learn philosophy — DesperateBeing

1) Use the Philosophy Forum as a means of learning philosophy.

2) Find any thread you are interested in - eg "Complete vs. Incomplete Reality"

3) Find any topic you are interested in - eg "I toy with the idea that there are many important phenomena in the world, which play a crucial causal influence in the way we view the world, but which we utterly fail to detect because we are human beings and not God (or angles, or intelligent aliens)"

4) Make an argument supporting or opposing the topic - whether 50 or 500 words.

5) Structure your reply along the lines of a "How to write a Philosophy Paper" - eg https://philosophy.fas.harvard.edu/files/phildept/files/brief_guide_to_writing_philosophy_paper.pdf

6) Support your argument with strong evidence - ie, incontrovertible logic or any established philosopher.

7) Find a source relevant to the topic - whether Plato, Wittgenstein or whoever - print-off a few relevant pages - highlight in yellow relevant ideas - try to include a few of these ideas.

8) Use a spell-checker

9) Post your reply - get feedback.

10) If no-one accepts your argument, then try again.

space with nothing in it — Amalac

Is Kant referring to the whole of space or only a part of space

Kant wrote "One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it."

I agree with Mww, who wrote "By empty space, Kant refers to only that space which would bound the extension of a possible object."

However, whether Kant is referring to the whole of space or only a part of space is irrelevant to the point that he is making.

Kant's position is important because it is at odds with Leibniz and the relationist claim that the idea of space existing independently of objects is incoherent.

IE, Kant is making the point that space can exist independently of there being any object within it, regardless of whether this is the whole of space or just a part of space.

Can one imagine a space with nothing in it

(Defining space as a continuous area or expanse which is free, available, or unoccupied rather than everything beyond the Karman Line.)

Russell wrote: "I should emphatically deny that we can imagine space with nothing in it"

If Russell is correct in saying that we cannot imagine a space with nothing in it, as space has by definition nothing in it, then it follows that Russell was saying that we cannot imagine space.

Because, if Russell is correct in that we cannot imagine space, then it would follow that when we observe the world we would observe all objects touching each other.

However, this is clearly not the case

IE, when we observe that in the world that there is space between objects, then it follows that we must be able to imagine a space that has nothing in it.

So if you imagine there being nothing in the table, then space would still not be empty — Amalac

Continuing Russells' " The second metaphysical argument maintains that it is possible to imagine nothing in space, but impossible to imagine no space".

Possible to imagine nothing in space
It is true that the space above the table is bounded by the table, but being able to imagine the space above the table having nothing in it means that I can imagine "a space" with nothing in it.
So, if I can imagine "a space" of 1m size with nothing in it, there is no reason why I cannot imagine "a space" of 1km size with nothing in it, or "a space" of 1 light year size with nothing inside it. In fact, there is no reason why I cannot imagine "a space" of any size with nothing in it.

In this sense - "it is possible to imagine nothing in space"

Impossible to imagine no space
"Red" exists in two ways. There is the "red" that exists as 650nm independently and externally of the mind and there is our subjective concept of "red".
In the same way "space" exists in two ways. There is the "space" that exists independently and externally of the mind and there is our subjective concept of "space"
As we know that our subjective experience of "red" is different in kind to the physical nature of "red" outside our mind, we should expect that our subjective experience of "space" to be different in kind to the physical nature of "space" outside our mind.

As we are born with an innate concept of "red", we are born with an innate concept of "space", ie, we don't need to learn either of them.
As Kant wrote: "Space is a necessary a priori representation that underlies all other intuitions"

Being born with an innate concept of "space", our concept of "space" is subjective.
As Kant wrote: "Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; instead, it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind’s nature in accord with a stable law as a scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally". Inaugural Dissertation Ak 2: 403

Kant is not saying that we don't observe the world (as he uses the words "sensed externally" and "intuition"), but he is saying that what we think we observe is determined by the innate nature of our brain.
Kant wrote: "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings.

Regardless of the degree of correspondence with any "space" existing independently of us, as we are born with an innate concept of "space", it would be impossible for the brain to ignore something that was a part of it's own structure.

In this sense, it is "impossible to imagine no space"

I should emphatically deny that we can imagine space with nothing in it.

Russell wrote "I should emphatically deny that we can imagine space with nothing in it"

However, in the space above the table in front of me there is no apple.

In order for me to know that there is no apple in this space, I must also know that there is a space in which there is no apple.

If Russell was correct in saying that we cannot imagine space with nothing in it, then it would necessarily follow that it would not be possible to imagine that there is no apple within this space.

And yet, I know that there is no apple in the space above the table in front of me.

If I can imagine that there is no apple in the space above the table, then it necessarily follows that I must also be able to imagine the space in which there is nothing.

IE, Russell was wrong in saying that we cannot imagine space with nothing inside it.

origin of meaning — Voidrunner

I would suggest that rather than meaning being an inherent part of the world, it is rather an inherent part of sentient life, believed to have begun during the Cambrian period.

Taking the specific example of the mollusc, which evolved about 541 to 485 million years ago. The mollusc's behaviour is extremely diverse, and light plays a critical part in its life cycle.

In our terms, bright light to the mollusc means heat and dryness and shade means desirable damp and shelter

One could discuss whether such behaviour is innate or intelligent, and whether conscious or not, but regardless, as light is part of the mollusc's phenomenological perception of reality, light must have significant meaning to the creature.

IE, meaning existed pre-language.

Non-existence can't exist — Derrick Huesits

The proposition "non-existence can't exist" is a linguistic curiosity and not a path to an ontological truth

Because words happen to be in the form of a proposition, it does not necessarily follow that they have any meaning, at least no more than Carroll's - 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves. Did gyre and gimble in the wabe".

A further consideration is the philosophical problem regarding the proposition "non-existence can't exist". As our knowledge of the world is about "existence" (ie, avoiding the problem of referring to non-existent entities), how can a proposition - a set of words - enable us to transcend to knowledge about "non-existence" ?

Non-existence can't exist -so, there must be infinite existence in all directions for all time — Derrick Huesits

Space-time is being conflated with existence

Itemising the argument in the first part of the OP :
i) there cannot be non-existence - therefore existence is infinite.
ii) space-time = existence
iii) therefore space-time is infinite.

Regarding item ii), space-time is being conflated with existence, rather than existence being a property of space-time.

If existence is a property of space-time, then there can still be existence in the absence of space-time.

In which case, item iii) does not follow. IE, space-time need not be infinite, and if not infinite, then not omnipresent.

I would argue there is a sense where "That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language." does not exclude us from discussing the form, or sense, or the picture, or what is concealed — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein and what cannot be said

Wittgenstein wrote in TLP 6.421 "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental". Russell wrote in the introduction to the Tractatus "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit".

The apparent paradox of talking about subjective truths

The question is how is it possible to connect private subjective truths to a public word.

Using colour as an example of a private subjective truth. I observe an object in the world. I experience various private subjective truths about this object - (green, circular, opaque). I observe that public words are attached to this same object - "opaque, green, circular"

Several instances may be required, but using inductive reasoning about constantly conjoined events, ie, that of my private subjective truth (green) and the public word "green", I may infer that the public word "green" is linked to my private subjective truth (green).

Note that the link is between my private sensation and the public word, not between my private sensation and someone else's private sensation. IE, my private sensation of "green" may or may not be the same as someone else's private sensation of "green", even though we share the same word.

Note that there is no information within the public word "green" that describes any person's private subjective truth. However, that being said, the public word "green" can describe my private subjective truth of (green) to me.

My inference that the public word "green" is linked to my private subjective truth (green) may eventually turn out to be wrong, in that I am using inductive reasoning, but pragmatically, for the time being, it is probably good enough.

Conclusion

I can use the public word "green" to describe my private subjective truth (green) because of my inductive reasoning about constantly conjoined events.

Wittgenstein's TLP 1 "The world is all that is the case" needs to be translated before it can be interpreted

As I see it, normally when reading a sentence in another language, such as "der Apfel liegt auf dem Tisch" we use a two step process. First we translate it into English "the apple is on the table" and then we interpret it (the apple is on the table).

However, with writers such as Wittgenstein, it is often the case that a three step process is needed. For example:
1) First, TLP 1 "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist" is translated into Standard English "The world is all that is the case"
2) Then we translate the Standard English "The world is all that is the case" into common usage "the world that exists independently of any human consists of a combination of simple and unalterable objects in space and time"
3) Finally, we interpret it - (within the world that exists independently of any human observer there are objects existing in combination within space and time, where such objects are unalterable and simple, ie, having no proper parts).

Once interpreted, one can then make a comment. Such as - Wittgenstein's "objects" are logical objects rather than physical objects.

IE, even when reading the Tractatus in English, it is as much a case of translation as interpretation.

language easily misleads us — dimosthenis9

TLP 1. The world is everything that is the case

It certainly is the case with Wittgenstein. As the SEP article on Wittgenstein wrote: "The Tractatus is notorious for its interpretative difficulties", of which the correct interpretation of the word " world" is one example.

For example, when Wittgenstein first uses the word "world", I am sure that only he knows what he means by it, certainly not the reader. It is not so much that he is using a private language of the kind as described in PI 243 "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language", but rather he is envisaging that the meaning that he intends the word to have will later become clear to the reader within the full context of the article.

It seems that Wittgensteins' approach is that the complete meaning of any particular word comes from its context rather than any pre-determined definition.
PI 21 - Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?—Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game.
PI - 22 - Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

However, there remains the problem with such a language game of the danger of circularity of meaning, in that, if the meaning of the word comes from the game and there are minimal links from the language game to an external reality, then there is the problem of how to choose between different games.

It seems that Wittgenstein does not always follow his own advice, when he writes:
TLP 4.112 - "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts"

1. The world is everything that is the case — Banno

1. The world is everything that is the case

As 1. "The world is everything that is the case" begins the Tracataus, it is probably especially important to understand its meaning, and I am trying to ensure that I've got hold of the right end of the stick.

The statement 1. "The world is everything that is the case" is initially confusing because Wittgenstein is using words in a way different to everyday usage and which can only be properly understood in context with the rest of the Tractatus, as others have already mentioned.

As a note, the Tractatus may be interpreted as espousing realism - the independent existence of objects, states of affairs and facts.

It seems to me that:
1) Wittgenstein's "world" is that which exists independently of any human observer, ie, the Earth and Universe in general. It therefore excludes human experiences of ethics, aesthetics, the experience of colour, the pain of a hot stove, etc. However, in common usage, the "world" would include both the human observer and the world they live in.
2) Wittgenstein's "case" has a meaning specific to the Tractatus- a fact - an existence of a state of affairs. However, in common usage we would say "it is the case that aesthetics is important"

"Tell me about something which cannot be put into words."

This raises the point as to how Wittgenstein is able to write about things that cannot be put into words.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

Bertrand Russell in his introduction to the Tractatus wrote - "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit"

As regards the exit, when Banno asks ""Tell me about something which cannot be put into words.", what appears to be a paradox is solved by the nature of language, in that the answer is simply "I cannot put into words my private experience of the colour red".

Summary

When Wittgenstein writes "the world is everything that is the case", what he means is very different from what would be meant in common usage.

The nature of language is such that it allows Wittgenstein to talk about things that, in a sense, transcend language.

"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world"

The meaning of "my world"

I would suggest that as Wittgenstein is using the term "my world" in a way that is not commonly accepted this contributes to any confusion in interpreting his intended meaning.

The original German was "meiner Welt, so it does not seem to be a problem of translating German to English.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein discusses what language can and cannot do.
He argues that there are some aspects of life, such as ethics, that are beyond the limits of language, in that they transcend language.
5.6 - "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" ?
6.421 - It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
7 - "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"

Wittgenstein links language to "my world" not by representing the world but by displaying its logical form.
4.001 - "The totality of propositions is language"
4.121 - "Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it."
1.1 - "The world is the totality of facts, not of things"
1 - "The world is everything that is the case"

As with Mary in Mary's Room, Mary may know everything about the science of colour but may never have experienced the sensation of colour. Mary's world (in the sense of the world that Mary lives in) includes both those things within the limits of language - the science of colour - and that which transcends language - the experience of colour. The same is also true that for each of us, in that our worlds include both that which can be described and that which is beyond description.

However, Wittgenstein is limiting the term "my world" to only that part which can be described in language.

IE, when Wittgenstein writes "my world", he is using the term "my world" in a more restricted sense than is commonly accepted, contributing to any confusion in interpretations of his intended meaning.

(1) is invalid.

With good reason, the pollees believe that a Republican will win the election, not that a Republican might win the election, meaning that (1) is invalid.

IE, it is (1) that is not part of a valid modus ponens, rather than the case that the modus ponens is not valid.

Trying to work out how to upload an image.
When dragging from computer, get message "You do not have permission to upload files"

Understanding "what a word means, and how a word means"

As regards "what a word means, and how a word means", a word such as "ndege", for example, is a group of symbols, and as a group of symbols has no intrinsic meaning. Any meaning a word has is external to the word and established by a link to a fact in the world.

In the spirit of the Tractatus, I am sure that most people would straight away know the meaning of "ndege" from just five pictures.



As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus 4.022: "A proposition shows its sense", meaning that the word "ndege" shows its sense by a link to a fact in the world, where the link has been agreed by the society within which the word is being used.

As Benjamin wrote in The Translator's Task (translated by Steven Rendall): "In "brot" and "pain", the intended object is the same , but the mode of intention differs", meaning that different languages may use different words, but they all have the same intended object, the same fact in the world.

The answer to "what a word means" is that words have no intrinsic meaning. The answer to "how a word means" is that there is an external link from the word to a fact in the world, where the link has been agreed by the society within which the word is being used.

So Logic is more like a mental Theory about Reality, than a material Thing in the real world — Gnomon

Logic is empirical

A field of study must study something. Ornithology studies birds, aesthetics studies aesthetics, psychology studies the mind, physics studies physics. Similarly, logic studies logic.

As with the word "aesthetics", the word "logic" has two distinct meanings. First as a verb, a doing word, "to study". Second as a noun, the thing that is studied.

Logic (as a verb) is the study of the logical relationships between propositions, leading to the acceptance of one proposition (the conclusion) on the basis of a set of other propositions (premises). A proposition is a combination of nouns and verbs that is either true or false, such as "all elephants are grey".

The truth or falsity of a proposition is determined by the T-sentence, such that
"all elephants are grey" is true iff all elephants are grey. The T-sentence sets out the equivalence between the word and the world. Therefore the propositions that logic (as a verb) studies have an equivalence through the T-sentence to facts in the world.

When looking at the world, we directly observe logic (as a noun) in the world. For example, we observe a particular rock as a single thing, something that is itself and not something else. We observe the same characteristic in other things, a bird, a tree, etc. IE, we directly observe the idea that x = x. This idea is an fact in the world discovered empirically.

1) As logic (as a verb) studies relationships of propositions, and as propositions have an equivalence with facts in the world, therefore, logic (as a verb) studies facts in the world.
2) As logic (as a verb) studies logic (as a noun), therefore, logic (as a noun) are facts in the world.
3) As facts in the world are empirically discovered, logic (as a noun) is empirically discovered.

In conclusion, i) logic (as a verb) is the study of something and logic (as a noun) is that which is being studied ii) logic (as a noun) is empirically discovered . In answer to Hilary Putnam's question in 1968, "Is logic empirical ?", the answer is yes.

Virtual Particles are imaginary objects created from logical reasoning to explain otherwise puzzling empirical observations — Gnomon

I agree that metaphor is a critical part of understanding.

My money is on the causal (energy) and substantial (matter) effects of Generic Information (EnFormAction) in the natural world — Gnomon

I can imagine the metaphor of the path of a particular rock in an avalanche.

I see neither intentionality nor teleology, as the rock has insufficient information as to where it will land up at the moment the avalanche is initiated.
The chances of the rock landing on one pre-determined spot is one in billions, however, the chance of the rock landing somewhere is one in one.
As the rock moves along its path through time and space, interactions between forces and particles, energy and matter, are not random but determined by the laws of nature.
During its path, any change in position of the rock is caused by the instantaneous interaction of energy and matter.
As the rock changes position, the information within the avalanche that the rock is a part of changes.
The final position of the rock is not pre-determined by either its start position or its final position but is determined by the integration of the set of particular situations it passes through along its path.
Given the same initial conditions and the same conditions along its path, there is not an infinite number of possible destinations but only one possible destination.

I perhaps understand that EnFormAction is about energy acting on a form causing an action.

But as regards Information Integration, the rock has to end up somewhere. In a sense its final resting position cannot be said to be due to "disorderly randomness", as its final resting position has been "organised" by the deterministic laws of nature. However, I don't understand the mechanism for teleological "intention".

If Logic was empirical — Gnomon

I would argue that logic is empirical, as logic cannot exist in an empty domain.

Reason one - the human mind is incapable of thinking about logic in an empty domain

The human mind cannot imagine a logical truth independent of something represented by the logical truth, regardless of whether one assumes Idealism or Realism.

For example, the human mind can only imagine the logical truth - If object A is the same as object B, then object B is the same as object A - by representing objects A and B.

IE, the human mind is only able to think about logic through empirical observation of objects about which logical truth may be applied.

Reason two - logic corresponds to the world

There is no instance where a logical truth doesn't correspond with the world.

For example, is has never been observed that object A is not the the same as object A.

Possibility one is that the fact that logic as a study of valid rules of inference corresponds with logic discovered in the world is coincidence.
Possibility two is that the logic invented in the rational mind and the logic empirically discovered in the outside world are two aspects of a common logic existent in nature.

IE, ignoring coincidence as an answer, logic is empirical because logic is an intrinsic part of nature.

as a "logical object", a Virtual Particle seems to be an Empty Domain — Gnomon

There seem to be many measurable physical effects that seem to point to the existence of virtual particles, but "virtual particles" are not the only possible explanation of these measurable effects.

Possibility one - the idea of a dimensionless point particle may simply be a way to explain why interactions are localised at dimensionless points, in that there are not particles but fields, and it these fields that interact at these dimensionless points.

A dimensionless particle is a problematic thing if one wants to give it properties such as mass or charge, in that the mass and charge of a particle will then have to be infinite. The same problem as a singularity at the centre of a black hole, where the laws of physics cease to exist as we know them.

Possibility two - one must distinguish between the mathematical formulation of a quantum field and how the quantum field is interpreted. A "virtual particle" may be a mathematical formulation but only a metaphorical interpretation. Such as Schrödinger's cat, The Uncertainty Principle, Evolution by natural selection, Black Holes, The Butterfly Effect, etc.

IE, the true nature of a "virtual particle" is unknown

the human mind can "see" logical relationships between imaginary "objects" — Gnomon

"See" may be used two ways.

i) The human mind can empirically observe using scientific instruments measurable physical effects of "virtual particles", but cannot directly observe the "virtual particles" themselves, regardless of what a "virtual particle" is.
ii) The human mind can imagine the cause of these measurable physical effects as metaphorical "virtual particles"

IE, the human mind can imagine the relationship between imaginary objects, but cannot observe the relationship between imaginary objects.

In conclusion, as the true nature of "virtual particles" is unknown, one cannot argue that that this is an example where an object may exist in a empty domain

Logic is not a physical object — Gnomon

Logic as a study of valid rules of inference
Logic is the systematic study of valid rules of inference, in that there are particular relations that lead to the acceptance of one proposition (conclusion) on the basis of a set of other propositions (premises).

For example, taking the modus ponens as an example, the rational rule of inference "if X happens, then Y will happen" ii) "X happens" iii) "therefore, Y happens" is valid because the empirical rule of inference i) "if X happens, then Y will happen" ii) "X happens" iii) "therefore, Y doesn't happen" is never observed.

As the validity of the rational rule of inference is determined by a correspondence with an empirical rule of inference, rules of inference must empirically exist in the world.

Logic as a relationship of an object
Whether logical truths entail the existence of any entities, or whether logical truth is independent of what exists is debated.

If logical truths hold no matter what the representation is about, then they hold in any domain, including empty domains. And if that is true, then logical truths cannot imply that anything exists.

But, on the other hand, if logical truths hold in any domain, then any domain has to contain the logical objects. Thus for logical objects there can be no empty domain.

Logic is not neutral with respect to what exists, and logic is not independent of what exists. Logic is not an object but a relationship of the object. If logic is a relationship of an object, then logic cannot exist outside the existence of objects.

For example, the following logical truths would not exist in a domain empty of objects:
i) If object A is larger than object B, object B is smaller than object A
ii) If object A exists, then it is not the case that object A doesn't exist.
iii) If object A is to the left of object B, then object B is to the right of object A.
iv) If object A is the same as object B, then object B is the same as object A.
v) Object A is the same as object A
vi) etc

IE, "logic" can mean either the study of the valid rules of inference, which exist empirically, or a relationship of objects, which also exist empirically.
As with mathematics, logic is an invention that corresponds with what has been discovered

If Logic was empirical, you could put it under a microscope — Gnomon

Independent of any observer, the physical world is logical. For example, i) rocks exist - ii) a particular rock is a rock - iii) therefore, a particular rock exists.

When we observe the physical world, we observe that the physical world is logical. Therefore, the logic of the physical world is verifiable by observation.

"Is logic empirical ?" is asking whether there a logic in the physical world that can be verified by observation.

Therefore, as the logic of the physical world is verifiable by observation, "logic is empirical".

a philosophical argument to conclude that Logic is physical — Gnomon

Wittgenstein
1) In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he proposed that in order for a picture to represent a certain fact it must, in some way, possess the same logical structure as the fact.
2) Such that a picture of a square and the fact of a square are different in some ways but have the same logical structure.
3) As we cannot judge that the picture and the fact have the same logical structure without a prior knowledge of the concept of a square, and as the concept of a square requires both rationalism and empiricism, then a posteriori empiricism is inherent in any judgement about logical structure.
4) As physicalism is inherent in any knowledge about a posteriori empiricism, physicalism is inherent in the logic underpinning Wittgenstein's logical structure.

IE, physicalism was an inherent part of Wittgenstein's logic.

Quantum Logic
The idea that the principles of classical logic may be revised on empirical grounds has foundations in the works of Quine and Reichenbach.

Hilary Putnam in his 1968 Is Logic Empirical ? discussed the idea that the properties of logic may, or should, be empirically determined. In particular, whether empirical facts about quantum phenomena may provide grounds for revising classical logic as a consistent logical rendering of reality. He argued that all the reasons usually given for the absolutely a priori status of classical logic applied equally well to the principles of classical Euclidean geometry.

IE, if logic is empirical, then it is physical.

You’ve used “different aspects of the same thing” several times, but without exposition of what the same thing would be. Is it spatial/temporal relations? But then, of what are they aspects? — Mww

In saying that the physical brain and nonphysical mind are two aspects of the same "thing", what is my understanding of this "thing" ?

Mysterianism
As Colin McGinn said, consciousness is "a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel". Mysterianism is the philosophical position proposing that the hard problem of consciousness cannot be resolved by present human understanding, though may be comprehensible with future advances of science and technology. For example, our understanding of the deeper problems of reality may be no more than that of a horse being explained the allegories within Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea, an understanding beyond the innate mental abilities of the animal, no matter how detailed or patient any explanation would be.

IE, A true understanding of the "thing" is, and will always be, beyond my ability.

Imagining the unimaginable
If the "thing" is beyond my human capacity to understand, then why do I believe it exists in the first place. We understand in the same way that language allows us the discuss other unimaginable things, such as time, space, causation, ghosts, gods, unicorns, the big bang, infinity, etc. However, this is not the language of the early Wittgenstein being a logical correspondence between language and the world, but rather language as metaphor. As Nietzsche wrote “We believe that when we speak of trees, colours, snows, and flowers, we have knowledge of the things themselves, and yet we possess only metaphors of things which in no way correspond to the original entities.”

IE, we can imagine the unimaginable through language, but not literally, only metaphorically.

Physicalism and nonphysicalism as two aspects of the same thing
There are many examples where one concept can be expressed as a combination of physical and nonphysical experiences. For example, i) aesthetics - needing both a physical form and nonphysical content, where, as Kant said, judgments of beauty are sensory, emotional and intellectual all at once.
ii) emotions - as Antonio Damasio, neurologist said "an organism can possess feelings only when it can create a representation of the body's functions and the related changes that occur in the brain"
iii) mathematics - both discovered and invented, and in the words of Mario Livio, "Indeed, I posit that humans invent the mathematical concepts—numbers, shapes, sets, lines, and so on—by abstracting them from the world around them. They then go on to discover the complex connections among the concepts that they had invented; these are the so-called theorems of mathematics" - iv) being - as expressed in the hylomorphism of Aristotle, where being is a compound of matter and form, necessitating both the physical and the nonphysical, v) language - the later Wittgenstein writing in Philosophical Investigations that the meaning of a word is its use in language, where meaning occurs in a nonphyiscal mind and use occurs in a physical world.

IE, there are many examples where the physical and nonphysical have something in common.

Panqualityism
My feeling is that panqualityism, a view promoted by Sam Coleman, is the most reasonable theory to explain the connection between the physical brain and the nonphysical mind. Panqualityism can be seen as a kind of middle way between panpsychism and physicalism. Whereas the physicalist thinks that we can give an entirely reductive account of consciousness, the panpsychist thinks that consciousness is fundamental, and the panqualityist thinks that that the qualitative aspect of consciousness is fundamental, whilst holding a reductive view of subjectivity.

It is argued that sentience on Earth developed as early as the Cambrian period with the Cephalopods 541 to 485 million years ago. It seems reasonable to assume that consciousness is a property of sentience, and is a function of the complexity of the particular sentient being. There is a choice of belief, either i) there was a day when consciousness didn't exist and the next day it did, or ii) consciousness has always existed though to a lesser degree. Both possibilities are mysterious, though I find possibility ii) the more reasonable. Going further back in time there is another choice, either i) panpsychism, where atoms are conscious or ii) panqualityism, where atoms are not conscious but in certain combinations are able to give rise to consciousness. Again, both possibilities are mysterious, though I find possibility ii) the more reasonable.

IE, given the choice of many mysteries, I find the idea of panqualityism the least mysterious

Conclusion
In summary, the "thing" that has the two aspects of physical brain and nonphysical mind
may best be understood by the theory of panqualityism. However, this can only ever be a metaphorical understanding rather than a literal understanding.

hypothesis — Wayfarer

Both hypotheses, i) that a physical mind is different in kind to a nonphysical mind and ii)
that a physical mind and a nonphysical mind are two aspects of the same thing, would be difficult to prove.

Yet hypothesis ii) has the advantage that it does not involve a paradox.

my concerns are specific to mind — TheMadFool

You are assuming that the physical and nonphysical are of different kinds, leading to a paradox.

However, if one assumed that the physical and nonphysical are two aspects of the same thing, there would be no paradox. For example, spatial and temporal relationships cannot fully be explained as being either purely physical or purely nonphysical.

Either physicalism is true or nonphysicalism is true! — TheMadFool

I agree that if one starts with the premise that the physical is different in kind to the nonphysical, then one will conclude that the physical is different in kind to the nonphysical.

Similarly, if one starts with the premise that water is different in kind to ice, then one will conclude that water is different in kind to ice.

However, water and ice are two aspects of the same thing.

Therefore, perhaps the key to understanding the physical and nonphysical is perhaps to treat them as two aspects of the same thing.

If mind-matter are two aspects of the same thing, then there is no paradox.

the religious — baker

Whereas an atheist may say "meaning comes from playing the game using the human spirit of imagination and understanding", a theist may say "meaning comes from playing the game using a spiritual imagination and understanding".

the secret to being happy in a foxhole — baker

(Attempting to combine the insights of the 5th C Greek Tigranes son of Artabanus, a 6th C Indian board game, the 18th C German philosopher Kant and the French 20th C avant-garde artists).

Life is like chess, where the pieces and board are intrinsically meaningless, yet there is meaning in use, in that the meaning of chess comes from how the pieces are moved on the board.

Meaning is in the journey, not in the final destination, not in a momentary win or loss, where “Tis not for Money they contend, but for Glory”.

The game is played using one's free play of imagination and understanding, one's reason and logic in harmony with one's irrationality and intuition. In this foxhole of sometimes crisis and chaos, rather than timorously looking outwards for imagined support and consolation, to look courageously inwards in order to find the strength in the reality of one's own existence.

IE, meaning comes from playing the game using the human spirit of imagination and understanding.

chess seriously — Tom Storm

But the meaninglessness of the game may be the very meaning that you are searching for. A Dadaesque rejection of reason and logic for irrationality and intuition, a Continental rather than analytic approach.

As Duchamp wrote: "All this twaddle, the existence of God, atheism, determinism, liberation, societies, death, etc., are pieces of a chess game called language, and they are amusing only if one does not preoccupy oneself with 'winning or losing this game of chess.”

accept the pointless existence of life and the universe and still feel meaning — baker

Meaning is use.

Even if life was intrinsically meaningless, extrinsic meaning can come from how life is used. Chess pieces on a chess board are intrinsically meaningless. The meaning of chess comes from how the pieces are moved on the board.

IE, meaning comes not from life itself but how life is used.

Which of these four possibilities — Thinking

First, comparing 1 and 3 (where evolution is continually being directed by a high intelligence) to 2 and 4 ( where things evolve without being directed other than by the natural laws).

The evidence around us points to a constancy of the laws of nature, in that we expect the sun to rise in the east each morning and would be surprised if next Monday the sun rose in the west, indicating 2 and 4 are more likely that 1 and 3.

Next, comparing 2 (where there is a high intelligence) to 4 (where there isn't).

As in neither case is evolution directed once it is underway, the question then becomes what determined the natural laws in the first place, in that why is the speed of light 1,079,252,849 km per hour and not 1,079,252,850 km per hour. Totally mysterious to me.

However, if the natural laws were determined by a high intelligence, the obvious next question is what determined this high intelligence, a higher intelligence possibly, thus leading to an infinite regress. By Occam's Razor, as possibility 4 is the simpler of the two, I choose possibility 4.

IE, as possibility 4 is for me the best working hypothesis (that there is no high intelligence), my belief is that possibility 4 is most likely to be the truest and where evolution means the evolving by blind interactions of chemistry.

your partial truth. — 3017amen

It certainly is.

logically impossible God — 3017amen

Even if the theist/atheist assumed both i) a god that is all-knowing and ii) a complete understanding of an all-knowing god would lie outside human rational thought, it does not follow that the theist/atheist would not be able to use logic to strive for a partial understanding of the truth.

Nature is like a system that constantly tries to perfect and learn about itself — Thinking

Starting with an analogy. If I am on a golf course and hit a golf ball, the probability of final result depends on prior intention. If I want a hole-in-one and I achieve a hole-in-one, then the probability is one in 12,500. If I am just passing the time of day and don't care where the ball lands, the probability of the ball landing somewhere is one in one.

On primordial earth were free molecules such as oxygen, carbon, nitrogen and hydrogen
and today there are single human cells, proteins and other complex forms of life.

If during primordial earth the prior intention was the creation of single human cells, etc at a future date by blind interactions of chemistry undirected by natural processes, then the probability of success could well be 1/1x10^8867

If, however, during primordial earth there was no prior intention as to a future situation, then the probability of there being something in the future would be one in one.

The question is, during primordial earth, in what body did prior intention exist ?

There are four possibilities:
1) There is a high intelligence external to the molecules who determines evolution, in which case the probability of proteins, etc happening is one in one
2) There is a high intelligence external to the molecules who intends for the creation of proteins, etc but allows the blind interactions of chemistry, then the probability could well be 1/1x10^8867
3) There is a high intelligence intrinsic within the molecules having a purpose and goal.
As the protein is the goal, then if the goal was achieved the probability would be one in one. This is teleology of Aristotle who claimed that the acorn's intrinsic telos was to become a fully grown oak tree. However, even Kant, who wrote about teleology in his Critique of Judgement , did not believe that teleology was a mechanism but rather a useful narrative to explain a complex situation.
4) There is no high intelligence and only the blind interactions of chemistry, then the probability of there being something is one in one.

Then what can we deduce from the existence today of complex proteins, etc ?

IE, the probability of the existence of complex proteins, etc would only be 1/1x10^8867 if there had been a high intelligence prior to evolution who intended for the existence of proteins, yet allowed the blind interactions of chemistry. Otherwise the probability of complex proteins, etc today would be one in one.

Non-beliefs aren’t really based on arguments — Pinprick

I believe that snow is white - my argument is that I observe snow is white
I disbelieve that snow is black - my argument is that I observe snow is white

IE, my disbelief is based on an argument

If logic is just a tool used to justify/support arguments — Pinprick

IE, I am using logic as a tool to support my disbelief that snow is black based on my argument that I observe snow is white

I’m not sure logic is needed to justify a non-belief. — Pinprick

A logical belief needs evidence.
There is no evidence for the existence of unicorns.
Therefore, it follows that a belief that unicorns exist is not logical.
IE, it is logical to believe that unicorns don't exist
Putting it another way, it is logical to disbelieve in the existence of unicorns.

IE, logic can justify a disbelief.

complexity in natural processes — Thinking

The immediate answer to the question "does complexity infer a high intelligence" is no, as complexity can derive from a mathematical equation as simple as that of the Mandelbrot fractal z (n+1) = z (n ) 2 + c

The subsequent question is more difficult: "is mathematics discovered or invented".

As Einstein said, “How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought which is independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the objects of reality?”. If discovered, then the structure of mathematics is intrinsic to nature, and there are eternal mathematical truths in a Platonic sense. If invented, then mathematics is a human construct that serves our immediate purposes.

If mathematics was discovered, then the next question becomes "is mathematics evidence that nature was created by a high intelligence". If mathematics was invented, then the next question becomes "is human creative ability evidence that nature was created by a high intelligence"

As Kenosha Kid wrote, "complexity is a sign of nothing at all", in that complexity of itself is not evidence that nature was created by a high intelligence.

Fractal patterns in both space and time are infinitely complex, yet don't need an intelligent originator. Natural phenomena include algae, coastlines, heart rates, proteins, river networks, etc.

Biden rocks less boats — Benkei

Though as Harry S. Truman said at his Commencement Address at Howard University 1952 :
"It is no service to the country to turn away from the hard problems--to ignore injustice and human suffering. It is simply not the American way of doing things. Of course, there are always a lot of people whose motto is "Don't rock the boat." They are so afraid of rocking the boat, that they stop rowing. We can never get ahead that way. We can only drift with the current and finally go over the falls into oblivion with nothing accomplished."

Perhaps it is a case of self-censorship, where forum members feel that they might get into trouble if
they expressed their honest opinions on this thread.

But as Mary Midgley wrote - "Is philosophy like plumbing? I have made this comparison a number of
times when I have wanted to stress that philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult, but is also needed. It is not optional".