I would have thought that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) is associated with GE Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein's ordinary language of the ordinary person-in-the-street. — RussellA

You’re not wrong about Moore. He was simply trying to satisfy the desire of metaphysics for certainty with basically, as you say, common sense (Austin responds to him in “Other Minds”). However, Wittgenstein is using the method of investigating what is said in particular situations, but the lessons from these examples are not a substitute for the foundation that metaphysics wants (I say this to clarify Austin in contrast, but I have no desire to debate this claim here.)

OLP looks at the ordinary use of words, what words mean within the context they are being used in. — RussellA

OLP is examining what anyone would say in a particular situation, in order to find unbiased philosophical data, not as proof of a position. And it makes use only of what anyone would agree is true (though this can be hard for people reading Wittgenstein to see, or agree to; Austin is more understandably insightful, but then without the depth of Wittgenstein). Thus the importance of trying to make the most sense possible of another’s position. Accordingly, here, Austin is also looking at the metaphysical use of words (attempting to give them as much sense as he can—Wittgenstein will actually make up situations that might make sense for them, as he has more sympathy, having been in their position, literally).

And I wouldn’t phrase it that the object is what words “mean”, but the implications that go along with them in different situations, the criteria we use to judge, the distinctions that are made, etc. We could say these are the ways they are meaningful to us. Austin is more concerned with showing that we have the means at hand to address the skeptic’s concerns with errors, illusion, mistakes, etc., where Wittgenstein takes the skeptic’s claims as illuminating the limitations of knowledge of others, expression, understanding, i.e., examples of our relation to ourselves, others, ad the world in general. Austin here only addresses seeing (“perceiving”) but he does elsewhere look at knowing.

OLP tends to be anti-essentialist, meaning that their philosophy is more about relationships between truth and reality rather than based on an absolute truth or reality. — RussellA

I’ll grant that OLP makes it clear that absolute anything is an empty pursuit. But Austin also shows how “reality”, as conceived as a standard for truth or knowledge, is a manufactured idea. Nevertheless, OLP does not abandon the “essence” of the world. I would argue that Austin is reclaiming the myriad ways in which we are interested in things. (I see this as another of Austin’s hidden lessons @Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997.) Wittgenstein points out that “Essence is expressed by grammar.“ PI, #371 This is not to say that the mechanics of our practices serve the same purpose as metaphysical essence. Grammar is not equal to essence; the standards or criteria we judge by reflect what matters to us about a practice, what is essential to us about the world.

Ctrl-C on a Mac does not do what a Windows’ zombie wants.

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997

In the end, I don’t think people take Austin seriously enough, to be as impactful as he should be, so thanks for taking him up. What I appreciate most is that he makes me realize that what you say matters, and that the truth can matter more than we realize, more than our cynicism, laziness, narcism, self-absorption, delusion, aggrandizement, and on and on. In honor of that, his best from the last Lecture:

“It all runs quite smoothly, there's positively no deception: and yet in the end that baby has somehow been spirited down the waste-pipe.”

“He gets off to rather a bad start, however, which reveals him as already at least half-way to perdition.”

“You've got to get something on your plate before you can start messing it around.”

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

So are we prepared to accept that:

many kinds of sentences may be uttered in making statements which are in fact incorrigible-in the sense that, when they are made, the circumstances are such that they are quite certainly, definitely, and un-retractably true. — Austin, p.115

Now it seems to me that the first thing philosophy will want to do is qualify this, as: not “incorrigible” in the same way, or not “truth”, or not “a fact”. And we must grant that we are not talking about “true” in all occasions and for all time, and thus not always the case (a fact set in stone), even given similar circumstances. But all of this perfection has been shown to be a fantasy based on fear and desire; the satisfaction of conclusive verification is not a foundation, but only what is demanded in this situation (our “real need” Wittgenstein will say). So, yes, the “truth” Austin is proposing is qualified in that the circumstances must allow for it, and may not sustain it, but, nevertheless, we have something true, and not, as may also be claimed, that it is only good enough for “everyday or practical or ordinary purposes.” P.119

That being said, and without yet having read the final chapter, I will only convey what I know of what Cavell claims are limitations of his old teacher (this @Banno is perhaps the only shoe I have to drop, having been pleasantly surprised that Austin addresses more than I had before considered, if only peripherally). I think we can agree that Austin says that we only know how to (or need to) address a concern if there is reason for asking, and that we have everyday ways of distinguishing and identifying, etc., though they may not always answer the question. Cavell (through Wittgenstein) takes the skeptic’s generic claims more seriously (where Austin is more… condescending?), though not on their terms either (towards certainty). Austin’s examples of objects and identification, etc., work to his advantage, where Wittgenstein is pulling back another layer in discussing pointing, rule-following, continuing a series, understanding, doubting, etc. The difference in these examples is that our not finding an answer reveals not our ordinary means of resolving cases, but that the mechanics of our lives reveal more than just about knowing how to answer questions. This, of course, is for another day—perhaps “Other Minds”?

[Austin does not claim] that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me.
— Antony Nickles

I don't quite understand this. What else would they be based on? — Ludwig V

Well, “based on” is a distracting word here—of course the only one capable of expressing myself may be me (though others can read me). But, obviously (ordinarily), we can be lying, and even lying to ourselves (“I’m angry” as an expression of sadness). More to the point here, what about not being wrong about statements about me is necessary? “I’ve been shot! Wait, no.” Perhaps we are afraid we won’t or don’t know ourselves, but this is a legitimate possibility. Or maybe I don’t have authority in the eyes of others to report on myself (a child, or a captive). This is to say, first-person statements might not be incorrigible at all, and, even if they are, the fact I am making them is not of the only importance.

But how do we distinguish philosophical theories which can be debunked by appeal to ordinary language from other theories, physical, psychological - without begging the question? — Ludwig V

The term “ordinary language philosophy” is confusing and made up. First, “ordinary” is only in contrast to “metaphysical”, here, sense-data. And it isn’t about “language”, it is about the everyday criteria and cases shown in contrast to the singular criteria of certainty (incorrigibility) and an abstract generalized case. And it is not an “appeal”, as if ordinary criteria are in competition with or replacing metaphysics (nor is the use of “ordinary language” the goal). It is a method of doing philosophy by examining specific cases and “what we say when…” in order to draw conclusions about the way things work (and don’t).

Austin mentions that we learn criteria when he says “certainly we learn what sort of thing it is to which the word 'pig' can and can't be properly applied” (p. 121 my bold). What I think he is pointing out is that we do not “define” a pig, nor do we need to check off a list of entailments (as in prerequisites), but that criteria are just the bounds of distinctions (categories), for example, between a donkey and a horse, which only come up when necessary. And so not that it can’t be a pig unless it checks all the (entailed) boxes, because we don’t know which, if any, criteria to apply until there is a situation, which may be novel, and thus require stretching or changing or ignoring our ordinary criteria.

So, has metaphysics seeped into scientific theories? I’m not going to answer that because I don’t want to go down the road of saying most neuroscience is operating under a number of misconceptions (whoops, now I’ve done it). But, of course, science is not searching for philosophical certainty; it has its own: if I apply its method, I come up with the same answer (so does everyone).

"I am in pain" is not simply passing on information, but is an expression that elicits a response — Ludwig V

Which is what I was trying to say, only said better. Of course we need not only be doing one thing either, and so this is to “give information” as well (and why we shouldn’t be said to “use” language), though, yes, the circumstances would need fleshing out. You would need to be unaware I was in pain, and also be someone who would be expected to do something about it, say, the host at a party, or a doctor. If you just walk up to me and say it, I am likely to respond, for lack of a better way to read it, “Yeah, we’re all getting old.”

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

The shift from worrying about true or false to commitment and retraction is definitely helpful. — Ludwig V

Just to tweak this a bit, Austin is not “shifting” from true and false to commitment (abandoning truth), but only adding that a claim (even to truth) is made in a circumstance, and I am only underlining his recognition that one of the pieces of the circumstance is that it is made by a person subject to the future (responsible to it, to further intelligibility—his “amending” or “retracting” as only examples) rather than philosophy’s desire to try to solve for the future, avoid the possibility of error entirely (be incorrigible, abstractly, universally—thus, also removing our part).

One would have to show this works in the context of incorrigible first person statements of experience. The assumption that the language is being used in standard, or at least shared, ways would be one point. The possibility of self-correction is another. (Austin mentions both of these.) — Ludwig V

Again, Austin’s claim is not that statements are ordinarily (not metaphysically) incorrigible because they are made by me (first-person), but because of the circumstances that make, say, “I am in pain” intelligible, for example, that I am informing you so that you might help me, even if I am not in pain, which is not a matter of it being “wrong”, but of me lying (p. 113, 118), which is always a possibility in that case (without recourse). My understanding is that neither Austin nor Wittgenstein claim that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me. However, in the sense above, it is important that it is me that is making this claim (with respect to my responsibility to it).

Also, saying that Austin is relying on “standard, or at least shared, ways” overlooks the fact that we might not find a right answer (p.66), that he leaves the whole matter of judgment open to new circumstances (though I can’t find that part again, maybe p. 74), and, in any event, any discussion is only brought up when it is under “suspicion” or is questioned, as “if there is never any dilemma or surprise, the question [of doubt, thus criteria] simply doesn't come up” (p.76). This is not a general foundation, but, again, pointing out that a question only comes up in a specific situation. Wittgenstein is read as claiming a foundation based on much the same thing, but he also ultimately finds an end to all that (rules, “my” “mental processes”, “language games”, etc.) and looks at much the same circumstances when investigating “continuing a series”, among other things.

The fundamental point is that what matters is the fact that claims are made in a situation. The conclusion is the same for first-person statements as with identification of a pig, or a color. And not only do they have different criteria (which is more Wittgenstein’s focus), but the application of those criteria still depends on the circumstance (what the “use” or “sense” is of something in that instance Wittgenstein would say).

Isn't there a doctrine - it is present in my memory, but I've lost any sense of where it can be found - that logical truths are true in all circumstances and consequently empty and trivial. — Ludwig V

The whole point here for Austin is that the more stringent our presumed standard (incorrigibility), the less cases that actually meet that requirement. Again, this is why philosophy reduces itself to the best-case of objects (or first-person claims). In fact, no case actually meets that requirement for certainty (not as a lack, but categorically/mechanically—thus philosophy makes up something, e.g., sense-data). As I stated above, Austin addresses this, among other places, in discussing the desire for, and outcome of, generalization (p.112), but also that it is less likely to cover “novel situations” (p. 130). Emerson refers (in “Experience”) to this as everything slipping through our fingers the harder we try to grasp (which Heidegger alludes to in “What is Called Thinking?”).

!@@#$@$$!!!

@Ludwig V

The problem with Austin is that he is taking his Ordinary Language philosophy too far, even further than the Ordinary Man would take it.

For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. — RussellA

Ordinary Language Philosophy has nothing to do with common sense or with the ordinary man, as I tried to explain here (and elsewhere as referenced in that post), it is a philosophical method, not a position.

Also, “nothing could be produced that would show that I made a mistake” (p.114) about “That’s a pig”, because the “circumstances are such” (p.115), not because of some belief in isolated sentences.

I lied

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture X: I was amused to see Austin describe philosophy’s desire for certainty in a few lines (it takes Wittgenstein half his book). Descartes starts his Meditations with “Some years ago I was struck by how many false things I had believed….” Austin characterizes this as the regret that in claiming some truths, we “stick our necks out further.” (P.112) The point being that philosophy hasn’t wanted to know the truth, or knowledge, but just to never get egg on its face (especially in the shadow of science). Austin uses the example of generalizing the case we make (retreating from claiming to know the name of the star, to only knowing that it is a star) to show that Philosophy wants to find a place from which it can “take no chance at all, my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principal nothing could show that I had made a mistake, and my remark would be “incorrigible”. (Id. Bold added)

The generalization of Austin’s example is one way that philosophy has tried to not be wrong. It struggles with moral loggerheads, but it only takes up the best case for knowledge (the easiest to prove) in: “seeing an object” (it uses “pain” as an example of the other because it is unavoidable, constant, etc. as well), and then it wants to universalize its findings back to ethics (and wonders why it has nothing to say).

Also, you will notice that I emphasized that Austin is aware that when we make a claim, we are making a “commitment”; we are committing ourselves to what we have said, to be responsible for “amending” the meaning, to be subject to the implications of how it is judged (or “retract” it)(p.112). In wanting to be “incorrigible” (as Banno has pointed out) philosophy not only wants something foundational for knowledge, but to rule out even the possibility of being corrected, which means forsaking the part we play in making a claim (or making it poorly, as to magenta on p. 113), which it does by assuming that “the words alone can be discussed…” not only by “neglecting the circumstances in which things are said” (p.118) but apart from a person having said it (“expressed” it Wittgenstein will record this as).

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture X: skipping seven pages in, past the Ayer/Carnap muck, we finally get to the truth. @Banno or others will be better at telling this story, but, traditionally, I would assert something (“The tree is green”) and the assertion is true if the fact is correct, thus all the worry about whether we can be sure that the tree is really green, that we see it (“perceive” it) correctly. Also, some will claim that only a certain type of sentence can be true or false, thus the “assertion” (or “proposition”).

Austin will claim that it is neither the form of the sentence that makes it capable of being true or false nor on what it is even claiming (its “meaning”) because the truth will “turn on… the circumstances in which it is uttered.”(p.111) If you and I are looking at a tree, and you say “The tree is green”, I could say “No [that’s false], Aspens are green, that’s a Maple, it’s brown.” But, if you say, “I meant the leaves.” I would admit “Okay, sure [that assertion is true (however banal).]” But now when you say “It just seemed too cold for leaves not to have turned yellow.” I might see what you describe, and say “Huh [that’s true].” And that is not a true fact, but an acknowledgement of the remark, and based only on a vague calculation of fall.

A tree falling

May I gently point out that there seems to be a typo here. There is a member called "LUDVIG" on this site, but that isn't me, but you were quoting me. I wouldn't want to miss something. — Ludwig V

I tried to tag everyone doing the reading when I wrote up my notes on a section; you have been spared all that. Not them.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Just to loop back to Lec. VIII where Austin countered Ayer in saying an illusion was a case where we see something where something else is, in Lec. IX Austin directly addresses that we can choose which way to say what we “see” (p. 99), which doesn’t depend on “my” perception but on what needs to be pointed out given the situation—our “interest in this aspect or that of the total situation” (p. 100). This differs from philosophy’s fixation that there must be a universal chair for all particulars, rather than at times that we have different interests in how we judge a chair to be a chair. And so, “…there will sometimes be no one right way of saying what is seen…”, not a “surface” or a sense-data. Or, as @Ludvig puts it: “it isn't clear that there is any description that is truly neutral” perhaps forgetting that there is always a context for a case. I will only point out that at other times there will be a right way of saying what is seen.

I also find it fascinating that Austin recognizes Wittgenstein’s work on seeing an aspect of something, “see…as…” as Austin says, though only allowing it for “special cases”. Not as empathetic as Wittgenstein I think, for whom seeing an aspect is part of treating a person as if they have a soul (PI, p.178), or seeing (acknowledging) the aspect of them as a person writhing in pain p.223.

Last time, swear

So here's a question for anyone who cares to delve deeper. That [we can’t see material objects and so only see sense data] seems to me to be the argument in Foundations, found on pp 24-25. If not that argument, then which? — Banno

Well, you are right that he does try to make it a “linguistic issue” “because [ordinary language] is not so good an instrument as the sense-datum language for our special purposes” Foundations p. 25 (emphasis added) And so the “purpose” forces the argument, thus “it is useful [in looking at how our experiences relate to what we say about things to] refer to the contents of our experiences independently of the material things that they are taken to present.” P.26 So the “purpose” here is to remove our statements to be “independent” from judgment to particular cases. Having removed ourselves from the “empirical propositional” and only relying on different methods of “descriptions”, “we cannot properly claim that it is either true or false.” I think this is why Austin characterizes it as being able to say anything you want, but what I take Ayer to be doing is abstracting the discussion from a factual one so we are always correct, despite it only being about our description, with the actual goal that we are never wrong about what we see (sense-data).

We could just refer to color and shape as a thing’s color and shape (thus the reticence to “abstract” from them to anything else as unnecessary); our interest in them (what we judge them for) is how we identify, count, compare, etc., and so we could investigate the mechanics and criteria of those practices in various contexts. However, no thanks.

The Cambridge Dictionary definition is "existing as an idea, feeling, or quality, not as a material object". This, to me, fits with, for example, Austin's insistence that not everything is a material object. Numbers would be an prime example. The Cambridge Dictionary gives, truth, beauty, happiness, faith and confidence as examples of abstractions. I have always understood properties like colour and shape to be abstractions — Ludwig V

Well, we could play a little at ordinary language philosophy and see if there are any actual distinctions but don’t we see here at least a related problem because of the use of “material object” as a contrast, when that term is the unattainable maguffin that has left us with “appearance” and “indirect perception”?

I would take an “idea” as an abstraction solely because it is, or can be, removed as my expression “Hey, that was my idea!” This is tied perhaps to a sense of problem-solving.

I’m not sure a feeling counts. This sounds suspiciously like it is in contrast to reason, as “emotive” to the positivists; somehow turned into a value.

Again, quality makes me nervous of its philosophical sense (as “real” was to be a quality), but quality is of course a measure of attainment, and so the goal (refined metal) or standard (of a specimen of horse) is abstracted in order to be standardized, though metal has science, and husbandry has breeding.

Numbers are the ultimate example. If math and science weren’t so successful, philosophy would never have gotten dragged off course so much trying to be like it. So, of course, the most important thing missing from math is us.

Truth and beauty are measured by standards; I’m pretty sure we don’t measure happiness (except in being petty). I want to say faith is more like resolve than opinion so I don’t think that counts, along with confidence, which is more like knowing a skill, though I imagine it could affect one’s general demeanor (or head size).

I know too much to want to get into color and shape here (I take it back, can we call them qualities and be done with it?)

I think that abstraction and generalization (which, despite Berkeley, I do not think are the same thing) are also sources of truth. So let's not over-generalize about it. Pragmatism is probably the best policy here. — Ludwig V

Of course there are legitimate cases where applications of generalization are more useful than specificity. This comes from the sense applied to multiple objects: classification, inferences from particular observations, etc., which is what Austin is doing. But here I am talking about generalization from a single case or two (in the sense of without objects). Abstraction is a harder practice to justify. Not taking into consideration multiple examples (the practice in multiple situations, contexts), as it were, of how things "are" (as Dewey might say I believe), is to intellectually theorize separate from actual cases (an event with attendant circumstances). So I would need an example (or two) of when abstraction is actually a good or useful process.

What I think differentiates these practices in philosophy is that they come from the desire for absolute certainty or universal truth as Austin discusses in Lec. X. (p. 104). In order to be universal, we necessarily must abstract from the particulars. In order to have a standard of certainty like direct perception, we must generalize our perception of every object from a case which works that way (direct perception of at least sense-data).

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture IX: The smack-down that Austin gives Ayer here seems almost uncanny (@Banno even feels Ayer might be misrepresented). And so how is Austin able to claim this kind of logical necessity? Take Ayer’s example when “I see a stick which looks crooked”. (P.87) Ayer wants to make this a special kind of “seeing”, but Austin says that what this ”shows” us is “that what looks crooked may not really be crooked.” almost as if it were a rule (P.88). He says this is something “we all know”, but then who are “we”? and what do we “know”? Isn’t it everyone who knows how “looks” works, in its sense of “seems”? Is there anyone who would deny the implication? Though perhaps there is a moment where it hasn’t yet dawned on you, but then you realize it (maybe with a slap to the head, as it seems obvious now), maybe if it were emphasized “I see a stick which looks crooked”, and then it is a given to accept the unspoken implication, as if it were simply a continuation of the sentence, “[but I don’t know that it is crooked or just seems that way]” and there might be other implications that we could acknowledge apply here, as “[until I get more evidence, look at it closer, differently].” So then ask yourself, say @Corvus, how these “just words” have now become, undeniable?

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Continuing from p.80 in Lecture VIII, Ayer admits that the criteria he values most is that of prediction. I have here and elsewhere asserted that the claim to objectivity or universality or purity or Ayer’s “directness” is based on the desire to have a reliable, predetermined, complete, independent standard, like math, that allows us to have outcomes that are predictable (thus the clamor for something like science, the facts of which are based on repeatability). For example, we want a moral rule or goal so that we don’t have to be good, we can just do what has been determined is good, and thus we are absolved because we can just claim, “I followed the rule!”

The desire to anticipate the implications of our actions is also a motivation for a general explanation. If there is anything Austin is good at, it is showing that abstraction is the death of truth. It seems clever to find one criteria to judge everything by (true or false? Real or not?) because it doesn’t change, which makes for predictable outcomes. But a general account also flattens out distinctions, which are exactly what will inform us of what might happen in a particular instance.

Shouldn’t type while biking

@Banno perhaps it could be said that the picture of a real world we would describe, merely mitigated by sense-data, limits itself only to a description of the difference of the relations between that data (p.80), and thus is just another version of the descriptive fallacy. Too early to tell as the “difference in relations” is so far unexplained and Austin does seem more concerned that the judgment is based on prediction.

Actually, if you are saying that perhaps in this context "real" and "unreal" are more important than "true" or "false", I think you may have a point. After all, part of the problem is that it seems that everything we want to describe can be equally well described in sense-datum language and in ordinary (natural) language. So truth/falsity is arguably not the issue. — Ludwig V

What I was trying to say is that Austin's goal here, as elsewhere, is to show that there are more considerations (criteria) and situations than philosophy takes into account. However, as he hints at earlier, which I mention here, I do think he is (or will be) concerned here also with truth, what Ayer refers to as "veridical", and, though I might grant we can describe things within the picture of sense-datum and on our ordinary terms (these are not a matter of "language"), I think Austin's point will be that there is a right and wrong, perhaps based on what doing those "well" consists of, or that we are not aware of, or do not get, "everything we want". This remains to be seen of course.

Fail #327

I've never even heard of her. Who is she? Is she a suitable life model for a ancient retired male WASP philosopher? — Ludwig V

Disregard entirely.

Get Plan B in place and then get on with it. — Ludwig V

You've been watching too much Amy Schumer.

I think I'll wait and see what happens in VIII — Ludwig V

Once you've read it, here's a link to my take so far. I haven't written up my notes past page 80.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B

As a pedagogical point, are folk here mostly familiar with speech act theory? — Banno

I think this essay addresses the issue in its own way, though perhaps less directly. I think it is important to note that acts that perform something are merely an example of a way that something has the import ("value") to us that we want of truth (judgment, necessity, implications, etc.), without their being judged on the criteria we have for true or false, and so "speech acts" are not replacing that standard (answering the same need), nor are a generalized explanation of meaning.

Is Austin anywhere arguing against descriptivism in these lectures? — Banno

In this essay, he is also giving examples, but of how we address "real" without turning it into a metaphysical quality everything has (that we don't "perceive"). As I put this above, Austin is pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address the situations involving "real" vs. "appearance"; in the instance of the other essay, rather than addressing everything as subject to the question: true or false?

Can you re-assure me that nothing disastrous will happen — Ludwig V

Just assume that terrible things are going to happen at any time, and then when they do happen you won't be surprised. Does that help?

He wants (needs to) rule that distinction out [between appearance and reality], (i.e. show that the question "How do you mean?" cannot be answered in this context). But he doesn't quite get that far. — Ludwig V

I don't know what the standard would be to "rule... out" the distinction, but I don't think he wants to say our questions about the world cannot be addressed, and so does not need to show that the position has no meaning. The problem of our skepticism of the world and others is not going away here; Austin is only pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address these situations (rather than solving it for every case, forever).

What I take him to be doing in Lec VIII is showing there are other types of cases involved in the issue in order to break apart the forced dichotomy of appearance vs. reality, which dictates their definition and mechanics. This widening of cases allows for discussion of appearing and appearance, and reality and what's real, only with the requirements of a context and the ordinary criteria we use in those situations.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B

Lecture VIII: I first realized here that Austin is very bent out of shape that someone can just "prefer to say" things one way or another, depending on their "preferences" (p.78); which made me look back at words being "invented ad hoc" (p.75), or "fooled around with" (p.62), and his guard against distinctions seeming "arbitrary" (p. 63), and particularly his insistence that some things can be "wrong" (p. 63), leading to:

...if Ayer were right here, then absolutely every dispute would be purely verbal. For if, when one person says whatever it may be, another person may simply 'prefer to say' something else, they will always be arguing only about words, about what terminology is to be preferred. How could anything be a question of truth or falsehood, if anyone can always say whatever he likes? — Austin p. 60

Which makes me consider that one of Austin's motivations, that I grant appear hidden, is to find (or defend) a truth between metaphysical certainty and radical skepticism (which would make his concerns less than trivial). This may come later.

What he does say is that Ayer is fixated on the case where we think something is there but nothing is, which sounds like when philosophy thought that ethics was possible, but determined there was nowhere from which to judge right and wrong (the way it wanted). Leaving that be, Austin counters with the case where we “see something where something else really is.” (Id.) This sounds similar to a case where one thing is limiting our ability to pick out another, say, seeing the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika (PI, #420). Austin also points out cases where “something is or might be taken to be what it isn’t really.” (P.80) This error comes from the possibility to focus/judge on parts of a thing ("aspects" Wittgenstein will say) for which there are criteria (thought of by philosophy as "particulars", or, here, "my perception"), and thus, as he points our here, the possibility to be fooled sometimes in the process. The fact there are certain public possibilities, is why “seeing” is not a mental process but is simply recognizing or identifying (“taking” says Austin) something as something, say, seeing a wing as a way for a bird to retain body heat, rather than seeing it as a means of flight. (One could almost say we “perceive” it that way, but this makes it sound like only we can, or know we have.) I’ll leave my thoughts on “general accounts” and “predictive value” for another time.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B


A p.s. to the reference to ways of distinguishing between dreaming and awaking in Other Minds. I found the quote (p. 87). Based on the surrounding text, I take it that Austin feels that the situation is one that philosophy has removed from the attendant contexts of the two things.

The doubt or question 'But is it a real one?' has always (must have) a special basis, there must be some 'reason for suggesting' that it isn't real, in the sense of some specific way, or limited number of specific ways, in which it is suggested that this experience or item may be phoney. Sometimes (usually) the context makes it clear what the suggestion is... If the context doesn't make it clear, [only] then I am entitled to ask 'How do you mean? .... — Austin, Other Minds, p.87 (emphasis in bold added) this is a link to the text

The fallout here is that asking the question "Am I awake or dreaming?" assumes that we are asking how we "know" if our experience is "real" in situations where we are able to distinguish between the two solely on the difference in the situations (their separate contexts)--Austin puts it rather arrogantly that I am not "entitled" to ask, but he just means it would never come to whether dreaming was a phoney version of being awake. Now, how the situations are different is a matter we could discuss, as I think I have, but that can be elaborated as ordinary, recognized distinctions of the surrounding circumstances.

fail, again

Can you re-assure me that nothing disastrous will happen if I follow the link anyway? — Ludwig V

I am running Safari on an iPad 6 and nothing seems to have gone wrong, but, and here’s a question, how would one know they are hacked when the point is for the hacker not to reveal they are hacking someone?

Did you see this reply?

I take him in the current work only to be pointing out that words can have different import given a context of expectations and shared understandings, rather than assumed to be interchangeable wherever they are until proven otherwise.

I believe Austin may be thinking that we know the concept of dreaming from 'one's own case'. — Richard B

It doesn’t sound like anything I’ve read of his. Even in Other Minds he is debunking Moore’s argument from analogy (I would like to know the page of your quote, as I could not find it). I would say that “the recognized ways of distinguishing” (not “knowing”) dreaming from waking are the criteria for differentiation of the two, one of which I claimed would be that we only remember dreams; another would be we don’t have control over the events of our regular life in the same way. I also think it bears pointing out that “recognized” is meant: by society, and is not a conscious acknowledgement or reasoned application of criteria. Our lives ordinarily happen as a matter of course and our criteria are only applied when there is something unexpected, “phishy”, “phoney” as Austin says. I believe I gave some examples of those circumstances above as well.

The quote by Wittgenstein is very easy to take in multiple ways. But, if our “descriptions” are the outward criteria, then there doesn’t need to be anything “inner” in the sense of something I know. Wittgenstein calls them “expressions” because I am in no better position to “describe” (or know) something than you are (I may be blind to myself, or say something that reveals more about me than I realize). This may be, of course, off the topic of Austin, other than he is also discussing criteria, and it does have a fallout for what processes are “inner”.

mulligan

I don't think it's a dismissal of Austin to fail to see anything of metaphysical import — frank

We're getting off the rails. I thought you were dismissing my claim that Austin "is providing evidence of how the world works." Thus my bolded quote where he is making claims about how the world works. As far as metaphysics goes, I'm not sure what you mean by that term. He's dismantling metaphysics (in all its hydra-head of forms), not trying to substitute an answer to the same skepticism.

We're approaching a point of difference, perhaps, in that for me, there is a place, if not for certainty, then at the least for confidence in our understanding, a foundation found in the very actuality of these considerations. We are not utterly adrift. I'm not sure you will agree. — Banno

I do, but--and this is Cavell reading Wittgenstein, so I'll keep it short--there is knowledge, and then there is our relation to that knowledge, to our criteria. You may know the right thing to do, but not do it, but then you are responsible for doing so. We may have confidence in our criteria, but we still have to live our lives by them, or not. Pure (only) knowledge is the attempt to remove any doubt, thus the possibility of human failing, remove the need for "our bond".

"'Real or not?' does not always come up, can't always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us--in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways, in which things may be not what they seem. — Austin p.69 (my emphasis in bold)

You'd have to give me some reason how this is not claiming evidence of how things are or are not done, or when they can be. — Antony Nickles

What metaphysical truth do you see in that? — frank

I was responding to what seemed like your dismissal that Austin:

"is providing evidence of how the world works, — Antony Nickles

I really didn't see him as doing that at all..."

Does it make sense now?

@Banno @Ludwig V (Below, I'm trying to capture that there is something to the sense that metaphysics (and skepticism) seem to follow the criteria that Austin sets out for real or not.)

Nevertheless, the truth about metaphysics is that it comes from philosophy's desire to generalize the question "Real or not?" onto everything, thus making "real" a quality of the entire world, as opposed to mediated; or objective as opposed to subjective, or appearance as opposed to universal, etc. In Austin's words, metaphysics was manufactured to answer the question whether the entire world "may not be what it seems", "raised" out of our fear ("suspicion", skepticism) that it is true. The remaining criteria (a must) of Austin's is "there is a way, or ways, in which things [the whole world] may be not what they seem [it seems]." p. 69 I'm not sure how that plays out.