...the point is not that definite descriptions must be true, but that they are definite if they don't apply to anyone else... — Janus

Then what grounds your objections to the actual cases of successful reference by false description?

There's a bit of conflation between what we're doing when referring to Thales by false description, and what is going on when we take account of that.

Janus seems focused upon what's necessary for us to take an account of successfully referring to Thales by false description, whereas Banno is just pointing to the fact that we're referring to Thales by false description.

Two different targets.

I thought it was by definition that definite descriptions must be true.

Well done Banno. You proved my argument better than I could have.

You are right to point out the conflation of true/false descriptions. Definite ones must be true, if I understand correctly.

Yeah, I don't know what else to say, so I'll take a stab at showing you where our positions diverge. It is worth noting that that divergence is largely as a result of my participation here.

Definite descriptions are not a necessary part of successful reference within possible world scenarios. Definite descriptions are not a necessary part of successful reference in the actual world.

The examples of successful reference by false description are too numerous to deny. Those are actual examples. So, the above two statements follow from actual cases. That's worth mention as well.

So, if one holds that definite description is necessary for all reference, then one has an inherent problem taking account of actual examples of successful reference that do not include definite description. That's where you find yourself, and it's where I found myself as well... struggling as a result of attempting to use an inherently inadequate framework. It quite simply is found to be sorely lacking in explanatory power.

The problem is resolved by virtue of making the framework amenable to the facts(the actual cases of successful description by false definition).

The steps I must take(what's necessary for me) to outline cases of successful reference that do not include definitive description are utterly irrelevant to whether or not there are cases of successful reference that do not include definitive description.

My ability to outline the two scenarios for you is necessarily dependent upon definitive descriptions. So, I cannot outline without resorting(using?) to any definite description. Now, the astute reader will realize and certainly agree that it does not follow from that that definitive descriptions are a necessary part of the scenarios themselves, unless one conflates what's necessary for my outline with what's necessary for what's being outlined. That - of course - is absurd.

:yikes:

Turns out that what was said was not so 'little' after all...

When you say that I should be able to produce an outline of a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, are you talking about what my outline necessarily requires? — creativesoul

Yes. — Janus

Then you're aiming at the wrong target.

This bears repeating:One can easily outline cases of successful reference that do not include definite description; one cannot outline cases of successful reference that do not include definite description without one using definite description. You're asking me to describe cases of successful reference that do not include definite description without using definite description as a means of proving that definite description is not a necessary part of successful reference.

What an account of those cases necessarily requires is not equivalent to what those cases necessarily require.<--------That is what you're conflating.

The proof that definite description is not a necessary part of successful reference are cases of successful reference by false description. My own case in point was Jane.

...it should take far less effort to produce such an outline than it does to keep giving excuses for why you won't. — Janus

Just answer the question...

When you say that I should be able to produce an outline of a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, are you talking about what my outline necessarily requires?

Well, I'm not so sure that the consequences of Kripke's take on what counts as essential parts are unacceptable. However, it does seem to be a possible case of special pleading for it does not allow one to stipulate circumstances within a possible world that are contrary to those concerning the essential parts, but he does allow a broad range change of circumstances involving people and proper names.

I actually think that Janus fails to meaningfully draw and maintain the distinction between what our report of cases of successful reference takes(what's necessary for those reports) with what certain cases of successful reference takes(what's necessary for certain cases of successful reference). That seems to be a consistent oversight of his expressions here.

I think Kripke kept that in mind.

Aren't you two at all concerned about where the consequences are leading?

One can easily outline cases of successful reference that do not include definite description. One cannot outline cases of successful reference that do not include definite description without one using definite description.

Just answer the question...

When you say that I should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, are you talking about what my outline necessarily requires?

Why? First of all, I'm not confident that you even know what I'm saying. Therefore, offering an example which proves the point(and they most certainly do) wouldn't be rightly understood to begin with. Second of all, I'm not even sure of what you're asking me to do, but I'm almost certain that your request is grounded upon the earlier confusion that I already remarked upon, and have posted several different times elaborating upon it. You know, that bit about the distinction I accused you of neglecting and you subsequently accused me of not having made it clear to start with. Here's our big chance!

So, to help clarify all of this, I ask you to answer a question regarding the following snippet of your request...

...you should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definite description... — Janus

To avoid any possible further misunderstanding as a result of the ambiguous language use in the above quote...

Are you claiming that I should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, because that's precisely what was written? Seems that at face value your expressing your opinion about what my(or 'the') ability to outline takes. The steps I must take(what's necessary for me) to outline cases of successful reference that do not include definitive description are utterly irrelevant to whether or not there are cases of successful reference that do not include definitive description.

My ability to outline the two scenarios for you is necessarily dependent upon definitive descriptions. So, I cannot outline without resorting(using?) to any definite description. Now, the astute reader will realize and certainly agree that it does not follow from that that definitive descriptions are a necessary part of the scenarios themselves, unless one conflates what's necessary for my outline with what's necessary for what's being outlined. That - of course - is absurd.

To quite the contrary, if my account is true, it will consist of true descriptions about actual cases of successful reference that do not include definitive descriptions. So, when you say that I should be able to outline a simple scenario without resorting to any definitive description, are you talking about what my outline necessarily requires?

:worry:

Yes, if what you say is true, you should; so....in order to substantiate the truth of what you are saying...start outlining... — Janus

Why ought I?

There have been more than enough examples here in the thread and in the lectures which satisfy those conditions. I've drawn my conclusions based upon those. Do you not see that?

Well not exactly...

Rather, I should be able to outline two scenarios(examples of successful reference), one in the actual world, and one possible world scenario where definite description is not actually being used in(is not a part of) either.

That's been done already several times over...

OK, so do you think definite descriptions are not necessary to "successful reference" in possible world discourse, even though necessary to the discourse itself? — Janus

Well, that's much closer...

Definite descriptions are not a necessary part of successful reference within possible world scenarios. Definite descriptions are not a necessary part of successful reference in the actual world.

That's one part of all this that makes me cringe, the notions of a posteriori and a priori.

What's so difficult about using the language I use as a basis for questions about what I'm saying?

OK, so do you think "successful reference" in possible world discourse can do without definite descriptions, even though the discourse itself cannot? — Janus

Speaking in terms of "do without" cannot take account of what I'm saying.

The thesis is that some properties are essential without special bias... — frank

As a result of their being known a priori?

The answer is that Kripke does not claim that we can't fix a reference by some contingent property. In such a case, just as Quine points out, this property becomes essential by special bias. — frank

That would be essential to successful reference, not essential to it's existence...

Can we substitute here?

Necessary for successful reference, and not necessary for it's existence?

Seems we can... the dent is necessary for successfully referring to that desk(for picking it out uniquely amongst others alike it in all the other ways noticeable), but is not necessary for the existence of that desk.

I'm merely pointing out the fact that all knowledge of elemental constituents(that something is an elemental constituent) depends upon naming practices(language, context, etc.) whereas the existence of elemental constituents does not always.

The overlap(the elemental constituents that are existentially dependent upon language) has not been properly taken into account here. Doesn't look like it can be given the frameworks in use.

All knowledge of elemental constituents(essential properties?) is existentially dependent upon naming practices. Not all elemental constituents are. Some elemental constituents are not existentially dependent upon naming practices. Some elemental constituents are not existentially dependent upon our knowledge of them. That which is existentially dependent upon neither naming practice nor our knowledge cannot consist of either. Some elemental constituents consist of neither name nor knowledge.

If all context is dependent upon language, then it would follow from Quine's conclusion that there are no essential properties independent of language.

That's just plain wrong.

Seems Kripke is claiming that what we can and/or cannot say about the referent of proper nouns within possible world scenarios is not determined by the same standard as what we can and/or cannot say about the referent of common nouns within possible world scenarios.

So answer this: if the lectern has a dent from being hit by a hammer, why don't we also know a priori that if it has that dent, it necessarily has it? Why wouldn't that be part of the connotations of 'that lectern'? Quine says it can be. Why is Quine wrong? — frank

Good questions.

Is there some special pleading happening?

The dent isn't an essential part of the lectern is it? It's not made of a dent. The dent does, however, help us to refer to it as opposed to other lecterns which are made of the same stuff.

With regard to Kripke's approach we could imagine that lectern without the dent, but we cannot imagine that lectern made of ice?

Why must it be so difficult? All I said was that what you wrote, as far as I can tell, offers no reason to believe that possible world discourse can do without descriptions, definite and otherwise. — Janus

I've not claimed that possible world discourse 'can do without' descriptions, definite or otherwise(whatever the hell that's supposed to mean).

Kripke is talking about possible world scenarios involving both proper names and descriptions.

Agree?

Making sense of what I said first requires at least an accurate account thereof. Start there. I'm not interested in defending your misrepresentation of what I said to you...

So in saying that the "actual world", as used in modal discussion, is not the world around us, he is pointing out that "actual world" here is used as a piece in modal games, no different to any other possible world. Hence when he says "the possible but not actual worlds are not phantom duplicates of the 'world' in this other sense", the other sense is that of a world of "the enormous scattered object that surrounds us".

He's saying that we ought not overcook the cake.

So after that I will maintain two things. Firstly, that the modal world in which we live is no different in ontology to any other modal world. And secondly, that the modal world in which we live is one of many possible worlds; to think otherwise would be to imply that our world is not possible. — Banno

Ooooh... :yikes:

Hmmmm...

That doesn't seem to follow from anything I've read thus far...

That is, to play modal games we just pretend that our world is one of many possible worlds.

That's not as frightening a claim...

I think that there's actually much to be uncovered by virtue of our teasing out some nuance here. Particularly, there's much packed up into the notion of "alternative circumstances"...

You've skirted around it...

...counterfactuals, which are events that we believe did not happen in this world... — andrewk

I have a problem with this notion of counterfactual. I argued several pages back strongly against it. Events that we believe did not happen in this world are not always counter to fact. They are always counter to belief.

It is also the case that we stipulate circumstances that we do believe to be true of this world within possible world scenarios.

My cat goes missing in the actual world...

We think through all the different circumstances that could have caused that event. Each set of alternative circumstances constitutes being it's own possible world if all possible worlds consist of stipulated circumstances. The one we believe may or may not be true. Whether or not it is so is not determined by our belief. Rather, it is determined by the actual events.

So, I'm not sure that his focus was upon counterfactuals exclusively. Rather, I took his notion of possible world scenarios to be one of a much more minimalist criterion, which makes more sense if he aims at gathering all of the different versions that he wants to target 'under one roof', so to speak.

'if a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any other matter.'(p. 114)

Hence there is a sort of inheritance of individuality...

If B is made from A, and C from D, in no possible world is B the very same as C. SO part of the grammar Kripke is proposing is that if two things have distinct beginnings, then they are distinct in every possible world.

That seems intuitively pretty obvious from the extensional nature of his approach to modality. — Banno

I'm ok with that.

"In addition to the principle that the origill of an object is essential to it,
another principle suggested is that the substance of which it is made is essential."(p. 114)

If B is made from A, then in every possible world B is made from A; To propose that B might have been made from D would be contradictory; yet instead one might propose that some B might never have existed, but that instead there was another individual - B' - which was made from D. — Banno

This one doesn't sit as well...

Help me out, if you would...

:smile:

Wait, I think I understand...

Instead B may have never existed(the B made from A), but rather there is another individual with the same namesake made from something other than A.

What good is that?

Ah! That's the basis of the cats in KatWorld. Cool.

What follows from the fact that we can imagine such things?

Mirror mirror...

:roll:

Anyone can look and judge for themselves what's taken place here.

Kripke is claiming that during possible world discourse using both proper names and descriptions, that we can change the description while retaining the ability for successful reference but we cannot change the proper name while maintaining that ability. There are no examples to the contrary.

It follows from that that we've the strongest possible justificatory ground for concluding that description is not necessary for successful reference within possible world discourse involving both proper names and descriptions.

It says nothing at all about what is or is not necessary for us to begin such possible world discourse(about what it takes to successfully pick the individual out of this world)...

Thus...

You're shooting at the wrong target.

He agrees that both are necessary for picking some objects out of this world. At least, his notion of designator allows for that because it covers both. His notions of being rigid and/or non-rigid are determined by whether or not the designator in question is capable of successful reference without the other within a possible world scenario involving proper names and descriptions after the referent has already been picked out of this world.

That's the best I can do...

Quid pro quo?

C'mon...

You can do it.

You're being a twit.

I've told you I don't agree with what you wrote... — Janus

Kripke is talking about possible world scenarios involving both proper names and descriptions.

Agree or disagree?

I'm going to spoon feed you... ok widdle guy?

Kripke begins these lectures(ignoring the introduction) by pointing out what we're doing when positing possible world scenarios(hypotheticals) while using proper nouns
— creativesoul
At least in the early part of the lectures, Kripke doesn't appear to address hypotheticals, which are events that, for all we know, may happen in the future of this world. Indeed, Kripke tends to only use the word 'hypothetical' in relation to 'hypothetical languages', which is something different altogether. Rather, Kripke is concerned with counterfactuals.. — andrewk

Well, I'm going off of what Kripke wrote about stipulating the circumstances thereof. Those can be either true or false with respect to the actual world, whereas counterfactuals cannot be true. So...

Look Janus...

Offer up a possible world scenario using both proper names and descriptions.

Then we can look to see if what you say about Kripke's position rings true. That offering is the only acceptable form of criticism, for possible world scenarios involving both proper names and descriptions are precisely what Kripke is talking about.

Got one?

Try to come up with one using your own description "the president of the United States at such and such time"...

Show me how we can use it along with a proper name as a means for setting out some possible world in order to see that Kripke is wrong. That would require the definite description maintaining our ability to successfully refer to the referent of the name, in addition to our also seeing that we can change the proper name within possible world scenarios and still successfully pick out the referent.