Are you implying the need for omniscience?

:worry:

What does that have to do with our knowing that conscious experience of seeing red cups requires red cups and a creature capable of seeing red cups, and that that capability itself requires biological machinery?

It has to do with the claim that we do not know what connection biological machinery has to conscious experience of seeing red cups. We most certainly do know that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role, wouldn't you say?

I'll get to your recent comments, but my replies require a bit of paving, so...

...conscious experience of seeing red cups requires the capability of seeing red cups, and that all the evidence suggests that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role in helping to provide that capability. — creativesoul

Do you agree?

phenomenonological — Isaac

I found the extra "non" a bit amusing...

Why invoke "qualia" here? What does it add that "footage" lacks?
— creativesoul

Qualia IS the footage. — khaled

So what is the camera?

If you want me to like you, try to improve, occupy the post of intellectual and spiritual dignity given to you by God, do not despise what is superior to you and you will not be despised either”. This is a missing element in American culture. — Rafaella Leon

To quite the contrary, it's an overwhelmingly popular element in American culture to judge(devalue) another based upon one's own religious beliefs. Problems readily occur when the judge discriminates based upon their own religious belief, particularly in cases where they wield some sort of power over the others' lives and/or livelihoods, or when the judge is otherwise supposed to be providing some good or service to them...

It's not missing at all. Rather, it's resulted in deeply embedded discrimination practices.

An explanation of the underlying biological machinery doesn’t help here. Because we don’t know what connection the biological machinery has to the experience. — khaled

I know that the conscious experience of seeing red cups requires the capability of seeing red cups, and that all the evidence suggests that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role in helping to provide that capability.

What has convinced you to believe otherwise?

Do you agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups?

He's explained to me how people see things like 3 times now. — khaled

To his credit.

And every time I ask what that has to do with anything. How does an explanation of how the camera works imply that the footage on said camera (qualia, metaphorically) doesn't exist?

Why invoke "qualia" here? What does it add that "footage" lacks?

How so?

Creative's doing a fine job of keeping the candle of wisdom alight. — Banno

Thanks, but from my vantage point it seems like some language use just whirls people so far away from red cups that the language itself is no longer connected to anything aside from itself and it's user.

He's explaining how the 'camera' works 'inside all of our heads'(the biological machinery - 'private' - aspect of experience)
— creativesoul

And I still don't see what that has to do with anything. — khaled

It has everything to do with the privacy aspect of conscious experience that we've been touching upon.

Earlier, with me, you invoked the idea that because we cannot take a screen shot of what another is seeing during an experience of seeing red cups, that we cannot know what they experience when doing so. We've agreed since, I think, that despite that, we can still - at the very least - know that they're seeing red cups, however red cups appear to the individual. Hence, variation in biological machinery does not impede our ability to know some things about another's experience. If we can know some things about another's experience, then it is not private.

Our personal and idiosyncratic capacity to respond to red cups is the extent of the privacy aspect of seeing red cups. That capacity includes the individual's own biological machinery as well as their skill with common language use. We've spoken about the language aspect(the use of which is a part of some conscious experience of red cups), Isaac is a good resource for the biological machinery aspect.

Now you're saying instead that (a bitter) taste is "associating the concept with it". What is "it"? — Luke

The involuntary biological response.

A parrot doesn't understand what a shark is because he learns to use it in one sentence such as "Sharks swim in the sea". And if your definition of "understanding" means that that parrot knows what a shark is I think it's ridiculous, even while recognizing that that parrot did in fact use the word correctly. — khaled

Making the same sound as "shark" is not equivalent to correct use of the term. Parrots may make the sound, but correct word use requires a bit more.

Earlier you spoke of not being able to take a screenshot of another individual's sight. Isaac is offering you as close a proximity of that as we can get. He's explaining how the 'camera' works 'inside all of our heads'(the biological machinery - 'private' - aspect of experience). It's worth setting aside presuppositions, opening up your defenses, and allowing a bit of knowledge in.

I don't personally believe in an afterlife, but I do think Chalmers, Nagel, McGinn, Block, etc. present more convincing arguments than Dennett, Churchland, Frankish, etc. — Marchesk

Chalmers and Nagel have their own problems... Dennett has his own as well... not sure about the rest.

They all three have the same problem though...

They do not understand how meaning arises/works, and it's role in all conscious experience as it pertains to thought and belief, of which all conscious experience consists entirely thereof. Different subject matter though.

"Pre-theoretical" means... ...stuff you do in practice without thinking about it in theory. Like when you watch large packs of birds fly. You are not necessarily theorizing about yourself watching birds fly, or even about how the birds fly. You may simply watch them. You may wonder why they fly so high or turn so suddenly, all as one, but it's not a research program yet, more a wonder, a question. You may start to reason that this is peculiar and beautiful, and start filming the phenomenon with your cellphone. You are still not theorizing much. You are just recording whatever you can of the event, thinking your friends will like this.

You may theorize latter, for instance if I ask you why you looked at those damn birds for so long. — Olivier5

I recognize my own take, yes. — Olivier5

In order for something(conscious experience) to count as being pre-theoretical, it must exist in it's(their) entirety prior to being named and subsequently described. — creativesoul

Similar, I suppose. I find no need for qualia though, whereas you seem to want to preserve it. So, something is different.

That was both cool and super, I learned something, thank you! — Daemon

No, thank you.

:blush:

I see no difference with my way of using this word. — Olivier5

Cool. So you agree with all of that?

No idea. — Olivier5

Well, if you're very interested in pre-theoretical conscious experience, then you and I have shared interest. Our notion of what exactly counts as such seems much different though, based upon what you wrote regarding your own ideas, and what I know of my own...

Here's the relevant bits where I set it all out for khaled...


What is a “pretheoretical condition”?

This is pivotal.

It is the requirement that something be able to exist in it's entirety prior to any theoretical considerations, and it serves as the standard to meet in our assessments. For example, most everyone would agree that some conscious experience existed in it's entirety prior to being named and described. Since all theoretical considerations about conscious experience consist of descriptions thereof(in large part at least), and all pretheoretical conscious experiences exist in their entirety prior to theoretical considerations, it only follows that pre-theoretical conscious experience cannot consist of descriptions thereof.

In order for something to count as being pre-theoretical, it must exist in it's(their) entirety prior to being named and subsequently described.

Our conscious experience of red cups consists - in part - of red cups. In addition, the frequencies of visible light that we've recently discovered to have named "red" long ago were being emitted/reflected by certain external things long before we ever named and described them in color terms, and long before our becoming aware of the role that light and biological machinery plays in conscious experience of red cups.

We need not discuss the role that light and biological machinery plays in conscious experience of red cups in order to have conscious experience of red cups. However, we most certainly need to discuss such things in order to immediately apprehend that conscious experience of red cups comes in different varieties, some of which do indeed satisfy the pretheoretical criterion, but none of those require the idea/notion/concept of "qualia".

"Talk(ing) about experience as a subject matter in it's own right" is not equivalent to understanding words such as "red" or "bitter". Understanding words such as "red" or "bitter" is a necessary prerequisite for subsequently talking about any conscious experience thereof as a subject matter in it's own right, but just using "red" or "bitter" is inadequate for doing so.

Understanding the words is not necessary for seeing red things or tasting bitter red apples. That is because some red things are pretheoretical. Red apples are such things, and the ability to eat them and experience the involuntary autonomous response that bitter apples induce in biological machinery is also pretheoretical. So, conscious experience of eating bitter red apples can happen pretheoretically.

That said...

One can also learn how to use the terms "red" and "bitter" to talk about the pretheoretical conscious experience of eating bitter red apples. The learning process itself also counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. Once that process begins to turn inward on itself, and we begin discussing seeing and tasting bitter red apples in terms of our "conscious experience" thereof, we've begun to talk about experience as a subject matter in it's own right. Such discussion is not pretheoretical.

This thread is a prima facie example of talking about experience as a subject matter in it's own right, whereas a first grader's use of the terms "green" and "red" to pick out different colored apples is not. The grade school experience is a conscious experience of red and green apples that is not talking about the experience itself as a subject matter in it's own right. Rather, it's a conscious experience of talking about the apples. To tease the nuance out, it's a conscious experience of red and green apples that includes language use, but is prior to any theoretical considerations. Thus, some conscious experience of red and green apples consisting of language use counts as pretheoretical as well as all language less conscious experience thereof.

One presupposes purpose and intent(Morse code), and the other does not.

That's exactly what I meant when I said "The experience of red cups includes what people call red cups" but I can see why that would have been confusing. — khaled

No problem, but...

What do people call "red cups"?

Red cups.

See???

The experience of red cups includes red cups. Shorter. Clearer. Better.

I know that both experiences include red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them, each and every time.
— creativesoul

Fantastic. Thanks for clarifying. That's exactly what I meant when I said "The experience of red cups includes what people call red cups" but I can see why that would have been confusing.

That's why it's not a problem for someone(like me) to make both claims you're asking about.
— creativesoul

Isaac or Banno would say that both claims are identical. — khaled

You're more than welcome.

Well, I'm not attempting to speak for either of them, for they are quite a bit more capable of explaining their own position than I.

However, the "in whatever way they appear to them" portion can be eliminated for red cups always appear exactly like red cups to each and every person capable of seeing red cups. That's why "All conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups and people seeing red cups" is better than "All conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them".

They always appear exactly like red cups, to each and every individual capable of seeing red cups, regardless of any variation between the individuals' biological machinery.

But that's the point of inverted spectra: "our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors". — Luke

Our verbal behaviour already matches despite known variations in biological machinery because those variations do not have any effect/affect upon the actual light being emitted/reflected, and that light appears exactly the same to us, each and every time we look at red cups. Red cups look exactly like red cups to each and every individual capable of seeing red cups, regardless of any variation between individual biological machinery.

That's the point.

We all pick out the red ones, regardless of any variation between individual biological machinery, and that's largely due to the public effable aspects that nearly all of our own individual experience of seeing red cups includes.

Odd, isn't it. — Banno

In some ways...

I am quite interested in pretheoretical conscious experience. In fact, I taught you how to use this word, remember? — Olivier5

Indeed. You taught me how you use it. What of mine?

Conscious experience of red cups includes more than just red cups
— creativesoul

Sure but I'm not sure what that has to do with anything. — khaled

That's why it's not a problem for someone(like me) to make both claims you're asking about.

We can know something about what another is experiencing when seeing red cups, and I need not know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup. I know that both experiences include red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them, each and every time.

It's been interesting.

What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out recently?
— creativesoul

Didn’t see that — Olivier5

It sets out what counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. But, since you've expressed no interest in that criterion, calling it a "strawman" built by Dennett, I suspected you may not have taken note that I'm not in complete agreement with Dennett, because I'm neither a dualist, nor a monist.

and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups.
— creativesoul

Let me rephrase. Here you say "includes red cups". And also you say:

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — khaled

All conscious experience of seeing red cups includes more than just red cups, ya know?

:brow:

Wait, now I'm confused. Whose side are you on? — Marchesk

Neither, and I said as much from the very beginning. Curious that, huh?

One might turn the psychologizing around and say that materialists have a dogmatic commitment to dismissing any arguments challenging their metaphysical commitments. — Marchesk

"Dogmatic" may be a bit too much, depending upon the person.

materialism fails to properly account for conscious experience. — Marchesk

Indeed.

When you say
the experience of red cups always includes red cups
— khaled

Can mean 2 things:

"X and Y are identical" which would be an unsubstatiated claim as you yourself said.
"X and Y are both produced by looking at red cups" which no one is disagreeing with. — khaled

It means that both Janus' seeing red cups, and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups.

Here you emphasize that the experience (colour-wise) produced by the red cup can be different. So let me just call the experience of a red cup you have X. Now when Janus looks at a red cup he has the experience Y. — khaled

That's an equivocation.

I'd not care to guess why it's seems so important for others.

It's odd to me.

I find it rather telling that it's never used when making things clear.

What you mean by “the experience of red cups always includes red cups” needs explanation. Do you mean “the experience of red cups for me is identical to others” in which case I think we both would disagree. Otherwise do you mean “the experience of red cups includes what each of us individually classifies as a red cup” which is literally what I said? Because it seems to be the latter from your replies. — khaled

I meant exactly what I said.

What - exactly - do each of us classify as a "red cup" if not red cups?

I've no idea what seems so difficult about this for you to understand.

Illusions and hallucinations of seeing red cups are not conscious experience of seeing red cups.
— creativesoul

So what are they... — khaled

They are illusions and hallucinations of red cups seen in past. They are illusions and hallucinations, in part, because of the fact that there are no red cups involved at the time of the event. Such illusions and hallucinations are made possible, in part, because of prior conscious experience of seeing red cups.

Go back and read.

You're all over the place...