Let me stop you there at the heart of our disagreement. The self is not 'behind' the senses or its data. The self is (I claim) a discursive performance of the body, a creative appropriation of community norms. The self is a way that a body acts in a society of other such selves. The self is a body that is trained to track itself for decency and the coherence of its claims and (in some cultures) for the amplification of its autonomy. This self is mostly inherited and reconstituted community 'software', including especially a language in which selves make sense, in both senses of the phrase. I mean we understand selves (make sense of them) as origins of claims (and other less symbolic deeds) for which they are then held responsible. Part of our training involves learning to apply concepts properly (within claims).the mind needs information from the other side of our senses — RussellA
RussellA perceives direct realists only indirectly: the direct realist in his head does not resemble the direct realist as it is in the external world — Jamal
Closest I can come is to imagine how perception works when we're wrapped up in a physical activity, like running to catch a ball or playing an instrument (or hammering of course). These don't seem very linguistic to me, though I could well be wrong. I'm not committed to perception-as-essentially-linguistic — Jamal
It's a deeper point than that, to do with the fact that in situations of perceiving we are always already linguistic, because of what we are. — Jamal
You say that on the one hand you're not committed to perception as essentially linguistic but on the other hand you say that perception is linguistic. — RussellA
Regardless, Direct Realism is the position that private experiences are direct presentations of objects existing in a mind-independent world, not about the nature of language. — RussellA
https://psychology.fandom.com/wiki/Direct_realism
Direct realism, also known as naïve realism or common sense realism, is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast to this direct awareness, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world.
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Direct realists might claim that indirect realists are confused about conventional idioms that may refer to perception. Perception exemplifies unmediated contact with the external world; examples of indirect perception might be seeing a photograph, or hearing a recorded voice. Against representationalists, direct realists often argue that the complex neurophysical processes by which we perceive objects do not entail indirect perception. These processes merely establish the complex route by which direct awareness of the world arrives. The inference from such a route to indirectness may be an instance of the genetic fallacy.
...the naive realist holds that things appear a certain way to you because you are directly presented with aspects of the world, and – in the case we are focusing on – things appear white to you, because you are directly presented with some white snow. The character of your experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness [understood in context to be some mind-independent property of snow] manifesting itself in experience.
Disjunctivists are often naïve realists, who hold that when one perceives the world, the mind-independent objects of perception, such as tables and trees, are constituents of one’s experience.
What needs to be explained is the meaning of "direct". — Michael
consciousness, whatever it is, doesn't extend beyond the brain, and so it's physically impossible for an apple and its properties to be "present" in my conscious experience. It might be causally responsible for conscious experience, but that's all it can physically be. — Michael
There's just the world, our world, the one we talk about. — plaque flag
The point is that concepts are public norms. The concept pain doesn't get its meaning from private experience. — plaque flag
The self is not 'behind' the senses or its data. The self is (I claim) a discursive performance of the body, a creative appropriation of community norms. — plaque flag
Respectfully, I claim that you don't yet understand the position. 'Mind-independent world' is potentially nonsensical, almost definitely misleading. 'Private experiences' too. — plaque flag
'Direct' should be read as inindirect, a negation or cancelling of the original mistake. — plaque flag
Consciousness (the semantically slippery eel) seems to extend to distant stars in some sense, or astronomy is bunk. — plaque flag
I say forget about internal theaters and secret screens. — plaque flag
Yes, this relates back to the Kant passage, but it doesn't address the question as to whether we have indirect or direct knowledge of this world. — RussellA
If the concept pain doesn't get its meaning from private experience, I stub my toe and feel pain, where does it get its meaning from ? — RussellA
I don't think that "the self" is normally defined as part an individual and part the community in which they live. — RussellA
Isn't an external world a mind-independent world ? — RussellA
Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for? — Jamal
To me this is a strange and very questionable statement. This really does sound like a ghost story from over here.consciousness doesn't extend beyond the brain — Michael
Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for? — Jamal
Isn’t intentionality a fundamental part of consciousness? Isn’t that pretty much what consciousness is for? — Jamal
To me this is a strange and very questionable statement. This really does sound like a ghost story from over here. — plaque flag
And so it could be that the experience is of an apple, and yet the experience is made of something like brain activity or sense data or rational inferences, none of which are features of the apple itself. — Michael
No, I was switching between provisionally explaining the argument that perception is linguistic as if it were true, and expressing doubts about it. This should be obvious. — Jamal
Not at all. Consciousness might just be reducible to brain activity, and brain activity obviously doesn't extend the brain. — Michael
If there's a "ghost story" at all it's with your theory that consciousness extends beyond the stars. — Michael
I suggest dropping that terminology. External to what ? — plaque flag
This resource offers what I am talking about (or close enough). — plaque flag
Mind is something a body does , a patterned way of moving. Even that minimal monologue is moving parts. — plaque flag
The term "external" comes from the resource you recommended. — RussellA
Just pretend it's not there. Like I said, close enough. — plaque flag
:up:I've accepted as much when I said that consciousness is reducible to brain activity. The "moving parts" of my inner monologue is the firing of certain neurons. — Michael
If you have to advise people not to use certain words, that's a bad sign. There's something you don't want to face. — frank
Please review the context. I think you'll see in this case that Russell is just being difficult. <smile> — plaque flag
Cool. So we can agree on embodied cognition. — plaque flag
That language is directed at that shared world ? Toward objects and other selves in it ? — plaque flag
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