Hear, hear.

Most especially, "Attempting to use purportedly reliable scientific knowledge to support a claim that we have no reliable knowledge of distal objects is a performative contradiction."

There is an alternative, which is to reject the juxtaposition of direct and indirect experiences entirely, and admit that we do sometimes see (hear, touch, smell...) things as they are; and that indeed this is essential in order for us to be able to recognise those occasions in which we see (hear, touch, smell...) things in the world erroneously. — Banno

Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time. — frank

The most accepted vies is representationalism, which is neither direct nor indirect. The issue is no longer "Do we perceive representations (indirect realism) or do we perceive objects (direct realism)" since it is understood that we perceive by constructing a representation, which is better described as neither direct nor indirect.

Essentially, the whole argument of this thread has been bypassed since Austin.

Folk are misled by physiologist saying silly things like "we don't see the tree, we see the representation of the tree". They are wrong, and should know better. We see the tree by constructing a representation of the tree. Hence, we see the tree.

Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time.
— frank
The most accepted vies is representationalism, which is neither direct nor indirect. — Banno

I think everything on that list was indirect realism.

since it is understood that we perceive by constructing a representation, which is better described as neither direct nor indirect. — Banno

I thought that was indirect.

Both fall prey to the fallacy of ambiguity; there is some ambiguity with the verb "see", for example. In the case of hallucination there is no object of perception. If there was, it wouldn't be a hallucination. So we're confusing the object of perception with perception itself. — NOS4A2

Schizophrenics hear voices. I feel pain.

As I’ve said before, arguing over the grammar of “I see X” is a confusion, precisely because as you say the term is ambiguous.

The only relevant concern is the epistemological problem of perception. Conscious experience - percepts - do not extend beyond the body. Distal objects do not exist within conscious experience. Our knowledge of distal objects is indirect, inferred from the effects they have on our body (specifically from conscious experience and its qualities).

Any “intentionality” in experience is akin to the intentionality found in paintings and in books. This isn’t the kind of “directness” that indirect realists reject, that naive realists accept, and that would save us from scepticism. See Howard Robinson’s Semantic Direct Realism.

I’m with you. As I’ve repeatedly argued, all these “non-naive direct” or “non-indirect” realisms are just describing indirect realism but refusing to call it what it is.

We see the tree by constructing a representation of the tree. Hence, we see the tree. — Banno

Can you think of any other circumstance in which this (imo, quite squarely incoherent) claim could be held?

Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time. I think the contemporary direct realist is trying to steer clear of the problems associated with it? — frank

Im not sure that's true - and I was to quote the Phil Survey response Banno did, so there we go. Banno's explanation of why seems convenience to me, but it's better than anything else put forward in here, imo.

If that is what they modern DRist is trying to do... ha..hah?

The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

The painting of some fictional landscape is identical with the painting – and identical to the paint itself. But the painting is still of something. So even if the experience of something is identical with the experience it is nonetheless the experience of something.

And what is the intentional object of perception if not whatever follows the word "of"? Perhaps Searle is being ambiguous with the phrase "object of perception".

Not that this really matters, as per my comment here, but I thought I should address it anyway.

:up:
— Michael

If that is what they modern DRist is trying to do — AmadeusD

One of the conundrums with indirect realism is that it seems to start as direct realism, where the scientist assumes he sees the world exactly as it is, then he concludes from what he's observed that he's not seeing the world exactly as it is. How do you deal with that problem?

One of the conundrums with indirect realism is that it seems to start as direct realism, where the scientist assumes he sees the world exactly as it is, then concludes from what he's observed that he's not seeing the world exactly as it is. How do you deal with that problem? — frank

I addressed this in a previous comment.

Firstly, if direct realism is true then scientific realism is true, and if scientific realism is true then direct realism is false. Therefore direct realism is false given that it entails a contradiction.

Secondly, given that scientific realism entails the existence of objects that cannot be directly observed (e.g. electrons), it is not a contradiction – performative or otherwise – for an indirect realist to be a scientific realist. Presumably even the direct realist can trust in a Geiger counter despite not claiming to directly see radiation. Direct perception is not required to accept something as true.

I think everything on that list was indirect realism. — frank

Indeed, which is where you err.

I thought that was indirect. — frank

See the word "by"? It's important. We do not see the representation; we see by constructing the representation.

I’m with you. — Michael

Indeed, you share the same error.

Thanks Pierre, I hadn't before seen evidence that this exact debate had been going on that long. :up:

When I look at something I can see its qualities: height, width, shape, colours, textures; I don't need to infer those properties.

Do you have an argument to support the idea that I need to infer the properties of objects, rather than simply see, hear, feel, touch and taste them? You are the one making the extraordinary claim here.

And you haven't even attempted to address your performative contradiction. What does 'direct' mean if not 'reliable', and what does 'indirect' mean if not 'unreliable'? Surely that is the only salient issue: whether our perceptions afford us reliable information about distal objects, and everything points to the fact that they do. How would we survive if they didn't? How would science work so well if they didn't?

Firstly, if direct realism is true then scientific realism is true, and if scientific realism is true then direct realism is false. Therefore direct realism is false given that it entails a contradiction. — Michael

And you haven't presented your argument as to why sciietific realism being true entails direct realism (in the sense I'm taking it, namely that its central claim is that we have reliable information from and about distal obkects) being false.

We have direct perceptual knowledge of our body's response to stimulation. — Michael

We know a lot about how bodies respond to stimulation. Some of it was inferred, hypothesized, tested and verified. The half second delay between seeing a 100mph fastball and that consciously registering within the batter was discovered. Blind sight, and all that too. Knowledge of our body's response to stimulation is not always acquired in the sense that 'direct perceptual knowledge' requires.

I'd agree with adding "sometimes" to the quote at the top of this post.

Our physiological sensory perception(biological machinery) is in direct physical contact with distal objects. Light directly enters the eye and lands on the structures in the back of the eyes, which are physically connected to the brain via even more biological structures. The same holds good for coffee in the mouth, fire on the skin, cake molecules in the nose, or decaying flesh in both the nose and mouth.

How do you square the physicalist standard you've required for what counts as being a constituent of experience against what's above? Do we agree on the above?

Try using other sense as paradigmatic, rather than sight. It's much harder to maintain that one touches something indirectly - to "infer" that the surface is smooth or rough; or to make sense of smelling the coffee indirectly... how does one "infer" the taste of lemon?

Firstly, if direct realism is true then scientific realism is true, and if scientific realism is true then direct realism is false. Therefore direct realism is false. — Michael

The first sentence is a paradox, isn't it?

Indeed, which is where you err. — Banno

Quite likely.

Yes, it seems easier to realize that touch, taste and smell give us immediate access to the qualities of things than it is in the case of sight or, especially. hearing.

Well, for instance, it's hard to see how disjunctivism could be indirect. That a veridical viewing of, say, a tree, could be an instance of viewing a mental image of the tree, while an hallucination was not..

Well, for instance, it's hard to see how disjunctivism could be indirect. That a veridical viewing of, say, a tree, could be an instance of viewing a mental image of the tree, while an hallucination was not.. — Banno

I agree that there's a big difference between hallucinating and seeing our shared world. I think if indirect realism is specifically the situation with a homunculus, it's probably not true. I don't think there's a little person in there.

Cool.

Indirect realism is the view that what we see is the representation. The alternate is that what we see is the tree, and that we see the tree by constructing a representation of the tree.

Ok.

How do you deal with that problem? — frank

I Simply see no problem.
They are all inferences. Its hte best description. It may not have an actual answer.

One of the conundrums with indirect realism is that it seems to start as direct realism, where the scientist assumes he sees the world exactly as it is, then he concludes from what he's observed that he's not seeing the world exactly as it is. How do you deal with that problem? — frank

I think you are right that direct realism is the beginning position. I doubt that many folk think they see the world "exactly as it is". Rather folk realise that sometimes they see things amiss. This is what the various illusions bring into focus, so to speak.

That we see illusions shows that we do not see the world exactly as it is; but it does not show that we never see the world. Nor does it show that what we see is not the world, but something else caused by the world.

That is those who advocate for indirect realism on this basis are grasping more than the situation will allow. That we sometimes see the world as other than it actually is does not imply that we never see the world as it is.

That we see illusions shows that we do not see the world exactly as it is; but it does not show that we never see the world. Nor does it show that what we see is not the world, but something else caused by the world.

That is those who advocate for indirect realism on this basis are grasping more than the situation will allow. That we sometimes see the world as other than it actually is does not imply that we never see the world as it is. — Banno

Its pretty astounding that these two utterances are included in the same person's account. If A is true, B is not possible. We cannot see the world as it is, if "we do not see the world exactly as it is". Your use of 'exactly' is doing 100% of the lifting. And nothing's off the ground.

Cobblers. One can see the word inexactly. That's why some need glasses.

Interestingly, when one sees an illusion, one sees it directly, i.e., without seeing any intermediary.

However, I suspect that indirect realists will argue that seeing is the intermediary. The intermediary between the object and what, though? Surely not the perception. Seeing is the perception.

Another picture that may prove helpful, with the lines representing some relevant causal connection.

amr0096dgaltgb9e.jpg — Michael

Thanks for this diagram, which illustrates the distinction between direct realism and indirect realism.

I think that the distinction could be brought out further by noting where each opponent locates the perception. Direct realists locate (direct) perception between the mental image and the distal object. Indirect realists locate (direct) perception between the cognition and the mental image. As the diagram depicts, indirect realists see the mental image directly and see the distal object only indirectly.

But how does the cognition "see" anything? It is the mental image, the representation of the distal object, which is the "seeing"; the sensory perception. The cognition does not have its own set of sensory organs with which to perceive the mental image.

When I look at something I can see its qualities: height, width, shape, colours, textures; I don't need to infer those properties. — Janus

Those are the qualities of the experience, not the properties of the distal object.

Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore distal objects (and their properties) do not exist within experience. Everything that is present in experience (smells, tastes, colours, etc.) is a mental phenomenon.

You might want to argue that some of these mental phenomena (e.g. visual geometry) resemble the properties of the distal object, but it is nonetheless the case that the mental phenomena is the intermediary from which the properties of the distal object are inferred.

But how does the cognition "see" anything? It is the mental image, the representation of the distal object, which is the "seeing"; the sensory perception. The cognition does not have its own set of sensory organs with which to perceive the mental image. — Luke

I see things when I dream and the schizophrenic hears voices when hallucinating. Sensory organs are not involved. Seeing and hearing occurs when the visual and auditory cortexes are active (which is why the cortical blind can’t see even though they have functioning eyes).

Indirect realism is the view that what we see is the representation. The alternate is that what we see is the tree, and that we see the tree by constructing a representation of the tree. — Banno

Seeing a representation of a tree and seeing a tree are not mutually exclusive, exactly as feeling pain and feeling my hand burning are not mutually exclusive. “I experience X” doesn’t just mean one thing.

The meaning of “see” in “I see a representation of a tree” is the meaning of “see” in “I see a cat in my dream” and the meaning of “hear” in “I hear a representation of thunder” is the meaning of “hear” in “the schizophrenic hears voices” and the meaning of “feel” in “I feel a representation of a rock” is the meaning of “feel” in “I feel pain”.

Naive realists reject the existence of mental percepts, indirect realists accept the existence of mental percepts, and then so-called “non-naive non-indirect” realists accept indirect realism but call it something else and then invent some strawman (“percepts of percepts”) to stand in for indirect realism.

In accepting the existence of mental representations you’re arguing for indirect realism, but for reasons unknown are refusing to call it what it is.

Not that the label really matters. Call it “Banno realism” if you want. Either way it entails the epistemological problem of perception and the warrant for scepticism. That’s the philosophical concern that gave rise to the dispute between direct and indirect realism in the first place.

The first sentence is a paradox, isn't it? — frank

I wouldn't say so. That scientific realism entails indirect realism is contingent on a posteriori facts, not a priori truths. Perhaps in some alternate universe the world works differently and direct realism is true (e.g. objective idealism may entail direct realism as it could allow for an extended consciousness within which "distal" objects are literally present).

But as it stands the science of perception supports indirect realism and so a direct realist must reject the science of perception, although I don't know how he can justify that rejection.

I see things when I dream and the schizophrenic hears voices when hallucinating. Sensory organs are not involved. — Michael

You don't actually see a distal object when you dream and the schizophrenic does not actually hear a distal object when hallucinating. That what makes them dreams and hallucinations instead of instances of seeing or hearing real objects.

An indirect realist would argue that imaginary friends are directly perceived but real friends are only indirectly perceived.