I was specifying a belief that I think Gettier’s practice shows that he holds. Yes, it does hark back to atomic propositions. — Ludwig V

Okay. Seems we're in agreement here as well. Gettier may well have presupposed such beliefs about propositions being clearly distinct. Michael seems to have as well. I'm more prone towards agreeing with Quine's idea of a web of beliefs. Davidson largely adopted it as well. Are you familiar?

I don't like "propositional attitude" much either. For me, it is a useful classification that groups together a number of different verbs that share a grammatical feature, that they are require a clause in what grammarians call “indirect speech”. Many, if not all, of these verbs are cognitive and hence of interest to philosophy. I wouldn’t have any objection to using “cognitive”, so long as other people would understand what I mean. — Ludwig V

So, we agree that belief as propositional attitude is problematic.

I know you mentioned speech acts earlier, and I did not see how it was an issue between our views. Would you consider yourself a speech act theorist along the lines of Austin and Searle? I see some definite similarities, based upon my very limited understanding. I own some of Austin's and Searle's literature, and have read Austin's "How To Do Things With Words", but my memory of it is not at all acute.

Is the clause you're referring to above a "belief that" clause, such that when we claim that someone believes a proposition, we're basically saying that they believe that, or believe that that proposition is true?

Could you elaborate on this mention of using "cognitive"? I'm curious what the benefits of the use would be, and if it were being used to replace or supplant some other common terminological use. I've no issue with your use of it. So, if it doesn't matter, we can leave it be.

I would like to express the point about "language-less" belief by saying that a proposition is (usually) an expression of a belief, but not necessarily the form of expression used by the believer. Actions, in which the belief is attributed as a reason for the action, are another way of expressing belief. Beliefs are reasons for action, if you like; and since that formulation includes speech-acts, it seems general enough to cover everything it needs to.

But that doesn’t really explain the concept. The core of it is a most the useful property. Without belief, there is no coherent way to say that someone acted for a reason but the reason is false. In other words, attributing beliefs enables the speaker to express an assessment of the truth or otherwise of the belief. — Ludwig V

It seems to me that belief has efficacy in that one's beliefs will cause one's actions, and by virtue of this fact we can attribute beliefs based upon actions. Witt made several convincing remarks over the years regarding this. I think we agree on that. The issue with that the approach is that it is underdetermined at best which sorts of beliefs caused which sorts of actions. Any number of actions could be caused by any number of beliefs. At least, that's my current understanding of it. There is always the chance of my being unaware of something or another of importance.

Trying to work out a way of expressing where I think we have got to, I have to start from my understanding of what the standard use of “proposition” amounts to. A proposition, on my account, is a sentence with its use in a context. This implies that each proposition comes entangled in a cloud of other propositions which are essential to understanding it. This includes, but is not limited to, its truth-conditions and its truth-maker (if I may use that term). An attribution of belief includes a proposition but locates it in a specialized context which requires special treatment. — Ludwig V

I've seen propositions defined in a few different ways. Attitudes towards propositions would follow the notion of "proposition" being used. I've seen others use it as you're using it here. If we take a proposition as a sentence with its use in a context, it may serve to eliminate the ambiguity of reference issue underwriting Gettier's Case I by allowing us to know that Smith was referring to himself and only himself despite the fact that the naked proposition is true regardless of who believes it.

This touches upon the issues I raised earlier regarding treating naked propositions as though they are equivalent to belief. Interestingly enough, it seems that treating a proposition as you suggest may very well be another way to dissolve the Gettier problem, at least in the first Case.

There's any number of tangents here, all of which are germane. Most folk approach Gettier's paper as though it is all about justification. You and I have been approaching it here much differently.

...each observation of an object of sense is particular
— Janus

The quote directly above serves as prima facie evidence supporting the charge that you're using unnecessarily complex language. Furthermore, such usage serves only to add unnecessary confusion. This could be demonstrated a number of different ways. I'll stick with one, for brevity's sake.

I'm assuming that a tree counts as "an object of sense". So, an observation of a tree would count as an observation of 'an object of sense'. But what sense does that make?

I mean, when we talk about one thing being "of" another, there is some sort of relation between the two. When we talk about an object of steel, there are no meaningful issues regarding the sensibility of our language use. We all know what counts as an object of steel. Steel cars, for example. Steel knives. Steel wheels. The same easily understood sensibility holds good for objects of brass, paper, plastic, etc. An object of steel is a something consisting of steel. An object of brass is something consisting of brass. An object of paper is something consisting of paper. But what sense does it make to talk about "objects of sense"?

A tree does not consist of sense. — creativesoul

You haven't identified what "other stuff" I said and precisely what parts you disagree with. — Janus

That's not true either. See above.

The irony here is that what you said afterwards is what I complimented. You've said all sorts of things, and then said completely different things after issues with the original things were pointed out, and then claimed that the completely different things were all you meant when you said the first things. Then you claim that what I wrote in the quote at the top of this post was 'murky'???

All good from my vantage point. I know better. The casual reader can decide for themselves. I'm done here. I've got far more important, meaningful, and rewarding things to do than to play pin the tail on the bullshit artist.

That's not true. You can see it. You may or may not understand or agree with it, but you can definitely see that I addressed something you said. I quoted it verbatim.

In fact, I quoted you twice and complimented the clarity of the second quote.

:smile:

What is the root of all philosophy?

Metacognition:Thinking about thought and belief.

Well, that clarifies a great deal, and I agree that this dissolves the Gettier problem. — Ludwig V

Is that alone not enough to warrant assent?

I agree that the Gettier problem has an element of ambiguity.

Each belief, proposition, and sentence is clearly distinct from all other beliefs, propositions and sentences... — Ludwig V

What counts as "clearly distinct"?

I disagree with it at face value. Doesn't this hark back to atomic propositions?

...if you focus on "Michael was not born in Germany" and the fact that all three people would agree on that, you will think that they all have the same belief, and with reason. If you focus on the fact that they each have a different reason for believing that, you will think that they all have different beliefs, and with reason. So, I prefer to stick with what I have just said and refuse to adopt either that they do, or that they do not, have the same belief. — Ludwig V

The reason for agreeing that they all have the same belief has been shown to be fraught.

They cannot have the same belief about Michael's birthplace if they have contradictory beliefs about Michael's birthplace. It's one or the other, not both. It has been clearly stipulated that they have mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace. It only follows that they cannot have the same belief about Michael's birthplace. Saying that they all believe that the same proposition is true is not a problem. Treating the proposition as though it is equivalent to their belief, and holding belief as equivalent to a propositional attitude is.

Acknowledging that they do not have the same belief about Michael's birthplace requires us, on pains of coherency alone, to deny that they do. Hence, "Michael was not born in Germany" serves just fine as a meaningful proposition. One who believes that Michael was born somewhere other than Germany will believe that that proposition is true. However, if we stick with belief as propositional attitude, we're forced to conclude that they all share the same belief about Michael's birthplace. <--------that's an unacceptable logical consequence. It's false.

How do we square that with the fact that they all hold mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace?

Seems to me that belief as propositional attitude has been shown to be lacking in yet another way. Earlier it was found lacking the ability to take proper account of language less belief. I find that rendering all belief as propositional attitude has hindered our understanding.

If I say "This car is made of steel" this assertion can be publicly checked and confirmed or disconfirmed. If I say " This thought I'm having is about a car made of steel" this assertion is not publicly checkable and cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. — Janus

If that's all you meant, it's much more helpful - to me anyway - to understand you by saying that rather than the other stuff you said leading up to it. The above is easily understood.

That's one reason why I disagree with the position you're arguing for.

if you disagree with what I wrote above, then explain why — Janus

I agreed with a particular critique that Meta offered against your position. Well, to be more precise, I generally agreed with Meta about a problem with your position, as you stated it. That said, the last post you offered had nothing to do with that issue.

It seems to me that both of you are using unnecessarily complex language coupled with inherently inadequate dichotomies to discuss the subject matter. The last post you offered shows the former nicely. For example, let's look closer at this:

...each observation of an object of sense is particular — Janus

The quote directly above serves as prima facie evidence supporting the charge that you're using unnecessarily complex language. Furthermore, such usage serves only to add unnecessary confusion. This could be demonstrated a number of different ways. I'll stick with one, for brevity's sake.

I'm assuming that a tree counts as "an object of sense". So, an observation of a tree would count as an observation of 'an object of sense'. But what sense does that make?

I mean, when we talk about one thing being "of" another, there is some sort of relation between the two. When we talk about an object of steel, there are no meaningful issues regarding the sensibility of our language use. We all know what counts as an object of steel. Steel cars, for example. Steel knives. Steel wheels. The same easily understood sensibility holds good for objects of brass, paper, plastic, etc. An object of steel is a something consisting of steel. An object of brass is something consisting of brass. An object of paper is something consisting of paper. But what sense does it make to talk about "objects of sense"?

A tree does not consist of sense.

So, in summary, I find such linguistic frameworks to be entirely unhelpful. Meta follows along because he grants too much to start with. Therefore, I disagree with both approaches regarding all that and more. I'll leave it at that though, for what I've said is plenty enough.

Exactly, in reality, the public is dependent on the private, and we could exchange public and private for external and internal here as well.. That is what Janus denies and refuses to acknowledge. As much as we like to model the private as emergent from the public, thereby making the public prior to the private, "the public" is nothing more than an idea and is therefore fundamentally dependent on the private. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree with both of your approaches for different reasons. I agree with your critique of Janus' position, as it has been stated in this thread.

The public/private distinction breaks down completely when the 'private' part becomes existentially dependent on the public part.

Shaming. Pride.

The examples are far too plentiful to enumerate.

So, there's that...

Carry on folks. Just running through.

:wink:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Flowery vague ambiguities all packaged up nicely into a name. It's all in the name. It's all about the name. What's the name picking out to the exclusion of all else?

There is nothing it is like to be me.

"Felt" quality of redness??? The redness of the apple feels...

Gibberish.

It's qualia because the felt quality of the redness is private and unique to each individual...

,,,colors are not the sort of thing that we feel.

What unites each of these is that some folk call them "states of experience" not that there is something it is like to be a conscious organism.

As if all conscious organisms who been burnt were/are conscious to the same degree about the same things in all the same ways? Gibberish. As if all people share one and only one set of characteristics or features of and/or within experience such that it makes sense to say that there is something it is like to be a person or a bat or a cat or whatever?

The hard problem of consciousness is nothing more than self-imposed bewitchment.

Shit Banno, I've mentioned you countless times in past without linking your name so you knew...

I'll do better now that I know it bothers you.

:gasp:

Yup. I was being facetious. He and I agree there.

If you're not pro-US, you must be pro-Putin. It's pathetic. — Isaac

As long as I can be pro-US while disagreeing with their foreign policy many/most times, and still not be pro-Putin.

I believe there is actually a proof of that, of the fact that we cannot visualize very well, even though we convince ourselves that we do visualize really well. I discovered it in primary school. There was this girl I was very found of. She liked my drawings and asked me for one. I decided that instead of drawing Mickey Mouse or Lucky Luke as usual, for her I would draw something nicer, more original: a horse. I thought I knew exactly how it would be, for I had this picture in my mind of a splendid horse. Then I started to draw.

Try as I may, I could not replicate on paper the splendid image I thought I had in my head. I had to take a photo of a horse and draw from it. The result was somewhat ok but I wondered: how come I needed an external picture to copy? Why couldn't I simply copy my mental image?

Introspectingly, I realized that this image was not actually 'there' in my mind. — Olivier5

Dennett has very interesting lines of thought on that... well worth watching. The gulf between the purported complex complete picture of something people believe they have in their mind('visual thinkers' and all that) with what they can describe when asked a few questions about it.

Do you think someone can sincerely try and do something that they at the same time believe - really believe - they will fail to succeed at? — Bartricks

Yes, I do. Some people know that success often comes after many failures. Others have guts and determination. I've had far more failures than successes. Failures are wonderful to learn from, if one has such a mindset.

It's not a matter of "if" one will fail when trying something new or novel. It's a matter of how one handles such times of strife. That is when character is shown, despite the common belief that such times 'build character'.

I don't understand what "how the relationship emerges" means. The relationship between propositions, belief and action isn't hidden. The relationship between the three persists for as long as S's belief persists. The relationship between belief and action is the relationship between reason for action and action and depends on the mental state of the believer - and, yes, that seems to conflict with my remark that it is not a question of the mental state of the believer. That remark over-simplifies the complex relationship between the mental state of the believer and the way that someone else may report it. — Ludwig V

Greetings!

We can revisit the above at a later date.

I don't want to get in amongst the weeds of the Gettier problem, but there's a link between the last paragraph and Gettier and it sits behind that last paragraph. If S is justified in believing that p and p implies q, is S justified in believing that q? Even if if p is false? I want to say no, but I'm not sure I can. — Ludwig V

Oh, we most certainly can deny that. I already do, for different reasons than you, however. Those reasons have nothing to do with whether or not P is true.

We're already up to our neck in Gettier overgrowth! That's exactly what the cottage industry cases are. :wink:

It is my understanding that one of Gettier's targets was that specific formulation. If S is justified in believing P and P entails Q, then S is justified in believing Q. I cannot remember whose formulation it was but that doesn't really matter here.

One thing that puzzles me is whether a belief that p implies a commitment to all the analytic implications of p. On the one hand, if S believes that p, it would seem that S must understand p - in some sense of "understand". On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that most people understand all the implications of any proposition they believe. — Ludwig V

Indeed. That is a problem.

In addition, even if and when S does understand P and that P entails Q, S's belief that Q is true is not adequately represented by Q and Q alone. Such beliefs are more complex than just Q. They are directly connected to P. Q because P. Not merely Q.

The earlier example that Michael was using demonstrates this all rather nicely. "Michael was not born in Germany" is entailed by a plurality of completely different beliefs about Michael's birthplace. Many of these directly conflict with one another. Three people with mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace all have belief that entails Q.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is entailed by all of the following...

Michael was born in Botswana.
Michael was born in Israel.
Michael was born in Russia.

We cannot justifiably arrive at believing that Michael was not born in Germany, unless we are already justified in believing that he was born somewhere else. P and Q are entwined by S's belief formation process, and irrevocably so. It is only as a result of severing P from Q and treating Q as if it is an accurate report of S's belief that problems arise.

Hence...

"Michael was not born in Germany" cannot stand alone as S's belief about Michael's birthplace. Current conventional practice leads to our claiming otherwise, and in doing so it also results in saying that all three individuals share the exact same belief about Michael's birthplace.

They - quite clearly - do not.

The only way to properly discriminate between the three individuals is to report their belief as Q because P, where P is any of the three beliefs written above. Upon doing so, we find Gettier's problem dissolved. Justified false belief is not a problem for JTB.

Heat doesn't radiate. Heat is the transfer of thermal energy between two bodies.

There are three modes of heat transfer, conduction, convection and radiation. — RussellA

Interesting exchange between you and Banno.

Pardon the quibble/pedantry. The above looks suspiciously like an equivocation fallacy. A substitution exercise shows it nicely.

If heat is the transfer of thermal energy, and we're using the term "heat" consistently, then in each and every instance where we use "heat", we ought be able to substitute that term with "the transfer of thermal energy", and retain all sensibility. However, we cannot successfully perform this exercise with the last statement in the above quote, for doing so results in the following...

There are three modes of the transfer of thermal energy transfer...

So, something is off. Could be just the use of "heat transfer". Is it just as sensible to say that there are three modes of heat, conduction, convection, and radiation. Or perhaps, that there are three modes of thermal energy transfer, conduction, convection, and radiation?

The "hard problem" is so hard because it's built upon the idea that we can solve all the easy ones, but what's left... that... that is the hard problem.

There is no light switch. No "on" and "off". Consciousness - as we know it - emerges via biological mutations and time. It begins with avoiding danger and gathering resources and grows in it's complexity over enough time and mutation. We know that consciousness - as we know it - is existentially dependent upon certain brain structures as well as all sorts of other biological machinery.

There is no "aha there it is!" moment. The "hard problem" is all in the name and the purported criterion of consciousness that is being taken into consideration.

I think having the discussion about the pre-predicative I highlighted, in an exploratory fashion, would. — fdrake

If the aim is at what all predication is existentially dependent on, there is much room for growth in all the right directions within this discussion.

I do not think it makes the right kind of sense to invoke things like getting stabbed with a spear as something that counts as being pre-predicative. It's also not the right kind of sense to invoke some feelings someone has just prior to speaking about them, or one's sitting in silence. That's the wrong kind of privacy, ineffability, and pre-predicative things to be taking into consideration. The notion of "pre-predicative" that makes the most sense to discuss involves what predication itself is existentially dependent upon.

Language less experience is pre-predicative. It is ineffable one the one hand(the language less creature cannot express it via language), but if we - as language users - get meaningful experience(meaningful thought/belief) right... we can talk about what is otherwise ineffable to the believing creature in much the same way that we can talk in great detail about another's false belief despite their inability to do the same while holding it.

The distinction between what pre-predicative belief/experience consists of and what our report of that consists of needs to be drawn and maintained. Some linguistic frameworks are incapable of doing so.

When determining whether or not an action is good, we can ask ourselves what the world would be like if everyone did that. That's a pretty good rule of thumb.

No worries about the delay. This conversation may have many. I'm very busy as well. Too busy to offer anything other than this at the moment...

:wink:

Cheers. Happy Holidays, happy new year, and all that jazz!!!

I'm not sure what makes you think that my view cannot make sense of actions based on false belief. The farmer believed a piece of cloth was a cow. He acted just like someone who believed that. His subsequent speech act could very well have been "Oh, there's a cow in the field". That is exactly what I would expect someone to say if they mistook cloth for cow.

The last paragraph in your reply deserves more attention than I can currently give it. I want to, but it will have to wait. Again...

Cheers!

But does temperature equate to (the sensation of) heat? — Banno

Cannot. Sensation consists - in part at least - of biological machinery, whereas temperature needs none.

Cheers .

Happy New Year!

Nice job managing these threads lately! I'm taking notes on that for months down the road when I'll have more time. :wink:

For now, I'll just read... time permitting.

Banno So, you're saying that I can use a name correctly even if I don't know who or what it refers to? — Janus

...we can use proper names correctly even when we do not have a suitable definite description. — Banno

Seems we were thinking of the Russian word for snow without thinking of snow at all, at least until we Googled it. — Banno

Google helped you two draw the correlation between the name and the thing being named.




There are many correlations shared between worldviews as well as each person having their own unique total set of meaningful correlations(personal worldview). Knowing what someone else means requires drawing the same sorts of correlations between the same sorts of things.

The notions of privacy and ineffability are fraught. Dennett's intuition pumps were remarkably effective at allowing me to realize how.

Language users' experience includes language use and all sorts of things that are themselves existentially dependent upon language. Not all experience does. Language less creatures have experience. All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience.

Bridging the gap between language less creatures' experience and language users' experience requires a notion/conception of meaning that is amenable to terms of evolutionary progression. Correlations are the only candidate I'm aware of that are capable of sensibly being attributed to language less creatures as well as language users. The framework is capable of explaining the evolution of complexity regarding beliefs over time.

Not here though.

Banno's thread. I've no time.

Happy Holidays!

...one specific proposition gets its meaning from its relationship to the other propositions in the system... — Ludwig V

I think that this line of thought would be well served by introducing a bit more regarding how the relationship emerges, how the relationship persists, what the relationship consists of/in, what the relationship is existentially dependent upon, etc.

The role of the users, in as precise a manner as possible.

as a rule of thumb, sociology considers any suriving regular social behaviour an institution.
— Dawnstorm — Moliere

the difference between a grunt and an utterance is exactly that the utterance makes use of an institution... it counts as a warning or an admonition or some such. It has a normative role. — Banno

We don't know why certain noises or marks count as utterances. — Moliere

We know how. Correlations drawn between(amongst other things) those particular noises or marks and the term/word "utterance" by a plurality of people capable of doing so.

This and the other... good threads Banno.

<raised beer mug>

Maybe.

The core issue is the stark difference between our notions of "belief". Your last reply shows a few more as well.

While I agree with rejecting belief as something in the head(mind), I differ on how to best handle that.

Does the farmer do all those things if he does not believe that that particular piece of cloth is a cow? I think not. I suspect you'd agree. How does focusing upon his actions tell us anymore regarding exactly what his(and all) belief are?

I'm also still curious about why you think my view is too rigid to cope with how the appropriate expression of a belief is affected by the believer, an author/speaker reporting the belief, and the reader/listener.

Perhaps, but it does invoke an extra entity.

What other form could moral facts take? — ToothyMaw

That skirts the key question here, does it not? Before we can make any sense of what counts as a moral fact, we must already have some criterion for what counts as a fact, for a moral fact is a kind/species of fact.

What do all facts have in common - if anything - such that having it is what makes them count as a fact, rather than not?

It seems to me that your standard amounts to all facts are true statements. Is that right?

It makes sense that the fewer barriers to something being true, the more likely it is to be true. — Down The Rabbit Hole

That does not make much sense to me. What sort of barriers are you referring to?

Occam's razor is commonly used against the explanation "God did it".

The main objection that I levy against current convention is that the conventional notion of belief as propositional attitude cannot bridge the evolutionary gap between language and language less creatures' beliefs.
— creativesoul

I agree that there is a problem about that, and that it is annoying. — Ludwig V

That puts it very lightly, to say the least. It looks to me to be a very serious foundational problem. If we think about it in terms of explanatory power and/or adequacy, "propositional attitude" language games are incapable of explaining how language less belief works. If language less belief existed in its entirety prior to language, and with enough time and/or mutation, gave rise to both language and the belief of language users, it only follows that we've gotten belief wrong at a very basic level.

I'm not sure how to square the public promotion of talking in terms of propositional attitude with an equally public rejection of propositions. I'm left feeling quite a bit puzzled about that. I do agree with you about propositions though. At least, I think we do. The notion is certainly fraught. From my vantage point, it would have been much better had we not attempted to use "propositions" as an ad hoc explanation for shared meaning(how meaning exists independently from and/or travels between language users).

Meaning is another thing convention has gotten historically wrong. That is an inevitable consequence of having gotten belief wrong, for meaning is itself a bi-product of belief formation, as is correspondence to what's happened, is happening, and/or will happen, as well as the presupposition thereof.<-----that last bit is directly relevant and pertains to an idea that you may agree with; that all belief presupposes its own truth.

It seems you're promoting the belief that approach. I am fond of it as well. It is very useful. I'm not at all certain that anything I've been arguing here inevitably conflicts with it or belief as propositional attitude, so long as we further qualify that (some belief(s) are equivalent to a propositional attitude - not all). I think that much of current convention is amenable to and/or dovetails perfectly with my view. I'm growing particularly fond of much of Davidson's work.


Pertaining to Witt...

I admire Witt for having shaken some philosophical sense into philosophy proper regarding the importance of paying attention to how people use language for more than just communicating thought and/or belief to one another. However, while there is merit to the notion of language games, and plenty of it, it is still based upon an inadequate notion of meaning, and that clearly shows up, to me anyway, in the quote below...

...one specific proposition gets its meaning from its relationship to the other propositions in the system... — Ludwig V

I do not outright disagree with the thrust of what Witt was said to be doing there. I mean, I wholeheartedly agree that many propositions become meaningful solely by virtue of being used in conjunction with other(different) propositions(in their language game). I just do not find that explanation/descriptive practice to be adequate enough. It's correct enough in the main. I mean, we can say the same about all sorts of words as well. It's useful as well. Here though, I'm thinking particularly about several dichotomies that have been used in academia throughout the history of Western philosophy, where they amount to being akin to being two sides of the same meaningful coin. All of which clearly have their use. None serve as adequate terminological frameworks for taking proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus, adequately described by neither side of the dichotomy.

Belief is one such thing.

The result of attempting to use those dichotomies as a means to properly take account of belief has been a self-imposed bewitchment(nod to Witt, of course). Flies in bottles.

When you translate all of that into the context of belief or knowledge, it becomes something of a mess. — Ludwig V

Indeed. That is evidence that there are inadequate conceptual schemes, linguistic frameworks, language games at work attempting to take account of that which existed in its entirety prior to them all.

I'm not altogether convinced by your way of handling it; it has admirable clarity and certainty, but I think it is too rigid to cope with the complexities of the language game with propositional attitudes, specifically the fact that the appropriate expression of a belief is affected not only by the believer, but also by the person uttering the sentence/proposition and by who is receiving it.

Whether you agree or not, I hope that is reasonably clear.

I think that I understand you. It seems we understand one another, by and in large. It would be both helpful and interesting, to me anyway, to unpack that last bit above.

Are you referring to current belief attribution practices when mentioning "the appropriate expression of a belief"?

Those accounting practices have not been clearly discussed here as a subject matter in their own right. They are certainly worthy. However, because those practices are clearly in use regarding Gettier's paper, and very much a part of the problem, I'd like to hear more about why you think my view is too rigid to cope with how the appropriate expression of a belief is affected by the believer, an author/speaker reporting the belief, and the reader/listener.

Thank you for the interesting avenue.

It's not just about aesthetics. It's about methodological approach. It's about warrant. It's about further discriminating between competing explanations.

Occam's razor is about reducing the likelihood for error. The fewest unprovable assumptions is best. The fewest entities is best.

The hitch seems to have been forgotten though...

...so long as there is no loss in explanatory power, the simplest explanation is the best.

... there are no atomic propositions. — Ludwig V

Indeed.

Individual beliefs are picked out of an ongoing process. As a result, as with events, we have to draw a line somewhere. I'm showing that the conventional line that is drawn severs S's belief about Michael's birthplace into pieces, setting the foundational pieces aside. The piece being treated as though it counts as S's belief about Michael's birthplace(the proposition "Michael was not born in Germany") is not equivalent to S's belief about Michael's birthplace, or S's belief about the proposition(the dissected piece), or S's attitude towards that particular proposition.

It does not follow from the fact that S takes "Michael was not born in Germany" to be true or to be the case, that "Michael was not born in Germany' is equivalent to S's belief about Michael's birthplace. What makes S's belief true is strikingly different from what makes the proposition true. It only follows that they are not the same thing. Nevermind that one consists entirely of meaningful marks and the other does not.

The emergent nature of belief formation carries along with it an existential dependency between the different elemental constituents of any given belief. S's belief about Michael's birthplace is not equivalent to the proposition "Michael was not born in Germany". S believes the proposition is true because Michael was born in France. That is not the case. The proposition is true because Michael was born in England, contrary to S's belief. Severing "Michael was not born in Germany" from "Michael was born in France" severs S's belief about Michael's birthplace into pieces. They count as different propositions. They are both irrevocable elements of S's belief; namely that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France.

Your claim is that if (1) is true then (3) is false. — Michael

I've neither stated that, nor does anything I've claimed only lead to saying that.

My claim is that if (1) is true then (3) is true. I think my claim is supported by common sense logic: (1) entails (2) and (3).

I'm pointing out that you're treating propositions as though they are equivalent to belief. They are not. They are not equivalent to propositional attitudes either.

"I believe that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France but I do not believe that Michael was not born in Germany" is an absurd claim.

Indeed it is. Who has said that or written anything that only leads to saying that?

Seems Moore's lesson has been forgotten.

You seem to be disagreeing about the criteria of identity of beliefs. But there are none, so far as I know. — Ludwig V

Are you sure? It seems that there are several commonly used notions of "belief". They are not on equal footing. I think it plain to see that there does not seem to be much agreement on that front though. Convention has been plagued by the inevitable consequences of having gotten that wrong. It is a century's old problem.

I would not say that there are no criteria(no standard regarding what counts as a belief) being employed though. It's a matter of unpacking everything to see them.

Hume openly admitted having no clue. The fire example refutes Hume's speculation about the nature of causality. It takes touching fire only once in order for a toddler to learn from experience and immediately come to know that touching fire causes pain. It does not require language in any way shape or form to come to know that touching fire causes pain.

Epistemology led to propositional attitudes. The fire example refutes that as well.

The main objection that I levy against current convention is that the conventional notion of belief as propositional attitude cannot bridge the evolutionary gap between language and language less creatures' beliefs. We can grant the notion and see where it leads...

If all belief is equivalent to an attitude towards some proposition or another such that the candidate under our consideration takes it to be true or to be the case, then either language less creatures have no belief, or propositions exist in such a way that a language less creature can have an attitude towards one such that they take it to be true or to be the case.

Convention has largely chosen to deny that language less creatures form, have, and/or hold belief... on pains of coherency alone.

"Michael was not born in Germany."
"Michael was not born in Germany, because he was born in France."

According to the argument you offered earlier, which of the above is an accurate report of S's belief regarding your birthplace?
— creativesoul

Both. Someone who believes the latter also believes the former. They are not mutually exclusive. As I have said, you need to show that someone who believes the latter doesn't also believe the former. You haven't done that. — Michael

I'm charging you and convention with getting S's belief wrong. I'm saying that you're treating S's belief as though it is equivalent to the proposition.

All I need to show is that it is not. The mutual exclusivity between those two propositions or any lack thereof has nothing at all to do with whether or not the proposition is equivalent to S's belief.

S does not just believe that you were not born in Germany.
— creativesoul

I do not just believe that Joe Biden is President. — Michael

Perhaps I should not have left such a low hanging fruit. That's cute.

S does not just believe that "Michael was not born in Germany" is true. S believes "Michael was not born in Germany" is true because you were born in France.

The proposition "Michael was not born in Germany" is equivalent to neither S's belief about that particular proposition nor S's belief about your birthplace. The proposition is true regardless of where you were born so long as it was not in Germany. S's belief about your birthplace as well as their belief about that proposition are true only if, only when, and only because you were born in France.

S believes the proposition is true because you were born in France. The proposition is true because you were born in England, contrary to S's belief.

You're treating S's belief about that proposition and the proposition as though they share truth conditions. They do not.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is not S's belief.