….the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought.
— Mark S

To be moral belongs to the agent in possession of the means for being so. It follows that “what makes it moral” is not quite the correct iteration, when it is much closer to the case that it should be, “what makes me moral?”. — Mww

]
The word "it" is too vague, though I have often heard the question phrased this way. "What makes the behavior or moral principle moral?" would be more precise. I see "What makes me moral?" is a different question.

I resist using Kant's vocabulary because it comes with too much baggage. All it takes is mentioning "categorical imperative," and people erroneously leap to the idea that the topic is Kantianism or deontology.

Focusing on the strategies rather than the ends (which have long been unclear). So essentially, in getting the 'how' right, you believe you can ensure a consistent and progressive morality. — Tom Storm

Right.

Tom,
While perhaps interesting to us, we have gone off-topic for schopenhauer1's thread Ad Populum Indicator of a Moral Intuition. Let's belay this conversation here. I'll consider the questions you have asked and create a fresh thread to address them.

There are imperatives. Imperatives are of two kinds, hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative carries the weight of an “ought” and is conditioned by desire, a categorical carries the weight of a “shall” and is conditioned by moral law, desire be what it may.

There is no Kantian categorically imperative “ought”, and traditional moral philosophy other than deontology treats conditional oughts as hypothetical imperatives, while deontologically grounded moral philosophy merely grants conditional oughts, but assigns no proper moral quality to them.

Your wording is confusing I think. — Mww

This agrees with the Encyclopedia Britannica “a hypothetical imperative, in the ethics of the 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, a rule of conduct that is understood to apply to an individual only if he or she desires a certain end and has chosen (willed) to act on that desire. Hypothetical imperatives are contrasted with “categorical” imperatives, which are rules of conduct that, by their form— “Do (or do not do) Y”—are understood to apply to all individuals, no matter what their desires.”

I have been thinking of the two concepts as

Conditional oughts (instrumental oughts) “If you desire x, then you ought to do Y” = (or close to) Kant’s hypothetical imperatives and

Imperative oughts (what everyone ought to do regardless of needs and preferences) = (or close to) Kant’s categorical imperatives

I do not want to rely on Kant’s ethics for definitions, but rather to take a broader view of how moral oughts and moral bindingness are commonly used in moral philosophy. For example, the kind of ought, or bindingness, implied by the question “But what makes it moral?” can be much clarified by specifying if a conditional ought or an imperative ought is sought.

If I use the term imperative ought in the future, I will include what it refers to and point out its similarity to Kant’s categorical imperative. Thanks for pointing out the possible source of confusion.

traffic rules can be explained in terms of cooperation strategies, yet they are not commonly understood as moral rules. So something more specific about morality seems to be left out in your functional analysis. — neomac

Traffic rules are laws; as you suggest, rule of law is an invention to solve cooperation problems. But laws coincide with what is moral only to the extent they are cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma – how to sustainably obtain the benefits of cooperation without exploitation limiting future benefits.

I claim that the function of human morality is solving the cooperation/exploitation dilemma. I have not said that all cooperation strategies, such as laws, are necessarily moral.

If that's true, then how come that societies in the past and present do not have the same cultural moral norms? As I said there are also cultural clashes because societies do not share the same moral cultural norms, so maybe there are limits to the possibility of cooperation which morality must account for. But if cooperation is not possible, then what's left to do with societies with non-shared cultural moral norms? Exploitation? — neomac

Cultural moral norms are diverse, contradictory, and strange mainly because of 1) different definitions of who is in favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups and 2) different markers of membership in those ingroups and outgroups.

Understanding the origins of these differences provides an objective basis for groups to resolve them. Groups may not always be able to resolve their differences (different goals for moral behavior may be intractable), but at least they can focus on the right issues.

... so it seems you are suggesting that there are cultural moral norms which might fail to meet the function you are attributing to them. And failing to meet a certain function may also mean that there is no such intrinsic function, the function is an external criterion. — neomac

Cultural moral norms, such as versions of the Golden Rule, are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible) rules of thumb for parts of cooperation strategies. Their failure to solve cooperation problems in times of war, when dealing with criminals, and when tastes differ is due to them being heuristics, not due to their function being misunderstood.

To me the most interesting aspect of morality is whether anyone can demonstrate objective goals. — Tom Storm

Moral philosophy has focused largely on goals. Given the lack of progress in convincingly defining an objective goal for moral behavior, we must face the possibility of no such goal existing. I am not concerned about this.

Choosing as a moral reference the function of human morality - moral 'means' as cooperation strategies that solve the cooperation/exploitation dilemma - gives us two constraints on moral behavior:

• Acting morally requires acting consistently with cooperation strategies
• The goals of morality cannot be achieved by exploitation

Then people are otherwise free to set whatever goal for moral behavior they can agree on. That looks like a pretty good moral system even if no objective goal of that moral system (aside from the constraint about no exploitation) is ever found.

Sorry Mark, I still haven't followed how we locate or arrive at corporation strategies that do not exploit others. Surely there are many potential cooperation strategies that can or do exploit others? — Tom Storm

Tom,

Right, too often ingroups have cooperated to exploit outgroups.

What if I described the function of human morality as solving a cooperation/exploitation dilemma that is innate to our universe? Would this help clarify that exploitation is opposite the function of human morality and therefore objectively immoral if we choose the function of human morality as a moral reference? (Here, “human morality” refers to cultural moral norms and our moral sense and “function” refers to the principle reason human morality exists.)

As I said above to neomac,

Adapted from an old essay of mine about why this dilemma is innate to our universe:

“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.
All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal cooperation/exploitation dilemma. This includes our ancestors.”

Which is the more revealing description of the function of human morality?

• “Human morality solves cooperation problems” (what I have been typically using) or
• “Human morality solves the cooperation/exploitation dilemma”

But couldn't enslaving 20% of the planet produce 1) the greatest happiness for most amount and minimize total suffering along with maximizing happiness? Such an approach could even be well considered. — Tom Storm

You point out the biggest flaw in simple Utilitarianism, that it does not prohibit immoral means of achieving that end. Utilitarianism's end, the goal, is moral by well-considered intuitions. Simple Utilitarianism is unfortunately silent on the morality of the 'means' to achieve this goal. Morality as Cooperation Strategies can come to Utilitarianism's rescue by limiting moral means to cooperation strategies that do not exploit others. This eliminates at least most traditional objections to Utilitarianism.

I'd also argue that Morality as Cooperation Strategies is also moral by well-considered moral intuitions. This would be true if, as I argue, our moral intuitions were shaped by morality as cooperation strategies.

Cooperation being a stepping stone to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself.
— Tom Storm
:up: — 180 Proof

180 Proof and Tom,
I'd phrase it as "Cooperation being a 'means' to a goal (wellbeing or flourishing), not the goal itself", but that is essentially the same.

What I am arguing is the mind-independent core of morality is its 'means' - cooperation strategies. The objectively moral goals (end) of moral behavior require other arguments that I am not prepared to make.

People I respect say there are such arguments for objectively moral goals for moral behavior. My interest is not in arguing against the objectivity of moral goals, but rather to point out the direct utility of understanding what moral 'means' are, independent of what people are cooperating to do.

Also, when morality as cooperation is teamed with an objective goal, coherence seems to be increased. For example, most of simple Utilitarianism's "problems" vanish if the moral means of accomplishing that goal is limited to cooperation strategies that do not exploit others.

I have not yet worked through the implications of accomplishing Negative-Utilitarianism's goals only by cooperation strategies that do not exploit others, but I expect those means and ends to be complimentary and reinforcing.

Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail.
— Mark S

How do you know that? — neomac

Because it is empirically true.

From a bottom-up perspective, all past and present cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment) can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies.

From a top-down perspective, we can understand that cooperation problems in our universe must be solved by all beings that form sustainably cooperative societies. Further, game theory shows that for these strategies for intelligent, independent agents to be successful, violators must be punished. Hence, just as predicted, cultural moral norms exist and can be identified as norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment.

Proposed counterexamples of moral norms that are not parts of cooperation strategies are always welcome.

“X is a moral intuition because most people believe X. — schopenhauer1

Aren’t moral intuitions simply our intuitions about what is moral? Moral intuitions are personal; their existence does not depend on what other people believe. And moral intuitions are as diverse and contradictory as the cultural moral norms that shape them. So no, “X is a moral intuition because most people believe X” is false.

It seems clear that popularity doesn't make a moral choice right. — Tom Storm

That is correct of course.

But how can we judge moral systems (such as philosophical moral systems) other than by their coherence and our moral intuitions about the premises and the conclusions?

How about “well-considered moral intuitions” as a moral reference for judging moral premises or conclusions?

Well-considered moral intuitions are coherent with intuitions from all perspectives. Given the diversity and contradictions of cultural moral norms and the diversity of perspectives we can individually take on an action, finding such moral intuitions is not easy.

Past candidates for such well-considered moral intuitions include the ideas that the most ethical choice is the one that will:

• produce the greatest good (or happiness) for the greatest number – Utilitarianism or
• minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or minimize suffering and, secondarily, maximize the total happiness. - Negative-Utilitarianism

Different people will claim different intuitions are coherent with either their own or everyone’s perspectives.

Thanks for the non-snarky reply.

Heuristics

Heuristics are usually reliable, but fallible, rules of thumb for doing something based on practical experience, not theory.

Cultural moral norms existed before moral theories. Moral norms exist because they have been selected for based on experience, specifically their ability to 1) produce the benefits of cooperation and 2) harmony with our moral sentiments (which, in turn, are heuristics for cooperation strategies encoded in our genes).

For example, versions of the Golden Rule advocate initiating indirect reciprocity, perhaps the most powerful known cooperation strategy. Versions of the Golden Rule are heuristics for initiating reciprocity. They are not moral absolutes. They are common around the world because they are highly effective at sustainably attaining the benefits of cooperation.

The ultimate source of cooperation problems

From an old essay of mine:

“In our universe, cooperation can produce many more benefits than individual effort. But cooperation exposes one to exploitation. Unfortunately, exploitation is almost always a winning short-term strategy, and sometimes is in the long term. This is bad news because exploitation discourages future cooperation, destroys those potential benefits, and eventually, everybody loses.

All life forms in the universe, from the beginning to the end of time, face this universal dilemma. This includes people and our ancestors.”

Human morality is our flawed set of heuristics for solving this cooperation/exploitation dilemma. This cooperation/exploitation problem is independent of culture or biology. The cooperation problems of a particular culture or biology do not change the primary function of their moral systems, just the implementation details.

The opposite of cooperation is exploitation, not competition. Competition is common between cooperative groups and, for individuals, within cooperative groups.

A moral norm against cheating in competition is fully in the domain of morality as cooperation strategies. There is nothing inherently immoral in competition.

Descriptive or Normative?

Knowing the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems enables us to predict when those moral norms will fail. We ought (conditional) not follow the Golden Rule when “tastes differ” and in certain times of war and when dealing with criminals in order to not decrease the benefits of cooperation.

And we perhaps ought not (conditional) follow marker moral norms such as eating shrimp and masturbation are abominations once we understand their arbitrariness as markers of membership and commitment to ingroups. And understanding “women must be submissive to men” and “homosexuality is immoral” are norms about cooperating to exploit outgroups gives us reasons we ought not (conditional) follow them in order to achieve the goal of moral coherence.

Look! Still no normative claims. We only have conditional oughts, which, as the OP suggests, appears sufficient for a culture and even mind-independent moral system.

Enter Bernard Gert’s claim from the SEP: “’Morality’ can be used…normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions (such as being well-informed), would be put forward by all rational people.”

In hindsight, normativity was a stinking red herring complexity I should have left out of the discussion in this forum.

I can make my case for the cultural utility of Morality as Cooperation Strategies based purely on conditional oughts – no spooky imperative oughts or even the normative power of agreement among rational people required.

• I'm not sure I endorse this thinking for reasons others have written, but best of luck hashing something out. I wonder if you need to drill down and examine more closely your presuppositions of well informed and rational. Perhaps you haven't appreciated the extent to which this is perspectival?”

I may take the opposite approach and avoid mentioning Gert’s definition of normativity again. That might be possible and still convey the culturally useful essence of the relevant science.

• Have you read Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape, I forget if you have or not.

I have read Sam Harris and was disappointed.

Here is something I wrote several years ago for an evolutionary perspective online magazine:

https://thisviewoflife.com/mainstream-science-of-morality-contradicts-sam-harris-central-claim/

And another response by Scott Atran who works mostly in the evolutionary psychology of religion is also critical.

https://thisviewoflife.com/here-he-goes-again-sam-harriss-falsehoods/

↪Mark S I'd be interested briefly to understand why you are exploring this subject? Are you hoping to change how humans understand morality, or is this an academic exercise, a hobby?

In other words, what's your end game? — Tom Storm

Thanks for the question.

Understanding morality started as a retirement hobby. I wanted to understand why morality existed.

Traditional moral philosophy was little help. Then I chanced across explanations of moral behaviors (behaviors advocated by cultural moral norms and motivated by our moral sense) as parts of cooperation strategies. I was surprised at how easy the relevant science is. However, explaining it can be devilishly difficult, as we see here.

What’s the dream?

That I can make a small contribution to making moral philosophy more culturally useful based on understanding human morality’s function is solving cooperation problems.

I don’t expect any big success. In any event, the many and varied ways that something so simple can be misunderstood keeps me entertained. And even if I decide to abandon my efforts, I expect that acceptance in mainstream moral philosophy of the science of morality as cooperation is inevitable. It will provide insights helpful in refining cultural moral norms that will better meet human needs and reduce suffering.

I post here looking for insights into how to present the science better and talk about its applications and implications.

180Proof, Thanks for assembling salient issues. From my side, it is not always clear which are the most important points to respond to. I appreciate the help.

I have responded to banno’s points but not yet seen his response. I doubt that means he is now in agreement.

Responding to the non-banno points in your list:

• "... how the idea that morality is about solving cooperative problems can actually help in addressing the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians.— neomac"

Understanding morality as cooperation cannot magically answer all our moral dilemmas. It may be of limited help in resolving the moral case for supporting or denying support to the Ukrainians against the Russians.

Morality as cooperation only tells us the function of human morality (to solve cooperation problems). Its applicability is limited since it is 1) largely silent about what the goals of this cooperation ought to be (which will be important in the Ukraine situation) and 2) has no innate imperative bindingness.

That said, if nations wish to interact with each other morally, there is an objective reference defining that moral interaction as solving cooperation problems. I have often heard the contrary view that interactions between nations can ‘morally’ be based on each nation looking out only for its own interests. That is incorrect.

Modest but still culturally useful examples of where morality as cooperation is useful include: 1) understanding that the Golden Rule initiates reciprocity strategies, 2) masturbation and eating shrimp being immoral are marker strategies of membership and commitment to an ingroup, and 3) women must be submissive to men is a descriptively moral norm that exploits an outgroup to benefit an ingroup. Understanding this is a fact of the matter sheds new light, enabling people to make more coherent moral decisions and resolve more arguments.

• Your ideal of well-informed, rational people with shared goals and ideas is nowhere to be found.— Fooloso4

Well-informed, rational people are a hypothetical idealization that Bernard Gert created as part of his definition of normative. The fact that no such idealized beings exist is irrelevant to the definition.

Due to our evolutionary origins, we share some needs and preferences that are generated by our genes. To the extent we share genes, we share at least some needs and preferences. Assumed shared needs and preferences are the basis of the ideas that the goals of moral behavior should be increasing "well-being" or flourishing.

• What is the relationship between morality and cooperative strategies? They are not, as you assume, one and the same. Cooperative strategies to achieve immoral goals are immoral cooperative strategies.

Cooperation strategies define moral ‘means’. Moral ‘means’ and moral ‘ends’ are different categories of thing. They are not necessarily connected.

Assume a soldier falls on a grenade to save his fellow soldiers. By morality as cooperation, the soldier has acted morally since he acted to solve a cooperation problem. Why would you think which side he was on in a war would change the morality of that act?

• Deontology is not "the traditional perspective" but one traditional perspective. There are others.— Fooloso4

First, I agree. Second, deontology was not mentioned.

I was talking about imperative oughts being the traditional perspective. By imperative ought I mean “what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences”. It has been my reading of traditional moral philosophy that imperative oughts, not conditional ones, are what are being assumed in most proposed moral systems, not just Kant's categorical imperatives. Is that incorrect?

If not, how would you describe the kind of oughts commonly assumed in moral philosophy?

Your ideal of well-informed, rational people with shared goals and ideas is nowhere to be found. The standards that might apply to science and technology do not apply to ethics and politics because there is nothing resembling an objective standpoint. — Fooloso4

The idea that what is normative is what all rational people would advocate is Bernard Gert’s (see SEP’s morality entry of the last 20 years or so), not mine. I leave it to Gert to defend. I find it a helpful perspective within mainstream moral philosophy.

My main point has been that there is an objective standpoint about the function of human morality. The evidence is that past and present cultural moral norms and the judgments of our moral sense are all parts of cooperation strategies. If this is true, then how would you argue there is not an objective standpoint about the function of human morality?

When you answer, remember this function (solving cooperation problems) has no innate, imperative oughtness connected to it. I am happy to agree there is no objective standpoint regarding imperative oughts - the main focus of traditional moral philosophy.

Regarding your counter-examples:

Well-informed rational people agree that an embryo is a fertilized egg, but there is no information, no evidence, and no reason that leads to general agreement as to the moral status of an embryo. — Fooloso4

Right. The moral status of an embryo is a function of the goals of a society (preserve life at all cost?), a subject that morality as cooperation is silent on. Just because human morality has a function does not mean that understanding that function can answer all our moral questions.

The "cooperative strategy" more often than not has always been and continues to be that those in power make the rules and those who are not "cooperate" by submitting to their power or suffer the consequences. — Fooloso4

Again, right. You describe an ingroup cooperating (using moral ‘means’) to gain the benefits of exploiting an outgroup (an immoral end). So what?

Neither of your counterexamples contradicts the function of human morality being to solve cooperation problems. Both are more about the morality of 'ends', a subject the function of human morality is largely silent on.

I understand why thinking of human morality in terms of its function (the principal reason it exists) rather than in terms of its imperative oughts (the traditional perspective) can be initially confusing.

Within an ingroup (Singer's circle of moral concern), all are morally equal. Some are more rational and better informed at knowing how to solve cooperation problems - how to act morally.

But being rational and well-informed about how to act morally does not imply such individuals will actually act morally because there are no generally accepted imperative moral oughts.

An irrational and poorly informed individual can choose to act more morally than a rational and well-informed one.

Really? Perhaps you could comment on my reply to Banno.

What does your claim that "well-informed and rational are normative” mean to you? I can make no sense of it.

That may be partly due to my background in science and engineering. I am using well-informed and rational in the conventional sense I would in science and engineering. I look at data and the hypotheses that explain it. I cannot make sense of being well-informed and rational about this data and the hypotheses explaining it as “normative”.

Perhaps “well-informed and rational” are used differently in philosophy?

But my usage seems consistent with Gert’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defining morality, so that seems unlikely. If you think well-informed and rational are used differently in philosophy than in science and engineering, please explain how they are used differently.

The naturalistic fallacy is a warning about imperative oughts. I claim no imperative oughts. That the function (the principal reason they exist) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense is solving cooperation problems has no innate moral bindingness even if it is objective truth. The naturalistic fallacy is irrelevant.

And of course, people cooperate for immoral goals. How is that relevant to moral ‘means’? Judging only by your comment, you appear unable to distinguish between the morality of means and ends.

‘Means’ and ‘ends’ are different categories of thing. Perhaps your embedded prior moral judgements and definition of morality are rendering you unable to think coherently about morality – unable to understand that moral means (unselfish cooperation) and immoral ends are distinct categories of things.

Empirically, past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments and motivations are parts of cooperation strategies. Whatever your embedded concept of morality is, it seems to be causing a bizarre rejection of consideration of the possible relevance of this remarkable claimed result.

When you say, “You have embedded prior moral judgements in your definition of ‘moral’”, I am puzzled how you imagine my prior moral judgments affect 1) empirical data about cultural moral norms and our moral sense and 2) the game theory of cooperation developed in the last 50 years or so that explain it.

Every criticism you mentioned is irrelevant.

That is OK with me because of your gift. The gift is the explanation of the reason for your thought processes - “You have embedded prior moral judgements in your definition of ‘moral’.” Thanks. I have thought along these same lines for years, but never expressed it so well. I love the word embedded – it’s just the thing.

What I am getting at is how conditional oughts can be helpful in defining moral systems.

"Moral behaviour is defined as performing bad actions only if they cannot be avoided,"
How do you define bad? The claim just passes the explanatory burden.

An objective moral judgment itself, I would argue, is involuntary and is an imperative in the sense that we do it regardless of whether we want to or not. — Bob Ross

Bob,

Why would you argue that? I can't think of any rational or instrumental (goal-related) reasons for doing so.

That may be your intuition, but what is your intuition’s philosophical merit if it is an illusion foisted on you by your genes?

Building moral philosophy on an illusionary understanding of “an objective moral judgment” is a recipe for endless speculations.

Why not ground moral philosophy in the origins and objective function (the principal reason it exists) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense? With that, you can build a solid, culturally useful structure and, for the most part, leave the endless speculations behind.

Bob,

Getting back to the moral realism question in your OP:

Is Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) a kind of moral realism? Does it determine mind-independent moral truth values?

Yes, a necessary moral component (a definition of right and wrong) exists for all highly cooperative societies of independent agents. Regardless of anyone’s opinion, that moral component is strategies that solve cooperation problems.

MACS describes that necessary moral component. MACS, therefore, is an expression of moral realism that determines mind-independent moral truth about that necessary component.

Does MACS tell us what we imperatively ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences?

No. It is silent on imperative oughts.

Does MACS answer all our questions about morality and ethics?

No. It only describes the cooperation strategies that are a necessary moral component for all highly cooperative societies. MACS is silent about the goals of this cooperation and the broader aspects of the traditional ethical questions, “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”.

P1: One ought to consider what causes cultural moral norms and our moral sense objective moral judgments.

P2: Solving cooperative problems is the cause of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.

C: Therefore, one ought to solve cooperative problems.

Is that syllogism accurate? — Bob Ross

Bob,

No, it is not accurate.

How about this version instead as explanation?

P1: Virtually all cultural moral norms and our moral sense’s judgments and motivations are heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for parts of strategies for solving cooperation problems. Game theory shows that a necessary part of cooperation strategies is the punishment of people who create cooperation problems by violating cultural norms that are the heuristics for solving cooperation problems.

P2: Solving cooperation problems is necessary for maintaining or increasing the benefits of cooperation in a society – the principal reason societies exist.

C: Therefore, if you wish to maintain or increase the benefits of living in your society, you ought (instrumentally) to advocate cultural norms that are heuristics for parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems and whose violation deserves punishment. By doing so, you will advocate for an objective morality with no imperative moral oughts.

Would all rational, well-informed people wish to maintain or increase the cooperation benefits of living in their society? Perhaps. If they did, then the proposed objective morality without imperative moral obligations would be normative by Gert's SEP definition.

Again, I am operating under the semantic use of an ‘objective moral judgement’ being more than just a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills (in a voluntary sense): would you disagree with that usage of the term? — Bob Ross

I agree that 'objective moral judgements’ are more than “a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills”. Objective moral judgments are proclamations dependent on the same objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense. The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills since imperative obligation is not a necessary part of what is objectively moral.

Perhaps you are still thinking something like “what is objectively moral is necessarily an imperative obligation”. This idea is “an illusion foisted on us by our genes" (as the philosopher of biology Michael Ruse likes to point out).

This illusion is the origin of the moral realism problem you describe in your OP.

An example of an objective moral judgment is "It is moral to solve cooperation problems; it is immoral to create cooperation problems" which summarizes Morality as Cooperation Strategies. It is objective (mind independent) in that it is the product of the objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense – cooperation problems and the strategies that solve them.

You seem to be essentially noting that we can derive objective facts pertaining to what norms societies are setup with (and sustain) and that these judgments (which are guided by the need for cooperation) are an objective standard for morals. Am I understanding you correctly? — Bob Ross

Not quite. You are missing a critical element: the subject of the objective facts. The subject is the function of cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment).

Assume it is objectively (mind independently) true that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems and cultural moral norms are fallible heuristics for parts of strategies, such as reciprocity strategies, which solve those problems. Knowing the function of cultural moral norms enables us to resolve many disputes about if and when cultural moral norms will fail this function or will fulfil it in a way that is contrary to our values and goals. Therefore, this function provides an objective standard for moral behavior we can use to understand cultural moral norms better and thereby resolve disputes about them.

For example, consider “Do to others as you would have them do to you” as a fallible heuristic for initiating reciprocity. When tastes differ and following it would create rather than solve cooperation problems, the proposed moral standard (solving cooperation problems) provides an understanding that it would be objectively immoral to follow the Golden Rule in this case.

Again, the function of cultural moral norms provides AN objective standard for morality. This objective truth is silent regarding the existence of other moral standards that are either “objective features of the world” (as it is) or “involuntary obligations” (which it is not).

The key to many miscommunications in moral realism discussions may be that one side is assuming the subject is "imperative obligations" and the other side is assuming the subject is "objective features of the world".

"A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad."

Thank you for elaborating on this, but, to me, I don’t see why a “primary reason” for norms existing would be thereby an objective norm: why is that the case? — Bob Ross

I repeat, "Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad." How could you argue that was false?

Past and present cultural moral norms are cultural standards for right and wrong. If virtually all past and present cultural moral norms have the function of solving cooperation problems, then solving cooperation problems provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad that is an objective (mind independent) feature of our world.

Note that my claim is silent regarding this standard of good and bad’s imperative obligation. It is also silent if there are other objective (mind independent) standards of good and bad of either the objective feature of the world or imperative obligation varieties.

And my claim is silent regarding the normativity of this objective standard of good and bad. I do argue that this particular definition of good and bad will be normative by Gert’s definition (what all well-informed rational people would advocate). But note that Gert’s definition is silent on imperative obligation. Gert’s definition describes as normative what all rational people would advocate, not what they would be imperatively obligated to do.

You seem to be focused on moral claims that somehow have the objective property of mind-independent imperative obligation. To me this is odd. Perhaps because I have come to the study of morality from the science of morality side. From the science of morality side, the existence of behaviors we are imperatively obligated to do regardless of our needs and preferences is highly unlikely.

The biologist/philosopher Michael Ruse seems to delight in saying, "Morality is an illusion foisted on us by our genes”. Perhaps this makes sense to him because he also is focused on morality as imperative obligations while ignoring morality as an objective feature of the world (as strategies that solve cooperation problems). Morality as an objective feature of the world is definitely not an illusion. It explains, among other things, why such an illusion of imperative obligation is encoded in our genes.

“… the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will)”— Bob Ross

I understand you to be saying (here and elsewhere) that fixating on a cultural moral norm (encoding it as a moral norm in your moral sense in my terms) makes it an objective moral judgment – an involuntary obligation.

Also,

"Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms." - Mark S

Maybe I am just misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how this provides a “mind-independent” basis: it seems as though you are making laws and cultural norms the standard of what is good. — Bob Ross

A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad.

(The superficially diverse, contradictory, and strange norms of cultural moralities without this insight into their ultimate source and function is relatively useless.)

But what is the source of this function’s bindingness? Are we logically free to “fixate” (and advocate as a matter of will) for a different standard of what is good and bad? Of course. The empirical observation of the ultimate source of cultural moral norms carries no innate bindingness. This function’s bindingness may be subjective and the choice to fixate on it to trigger the feeling of bindingness a matter of preference. But the ultimate source of human morality is an objective truth not a subjective one.

So what is the mind-independent function of cultural moral norms? To solve cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

In highly cooperative societies, all intelligent, independent agents must solve these same cooperation problems and therefore their morality will also have the function of solving these cooperation problems. (We can expect them all to know why the Golden Rule is a useful moral guide and, if they are sufficiently advanced, when and why it goes wrong and should be abandoned.)

Based on what I argue the function of human morality is (solving cooperation problems), the most useful definition of "objective moral judgments" is based of the “objective features of the world” rather than “an involuntary obligation (of a will)”.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is wonderfully compatible with
Wikipedia’s definition - "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

But could it be normative? By the SEP, normativity sounds likely:
"The term “morality” can be used ... normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

I expect rational people would prefer to live in cooperative societies and therefore would be interested in basing their moral system on solutions to problems that block cooperation.

Thanks for your careful reply. I am keenly interested in better understanding reasons for preferring your or Wikipedia’s definitions of moral realism.

Wikipedia’s definition - "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

I understand your definition to be

the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will) — Bob Ross

Rewriting Wikipedia’s claim in a parallel structure:

“A valid definition of objective moral judgments is that they refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the “involuntary obligations” definition of "objective moral judgments"?

Advantages:

• Harmonious with our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

Disadvantages:

• No such involuntary obligations appear to exist.
• Resulting moral antirealism claims based on this definition are confusing if moral judgments refer to objective features of the world.
• Offers no objective (mind independent) basis for resolving moral disputes.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the “objective features of the world” definition of "objective moral judgments"?

Advantages:

• Objective features of the world exist that are the basis of moral judgments as summarized by cultural moral norms. Those features are strategies that solve cooperation problems.
• Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms.
• Understanding the function of cultural moral norms explains the origin and function of our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

Disadvantages:
?

Additions or corrections to advantages and disadvantages?

Also, I don’t understand “this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective” when the subject is objective features of the world. Science is good at being objective concerning features of the world.

Then you say “Again, I have a hard time understanding how this is actually a moral realist position: can you please elaborate?”

It is not a moral realist position by your definition. My response's point is that your definition of moral realism is less useful than the “objective features of the world” definition based on the above advantages and disadvantages. These are just definitions. We are free to choose, assume, or advocate the most useful.

Postscript:
Do you have a reference for a formal definition of “objective moral judgments” consistent with

the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will)? — Bob Ross

Is the moral realism vs. anti-realism just a good approximate line to draw? Is it clear and cut? Do you think one can hold there are objective moral judgments and that none of them are obligatory to fixate upon? — Bob Ross

Whether moral realism or anti-realism is correct is a function of how we define the terms.

Assume we use your definition of moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives”, which I take to be imperatives about what we somehow ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. Then I would argue that moral realism is unlikely to be true.

But, as Hanover mentioned, people have also defined moral realism as:

"Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

By wikipedia’s definition, I support moral realism. My realism claim is based on the empirical observation that past and present cultural moral norms (ethical sentences) refer to parts of cooperation strategies (reciprocity strategies for the most part) which are objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

One criterion for the most useful definition of moral realism (and other terms in moral philosophy) is which will make understanding morality less confusing. It would be confusing to simultaneously 1) define moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives” (which results in the conclusion that moral realism is likely false) and 2) accept the empirical data that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems (which implies a kind of moral realism).

Thus, the most useful definitions of moral realism and other terms in moral philosophy could be based on what we empirically observe about morality.

Perhaps the difficulties you refer to in your opening post are due to a mismatch between your chosen definition of moral realism and the reality of what human morality is?

"How is moral conscience even possible?" — Heiko

That is an easy question to answer. We have an innate moral conscience (and an innate moral sense) because it enabled our ancestors to solve cooperation problems in ways that increased their reproductive fitness.

However, I have no reason to believe that knowing the function of our moral sense - to solve cooperation problems - can answer questions about moral ends and moral values independent of cooperation strategies.

Heiko
519
No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means.
— Mark S

An "end" would be something of unquestionable value. Happiness is good and hence worthwhile. "Maximizing" it.... seems formal. This seems to give it priority over other goods. Minimizing suffering is not necessarily the same and can be made to conflict with it in thought experiments. How would we judge what to do? To me it seems there has to be another end behind those. — Heiko

Heiko, I know of no reasons we should believe that a moral theory’s, even an objectively true moral theory’s,

"end" would be something of unquestionable value. — Heiko

That sounds merely like your preference.

We might also prefer that mind-independent moral theories be able to answer any ethical question. Again, there are no reasons I know of to believe that.

For example, the Morality As Cooperation Strategies moral theory is essentially silent about moral ends and values other than values that are parts of cooperation strategies; hence this thread about judging moral ends separately from moral means.

Perhaps I misunderstand you. I hear you objecting to all cultural moralities as, on balance, bad.

This sounds like the definition would be a means to achieve the end...
Sorry - you see the problem with this I hope. — Heiko

No, I don’t see the problem. Maximizing durable happiness by maximizing satisfaction and minimizing suffering defines an end. It does not define a means.

It’s not rare that people will be forced to do X even if it’s supposedly to be in their interest. Who decides when and what and who and all that. They may not like that. — schopenhauer1

Societies decide when “people will be forced to do X” when they advocate and enforce moral norms. For example, people will be coerced into not stealing and murdering. Will some people not like that? Sure. Will anyone else care? No.

nor the means justify the end
— Mark S
I have never heard of or considered this possibility.
It would be better of course if you supported that with some argumentation and/or examples ... (Referring to Kant cannot substitute that.)

Actions (means) in general are based on will and are done in order to accomplish something.
.... it makes no sense to talk about "the means justifying the end". Which makes this statement void of meaning and of no use.

I will be glad to "hear" about any arguments or examples that disagree with the above. : — Alkis Piskas

My comment that the “means do not justify the end” was about moral means and ends, so let’s restrict the discussion to morality.

If you are convinced that moral actions necessarily have an end, you might ask people who are acting morally at a considerable cost what their end is. They might say the end was “acting morally” but that is not a meaningful definition of “end” as I am using it. As Hume pointed out, people act according to their motivations which they may not understand rather than a logical consequence of their chosen ends.

So, no, moral actions do not necessarily have any end (beyond “acting morally”) that are understood by the actor. Behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by cultural moral norms may have a function and ultimate cause but no conscious end. People act morally most commonly because they feel a motivation to do so, not to accomplish some goal.

Are you claiming that Kantianism does not hold that “moral means justify ends” (as per it being ‘immoral’ to lie to the murderer about where their next victim is)? My understanding of Kantianism is superficial and I would be happy to learn that is not the case.

So, actions (means) should be judged for themselves, independently of the purpose (end) they are supposed to achieve.
Actions have end results, consequences and possible outcomes. They can --and sometimes even must-- be judged for themselves.

As a general rule, the end does not justify the means. — Alkis Piskas

And neither the ends justify the means (as per utilitarianism's possible over-demanding ‘means’), nor the means justify the end (as I have read Kant advocated).

What is the difference between moral and non-moral "ends"? moral and non-moral "means"? Can "ends" be moral with non-moral "means" and/or vice versa? Are the relations of "means to ends" different when both are moral from when both are non-moral? Lastly, is tge distinction 'moral and non-moral' between independent, parallel concepts or is one concept dependent on – contingent to, or subset of – the other concept? — 180 Proof

!80 Proof,
“What is the difference between moral and non-moral "ends"? moral and non-moral "means"?”
Gert proposes that what is morally normative (what I was referring to here as “moral”) is what all rational people (with specified conditions) would advocate as moral for their society. If we accept that, then the difference is what “all rational people” would advocate as moral and non-moral “ends” and “means”.

"Can "ends" be moral with non-moral "means" and/or vice versa?"
Yes. Utilitarianism might be a moral end that could be achieved by an immoral means such as forcing a large penalty on one person in order to create a tiny benefit for many people. Or moral means such as defined by Morality as Cooperation Strategies could be applied to achieve immoral ends such as the extermination of outgroups. (Negative utilitarianism offers the interesting possibility that the "ends", lessening suffering, is the same as the "means", but I have not thought much about it yet.)

"Are the relations of "means to ends" different when both are moral from when both are non-moral?"
“Means” and “ends” can be non-moral, both moral, both immoral, or some mix of moral, immoral, and non-moral. I don’t see why the "means to ends" relationship would change.

"Lastly, is the distinction 'moral and non-moral' between independent, parallel concepts or is one concept dependent on – contingent to, or subset of – the other concept?"
Moral and immoral “means” and “ends” are subsets of possible behaviors and “ends”. Then non-moral “means” and “ends” would be subsets of all other possible behaviors and “ends”. I am not confident I am addressing your intent here.

To be meaningful don't we have to define what is good as a state-of-affairs?
— Mark S

Define? I don't think so. Mediate? May be. We could also point to examples what is bad and leave the conclusion open.

"The good" is that what can be wanted reasonably. Is that a state of affairs? — Heiko

If we are going to effectively work toward achieving something, here a moral ‘end’, then we have to agree on what we are working to achieve – we have to define it. Sure, if you don’t care about achieving an end then you can leave it undefined.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is a non-zero-sum game. This produces many opportunities to increase the benefits of cooperation without harming others.
— Mark S

That's not true. The mere act of "trying" to cooperate may cause issues relating to autonomy or lack thereof. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps helping others and otherwise being kind could cause issues relative to autonomy or lack thereof, but wouldn’t that be rare? Why focus on possible rare bad effects instead of the normal, plentiful benefits?