If I understand what you are saying I think I agree. It is often said that the self, being the experiencer cannot be itself the object of experience, with the analogy of the eye that cannot see itself being invoked.

However the eye is a real object which can be seen, so I think it is a rather weak analogy. If the self is nothing more than an idea then of course it cannot be experienced it can only be thought.

That said we have a sense of self (or is it just a sense of being?) which seems to be pre-conceptual. If it is just a sense of being it is also a sense of being different (from everything else) it seems. I don't doubt that (at least some) animals have this kind of sense.

Fair points!

If everything simply exists without known cause, then there is no moral implication. — Brendan Golledge

Morality does not issue from anything as arcane as cosmogony but rather from the pragmatic necessities of harmonious social life.

I would think phenomenology would necessarily be rather poor at yielding reliable knowledge about the experience of people in general, given the neurodiversity of people. — wonderer1

Yes, there is the assumption that either we are all the same or that at least we are all basically the same. Is that assumption justifiable? I don't know.

That makes sense, and I didn't mean to imply that it couldn't be called a science at all. But the epoche does set on one side the "hard" sciences, doesn't it? That's why phenomenology has to have a method of its own. — Ludwig V

I wasnt thinking so much of a distinction between hard and soft sciences. I think phenomenology is unique whether counted as science or not in that it attempts to deal with the nature of human experience itself as distinct from all the other sciences which deal with observed phenomena of one kind or another.

Yes. You may be thinking of fantasy stories. But those rely on hand-waving - magic or future technology - to keep plausibility going. — Ludwig V

I am not sure if you would count them as fantasy stories but I was thinking more specifically of myths and metaphysical speculations and religions. That is conjectures which count themselves to be non-fictional.

Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.

That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:

“….It is important to keep in mind that Husserl’s phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the “I”; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible….” — Mww

One experiences phenomena by perceiving them. How does on experience oneself? By being it? If we have a sense of the self by virtue of being then I think phenomenology would consist in the introspective apprehension of that be-ing as well as in the reflective investigation and description of the qualities and nature of experience and being in general. I'm not making any judgement about whether phenomenology yields valid or reliable knowledge. Vervaecke counts "participatory knowing" as one of four kinds of knowing.

It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the “I” is impossible, if only the “I” is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of “I”’s, or different forms of a single “I”, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.

Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other. — Mww

Yes, perhaps the "I" is nothing more than a mere idea which we hold as an overarching unifying principle. If that were so it would be a kind of metaphysical or ontological illusion. A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea.

I wasnt thinking clearly. I should have said "foster laziness" not "prevent laziness'. I find nothing to disagree with in what you've said. Perhaps an analogy could be drawn with the use of a calculator. Its a timesaving device and perhaps no harm if the user can perform the functions unaided but if they become a substitute for personal abilities I think thats a detriment.

You had me almost believin' for a moment there!

Well, the Husserl's crucial idea was the epoche or "bracketing" of external reality to exclude it from consideration. The "first-person" or subjective "lived world" was the subject-matter. The methods of the sciences as understood in his day were not applicable. But he did think of phenomenology as a systematic study and methodology. So in that sense, it was a science but it wouldn't have been called that at the time. — Ludwig V

As far as I remember Husserl considered phenomenology to be the science of consciousness, of human experience. I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience in the other sciences. I could be mistaken about that of course.

That's about right. I would add that no clear meaning can be attributed to reality beyond our access and the the ambit of common human experience - amplified by techniques discovered or at least valdiated by science - is all there is. — Ludwig V

I agree with that. But I do think that our capacity to imagine possibilities beyond the ambit of common experience is an important phenomenological fact about the human.

I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding. — Mww

Yes, I think there's some truth in that.

While they don't prevent participants who have an imperfect command of English to make use of those tools to learn how to better express themselves, they also make them aware of the risks inherent in abusing them (and enable moderators who suspect such abuse to point to the guidelines). — Pierre-Normand

I wonder whether using LLMs to tidy up grammar and improve clarity of expression would not hamper one's own development of those skills. In other words, I wonder whether it would not foster laziness. For the rest I agree with you.

But I thought that Husserl specifically developed phenomenology to be something quite distinct from science - unless you define science as anything that attempts to achieve objectivity.

Which prompts me to complain that this entire discussion is scientistic and ignores the possibility that disciplines that do not aim to emulate science may be (I think are) essential to understanding consciousness. History, Literary and Cultural Studies, Sociology, some branches of Psychology etc. - not to mention Marxism and Psychoanalysis which might well have something to offer. But, of course, it all depends how you define "science". — Ludwig V

It does depend on how you define science. I think Husserl considered phenomenology to be a science, and I see no reason not to think of psychology, anthropology, sociology and history as sciences.

Yes, I guess it is. Perhaps that simple-mindedness is a fault. One can't, for example, describe an unborn baby as a foetus and pretend not to know what kind of context that sets up. — Ludwig V

I would count simplemindedness as a fault wherever a more nuanced understanding is available.

Well, I certainly agree that it is a good thing to recognize the difference between a picture and a description and being there. Whether "limitations" is appropriate for that is another question. — Ludwig V

You introduced the photograph analogy. I think a photograph does capture aspects of the reality just as our thinking can. Thinking may be more or less apt. I can see your point if you mean to say that we needn't worry about whether or not what we say is absolutely adequate to the reality, but should rather concern ourselves with the relevance, validity and soundness of what we say within the ambit of common human experience.

First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.

Probably isn’t a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases. — Mww

AFAIK since Nietzsche Husserl and Heidegger the continentals have (purportedly at least) eschewed metaphysics or at least reduced it to be a subset of phenomenology.

I refuse to use ChatGPT at all. I suspect some participants are using it to research particular issues and to enhance their own posts making them look much more substantive than the posts they used to present.

I'd say ban its use altogether except in those kinds of threads explicitly concerned with exploring the chatbot nature such as @Pierre-Normand has produced.

I mean even banning it for simple purposes such as improving grammar and writing clarity. Of course this will rely on the honesty of posters since it would seem to be impossible to prove that ChatGPT has been used.

OK. I'm not denying that so-called analytic and continental approaches to philosophy are concerned with different things. Its too complex a topic to bother trying to address here, and it really has little to do with the OP in any case.

I think it's worth noting that in that three-year-old conversation you linked I said I approve of a plurality of approaches because we cannot pre-emptively decide what each will turn up. I havent changed my mind on that. You seem to be much more intent on polemicising the issue.

Certainly the brain can be studied by empirical science. Consciousness as such though is not an observable phenomenon. Dennett recommends an approach he terms 'heterophenomenology' which is an attempt to combine empirical science with first person reports.

Do you think we can be confident that introspection and reflection on experience may yield reliable information about the nature of consciousness?

What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy?

I'm not concerned about labels. I just don't understand the call for a "first-person" science given that we already have phenomenology and (I forgot to mention) psychology.

I mean you can't incorporate the first person into the study of chemistry, biology, geology, botany, or even physics and so on. That said it should be obvious enough to acknowledge that all those sciences are carried out by persons and that they are dependent on human perception and judgement. I can't imagine anyone being silly enough to deny that.

Right - his first book was 'towards a science of consciousness', but note his exploration of the requirement for a 'first-person science', i.e. science which takes into account the reality of the observer, instead of viewing the whole issue through an 'objectivist' lens. — Wayfarer

Don't we already have, and have had for a long time, that "first-person science" in the form of phenomenology?

But, to be fair, those effects are not always being consciously manipulated. — Ludwig V

Right, but then isn't that the "simpleminded" case?

Perhaps it's not relevant. Let's not pursue it here. — Ludwig V

:cool:

Oh, I don't think it is all that simple-minded. It is an attempt to gain a rhetorical advantage by labelling the phenomenon in a prejudicial way. If I'm feeling charitable, I try to ignore the label for the sake of the argument. — Ludwig V

Well, I think it's either simpleminded or dishonestly tendentious. "Trying to gain a rhetorical advantage" seems a strategy more suited to sophistry than to philosophy.

I'm not that bothered about that supposed failure. It's a bit like complaining that a photograph doesn't capture the reality of the scene. — Ludwig V

I'm not bothered by it either, so it wasn't a complaint, but merely an acknowledgement. I see it as a good thing to acknowledge our limitations.

But not by reporting facts. Language has resources beyond that. — Ludwig V

It's not clear to me what you are wanting to get at here.

That's true, but what if the robotically-enabled systems decide to disable the passive LLM's? — Wayfarer

Would it be the robot's "brain" that decided or the robot itself? :wink:

It isn't different to what I've been saying all along. My writing seems clear to me, but maybe I overestimate its clarity for others, I don't know.

I'm familiar with Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. I read the book many years ago. I agree that it makes no sense speaking about the brain deliberating, making decisions and so on because that way of speaking belongs to the space of reasons, to the understanding of human experience and behavior. There is a sense in which activities of the brain are no part of human experience. We are "blind" to what goes on in the brain. However there is another sense in which deliberating, making decisions, judging and experiencing in general are not really separate from neural activity—they are the experiential dimension of neural activity, so to speak.

It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act. — Janus

I'm afraid it is very controversial. The disagreement centres on "cause". There's a definition which circulates in philosophical discussion and this definition itself is, in my view, suspect. — Ludwig V

By "cause" I mean something like "provides the necessary conditions". I'm not thinking in terms of "linear' efficient causation, although that too arguably plays a part. There are always going to be problems with our attempt to formulate ideas of causes and conditions, given that those formulations are inherently dualistic and given that the reality is, presumably, non-dual.

That said, we are concerned with what it seems most reasonable to say, while acknowledging that our words can never capture the reality.

give rise to that decision or action — Janus

You've moved away from the troublesome concept of cause to something vaguer, which masks, to some extent, where the disagreement is. — Ludwig V

So, here is where I think your misunderstanding of my argument is. To my way of thinking if a set of conditions gives rise to another set of conditions then the former could rightly be said to cause the latter, at least within the scope of what seem to be reasonable ways to think, while not extending to a claim of exhaustively capturing what is going on.

You refer to "when I decide to act or simply act". That seems to posit the possibility of acting without deciding to act, which seems absurd, and certainly won't help the neurophysiologists, who are looking for causes of action. — Ludwig V

It seems to me that very many even most of our actions happen without conscious decision. I think it is only meaningful to speak of decision when we are self-consciously aware of deliberating over what to do. We can posit that unconscious decision-making takes place, but then it becomes, as is so often the case, a terminological issue. Same goes for positing unconscious intentions. Are these unconscious decisions and intentions just rationalizations after the fact? If not what could they be other than neural activity?

Then we need to think about planning, preparing, trying - where do all these fit in? — Ludwig V

To my way of thinking planning and preparing can be parts of deliberation, Trying is just doing it seems.

The dualists explained "simply acting" by positing that they took place very rapidly or unconsciously, which I think most people now recognize as hand-waving. Neurophysiologists are doing the same thing. The difference is that they are waving their hands at physical correlates.
It's a mess. — Ludwig V

For me there is no separation between the physical processes and the semantic or qualitative aspects of our lives. They are all of a piece and only seem separate due to our inherently dualistic thought and speech.

So I don't believe the meaningful qualitative dimension of our lives would be possible without the physical. However I don't buy the reverse argument that because the very idea of the physical is a part of our meaningful qualitive experience and judgment that it follows that the physical universe could not exist without the presence of percipients capable of apprehending it. So i think in that sense it is most reasonable to say that the physical universe is both ontologically and temporally prior.to perception, experience and judgement.

Moreover, merely replacing the mind by the brain leaves intact the misguided Cartesian conception of the relationship between the mind and behavior, merely replacing the ethereal by grey glutinous matter. — Wayfarer

What seems most misguided and retrogressive to me is the very idea that the brain is merely "grey glutinous matter". That seems most simple-minded to me. The counterpoint to that—thinking of the mind as ethereal is the equally retarded sibling.

You apparently just don't get it. I don't expect you to agree with me, but your objections, which amount to changing the subject, show no understanding of what I've been saying. The principle of diminishing returns dictates that we might as well leave it there.

What if the either/or thinking is correct? There are either/or situations. A square circle is either/or. It's not both. — Patterner

A square circle is not either/ or and nor is it a paradox, It is just an incoherent conjoining of words.

Of course they do, but we also act for reasons. As I keep trying to get you to see they are just different kinds of explanation. You might get it if you ditch your either/or thinking.

The whole process of perception and action is 'of a piece' but you don't say that can be explained solely in terms of physical processes unless you're a philosophical materialist - which you say you're not, but then you keep falling back to a materialist account. — Wayfarer

You continue to misunderstand. I'm not claiming that intentionality and personal experience can be comprehended or encapsulated in any purely physical account.

But the 'two competing explanatory paradigms', mental and material, just is the Cartesian division - mind and matter, self and other. — Wayfarer

Again you misunderstand. The Cartesian claim is that of two distinct substances. Spinoza corrected that with the realization that thinking in terms of cogitans and thinking in terms of extensa are two different modes of understanding and he said they are the two we humans can comprehend out of the infinite attributes of the one substance.

So they are not "competing" explanatory paradigms, and I didn't say they were. I said they are two different and incommensurable explanatory paradigms. I think you see them as competing because you presume that one must be correct and the other incorrect. So you are reflecting your own prejudices, not mine.

The way to "transcend that division" is to see that they are just two ways of understanding and that no polemic is necessary or even coherent between them.

They might be unconscious, but that doesn’t mean they’re reducible to, or explainable in terms of, electrochemical processes. That is precisely materialist philosophy of mind. — Wayfarer

I haven't said that our actions and decisions are exhaustively explainable in terms of neural processes. We make sense of our actions in terms of reasons not in terms of causes, and I've explicitly acknowledged that in this thread I believe.

Obviously stimuli can affect your endocrines, adrenaline, and the like. But that is a matter of biological physiology, not electrochemical reactions as such. Electrochemical reactions are a lower level factor that response to higher-level influences, which in the case of humans can include responses to words. — Wayfarer

Stimulation via the senses is achieved via electrochemical processes as I understand it. And again, I don't think that is controversial. So the whole process of perception, judgement, decision and action is all of a piece. It doesn't follow that we can dispense with our ordinary way of understanding perception, judgement, decision and action in terms of affection and reason, or in other words it doesn't follow that scientific descriptions of what is going on could outright replace those ordinary kinds of explanations. They are just two different explanatory paradigms which cannot be combined into a unified master paradigm as far as I can see, I admit it might turn out that I'm wrong about that of course. At present no such master paradigm seems to be on the horizon.

.

However you want to label it is not relevant to the point.

So, you don't believe that when you act there have been prior neural processes which give rise to that action? Determinism doesn't entail that one cannot learn and/ or change one's mind, or that rational argument has no effect on what is believed. If you think that then you are working with a simplistic notion of determinism.

Cheers Ludwig such details are easily missed. I do it all the time.

So how does it cause a decision to act? Do chemicals also ‘decide to act’? You’ve said many times that the material universe is devoid of intention. — Wayfarer

It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act. Do you really believe that when you decide to act or simply act that there have been no prior neural processes (that you have obviously not been aware of) which give rise to that decision or action?

It's uncontroversial that the brain responds to stimuli and orchestrates all bodily processes and actions. That's what I mean. I've already said that I'm referring to that as modeling but am not suggesting it is any more than a physical process. Take it as a metaphor.

i No, I'm not attributing agency in any other sense than action. In the kind of sense that the chemist speaks of chemical agents.

if you posit that the brain has to carry out some process - call it modelling - that has to be executed before any action can be carried out - it seems to me that you have created an infinite regress. — Ludwig V

I don't see why you would think that if the brain is constantly modeling all experience and action that it would imply dualism, a homunculus or an infinite regress.

I'm not saying the process of 'modeling" is anything other than a physical process,

I'm not claiming that there is somehow a kind of theatre with a little watcher in the brain which is prior to our experience, thoughts and actions. Think of a computer program that generates novel ways of articulating ideas. The processes that do that we could refer to as a kind of modeling constituted by the electronic switching that gives rise to the program.

I can't see why an infinite regress would be involved. You haven't actually explained your reasons for those three claims.

:cool:

Even something as abstract as a "view from anywhere" implies that someone, some consciousness, is going to step into that place and attain the view. — J

The God's eye view is sometimes referred to as the view from nowhere. I think it would be more aptly understood as the view from everywhere (and everywhen). I also like the relativistic non-omniscient notion of a view from anywhere. It could also be called 'the view from nowhere in particular'.

while the view from nowhere solipsisticly centres on the self, the view from anywhere is eccentric, looking to account for what others say they see, while seeking broad consensus. — Banno

I don't see it that way. The self-centred view is the view from somewhere, not the view from nowhere.

Do you need prior modelling of the modelling? No? Then why do you need to model the action in the first place? — Ludwig V

It seems reasonable to me to think that for everything we think and do there is a corresponding neural network of activity. That is what I mean by 'modeling'. As I already said although we think of it as modeling a conceptual or semantic process, we also think of what the brain does as a physical process. In any case, why would we need modeling of the modeling?

Is the brain part of the self or not? Assuming it is, then it has to model itself, including a model of its modelling. !?
Can you tell me the difference between my "self" and "Ludwig" and "I"? I don't perceive any. — Ludwig V

Are you denying that it most plausible to think that the brain evolves a model of our overall being we refer to as 'the self'? Of course that model includes the brain and the body. The brain that models is conceptually the central part of that model, but it is not an experiential part at all. Apparently the brain lacks any sensation. It is the one part of our bodies we cannot feel.

Yes. Exactly. So how do you know the brain is modelling anything?

It may be that I simply don't understand what you mean by "model" and "modelling". — Ludwig V

I'm saying that the brain's inscrutable neural processes we can only conceive as 'modeling'. What could it mean to say that conception is wrong when we cannot directly observe or even feel what the living brain is doing?

Tell me about it. There's no hurry. It's just that it might be interesting to swop notes as and when. Up to you. — Ludwig V

I agree it would be interesting to compare notes. I'll certainly let you know if I start reading Groundless Grounds. I'm enjoying our conversation. :cool:

"nothing at all happens without the brain" is not helpful. Nothing at all happens without the legs, heart, etc. — Ludwig V

Of course it's the whole system working together. However the brain is the central processing unit so I think it is important to emphasize that nothing happens without the brain.

If the brain tells the heart to beat and the lungs to breathe and processes and renders intelligible all sensory input and tells our limbs how to move when performing actions both simple and complex how would all this be possible without prior modeling?

Apart from all the autonomic functions the brain gives rise to consciousness and creates an overarching model we refer to as the "self".

Preparation is concept that links preparatory activities to the activity, so it is conceptually, not merely causally, linked to the activity. — Ludwig V

We understand and experience neural activity only as affect, percept and concept. We can say the brain must model all our bodily functions and actions and all its sensory input, but its true we don't know exactly what all those neuronal processes and networks are doing simply because they cannot be directly observed in vivo.

I should hope not. It's meant to be a foundation, not the actual activity. It certainly represents a big change in the concept if you are a platonist. — Ludwig V

Right. Luckily I am no platonist. I find the very idea that numbers are somehow real apart from their instantiations and our generalizing concepts of them to be incoherent.

I shall be very interested to know what you make of the book. I'm very sympathetic to the project. — Ludwig V

Cheers. I do have quite a lot on my 'to read' list and nowhere near as much time to read as I would like so there may be a fair bit of time before I can get to it.

-Robots do not have any subjective experiences of the electrical activity within them by which they detect sensory input, discriminate this input from that input, and act based on what they are currently detecting. We do. Why don't they? Why do we? — Patterner

I think the answer is quite simple. We are complex multidimensional evolved organisms, and they are not. Also we do not have any subjective experience of the workings of the brain and the CNS, we only experience the sensations, affects, thoughts and actions that manifest on account of those workings.

Right. But, if all is physical determinism, then why would we experience the wanting? A robot that is programmed to fill a cup with water when its sensors detect it is empty doed not "want" water. — Patterner

Why would we not experience wanting? Why compare us to robots? We are not robots we are evolved organisms.

And, advantage or not, how is the subjective experience accomplished? — Patterner

We don't know, and may never know, how it is accomplished. I say we may never know, because even the neural processes cannot be directly observed in vivo. But we have no evidence to suggest that neural activity could not possibly be accompanied by conscious experience. We understand physical processes in causal terms by directly observing them and in the case of neural processes this is just not possible.

Even if we could observe in living detail the neural processes we cannot observe conscious experience, so establishing the link between the two would still seem to be impossible, as far as I can imagine. Of course I might be mistaken, I won't deny that.

I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity is wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose. — Patterner

I don't see the 'wanting to have milk' as epiphenomenal but as a necessary part of the associated neural activity. We certainly don't experience the neural activity as such.

Without wanting to nit pick, I don’t think that’s quite right. The stock example I’ve always read is, the answer to ‘why is the kettle boiling? — Wayfarer

There is no essential difference I can see between the example I gave and your "stock example". If you see a difference perhaps you could highlight it.

You have arithmetic as soon as you can do that, but for true mathematics, you really need to go in for more elaborate calculations, such as algebraic ones and recognize "0". That changes the concept of number, but still grounds it in the relevant activities, not in any objects, physical or abstract. — Ludwig V

Thanks, but I'm not seeing how it changes the concept of number beyond just extending the basic concept inherent in counting.

There's an entry in the index for "rational reconstruction". You may have to read around the actual passages a bit to see what is going on. If you do read it and want to ask me questions by private message, I would be happy to answer - not that I can answer all the questions, by any means. It's all about the role of articulation (in language or talking to oneself) in thinking and action. So relevant to animals. — Ludwig V

Thanks I'll check it out. By the way I'm not averse to Heidegger. I have read some of his work including Being and Time, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and secondary sources such as Dreyfus, Malpas and Blattner, listened to Dreyfus' lectures and attended a couple of undergraduate units dealing with his early work and I found it all quite rewarding. It was my interest in Heidegger more than my interest in Wittgenstein that led me to buy the Braver books.

You are quite right. My problem with your way of putting it is that the cause is a different entity or event from the effect. That's why I want to say that my going to the shops consists of my moving my legs, etc and the neural activity (which, after all, is involved throughout by controlling the movement of my legs. — Ludwig V

Yes I agree we must include the whole system of causes and conditions. That said nothing at all happens without the brain and the neuroscientists tell us that the neural networks in the brain model everything we think and do just prior to our thinking and doing.

That still doesn't show that rationality is contingent on being correct or knowing the truth. — night912

I agree. The larger part of rational thinking consists in inductive and abductive reasoning which is inherently defeasible.

As explanations they are incompatible in the sense that they cannot be combined into a 'master' explanation that incorporates them. That is not to say that being caused and intentional behavior cannot both exist in the same universe or being.

Say I go to the shops for milk. If someone asks why I went to the shops I'll say it was to buy milk. That's one explanation. On the other hand, I could say I went to the shops because the neural activity which is experienced as realizing I was out of milk and neural activity which is experienced as wanting to have milk led to neural activity which led me to go to the shop.

The reason I went to the shops was to buy milk. The cause of my going to the shops was neural activity. The two explanations do not rule each other out they are just two different ways of understanding the same event. Their incompatibility consists in their different ways of understanding. It doesn't follow that one is right and the other wrong,

If those two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm, then one or both of those kinds of explanations need to be modified or discarded. Because, since everything exists in this one universe, there must be a single paradigm that explains it all.

But perhaps there is a paradigm that they both fit within. As opposed to melding the two. — Patterner

I don't see why there must be a "single paradigm that explains it all". Those two modes of explanation are both essential to human life. For the modern mind explanations of phenomena as intentional cannot carry any weight because they are justified neither by observation nor logic.

When it comes to explanations of human and some animal behavior the notion of acting for intelligently formulated reasons would seem to be indispensable so I can't see a possibility of discarding either one. As to "modifying" them or finding a "master" paradigm within which they would both fit I cannot even begin to imagine what those would look like.

Of course that doesn't mean it is impossible, but it certainly seems impossible from where I sit. The logics of intentional behavior on the one hand and being constrained to act by external causes on the other just seem incompatible.