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:wink:

Sounds like you're a mathematician... physicist or something?

:smile:

I reject Kant's notions of a posterior and a priori. There is no knowledge without thought/belief. Thought/belief begin simply and accrue in complexity. All thought/belief are existentially dependent upon sensory experience. There is no line to be drawn between knowledge with and knowledge without.

I knew I didn't have Godel quite right, but the gist(I thought) was that he was critiquing inductive logic/reasoning. Deductive is another matter altogether.

Where's the philosophy?

Nice avatar name. We'll see how well it is represented...

Godel show the that all inductive/axiomatic logic is incomplete, as you've indicated. Math is not knowledge. Math is method. May be best looked at as a language. We can have knowledge of math. Logic is not a measure of truth. It is a measure of coherency, and coherency is imperative to avoid self-contradiction as well as building and maintaining shared meaning.

The reason why statements made in common parlance aren't 'provable' in a logical sense of proof is because logic presupposes truth. Logical proofs prove coherency. Coherency is not enough for truth. The Scopes Monkey Trials show this nicely, as do any other number of absurdity arrived at from following a valid form of argument but starting with an absurd premiss.

Gettier said nothing about these concerns. They're irrelevant.

Throw truth out the window, and you get the conditions for Trump.

...to add the adjective 'true' implies that it is both justified and true,w hen in fact all we have access to is the justification. We have no extra process where we can then go and determine whether it is true. OK, we can checked off justified or best justified, now let's see if we can check off true... — Coben

Popular line of thought, but false on several levels.

We have some access to what's happened and/or is happening. That's all we need(assuming a meaningful claim) to check if the claim is true(or not).

Truth is for the Pope. — Coben

Rhetorical drivel based upon a gross misunderstanding of truth and the irrevocable role that it plays in all thought/belief and statements thereof, including your own.

Provable knowledge is never (correspondence theory's) true. — alcontali

Rubbish. We can know all sorts of provable stuff, and did, long before this school of thought you espouse was invented.

I can know that I'm typing on a computer. My typing can be shown. There is no better proof of my typing than watching it happen.

Provable, according to proof theory, means that the proposition necessarily follows from the construction logic of the world (in which you prove it).

You cannot possibly achieve that with the real, physical world.

It just cannot be done. — alcontali

There's a certain amount of irony here. I mean do you live somewhere else, aside from the real physical world?

Validity is a measure of coherency. Coherency is insufficient for truth. "Logical truth" is a misnomer.

You'll quickly get beyond my comprehension level using such mathematical jargon. Can you make the case in plain language?

The correspondence theory's truth is absolutely never provable, simply, because we have no access to the (axiomatic) construction logic of the real, physical world, i.e. the notorious theory of everything. — alcontali

I would disagree here.

Correspondence is easily provable. That's what verification/falsification methods look for.

Statements that have no correspondence with the real, physical world are not (necessarily) false. They are simply not "true" as meant in the correspondence theory of truth. — alcontali

Statements of thought/belief. That is what I'm talking about here.

For example, if we construct an abstract, Platonic world in which there are two symbols, S and K, and two rules [1] Kxy = x [2] Sxyz = xz(yz), then we can trivially demonstrate by applying both rules that (SKx)y = y. Therefore, SKx is the identity operator in this abstract world. — alcontali

I'm granting all this. It's true by definition. Different animal altogether.

Thought/belief is long before statements.
— creativesoul

Agreed... — alcontali

Therefore to hold that all belief is propositional in content is a mistake, unless one also holds that propositions are somehow existentially independent of language. Such would have to be the case if thought/belief is prior to language and all thought/belief is propositional in content.

SImply put "Justified belief" is enough As stated so clearly by Gettier. — alcontali

Regardless of what Gettier says...

I disagree.

We cannot know a falsehood.

The correspondence theory of truth requires some kind of legitimate isomorphism between the true proposition and the history of the universe. — alcontali

I like everything I've read from and about Russell. I agree that coherence alone is inadequate/insufficient. I diverge from convention correspondence schools primarily with regard to propositions and all that they entail. I reject propositions in lieu of thought/belief statements. Belief cannot be reduced to propositions. Statements can. Thought/belief is long before statements.

↪Janus Let him speak for himself. That is what he said. — Banno

On the one hand stated that all thought is unspoken, while on the other called thinking in musical terms "non-linguistic" thought...

He's said enough.

If "true" means that a proposition appears in the real, physical world, then not one theorem in mathematics is "true" — alcontali

If "true" means that a proposition appears in the world, there is something terribly wrong with the framework.

The barn facade is the same problem. Accounting malpractices. The belief is that the facade is a barn. Another barn or sheep actually being present somewhere outside the scope of one's sensory perception is irrelevant here. The belief is about that which has been singled out.

What's left of Gettier?

This is the same conclusion as Gettier's, but obtained in a different way. — alcontali

I don't see the similarity.

Smith is justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford. We'll grant Gettier there as well. However, Smith could not know that Brown was in Barcelona because he did not believe it, despite Gettier's other sleight of hand. Smith stated the disjunction because he believed it to be impossible that Brown was in Barcelona. That's why people state such ridiculous things on purpose. They find them beyond the ability(impossible) to be true. Such is the flavor of sarcasm.

Jones owns a Ford or I am a money's uncle. The second disjunct is not a belief. Only the first is.

An illusion is of something that is not...

Much ado about nothing.

Where there is no consciousness there can be no illusion thereof. If all consciousness is an illusion, what is it an illusion of?

Thought/belief begins simply in it's constitution and grows in it's complexity. All thought/belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things. In the simple stages of thought/belief, those correlations are drawn between all sorts of different things... all of which are directly perceptible.

Existence is not.




Thanks for the tip... being the all too trusting chap that I am, I do not recognize insincerity very well.

Whether or not Banno's remarks are irrelevant nonsense is neither established nor determined by your belief about them. I think Banno was spot on in more than one way. Your neglect to directly address much of what has been argued here is telling.

Speech is not thought, it is a medium through which thought can be communicated/expressed.
— Merkwurdichliebe

That's pretty much where you go astray.
— Banno

Why, is speech blue and not red? Or, is it that "medium through" does not include "medium". What nonsense criticism are you trying to get away with this time? — Merkwurdichliebe

That criticism wasn't nonsense. It was not understood by you, apparently. It was spot on though, given the context.

Speech and statements are distinct, just as thought and speech is distinct. So what's the problem? — Merkwurdichliebe

The problem, I suspect, is the framework you work from. My suspicion is that there are inadequate criteria at work.

Settle it for me.

Thought, speech, and statements...

What counts as each?

I see nothing philosophically interesting there to talk about. Looks like an exercise in arguing semantics.

Speech is not thought, it is a medium through which thought can be communicated/expressed. — Merkwurdichliebe

I find this quite problematic, my friend...

Statements are statements of thought/belief.

Non linguistic thought/belief are correlations drawn by a language-less creature.

Hmmmm...I just can't seem to find a good example that illustrates thought that doesn't involve language. — Merkwurdichliebe

So, you're saying that non linguistic thought is any thought that does not involve language, and you cannot offer an example of that.

That would explain the dismissal of non-linguistic thought/belief.

Wouldn't it be better to realize that the approach you've been using is inadequate for taking proper account of it?

Certainly we agree that some language less creatures are capable of thinking?

What exactly are you calling "nonlinguistic thought"?
— creativesoul

Any thought that doesn't involve language. — Merkwurdichliebe

All unspoken ones then?
— creativesoul

No. All thoughts are unspoken. — Merkwurdichliebe

So, what counts as not involving language?

:brow:

What exactly are you calling "nonlinguistic thought"?
— creativesoul

Any thought that doesn't involve language. — Merkwurdichliebe

All unspoken ones then?

Abandoning universal rights to privacy and free speech requires first granting them...

The US cannot abandon them for it has never granted them.

I'm completely ok with dismissing the notion of nonlinguistic thought. The more I consider it, the more it becomes apparent that it is quite redundant and that it unnecessarily complicates matters. — Merkwurdichliebe

What exactly are you calling "nonlinguistic thought"?

:brow:

Looks like a conflation between an account and what's being taken into account.

Care to offer an argument for how you've arrived at those conclusions?

Not interested. Are there any other frameworks you'd like to compare/contrast? What are we up to now? How many different times have you changed your terminological use? May be part of the problem here, if you're genuinely having trouble understanding what I've been arguing.

All things thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered are relative in a specific sense. Meaning is relative.

If you cannot tell the difference between existence and an existent, then there's not much I can do here.

Thinking that something is directly perceptible requires thinking in those terms. Those terms require already having picked something out to think about in terms of whether or not it is directly perceptible.
— creativesoul

Not when making nonlinguistic correlations. — Merkwurdichliebe

Think/believe what you like. Gratuitous assertions are inadequate on my view.

I've been defending everything I've said without subsequent valid objection aside from the "presupposing the existence of it's own content"...

That, I think, can be maintained by careful ad hoc.

predication
— creativesoul

Does correlation require predication? — Merkwurdichliebe

No. It is quite the reverse. All predication is correlation. Not all correlation is predication.

And what happens when something that is thought to be directly perceptible is not perceived? Then there is the thought that it does not exist (perceptually). It is easy to see how existence factors into nonlinguistic thought... — Merkwurdichliebe

Thinking that something is directly perceptible requires thinking in those terms. Those terms require already having picked something out to think about in terms of whether or not it qualifies as being directly perceptible or not. All thinking in terms requires language. Non linguistic thought has none.

:brow:

Existence is attributed to things merely experienced. Making any distinction/correlation , linguistic or nonlinguistic, is predicated on the pressupossition of existence. So it it rather illogical to say that existence does not factor into thought prior to language acquisition.

I hope you can convince me otherwise. — Merkwurdichliebe

If the entire history of language use including the term "existence" is not enough to prove that we name and think of things long before thinking about them in terms of their existence, then nothing else I could argue would hold more clout.