(A Christian philosophical view would be that this natural order is instituted by God, and the appropriate response is that of obedience to divine commandments, which I will leave aside in favour of philosophical analysis. However it should be understood as part of the background of this question as modern culture has been shaped by rejection of that view - it defines what not to believe for a lot of people.) — Wayfarer

For me that way of framing it is tendentious. The Christian worldview held sway for a very long time, and its only guarantor was the voice of unimpeachable authority. It is not that rejection of that worldview is driven by nefarious motives or some kind of willful blindness, but rather that, as a paradigm, it has too many inconsistencies with human experience to be capable of continuing to convince those who look at it impartially, and it also flies in the face of a human sense of justice. It is unknown, unknowable, just how many it failed to convince in its heydays, since at those times espousing disbelief was dangerous.

:up: Very nicely laid out!

Those opposing will argue that mental acts, such as speaking and reasoning, and perhaps even the very quality of subjective experience itself, cannot be explained in terms of physical processes. — Wayfarer

Whether consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes is a different question than whether it or the physical (or neither) is ontologically fundamental. Then there is the further question as to whether the notion of ontological fundamentality really makes any sense.

To me it seems obvious that the qualitative aspect of experience cannot be explained in physicalist terms, just as the meaning of a poem cannot be given in mathematical terms. There are many possibilities for category error and reification.

What is a non-linguistic concept? A dog associating a leash with a walk, is that a concept? It's association sure. Concepts seem to be something beyond just association. — schopenhauer1

Would you count seeing something as something as a kind of conceptualization? The ball stands out for the dog; it's a gestalt. This is cognition and re-cognition. Then the dog sees the ball as a to-be-chased; would you say this as a conceptualization?

My own experience of inner dialogue is that much of it goes on in terms of images, not words. But then perhaps the earliest forms of communication of ideas were in images and gestures delineating forms, rather than in words. Problem is we cannot be there to observe.

Yes, I understand that the Tractatus priveleges one usage over another, but that doesn't change the fact that there are different usages. It is an ambivalent term. A dog chasing a ball, for example, according to common usage as I understand it, is not a fact but an event. That the dog chased the ball is a fact, and that the dog chased the ball is also a proposition or statement.

Anyway, this just reflects the sloppiness of language, and I'm not claiming it is of any great importance.

Interesting post! :up:

As I understand it the term 'fact' refers ambiguously to both actual states of affairs, and statements describing states of affairs. It is in the latter sense that it is said that encyclopedias are compendiums of facts (or at least purported facts). Encyclopedias do not contain states of affairs, but statements of states of affairs like 'Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade at sea level". "Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade" is a fact or true statement in this sense.

So, I don't see it as a case of "either/ or" but "both/ and" since the word 'fact' is commonly used in both of these senses, and thus I don't believe I have conflated anything.

Are you saying true propositions are necessarily true? — Sam26

Not quite, I'm saying that if a proposition is to be counted as a fact then it is necessarily true. That still sounds a little ambiguous, because it might be understood to be saying that only propositions which are necessarily true are to be counted as facts, but that's not what I meant. So, I should have said that if a proposition is to be correctly counted as a fact, it must be true.

I agree with you that whether or not we ascribe reasoning to animals will depend on how we define 'reasoning'.

A fact is not true or false. There are no false facts, only false claims and beliefs about what is a fact. — Fooloso4

You are thinking of 'fact' as equivalent to 'actuality'. In a different sense, the encyclopedia is a compendium of facts, or true propositions and descriptions. Facts, considered as true propositions are necessarily true. If a propositons or description is false it is not a fact. Facts considered as actualties are not true or false, they simply obtain.

The fact: the baby is crying
The proposition: the baby is crying — Fooloso4

You seem to be pointing out that the fact is concrete whereas the proposition is abstract. The baby crying is a concrete fact. The term 'fact'; is ambiguous; it can mean either 'true proposition' or 'actuality'.

Thanks for your explanation, unfortunately I don't have the background to properly understand what you're saying, so I cannot form a judgement of its veracity or even plausibility.

Logic, viz., propositional logic, is an act of inference using propositions. Not all of our actions are of this type, which I'm sure you know, and not all regularities are of this type. My thinking was that there is a kind of logic, not propositional logic (formal logic), behind reality, this was the thinking of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Logic in the T. is the starting point, and this W. inherited from Russell and Frege. — Sam26

I agree and I wasn't thinking about propositional logic but logic in the broader sense of semantic relations or structure.

IF you prefer, the world is proposition-ready... — Banno

I'd agree with this, with the qualification that actualities as experienced by humans (and arguably certain other animals) are proposition ready.

(The CPU maps inputs to outputs in the exact same way regardless of the program that it is running.) — Pierre-Normand

I know little about computers, but on the face of it seems to me that, even if the CPU maps inputs to outputs in the same way whatever program it is running, the actual inputs and outputs themselves are not the same.

Without the explicit thoughts, we cannot classify this as "inductive reasoning". — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no doubt that some kinds of animals have a capacity to reason, and I don't believe that reasoning is necessarily carried out, even by humans, in the form of "explicit thoughts". But I also don't care to expend the effort on trying to convince you of that.

Hence it is sentences that are "context driven"; not truth. — Banno

Is truth always context dependent? Yes, because it is statements that are true, and stements are context-dependent. — Banno

Are you drawing a distinction between being context driven and being context dependent, or are you simply contradicting yourself?

I would agree with your second sentence that both statements and their truth or falsity are context dependent.

:up:

Yes, I am suggesting that rationality drives the brain, while the brain "drives" rationality in a different sense: through enabling us to think rationally. Likewise, the driver drives the car while the car "drives" the driver (through enabling the driver to go where they want to go). The main difference, of course, is that the car and the driver are separate entities whereas the brain is a part of a whole person. But I don't think that undermines the point of the analogy. — Pierre-Normand

So, are you suggesting that there is an additional component to rational thought, a purely semantic aspect, that is enabled by, but is not itself determined by, neuronal activities, and that can feed back into the neuronal activities and change them, thus creating a situation which is not completely physically deterministic? Or something like that?

It doesn't make sense to attribute mental states like my memory of my grandmother or my belief that 2 + 2 = 4 to the whole of my body or a function.

But that does sound like a rehash of behaviourism.

I have distinct mental contents which is not similar or identical to any part of my body or behaviour. — Andrew4Handel

If you are to ask where these states are located then where else but the body? I mean they are your states, and where else are you but with your body?

I don't see how this has anything to do with behaviorism, but maybe I'm missing something.

It's true that we have mental states which are not similar or identical to any behavior or part of your body. You also have parts of your body which are not similar or identical to any other parts of your body, like your navel, your nose, your scalp, your heart, lungs, stomach etc., etc.

But in any case it's not that your mental states can be understood to be parts of your body, because body parts are obviously observable and physical like the body is. Mental states are not obviously physical, not observable, so they cannot comfortably fit into the category of 'parts of the body'. It may not be possible to precisely locate a mental state, but there is no doubt they are associated with living bodies; yours with yours and mine with mine. I mean it would make no sense to say that your mental state is located anywhere else would it?

That's right, but inductive reasoning is still a form of reasoning, so we cannot deny, as Jacques does, that causation is based in reason. We just have to respect the fact that this type of reasoning, which currently provides us with our understanding of causation, cannot provide that high degree of certainty which deductive reasoning does. — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue here is that animals also seem to have inductive expectations. So maybe what we think of as inductive reasoning consists in rationalising our instinctive expectations.

Another line of thought is that the idea of causation derives from our direct experience of ourselves as both causal agents and as being subjected to the effects of other things like the sun, wind and rain and so on. I can push, pull, cut and smash things and in doing so feel the force I am exerting.

So, on that view the idea of causation does not merely derive from observing constant conjunctions, but rather derives from the actual bodily sensations of the forces involved in moving, cutting and smashing things etc., as well as forces like the heat of the sun, the wind and the rain and so forth on the body

This morning I posted this, which I think is also relevant, in another thread:

The kind of expectation that things in the future will be as things have been in the past does seem to be instinctive in animals as well as humans. The implicit logic there would be "regularities remain invariant", but I am not imagining that animals actually have such explicit thoughts.

So, I don't think there is really any "law of induction", or at least it would be some kind of conditional deductive formulation such as, "if there are laws that govern observed invariances, and if those laws are changeless, then we could expect observed regularities to remain regular".

Hume's view is that causation is based in inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, but I don't think inductive reasoning involves any deductive certainty, or necessity.

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us.

287. The squirrel does not infer by induction that it is going to need stores next winter as well. And
no more do we need a law of induction to justify our actions or our predictions. — Fooloso4

The kind of expectation that things in the future will be as things have been in the past does seem to be instinctive in animals as well as humans. The implicit logic there would be "regularities remain invariant", but I am not imagining that animals actually have such explicit thoughts.

So, I don't think there is really any "law of induction", or at least it would be some kind of conditional deductive formulation such as, "if there are laws that govern observed invariances, and if those laws are changeless, then we could expect observed regularities to remain regular".

why did you clam that Hume's view is "that causality is based neither on logical necessity nor on inductive and deductive reasoning, but on custom or habit". — Metaphysician Undercover

Inductive reasoning is really just custom and habitual expectation at work according to Hume.

There is a kind of logic that even (at least some) animals are capable of that is quasi-deductive: for example if something is solid I will not be able to walk through it, or, because I know from experience that things that are not supported by anything solid will fall, I will fall if I try to walk off the edge of the cliff. Of course, I'm not suggesting that animals formulate such logical "deductions" in words.

Rather than a logic I would say an intelligible regularity. — Fooloso4

What do logics basically consist in, if not intelligible regularities?

softwhere(?) — plaque flag

In the head (so obvious I couldn't resist) :wink:

If you accept that all those vivid mental states are underpinned by neuronal processes and neuronal processes are in the brain or brain/body, then I guess the only answer you could give would be that those states are in the brain/ body. The problem is that neuronal processes can be more or less precisely located, but mental states cannot unless they are equated with brain activity. Are there any other alternative approaches you can imagine or even begin to imagine?

Some have conjectured that the brain does not produce thoughts and memories but rather that it is like a transceiver. How could we test whether that or the standard picture is the true one?

If we assume that mental states and brainstates are really the same, then the ability of brainstates to be truth-apt is a mystery: how could a neuronal process that underpins a true belief be distinguished physically from a neuronal process that underpins a false belief? If they cannot be distinguished physically then there is something about different mental states that can be distinguished that cannot be distinguished in the corresponding brain states, and that does seem to be a problem, at least for eliminative physicalism.

What phenomena are in the brain and if so how? — Andrew4Handel

Neuronal processes are in the brain, just as digestion is in the body. That said neuronal porcesses are not just in the brain apparently:

Neurons do exist throughout the body, performing a variety of functions. Most neurons fall into three classifications: sensory, motor, or interneuron.

Sensory neurons are spread throughout organs, including the skin, muscles, and joints.

Motor neurons are found in cell in the heart, intestinal system, diaphragm, and glands.

The third major category of neurons is the interneurons. These neurons are specialized to provide for communication between the sensory and motor neurons. Interneurons are also able to communicate each other.

It doesn't seem quite right to assign any specific location to thoughts, memories and desires, although it might be reasonable to say that they are associated with the persons who 'have' them or are aware of them.

Not all questions can be expected to have a definitive answer.

:up:

:ok:

Maybe there won't be one.

:cool: I've replied in the other thread

I wasn't presenting an analogy. — frank

When you said it's not a ghost in the machine its freakin' software, I thought you were making an analogy between humans and computers. If not, then I misunderstood.

If you don't know how it works, hold off on stating what must be the case. — frank

I haven't stated anything to be the case.

Again, if you don't know how it works, lighten up on the dogma. — frank

I haven't presented any dogma, I was merely questioning what I took to be your (bad) analogy.

I don't support the "ghost in the machine" idea, but as I said earlier the machine analogy is as much a dogma as the ghost analogy is. And for that matter the denigration of the whole idea of consciousness being a ghost in the machine is itself a dogma.

You seem to be saying that rationailty drives the brain, rather than the brain drives rationality. What if the ability to be rational is embodied in neural structures, and rational processes are preceded by, and the outcomes of, neuronal processes? Processes of (valid) reasoning seem to follow the rule of logical consistency, but they sometimes fail to maintain that; could that be seen as a neuronal malfunction or dysfunction? Should we think that the series of neuronal processes that enable a rational train of thought are completely deterministic? If every thought is preceded by a neuronal event, and neuronal events follow one another deterministically then freedom of thought would seem to be an illusion.

By the way, I'm not arguing for determinism, but even if the processes of the brain were indeterministic, how would that change the situation? Perhaps allow for novel thought processes?

No, it's not a ghost in the machine. It's freakin' software. — frank

The reason I don't think it is a good analogy is that software is installed, can be replaced holus bolus and a particular software yields exactly the same results in different machines.

What exactly does it mean to say the behavior of humans does not reduce to neuronal activity? Obviously observable behavior of the whole organism is not itself neuronal activity, so in that sense the former is not reducible to the latter, does it follow that behavior, including thinking and feeling, is not a result of neuronal activity?

All I'm saying is that the body is conscious. You can lose parts of the body and it will be conscious. Lose an indispensable part of the brain and the body will no longer be conscious.

All of this we know from common knowledge derived from the experiences of others or perhaps your own experience if you are somehow involved in medicine or witnessed the demise of an unfortunate family member or whatever.

It doesn't follow that we can therefore exhaustively explain how it is that the body is conscious. That would be like explaining how it is that fundamental particle or energy fields can produce a world of incredible complexity and diversity of life.

Can you think of any other lines of investigation down which we might proceed to find such explanations?

:cool:

From the article:

The crux of machine learning is description and prediction; it does not posit any causal mechanisms or physical laws. Of course, any human-style explanation is not necessarily correct; we are fallible. But this is part of what it means to think: To be right, it must be possible to be wrong. Intelligence consists not only of creative conjectures but also of creative criticism. Human-style thought is based on possible explanations and error correction, a process that gradually limits what possibilities can be rationally considered.

So, if bots can reason, according to this their reasoning would be confined to deductive and inductive reasoning, and they are incapable of abductive reasoning, or in the words of the article, "creative conjecture".

My own view is that compatibilism is incorrect, but the two types of incompatibilism mentioned above are also misguided. Instead, I advocate for a form of libertarianism that is compatible with determinism at the low level of the physical implementation of our cognitive abilities but not with determinism at the emergent level of our rational decisions. The belief that determinism governs both levels if it operates at the lower level stems from misguided views about supervenience. — Pierre-Normand

So, the emergent level of our rational decisions is not determined at all by neuronal activity? Or are you making a Spinozan point that the rational decision and the neuronal activity are the same thing understood from different perspectives?

Our having reasons to do things causes things to happen in the world. Rational causation is a form of downward causation. — Pierre-Normand

Do you see our having reasons to do things itself being caused by neuronal activity? Because if it is then that would be "bottom up", no?

It just explains the fact of the carrier of my consciousness, my physical body. The body should not be confused with the consciousness. It's like confusing a program running on a computer with the computer itself." — Andrew4Handel

I don't find thinking from computer analogies at all convincing. Why can we not say I am the body and the (living) body is conscious?