Are we to say that ghosts are not real for us, but real for them? — Manuel

Ghosts are real in the sense that when they/we think about ghosts, they're/we're affected/effected by those thoughts. Seems to me anyway...

Absurd to deny, I should think, and thereby easily dismissed.

Now, whatever shall we do with realism? — Mww

That which is real has affects/effects.

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?..............I'd like to read your answer to the question above
— creativesoul

I agree that the proposition in language "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are in the world Cypress trees lining the banks.

However, the question is, where exactly is this world. Does this world exist in the mind or outside the mind. — RussellA

:yikes:

Evidence/remnants/consequences of linguistic bewitchment(radical skepticism/idealism).


We spoke earlier about this. The trees are in the Mississippi delta backwaters. We could increase specificity. Hone our aim, as it were. There's a small bayou named "Manchac". I could show you a map. I could take you there and show you in person. Coming off of the bayou Manchac and then reconnecting to it are canals. All along the banks of some of those canals are docks, decks, houseboats, houses, and living areas. There are sometimes adjacent swampy areas close by. Bald Cypress grow there.

None of those things and none of those places are in my mind.

Being conscious of perceiving requires language use. Otherwise, one merely perceives. One can be conscious of what they're perceiving, but one cannot be conscious of the fact that they are perceiving until and unless they have language use as a means to talk about that as a subject matter in its own right.
— creativesoul

I could say "I perceive the colour green" or "I am conscious of the colour green". These mean the same thing, on the assumption that perceiving requires consciousness, in that I can only perceive something when conscious. — RussellA

What I'm saying is that it is possible for a capable creature to directly perceive green cups but because they do so by means of ways that they are completely unaware of, they're not conscious of perceiving. They're just doing it.

House cats can see green cups in cupboards and have no idea that they're called "green cups".

Because they are unaware of the fact that they are perceiving green cups, they do not have conscious awareness of the fact that they are perceiving a green cup while they're watching another creature hide by moving around to the other side.

The cat is now paying very close attention to the green cup. S/he's watching the edges. S/he's anticipating seeing the mouse. The cup may not appear the same to her/him as it does to us, at least regarding the color.

It seems that some here think that having biological machinery somehow discounts any and/or all capable creatures from directly perceiving things. As if having eyes somehow disqualifies one from even being able to directly perceive the green cup in the cupboard. "The green cup" is a rigid designator.

When looking at the same object, I may perceive the colour green and the other person may perceive the colour blue. I can never know what colour they are perceiving, not being telepathic. However, if the other person is perceiving the colour blue, then one of us is not seeing the object as it really is. — RussellA

If the object has no inherently existing mind-independent property of color to speak of, then it makes no sense to accuse either one of you of not seeing the object 'as it really is'(whatever that's supposed to mean). It's appearing green to you and blue to them makes no difference - if the object has no inherently mind independent property of color.

Someone recently accused indirect realists of working from the same mistakes as naive realists.

If the object appears green to you and blue to them, it is because the object both of you are directly perceiving has different effects/affects on different individuals. It does not follow from that that we do not or cannot(which is what some seem to suggest) directly perceive the object under consideration.

The cat can too.

We do not perceive mental concepts.
— creativesoul

We perceive a tree. A tree is a concept. Therefore we perceive a concept. — RussellA

Trees are in the yard. Concepts are in the language talking about the yard. Both are in the world. Concepts are in worldviews. Cypress trees are in the backwaters of the Louisiana delta.

there is ample evidence of perception and thinking being entangled. — wonderer1

I think that the latter is existentially dependent upon the former, but not the other way around. Seeing a green apple as a green apple is both perception(seeing the green apple) and thinking(seeing the green apple as a green apple).

Some language less creatures can see green apples but cannot see green apples as green apples.

The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the sensation ordinarily caused by such wavelengths seems to be leading you and others to equivocate. — Michael

I'm curious if you'd show me how I'm equivocating.

For something to be true, there must be a reason why it is true
— Lionino
That does not look right. — Banno

My first thought as well...

Perhaps by "reason" he means truth conditions must be met?

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it.
— creativesoul

Exactly, it is a question of linguistics. — RussellA

Not what I said. I'm making the point that to see the green apple as "a green apple" requires language use, whereas seeing the green apple does not.

In a world independent of humans are elementary particles, elementary forces in space-time. When we look at such a world, we directly see the world as it is. — RussellA

Weird that you're claiming to look at a world independent of humans and in doing so claim to be abke to directly see that which is imperceptible to the naked eye. Weird indeed.

That looks like special pleading for elementary particles. What makes them different from Cypress trees? We name them both. Both exist long prior to our awareness of them.

We can see the trees though. So, if either of the two is under suspicion of whether or not it is dependent upon us, it would certainly seem that the tree was safer from that charge.

You can only know that you are looking a a mkondo in the world if you already know the meaning of "mkondo". It is true that humans may impose their concept of a "mkondo" onto the elementary particles and elementary forces that they observe in space-time, but this mkondo wouldn't exist without a human concept being imposed upon the elementary particles and elementary forces that do exist in space-time.

So what are we perceiving?

On the one hand we are perceiving a set of elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, meaning that we are directly perceiving the world as it is, and on the other hand we are also perceiving a mental concept, meaning that we are also indirectly perceiving the world as we think it is.

Perception needs both aspects, something in the world and something in the mind. — RussellA

I think your use of "perception" is stretched beyond sense ability. We do not perceive mental concepts. This does mark at least one of the aforementioned significant differences between our views.

You look at the world. Do you see a mkondo?

You obviously cannot know whether you are seeing a mkondo or not until you know the meaning of "mkondo".

IE, you have to know the meaning of "trees lining the banks" before knowing whether you can see trees lining the banks. — RussellA

That's not right though. I'm talking about seeing trees and your talking about knowing about that.


A capable creature need not know that they're seeing a Cypress tree in order to see one.

I need not know what "trees lining the banks" means in order to see trees lining the banks. If that were the case, and we took it to the extreme, language less animals could not see Cypress trees, whether that be lining the banks or otherwise. Further, I suppose it would follow from what you claim that they could not see anything at all.

I wrote that I can never know what someone else is thinking. However, sometimes I can guess. Though, I can never know whether my guess is correct or not. — RussellA

You need not know that your belief is true in that case in order for it to be so.

I would say that "I am conscious of seeing the colour green"... — RussellA

That requires knowing how to use the word "green" to pick out green things. Knowing how to use the word "green" requires knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of tasting something bitter"...

Paying attention to bitterness does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of an acrid smell"...

Paying attention to an acrid smell does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of a sharp pain"...

Paying attention to a sharp pain does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of hearing a grating noise"...

Paying attention to a grating noise does not require knowing how to use language.



One of those things above is not like the other.

...Therefore, in my mind I am conscious of perceiving a sight, a taste, a smell, a touch or a hearing.

That only follows from the outlier above.

Being conscious of perceiving requires language use. Otherwise, one merely perceives. One can be conscious of what they're perceiving, but one cannot be conscious of the fact that they are perceiving until and unless they have language use as a means to talk about that as a subject matter in its own right.

Drop everything after the term "sight", and I would concur that that follows from what preceded it.

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?
— creativesoul

I think it is right as you have done to distinguish words within exclamation marks to refer to thoughts and language and words not in exclamation marks to refer to things in the world. — RussellA

I've done that to help make it clear what I'm asking. So, I'd like to read your answer to the question above. There's also more you wrote a few days back that I'm working on addressing.

:wink:

Seems you and I are largely in agreement on direct perception, which did not really surprise me.

I would say that "I am conscious of seeing the colour green", "I am conscious of tasting something bitter", "I am conscious of an acrid smell", "I am conscious of a sharp pain" or "I am conscious of hearing a grating noise".

Therefore, in my mind I am conscious of perceiving a sight, a taste, a smell, a touch or a hearing. — RussellA

If we draw enough meaningful correlations between green things and other stuff, we can become conscious of green things. That's not the same as being conscious of seeing green things. The apple is green. We can become conscious of green things before we know it. Being conscious of seeing the colour green is knowing how to group things by color and being aware of doing it. Being conscious of a big green monster does not require being conscious of seeing a green monster.

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it.

Not all discussion requires argument. I like to think we've helped one another in some way.

If it weren't for you and other folks like you, Idah been arguing with myself. I appresheeightcha.

:wink:

Nice stuff recently!

Are they seeing Cypress trees or are they seeing the way the Cypress trees appear to them? Are they smelling fresh ground Kona coffee, or the way fresh ground Kona coffee smells to them? Are they tasting cauliflower, or the way cauliflower tastes to them? — creativesoul

We're not smelling our subjective individual conscious experiences. We're not tasting the way coffee appears/interacts to/with our biological machinery. Our sense of taste is equivalent to the way the world appears to our tastes.

If it were the case that the object of our rational attention was the way the world appeared to us, then we would already be knee deep in metacognitive content. For we cannot be captured by the way the world appears to us until we draw a distinction between the world and how we see it. Until then...

We're captured by the world.

Terms of evolutionary progression.  

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?
— creativesoul

I think it is right as you have done to distinguish words within exclamation marks to refer to thoughts and language and words not in exclamation marks to refer to things in the world. — RussellA

:smile:

creativesoul, excuse my answering a question to you. — Banno

I've not a single issue with that.

Imagine an organism with a peculiar sex difference; the males' eyes and the females' eyes are, relative to the other, upside down such that what the males see when standing is what the females see when hanging upside down, and vice versa.

The way the males see the world is very different to the way the females see the world (with respect to its orientation).

Imagine also that this organism is intelligent with a language. Both males and females use the same word to describe the direction of the ground and the same word to describe the direction of the sky.

And we can add to this by imagining differences in size (e.g. that one of the sexes has a magnified vision relative to the other) and colour (not to mention smell and taste).

The way they navigate and talk about the world is the same, and yet the way they see (and smell and taste) the world is very different. The appearance of the world is a mental phenomenon. It is the appearance of the world that is the immediate object of their rational consideration. — Michael

The last claim makes no sense to me. It leads to all sorts of nonsense.

Are they seeing Cypress trees or are they seeing the way the Cypress trees appear to them? Are they smelling fresh ground Kona coffee, or the way fresh ground Kona coffee smells to them? Are they tasting cauliflower, or the way cauliflower tastes to them?

What sits between the lemon and the creature's smelling?
— creativesoul

A necessary relation, and some means by which it occurs. (??) — Mww

Hey M!

Causal. Biological machinery(physiological sensory perception).

I'm curious how you would fill out your answer.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist must agree that the thought of "trees lining the banks" must be in the mind, otherwise how would the mind know about trees lining the bank in the first place. — RussellA

Must we? I find trouble with your manner of putting things. :yikes: The aforementioned notion of mind is hard at work here. I suspect we work from several incompatible notions.



How we arrive at knowledge of trees lining the banks is irrelevant to the question asked. "The thought of 'trees lining the bank'" is also irrelevant.

Your target is whether or not "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if there are Cypress trees lining the banks. Thus, asking how we "know about trees lining the bank in the first place" focuses upon knowledge(and mind building). That's a great conversation. I'd love to have it one day, just not this one. I'm not asking how we know about cypress trees lining the banks of rivers. I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that there is something in the world causing us to perceive "trees lining the bank", as both believe in Realism.

I perceive quoted phrases like the one directly above via biological machinery. Our eyes are imperative to doing that successfully. I suppose I could learn braille and rid myself of such ocular dependency, but I digress...

We need not know the meaning of "trees lining the banks" in order to see trees lining the banks. We need not know how we come to know that there are trees lining the banks in order for there to be trees lining the banks. We cannot come to know that there are trees lining the banks if there are not. <----that speaks to your earlier question.

The question is whether or not - during the all times when we are looking at Cypress trees lining the banks - if we are directly perceiving the world as it is - if there are indeed Cypress trees lining the bank. I say we are and there are.

The Indirect and Direct Realist differ in what the something is in the world that is causing us to perceive "trees lining the bank".

For the Direct Realist, in the world are trees lining the bank regardless of there being anyone to observe them, in that, if you look at the world you will perceive exactly the same thing as me.

I wouldn't say it like that; not here at this juncture anyway. I know better. That context is far too broad. We need to get more specific if we want to arrive at a scenario where two people perceive exactly the same thing.

You and I are most certainly working from very different notions of "mind" and "perception". Acknowledging that seems necessary here. Helpful, hopefully, in some way. 

This means that if we are both looking at the same trees lining the bank, we will both be perceiving the same thing.

I agree with that exactly as it is stated, but deny the rest...

This means that I will know what's in your mind at that moment in time.

"Perceiving the same thing" might mean that to you, but not me. Cypress trees are not in the mind.

For the Indirect Realist, in the world is something regardless of there being anyone to observe it. As what I perceive is a subjective representation of the something in the world, we may not be perceiving the same thing.

You cannot believe that the Cypress trees along the banks of Mississippi delta backwaters only exist within your mind.

I would not say that I cannot know what is in your mind when we're looking at the same thing. Sometimes I can. Sometimes not. Rather, I'm stating that what we're looking at is not always exactly nor is it always only - what's in our mind - while we're looking at it.

I think your notion of "mind" is suspect.

As I have never believed it possible to know what someone else is thinking, I am an Indirect rather than Direct Realist.

You've always held false belief then. It is sometimes possible. AS best I can tell, that is not a litmus test for whether one ought be either a direct or indirect realist.

Because you have the concept of a bald cypress before looking at the river bank, you perceive a bald cypress.

As I don't have the concept of a bald cypress, all I perceive is a mass of green with some yellow bits.

I'm befuddled how that could make much sense of anything in the world.

You figure the tree stops being a directly perceptible entity that has existed long before you ever came across it simply because you've never seen one? You seem to be conflating your knowledge of what you're looking at with what you're looking at.

Did the bald cypress exist before anyone looked at it? You know that a mass of green with some yellow bits is a bald cypress, but I don't know that...

Nor need you in order for you to be looking at one.

So how can a bald cypress exist in the world independently of any mind to observe it, if the bald cypress only exists as a concept in the mind?

It couldn't if that were the case. Problem is - they do. Therefore, they do not only exist as a concept in the mind. The Mississippi river delta waterway does not reside within your mind. Those Cypress trees lining the backwater banks do not either. To drive the point home, I could break a small limb off and thwack you with it. I certainly need not extract anything from within your mind in order to successfully do so.

If that doesn't change your mind nothing will.

You and I can look at the same river. We both see the same river at the same time.
We can both isolate a heron to the exclusion of all else. What on earth grounds the objection to saying that we are not seeing things as they are, at that time? Is the heron not this or that species? Is it not sitting atop a remnant of past logging operations? Are the trees lining the banks not bald cypress? Is that not an alligator gar, right over there-------> Is that not an old flat tire still on its rim? Is the distance between the gar and the tire not whatever it is?

We could also be focusing upon the heron's beak. Look, a bit of mud is caked alongside it. Is that somehow not the way the heron is - in part at least? Is the mud not caked alongside its bill?

Are those things in our mind? I would not think a direct realist would arrive at that.

There's a notion of mind there that not all direct realists hold.

If person A directly saw an object as it really is, and person B looking at the same object also saw the object as it really is, then person A would know what was in person's B mind — RussellA

Whence the need for omniscience?

What sits between the lemon and the creature's smelling?

Touche' :razz:

It's not about punctuation use...

↪creativesoul Correct. But I'm unsure what else to say, — AmadeusD

May I suggest Davidson's Anomolous Monism or his paper in the early 70's or late 60's, "Mental Events" which has a very basic argument, undeniable really, that you may find of interest. It's quite germane to this topic.

Pomo authors like Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida often get blamed for the excesses of wokism and cancel culture, when in fact the repressive moralism coming from these movements is attributable to such doctrines as Critical Race Theory, and figures like Franz Fanon and Antonio Gramsci. These approaches are heavily influenced by Marx and psychoanalysis, which are put into question by pomo writers like Foucault and Derrida.
— Joshs

:ok: Very well put. Actors such as JBP and Shapiro are doing a disservice to their own cause when they bring up Derrida and Foucault, all the while the people they want to fight are seldom named — some might say they are poisoning the swamp, but realistically they are just ignorant... — Lionino

The irony...

It's Critical Theory, not 'Critical Race Theory'. You should read it.

We accept that heat death and eternal expansion will happen, we accept that quantum fluctuations will form significantly more Boltzmann brains than normal observers have ever existed, but we don't accept that we are most likely one of these Boltzmann brains. Although I'm unsure how to justify this. — Michael

Show that Boltzmann brains are not equivalent to normal human observers.

Greetings. Sorry for the delay. They'll likely come often. Life and all.

I really appreciate all your interest. Perhaps this could be the beginning of a worthy discussion. Few, if any, other things pique my interest as much as meaningful human thought, belief, and/or experience.

I've become unsatisfied with the terms in the OP. An acceptable terminological framework will be capable of making sense of the evolutionary progression of human minds. It should also have the capability to bridge the divide between the simplest and the most complex sorts of meaningful human experience. It should be readily amenable to an evolutionary timeline. Where there has never been human thought and belief, there could have never been meaningful human experience.

Most all of this speaks to some of the changes that asked about earlier. Sure, the terms "thought" and "belief" are not always used in synonymous fashion. We cannot always exchange them freely and expect to retain whatever sense we had been making. So, the distinction between thought and belief needs to be drawn and maintained, even if they are much the same thing at their core.

Galuchat poked around at an issue as well. That issue was a result of implementing "objects of physiological sensory perception". The terminological framework is incapable of making enough sense of the evolution of the human mind/meaningful human experience while in utero.

I've found that the subject/object dichotomy is incapable of properly accounting for all meaningful human experience. Not all meaningful human experience is accurately described in such language. Some directly perceptible things are not objects in the sense of existing independently of a subject, but rather are contained within the biological boundary separating the creature and not the creature.

I do believe all experience shares a core set of common denominators. My thoughts regarding human thought and belief have been evolving at a rather brisk pace in the past few years.

I am convinced that biological structures are key. They operate autonomously long before we become aware of it. Dennett's little robots/machines fits here. It is tricky, but I like to believe that an adequate terminological framework will satisfy us by its use. I would hope so anyway. Although I'm not in complete agreement with Dennett, I would not be surprised if his aim hits its mark. The accuracy will not be displayed by only his published works but those he inspired as well. His aim is/was towards a better understanding of the human mind.

So, to answer any questions regarding if my stance has shifted...

I still agree with the basic idea that gave rise to the opening post. Replace "thought and belief" with "meaningful experience". Generally, all meaningful human experience consists in very large part of correlations being drawn between different things by the individual at that time.

So, I still maintain that at conception there is no meaningful human experience. The biological machinery at that time is grossly underdeveloped and as a result is insufficient for drawing meaningful correlations between different things. Although, I think it undeniable that correlations are drawn in utero. If all meaningful human experience consists of correlations being drawn between different things, and all experience is meaningful to the individual, then meaningful experience is limited to and/or enabled by the biological machinery providing the means. Practicing this helps eschew anthropomorphism, which has run amok.

Talking as if memories are distinct entities, things that can be stored, seems mistaken to me.
— creativesoul
Memories are stored, are they not? In the brain, in some physical manner. — Patterner

Well, we say that memories are stored. It is common parlance. It's a useful but very misleading analogy. I suppose what I'm getting at with this point is that it is as a result of how memories emerge and 'persist' that we can know it is impossible to reconfigure them without also reconfiguring everything that they are existentially dependent upon. That includes far more than just the biological material/structures of the human brain.

So, it's not even a possibility. Logical possibility perhaps, but what else would have to be the case in order for that to happen? It does not follow from the fact that we can imagine some possible world in which Boltzmann brains could emerge, that this world is that one.

Talking as if memories are distinct entities, things that can be stored, seems mistaken to me. Without a tree there is no memory of one. Our memories of trees are existentially dependent upon trees, regardless of their meaningful content, regardless of their veracity. Our memories of trees cannot be reconstructed in any other manner other than series of physical and mental events from whence they emerged.

If it gets a few more folk to learn a bit of philosophy of language it might be for the greater good. — Banno

:point:

I believe the idea is that, if you are a BB, no, you have not been chatting with anyone for any amount of time. Rather, you, a BB, have existed for only a moment. The gigantic number of particles needed just happened to drift into the exact arrangement needed to give you all the "memories" you have, which only seem to have taken place over long periods of time.

All nonsense. But a very fun idea. — Patterner

Regarding the idea...

What would it take to even be able to physically reconfigure a normal human observer? All the necessary parts. What do all normal observers have in common such that that's exactly what makes them normal human observers? That's a matter of necessary elemental constituency and existential dependency. There's a bit of work involved there.

Or...

I don't know for sure, but my impression of Witt leads me to think that ideas such as Boltzmann Brains would count as bewitchment.

Given that the sheer number/quantity of particles necessary for reconfiguring me involves reconfiguring everything that I am existentially dependent upon(everything that effected/affected me either directly or indirectly), and I am a normal human observer.

Normal human observers have been affected/effected and/or otherwise influenced, whether directly or indirectly, by all sorts of things. Some of those things are external to us, some of those things are parts of us, some of those things are a combination thereof.

You'd need to recreate the entire universe according to a strict determinist(causal) account. Boltzmann Brains are supposed to come from that... aren't they? Do they presuppose that all it takes to recreate an observer is to recreate and rearrange just the biological components?

Hume's influence on the academic/philosophical/scientific community at the time caused Kant to awaken from dogmatic slumber. He said as much himself in the forward, or at the beginning of the CPR...

Right?

:yikes:

I don't think anyone would claim that Kant's CPR was caused by Hume. — AmadeusD

Kant did.

I do wonder if his inability to understand speech acts is related to his extreme individualism. — Banno

I think he plays, purposefully for the sake of playing... an agent provocateur. He cannot believe everything he writes.

The Boltzmann brain problem is that given that our scientific theories entail the eventual formation of an exceptionally large number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours, it is exceptionally probable that the Big Freeze has happened and that we are Boltzmann brains having the illusory experience of being normal observers before the Big Freeze. — Michael

How do you get from

"given that our scientific theories entail the eventual formation of an exceptionally large number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours"

to

"it is exceptionally probable that the Big Freeze has happened"

The Boltzmann brain problem is that given that our scientific theories entail the eventual formation of an exceptionally large number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours... — Michael

That's not the only possibility entailed by our scientific theories.




How long does instantaneous existence last? I've been chatting with Banno for over a decade. Jeep/Wayfarer too. Sam 26 even longer.