It appears to me that Trump wants the "border" problems to persist, because it's to his political benefit. — Relativist

Spot on.

The republicans in congress have not supported border policy put forth after Trump voiced his opposition to it. Prior to that they were preparing to take action on the border issues. So, what we have is someone who is not an elected official influencing those who are to such a degree as to have them not take action on things they themselves loudly claim needs to be taken.

Why?

Because Trump wants to campaign on the 'border' and if there are bi-partisan actions taken to help correct the problems, then Trump's case is weakened, his plan is short circuited. So, just like Trump wants an economic crash to happen, he also wants the border to be a problem.

The Republican party is deliberately not taking action to correct illegal entry into the United States, because Trump wants it to be as big of a problem as it can be right now. That is to put Trump's political interests in front of what's in the best interest of America.

...a 3-hour riot was a violent insurrection... — NOS4A2

Rather...

A 3-hour riot interrupted the peaceful transfer of power.

Trump was personally directing Pence to publicly place the election results in question by questioning the electoral college results. He was supposed to act confused about what he should do when handed two different slates of electors. There were roughly 150 congressional members that voted against the electoral college results. Some of them were directly involved in the personal transfer of the aforementioned slate of electors. We need to know who knew what and when.

The investigations into the events of Jan. 6 began in 2021, long before Trump was a presidential candidate. The same is true of Georgia election interference and the classified documents cases. So, the claim that the indictments regarding these cases were/are attempts at 2024 election interference based upon the indictment dates does not square with the facts; that indictments happen after the investigation, and those investigations were under way long before.

I do not know what transcending a language construct could possibly mean.

If you reject the subjective/objective dichotomy the hard problem looks very different.

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. The main issue in the context of the discussion of physicalism is the emphasis on objects and objectivity, and also on what is measurable. The basis of scientific method is the identification of the measurable attributes of objects. That is what has been referred to as the 'supremacy of quantity'. Whereas states of being are qualitative by nature - they're characterised by feeling (among other things).That is the whole 'hard problem' issue in a nutshell. I don't think it is unclear. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I understand that that's how you talk about this stuff. I understand that I'm in the minority as well. So, sure... they are perfectly intelligible. People use them all the time. I'm just saying that it seems to me that the subject/object and subjective/objective distinctions, despite their popularity, look like a big part of the problem from my vantage point.

Not everything fits into one or the other category. Cognition, metacognition, meaning, truth, social institutions, and other things quite simply are neither one nor the other. Many things consist of and/or are existentially dependent upon both, and thus are neither. That is the problem I see with those language constructs, in a nutshell. The inherent inadequacy of the linguistic framework to be able to take proper account of such things.

I don't think the direction this thread is headed is of much help in understanding physicalism, so I had walked away, but I will make a few comments by way of responding to you directly.

I don't think emergence can be well understood in either casual or evolutionary terms, but that rather it might better be understood as a different way of talking about something. See this post. — Banno

I saw that. I tend to agree with the general thrust. We can discuss that in greater detail if you want to.

Originally, I became interested in this thread by Christoffer's first post, which reminded me very much of the reasoning behind my own methodological naturalist bent. I adopted that underlying method a very long time ago, and it was key to me 'shedding' much of the beliefs and 'reasoning' behind them that I adopted between the age of 4 and teenage years... whew, talk about hard work!

However, if my own grasp of his subsequent posts was accurate enough to be indicative, it seems our agreement was limited to preferring methodological naturalism as a philosophical method of approach.

The argument that some things are physical, monism is true, and hence physicalism is true is enticing, but I do not believe all things are physical even though I find it most likely that those things are existentially dependent upon physical things.

But it's not clear to me from what you have said, whether you accept or reject a preference for monolithic explanations.

That makes two of us! :wink: It's not clear to me either.

SO I'm not at all sure where this leaves us.

Earlier you mentioned anomalous monism, which - if you're referring to Davidson - I have been wanting to understand his notion. Although I've watched and listened to several videos of Davidson regarding that, I do not have a good grasp of it at this time, although I do remember finding the notion very interesting, and a bit compelling. I want to review, listen, and watch again in the near future.

Searle's stuff seems relevant too... regarding emergent things(obligation for instance).

I'm not sure where this leaves us either, but if you have something in mind that you'd like to discuss, I'd be glad to join you.

Mahalo!

I get it, I really do! I'll have another go at it. What I'm saying, and it's an important qualification, is that consciousness does not exist as an object. We can, of course, speak of it as an object in the metaphorical sense - an 'object of discussion' - but the mind itself is not an object in the sense that all the objects we see and interact with are objects. I say that is why the 'eliminative materialists' can't acknowledge its reality - precisely because it's not objectively existent. — Wayfarer

Sounds about right to me. I'm neither a fan of object-oriented frameworks, nor of the object/subject distinction. I also find very little sensible use for the objective/subjective distinction, although Searle has recently convinced me that it may be rightfully applicable in certain contexts. There are several historical dichotomies that I've found lack the explanatory power necessary to take account of that which is neither one or the other, but rather... consist of both(and more when it comes to emergent things).

There's another distinction that I make between 'what exists' and 'what is real', but it's a very difficult distinction to unpack. But what got me started on that was the distinction between intelligible objects, such as numbers and logical principles, and empirical objects, such as apples and chairs. I think that is preserved in the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge although it's very much fallen out of favour in Anglo philosophy. — Wayfarer

Yup. That's another set of pairs that I reject. I understand the taxonomy you're setting out enough to say that I'm not claiming that your use of "consciousness" and claiming that "consciousness does not exist" is incoherent. Seems to make sense according to your own taxonomy. I just lean towards Occam here and hold that everything that has an effect/affect exists. Consciousness causes both.

I'm of the view that there was at least an implicit distinction recognised between empirical and intellectual objects in pre-modern philosophy. So, empirical objects are phenomenally existent - that is, they appear as objects of sense (bearing in mind that 'phenomena' means 'what appears'.) But logical principles, numbers and the like are not 'phenomenal objects' in that sense - they are 'objects of thought'. I'm of the view that this is an important epistemological distinction that has been lost in the transition to modernity. But it's the first point that is most relevant.) — Wayfarer

"Object of thought" is exactly what come to my mind while reading the first paragraph of this reply.

I think we both hold that some things are physical. We also may agree that there are other things that do not seem to be physical in elemental constitution. Perhaps we may also agree that some things consist of both physical elements and non physical elements.

So, by my lights, that is to say that the dichotomy of physical/non physical is inadequate...

Many well-read participants here will read one or two statements from another and be reminded of some historical position or another simply by the appearance of a few key words that have been used in past. It's as if one or two words or phrases always serve as prima facie evidence for concluding that the user shares whatever position those few words reminded them of. Then they go one to use this crutch of misunderstanding to disregard the other. It seems more and more apparent to me that you've done something very similar to that, here in this thread, with me. No judgment here, just observation...

Unfortunately, you seem convinced that you know what my position is. It's a shame that that's the case, because I do not think that you do. I've ignored, and I will continue to ignore the sentences that prove that clearly... to me, anyway. I'm just not interested in that sort of 'discussion'. Nor am I here to deliver a scathing critique of your contributions(which could most certainly be done). Nah, I'm much less likely to do such things in my 'old age'. I do not really see the point anymore, most of the time anyway. I'd much rather attempt to make headway. There is some agreement between us. That being said...



This needs attention...

But the problem is, you’re still regarding ‘it’ as a phenomena, as something that exists. But consciousness is not ‘something that exists’, it is the ground of experience. Now, certainly, consciousness can be treated as a phenomena, as something that can be studied and understood - that is what cognitive science and psychology deal with. But I think the ‘hard problem’ argument is not addressed to that - it is about the meaning of being (‘what it is like to be….’), which is not an objective phenomenon.
— Wayfarer

As you implied, the key to your differences with ↪creativesoul is in divergent definitions of "To Be / To Exist" — Gnomon

There, you were spot on. That seems an unbridgeable divide between Way and myself. He insists that consciousness does not exist, and to me... that makes no sense. On my view, everything spoken about exists. It's just a matter of how. Simply put: That which has an effect/affect exists(is real).

Emergence is what's going on when such knowledge is being formed.
— creativesoul
Yes, the awareness of physical emergence... — Gnomon

Here, you said "yes", but did not understand what you were agreeing to. I was claiming that that bit of knowledge was an emergent entity/thing. That was all I was saying at that time.


The following could prove fruitful...

I define the human Mind as the primary Function of the human Brain. Technically, a "function" is not a thing-in-itself, but a causal relationship between inputs & outputs, as in the information processing of a computer. The biological Brain is a machine, but the psychological Mind is a process, a function : the creation of Meaning — Gnomon

So, we seem to agree that minds are existentially dependent upon brains.

I'm curious to see if you'd be willing to unpack that last sentence. Notably, the last bit about "the creation of meaning". I ask, because it has long been my contention that academia has gotten that wrong, and that the academic (mis)conceptions of meaning(current conventional understanding regarding theories thereof according to the SEP) have led or helped lead to many a philosophical conundrum.

It's relevant here I think.

When you look at a world containing a street with cars and buildings, if this world was not internal to your mind, how would you be able to think about it? — RussellA

By virtue of drawing meaningful correlations between different things, some of which are not "internal to your mind".

Trump's grievances (regarding 2020 election results) have been heard and found to be unwarranted, groundless, and unjustifiable as a result of having inadequate - ahem no - evidence to support them. He knew that during the call. The results had already been counted and recounted. Trump refused to accept the official election results. The phone call itself is evidence of election interference.

The problem is that "what constitutes emergence," is deeply tied to metaphysical considerations that lie upstream of the concept, and how dependence is framed. Emergence is an old concept, but it seems many classical formulations of it are dead in the water.

I understand why people think we need emergence. My intuition though, is that a lot of attempts to build a definition of emergence are being built on top of prior assumptions that simply preclude the possibility of such a thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Bolding mine

I agree with the overall sentiment of this post. If emergence is a naturally occurring process, then it all boils down to the elemental constituency and existential dependency of the candidate under consideration. We've briefly talked about that in my thread by the same name.

Could you elaborate on some of the prior assumption that preclude the possibility of emergent things/entities? I personally do not find that the notion of emergent property is capable of taking proper account of all emergent things/entities.

The second is that not only do we live in a physical world but that physical explanations are to be preferred to any other sort of explanation — Banno

For my part it's not that a purely physical explanation ought be, or is, preferred, but rather that the explanation and the entities referred to within it ought be made amenable in terms of evolutionary progression to/from purely physical entities.

Assuming monism is true, evolution always happens, and methodological naturalism is the best approach...

...provide a single overall account of how the world works. — Banno

Again, for my part...

Consistency/coherence within and of one's own worldview requires the ability(explanatory power) to provide different but commensurable explanations/accounts regarding how different sorts of more than just physical entities/things emerge.

On my view, there are no purely immaterial things(although I may be able to be pursuaded to see things otherwise). On your view there is. It's a matter of methodological approach. The differences between our two views are so stark that we may not even be talking about the same things despite using the same words.

For example...

When you use the term "mind", what are you referring to such that it does not consist - in part at least - of biological machinery?

We're working from very different linguistic frameworks. For one, you're drawing a distinction between minds and the world in such a way that minds are not in the world. On my view, there is no emergence without some physical elemental constituent(s).

They did get him for what he did do that was illegal. They are also going to get him for what he did not do; keep his oath of office. He could not do both.

Emergence is a continuous process that appears to be sudden only because the mind reaches a tipping-point of understanding between an old meaning and a new meaning, — Gnomon

As if all emergence results from a tipping point between an old meaning and a new one.

...can anyone set out clearly what emergence is? — Banno

On my view emergence makes the most sense when used to refer to a naturally occurring(evolutionary) process that began long before language use emerged.

Consider a specific example of knowledge...

It is only from the recognition of causality, that a capable language-less creature will learn and thus come to know that touching fire causes pain. A creature incapable of attributing meaning to the behaviour and the fire will avoid the danger nonetheless, because fire damages biological material regardless of whether or not the biological entity in question is capable of acquiring the aforementioned knowledge in the aforementioned way. So, to be clear, avoiding the danger does not always require knowing that touching fire causes pain. Very simple biological organisms do it just fine despite not having what it takes to correctly attribute causal relations between different things.

Emergence is how the recognition of causality results in knowing that fire hurts when touched. Knowing that fire hurts when touched emerges from correctly attributing(recognizing) the aforementioned causal relations.

Knowledge of biological machinery and physics results in knowing how fire hurts when touched.

Emergence is what's going on when such knowledge is being formed.

Knowing that fire hurts when touched - as set out directly above - is existentially dependent upon more than just the fire and the biological creatures' behavior regarding that fire. The knowledge is not contained within, nor possessed by merely the elemental constituents, nor is such knowledge possible without all of them. Without the fire, the behaviour cannot happen. Without the behaviour, the attribution of meaning cannot happen. Without the attribution of meaning, the knowledge cannot be formed/acquired. Without the capable creature, the meaningful attribution of causality cannot happen. Without the meaningful attribution of causality, the formation/acquisition of that bit of knowledge cannot happen.

Other notably emergent things include truth(all senses of the term) and meaning(all senses of the term).

Of course, although I'm not certain, I would strongly suspect that not much of this, if any, aligns with current academic notions of "emergence".

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Earlier you asked what the difference was between emergence and 'backwards reduction', or something to that affect/effect. Why does that question matter to you? Keep in mind what I just roughly outlined above.

Nah. Just me overstating more than a decade of time between my first reading of Wayfarer's posts. :blush: Not plural.

But the problem is, you’re still regarding ‘it’ as a phenomena, as something that exists. But consciousness is not ‘something that exists’, — Wayfarer

Nah.

The problem - here and now - is that I have someone whom I've respected for decades attempting to tell me what my viewpoint is, and they're dead wrong in very important ways. You're right in saying I regard consciousness as something that exists. The rest is inapplicable, a false description. It does not match up to my position on consciousness, particularly regarding its emergence.

If the 'subjective quality' of experience(or experience if you prefer) emerges, then a lack of experience within or regarding the more basic elemental constituents is exactly what would be required and expected, not by design so much, but rather by necessity(existential dependency and elemental constituency).
— creativesoul

Sorry, but this makes no sense. — Wayfarer

Yeah, no surprise. In order for it to make sense, one must be thinking about what it would take in order for consciousness to be an emergent result of evolutionary progression. We must first do a bit of arm chair reasoning.

We would not look for it at the level of chemical compound. Those are necessary elemental constituents.

"Consciousness" is as undefined as a physical object as an "ecosystem". And in similar fashion both systems produce problems for us to define their behavior by just studying its parts. Just like consciousness we have problems explaining the behavior of the whole of an ecosystem by trying to draw lines from its parts. It's like something "clicks into place", a cutoff point in which new behaviors emerge. It's this abstraction that produce a problem for scientists to just explain consciousness by the neurological parts alone. The interactions between all systems and individual neurons increase so quickly in mathematical complexity that we lose our computational capability to verify any meaningful causal links other than trivial ones that formed our knowledge of how different parts in the brain are linked to basic and trivial functions of our consciousness. But the holistic entity that is our consciousness shows functions that we don't understand by these trivial links we experiment with. And they disappear as through a cutoff point when we remove more and more interactions and interplays between functions in the brain, as I defined when writing about the near-death waking up-experiences.
— Christoffer

:100: :up: to your whole post...

...and this paragraph especially is brilliantly said. — wonderer1

Seconded. It seems to me that methodological approach deserves attention. Earlier, perhaps your first post in this thread, you set out much the same reasoning I've agreed with elsewhere(a nod to methodological naturalism and Occam's razor).

If monism and evolution are true, emergence must be true.
— creativesoul

Consciousness, in my view, is just part of the same coin as anything else. Maybe the best description would be that both mind and matter are part of the same thing, but an emergent property that functions as a fluid abstract system rather than a set object could be viewed as an abstract while a defined set object that emerge would be called an object. — Christoffer

Greetings Christoffer! Your contributions to this thread have been interesting. They've captured my attention.

It seems to me that not only are mind and matter "part of the same thing", but that they are part of a plurality of things, all of which 'emerge' as more complex entities.

And yes, consciousness must be taken into account in a fluid spatiotemporal manner. The problem currently - it seems to me - is the apparent inability for the sciences to draw the evolutionary bridge between language less creatures' and language users'. There are also inherent issues with the origins of meaning, which is required for all cases of consciousness. The experience must be meaningful to the creature, at the time.

This subjective quality is what is not observable or measurable in terms of objective properties of chemical substances. And that is by design... — Wayfarer

If the 'subjective quality' of experience(or experience if you prefer) emerges, then a lack of experience within or regarding the more basic elemental constituents is exactly what would be required and expected, not by design so much, but rather by necessity(existential dependency and elemental constituency).

Apple pies are not found - cannot be found - by looking at apple trees.

That's not a flaw. It is a feature.

Emergence, as it seems, has some general attributes that can be found all over our reality and it may be part of how reality itself functions. — Christoffer

If monism and evolution are true, emergence must happen.

It seems to me that supervenience is all about existential dependency
— creativesoul

I don't think it's about dependency. — frank

Emergence is.

What aspect(s) are you still trying to understand?
— wonderer1

The whole thing. — frank

It seems to me that supervenience is all about existential dependency. As someone mentioned earlier, the difference between emergentists and non-emergentists may prove helpful.

You're presupposing that... somehow... in some way are... you are privy to Michael's beliefs moreso than Michael.

While - in certain situations it is possible to know what another believes moreso than the other, I do not think Michael is the sort of person that does not know what they believe in this context. Nothing they've written must lead to wherever you've arrived. Entailment fails to be a dependable tool here.

Kindness and empathy and charity would make the world a better place even if kindness and empathy and charity aren't moral. — Michael

If by "moral" you mean according to some particular behavioural code, then I agree.

Codes can be mistaken.

Okay.

What about the rest of what I said?

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and not cause suffering either way. — Michael

I can acknowledge that the world would be a different, better place if everyone acted with kindness and empathy and charity, but whether or not kindness and empathy and charity are moral makes no difference. — Michael

Whether or not kindness and empathy and charity make the world a better place does matter though.

I'm curious if I have the general gist of what you've been arguing in this thread.


Seems to me like you're explaining in general terms what makes the world a better place in a manner that allows/permits us to dispose of the term/notion/conception of "moral". That is to say that this, this, and this makes the world a better place, but I do not care if those things are called moral or not, I'll do them because I believe that the world will be a better place if I do, but I'm unwilling to insist that others should do the same.

It seems you're not okay with insisting that others have some obligation to share your beliefs about what makes the world a better place.

If that's close... I agree. They have to get there own their own. One cannot be forced to care about others.

Seems naturalist to me.

Why be moral?


:smile:


That's like asking...

Why be kind?

Why do what's best for most everyone concerned/included?

Why glorify doing good for goodness' sake?

Why ought we make concerted effort to think about how our behaviour effects/affects the world, and subsequently tailor it to help bring forth goodness while causing the least harm?

Why do what one believes is most helpful and least harmful?

Why be virtuous?

Why be admirable?

Why do our best to affect/effect positive change in the world?


So, why be moral?

Hopefully because we care about everyone who/that is affected/effected by our behaviour.

Sometimes there are choices other than just faith or authority There have been times when neither faith nor authority had things right.

That presupposes a subject capable of complex metacognition.

You haven’t answered either:

What makes the statement true; or
Where your confidence comes from.

Neither of your answers are in any way adequate. — AmadeusD

Well, if I've not answered then what are you possibly referring to when writing "Neither of your answers are in any way adequate"???

:brow:

First question...

Correspondence is an emergent relation between what is thought and/or believed about what is going on and what is going on. When what is thought about what's going on is 'equivalent' enough, or close enough to what is going on, then truth emerges. That is how meaningful true belief become real/actual/manifest/formed. That's what it takes. That's how correspondence 'between' belief about reality and reality(hence, meaningful true belief) emerges onto the world stage.

If it is the case that we ought not kick puppies, then "we ought not kick puppies" is true.

Are you questioning whether or not it is the case that we ought not kick puppies? — creativesoul

That was early on. Perhaps you missed it?

The second question has not been asked. Those meaningful marks have not been presented to me in that order prior to now. Earlier you asked where my confidence came from when I said that if it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden then it is also the case that we ought not kick puppies and vice versa. You queried regarding my confidence in making those claims. I answered as clearly, concisely, and completely as possible in the fewest meaningful marks possible to do so.

I stand by that answer. I know what they both mean. They mean the exact same thing.

Since we can build on the simple fact of our agreement. We can discourage puppy kicking, try to avoid the temptation provided by puppies, or introduce sanctions against puppy kickers. All the bits we need for a moral practice still follow, without a grounding in deontology or consequentialism, and with precious little metaethics. — Banno

Can we tease this out a bit further?

Would you agree with my saying that we need no 'rule giver', 'enforcer', and/or judge aside from ourselves if for no other reason than strictly because we are all we have? Since that's the case, then the mantra of "practice makes perfect" is the best approach we have. If that's all we have, then it's best for us to accept the facts and begin openly discussing which sorts of behaviours are better than others and why... without appealing to external judges and rule makers aside from ourselves.

At some point we must discuss consequences lest we have no other basis upon which to ground our belief about what and/or which behaviour is best in some set of circumstances.

Seems a brute fact to me. There is no need for an external judge, especially one of supernatural origin. Occam's razor applies. It is almost certainly the case that we humans 'make up the rules' governing our own behaviour. We are the ones who decide what is acceptable/unacceptable.

That's the natural progression of human thought. We act. We reflect upon actions. Then, we reflect upon those reflections, ad infinitum. In this way, morality and moral discourse emerges.

So, we arrive at not so much as admitting that codes of conduct are subject to influence by individual particulars, but insisting upon keeping that fact in mind and building upon it.

Interesting. Thanks for that. Collective intentionality may dovetail nicely with my own position.

Yup. I've been listening to/watching Searle lectures from time to time for a while now. Trying to keep the ontology closer to ground level. Dennett helps too!

:cool:

Searle's status functions??? Institutional facts???

People threatening to hang Mike Pence are not enemies of the US either, I suppose...

:roll: