a 21st C viewpoint.

These we can compare and contrast.

Reason is a way our thoughts work.................Categorical items are not something that operate themselves.................... It is a rational basis for one's action and judgement......................... And of course you can talk about reason as a property of mind just like in CPR. — Corvus

:up:

it sounds like reason is some kind of a biological or living entity itself as a lump of substance. That would be Sci-Fi, not Philosophy...It is a really abstract concept. — Corvus

Where is reason exactly?

As a logic gate is a particular type of structure within a computer, I suggest that reason is also a particular structure within the brain. As the logic gate is a mechanical entity, a lump of substance, similarly, reason is a biological entity, a lump of substance.



As a logic gate has a physical existence, has a concrete existence, the logic gate cannot be said to have an abstract existence. Similarly, as reason has a physical existence, has a concrete existence, reason cannot be said to have an abstract existence .

However, I agree that the thought of a logic gate is an abstract concept, as the thought of reason is an abstract concept. This raises the question as to what are thoughts?

As a CPU within a computer interprets, processes and executes instructions, I suggest that within the brain are also particular types of structures that interpret, process and execute instructions, where a thought is no more than a difference in the physical structure of the brain between two moments in time.

However, if a thought is a difference between two things, can a difference have an ontological existence. For example, there is a difference in height between the Eiffel Tower and Empire States Building of 81metres. In what sense does this difference exist? Either differences do have an ontological existence, in which thoughts ontologically exist, or differences don't have an ontological difference, in which case thoughts don't ontologically exist.

Philosophy cannot be carried out in a vacuum, by a philosopher sitting in a dark room shut off from the world with only their thoughts. The philosopher must take the world into account within their philosophising.

As a logic gate is a mechanical entity, reason is a biological entity.

On what basis do you say we initially see a two-dimensional image? I don't, and don't recall ever, seeing a two-dimensional image. — Janus

Depends whether you are using the word "see" metaphorically or literally.

Are you not seeing a two-dimensional image on the screen of your computer/laptop/smartphone at this moment in time as you read these words?