Statements are not states of affairs. I'm not sure what you're objecting to. I've never claimed statements are states of affairs.

Fair summation of that part... :smile:

How do we 'justify' stating the rules?

Here is empirical evidence of you admitting that you're not even interested in justifying your position. — Michael

That was me rejecting your method of justification/verification(criterion for what counts as being justified).

My position is that some utterances of ought are true. Utterances of ought are a kind of claim. All true claims correspond to reality. Some utterances of ought correspond to reality. I set all that out simply already. My position may not be readily amenable to your current view. I suspect your view cannot meet it's own standard of what it takes to be sensible, rational, and justified. I could be wrong, but I doubt that I am in that regard.

I'll circle back to something earlier...

If it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies. Those two claims express the same state of affairs/situation/set of circumstances/the way things were/are...etc. When it is the case that one ought not kick puppies, then it is also the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, and vice versa. Hence, "one ought not kick puppies" is true when those situations 'obtain'(to borrow your language).

I cannot make you read and/or take into consideration what I've wrote in support of what claims I've made here.

You also seem fixated upon changing what I write into statements I've not made. All of this can be verified.

These are all irrelevant questions.
— creativesoul

They're not. They're central to metaethics.

You're asserting that some type of ontological entity exists ("moral obligations") but won't justify your assertion. Hence your position is unjustified, and I am justified in rejecting the unjustified. I reject your moral realism. — Michael

Can you verify those claims? I'd love to see that.

If, like above, you "do not feel the need to [justify the claim] that we ought not kick puppies" then your assertion is, quite literally, unjustified, and hence a dogma. Dogmas are irrational, and so your position is irrational. — Michael

So what evidence – whether empirical or rational – supports your assertion that there are non physical things? — Michael

These are all irrelevant questions. Relations are not physical. Intent is not physical. Truth is not physical.

All of these things and others are existentially dependent upon physical things, but do not consist of only physical things. I'm that sort of physicalist, I suppose, but I'm not married to stuff that is that far beyond the practical matter at hand.

I do not require omniscience from others either. Do you satisfy your own criticisms/criterion about what counts as dogma and being irrational?

Just curious.

Okay, so we're getting somewhere.

Obligations are non-physical states of affairs. As it stands it then seems that a moral realist cannot be a physicalist.

So what evidence – whether empirical or rational – suggests that non-physical states of affairs exist? — Michael

That particular state of affairs consists of both physical and non physical things.

I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. I could also care less whether or not that particular claim could be verified.
— creativesoul

This seems to give up the claim of truth, then. — AmadeusD

Well no. A claim need not be verified in order for it to be true.

That doesn't follow.

It seems your argument is something like if a claim cannot be verified it ought not be believed, or it doesn't make sense, or something like that?

That's not what I mean either. While you may get bit if you were to kick certain puppies, that's not why you ought not kick them.
— creativesoul

But you just quoted yourself saying "demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment."

If this had nothing to do with explaining what it means for one to be forbidden from kick puppies then why did you bring it up? — Michael

Well, you were seeking verification. Hence... rules. Rules... are an example of b. At least you're consistent.

I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. I could also care less whether or not that particular claim could be verified. So, it's not so much that I brought it up for any other reason than to point out where the need for verification leads one sometimes.

If it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies, and hence "one ought not kick puppies" is true.
— creativesoul

The bits in bold are the bits I'm trying to make sense of. Are they physical states-of-affairs — Michael

Those expressions reference states of affairs, the case as it was/is, the particular situation/circumstances at the time, etc.

Such things consist - in part at least - of that consists of things that are both physical and nonphysical, hence, I would not put it quite like that... "physical states of affairs".

So moral obligations are pragmatic suggestions? I ought not kick puppies because... they might bite me in retaliation?

I can accept that. But I don't think that's what moral realists mean. — Michael

That's not what I mean either. While you may get bit if you were to kick certain puppies, that's not why you ought not kick them.

Yup, when our report of the utterance is qualified enough, we'll be talking about certain communities' codes. Not all.

No worries.

Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment.
— creativesoul

Sure — Michael

Not an argument, but an agreement. That's adequate enough here.

This case requires rule giver and/or reward/punishment... an external judge. Granted.

I owe your last reply more consideration than that. :wink:

I'll look...

The claim rests on the rule being the benchmark for truth. — AmadeusD

Nah. Sometimes codes are wrong/mistaken.

I argued how b was false
— creativesoul

You didn't. You just asserted it and threw out vague suggestions to "check the codes of behaviour" without explaining where to find these codes of behaviour and where they come from. Do I check the village noticeboard where the Elders have listed their decrees? — Michael

You're conflating two separate issues.

A few pages back I argued how an external judge was not necessary. You now offer a case where one is. I never argued that there are no such cases, only that it is not always the case. Your counterexample to my claim is of no issue, I've not made such a universally applicable claim... yet. The counterexample to b is most certainly an issue for your claims.

There is no single place where you can find all particular behavioural codes. The point is that they can be found sometimes. Wherever they may be kept, assuming you have access, that's where they are.

From whence punishment from external entity/judge? There is no need on my view. I covered that part already. In the first few posts of this particular discussion. It has since went sorely neglected.
— creativesoul

A search for posts by you containing the word "forbidden" this week brings up five results, all of which only assert that something is forbidden without explaining what this means. — Michael

You missed the point. You unnecessarily multipled entities again.

Earlier you expressed your cognitive dissonance involving a, b, and c. I argued how b was false, leaving a and c. That alone would have resolved the dissonance if that report was accurate.

When one's argument against moral realism involves claiming to not know what it means when some behaviour is forbidden, then I'm not sure what else I could say to help. Knowing that much seems to be a necessary prerequisite for doing metaethics.

This is boring me.

You objected that you could not make sense of what I wrote.

Is your argument that if you cannot find the applicable code of behaviour which clearly and unambiguously forbids kicking puppies that it does not make sense to you or is it that making sense requires being verifiable/falsifiable? Something else?

What I wrote stands. I'm failing to see the relevance in what you're doing.

Check the codes of behaviour.

Pose a clear question.

how do I verify or falsify the claim that we ought not kick puppies? — Michael

What if such a claim cannot be verified/falsified by your choice of method?

Fourth.

Here, here, and here were the earlier comments. — Michael

Which one has the question?

Sometimes, kicking puppies is forbidden.
— creativesoul

If by this you just mean that someone or something bigger and stronger than me has threatened to punish me if I kick puppies then I understand what you mean. If you mean something else then you're going to have to explain it. — Michael

From whence punishment from external entity/judge? There is no need on my view. I covered that part already. In the first few posts of this particular discussion. It has since went sorely neglected.

So I ask again, for the zillionth time: how do I verify or falsify the claim that we ought not kick puppies? — Michael

That's the very first time you've asked me.

What's the confusion? I don't get it.

:yikes:

Sometimes, kicking puppies is forbidden.

Are you saying that you cannot make sense of that? Are you saying that I somehow, in some way, need to make more sense of it? Seems plain and simple to me.

Are you denying it?

I wouldn't put it like that.

What? I didn't charge you with anything. — AmadeusD

An appeal to authority is a fallacy. You charged me with exactly that.

And what contradiction, sorry? I'm trying to have a discussion not a pissing match. — AmadeusD

Performative contradiction.

You first claimed that it is not the case that one ought not kick puppies. You then went on and realized that sometimes kicking puppies is forbidden and accused me of 'appealing to authority'.

What is the what is going on with respect to the obligation not to kick puppies? — Michael

I used the phrase to reference reality. There are many such linguistic tools. None of which are capable of effectively capturing everything that has ever happened. So, the phrases "the way things are", "the way things were", "the case at hand", "what's going on", "what went on", "events", etc. are all rightfully employed when the appropriate situations/circumstances need discussed.

If it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies, and hence "one ought not kick puppies" is true.

I don't think so no. It can be the case that a code of conduct exists, and that a group or society accept, and live by, a code of conduct. So you could say, "In this quite particular scenario, it is the case that one ought not kick puppies" but that's just an appeal to authority... so, I suppose in some sense i have to concede here but it's not a concession on my position, just on the way it applies. — AmadeusD

That's odd. While contradicting yourself out loud you (inaccurately)charge me with a fallacy?

Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies?
— creativesoul

Realise you didn't ask me, but it's apt to my considerations of the discussion - I don't think it could be the case, as it's a judgement, not a state of affairs with with one's opinion could correspond. — AmadeusD

As if codes of conduct cannot be considered as an elemental constituent within a state of affairs? As if it is never the case that kicking puppies is forbidden?

:brow:

A correspondence theorist might well be rightly puzzled as to what it is to which an ought statements corresponds. But to my eye this is not a reason to think there are no true ought statements, but instead to question if truth is always correspondence. — Banno

Hey my friend. I think perhaps correspondence and coherence combined.

I've been mulling over promises...

When the direction of fit is such that keeping one's word confirms one's sincerity, it is certainly the case that if one is sincere, then one will keep one's word. Hence, when a promise is made to do something, it is always the case that one ought do it. If it is not the case, then it is not a promise.

Correspondence is an emergent relation between what is thought and/or believed about what is going on and what is going on. When what is thought about what's going on is 'equivalent' enough, or close enough to what is going on, then truth emerges. That is how meaningful true belief become real/actual/manifest/formed. That's what it takes. That's how correspondence 'between' belief about reality and reality(hence, meaningful true belief) emerges onto the world stage.

If it is the case that we ought not kick puppies, then "we ought not kick puppies" is true.

Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies?

So by what means are moral claims made true? What sort of things (if any) do they “correspond” to? — Michael

Those are good questions.

I find it a bit amusing that you're insisting that I'm not doing metaethics while I'm doing nothing but thinking about morality and ethics as a subject matter in its own right. As if the only thing that counts as "metaethics" is discourse about what it means for a moral judgment/statement to be true.

I'm attempting to openly consider many different takes/positions on the matter at hand.

So, I do not care what label/name you give it... I'm interested in discussing what it takes for some utterances of ought to be true.

It’s about not understanding what it means for a moral sentence to be true and not understanding how to verify or falsify a moral sentence. — Michael

Those could be perplexing considerations if we work from the conventional notions of truth as in using one and one only. Perhaps different sorts of claims are true by virtue of different means, or by virtue of corresponding to different sorts of things.

There is more to the issue than you and some others seem willing to admit. — Michael

Well, in my own defense, I was simply working from exactly what you boiled the dissonance down to.

It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? You might be able to pick a side without justification but I can't.

Hence why I remain a skeptic. — Michael

Hence, from that I offered...

Divorce the utterance from the label and walk away a free man. "One ought not kick puppies" is both sensible and true. It's definitely sensible, and that's enough, if you'd like to set the truth issue aside. If categorical imperatives make no sense, and "one ought not kick puppies" makes perfect sense, then "one ought not kick puppies" cannot count as a "categorical imperative", for the claim cannot do both, make perfect sense and make no sense..

Time to choose between the archaic taxonomy(categorical imperatives) and what you know is true despite not fully understanding how and/or why it is.

I find the focus on what counts as normativity as irrelevant to whether or not some utterances of ought are true. I'm open to be persuaded otherwise.