From the perspective of thought, gravity exists in itself as an idea, and from this perspective, there is every reason to say that gravity has existed for eternity. But the idea of gravity is not actually existing until substantiated as a particular concretion. — Merkwurdichliebe

Gravity and the idea of gravity.

What's the difference on your view?

So first, we should consider existence. What is it? Is it reducible to the concepts apprehended in abstract thought, like gravity as it exists-in-itself? — Merkwurdichliebe

The papaya tree in my yard is not a concept. It exists. It existed prior to our talking about it. We need language to talk about the tree. The tree does not need to be talked about.

What does the absolute/relative dichotomy add to our understanding aside from unnecessarily complex and confusing language use?
— creativesoul

It sets up the dialectical extremes that the discourse is confined to. — Merkwurdichliebe

The discourse is about existence. Since when is existence confined to discourse?

Thanks for those responses. I think you are onto something. I have more responses coming... — Merkwurdichliebe

This has been an interesting river of thought.

Some questioning of another worldview is questioning whether or not it is worth following. Such questioning can be based upon knowledge.
— creativesoul

Wouldn't the question of something's worth be due to a lack of knowledge regarding its worthiness?" — Merkwurdichliebe

I don't know. Let us take that consideration a bit further. Perhaps an otherwise unknown answer reveals itself, and becomes known.

What is something worth?<-------------that is the question of something's worth.

This question can be asked by those who know little, those who know much, and those who are somewhere between those two extremes. Questioning the worth of something doesn't indicate a lack of knowledge of the thing's worth.

Hopefully we need not have to remind ourselves of our own fallibility. Omniscience isn't required for knowledge about something. Unattainable standards are untenable.

...Questioning of a thing's worth is only necessary at the point which knowledge of its worthiness is lacking, otherwise why would we question it? — Merkwurdichliebe

That's one reason why one could be asking about a thing's worth. It's not the only reason.

One can have knowledge of a thing's worth. One can talk about the thing and it's worth in great detail. One can use that knowledge to question the worth placed upon the same thing by another worldview.

Comparative value assessment.

...The only question in which the answer is fully known (that I can think of) would be the rhetorical kind, as is done in teaching. — Merkwurdichliebe

I'm more of an optimist, I suppose. There is this hint of fatalism about your writing.

Some answers are fully known. Depends upon the question. Aren't those worth more?

The relativism of the knowledge of existence is the problem here. Even if everything in existence was absolute prior to our knowledge of it, we can only relate to it through our reletavistic understanding. Anything and everything we can know about existence is a reletavisic truth approximation. — Merkwurdichliebe

Well, seems to me that it is the very phrase "the relativism of the knowledge of existence" that is the problem here along with "relativistic truth approximation". What do those phrases even say, and what are they saying it about? What is the referent of either? Why talk like that? I mean, what good comes of it?

What does the absolute/relative dichotomy add to our understanding aside from unnecessarily complex and confusing language use?

I personally find that the absolute/relative dichotomy is yet another inherently inadequate framework. I mean, what on earth does it even mean to be "absolute in existence"?

Some things exist in their entirety prior to our becoming aware of them. Some things do not. We can know that, and we can be certain of it.

Check out the Rorty clip above. The relativity of 'existence' thesis renders 'things in their own right' meaningless i.e. Kant's 'inaccessihle noumena' was abondoned by later phenomenologists as a useless concept. — fresco

I reject Kant's Noumena for different reasons than I reject Rorty's notion of truth as a property of true propositions(that's not just Rorty's by the way). I reject them both, nonetheless. Some things exist in their entirety prior to our awareness and/or naming them. That stands good and against the relativity of "existence".

I have no idea how you arrived at that based upon my reply.

I would actually be interested in an example of a lie that leads to good. — AJJ

The Nazis are at your doorstep. They ask...

Are there any Jews in your attic? There are.

...understanding of what we are questioning is only necessary at the point which knowledge lacks, otherwise why would we question... — Merkwurdichliebe

We question not only as a means to acquire knowledge, but also as a method of rejection/denial. Some questioning of another statement is doubting that the statement is true. Some questioning of another worldview is questioning whether or not it is worth following. Such questioning can be based upon knowledge.

How ought we assess situations when and where the moral thought/belief of one group stands in direct conflict with another's?

Why is the notion of objective value so important on your view?

Why would human consciousness be a pre-requisite for being alive?

What we call human consciousness typically includes self identity and other socially constructed notions. If we attempt to employ that sort of criterion for what it takes to be alive, then we would be forced to say either that human consciousness is completely intact at the moment of conception, replete with a sense of self(which is impossible due to it's social content), or we must admit that not all humans are alive, because not all humans have a socially constructed sense of self.

Either being alive doesn't require human consciousness or not all humans are alive.

Human consciousness begins simply and gains in it's complexity. It is not a necessary pre-requisite for being alive.

Rather, words are tools that we use to draw significance to certain phenomena and associations. — TheHedoMinimalist

And the word "alive" picks out all the things that self-replicate, maintain homeostasis, etc.

But, are those things actually important? — TheHedoMinimalist

Of course those things are important. They are what one is talking about when s/he says that some thing or another is alive.

Language enables questioning. — Janus

Ah, I see. That's much easier to understand. Yes. Questioning a worldview is existentially dependent upon language acquisition/use.

Strictly speaking, one need not be fully embedded in cultural mores and customs in order to question them. One can reasonably, rationally, sensibly, respectfully, and honourably question and/or negate some core tenet of a foreign worldview without previous assent.
— creativesoul

Sure, with the knowledge and understanding that is enabled by language we can question whatever we want; the only prerequisite being that we do understand what we are questioning. We can't question a foreign worldview if we don't either speak the language or have access to translations that make it intelligible to us. — Janus

I would concur. We could think/believe that we are questioning a foreign worldview, and be mistaken. We would be questioning our own preconceived notions thereof. Without some knowledge of the foreign worldview, our critiques would be of something other than the worldview.

What is the argument and/or reasoning offered to reject the common notion of what it takes to be alive?

Stick puppets are animated. Some stick puppets have rocks for heads. Some rocks are animated.

How does moral judgement pertain to morality? — Merkwurdichliebe

Moral judgment is what happens when one expresses approval/disapproval of some thought, belief, and/or behaviour. If one claims that some thought, belief, and/or behaviour is acceptable, s/he can do so using a multitude of different terms all rendering the same judgment. The candidate under our judgment is rendered either acceptable or not, good or not, moral or not(in prescriptive/proscriptive language)etc.

Typically, moral judgment is universally applicable regardless of the individual actor/agent. That is implicit in much of the historical talk of and/or about moral judgment. When something is unacceptable(morally wrong) in some situation or other, it is unacceptable regardless of the individual in the situation. If smacking a defenseless old lady in the back of a head with a shovel is wrong/immoral/bad/evil and/or otherwise unacceptable in any other terms, it is so despite who wields the shovel.

To directly answer the question with the above in mind...

Moral judgment is to condone and/or condemn, assent and/or dissent, approve and/or disapprove. It is to call something "good" or "bad", or any other number of ways to say that something is acceptable/unacceptable. The point is that moral judgment takes comparison to a moral standard. Early on, standards are the adopted morality acquired via common language use. Language acquisition and use has morality intact as the standard.

Moral judgment is existentially dependent upon morality.

Morality seems to require the communication of individually held thought/belief, and an agreement (perhaps a social contract) amongst morally conscious individuals. The social contract is only concrete if the individuals signed on have a sincere commitment, or allegiance to the conventional moral code. — Merkwurdichliebe

Since morality is the rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour and rules are existentially dependent upon language, then so too is morality. Communication results from successful language use. However, there is nothing to stop certain circumstances from arising in which there's not much of an agreement between those governed by the rules, and those writing and/or otherwise determining/establishing the rules.

The signing of an agreement is concrete enough proof of all parties consenting to the terms within. Although, cases can and ought be made against deliberate deception underlying some contracts/agreements.

If one signs on insincerely, they are still liable/responsible for keeping to the terms of the agreement.

Would you explain moral principles here? — Merkwurdichliebe

Sure.

Moral principles are moral thought/belief. The difference, I would presume, is that they are the thought arrived at via reflective and critical assessments(thinking about thought/belief). As a result, they are often more valued, and/or said to be a 'higher' kind of thought. I can both acknowledge and question that phraseology. Better understanding often requires more complex reflective thought(higher thought). However, being a result of thinking about thought/belief(being a higher kind of thought) does not always equal better understanding.

One can rationalize nearly any behaviour one wants to, including genocide. Such rationalization is always more complex thought.

Just because we name something, it does not follow that that thing does not(or did not) exist in it's own right(in it's entirety) prior to our naming it.

All morality. The written and/or spoken rules of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. All governmental laws, etc.

Horses and water...

Be well.

If facts are true statements, then whether or not we ought believe them has nothing to do with 'objective values'. We can know what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. We can know how irrevocably important it is to form, have, and/or hold true belief. We can know that and also know that there is no such thing as 'objective value' aside from being an imaginary construct. It points to nothing but linguistic conception.
— creativesoul

Urgh. I don’t care about anyone’s personal credo. — AJJ

Your belief isn't necessary. If what I've said is true, then what you've said is not.

What’s more accurately been in contention is whether we ought to believe facts. — AJJ

If facts are true statements, then whether or not we ought believe them has nothing to do with 'objective values'. We can know what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. We can know how irrevocably important it is to form, have, and/or hold true belief. We can know that and also know that there is no such thing as 'objective value' aside from being an imaginary construct. It points to nothing but linguistic conception.

Whether or not there are objective values is what's in contention. That is what's at issue. You're assuming what's at issue in the argument you're offering. I've merely done the same.

How do we reconcile that?

Argument for it rather than assume it.

Got one?

All statements are existentially dependent upon a subject. Some statements are true. All true statements are existentially dependent upon a subject. That which is existentially dependent upon a subject cannot be objective. There are no objective true statements. There is no objective truth value.

If facts are true statements and there are no objective values then saying that there are no objective values is a fact. If we ought believe true statements, then we ought not believe the above quote.
— creativesoul

The argument, rephrased a little, contends that there must be objective values if there are facts. If this is the case then it’s not actually possible for “there are no objective values” to be a fact. — AJJ

But it's not the case. "There are no objective values" is true.

If there are no objective values then there are no facts... — AJJ

If facts are true statements and there are no objective values then saying that there are no objective values is a fact. If we ought believe true statements, then we ought not believe the above quote.

The prelinguistic thought/belief about behaviour that the pre-linguistic person finds unacceptable is not based upon morality. S/he/they has/have none. Morality is codified moral belief. It seems to me that these are the sorts of thought/belief that underwrite all morality, and thus, all morals.

However, those rudimentary moral thought/belief are inadequate for being morals. So, such prelinguistic likes/dislikes cannot be said to be the source of morals. Rather, they are better understood as necessary preconditions for the emergence of morals.

Prelinguistic correlation holds motivational significance. Accepting/liking is a complex impulse in prelinguistic thought/belief. It is probably associated with the autonomic processes of the limbic unit as externally modified by cultural factors (if it's a social animal in question). In this process, no conceptual meaning can be abstracted, and moral thought/belief requires abstract conceptualization that charges its correlations with a deeper motivational valence. Please correct me if I am off. — Merkwurdichliebe

I think the below says it better...

Moral thought/belief does not require morality. Moral judgment does. Not all moral thought/belief is judgment. All moral judgment is moral thought/belief. All moral thought/belief is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour... — creativesoul

It looks like you are saying all thought/belief is reducible to correlation including moral thought/belief, and that judgement is predicated on moral correlations. — Merkwurdichliebe

Moral judgment. Not all judgment.

Sure.

Predication is a linguistic practice which draws a meaningful correlation between something and what is said about that something. Typically the grammatical form of subject/predicate.

Not all correlation is linguistic.

Pavlov's dog and any number of other everyday examples bear witness to a language-less creature drawing correlations between different things.
— creativesoul

Thanks. And, I agree.

Moral thought/belief obviously requires predication. Would you say all moral thought/belief is predication? — Merkwurdichliebe

But...

I don't agree with that. Not all moral thought/belief requires predication. Moral judgment requires predication(language). I've been at pains to distinguish between moral judgment and moral thought/belief. I've just finished doing so - once again - here on this page. It's in the same post after the portion you responded to.

Sure.

Predication is a linguistic practice which draws a meaningful correlation between something and what is said about that something. Typically the grammatical form of subject/predicate.

Not all correlation is linguistic.

Pavlov's dog and any number of other everyday examples bear witness to a language-less creature drawing correlations between different things. Note, I'm not agreeing with Pavlov's assessment or the convention at the time. The involuntary salivation shows expectation. Expectation is more than stimulus/response. The dog thought/believed that it was going to be fed.

So...

Are we all in agreement that morals are existentially dependent upon common language use and/or acquisition? All morals are existentially dependent upon language.

Culture is the source of morals.

Language lends to abstract thought/belief - understanding. But understanding of what we are questioning is only necessary at the point which knowledge lacks, otherwise why would we question? Questioning implies a deficiency of knowledge. Ignorance is a very real thing, and ignorant thought/belief has no problem filling in the gaps, where it lacks knowledge (I'm absolutely certain I'm doing that here). Consider the foreign world view, it is not uncommon to see the ignoramus impose familiar cultural mores onto a foreign culture, even going so far as to deem an entire group evil based on zero knowledge of its culture, except that it is apparently alien. I only need to understand that Arabic or Islamic culture is different in order to judge it as evil...which I do, just kidding. :chin:

This is one example of the type of moral thought/belief called "judgement". Judgement does not require understanding, and, probably in most cases, involves a high degree of irrationality and ignorance. — Merkwurdichliebe

While there is an underlying sentiment that is agreeable here, I would suggest a starkly different accounting practice; one that avoids attributing agency to knowledge and ignorance.

You're right though to note that one can condemn another culture based upon inadequate and/or even outright false thought/belief about that culture.

I think that Janus was noting that prior to criticizing a foreign worldview, some understanding of that worldview must be had. Otherwise, the criticism is of something else.

What is thought/belief in the first place? How are we defining it? It is impossible to determine what makes them common until we do this.

After reviewing earlier discussions, thought/belief was associated with meaning. But I never got to the point at which we specifically defined it. — Merkwurdichliebe

Actually, thought/belief have been set out many times over here. While it's been mostly a snippet here and there, a few posts went into greater detail, and there have been quite a few dedicated to thought/belief and what they all consist in/of. There was what seemed to be some enthusiasm afterwards. There was not anything that resembled a rejection and/or objection by you. So, I assumed you'd agreed, I suppose, to all of the different snippets and subsequent delineations.

I entered into this discussion by noting a broad-based academic deficiency regarding the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. This has been discussed more than once as well, without much in the way of objection/rejection.

What has not been set out is how we can arrive at a universal criterion for all thought/belief. As mentioned earlier, I looked towards thought/belief statements for starters...

All statements of thought/belief consists entirely of predication. All predication is correlation. Not all correlation is predication. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, and is meaningful to the creature drawing the correlation/connection/association between the different things. All thought/belief consists entirely of correlations, connections, and/or associations drawn between different things. There are no examples to the contrary. That serves as a minimalist criterion with maximum scope.


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There's also a bit of clarity needed. has called me to task, and for good reason. We do not want to fall into anthropomorphism. We do not want to attribute human thought. belief, tendencies, and/or mental abilities to non-human animals. Avoiding anthropomorphism is and always has been a guiding principle and/or standard of mine.

However, at the same time, if thought/belief is amenable to evolution, then it must somehow exist in it's entirety prior to language acquisition/use in such a way that it can and does evolve into what we commonly call our own thought/belief. The alternative is to deny that non-linguistic creatures are capable of thinking/believing anything at all which is absurd on it's face, and would render language acquisition a process that does not require pre-existing thought/belief. As mentioned a few times heretofore, such a stance would have tremendous difficulty accounting for processes such as learning the names of things.

Yet, the potential to mistakenly attribute thought/belief that only humans are capable of to non human creatures remains quite high. That is particularly true if and when we do not have a good understanding of what all human thought/belief have in common that makes them what they are.

With the framework of thought/belief provided, we can and ought avoid anthropomorphism by virtue of carefully noting the content of the correlations(the thought/belief content). All thought/belief(correlational) content exists in it's entirety prior to becoming a part of the correlation. Here is where existential dependency plays a role as well. For example...

Morals are existentially dependent upon complex language acquisition and use replete with moral thought/belief that renders moral judgment(expresses consent/dissent regarding whether or not some thought, belief, and/or behaviour is acceptable). That is to perform comparative assessment between one's own morality and the behaviour in question. Thus, there can be no such correlations drawn by a creature devoid of morality. There is no prelinguistic moral judgment.

That's just a quick application of what I'm putting forth, and/or arguing for.

I understand that this seems at odds with no prelinguistic creature accepting and/or liking being harmed by another. Reconciliation seems needed.

Moral thought/belief does not require morality. Moral judgment does. Not all moral thought/belief is judgment. All moral judgment is moral thought/belief. All moral thought/belief is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour...

Easy enough.

Humans, by virtue of language, have transcended the merely instinctual imperative to adhere to proto-moral behavior... — Janus

I've no idea what you're saying here...

..but they are nonetheless socially conditioned and inculcated into pre-reflective moral (and obviously other) worldviews, that form cultural and conceptual contexts, contexts only within which questioning of those paradigms may later become possible. — Janus

Strictly speaking, one need not be fully embedded in cultural mores and customs in order to question them. One can reasonably, rationally, sensibly, respectfully, and honourably question and/or negate some core tenet of a foreign worldview without previous assent. That said, in general, when talking about questioning one's own adopted worldview...

Yes. Totally. One must have one prior to calling it or parts of it into question.

We adopt a worldview replete with morality fully intact. That adoption process requires language use, as does the inculcation and conditioning aspects.

Expressing one's worldview prior to doubting it requires linguistic pre-reflective thought/belief. However, doubting it is reflective. It is to think about one's pre-existing thought/belief. One can question and remain steadfast. Not all thinking about thought/belief results in drastic change. Not all doubt ends in abandonment. Not all doubt ends in radical uncertainty.

All doubt is doubting the truth, the dependability, the veracity, and/or the reliability of something or other.

Questioning the morality within one's own worldview requires reflective linguistic thought/belief. That is to isolate particular kinds of thought/belief according to what they're about. All morality is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Questioning one's own morality is to question it's veracity, it's dependability, it's accuracy. Questioning one's own morality requires isolating one's own thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Your welcome.

They are all modes of assessment by which we make correlations/associations/connections. — Merkwurdichliebe

Let's take a look. In order for the above to be true... One of the following would also have to be true...

1. Modes of assessment exist in their entirety prior to any and all thought/belief.
2. There is no difference between modes of assessment and thought/belief.
3. Thought/belief is one mode of assessment

Regarding 1...

Something that consists of something else cannot exist prior to that something else. All assessment consists of pre-existing thought/belief. Assessment cannot exist prior to all thought/belief. Hence, it only follows that not all thought/belief are modes of assessment.

Regarding 2 and 3...

The same answer.

Final conclusion...

I reject that answer and remain steadfast to what I've been arguing for thus far.

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I thought/believed that we'd already agreed to the universal criterion for what counts as thought/belief. I'll chalk it up to a pattern of mine. I tend to assume that the reader has already been through all the same veins of thought/belief and carried away the same understanding as I have.

You are right, we've put in a lot of groundwork to validate our premise. That post was not meant to discount our premise in this discussion.

I was merely expressing my opinion that no premise is fully immune to criticism. But that a different topic for a different thread, so I will stop here. — Merkwurdichliebe

We're good. No problema.

While it is true that no premise is fully immune to criticism, it is also true that not all criticism is either valid or well-grounded. Some are neither. As you say, that's a different topic for a different thread.

There also needs to be a distinction drawn between linguistic thought/belief that is not reflective, and linguistic thought/belief that is.
— creativesoul

Yes, that seems to be a good and even necessary distinction, which was at least implied, if not explicit, in an earlier post where I wrote:

Humans, by virtue of language, have transcended the merely instinctual imperative to adhere to proto-moral behavior, but they are nonetheless socially conditioned and inculcated into pre-reflective moral (and obviously other) worldviews, that form cultural and conceptual contexts, contexts only within which questioning of those paradigms may later become possible.
— Janus

So, we have the pre-reflective (but not pre-linguistic, obviously) context within which, and by virtue of which, later reflection upon that paradigm becomes possible. — Janus

This is agreeable as well.

So we are playing around with three kinds of thought/belief. Prelinguistic, linguistic pre-reflective, and linguistic reflective.

What do they all have in common that makes them all thought/belief?

:smile: