I find that the POE has already been made, just like Roe v Wade. No need for another.

...it might be what Davidson thinks. — Srap Tasmaner

Seems to be a goal he strives for. As far as truth conditional semantics goes, truth conditions play a major role in one's belief statements. Belief statements are meaningful to the speaker. We need only look to Gettier's first case to see that "the man..." in Smith's own belief(which is what is being taken account of) can only be Smith himself, and thus Smith's belief is not true.

Gettier uses entailment and in doing so changes the truth conditions of Smith's belief, which completely changes the meaning, and is thus no longer Smith's belief. Salva Veritate. So, I do think that there's something to it.

"The elites" is too ambiguous.

Davidson's approach?
— creativesoul

And related. Basically all the approaches inspired by Carnap and Tarski.

I don't know if there is any experimental evidence at all for the whole model theoretic approach to the semantics of natural languages. There is considerable experimental evidence for lots of stuff in linguistics, but not so much this, so far as I can tell.

For an example of something right next door with experimental support, there's Eleanor Rosch's prototype theory. That's not the same kind of semantics, but does actually tell you something about the semantic connections between words as people actually use them, or at least tries to. — Srap Tasmaner

Unfortunately I cannot open that link. Incompatible user platform, I suspect.

I'm still sniffing around the landscape of semantics a little to see who's actually doing research.

I would personally place more importance upon a theory/explanation of meaning that successfully bridges the gulf between linguistic and non linguistic thought and belief.

There is no syntax in language less thought and belief. I find that cleaving meaning into syntax and semantics results in an inherent inability to take account of that which does not consist of syntax. Meaning exists in it's entirety prior to common language use. Syntax is existentially dependent upon common language use.

Black Lives Matter is a movement that champions fairness and justice; equal treatment under the law. Equal treatment under the law is the standard lying between law and order and an abuse of power.

Trump has used the powers of the presidency to influence matters that are beyond the carefully designed parameters bestowed upon that office in the Constitution. Trump uses the powers of the office of the presidency to discredit any and all people who disagree with him in a manner that can only be categorized as silencing one's own critics prior to presenting them in the worst possible light, simply because they disagree. That is to devalue, deny, and deride the free speech of American citizens, at the very least.

The rights of the accused are shared, especially when the accusations are coming from the president of the United States of America.

A distinction, you say?

I'm uncomfortable with this whole approach to semantics... — Srap Tasmaner

Davidson's approach?

It is a populism based upon fairness and justice that is able to distinguish between law and order and an abuse of power.

Do you not see the connection?

:lol:

But a populism based on fairness and justice is able to distinguish between law-enforcement proper and abuse of power. One is worthy of admiration while the other of scorn. Consequently, one can be for law and order while being against the abuse of power. — NOS4A2

Black Lives Matter

Yeah, Trump's all for law and order unless he's the one it's being enforced against.

...

I think we're both saying that Davidson is unjustified in his move to attribute his theory to another. On my view it's a clear conflation between his accounting practice and what's being taken into account. However, earlier you expressed a resistance to such a framework.

There's talk of 'covid fatigue' being a cause of increasing case and death numbers. I think that there can and ought be a very strong case made regarding how Trump's approach, as well as others', is the root cause of the fatigue.

People are tired of this new normal. We are not creatures who thrive in isolation. Rather, we are interdependent social creatures and necessarily so. We need intimate connections with other people.

Trump's approach to addressing covid has caused covid fatigue. We must get past covid. The only way to do that is to contain it. The only way to contain it is to stop the spread. The only way to stop the spread is to reduce close interpersonal contact.

Had we pressed pause on all financial transactions, on all debt repayment, mandated isolation and self quarantine, while guaranteeing the necessary resources for each and every individual American to live in relative comfort during the meantime, all the while putting every bit of the resources needed into ramping up testing, ppe, and contact tracing efforts, we would have long since already been in a place to be able to effectively begin safe efforts to re-open the economy and/or go back to life 'as normal'.

That remains the best path forward.

Something that struck me as rather self-defeating nonsense...

Trump is supposed to be running on a law and order type of platform. At least, he loves to say the words. Here's the problem...

The FBI are law enforcement officers.

The interpretation is the result of someone or something solving the problem presented by the defective utterance, but it will be captured by Davidson simply as an interpretation, slotted into a bit of model theory in the usual way with no trace of its historical psychological origins. That procedure might be fine for aggregating language use within a population, but then attributing this "passing theory" to a member of that population isn't self-justifying. — Srap Tasmaner

The interesting thing to me, is that by virtue of creating his solution(prior and passing theories) he's actually doing what's necessary for successfully interpreting malapropisms but his accounting practice cannot take account of what he, himself has just done. — creativesoul

Aren't we saying much the same thing?

:smirk:

The system is beginning to drive a wedge between itself and Trump. Cleave Trump off, and the pre-existing issues that gave rise to Trump remain, but all those who mistakenly think that Trump is the problem will celebrate that Trump is gone.

I sense Heraclitus' river coming around the bend...

Davidson's notions of prior and passing theories 'overlap' in odd ways that allow for their evolution one into the other and must, I suspect, in order to perform the task he's placed upon them. A sort of "well, something is missing here", but what is it that is clearly needed but lacking from the current description? Something beyond the scope of what counts as acting in accordance with convention. He notes this more than once.

But if you don't notice and still land on the intended interpretation? Then the utterance has just been handled by System 1 for you and doesn't bother to tell you it corrected an error in the utterance. Who solved the problem then — Srap Tasmaner

There is no problem in such situations. The prior theories are equivalent to the passing theories. Passing theories are the 'dark matter/energy' of Davidson's position, whereas the prior theories are equivalent to current convention. Nothing is missing if successful communication happens.

The interesting thing to me, is that by virtue of creating his solution(prior and passing theories) he's actually doing what's necessary for successfully interpreting malapropisms but his accounting practice cannot take account of what he, himself has just done.

I think a discussion of conscious vs sub-conscious processing would be too far from the topic of this thread. — Isaac

Probably so, but they could be characterized in a manner that relates. A problem I see is the often implicit presupposition that consciousness is clearly delineated from unconsciousness in a way similar to a light switch; on and off; present or not; or some such accounting practice. I suspect it's much more a matter of naturally occurring 'degrees' of complexity, whereas the simplest evolve into the more complex given the necessary preconditions for doing so.

I appreciate the evolutionary bent.

That's a bridge between two things that I've yet to have connected. Intriguing. I suspect that I will not grant meaning or truth to such simple biological mutations(replication 'errors'). Seems that causality does the trick.

There are specific circumstances in which we must say that appealing to convention is an unjustified, unjustifiable, wrong, and/or otherwise mistaken move. Some of these specific circumstances are certain kinds of discussions, particularly those involving our talking about that which existed in it's entirety prior to our taking it into account.

Successful communication via language use is one such thing.

How are appeals to convention wrong in those types of situations? In the only way they can be; the characterization, definition, and/or description of such things. We can be wrong about what such things consist of as well as what they are existentially dependent upon. The same is true regarding everything that exists in it's entirety prior to our account. It's what we say about that which exists in it's entirety prior to our discussing it that matters most here. Perhaps this be best put another way.

It is the methodological approach that matters most here. That approach involves setting some common sense standards. Any and all reports/accounts require something to be reported upon and a means for reporting. X exists in it's entirety prior to our report. That which exists in it's entirety prior to our report cannot consist of our report. That which exists in it's entirety prior to our report cannot be existentially dependent upon our report.

Successful communication with speech cannot be existentially dependent upon our account of it. Successfully communicating with speech is an event that happens before taking such events into account. We all agree that that event involves language use. We miscommunicate prior to taking such situations into account as well. We do both long before ever talking about the fact that we do. It only follows that neither are existentially dependent upon our taking them into account, even given the fact that they are both existentially dependent upon language use.

What do all successful attempts at communicating with speech require; what is the bare minimum needed in order for that to actually happen; what do such attempts consist of; what are they existentially dependent upon?

This line of reasoning/questioning has been left sorely unanswered.

Many philosophers and linguists alike hold that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned and/or have somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation - as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities. Linguistic competence, I presume is aptly described here. I've seen no adequate objection to the contrary. The odd success of malapropisms are prima facie evidence that that is just not the case; that is not enough;that no such method fills the bill. The only conclusion is that successful communication/interpretation with speech does not operate solely on such a basis.

To quite the contrary, paraphrasing Davidson...

Some successful interpretation happens in a way that is not in accordance to convention; that does not operate solely on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities, but are rather also derived by wit, luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their point across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are most likely, etc. There is no more chance of regularizing, or teaching, this process than there is of regularizing or teaching the process of creating new theories to cope with new data in any field—for that is what this process involves.

Creating new theories...

Novelty.

That's what's left sorely unaccounted for. The attribution of meaning to that which is not already meaningful(to the capable creature under consideration). If an appeal to conventional standards were unassailable then paradigm shift would not happen. The conventional accounting practices involved in setting out what's necessary for successful communication via language use are found wanting. The approach is the problem. The presuppositions that truth and meaning are existentially dependent upon language are the fatal flaws underwriting every bit of this discussion(at least on the academic side of it). That is not to say that linguistics and/or philosophy ought be cast aside and/or flippantly dismissed. Rather, it is only to say that it's come time to revise and sharpen some of the core tenets.

Davison made a valiant attempt. His conceptual framework was inadequate to begin with, unfortunately. To his everlasting credit, he began to shed some much needed light upon the deep seated connection between truth and meaning, especially in his other works prior to this paper. The two are existentially codependent upon one another, to put it mildly.

On a more personal level, I like Davidson, or at least what I've seen of him. His temperament was kind curiosity, worthy of emulation. Admirable. I hold him in much higher regard than many of his contemporaries as a result.

If you want to better understand what Davidson is getting at, like I do, then perhaps we could use our discussion to our mutual benefit. Rather than reading him through a highly suspicious and critical lens, like we're both prone to doing, perhaps we could bounce his words - and the discourse in this thread - off of one another as a means for doing so?

:smile:

I'm down.

...it points to the fact that word selection and grammar are secondary to general communication... — Isaac

:up:

I suggest that you carefully read the aforementioned pages to better understand what Davidson is doing with "theory". — creativesoul

I've already read the paper. What do YOU think he's doing with it? — Janus

Since you've claimed Davidson is using the term "theory" in an 'inapt' manner, I've thought about it and decided that you could not be more wrong, my friend. Whether or not Davidson uses a term in an inapt manner is determined by whether or not his use of that particular term is suitable and/or appropriate for the circumstances. Given that he's painstakingly setting out how a standard description of linguistic competence is inadequate, and he's proposing his own solution to that problem, then his use of "theory" is perfectly appropriate and/or suitable to the situation at hand.

One may say that he's using the term 'loosely', because the strict scientific sense of "theory" differs greatly from his use in the paper. That would be a mischaracterization, to say the least. He's using it to describe how successful communication with speech happens, and he's doing so in a rather exquisitely explicit fashion. He's setting out a rather nuanced, but perfectly understandable notion/sense of "theory". To understand what Davidson is claiming, one must - at the very least - grant his use/definition of the term.

Any failure to do that will most assuredly result in misunderstanding. A reader who sincerely desires to understand another, particularly when there are novel language uses at hand, must be ready to think anew. Below are just a couple of relevant excerpts from the paper which provide more than enough information for the astute reader to readily understand what Davidson means when he uses the term "theory".

From the pages suggested earlier...

To say that an explicit theory for interpreting a speaker is a model of the interpreter’s linguistic competence is not to suggest that the interpreter knows any such theory...

In any case, claims about what would constitute a satisfactory theory are not, as I said, claims about the propositional knowledge of an interpreter, nor are they claims about the details of the inner workings of some part of the brain. They are rather claims about what must be said to give a satisfactory description of the competence of the interpreter. We cannot describe what an interpreter can do except by appeal to a recursive theory of a certain sort. It does not add anything to this thesis to say that if the theory does correctly describe the competence of an interpreter, some mechanism in the interpreter must correspond to the theory.

Principle (2) says that for communication to succeed, a systematic method of interpretation must be shared. (I shall henceforth assume there is no harm in calling such a method a theory, as if the interpreter were using the theory we use to describe his competence...

According to Davidson, the problem is this: what interpreter and speaker share(the understanding of the speaker's words), to the extent that communication succeeds, is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to speaker and interpreter in advance; but what the speaker and interpreter know in advance is not (necessarily) shared, and so is not a language governed by shared rules or conventions. What is shared is, as before, the passing theory(the understanding of the speaker's words); what is given in advance is the prior theory, or anything on which it may in turn be based.

All the things Davidson assumes an interpreter knows or can do depend on his having a mature set of concepts, and being at home with the business of linguistic communication. His problem is to describe what is involved in the idea of ‘having a language’. He finds that none of the proposals satisfy the demand for a description of an ability that speaker and interpreter share and that is adequate to interpretation.

My take is that Davidson posits "prior" and "passing" theories as a means of satisfying that demand.

If Davidson is claiming that people generally have "complex theories" about the rules of language use, which he says in the passage you quoted that I responded to he assumes "must be about right" then I would say that is an inapt use of 'theory'. for the reasons I already gave. — Janus

There's a bit of a misunderstanding between us, and it seems to be growing. Let's see if we can resolve that prior to continuing, for if we cannot, further discussion will result in futility. The passage you mention(copied below) was Davidson's report of the standard description of linguistic competence at the time. That standard is not Davidson's, although he does overtly accept some responsibility for it.

If his report is accurate, then the standard description of linguistic competence at that time was...

...in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way. This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right. The difficulty lies in getting clear about what this sense is...

To that you replied...

Most speakers and hearers probably don't entertain any "complex theories" at all. A complex theory may be able to be formulated after the fact based on analysis of practice... — Janus

If Davidson's report is accurate, then you're objecting to the standard description of linguistic competence.

Are you denying the accuracy of the report, or are you questioning the standard description itself?

It does not add anything to this thesis to say that if the theory does correctly describe the competence of an interpreter, some mechanism in the interpreter must correspond to the theory

This part is curious.

I suggest that you carefully read the aforementioned pages to better understand what Davidson is doing with "theory".

Yes, and I think his use of "theory" in that context is therefore inapt — Janus

You'll have to spell this out for me, by quoting him in the relevant context. He's covering a lot of ground in that paper... or trying to anyway. I suggest a very careful read of pages 256 and 257.

Sorry not sure what you mean; lacking in what capacity? — Janus

Do you find that the three principles are lacking in the capacity to take proper enough account of the approaches you mentioned? He also talks at length about the inherent limitations of general accounts.

Most speakers and hearers probably don't entertain any "complex theories" at all. — Janus

Davidson agrees, and actually talks about that in a little bit of detail. It's not that the speaker and/or audience is aware of how they successfully communicate, it's rather that they can and do. He speaks at length about his use of "theory".

I'm not sure. Do you find the three principles somehow lacking in that capacity?

...in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.

This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right.

The above is Davidson's report of the conventional understanding regarding what successful communication with speech requires. The three principles set that out in a bit more detail.

I'm saying that successful communication with speech is not governed entirely by rules or conventions.
— creativesoul

OK, and I agree; but isn't that the very thing that Davidson is also proposing. Isn't that, in other words, just the initial recognition of the problem? — Janus

Yes, I agree with Davidson on that point. This assumes that the three principles he proposes 'covers' conventional accounts(standard descriptions) of what successful communication(linguistic competence) requires.

So I am imagining a situation in which the speaker and the hearer are in the presence of a soup tureen full of soup (and not standing in a soup kitchen). Given that, what if the speaker had said " That's a nice soup whatyoumaycallit" or "that's a nice soup dog" or "that's a nice soup [blank]"? Would we not, in such a situation, understand just the same what was meant? — Janus

I think we would, but...

The question is how we understand what is meant when that differs from what is said and what is said is not in accordance with convention. If our linguistic competence, or ability to successful communicate with speech relied upon only our learning and acting in accordance with the rules, then we could not. Thus, successful communication and/or linguistic competence takes more, and the standard description is found lacking or wanting.

You seem to be saying that language is not governed entirely by rules or conventions because otherwise it would be impossible to understand malapropisms, since we would not be able to step outside of literal meanings (what Davidson calls "first meanings"). — Janus

It may not matter, but I'd say that that is not quite what I'm saying. There's a little more nuance than that suggests. Not much, but a little. I'm saying that successful communication with speech is not governed entirely by rules or conventions.

Hey!

That's too bad that you're losing interest. I'm gaining understanding the more I read here and back to the paper...

Your notion of association, as you know, is commensurate with my own position on how meaning works.

The part of that post that sets out how we understand malapropisms is the bottom half basically. Perhaps a re-read may help you to understand what I'm saying about the attribution of meaning. I've also said much since; that may be of help.

The thing is the GOP doesn't have to do both before the election. — Mr Bee

Good point.

The suffering of the American people due to covid is sobering despicable prima facie evidence that the government is not working on behalf of the best interest of all Americans. The people can see that much. Some know that. Hence, the actions to suppress the vote of very very actively engaged voters is being taken by the same elected officials that have sorely neglected their duty to Americans.

I suspect that there are enough people working to reduce the effects/affects of the abundant disinformation that Biden will win. That's just a start though. He is still highly unlikely to do what needs to be done in order to increase the livelihood and well-being of everyday normal working class American citizens in any significantly different way than the status quo prior to and since Trump.

I've said all along that Trump is not the problem, he is a symptom thereof.

What's shared, to the extent that communication succeeds, that is not learned or governed by rules or conventions, is the very ability(which could be characterized as a method) to attribute meaning.

The problem we have been grappling with depends on the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation
— p. 265

I read that as saying communication by speech does not require any such thing — Srap Tasmaner

Whereas, I read that as saying the problem is the assumption that communication by speech requires a common method or theory of interpretation that is in accordance with convention - as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities. Hence, the problem dissolves if we can successfully describe communication by speech in a way that does not make that assumption. All it would take would be to add something else to that method that is not in accordance with convention. It doesn't necessarily require rejecting all conventional understanding on the matter.

That would also change the conventional understanding of linguistic competence, not deny that there is such a thing.

the problem is this: what interpreter and speaker share, to the extent that communication succeeds, is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to speaker and interpreter in advance...

Think of a great game of chess: every single move is in accordance with the rules... — Srap Tasmaner

Malapropisms are not in accordance with the rules.