Thanks for the link. I'll have a look.

By the way, I'm still thinking about "wary". It's not the same as fear or anxiety, not obviously an emotion or a mood, more like a policy. https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/wary defines it as "having or showing a close attentiveness to avoiding danger or trouble". The lists of synonyms and antonyms is interesting. No emotions or moods occur, yet clearly "fear" and "anxiety" are related.

Is "meh" a feeling? The feeling of not having a feeling? — unenlightened

That fits with my impression. But I'm not at all sure I've really understood it properly - which may be framing it wrongly. My impression includes the impression that it is as much a speech act as an emotion.

I could almost define anxiety as the fear of fear, but I wouldn't defend that if it doesn't fit. — unenlightened

That makes sense.

I think the standard distinction between anxiety and fear in academic discussion is that anxiety is said to be a mood, rather than an emotion. Part of the difference is supposed to be that anxiety doesn't necessarily have an object, whereas fear does. I tend to think of it a fear looking for an object. But that's not the whole story. If I'm anxious about rising prices, it's not the same as fearing them. Perhaps because the danger is a possibility/probability rather than real.

But the verbal dimension compounds this fear through the imagination. — Moliere

That seems perfectly true. But there's a big and difficult problem, compounded by the idea that emotions are introspectible, so that second/third parties have limited authority. Yet we do not accept first person reports as entirely authoritative. This ambiguity fuels the difficulty in understanding the rationality of emotions. The problem is particularly acute when we want to apply the framework of emotion where language is missing (yet the framework of action is at least partially applicable). I'm talking about what some people call embedded beliefs.

Shades of grey, on the border between categories. Partly empirical, partly conceptual. Hence difficult for philosophy. Nonetheless, important for understanding human beings.

The fear is still there, of course, otherwise the thrill wouldn't be there. — Moliere

Yes. It is convenient for understanding this that adrenaline supports both fight and flight. Hence the term "adrenaline junkie".

Thanks. I'm afraid I have a problem - I don't know which thread is your other thread.

And this primary division persists in every feeling and every judgement being positive or negative. — unenlightened

Isn't there a third possibility? Neither positive nor negative, i.e. irrelevant to me.

the dis-ease of armchair philosophers rather than rock-climbing philosophers — unenlightened

Perhaps. I would hope that a rock-climbing philosopher would be at least somewhat fearful. It shouldn't be a surprise if there were few anxious people among them. Anxious people will tend to avoid rock-climbing, won't they?

I fear I'm nit-picking.

Only that it's curious that it does do so, given how there's so much we do not know (and it can even be fun to not know), and a lot of what we do not know doesn't matter to us, and how even after we know the imagination can continue its anxiety spiral regardless of that desire for knowledge being satiated. — Moliere

Does it help to say that we have to start somewhere and the things around us and affect us are not a bad place to start? But there's always more to be known and so anxiety is always a possibility.

All off-topic to atheist dogma, but I found the topic interesting to continue. Sorry un. — Moliere

You're right. I've taken a lot more interest in this kind of discussion since I read Cavell, especially on the question what lies behind scepticism, since it seems impossible to put it to bed (or, better, the grave.)

For the modern Humean such stories are thought to be nothing but falsity, but this non-factual understanding is a part of their attraction, I think. — Moliere

We live by and in stories. Arguably, it's the first kind of understanding and even science has one. (It's called history, but it serves the main purpose of orienting us towards life).

When I was young and knew everything, I was what you call a modern Humean. It took a long time and much actual life to get the point.

Though have you ever wondered why not knowing makes for anxiety? — Moliere

As a person with a (mild) tendency to anxiety, I have never wondered that.

What relieves my anxiety is not so much feeling in control as confidence that I can adapt to whatever happens and partly by feeling that most outcomes don't matter much. (Some people think I'm easy-going!) Getting absorbed in philosophy helps - and quite a lot of other things, as well.

Anxiety gets bad when you speculate on possible outcomes and can't work out what you would do, but feel that you couldn't cope with it. Then a vicious spiral begins and fantasy takes over and things can get bad. I've always believed that many, if not most, people work like that, and failed to understand those for whom it doesn't.

In support of my feeling, I cite the obsessive discussion of anxiety in existentialist circles and the fact that most living creatures seem to live with it - have you ever watched a bird feeding, the continual pauses for a quick look round? - they are terrified. (Dogs seem mostly over-confident.) Evolution would likely favour a certain level of paranoia.

So my question is the mirror of yours - how do people who don't get anxious cope with not knowing? Confidence can be soundly based, but nonetheless is liable to failure, so it seems to me that people who don't get anxious are living in denial or under an illusion or myth.

Which is all off-topic, except perhaps to note that fear seems to rule many apparently confident and arrogant (dogmatic) people.

Kantian dogma might be that set of beliefs which he thought were contrary to reason but which people believed mostly due to this hunger for something decisive where nothing decisive could be said. — Moliere

Very plausible. As to Kant's emotion life, I've always thought that anecdote about him going for his constitutional walk at exactly the same time every day spoke to obsessive control, which suggests strong and dangerous emotions. Anyway surely a passion for philosophy and devotion to the pursuit of truth are emotions as well as values - and strong ones at that? (Some would-be rational people need to be reminded of that, IMO.)

they can be "tamed" to live a certain way. — Moliere

I prefer "balanced", but the crucial bit is the difference from repression and from indulgence. I suppose you know about the motto of the oracle at Delphi - "nothing in excess". Which can itself be overdone, of course. (Never forget about Dionysus - he'll come and get you if you do.)

Don't we have a kind of understanding of emotions and values through our commitments and emotions we carry? Why do we need to understand these things at all? — Moliere

Yes and no. By which I mean that, as well as provoking and inspiring us, they sometimes puzzle or frighten us. Though, to be honest, I'm not at all sure what "understanding" means. Certainly, knowing about my hormonal system explains nothing, in the relevant sense.

At least this is another motivation for the game of reasons that lives alongside the cooperative motivations. And the subjective, in relation to that motivation, is a position of vulnerability rather than invulnerability. — Moliere

The flexibility of all this is quite tiresome. Philosophers, at least, regarded the subjective ("introspection") as preferable because they thought it was immune to error - the same reason as their preference for mathematics. Aiming for something objective meant risk to them - something to be avoided at all costs.

I think reason gets re-expressed and re-interpreted depending upon what we're doing rather than having it act like an arbiter or judge of the reasonable. — Moliere

You're right about that. But people do hunger for something decisive. Not knowing makes for anxiety.

I think it goes like this : Given fear of death, fear of tigers and poisonous snakes is 'reasonable' in the sense that they are capable of causing death, whereas fear of mice is not. But as Hume famously didn't say, "you can't get an emotion from a fact". Fear of death is not reasonable, merely common. Lay on, Macduff, And damned be him that first cries “Hold! Enough!” — unenlightened

Well, emotions and values are ineradicable (saving certain ideas like Buddhism (nirvana) or Stoicism/Epicureanism (ataraxia)) from human life. We need to understand them whatever their status. Human life is a good place to start to identify what's valuable (and therefore to be desired or avoided, loved or hated, feared or welcomed. Where else would be better?).

self-control: a peculiar notion which always feels contradictory to me. — Moliere

To me as well. It's just a manifestation of the preference for hierarchy. I think competing emotions and inability to decide (not necessarily irrational - sometimes there is no rational answer) are enough to explain the phenomena. No need for an arbiter.

If you don't like it, you can appeal to the mods, whose dogma is final, subject to the terms and conditions of the service provider, that are subject to the various laws of the countries involved, subject to anyone giving enough of a damn to set about enforcement. — unenlightened

I take your point. Life is complicated, isn't it? However, your last clause hints at the basis of success for a dogmatic person. Keep the people quiet, because if they get really riled, you're in trouble.

Your quotation is an excellent example of the genre. Lao Tzu always steers neatly between the bleedin' obvious and the intriguingly mysterious. Each element is perfectly clear, but why they are arranged like that is completely mysterious. But I guess you quote it because there is a connection with what we're talking about. Power, and its ultimate form, death, is the ultimate weapon of dogmatics; its limitation is that it only works when people fear death; when people lose their fear of death the dogmatic can wreak terrible destruction, but will lose in the end. Philosophers seem to hate talking about power in human society and loath to acknowledge its role.

Hence one has recourse to dogma: "The referee's decision is final." Or the Supreme Court's, or the Central Committee's, or whatever. — unenlightened

Yes. Maybe this will be merely annoying, but there is a difficulty when we cannot appoint a referee. We look for a substitute - something that will determine the decision. This applies to truth, as in science. We look for facts, or we look to reason - even logic. It doesn't work very well. Hence fact and reason begin to get a bad name. Pity. There's no better authority.

We can debate the meaning of any word, but only by not debating the meaning of the words we use to debate it. Thus even a debate on the meaning of dogma requires a dogmatic understanding of 'meaning', 'debate' etc. One might say that dogma is the (perhaps temporary) still, fixed point of the mind. — unenlightened

So, paradoxically, we are modifying what "dogma" has meant through most of this thread. Now, we are distinguishing between good dogma and bad dogma. I can live with that. I still reckon I can tell the difference.

The thing is, "the still, fixed point of the mind" can change status and become the subject of a discussion. That's what preserves us from arbitrary authority.

My thread, my rules; this is what dogma is, and this is my dogma — unenlightened

:wink: That seems reasonable and I will defer to your judgement. If I don't like it, I can always go away.

Surely with dogma, though, there'd have to be a shared other dogma which would allow for a third party to be relevant? — Moliere

That’s a problem. If there is to be a discussion, there needs to be shared ground. Wittgenstein would talk about shared practices and ways of life. IMO that’s not wrong, but too vague for specific applications. For example, discussing something is a practice (or, a collection of practices, since discussions can range from gossip and banter to legal procedures and rules of evidence to academic theories of different kinds). But it would be a start to say that the practice needs to be shared. (A practice does not need to be correct; it’s only wrong if it isn’t practical, in the sense of enabling the discussion) In one way, the practice needs to be objective, but we don’t really need that – inter-subjective or at least allowing space for each party - will do.

But reason speaks differently to different people, and people are motivated by passion before reason so subjectivity has a way of coming back around even as we try our best to adhere to objective reason. — Moliere

Tell me about it!

Subjectivity has a way of reappearing whenever we think we’ve got rid of it. Why do we want to get rid of it? Perhaps because objectivity is a way of making interesting disoveries and resolving disagreements, and we put quite a high (but not supreme) value on that.

There’s a sense of reason in which reason “moves nothing” as Aristotle said. Hume’s version was, of course, the is/ought distinction. That means, as Hume pointed out, that reason is a slave to the passions – good only for working out means to the ends (values) set by the passions). (Spoiler alert – only in one sense of reason, IMO)

In another part of the jungle, the is/ought distinction shows that theoretical reason is not relevant to the passions. But that doesn’t need to mean that they are irrational. There are reasonable fears and unreasonable fears, reasonable joys (winning the race) and unreasonable joys (preventing an opponent from winning the race – unreasonable because it undermines the point of the practice of racing.) (Actually, “reasonable” is useful also in theoretical contexts, when formal conclusive proof is not available.)

Originally I wanted to have a kind of rule for classifying dogma, but this way of looking isn't really like that. It's probably better that way. — Moliere

Rules are fine – in their place. They are best developed after one understands the relevant practice(s). Sometimes, as in the rules of a game, we have a more or less free hand – what we say goes. But we are nevertheless constrained, if we want people to play the game, by what people find worth-while and/or amusing. In addition, rules can only be effective if there is agreement on how they are to be applied (i.e. in the context of a practice). It is important to be aware that every rule can (and mostly likely will, eventually) encounter circumstances in which the appropriate application may be unclear or disputed.

While NIST is ultimately a maker of subjective definitions, they are inter-subjective and checked and about as good as you can get for those purposes. That's not the same as me claiming this or that brand of peanut butter is better though; we'd call that obviously subjective. — Moliere

I'm sorry, I can't decipher NIST. What does it mean?

One could claim that one brand of peanut butter is better than another on objective grounds - that it is organic or doesn't use palm oil. Sure, the fact/value distinction would kick in, but the argument about whether those grounds are appropriate is at least not straightforwardly subjective. Whereas making that claim on the ground that "I like it" is quite different; that would be subjective. (But "I like it because it is organic" is different.)

"Reputable", it seems to me has objective elements, because (in normal use) it would be based on reasonably objective grounds. The question would be about the worth of, for example, relevant social status (relevant professorship or other mark of success).

So I'm just going to ask the obvious: Did we actually find a description of dogma that three of us are fine with? — Moliere

It looks like it. :grin:

I accept that if we dig in to it, we'll find differences of opinion.

The assumption seems to be that dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps intolerance is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'. — unenlightened

I'm sorry. Those pronouns like "it" are very easy to misunderstand. This version is fine.

Right... if we have reputable dogma then my dogma is good and their dogma is bad. — Moliere

Well, yes - if you don't have a definition of "reputable" that's not subjective.

Which is succinct and manages to lay out what's meant. I'm understanding better what is meant by dogma at this point. — Moliere

I like unenlightened's first sentence. I don't understand the second.

dogma makes for intolerance, but perhaps it is more related to power, and dogma is simply 'certainty'. — Moliere

Dogma includes "certainty", in the psychological sense. But psychological certainty is a trap, precisely because it leads to dogma and there's nothing like power for fostering certainty beyond what's reasonable.

I don't think we should use "truth" here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Quite right. I was careless. I should have said, "I was thinking that if there is some validity in the madcap interpretation, it isn't madcap". However, doesn't "objective" means capable of unqualified truth or falsity? "Subjective" is more complicated. I think that some people would say ¬"subjective" means not capable of either truth or falsity, while others would say it means "true or false for someone".

Any claim of such a "general or standard use" will miss out on a whole bunch of non-standard usage which is just as real as that contained by the general description. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say or imply that non-standard uses of a tool are not uses. On the contrary, they clearly are.

Making such a claim, is just a generalization intended to facilitate some argument. "The standard use of a hammer is to pound nails". — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, I was't careful enough, again. A normal claw hammer is designed and manufactured for people to pound nails (and to pull them out). (There are other kinds of hammer designed to pound other things.) Most people use their hammers most of the time for the designed purpose - they perform better than most alternatives. I agree that's an empirical generalization.

You ought not think of meaning as in the head. It's far easier to understand meaning as being in the writing itself, but put there by the author. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I understood "in the head" to be metaphorical for "in the mind", which is itself a metaphor. To my mind, so is "in the text". But it is true that the text expresses the author's intention or even is what the author intended to write - curiously even if certain parts/features were not intended, but developed as the text was written. It all gets hideously complicated. I think the rest of that paragraph is OK.

But I think you may be too restrictive if you are saying that the meaning of a text is limited to what the author intended. I don't see how anything can prevent other people from finding meanings (or quasi-meanings?) in the text which are not misinterpretations but which the author had not noticed. Plato was right - a text does not know who to speak to, but speaks to everyone equally.

The point though is that I do not want to throw all madcap interpretations in the same trash-heap. As I said, the madman still expresses glimpses of insightful intelligence. And different madmen express different forms of insight. So their interpretations cannot all be classed together. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was thinking that if there is some truth in the madcap interpretation, it isn't madcap. But still, there is the point that interpretations may be mixed. Perhaps all interpretations will be found to be mixed. In any case, perhaps a trash-heap, as such is not such a good idea. Still, I'll want to know what to spend my time on. Difficult.

Words are tools, and tools have no general "use", as use is a feature of the particular instance where the tool is put toward a specific purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. Tools do have a general or standard use. It is true that bricolage can develop other uses, which may even become standard, but that doesn't undermine the point. I don't see why a particular view of interpretation should not be adopted in a particular context provided that practitioners are able to work with it.

Then we have many options in between these two extremes. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's certainly a spectrum of the kind you indicate and important difference between "simple" cases and "complex" ones.

But when we get to philosophy, the intent of the author is not exposed in this way. This is because the intent of the author of philosophy, the author's goal, or objective, is often actually unknown to the author. We can express it in general terms like the desire for truth, or knowledge, or an approach to the unknown. — Metaphysician Undercover

That exactly my bother about the "intent" criterion and why I can't accept the definition of a speech act in terms of intention. Plus there's the objection that "meanings just ain't in the head" - who was it who coined that?.

A broken watch does not do what it is supposed to do, keep time, a madcap interpretation does what it is supposed to do, provide an understanding of meaning. The madcap interpretation is just different, in the sense of being outside the norm, so to make the analogy good, the watch would not be broken, but giving you the wrong time. In theory there would be a way to "translate" the interpretation, like relativity translates different ways of keeping time, because as a translation it must be ordered in some way and not completely random. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Giving the wrong time" makes some sense. I'm not sure in advance that all madcap interpretations provide an understanding of meaning. On the other hand, I can see that you don't want to rule out radically unorthodox interpretations in advance. Perhaps we should lump all madcap interpretations into the same trash-heap.

I don't quite understand your last sentence. If it means that all interpretations must be mutually reconcilable, that undermines the point of different interpretations - unless the reconciliation is simply the original text, which all interpretations have in common.

If it makes sense, it's plausible isn't it? — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't seem obviously true to me. Philosophy has produced several theories which, in my view, make sense, but aren't plausible. My dream that I can jump/fly over tall buildings makes sense, but isn't plausible.

So the ancient person could very well be writing in a way which would appear incoherent to us today. Then the interpreter who tried to put things in coherent terms would be doing a faulty interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, as usual, you have a coherent position. Revealing the incoherence of a text on its own terms is a perfectly coherent project. But would you say that Locke anticipated modern physics, or that Berkeley anticipated modern relativity theory?

But to allow the condition of the modern society to influence how one interprets the intent of the authors would be a mistaken (subjective, because one's personal position would influence the) interpretation. The objective interpretation would be to look solely for the authors' intent, and not allow one's own intent to influence the interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

But can we always divine the intent of the author? We can't always discern the intent of even modern authors from the text alone. But I accept that the intent of the author, so far as we can divine it, is always important in interpreting a text. The same applies to the context in which they are written. But if that's the only correct way to read them, I'm left puzzled by the fact that some texts remain relevant long after times have changed, and we continue to read and discuss them. Your approach seems to consign all historical texts to a museum.

I thought the starting-point of this discussion was the issues around the fact that there's no single authoritative (privileged) interpretation.

A better example probably is the ongoing discussion around the second amendment in the US constitution, the right to bear arms. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are right, that is a better example.

Therefore instead of looking to change them it just becomes a question of the intent behind them, and how to apply that same intent today. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough. But the catch is "how to apply that same intent today". That means interpretation in a context the author(s) didn't know about. There's a narrow line there between divining the intent of the author and speculating.

The objective interpretation would be to look solely for the authors' intent, and not allow one's own intent to influence the interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not well-informed about jurisprudence, but I believe that the Supreme Court in the UK has a rule that the intent of Parliament does not determine the meaning of the Act; it will only consider the words on the page. There's a notion of objective meaning at work there which philosophy would find troublesome, but nonetheless, lawyers seem to be able to work with it, and if meaning is use, that validates the principle, at least in the context of the law.

dogma as a relationship between beliefs, which would be partially content-dependent — Moliere

I certainly agree that dogma is a relationship between beliefs, in that dogma is in some way protected against refutation, with the implication that other beliefs can go to the wall. But that status is attributed by the believer, so I don't see that I can delineate any content in advance.

so insisting that space is infinite, for instance, is dogmatic due to the place that "space" fits within the scheme of reason. — Moliere

Yes. Kant is using "dogma" in its traditional, non-rhetorical use. Which is not wrong, just very unusual. One of my problems here is precisely to distinguish "respectable" dogma from the disreputable kind.

It's a luxury for me to say it, but it still looks to me like religion as such is not the problem, but the social and geopolitical situation in which religious divisions take on greater significance than otherwise. — Jamal

You may well be right. So I will retreat to saying that it depends on the details of the case and I won't argue about what "significance" means. I assume that if the people involved find religion significant in their context, it is significant.

This is an interesting method for determining dogmatism! It is interesting because the content of beliefs isn't referenced at all — Moliere

I'm glad you find it interesting. Now, I'm interested that you think that the content might be relevant. I never considered the possibility, because you find dogmatists everywhere. Atheists, priests, philosophers, football fans, etc. One could look at the status or role of the belief. But I'm reluctant to call axioms or "hinge" (or similar) propositions dogmas even though they are beyond argument, because they can be evaluated indirectly, through the system that results.

That's hilariously in character -- Disagree with me? Why, you must not understand! — Moliere

:grin: But seriously... there is another variety of dogmatism, which is not quite the same. It starts from exactly the same response - "you must not understand me.", but does argue, properly at first. But when it becomes apparent that the proposition at stake will not be abandoned, (for example, as in ad hoc explanations), the debate is over - unless one can agree on a solution such "hinge proposition" or axiom, in which case a solution has been reached. Those solutions are a bit of a problem.

The key, though, is that proper engagement requires that one put one's own beliefs at stake.

Why must there be such limits? A madcap interpretation is still an interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's true. I'm happy to accept that a madcap interpretation is an interpretation, but only in the sense that a broken watch is a watch.

Incidentally, this is very evident in fiction, one must allow the author to describe the environment, and the reader must allow oneself to be transported to that environment, leaving one's own. In school we start by learning fiction, and it's good practice. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are quite right, of course. But fiction is a particular context. Even so, Aristotle says that a story must be plausible. I think that's too restrictive, yet there's something in it.

Can I give the same liberty to, say Berkeley's immaterialism/idealism? Assuming that it is a consistent and complete system on its own terms, I could have no objection. Could I object to Putin's interpretation of the history of Eastern Europe?

Another example (legal in this case) based on ancient memories of "The West Wing". Suppose a country has a constitution written more than 200 years ago. There is a provision that each geographical division of the country should send to the legislative body an number of representatives proportionate to its population. It is taken for granted that women do not count. It is further provided that slaves shall count as a fraction of a person (say 2/5th). Fast forward to the present. It is clear, isn't it, that something must be done. No-one is a slave any more, so perhaps that provision can be simply ignored. The provision about women was so obvious that it is not even mentioned, so perhaps one could simply include women. But it would be safer to delete the slave clause and add a definition of "person". You might not count that as re-interpretation, but it surely demonstrates that it is sometimes necessary to take account of the contemporary context as well as the historical context.

It's a luxury for me to say it, but it still looks to me like religion as such is not the problem, but the social and geopolitical situation in which religious divisions take on greater significance than otherwise. — Jamal

Basically I agree with you. But the local religion is also part of the social and geopolitical situation. So perhaps it might be more accurate to say that religion is only part of the problem, or one factor in the problem. Or, perhaps still more accurate, that the local interpretation of the religion is a factor in the problem.

Logic is designed to be context independent, that's the beauty of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was please that you like my previous post. I have to say, you have a way of putting things that I simply cannot help responding to. And it seems, we are capable of conducting a dialogue. It's not every day that one finds that.

To the quotation:- Well, yes. But then, it is a context, if a special one. I don't want to get trapped into defending my use of "valid" - which, by the way, has uses in many context apart from logic. I was trying to say that not every madcap idea counts as an interpretation. There are limits. The text is flexible, but only up to a point.

As to your primary and secondary context, I think we need a few more. The author's environment, social, physical, intellectual, etc. is certainly one context. The readers' environment is another one, and of course that may break down into a number of sub-contexts; it may overlap, to a greater or lesser extent with the author's environment. Finally, there are the multifarious contexts of posterity. This is relevant because when the text is read in a different context different questions, issues, priorities may come up and lead to a need for interpretations that go way beyond anything the author could have meant or thought. But still, it is not the case that anything goes.

Maybe that's the better route towards understanding dogmatism critically. — Moliere

It's a question of one's attitude to others. Subject to the paradox of tolerance and provided tolerance doesn't mean one cannot listen to others and take them seriously, your route seems the only tolerable option.

I once knew someone who was passionate about the Enlightenment. Unfortunately, he took this to mean that when someone disagreed with his argument, he should repeat the argument. He was perfectly patient, never dogmatic, but never responded properly. He was dogmatic, but not offensive - just boring.

I was just making a mild joke — Tom Storm

Point taken.

Not recognizing a bit of fun when I was talking about the role of fun in philosophy is a bit of a mis-step.

I tend towards anti-foundationalist skepticism myself. — Tom Storm

I'm very taken with Hume's distinction between excessive scepticism and moderate scepticism. He condemns the former and recommends a dose of ordinary life as a cure, but recommends the latter as the best approach to life, including philosophy.

PS added later. Hume describes moderate acepticism as "judicious" which I think is a splendid and spot on. I couldn't remember it when I wrote the last paragraph.

I think this evasion or deflection happens in science just as it does in religion. — Janus

That's fair. There's a very fine line between parking the question what burning (as in fire) is when you are an alchemist and don't have the theoretical context to explain the phenomena (which turned up eventually in molecular theory) and dodging the issue, as when Aristotelians ended up characterizing matter as pure potential.

or more precisely the belief that there is a correct interpretation, which is the incorrect interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. But I don't think that anything goes. "Valid" is the word I think of as correct.

Validity depends on context. By asking different questions, one sets a context. There's an old question about whether Epicurus anticipated modern atomic theory. For me, the answer is no, since he didn't know modern science and his atoms are very different from ours. Not everyone feels the same way. But I don't argue with them. I just ignore them. Again, some people think that Berkeley anticipated relativity theory. There are striking resemblance and connections, but I think that "anticipated" is far too strong. Our relativity is very different from his.

The complication comes with "meaning". In ordinary language, we do get involved with what the speaker/author intended; we divine those by the context. If I'm a soldier on parade, the words of command mean (intend when uttered) a precise response. Alternative interpretations are frowned on. Flexibility of interpretation is appropriate in response to the kinds of case that we have been talking about, but that's a different context.

Yes. I am a reluctant post-modernist. — Tom Storm

That's a pity. You're missing out. The original guys enjoyed it. (The dialogue between Searle and Derrida is a good example.) It was having a sure-fire way of tweaking the lion's tail - where the lion was the orthodox academy. The sense of fun that I found in them was part of the appeal. (I also realized that it must have been part of Socrates' appeal when he revealed Socratic method to his friends. I suspect that it was one of the reasons he lost the trial.)

once a work is in the public domain, anyone can bring anything to it, put it to any use and make their contribution as important as or more important than the original and turn it into something quite else from what it was intended to be. — Vera Mont

I wouldn't go as far as that. It's probably true to say that one cannot limit in advance what interpretations might be found in a text. But I think there is a distinction between valid and invalid, difficult though it is. Could one find an interpretation of Hamlet that saw him as a man of action? I would take a lot of persuading. I hope I'm not being difficult.

This experiment demonstrates very clearly that it is possible for an author to not know what one intends to write, when it is written. — Metaphysician Undercover

The experiment does show that a text can have meanings that the author did not intend. So does the practice of improvisation in music. But that's not quite what's at stake - or so I thought. What was at stake was whether a text could have meanings that were not intended, despite the writer having different, even incompatible, intentions - or rather, whether it is legitimate to attribute to the text meanings that the author did not intend. In one way, that is clearly possible, but we often think (in other contexts) that such attributions are misinterpretations. If a teacher says "That's all" because that's all there is to say on the topic in hand, and the class leaves the room, it might well be a misinterpretation if the teacher was merely moving on to the next topic.

Pointing out that snakes cannot talk in response to a non-literal interpretation of the fall of man really seems to miss the point. — Moliere

It certainly does. If it does anything, it emphasizes difference in the interpretation of "interpretation". The difficulty is that sometimes interpretations sometimes exclude each other - or seem to. They certainly reflect different presuppositions and different interests.

I suspect two different uses of interpretation here. One is a use in which interpretations do not exclude each other; each is valid or invalid on its own terms. The other is a use in which a rule is applied to a case. (Yes, I'm channelling Wittgenstein). Each application of a rule is an interpretation, so it may be applied in different ways. Sometimes, we can agree that the rule might be applied in different ways; then we seek a "ruling". But if the rule is to have any meaning, we need to be able to say that one way of applying the rule is right and another is wrong.

It seems to me that the conviction that one has the right, correct, true answer is the source of dogma, and consequently the most pernicious view. I don't think that atheism or religion are necessarily pernicious, it is the conviction that does the harm.

Yet, if there is any truth to be found in this chaotic world, and even if there is none, one has to take a stand somewhere. How can one do that and avoid becoming dogmatic?

I might have gone in wanting to say X (and partly achieved that) but what the story really demonstrated is Y. — Tom Storm

That might be a surprise, but, so long as X and Y are compatible, not a problem. Surely it's only a problem if X and Y are not compatible. Your use of "really" suggests that's what you have in mind. That's a situation that post-modernists particularly enjoy(ed).

My experiences of writing philosophy include the slightly weird experience of finding an argument taking charge and leading me down a path I didn't intend to go down and don't want to go down.

It's always worth understanding what the author's intentions were (or might have been) and what a text means (or might have meant) to the author's audience (i.e. in the relevant social and cultural context). But sometimes people forget that many texts are read and are important to audiences far beyond their original context The question of interpreting them in those circumstances must go beyond their origins. Indeed the problem starts to arise as soon as the text is published.

(Plato was scathing, in the Phaedrus about written texts for exactly that reason. He ("Socrates") says (from memory) that "they do not know to whom they should talk and when they should be silent.")

The only answer apologist can give is "God moves in mysterious ways": which is not even close to being morally satisfactory. — Janus

Quite so. That's the classic. When I first started asking awkward questions, I was told that "we don't worry about those questions". That produced the same result. I went and asked the questions where people do ask them - mostly in philosophy, with the obvious result.

I prefer what scientists do. They file the question under "pending", basically meaning "to be worked out later". That's the undogmatic response.

Which complicates identifying someone else's dogma even more! — Moliere

Thanks. There's no smoking gun. One sign may be an undue willingness to find other people's opinions dogmatic. Another is undoubtedly avoiding engagement with the opposition's arguments (without good reason). But nothing is simple. On the whole, I prefer to avoid the term. It is used far too often as rhetoric - giving a dog a bad name.

But this claimed 'loss of freedom' would have to be justified in a global system where all stakeholders can take their basic needs for granted, for free, from cradle to grave. — universeness

There are two problems with this perfectly reasonable idea. Both are already at work in our world. I don't argue that the project is hopeless, only that the dimension of effective enforcement is critical, and that the tension between resolving problems within a legal and democratic framework and the exercise of force is inescapable.

I live in a country that adopted precisely this principle some 75 years ago. Ever since, nearly everybody had accepted it. But the welfare state had been a battle-ground over the question what "basic needs" are. One party tends to squeeze and erode it, the other tends to support and extend it.

By the way, the welfare state is not a matter of left vs right or socialism vs capitalism. It began in 1883 when Bismarck introduced the first welfare state legislation in Germany/Prussia. This was no socialist programme. It was implemented by aristocrats who recognized that it was the best way to keep the working classes in line. But perhaps you know that.

The idea of human rights, articulated and supported by a legal framework, has been a reality ever since 1945. There's an on-going debate about what exactly they should be. But powerful lobbies, religious and political, have never really accepted the idea and they are able to repress demands for their effective implementation over a very large proportion of the world.

Maybe consensus and acceptance of enforcement will be possible one day. I would love to be around when it happens, but I don't think I will.

Thanks. By sacrifice I meant the temporary death of Jesus, the 'blood sacrifice'.
— Tom Storm

That whole aspect of Christianity has never made any sense to me either. — Janus

I agree. But I think it is not just an odd doctrine. It seems to me to be actually immoral to destroy an innocent life in order to escape from guilt, (even if the victim volunteers). Once the sin has been committed, nothing can alter that fact. There are various things, practical and symbolic, we can do in order to go on living, but what really amounts to a resolution of the problem is a mystery to me. Time's a great healer, I suppose.

Notice though, that this ultimate end is not susceptible to rationality, because it cannot be transformed by rationalization into the means for a further end, and this is what is required to make it rational. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems, after all, that we do have similar aims - escaping from the infinite hierarchy. That has to be promising.

I'm afraid I find myself a bit confused and lost amid all the messages. I've taken a screenshot of one of your messages which seems to explain what you're after. I shall take some time to read it and think about it.

All of the approaches I suggested come down to "This is what I do!" (Wittgenstein) or Hume's version (in response to the problem of induction), that even though the objection is irrefutable, we are going to continue in exactly the same way anyway. I think he thinks that means that the objection is trivial or futile.

The objectivity of fact only requires justification if one intends to maintain the separation between fact and value. A practice can be held up as evidence in an attempt to justify a fact as objective, — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought that's what you meant. Alternative strategies are 1) to find a way of "desubjectifying" values or 2) undermining the distinction between objective and subjective. Which one is best, I'm not sure.

The means cannot be truly "factual" if this is supposed to mean objective, because the means are justified by the end, and the end is justified as being the means to a further end. — Metaphysician Undercover

If "if p then q" can have a truth value, does that not mean that it is objective. It is certainly true that if want to catch a train, you should go to a station. Why is that not factual - and objective?

A tyranny? Can you give me an example of what you think their main complaint might be? — universeness

Loss of freedom. Being forced to do what they don't want to do.

Interesting. The challenge is how do we determine what is intrinsically worthwhile and what is not? This has to be based on a value system which is open to challenge. — Tom Storm

I don't know what people say now. I think in Peters' time it was thought that an activity would qualify if there was universal agreement. That is weak because you can pursue the same activity both for its own sake and for some further end. I see two possibilities, which are the explanations offered in math and logic. First, there is the medieval view that axioms should be "self-evidently" true, as in Euclid. That's less popular nowadays. Second, they are arbitrary, but in effect justified by the usefulness or interest of the system they produce.

Can you think of anything available to humans that is not natural? I don't know how far this gets us in practice. I tend to think that if we can do it or make it, it's natural... Whether it is 'good' or not is a separate matter. — Tom Storm

That's a perfectly tenable view. I'm no fan of the idea that certain practices are "unnatural". What I had in mind is the idea that we have certain motives built in and will therefore pursue them come what may. The idea is that these are the things that we need to do to survive (or reproduce). It is hard to reject the idea that for an organism to pursue it's own survival (and, by extension, flourishing) does not require justification. Whether it is rational for other organisms to allow that, is another question.

I don't think the 'continuous battle' you seem to be suggesting MUST be a permanent state of life for most humans due to some obscure dictate that humanity is too inherently flawed. — universeness

I don't disagree with most of this paragraph, including this sentence.

I wasn't suggesting that the continuous battle MUST be a permanent state, just that our past experience suggests that it will be. Things might change. But I don't see how. World government based on human rights with effective enforcement? As things stand, many people would experience that as a tyranny. But perhaps we wouldn't care?

Nor did I mean to say that the battle with psychopaths has always involved everyone. But it seems to me that there has always been someone involved in it. Sure, it doesn't follow that there always will be someone fighting. But I do think it will always be dangerous not to be willing to battle (which means suspending normal life!)

So to support this division, the objectivity of "fact" must be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

From the context, I'm guessing that you think that's problematic. Depending what you mean by "justified", that's true. For example, one could argue that our practices, which define "rational" as well as "fact", themselves are not exempt from the challenge of justification, hopefully of a kind different from the justification that they define. The only alternative is some kind of foundationalism.

But if the objectivity of facts is in question, it follows, doesn't it, that the subjectivity of values is also in question. But the means to a given end is already subject to rational justification, so it is presumably "factual", if a conditional can be factual. So it all turns on the status of ends.

As a preliminary, I observe that individuals are what they are within a society, which develops the rational capacities they are born with and, in many ways, defines the world in which they will live and do their thinking and make their choices. I'm happy to agree there is no reason to assume that what we are taught is a consistent or complete system, either for facts or for values.

There are four possibilities that I am aware of:-

1 God's commandments do not help us. The Euthyphro problem is one difficulty. The question which god is another.

2. What is comprehensible as a final end in the context of human practices and ways of life. Martha Nussbaum uses this criterion in "The Fragility of Goodness". This one is particularly interesting because it adopts the Wittgensteinian approach of rational justification as based on practices and ways of life, and so would be either identical to, or parallel with, the concept of rationality.

3. The idea that some activities are "intrinsically worth while". This is a popular concept in philosophy of education. I learnt of it from R.S. Peters' work, but I don't know if he originated it. This amounts to declaring that some ends need no justification, though if you look at the examples (art, music, philosophy &c.), there is a widespread fondness for turning them into the means for other ends. Perhaps those are intrinsically worth while. I think the idea is that these are axioms, from which it is rational to deduce means. So this too amounts to incorporating means into a rational framework.

4. Naturalization of values. By this I mean argument from what are posited as human needs or instincts, shaped by the natural and social context. This has the merit of being very likely true, but suffers from all the arguments that established the fact/value distinction in the first place. It could be a variant of either of the other alternatives.

I don't know whether these approaches amount to abolishing the fact/value distinction and I don't suppose for a moment that they would abolish the issues you and @Jamal are discussing. But I think they might help.

I DO NOT claim that all horrors humans face are caused by religion BUT I DO list it in the top 5 of the biggest barriers to human ability to individually 'be all you can be!' whilst we still have the very short lives we do. — universeness

I realize that you've had a long dialogue about this already. Perhaps you're bored with it. But if I'm right that psychopathic behaviour is part of the human condition, removing religion may reduce the opportunities, but won't cure the problem. Those personalities will just find other ways to wreak havoc on the rest of us. I'm not saying there's nothing we can do about them, just that it's will be a continuous battle. Remember the slogan that freedom is not a place you arrive at and relax. It always needs defending.

Does that logic work as a 'theism'? — Paine

It depends on your god.

I detached from the god, but kept the people and dogs. — Vera Mont

I'm always in favour of people and dogs (and I've nothing against cats, rabbits and horses).

This is a new feature of dogmatism that hasn't been mentioned yet: dogmatism as a tendency to protect a belief. Maybe to combine two theories put forward, yours and Wayfarer 's -- dogmatism is a tendency in human beings to protect the regular form of an accepted principle. And dogma is whatever is being protected. — Moliere

I don't have an issue with that. But there is another point to take into account. Some people talk about "hinge" propositions - ideas around which the debate turns, but which are never the focus of debate. I don't understand the ins and outs of this idea. A related idea is that of conceptual or grammatical propositions. Most people are happy to talk about analytic or a priori propositions. These relate to the language in which debate is carried on or to the ideas that frame the debate.

However that may be, for a debate to occur, there needs to be an agreement about what is at issue and what isn't and what counts as evidence or argument. These things are not dogmas merely because they are not at stake. They can be challenged at any time, but that amounts to changing the subject and that's the difference.

My point is that these are also protected, but legitimately. On the other hand, they can be challenged at any time, and to refuse such a challenge would be dogmatic.

Following this a little further, "dogma" used to mean simply doctrine or principle, but it now has a a value built in to it, so it means something like unreasonable resistance to a reasonable challenge (where what is reasonable can itself be open to challenge). That's my basic point. Unfortunately, one person's dogma is another person's evident accepted truth. So I wouldn't necessarily feel upset if someone called me dogmatic. I might just feel that the discussion was over and about to degenerate into abuse.

(We can speculate on religion in the area if the Nazis hadn't lost; I'm guessing (pure conjecture on my part) that there'd have been some moves toward occultism or Germanic paganism of sorts.) — jorndoe

No need to speculate. The Nazi party was very keen on occultism and especially German paganism and actively promoted it. To be fair, paganism is still around; I have a friend who describes himself as a pagan. He is a perfectly decent, liberal, nice guy. There's a good deal of information about this (including about the Nazis) at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_paganism

The claim is an authoritative yet wholly unsubstantiated opinion, no? — 180 Proof

Not if you count the witnesses described in the Gospels. Of course, those are not unbiased sources.

But one of the awkward issues around these old and significant stories is that they are sometimes contain a nugget or two of truth. Homer's epics are an example, as I'm sure you know. The line between history and myth is not clear.

Even if you accept the witnesses, it would not prove the resurrection. It seems not impossible that Jesus might have been in a coma when they buried him. The Resurrection was just a recovery from coma. Not that that explains everything, but it shows something about how the argument might go. And that's the point. If it's dogma, argument is not allowed or frowned upon.

I'm not sure that I'd put dogmatic atheism with science -- usually my feelings on dogmatic atheism is that it's anti-scientific. — Moliere

I'm glad you like "tendencies" - it's helpfully vague. I'm sure there are many varieties of dogmatic atheism and one of them may be anti-scientific. But I think science is not exempt from dogmatism quite apart from the atheistic variety. Dogmatism is a tendency (!) in people, including scientific people to protect what they believe in, and there is a temptation to rule difficult questions out of court because they are inconvenient and to confuse that motive with more respectable justification for rejecting a question. I would agree that it's not part of what science should be. But then, one needs agreed starting-points to start any research. Is temporary or provisional dogmatism ok?

These are all 'not true'. But they tell important truths in story form. — unenlightened

Quite so. Truth is not just facts.

Does that make it clear how truth, while important, isn't at issue? — Moliere

I'm afraid I don't quite understand what you mean. Is it something like "the importance of truth is not at issue" (which I agree with)? But surely it's obvious that what is true - whether a particular proposition is true or not and even which propositions are capable of truth or falsity - is often at issue?

It seems to me that the distinction between religion and science is usually over-simplified. Religion often includes claims that are supposed to be facts about the world which provides what is most important to it - an account of the world that provides purpose and meaning - I prefer structure - to life. Science includes ideas about what is valuable, primarily truth, of course, but a great deal about how to live life, what is worth pursuing and how it is to be pursued (which, of course, is the stock in trade of religion). Incidentally, how far modern capitalism is an outcome of science is unclear to me, but I would like to think that alternative outcomes of the primacy of science are available.

But anything that provides a basis for a way of life and justifies certain practices and is available to large numbers of people, is going to find lots of different kinds of people amongst its followers. So whatever was originally proposed or recommended is going to find different tendencies developing. So all religions have fundamentalist tendencies, liberal tendencies, intellectual tendencies, practical tendencies, missionary tendencies, quietist tendencies, and on and on. That includes the way(s) of life that exist around science. So I'm inclined to see dogmatic atheism as a tendency within the practice of science which is bound to develop.

I find grand narratives like the conflict between religion and science very difficult. They tend to evaporate when looked at too closely.

If you look at it that way, the dogmatic atheist and the religious fundamentalist can be seen as dual symptoms of an imbalanced/asymmetric form of progress. — Baden

I would go along with that. But let's not be too pessimistic. Perhaps progress happens by over-correcting imbalances.

Maybe we can have one president or prime minister that is either or - male or female. — Benj96

Well, it's certainly true that we can't ensure that a member of every group - sex/gender, race, class, religion, profession etc. etc. can be in the role of supremo, even if a committee is appointed/elected to take that role. We can't even ensure that every group has proportionate representation in the body of representatives - parliament, council or whatever.

It's essential that everyone learns to take sympathetic account of everyone. I realize that's a big ask and requires consistent educational effort. The good news is that any progress towards that goal is good news.

Excuse me for butting in, but may I ask whether there is a reason why you only recommend scepticism about powerful large entities - not that that's inappropriate. But surely we also ought to be sceptical about individuals as well?

I would suggest that one at least reins in the scepticism about people one loves. Love surely means trust means minimal scepticism. It's about the amount of evidence needed before one switches off the trust and switches on the scepticism.

Certainly, we need sensory input to develop a self. I wonder how much we need it to remain a self. — Patterner

I can't see how we would ever be able to find out. On the other hand, being regarded as a person and, in my opinion, learning to be a person both require the ability to interact with others. So one does not need only the senses, but the entire sensori-motor system.

Would seem rather an awkward case for neural reductionism. — Wayfarer

There doesn't seem to be any major effect on normal life. I'm sure that neural reductionists would be happy to accept that brain function can be preserved even under these circumstances. That's what is so surprising about these cases. The only symptom that could be identified in the case of the person I knew is that they seemed to get a lot of headaches.

Man with Tiny Brain Shocks Doctors — Wayfarer

I'm surprised that the doctors were shocked. I've heard of this phenomenon before. Indeed, I once knew someone who had this condition diagnosed. There were absolutely no evident symptoms of abnormality. The brain is an amazing thing.

the issue of what constitutes the self. — bert1

The answer is that what constitutes my self is me. There's no need to reify the self as some part of me. Indeed the question whether some part of me is my self creates some questions that are very hard to understand. If that part of me were to be damaged or destroyed, who would I be?

It does seem, however that most physical damage does not affect who I am. It is mental damage, such as the various dementias or the phenomena of multiple personalities, that creates the issue. I don't see a clear borderline there. Note, I'm not saying that mental damage doesn't have a physical basis, just that what interferes or prevents the various functions and activities that we classify as mental can lead us to feel that this is not longer the same person or even not a person.

Both of these are important and complicated issues. But daunting. It would be interesting to undertake it, but if I ever do, it will have to be later. But if you want to make a start, I would be happy to discuss progress with you.

I suppose one would have to first do some sort of literature search. I don't suppose much has been written about this, but there might be something.

The only part of you that you cannot lose, and still think of yourself as you (and, for that matter, still think), is your brain. If you could no longer walk and type and wave, and see and hear and taste, you’d still be you. (Though you might wish you were not.) — Patterner

I agree, of course, that If I lose my brain, I cannot think of myself as me. But it would be a very delicate balance to produce exactly the right brain damage to achieve loss of self without immense collateral damage up to and including death.

However, I do think that more than just a brain is needed to maintain a sense of self. It's not quite the same issue, but you did say earlier:-

We certainly need sense-data for our brains to form connections and pathways, and for consciousness to form. (Anybody think an infant born with no ability to sense anything will become a thinking person?) — Patterner

There's a constant temptation to identify this or that feature of human beings to this or that physiological component. Often, that's possible. But not always, and being a person is a case in point - or so it seems to me.

And I don't think it's accurate to say that Hume intended to show that Newton was wrong. I think that his intention was completely different. — Jacques

No, it isn't. I didn't intend to say that. Especially as he admired Newton. Apparently his ambition was to become the Newton of psychology. It's much more likely that he intended to supplement Newton by placing psychology on a firm foundation, just as Newton placed physics on a firm foundation.

Where does he portray reason as infallible? — Fooloso4

He doesn't. I assumed it was an error.

Can't imagine the mind exists independent of the brain. Seems to me the mind is the brain, doing... mind things. — Patterner

It's complicated. My heart pumps blood; I don't. My kidneys filter my blood; I don't. My muscles move my arm, fingers, legs; but I (and not my brain) walk and type and wave. My brain is clearly a key part of seeing and thinking, but I do those things, not my brain.

We can only say that, as far as we know, they have held true without exception up to now, and that we hope they will hold true tomorrow. — Jacques

It's inescapably true that scientific theories can be replaced, and very likely that the ones we know will be replaced. That's progress, so worrying about it seems inappropriate.

But I don't think that it's really accurate to say that Newton showed that Aristotle was wrong or that Einstein showed that Newton was wrong, it was just that Aristotelian physics only works in restricted circumstances. Einstein didn't show that Newton was wrong, just that Newtonian physics doesn't apply near the speed of light. The idea that the earth is flat is just wrong, but the idea that it is a sphere is compatible with Ptolemy (with the earth at the centre of the universe). But the resulting astronomy would be very complicated and inaccurate; Copernicus/Kepler is simpler and more accurate.

Knowing the speech to text and swiping make a lot of errors, I try to proofread. I obviously do not always succeed. — Patterner

It's a common error. I was educated on texts that were derived from manuscripts, which meant that I had to deal with the science of variant readings. It's just part of the way things are.

Can we program consciousness into them, because consciousness is nothing but particles following rules? Why are we not as they are, collections of particles following rules, not noticing, and thinking about, what we're doing? — Patterner

I don't know whether we can program machines to be conscious or not and I don't know why or how we are conscious. Maybe there'll be answers some day. In the mean time we are making a philosophical mistake that was first made by Plato - thinking that the latest scientific development is the answer to everything.

But it's not only the sense-data and physics. — Patterner

It depends whether you mean that it is the addition of some thing (not something) else. I don't think a disembodied mind can exist, although it seems that people can not only imagine such a thing, but believe in it. A physical dimension or substrate is necessary. But a rock doesn't have a mind and is not conscious. It doesn't have the equipment. The equipment required is more than brain. As you say, sense-organs are not optional, although their capacities are variable. The brain is pretty useless unless it is attached to a the spinal column and indeed the entire nervous system. But even that is not enough, I think. It needs a glandular system, which gives us much of our motivation, and a skeleto-muscular system that enables action. But the body is not the mind. I'm not confident to articulate anything beyond that, but I know that I am a person, a human being, a living body and conscious. And I know that I am not four distinct entities. Now I'm rambling because I don't have anything coherent to say.

But I have an impression that we are, after all, on the same page, at least.

I've had Op 127 in my head since your first response to me. Finally listening to it right now. — Patterner

Good choice.

I don't see this. Right from wrong is a judgement made by reason. If reason is fallible so is that judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. I didn't mean to imply it was anything but fallible. So long as we get it right sometimes and can correct our errors when we become aware of them. I'm afraid total security is not available.