Here's the core:
What bullshit essentially misrepresents is neither the state of affairs to which it refers nor the beliefs of the speaker concerning that state of affairs. Those are what lies misrepresent, by virtue of being false. Since bullshit need not be false, it differs from lies in its misrepresentational intent. The bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the facts or about what he takes the facts to be. What he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about is his enterprise. His only indispensably distinctive characteristic is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is up to.

Taking states of affairs to include mental states, a lie has the intent to misrepresents a state of affairs, and hence the lier's consequent belief about that state of affairs. Bullshit may well misrepresent a state of affairs, but that would be incidental. Bullshit lacks any intent towards the truth or falsehood of its propositional content, the intent being something distinct from the erstwhile assertions being made. — Banno

Yes.

I can only hope that these recent events get enough Americans off their lazy asses to vote. The democratic nominee will be important as well...

Trump stands no chance against Bernie. I'm awaiting those debates, and I hope that they are many and about what's wrong in American politics and how it got to be that way...

Trump is the poster child of corruption in American politics. He's a symptom of much deeper problems. The manifestation of cancer caused by monetary corruption and long standing traditions of glorifying immoral behaviour and rugged individualism.

What sort of precedent would be set, if we were to allow a president of the United States to publicly degrade and denounce a clearly outlined Constitutional process; all of which he himself swore to uphold to the best of his ability?

The Constitution is the only tool that can be used to remove one who is unfit from the office of the presidency. A corrupt president who has acted in impeachable ways will attempt to divert public attention away from this fact of American government. A president whose been falsely accused knows that there is no evidence otherwise. I mean, it's not like he's walking black at night! A president who faithfully executes the powers afforded to the office must allow the impeachment process to be enacted by those with the power to do so. That holds good regardless of innocence/guilt.

What sort of precedent would be set if the president ordered people within his administration to not honor an official subpoena to appear as an integral part of a constitutional process that the president himself has sworn to uphold?

That is to use your power as a means to obstruct and/or otherwise impede an ongoing constitutional process. It is to interfere with the specific intent of not allowing someone to tell their story about the president's own behaviour(which is precisely what's being investigated). It is to impede and/or obstruct the investigation.

That's precisely what this president has done. This behaviour screams for proper privately intrusive investigation. No one is above the law, Mr. President.

This particular process is one of emergency measure that only need be enacted in times when the president's behaviour leaves no reasonable doubt that he is not fit to be occupying that public office; that he is not faithfully executing the powers granted to the office of the presidency. Allowing the other braches of government to do their job, especially when it is such a specific job that only arises under very specific conditions - such as carefully investigating the president - is something that all presidents must do.

That's precisely what this president is not doing.



The impeachment process is the only defense that this republican nation has against someone who thinks, believes, and publicly says that he can get away with and/or do whatever he wants to do, because he is the president.

That is our president.



What sort of precedent would be set if the very parties responsible for dutifully enacting the closing proceedings laid out within these constitutional measures... these impeachment process guidelines... were to know that the above were true, and subsequently refused to faithfully enact those duties? What if they neglected to execute one particular responsibility bestowed upon them and only them... to look at the charges levied against the president by means of weighing all the relevant evidence, including the testimony of the very people which this president ordered to not appear in spite of subpoena?

What kind of precedent are we setting here?

Mitch McConnell knows all this. By not allowing these witnesses to appear and give testimony about the charges he is himself is complicit in the obstruction charge as well as dereliction of his own sworn duties, impeachment responsibilities notwithstanding...

The oath to take the public office they preside over includes upholding the Constitution... which most certainly includes performing their role as judge regarding the guilt/innocence of the accused based upon the facts and testimony brought into evidence...
— creativesoul

But it's the Senator's role to interpret and apply the constitution during an impeachment trial. — VagabondSpectre

What sort of interpretation could possibly include proclaiming what McConnell publicly proclaimed prior to trial? He publicly announced that his position was already aligned with the accused. The accused has been openly publicly denouncing the entire constitutional process and ordering specific people(witnesses) to not honor the process itself...

Everyone is equal under the law. No one is above the law.

The oath to take the public office they preside over includes upholding the Constitution... which most certainly includes performing their role as judge regarding the guilt/innocence of the accused based upon the facts and testimony brought into evidence...

A judge who is fulfilling his/her duty does not openly and publicly state that they are already of the exact same position as the accused prior to allowing the trial/hearing to proceed. When the accused is the president and that president has already ordered specific witnesses to not honor subpoena, and that judge says what McConnell has said...

:down: :angry:

That is dereliction of duty.

I wonder... Is it a crime to violate an oath to be an impartial juror in an impeachment trial? — VagabondSpectre

Dereliction of one's solemnly sworn duty...

Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes. — Banno

Bullshit he thinks is different in kind.

Now, does his argument support this contention? — Banno

Good question. I agree with his contention. I'm not convinced that Frankfurt made his case.

I think in an attempt to make his case that bullshit is different than humbug he guides our attention towards two 'distinct' types of misrepresentation both of which would need to count as short of lying; the misrepresentation to others about what happened and/or is happening, and the misrepresentation to others regarding the speakers' own attitude and/or state of mind.

He develops different criteria for what counts as each... or at least he needs to.





He wants an outright lie about what's happened and/or is happening(facts or states of affair, if you prefer) to consist of statements made but believed to be false by the speaker. The account of misrepresentation of one's own state of mind and/or attitude would be rendered similarly. An outright lie about one's own state of mind and/or attitude would need to consist of statements about the speaker's own state of mind and/or attitude. This is shown by his explanations throughout for disqualifying different examples, such as the lie about the money in the pocket. There he confirmed/granted the lie about the facts, but denied that that counted as being a lie about the speaker's own state of mind, and/or attitude because there was no statement made about such... thus, Frankfurt claims that this fell short of lying about one's own state of mind, attitude, or belief.

We both balked here...

You balked - quite rightly - at Frankfurt's sheer neglect to also consider that the statement carries with it the dispositional or propositional attitude of the speaker towards it... belief!

Assuming sincerity, people believe what they say/write. So, to say something other than what one believes, is to misrepresent one's own belief.

There is no need to talk directly about one's own belief if one intends upon hiding and/or misrepresenting it.

Yes... I think I see what you're saying. We could perhaps make a good case that Frankfurt waffles on the "short of lying" part. He certainly works from more than one notion of lying.

Yes. That is the part about the analysis that I find quite compelling, and it offers a hand in glove fit to so many of the things in American culture. I do think it's a bit more complicated than it seems at first blush...

Certainly we can yield something worthwhile here...

Come on Banno. From page 10 through 20 is interesting... and there's so much that you and I agree with...

It is just this lack of connection to a concern with truth this indifference to how things really are — that I regard as of the essence of bullshit.

This is the part that seems to me to be the crux of Frankfurt's analysis.

Which person is Reason anyway?

:lol:

Feigning ignorance of form...

First, it is not a mistake to personify Reason. I have now provided - it feels like about 100 times - an argument that demonstrates Reason is a person. There are prescriptions of Reason; only a person can issue a prescription; therefore Reason is a person. — Bartricks

There are prescriptions of shit; only a person can issue a prescription; therefore shit is a person.

it's a simple act for Pelosi to hand the articles to the Senate, but until she does, the Senate has nothing to consider. — Hanover

And yet the leader has already spoken as if it is fait accompli?

Here is where I think the book gets rather interesting...

To be clear. You and I are in much agreement, including thinking that there is an error regarding 'short of lying'. Frankfurt holds that a lie must be a false statement. Neither humbug nor bullshit must. Towards the end, he draws this distinction between bullshit and lying more clearly...

It seems that Frankfurt wants lying about one's own belief to consist of false statements about one's own belief. As you've asked... does it matter to the overall? I don't think it lessens it's worth in the end...

Frankfurt then attempts to draw a distinction between Black's formal definition of humbug and bullshit...

Nonetheless, I do not believe that it(the oration) adequately or accurately grasps the essential character of bullshit. It is correct to say of bullshit, as he says of humbug, both that it is short of lying and that chose who perpetrate it misrepresent themselves in a certain way. But Black’s account of these two features is significantly off the mark...

As you note...

Does this matter in regard to the overall project? The orator example is clearer, I think. The orator, according to Frankfurt does not care what his audience believes with regard to god and history; only that they draw a certain conclusion about what he, the orator, believes about such things. A prime example of humbug.

But that's not right. The orator's aim is the endorsement by their audience. If the audience does not admire those who are patriotic and god-fearing, the oration fails. Indeed it is those who do not accept these values who are most likely to recognise the humbug. — Banno

Yes. If they also think that the orator does not believe the same way as their audience.

This last bit I think may be the important aspect. The intent to have people believe something that the orator believes to be false. It's not there in the oration. Rather, the oration is all about making the audience believe that the orator believes these things, or holds them in high regard...

Seems we all, including Frankfurt, were taken aback by the notion of 'short of lying'... I think Frankfurt is working that bit out, while attempting to grant it, with the twenty dollar example.

If I lie to you about how much money I have, then I do not thereby make an explicit assertion concerning my beliefs. Therefore, one might with some plausibility maintain that although in telling the lie I certainly misrepresent what is in my mind, this misrepresentation — as distinct from my misrepresentation of what is in my pocket — is not strictly speaking a lie at all. For I do not come right out with any statement whatever about what is in my mind. Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me. On the other hand, it is unquestionable that in so affirming, I provide you with a reasonable basis for making certain judgments about what I believe. In particular, I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket. Since this supposition is by hypothesis false, I do in telling the lie tend to deceive you concerning what is in my mind even though I do not actually tell a lie about that...

This is the bit that expands upon...

A belief is always a belief that such-and-such. Hence, misrepresenting what one believes is always misrepresenting two things: that such-and-such is the case; and that one believes that such-and-such is the case. — Banno

Note... he(Frankfurt) calls it a lie, it's just not a lie told about his own belief... it's about the amount of money in his pocket...

He's trying to make sense of how one could be said to be deliberately misrepresenting one's own thought and belief but somehow fall short of lying...

The discussion of "short of lying" becomes a bit more problematic.

I baulked at
Nor does the statement I do affirm — e.g., “I have twenty dollars in my pocket” — imply any statement that attributes a belief to me.

and yet:
I provide you with a reasonable basis for supposing that I believe there is twenty dollars in my pocket.

Frankfurt says that asserting one has twenty dollars in ones pocket does not imply that one believes one has twenty dollars in one's pocket, but that a reasonable person might so judge.

But consider what Moore might say: is would be inconsistent to assert "I have twenty dollars in my pocket, but I do not believe I have twenty dollars in my pocket".

I think Frankfurt has erred here. — Banno

This may be worth spending a bit more time teasing out what Frankfurt was doing... making sense of Black's implication that one can deliberately misrepresent ones own thoughts, feelings, and/or attitudes and still somehow fall short of lying...

Black probably means that humbug is not designed primarily to give its audience a false belief about whatever state of affairs may be the topic, but that its primary intention is rather to give its audience a false impression concerning what is going on in the mind of the speaker...

Frankfurt then moves on to the next bit...

Especially by pretentious word or deed: There are two points to notice here. First, Black identifies humbug not only as a category of speech but as a category of action as well; it may be accomplished either by words or by deeds. Second, his use of the qualifier “especially” indicates that Black does not regard pretentiousness as an essential or wholly indispensable characteristic of humbug...

Frankfurt clearly interprets Black as not regarding pretentiousness as an elemental constituent of all humbug instances, and he seems to clearly agree when concerning bullshit...

The fact that a person is behaving pretentiously is not, it seems to me, part of what is required to make his utterance an instance of bullshit.

What followed is pretty much the rest of the book. It is quite intriguing if for no other reason than the methodological approach he then puts to use. He sets out the notion of humbug, taking it's parts into very careful consideration...


Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes. — creativesoul

The first thing he focuses upon is the bit about deceptive misrepresentation, bringing attention to the intent or design to deceive. This means that part of humbug includes a certain state of mind. Since what counts as being humbug invariably depends upon the state of mind of the language user, it cannot be identical to just the utterance by which the humbug is perpetrated. He noted the similarity here with a lie, in that both are directly tied to the intent to deceive, and neither are identical to the falsity or any other properties of the statement. He then notes that in some accounts of lying there must be false statements made, and in others there need not be so long as the speaker believes it is false and by making it intends to deceive.

Then he takes on the 'short of lying' aspect, for humbug somehow falls short of lying although both are made intending to deceive. As Banno noted earlier, Frankfurt seems to think that Black's notion of humbug evokes a continuum upon which both lying and humbug rest, with the latter falling short of lying. He says the following on page 3...

Black’s phrase evokes the notion of some sort of continuum, on which lying occupies a certain segment while humbug is located exclusively at earlier points. What continuum could this be, along which one encounters humbug only before one encounters lying?

Frankfurt wants to offer a theory about the commonly used term "bullshit". He overtly notes that the topic/notion does not seem to have been clearly accounted for at all. This seems a bit odd, as a result of everyone knowing that there's so much of it pervading our everyday lives on a continual basis. So, Frankfurt seems to think - and I would readily concur - that a detailed account is long since overdue.

As just mentioned, Frankfurt's search on detailed accounts of bullshit found no results. The closest thing he found in English was the notion of humbug, but he seemed to believe that the two were not quite synonymous enough to be interchanged at random without significant loss of meaning. So, he was not happy drawing a semantic equivalence between the two. However, it seemed he did find the notions close enough that it be worth comparing them as a means to tease out what bullshit is - in part at least - from adopting and/or using the relevant similarities within the notion of humbug.

What followed is pretty much the rest of the book. It is quite intriguing if for no other reason than the methodological approach he then puts to use. He sets out the notion of humbug, taking it's parts into very careful consideration...

Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes.

I am. I'm almost certain I have my own copy... at least one.

I'm saying... simply...

The Republicans and their donors ARE invested.

It's not bizarre unless the above is not being seriously taken into consideration.

Hmmm...

Seems a bit more to me that perhaps the reason it all seems so bizzare is because the very fact that someone like Trump has won, and is being protected at all costs by the Republican party even when that protection is a clear and undeniable contradiction to the US Constitution shows that there are some very compelling reasons governing their behaviour...

And it's not because they like Trump personally, although they seem to have gotten over the fact that a tactless unreserved rude crass spoiled rich kid attained the power of the presidency...

That it is a known fact that Russia successfully interfered with the election, but nothing at all has been done about making sure that it does not happen again..

OUGHT MAKE US ALL WONDER WHAT THE FUCK IS GOING ON IN WASHINGTON?

He won't tell unless we do.

I have not equivocated over the term 'reason'; rather I have carefully specified the different uses to which it can be put. — Bartricks

"Over the term"...

Nonsense.

"while using the term"...

Yes... you have.

When an author uses different senses of the same term in the same argument it results in equivocation at best, and self contradiction at worst.

We're not in disagreement about the fact that there are a plurality of accepted sensible uses of the term "reason". We all know that to be true.

We're in disagreement for all sorts of reasons...

...not all sorts of people. Moron.

You are equivocating the term "reason" because you are using it in more than one sense in the same argument. This can be easily proven by means of substitution. The same practice will also clearly show that Reason is not a person.

Oh look! There it is directly above!

My my my...

You really are serious, aren't you?

:snicker:

I do have to admit I find the whole impeachment process politically bizzarre. The outcome is predetermined: — StreetlightX

It's not supposed to be.

Dereliction of duty.

:rofl:

You really are serious?

:brow:

Do you believe what you write?

But what's wrong with my analysis? — Bartricks

The personification of thinking about one's own thoughts and belief(reason). Equivocation of a number of different terms, including "reason". Failing to properly quantify premisses(not specifying "some" and implying all when it is not).

:wink:

Since you asked.

...avoid the traditional gatekeepers of truth. — NOS4A2

You and your imaginary friends... there are no such 'gatekeepers of truth'. The Church once was... quite unfortunately for everyone's sake afterwards. Many have thrown the baby out with the bathwater...

There are witnesses who have direct access to the president that have relevant yet to have been heard testimony about the articles of impeachment...

Those witnesses need to be heard, particularly if they have been previously ordered to not obey subpoena.

Mitch McConnell's statements about coordinating with the president and already having the exact some position as the president on the matter, when he's supposed to be acting as an impartial objective unbiased judge on the matter is dereliction of duty...

I try to understand what the fuck you could be thinking and I don't get it. — frank

When one throws truth out the window in lieu of whatever works... rhetoric, propaganda, double standards, etc., and the American people already see that as normal...

There ya go.

Something to note... the Republican talking points are always fairly simple sounding, easy to understand, and everyone is on the same page saying the same things about the same stuff.

That matters more than most realize I think... indoctrination works the same way...

I think it is no accident that philosophers are made fun of.
— creativesoul

Rodeo-clowns' occupational hazard, ain't it? — 180 Proof

Perhaps, but the rodeo clown is not expected to have much to say about the rest of the rodeo...

Anyone who watches Bernie Sanders speak in a debate format will soon find out what proper debate looks like. All one needs to do with Bernie is remind everyone of all the different pieces of legislation which resulted in financially harming the average everyday citizen, and then look to see how he voted at the time...

Sometimes the only nay!

Guess who got it right?

The news media has become very selective in what it states and prints and is politically biased - on both ends of the political spectrum. How are philosophers to solve this problem? — John Gill

I think it is no accident that philosophers are made fun of.

It's not only politically biased... but it's also financially biased. As long as people are more prone to watch train wrecks, they will show nothing but.

I do see grown adults asking what "knowledge" and "god" is, so maybe there is something different with these terms. Maybe if you'd stop being so facetious we could have a respectful back and forth. — Harry Hindu

I'm not being facetious.

Many folk have different ideas about what "knowledge" is. The same is true of "god". The same is true of "truth". The same is true of "meaning".

That's not adequate ground to conclude that because people use the word when asking about what it is that there is no clear understanding of what it is... especially when and if it is something that exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it.

It could indicate a clear case of the listener knowing that there are a wide ranging number of different notions that all use the same name, and not having a clear understanding of which notion the speaker is employing.

Right?