If we look at human activities as fallible, such that this is necessary, or essential to all human activities, then we can conclude that reasoning, or "reason" is necessarily fallible, through deductive logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are some complications here, but that is at least close to what I’m trying to say. I think we are already agreed on a similar argument in relation to the senses.

Fortunately, “fallible” means “sometimes wrong”, not “always wrong”. Fortunately, also, the argument relies on the fact that we can tell wrong from right. So between the senses and reason and a suitably critical attitude, we can achieve some knowledge.

I think consciousness is casual. — Patterner

I’m puzzled. I think “casual” here may be a typo. Is that right?

Our consciousness, our awareness, is nothing more than lumps of matter noticing what’s going on. — Patterner

I don't disagree. But there are different kinds of lumps of matter. Some of them are conscious. Others are money. Others are people we love.

I’m still puzzled.

Are numbers, words, logical variables, musical notes, lumps of matter? What about shadows, rainbows, surfaces, colours, boundaries, sub-atomic particles?

Votes, contracts, insults, punches, all involve lumps of matter, but are they lumps of matter?

Pictures are lumps of matter, but are they just lumps of matter like any other?

Card games all involve lumps of matter, but does that mean there is no important difference between them? Banknotes are all lumps of matter, but it doesn't follow they all have the same value.

Let me try an analogy. There used to be a popular philosophical theory – sense-datum theory. This argued that everything that we know, including our concepts, comes from the senses. Many people took this to mean that everything can be reduced to sense-data. Hence, physics can be reduced to sense-data. So what would you say to them?

Love your quartets, btw. — Patterner

I'm glad to hear it. I love them too. I wish I had written them, but glad I don't have to live that tortured life.

I would say that a computer is constructed such that, in a (weakly) emergent sense, the computer behaves as if it were governed by mathematics/software. However, it would be suggesting overdetermination to claim that the behavior of the computer is governed by mathematics as well as physics. (I'm not sure what "governed by mathematics" would mean.) — wonderer1

Well, you're not wrong. My use of "governed" was not satisfactory. But your introduction of "emergent" is part of what I'm trying to say. Emergent properties, in my understanding, do not reduce to, for example, physics. But physics is still what I would call the substrate of them. If the calculations of a computer are to be regarded as reliable, we need to believe that they (non-accidentally) coincide with or represent, or are, mathematics. It's a similar relation to the one that exists when we make the calculation by writing symbols down and moving them around in accordance with certain rules.

I can't speak for what others are thinking when they say that "a computer is performing a calculation", but what I am doing in that case is taking pragmatic advantage of speaking simplistically in terms of the emergent properties a computer was designed to have. — wonderer1

When the machines in a supermarket shout "Unexpected item in the bagging area", are we justified in saying that the machine said something? No, and yes. I interpret the sounds as speech (which they are designed to be) and treat that speech as if someone has said it. But when it sounds like speech and I react to it as speech, why is it wrong to say that something was said?

I'd say physics left to itself produced stars, which produced the elements of which the Earth is composed. Physics occurring on the Earth through evolution produced brains, and brains can reasonably be considered computers. (Though not digital computers.) The operation of brains is still physics and resulted in the production of digital computers. So in a roundabout way physics left to itself did produce digital computers. We just don't tend to think of ourselves as being aspects of "physics left to itself". — wonderer1

Oh, yes, we are indeed star-dust. But not simply star-dust because we can do things that star-dust cannot, like understanding and manipulating physics.

But I'm arguing the fallibility of science in general, because of its reliance on sense data, so this is just circular. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fallibility of science is just a facet of the fallibility of human beings. I'm guessing, but I guess you are taking this line because you want to escape Hume's problem.

I agree with Hume's criticism of induction, as indicated. I just don't agree with how he proceeds from there. That the problem exists is really quite evident, but I think that Hume moves in the wrong direction, toward portraying it as unresolvable rather than toward finding principles to resolve it. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you put your faith in reason because a rational principle would resolve Hume's problem? But reason has two facets. One facet is the theorems and deductions, which give transcendent certainty. Tempting. But the other facet is human beings who try to follow the rules of reason. When things go wrong, we cannot blame the rules which are by definition immune to mistakes and error. So we blame ourselves instead. In other words, reason has success logic. You can trust reason in the abstract sense, but human attempts to apply it are not immune from mistake. When you think you have the rational solution, you may be mistaken. I think of reasoning as a human activity, rather than an abstract structure, so perhaps I have a slightly different perspective from you.

You misunderstand. What goes on in our brain is the physical basis of awareness, so if what goes on in our brains were any different, we would not have awareness. As to the causal effects of awareness, it would be contrary to physical laws if there were none. We just don't know what they are yet.
— Ludwig V
I don't know what you mean here. — Patterner

Neither do I. It's a problem and I don't know the answer. I was responding, not well, to you saying:-

The physical events - which we think of in terms of neurons and brain structures, but which are ultimately reducible to particles movements and interactions - would still take place without our awareness. And our awareness doesn't add anything, because awareness has no causal ability. It's all physics. — Patterner

Let me try again. The physical events in our brain - let's say - cause (or maybe underlie) our awareness, so although they are not dependent on our awareness, they can't take place without our awareness. I can't imagine why you think our awareness has no causal ability.

That's all there is, — Patterner

I don't know what that means.

If something other than physics is producing computers - if something other than physics exists at all - it had to have come about other than by physics. — Patterner

This is not false. But it is simplistic.

You may have noticed what many people have pointed out, that one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. There's no physical difference. So what makes the difference?

It's also a common problem that one person's music is another person's dreadful row. There's no physical difference. So what makes the difference?

Pleasure and pain are sometimes physical phenomena, sometimes not. All pleasure and all pain is produced by physics. So what's the difference between physical pleasure and physical pain? And what the difference between physical pleasure/pain and non-physical pleasure/pain?

Physics is a human construction - a representation, let's call it - of the world. It is the result of human activity. Do we conclude that physics made physics? Or that physics doesn't exist?

Not to say there aren't a lot of unknown details to how consciousness arises, but doesn't information processing seem likely to be the substrate on which consciousness is built? — wonderer1

That's not untrue. But philosophers and other academics tend to forget that the nervous system not only passes information to and fro, but also controls action. Life is about information, but not only about information.

If I understand physical reductionists (and that's an "if", and I guess not all agree with each other), physics' recognition of the things you mention is irrelevant. — Patterner

You are quite right that reduction is a complicated topic. But one thing it clearly means is leaving out what's irrelevant - and that means "irrelevant to physics". I accept that in some sense everything has a substrate in the physical. But that's not as simple as you might think. The obvious case is mathematics, which is the basis of physics. But do we think that physics reduces to mathematics?

What goes on in a computer doing a calculation is, no doubt, entirely governed by physics. But it is also governed by mathematics - that's why we call it a calculation. Of course, humans have organized the computer to ensure that's the case. So the basis of the physical processes in a computer is mathematics and the basis of that situation is that humans have arranged it. Yet the basis of human activity is physics. But physics left to itself does not produce computers.

I'm referring to the idea of a category. Physics explains everything in the category of the physical and nothing in any other category. So most radical reductionists are making a category mistake. The best way I can think of to explain this is by quoting the Wikipedia entry "Category mistakes":-

The term "category-mistake" was introduced by Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind (1949) . . .
The phrase is introduced in the first chapter. The first example is of a visitor to Oxford. The visitor, upon viewing the colleges and library, reportedly inquired "But where is the University?" The visitor's mistake is presuming that a University is part of the category "units of physical infrastructure" rather than that of an "institution". Ryle's second example is of a child witnessing the march-past of a division of soldiers. After having had battalions, batteries, squadrons, etc. pointed out, the child asks when is the division going to appear. "The march-past was not a parade of battalions, batteries, squadrons and a division; it was a parade of the battalions, batteries and squadrons of a division." (Ryle's italics) His third example is of a foreigner being shown a cricket match. After being pointed out batsmen, bowlers and fielders, the foreigner asks: "who is left to contribute the famous element of team-spirit?" He goes on to argue that the Cartesian dualism of mind and body rests on a category mistake.

You said:-

The physical events - which we think of in terms of neurons and brain structures, but which are ultimately reducible to particles movements and interactions - would still take place without our awareness. And our awareness doesn't add anything, because awareness has no causal ability. It's all physics. — Patterner

You misunderstand. What goes on in our brain is the physical basis of awareness, so if what goes on in our brains were any different, we would not have awareness. As to the causal effects of awareness, it would be contrary to physical laws if there were none. We just don't know what they are yet.

We understand how the properties of particles that we are aware of give rise to the macro properties.  Physical properties like liquidity, as well as physical processes like flight. There is no macro property that is not, ultimately, due to properties of the micro, even if we don't think about it that way. — Patterner

That's true. The problem is that physics defines itself in such a way that it cannot recognize anything else. So friendship, love, hatred, tyranny, democracy cannot occur in a theory in physics. One can sometimes "reduce" things to physics, like the aurora borealis or heat. But the beauty of the aurora borealis is not reduced, but eliminated, and there is an argument about whether heat is the motion of molecules or a sensation, which is not something that can be recognized in thermodynamics. That doesn't resolve the problem, but perhaps does something to explain why it exists.

If you do not see that reason is far more reliable than sense, and when the two disagree it is far more reasonable to accept reason over sense, then I think you're right when you say further progress is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

1) If you show me some statistics, I'll consider your hypothesis. 2) The rejection of the irrationality of the square root of 2 by the Pythagoreans was not because of the senses but because of their reason. You will say that they were not rational. So reason guarantees success because failure is labelled as something else. 3) Many people (some theists and some atheists) have believed, and some still do, that belief in God is rational. Many others (including some who believe in God) do not. It certainly is not a matter for the senses. Who's right? 4) The belief that the sun goes round the earth seems to me to be an error in reasoning, not in perception. 5) Reason requires premisses to function at all. Where do they come from? Either they are axioms or they are empirical. 6) Have you never made a mistake in reasoning about something? If so, congratulations. You may be unique.

Seems to miss the point. We don't have to give up either. Reason is pretty useless without the senses, at least to any empiricist. IOW the senses are, for example, the foundation of science: in observations. — Bylaw

I appreciate your support.

Reread my post, I said "when the two disagree". It seems like you misunderstand the nature of science. The senses are not the foundation of science, science is based in hypotheses, theory. Your empiricist theory has misled you, another example of how human beings allow their senses to deceive them. — Metaphysician Undercover

You did indeed. My mistake. However, I thought, as said, that the foundation of science, and the ultimate arbiter of truth, was observation and experiment. Hypotheses and theories are critically important, but when theory and data conflict, it is theory that needs to be changed. I have the (no doubt misleading) impression that a key battle in the establishment of modern science was that principle. Have things really changed that much?

Why do you think that the sun appears to come up and go down, when this has been proven to be false? — Metaphysician Undercover

This illustrates the depth and complexity of our disagreement. The sun does go up and down, from the point of view of the surface of the earth. It could not be otherwise. The cues that normally allow us to know when we are moving are missing, just as they are missing in an aeroplane. Or better, we are not moving in relation to our immediate surroundings, so we interpret everything from that point of view. When we identified the evidence and interpreted it correctly, we changed our belief. The situation of being spun is quite different because we are being spun in relation to our immediate surroundings.

.....moving forward into the realm of what logic dictates, even though this may appear contradictory to sense data, is to fall for that deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Senses and reason are both capable of misleading us and are our only resources for finding the truth. Junking one in favour of the other is incomprehensible to me.

I have a feeling that the conditions are not such as to provide a basis for progress in this debate. Do you?

In reality life is not simple, so all we're doing with this type of notion is facilitating the deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure that I understand what you mean by "this type of notion". But I am sure that the senses do not systematically deceive us. I'm also sure that simplicity is not an option, but a necessity. When someone throws a ball at us, we cannot apply Newtonian mechanics to work out how to catch it. The fact that we can catch it in the time available is amazing; but we can only do it by simplifying. Equally, to do the washing up, we need to know that hot water and detergent will help us to do this; if we had to consider the molecular interactions involved, we would starve before we had clean plates. If we had senses that perceived everything that's going on at the level of electrons, we would be unable to grasp the bigger picture that we need. It's not about deception; it's about pragmatics.

Look, we see the sun as rising and setting, when logic tells us the earth is really spinning. . . . Do you think that living beings are incapable of 'feeling' that the planet they are on is spinning? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a classic example of what I mean. There's a story - I don't know if it's true - that someone observed to Wittgenstein that it is easy to understand why the ancients thought that the sun goes round the earth, because that's the way it looks. To which Wittgenstein replied "How would it look if it looked as if the earth was spinning?" The answer is, exactly the same. There's no deception, just a misinterpretation, based on the assumption that we are not moving. We make that assumption all the time, except when we know we are moving. In this case, there's no easily available perception that would bring it into question, so we interpret our perceptions in that way. Eventually, having paid attention to other perceptions, we work out that the earth is spinning and interpret our perceptions accordingly. Where's the deception?

As to electrons, we are simply not equipped to perceive electrons directly. I'm cautious about pronouncing on the sub-atomic world; I don't understand the physics well enough. I am clear that our senses give us the information they are equipped to gather. By paying attention to our perceptions more closely, we work out that physical objects are very different at small scale. Our perceptions did not deceive us, any more than a normal microscope deceives us when it does not reveal electrons. We misinterpreted them, but now have a better understanding because we paid closer attention to the information they give us.

"Mundane" was perhaps a poor choice. I agree that sometimes the truth is amazing. But I also think that it is sometimes mundane.

There is a fundamental incompatibility between the perception of reality as a persistently changing continuity, and as a succession of separate but contiguous discrete instances. This is an incommensurability which mathematicians have not been able to resolve. Therefore, one of the ways of representing the world must be wrong, either the way of sensation, as a continuity, or the way of logic, as a succession of discrete instances. — Metaphysician Undercover

This goes way beyond my criticism of Hume for his atomistic idea of experiences. Logical atomism is a different issue, and I'm not aware that anyone thinks it is viable. Your conclusion is that:-

So to allow for the possibility that reality is intelligible to us, we must assume that the senses deceive us — Metaphysician Undercover

Your conclusion has a certain paradoxical appeal. I agree that sometimes we draw the wrong conclusions from what our senses tell us (that's a bit over-simplified, but it will do for now); but surely we sometimes get it right. Similarly, reality is partially intelligible to us and partly not, and we work hard to understand the latter part. You seem very fond of comprehensive statements, but the truth is more mundane than that. For example, you say:-

We say things like "this was the situation at time1, and this was the situation at time2. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I say "Don't we also say things like "between t1 and t2 this process was going on?"

I'm not at all sure what you are getting at in this post.

I'm afraid I got confused by your post.

In the beginning, you say:-

Hume described the experience of sensing as a series of static states which may change as time passes. This implies a break, a divide between each state. Then he moves to address the problem of how the mind relates one state to another. The distinct states being what sensation gives us. But i think that in reality, sensation is an experience of continuous activity, which we produce breaks in through withdrawing our attention, either intentionally or unintentionally. — Metaphysician Undercover

But by the end, we have:-

From this perspective we can apprehend the continuity which is given by sensation as manufactured, created by the apparatus which produces the sense experience, and therefore there is the potential that this is not a true representation. Now we would have the proper platform for inquiring into the possibility of true divisions, the true separations in time, which the experience of sensation, as a continuity, hides from us in its deceptive ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with the first quotation, but not with the second and, although I accept that we often get things wrong, I'm not at all sure that it is because our sensations deceive us; it may be that they neither deceive nor reveal. The problem may like in our interpretations.

That's a lot to respond to in your posts. It's an impressive extended argument. I don't pretend this is comprehensive. This is just a series of comments.

If deductively accessible logical laws do cause progression, then seeing the rock break a window IS seeing causation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with the consequent, but I don't understand the antecedent. If the antecedent is false, then the project of understanding the world is hopeless. Or is there an alternative approach?

If the universe follows laws, if it is deterministic (even in a stochastic way), then it seems possible, maybe even plausible given the successes of attempts to identify such laws, to define the root rules by which the present always evolves into the future. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's an ambiguity between "follows" in the sense of "comes after" and "follows" in the sense of "is constrained by". It doesn't make any sense to me to speak of the universe being constrained by natural laws. Natural laws are what the universe does given that it is not constrained. Actually, it is neither constrained, nor not constrained; it just does what it does.

There's a similarly weakness in the idea of causation. There's an idea that a cause somehow forces its effect. But that's a category mistake.

This supports the essentialist picture. If a thing’s identity depends on what it is made of, its microstructure will necessarily determine its disposition to behave in particular ways, i.e. its causal powers.

Unfortunately, although the idea that a thing's identity depends on what it is made of seems plausible, I can't accept essentialism, particularly not the variety that derives from Kripke.

The problem with that argument, for me starts from:-

Identity statements between rigid designators are necessarily true if they are true. Each term independently picks out the same thing in every possible world.

So far as I can see, Kripke's argument proves that for every statement capable of truth or falsity, if it is true, it is necessarily true. But doesn't it follow that any statement that is not true in every possible world, is not necessarily true in every possible world. I find this unhelpful.

Because seeing events follow from one another is somehow not seeing how events follow from one another. But this is true only if you don't accept that events follow from one another in the first place. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's right. The difficulty is to see exactly what "how" means and to understand that asking such a question means rejecting Hume's idea of atomistic idea of experience (which analytic philosophy largely inherited from Hume). That requires understanding Wittgenstein's reasons for abandoning his logical atomism - that is, the colour-exclusion problem and his remark to the effect that a single proposition is never "compared to reality" but a system of propositions. Similarly, we do not experience the world as a succession of atomistic, independent events. We need to pay attention to the idea of a "Gestalt", to understand the part/whole relationship in a more complex way.

Either of these routes then leaves Hume open to all the arguments against radical skepticism, my favorite being from Augustine's "Against the Academics," because they're witty. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't read the Augustine book. I'll make a note of that. Thanks.

Therefore the skeptic wins out in the end, because each such expectation is unique, and therefore must undergo examination through the skeptic's microscope, in a way unique to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid I disagree with both of you. You misunderstand Hume. His position is that scepticism is right if it recommends careful and judicious examination of the facts and judicious decisions based on them, wrong if it is applied excessively. I think that's about right. It's not a case of radical scepticism (Pyrrhonism according to Hume) or nothing.

So we would need to isolate and analyze this specific UP as to its own peculiarities and uniqueness, in order to determine whether your expectations about particular aspects of the future are well grounded. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hume's position is that even though our inferences are not well grounded, we will continue to make them, as a result of what he calls "custom or habit". He then makes a sequence of moves, as I outlined in an earlier post, to arrive at a non-sceptical position that "uniform experience" is proof. One may or may not think that's legitimate; it's certaintly dubious. There is also the problem that experience is not uniform, unless we select among our experiences. Which, as you are indicating, we do, and in the process notice differences as well as similarities.

but only the ones which prove themselves to be useful (and this is itself an inductive method) are accepted into convention. The usefulness is what inspires the "firmly held dogma". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's exactly what Hume says, in the end.

Please tell me what your rationale is for believing that the future will resemble the past. — Jacques

Wittgenstein, as so often, has it right when he says:-

If anyone said that information about the past could not convince him that something would happen in the future, I should not understand him. One might ask him: what do you expect to be told, then? What sort of information do you call a ground for such a belief? … If these are not grounds, then what are grounds?—If you say these are not grounds, then you must surely be able to state what must be the case for us to have the right to say that there are grounds for our assumption….-Wittgenstein

I would only want to add:-

First, it's not just about the future and the past. There is much about the past and the present that we do not know. What we normally do is to expect that what we do not know will resemble what we do know. It's about the known and the unknown.

Second, it's not a simple either/or. It would be quite unreasonable to expect that the future will totally resemble the past and to expect it to be totally different. We actually do is to expect that the future will resemble the past in some respects and to expect that it will be different from the past in other respects. That seems reasonable to me.

But we also have no choice but to continue to use the same language to describe the present, the past and the future. We can and do adapt our language in the light of unexpected events as they occur. What's the alternative?

Does that help?

It is this understanding of "the reason why" the two events are related, which validates the necessity of causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid I do have a problem here. I don't disagree with this, but I don't understand what "validates the necessity" means.

we can say that when the cause occurs, the effect must occur. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's fine, except that I want to ask why "must". What if it doesn't?

If you say "Oxygen is necessary for life (except for anaerobic bacteria)", I understand that if there is no oxygen, most living things die. So I understand that most living things must live in an atmosphere that contains a certain percentage of oxygen.

So, for example, if a temperature of lower than zero Celsius is said to cause water to freeze, then we can say that whenever this temperature occurs, water will freeze necessarily. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not clear what the last word adds to the bald statement "water will freeze."

The best that I can offer is that if the prediction fails, I will not abandon the generalization, but treat it as a problem that demands an explanation that will preserve as much as possible of what I thought I knew. So if a sample doesn't freeze at that expected temperature, I will research until I find an answer - such as that the water contains too much salt to freeze at the normal temperature. Again, having learnt that fire causes burns, when I find burns occurring in the absence of fire, I will research until I realize that it is heat, not fire, that causes burns and amend my causal law accordingly. Admittedly, my belief that when a causal law fails, there must be an explanation, and my treatment of such failures as not just a fact, but a problem, is a matter of faith, (this may not be the right expression, but something along those lines is needed). Strictly speaking, when what we think is a causal law fails, that disproves the law (cf. Popper). But I can postpone abandoning the law until I'm convinced that there is no explanation for the exceptional case. There is no time limit on the postponement, so I am never compelled to abandon it and if my law is useful, I will classify the falsification as an unexplained event and continue to rely on it. Necessity is a matter of the status of "water will freeze", and not a straightforward question of truth or falsity.

Does that make any sense?

The point is not whether our predictions are guaranteed, or one hundred percent certain, but that we can have success in a consistent way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think Hume would agree with you. But he does say something to the effect that we discover from experience that there is a "pre-established harmony" between our predictions and what happens in the world. He doesn't explain himself. I think I see the finger of God there, but I'm speculating. (Hume (in the chapter on miracles) says that he does believe in God, but on faith, not reason, and he says that this faith is a miracle (i.e. caused by God).) If I'm right, this would probably be taken as a guarantee by believers.

Now, we can see that Hume tends to conflate these two types of successful prediction, the one based in statistical analysis, requiring no concept of causation, and the one based in causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say that's exactly right.

We might inquire whether this type of prediction based in simple memory, and developed into an application of mathematics in statistical analysis, is a form of reasoning, or another type of habit or custom. — Metaphysician Undercover

It all turns on the question of justification. Statistics can identify correlations, but cannot justify them. I believe that statisticians do recognize the difference between correlation and causation, but I don't know how they deal with it. Certainly, statistics can't provide what you are asking for.

And I really don't think we can relate two types of events as cause and effect, in the true and necessary way required to produce consistently successful predictions, without some form of reasoning. And this is why it is necessary to understand "the reason" why they are related as cause and effect, in order that the relationship proposed be the true and necessary relation required for consistently successful predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would agree that there is a valid question why correlations hold, when they do. Much science provides answers, in the form of explanations, which are defined (in philosophy) as deductive-nomological arguments. (That is, a syllogism that deduces the phenomenon to be explained from a law, or generalization) I don't find that particularly helpful, and it walks straight back into the arms of the argument against induction. I prefer to think of theories as mechanisms, showing how the effect is produced. In any case, theories put a given correlation into a larger context and so get round Hume's atomistic approach - taking each correlation on its own.

I have to say that I don't understand what necessity means here. I assume you don't mean the "true in all possible worlds" kind of necessity. That would be ambitious for an explanation of empirical phenomena.

He needs to explain what other types of mental customs we have, which are other than reasoning, and how those other customs might result in successful predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not trying to defend Hume, just to understand him. All we've got is what he wrote and I don't think those texts have the answers to your challenges, except that I don't think he ever claims that there is any guarantee that our predictions are always successful. That would be inconsistent.

Look at it this way. He argues 1) that all our ideas are drawn from experience 2) that experience provides no justification for making predictions based on past experience and 3) that we are going to go on doing just that. He also says that we have found this practice useful. Whether this counts as a justification or merely a cause is debateable.

So far, I don't think that's inconsistent. What is odd is that he changes the definition of "proof" (in a footnote, perhaps thinking that no-one will notice) and then ends up saying that "uniform experience amounts to a proof" - which, to be fair, is not quite the same as saying that it is a proof. The only defence I can think of for this move is a Wittgensteinian move along the lines "This is what we call proof in this context."

Does that make sense?

I think this is interesting as a response to scepticism that does not attempt to refute it.

Hume's statement that "uniform experience" provides a proof which leads no room for doubt is very unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. One of my points was precisely that he ends up ignoring the sceptical argument that he has so vigorously defended. However, his actual policy is to ignore it. He says, for example, that scepticism cannot be refuted and recommends a return to normal life and everyday occupations as a cure for it.

Hume response to scepticism is what I would call robust. (I think he would have liked Dr. Johnson's response, but he doesn't mention it.) Moore and Wittgenstein are similarly robust as well.

But, it is through the use of memory, comparison, and inductive reasoning that we identify consistency through distinct events, to conclude uniformity. — Metaphysician Undercover

You outline a standard account. But I don't accept that it is Hume's. But he is very clear a) that he accepts the sceptical argument (on the grounds that our experience provides no basis for rejecting it) and b) that we make our predictions because of association of ideas and custom or habit. He is careful to say that our understanding plays no part in this, which I think means that no process of reasoning is involved. I think his account is best classified as a causal one.

However, I have to admit that interpreting what he says is not straightforward because he never uses the word "induction". (I think it was introduced by J.S. Mill long after Hume wrote.)

We just naturally assume that things will be the same, rather than having derived this idea from experience and inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry if this is a bit off-topic and I promise not to pursue it. What you say is true. But I can't resist pointing out that Hume makes a lot more of his similar point.

In Enquiry V, he repeats again that there is "no secret power or process of reasoning that leads us to expects similar results" from similar initial conditions and then points out that we are still "determined" to draw the same conclusion, even though we are "....convinced that .. understanding has no part in the operation". He concludes that "There is some other principle which determines (sc. us) to form such a conclusion. This principle is Custom or Habit." Then he says "By employing that word, ..... we only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects". So it is essentially a causal explanation of why we continue in the same way despite the sceptical arguments.

So far, so good. But he goes further in footnote 1 to Enquiry VI.

"Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition"

And then in X.1."... it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life ; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; … Enquiry X. 1

So Hume really ought to be classified with G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein in as an opponent of sceptical conclusions.

I didn't mean to be too dismissive because I hadn't read the article carefully enough to be sure. I was very surprised that the homunculus turned up. It's such a cliché.

It's quite simple, really. We think of the box on the wall that contains a thermometer and a switch and think that controls the heat. Which it does, in a way. But when you take the box apart, you find, to your dismay, that no part of the box controls the heat. It's the system that controls the heat, not any part of it.

A different kind of example is in the orbit of the planets, etc around the sun. No part of the system that produces that effect is in control of it. It is the balanced system as a whole that keeps the planets in line.

Easy problems can be quite elaborate and even proven accurate, but still don’t actually touch upon the hard problem itself. — schopenhauer1

I haven't worked out my approach to the problem. It's on my list of chestnuts that I would like to get my head around one day. But I would start by making sure that the problem isn't in the way it is formulated. My suspicion is that it is not capable of solution and merely demonstrates that Wittgenstein was right about subjective experiences (which is what, I think, "qualia" are supposed to be). I will concede, however, that his response to the expostulation that there is a difference between you experiencing a pain and me experiencing the same pain. He asks what greater difference there could be. I don't think that's enough.

I apologize if I seem dismissive. I don't mean to be. People who deserve respect take the hard problem very seriously.

Very interesting.

The idea that feedback loops are critical to understanding what goes on seems absolutely right to me. Certainly they make all the difference between a reflex and an action, and seem to explain the phenomenon of blind sight.

But any theory that requires positing a "mental representation" which implies an internal observer (visible in the diagrams of the brain after the paragraph beginning "The key to acquiring phenomenal properties..."} is postponing the hard problem and for that reason seems implausible to me.

I'll have to read this more carefully.

Language is very complicated indeed. But if philosophers don't pay close attention to complexities, they will develop distorted and partial views. But paying attention to complexities usually makes it more difficult to get a debate that can be decided for or against on each side. There's a very fine line between clarity and misrepresentation.

There are two approaches to language. One treats it as a definite structure; the other treats it as a complex activity. I prefer the latter.

I'm not tempted by scepticism. But I am puzzled and fascinated by the enduring appeal of sceptical views, and the confidence of sceptics in their approach. The odd thing about it is that philosophers who try to respond to scepticism and dismiss it are often remembered as sceptics. Descartes, Berkeley and Hume are all examples. Cavell was right to think that refuting it is not enough and that we need to try to understand it as a phenomenon.

I think some skepticism is just incredulity which is more of an attitude or emotion than reason. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, and I find myself in the grip of incredulity when confronting some sceptical writing. The complication is that incredulity and, indeed, attitudes and emotions may well be irrational, but can have a rational basis. My idea (starting from Cavell) is that we would benefit from a deeper, less dismissive examination of scepticism on the basis that it is more like an attitude or emotion than a hypothesis that is true or false.

I think language allows us to talk about things that may not exist but are based on things that already exist. It seems impossible to talk about things that have no basis in preexisting structures. — Andrew4Handel

The peculiar magic of language is that it allows us to talk (and think) about things that do not exist and even things that exist but are absent or things that cannot be perceived at all. But to talk about them, we need to start where we are. That's not a limitation because there's no alternative.

It goes something like this, I can imagine I am being deceived by my senses that there is a real world out there but what it could be is [insert what you can imagine] like a dream, brain-in-vat, simulation, etc. Then the philosopher goes on to say because this is possible will have no reason to believe we know anything. Radical skepticism is born. — Richard B

I agree with this. You are right that we are far too casual about what it means to imagine something. These situations are never articulated fully and I'm not at all sure that they can be. I don't think either of them is remotely possible unless the real world is pretty much like the one we know and love.

Those cases might persuade me that the "world out there" might be very different from what I experience. But then, I know that already - the physicists remind me of it every time I hear about their work. No brain in a vat or simulation hypothesis could be more unimaginable that the world as seen by relativity or quantum physics. Developing a philosophical understanding of that situation would be more useful than speculating about brains.

Then there is the second move from imagine to possible, neglecting the possibility the we might be capable of imagining impossibilities. (The logic of that is a bit complicated, but still.) The third move is to confuse possibilities with actualities, neglecting the fact that many possibilities are not actual.

There's an issue of human psychology here. Once one focuses on the real possibility that a meteorite might fall on my head or my house at any moment, a feeling of insecurity can develop. Most people, I suppose, reflect that there is nothing I can do about that, and if it happens, I may be dead; if I am not, I'll have to cope with it. Then, after a while, they get bored with that thought and forget it. After all, it hasn't happened yet; I am certain of that.

There is an issue it seems however concerning how we describe our experiences without language. It seems we need language to catalogue our experiences. It depends on what kind of knowledge we want and what we want to do with it. — Andrew4Handel

It is too easy to imagine possibilities that aren't possible and the possibility that language is not meaningful, in my book, is among them. Which is not to deny that misunderstandings are not uncommon. What matters is that we have many ways of dealing with them - when they make a significant difference.

We need language to describe what we experience and there are many things that we can't know without language. But we don't need language to know some things. Animals that don't have language show what they know by their behaviour. The difficulty is to express accurately what they know.

Not all beliefs are reasons for doing something. That pretty much sums it up... broadly speaking. — creativesoul

I didn't mean to imply that everyone will necessarily act on every belief they hold. I meant only that a belief is available to the believer to act on as and when they find it appropriate to do so.

One of the actions stemming from a belief may be expressing it in words, which is not doing anything in one sense, but is doing something for my purposes here.

Though doing nothing can be an action. If I know that there's a bomb under your car, doing nothing would count as an action.

I have forgotten most of what we said. So I'm looking forward to seeing what you dig up.

In this sense I think quite a lot of philosophy might be based on false doubt. — Andrew4Handel

I agree, except that I pretty sure that the "might" is definitely over-cautious. But that thesis needs more detail, which I can't at the moment provide.

language transmits facts and not that all language is up for interpretation. — Andrew4Handel

I'm not sure what you mean by "not up for interpretation". Do you mean something like "has a clear and definite meaning"? My qualification would be that that applies in specific contexts and usually between people who have a relationship within that context. I don't think it is possible to construct a meaningful sentence that cannot be interpreted in different ways in different contexts.

In this sense we know words successfully transmit accurate, veridical meaning that we successfully use to negotiate the world. We tend to understand most of what people tell us unless it contains technical jargon. — Andrew4Handel

There's nothing wrong with what you say, so far as it goes. But language has other important uses, admittedly always in communication, but still...

There is quite a list, but consider the importance of communicating and negotiating values - which, after all, are the basis of action, and co-operative action is at the heart of being a social creature. Speaking of which, establishing friendship - even love - and trust is just as important, though that may be done indirectly rather than in the way we communicate facts. And so on.

But, If I am receiving that data from someone, there can be a lot of subjectivity and connotation bias. I mean, the words do exist themselves, yes. Yet, we can make a twisted use of them and lie to others. So, I see the opposite of your point: we have to believe others to make decisions and keep up the communication. — javi2541997

I agree that it is almost impossible (and the "almost" is probably wrong) to communicate facts and nothing else. Neutral data is very rare. I do agree that trust is a very important factor in living a social life - that's why we tend to believe others unless there is a reason not to. Which is why it is so easy to deceive people.

I think I'm trying to say that language is not just for communicating data, but is critical to nearly everything about the way we live, because we are social animals. That brings a weakness, that it is possible to deceive us. But, in my book at least, that doesn't justify radical scepticism.

I've also been inactive for a while. but you certainly had a better reason for being inactive than me. My reason was that I got fed up with some of the downsides to this game and switched to off-line activities, such as reading a book. It's quite simple, really. What keeps me going is an interesting conversation:-

So, while I agree with saying that beliefs are reasons for doing something (Witt sets this out nicely in a manner that you've continued here), I do not think that beliefs are equivalent to reasons for doing something, and you've said much the same thing a few replies ago. — creativesoul

I don't understand the difference between the first sentence in the quotation and the second. What does "equivalent to" mean in this context?

Maybe the shame and guilt come from our expectation of our self. — TheMadMan

That's perfectly true. As jgill says:-

Perfection is a distant and cruel god. — jgill

Im not sure how one can give a moral judgment to the mistake/error. I think that the moral judgement falls to what could cause the mistake/error i.e negligence, pride, anger etc. — TheMadMan

Maybe that's so.

It may be contradiction of terms but its a reality. Maybe "innocent mistake" would be a better term for what I mean. — TheMadMan

It would certainly help.

But I think we are agreed that people often feel guilt and shame about mistakes and errors or whatever we call them when they are not at fault. And it can be difficult to deal with. But perhaps this isn't a problem that philosophy can deal with effectively.

As the diagnostician, empirical-situational and implementable in some way. Instrumental knowledge. — Pantagruel

OK. I see.

As a proposition, the sentence does not convey that I am convinced of anything. As a statement, one could argue that the omission hints at a lack of personal conviction. However, any such argument would be based on subjective experience; i.e. how a person subjectively reads into the omission of details. Personally, I would disagree, but as said, this is subjective. — Ø implies everything

I agree that the sentence/proposition/statement "S believes that p" on its own does not convey that you are convinced of anything. But If you have decided that S has sufficient justification, you convey that p is true. By conveying that, you convey that you know that p. That's the point. One can say something false by omission, as well as by assertion.

Part of what I was trying to say is that mistake and error are different. I'm not sure that I was right to say that lacking relevant information is an error. But I couldn't think of the right word.

Another part of what I was trying to say is that it is appropriate for people to feel regret about something wrong or problematic or lacking when it isn't their fault. But faultless mistake or error is a contradiction in terms and that people do quite often feel guilt and shame about things that are not their fault. I think that life is hard enough without taking responsibility for things we are not responsible for.

You can know all that is possible for you to make predictions and still make a mistake because there are many forces outside your knowledge that could play a role in your mistake. — TheMadMan

I'm not sure that getting something wrong because the information you have is lacking is exactly a mistake, though it is certainly an error. Either way, guilt and shame are only appropriate if one was reckless in not ensuring one had all the information or careless in not properly interpreting it.

Sometimes people feel guilt and shame when it clearly wasn't their fault. That is inappropriate guilt and shame, though it can be hard to shake off. Often people think up things they might have done and didn't do. But they did do everything they could, and that's all that can be expected of them. But those feelings are often part of regret.

If we change it to He is sufficiently justified in believing that p, then it does convey that I have proof that he has proof. That then also conveys that p is true. Thus, the truth criterion is, in cases of sufficient justification, redundant. — Ø implies everything

"He is sufficiently justified in believing that p" conveys that you believe he has sufficient proof and that you are not convinced that p is true, which suggests that you think that he does not have sufficient proof. So it is self-contradictory. If you really believe that he has sufficient proof, then you will say that he knows that p.

Again, if I say that you believe he has sufficient proof, I am suggesting that the proof is not sufficient. If I believe that his proof is sufficient, I will say you know that he had sufficient proof. It all depends a) on who is speaking and b) whether p is true (and sometimes p = "the proof is sufficient.")

Is there even one standard for "sufficient justification"? — Pantagruel

No, I don't think there is. What counts as proof and what counts as sufficient proof depends on the context - i.e. what kind of proposition you are talking about.

It is also true that there may be an element of what is called judgement that enables people who have the skill and talent to leap over lack of strict deductively complete proof. The proof of the pudding, of course, is in the eating. It is not impossible to spend years making judgements and getting them wrong. So the record of a diagnostician is critical to assessing whether they have good judgement or not.

I'm not clear what you mean by substantive-performative knowledge.

No, I don't think you get what I mean. 1) You are interested in propositions. I do not know what they are. I am interested in statements. I couldn't give a formal definition of those, but they do include the idea of speech-acts as an important part of understanding "he knows that p". 2) you are interested in truth and falsity and "informational content". I am also interested in what a speech-act does or conveys.

"He is justified in believing that p" does not convey that I have proof that he has a proof. It does not convey that p is true, only that it might be true. It conveys that I have evaluated his justification and believe (but do not know) that his justification is, indeed, a justification, but not necessarily a sufficient justification. "He is justified in believing that p and p is true" nearly conveys that he knows that p, but, by using "believe" rather than "know" I do not commit to his justification being sufficient.

When one witness says that p, one has evidence. When two witnesses independently say that p, one has more (stronger) evidence. And so on. When the police turn up and provide forensic evidence, the game changes and the evidence gets yet stronger. My endorsement of our subject's claim adds to the evidence (provided that it is independent), even though it does not necessarily change the truth value of p or its informational content; it gives reason for the jury to trust the evidence.

No apology necessary. Everyone has an off-line life to live.

So, you are saying that the truth criterion of the JTB definition is evaluated from the standpoint of the speaker, regardless of the subject of knowledge? That is, if I say that someone else than me knows something, then the truth criterion applies to the proposition that I am stating? — Ø implies everything

The answer to the first question is Yes. The answer to the second question is No. The truth criterion applies to the proposition known - to the "that.." clause.

You say: -

He knows p = He is justified in believing p and this proposition is true/known by me — Ø implies everything

I say: - He knows that p = He is justified in believing that p and p is true.

There are two issues in what you say after that.

First, you assume that "justify" means "conclusively justify". That's not obvious and not universally accepted. I waver somewhat on this.

Second, you are assuming that there is only one proof for each proposition. That's not the case. The justification (whether conclusive or not) available to the S (the person who knows or doesn't) may not be the same as the truth-conditions available to the speaker. In any case, in practice endorsement by the speaker provides additional reassurance to the audience. Even if the S's justification and the truth-conditions available to the speaker are the same, endorsement by the speaker strengthens the testimony. "Believes" can never do this.

I've never understood why the mere fact of being created by God confers any meaning on this universe, whether It created it or not.

There's another issue that is raised by the second question in the post:-

Then what do our experiences mean? We all have one fleeting moment after another and then we simply die. — jasonm

The implication is that meaning must be enduring - preferably life-long if not permanent. I don't buy this. There are some things in my life that I would call meaningful and have endured. There are other things that haven't. But that doesn't make them meaningless. I'm glad they happened, I shall treasure them as long as I have a memory. Moments that people treasure are part of life. That they are moments does not detract from their meaningfulness.

At least, that's true by my understanding of meaningfulness. In a sentence, something is meaningful if it is intrinsically valuable. That is, I don't feel any need to find any further justification for it. The arts provide many examples, but so do the sciences and even philosophy; one can find other examples everywhere in life. There's no problem with finding it, if one is looking for it - but not too hard because that spoils the effect. Asking whether something is meaningful is a good way of wrecking it as well.

I'm sorry to be picky. I do, of course, agree that the new-born should be protected. But what's the point of protecting them for the first year or two and then abandoning them to their fate. To be sure, as they grow up, one can expect them to be more independent and they will demand that. But appropriate support should be provided until they are.

Which suggests to me that in some cases, some support may be needed for a long time or even for life. But enabling people to function as independently as possible is probably cheaper, as well as more humane, than clearing up the disasters that result from not supporting them.

You do say "at least". You are right to do so. I'm just reinforcing that.

If you agree that for non-skeptical accounts of truth, truth is a redundant criterion of knowledge in the first person case, then you also agree that it is redundant for the nth person case. — Ø implies everything

We obviously misunderstand each other. This is starts from the grammatical structure of verbs. There are only three persons in the singular and three in plural forms of any verb, including "know". "I know that p", "You know that p" and "He/She knows that p". The plural forms are "We", "You" and "They", but we don't need to consider those for present purposes.

We need to consider three roles in speech situations - the subject, that is, the person who knows, or doesn't, the speaker, who asserts that the subject knows and the audience, who are being addressed by the speaker (or at least are within earshot).

In the case of "I know that p", since the speaker and the subject are the same person, the truth clause is redundant (with some potential qualifications).
In the case of "You know that p", the audience and the subject are the same person. The truth condition is not redundant, but conveys the information that the speaker endorses the subject's belief that p.
In the case of "She/he knows that p", speaker, subject and audience are all distinct from each other. The truth condition is not redundant.

Now, as for my definition of belief as emotional and knowledge as justified belief; what else do you propose? — Ø implies everything

I propose to continue to use both terms with the meaning attributed to them by any good dictionary.

First, some options are imagined. — Dfpolis

Could you clarify whether this is an action and, if so, a rational action?

Far greater wounds are suffered in battle and may pass unnoticed because attention is not focused on one's body, but on something else. — Dfpolis

I would agree. But I would not believe that I chose to focus my attention elsewhere.

Doubts can only affect our commitment to the truth of what we continue to know. — Dfpolis

How does doubt affect our commitment to the truth of what we know if it does not undermine it.?

Will is a power that allows us to value and so choose. — Dfpolis

We have the power to value and to choose. Why do you posit anything over and above those powers?

Still, given multiple conceptual possibilities (lines of action), one needs to be actualized. That actualization is a specific kind of intentional act. — Dfpolis

Could you please explain how that the requirement of a specific kind of intentional act before any action doesn't give rise to an infinite regress?

Because objects act on the senses to inform the nervous system, thereby presenting themselves for possible attention. When we choose to attend (focus awareness on) to them, we actualize their intelligibility, knowing them. — Dfpolis

I've no doubt that there is a causal chain from what is called the external world to our brains. I agree that sometimes we choose to attend to things. But I also think that sometimes we do not. When I burn my fingers on a hot stove, I do not choose to attend to the pain.

Doubts question his commitment to the truth of what he continues to know and believe. — Dfpolis

Ah, so knowledge does also require commitment. Thank you for clearing that up.

Since both knowledge and belief require commitment, how is it possible to continue to know or believe things that one is not committed to? Do you really mean to say that one knows something that one doubts?

I am calling this power (which is not a thing) "will." — Dfpolis

I'm sorry if I led you to believe that I thought that "will" is a thing (object/state?). But my criticism was not about that. Your belief that all actions of whatever kind stem from a single power is a distortion through over-simplification. Your description of how we need to balance our values shows that there are different kinds of action which stem from different needs and wants and desires - and habits and customs.

My preferred language is to call the neural modification induced by the action of the object on our senses a "presentation." — Dfpolis

I find it hard to see why you want to call something a presentation when it is never presented to anyone or anything.

He knew he was in his chamber, writing, but chose to believe he might not be. — Dfpolis

If Descartes thought he might not be in his chamber writing, one might have expected him to be rather alarmed and to stop writing while he worked where he was and what he was doing. But he never stops believing that he is in his chamber writing.

Thus, if you know that John knows P, you also know P, because if P were false, then John does not know P, which means you do not know that John knows P, which contradicts the premise. — Ø implies everything

But if I know that John knows that p, I do know that p is true. If p had been false, I wouldn't have known
that John knows that p. What's the problem?

Going from JTB to JB does not make knowledge into belief, by definition of JB as "justified belief", in which a belief is merely an emotional conviction, whereas "justified" (not "justifiable") is an emotional conviction that the belief is correctly supported. — Ø implies everything

Then either you are changing the definition of belief. The differential of belief and knowledge is normally thought to be that a belief is still a belief even if it is false. This is perfectly compatible with some beliefs being justified and some not. Emotion does not justify a belief unless the emotion is justified. If that is the case, the justification of the emotion also justifies the belief. You are also changing the definition of knowledge, by allowing that it might be false and still be knowledge. Your argument about John presupposes that if p is false, p is merely believed, not known.

There are theists who exemplify the state of feeling that one's conviction is true, yet simultaneously not feeling that it is justified. That is, these theist have, in their own eyes and others', unjustified beliefs. — Ø implies everything

I think you misunderstand "God exists". It is what is called a hinge proposition, like an axiom. Everything is interpreted in the light of this. Justification starts from that, and it would be inappropriate to try to justify it.