But is that what we ought to do? — Banno

Does MACS define what we imperatively ought to do? No, of course not. I have no reasons to believe such imperative oughts ever have or ever will exist.

Does MACS define what all (or virtually all) well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral in their society? I argue it does, and is therefore normative, in my post “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”.

Without considering what all rational people would do (with no assumed normative content), is MACS useful for resolving disputes about when to advocate cultural moral norms? Yes, that is the point of this post as:

This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:

1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies). — Mark S

Why are you starting multiple threads on the same topic? — Agent Smith

Good question!

The three threads are about three different applications of MACS. One long thread on the subject would be hopelessly confusing about which application of MACS was being discussed in each comment.

Also, describing each of the three applications one at a time as they build on each other allows me to refine my ideas and presentation for the successive OP’s based on the much appreciated comments and questions I get.

In review, the separate applications are:

1) “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”

Introduced the empirical data that MACS is based on and described how this data is culturally useful for resolving many disputes about cultural moral norms. It is useful despite having no innate, or argued for, normativity. A simple 'is' observation about past and present cultural moral norms is sufficient to resolve, as described, many serious disputes about enforcing cultural moral norms (which MACS reveals to be heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies). For many, that may be an unusual idea. This thread discusses several controversial questions and is useful as a standalone.

2) “Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism”.

Emphasizes that MACS only tells us about what moral means (moral interactions between people as described by cultural moral norms) ‘are’ and is silent about moral goals such as forms of consequentialism. By defining moral ‘means’ as solving cooperation problems, MACS complements consequentialism by eliminating consequentialism’s well-known ‘means’ flaws such as over-demandingness. Conversely, consequentialist goals complement MACS by providing a definition of what goals of cooperation are moral – a subject MACS is silent on. There are still no normativity claims involved regarding MACS itself.

For people who do not accept the reality of imperative moral oughts, a MACS/consequentialist morality might be their preference for both their society and themselves.

Again, there are several ideas that may be new here and worth discussing on their own.

3) “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”

Could MACS be normative – define what we ought and ought not to do?

Describes the third application of MACS with a normative claim.

I don't think cultural norms track morality only. Sinister elements may too. — Agent Smith

Sinister elements such as domination moral norms and some marker moral norms do of course exist as I described in “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”

Cultural norms track a lot of things. The subject here is cultural moral norms – norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment, though the violator may not actually be punished except by social disapproval.

Does it mean a lot to you, this MACS? — Agent Smith

Yes, it has kept me entertained for about 15 years now. The science was easy. The presentation is devilishly difficult.

I suggest you reread my first post.

“What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”.

It will help clarify that the examples you mention are Domination and Marker norms, not Partnership moral norms.

As I describe in my next post: "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies"

Partnership moral norms conform to MACS’ moral principle, “Act to solve cooperation problems” and are universally moral.

Domination moral norms (and sometimes Marker moral norms) violate MACS’s “Do not act to create cooperation problems”. These violations make them immoral in an absolute sense.

You are more familiar with Prinz and Nussbaum’s work than I am.

But I would reiterate how revealing it is to move up a few levels of causation from emotions being the ultimate source of moral judgments (close to Prinz and Nussbaum’s positions?) into what caused these emotions to exist. It is much more revealing and useful for resolving disputes about moral norms to understand the ultimate source of cultural moral norms not in our emotions but in strategies that solve cooperation problems.

Because you fail to grasp the pragmatic rationality of MAGA adherents relative to their way of looking at the world, you blame them for your failure of understanding and reify this hostility as ‘correctly scientific rationality’ which you will then attempt to shove down their throats with the blessing of your fellow scientists. Just rinse and repeat and we have a perfect recipe for the perpetuation of intercultural violence. — Joshs

You misunderstand me. As I have said, I don’t expect the MAGA adherents who benefit from their ‘morality’ to be swayed by MACS arguments. I expect the MAGA people being exploited or concerned by those arguments (women, gay people, people of color, average people in MAGA areas) to use them as an intellectual moral cudgel they have not had against the oppressors. What I am after is providing intellectual weapons for resolving “intra” cultural (within MAGA) disputes about morality.

True that. I guess one is moral to members of a group you belong to to be immoral to members of other groups. Basically its some kinda military pact between individuals and between groups against other individuals and other groups. However, this is the current version of morality that people are questioning the validity of - animal rights, speciesism, vegetarianism, veganism, eco-movements, etc. are attempts to rectify the problem (from pirates to Jains, we must become). — Agent Smith

These are “circle of moral concern issues”.

From my "What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?" post’s OP: “What about its limits? ,,, It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited.”

MACS’s strategies are silent on all those circle of moral concern issues you bring up.

Science is inadequate to answer those questions. We must look elsewhere.

You're acting like morality exists just to solve problems of cooperation, and this is just entirely lacking in nuance, it's rarely that simple, or innocent. — Judaka

No. I am discussing the cultural usefulness of understanding that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies.

Of course, ethics is a much broader topic than the function of cultural moral norms.

From my OP

What about its limits? This observation’s usefulness in resolving moral disputes is limited by its silence on important ethical questions. It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

As to what I claim, referring once again to my OP,

Cultural moral norms are arguably heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for subcomponents of strategies that solve cooperation problems. — Mark S

I argue that this knowledge is useful for resolving many disputes about when and if cultural moral norms will be advocated in a society. Therefore, understanding that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is culturally useful knowledge.

Your objection, as I understand it, is there is no normative content to this science telling us what we morally ought to do – the business of ethics as you see it.

Ace! You’ve got it!

But rather than the downfall you see, its lack of normative claims is its power. It provides a culturally useful basis for resolving common moral disputes (as described in the OP) without the necessity for any agreement on moral premises or normativity. No requirements for agreement on moral premises or normativity is a big advantage.

I see the business of ethics as also helping people resolve common disputes about cultural moral norms using the most effective means available. You disagree?

Do you propose to help people resolve their common disputes about cultural moral norms based on sophisticated, complex, unresolved assertions about moral premises and sources of normativity?

Good luck with that. That huge mess is what I am looking to help people avoid. Not everyone is a philosophy major who loves nothing better than endless arguments about moral premises and normativity.

On the other hand, principles that underlie the empirical observations about the function of past and present cultural moral norms may (spoiler alert) turn out to be normative – what we ought and ought not to do. This is possible. We are talking about the function of all cultural moral norms no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange. That function should have something to do with morality.

Coincidentally, I am just finishing a post on the normativity of MACS and will present it in a day or two. I define the universal principles underlying MACS and argue for their normativity. I hope for many good comments.

But that argument is complicated and not one I would inflict on average people looking to resolve a dispute about when to advocate not following the Golden Rule.

Most people trying to resolve disputes about moral norms will be more successful starting with the elementary understanding that cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies.

We ought cooperate in kicking puppies. — Banno

The OP proposes that the function of past and present cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. That is what cooperation strategies do. How do you imagine kicking puppies solves cooperation problems? You are just making up nonsense.

As I've been trying to point out, the cooperation morality is helping to create is tribal in nature. Conflicts are a part of the nature of morality, it's a healthy part of what it evolved to be. I have no desire to resolve such disputes. — Judaka

The cooperation that morality enables does so by solving problems that are innate to our universe. The nature of moral norms is to solve conflicts. If you have no desire to resolve such disputes, you would not be a good person to associate with. OK.

There is nothing about groups in the cooperation problems that are innate to our universe. Cooperating in groups (tribes) and discriminating against outgroups is just one cooperation strategy, not an innate feature of the problems being solved.

Morality evolved for the purpose of cooperation, but it's much more than that now, just like so many other things about human behaviour. There's money to be made, power to be had, ideals to be upheld and yada yada. And as I've said, it's not about species-wide or culture-wide cooperation. — Judaka

Sure, ethics has grown far beyond cooperation strategies to include answers to broader questions such as “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”

So? The subject of this thread is “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?” and “Could that knowledge help resolve disputes about moral norms?”

Morality is more complicated than its original function, and how it accomplishes this original function is not through a conscious love of cooperation, it's so very far away from that. — Judaka

Perhaps you are thinking about the complexity added by two powerful human-invented cooperation strategies: money economies and rule of law?

Money economies are fantastically more efficient means of solving cooperation problems than moral behaviors as defined by moral norms. And rule of law efficiently supplies the necessary punishment component of cooperation strategies by reducing the risk of punishment provoking escalating cycles of retribution.

Money economies and rule of law do not directly “complicate” the function of morality. Their chief effect has been to obscure the function of morality as solving cooperation problems.

Prior to the invention of money economies and rule of law, it would have been common knowledge, even obvious, that the function of morality was to increase cooperation. People knew they needed to solve cooperation problems and acting morally was the only means they had to do so, except for inefficient barter or force within hierarchies.

See Protagoras’ explanation of morality as cooperation in Plato’s dialog of the same name. Protagoras described as ancient knowledge that morality as cooperation was a gift from Zeus. Entertainingly, Socrates ignored and did not respond to 1) this correct explanation of morality (correct if we substitute biological and cultural evolution for Zeus) and 2) Protagoras’ main point in the debate about teaching morality. Perhaps Socrates ignored it because morality as cooperation was too commonplace an idea and therefore uninteresting. Or perhaps Socrates had nothing to say to criticize it and commenting favorably did not suit his purposes.

Psychopaths (people with diminished or absent empathy and conscience) will not feel any “love of cooperation” – they only love themselves.

In contrast, the spontaneous feeling of satisfaction and optimism in the cooperative (moral) company of friends and family is a primary source of durable happiness for most people.

Most people already agree on the basics of what's moral or immoral (lying, murder, stealing, etc.). What's disputed are the foundational questions, and you're probably not going to find consistency here. For me, the foundational questions are the real questions. — Sam26

First, remember that "past and present cultural moral norms are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems" is claimed provisionally true science with no innate normativity. People may find it useful or not. No problem if they do not.

Second, the foundational problems you reference refer to (I assume?) what ought our goals be or what ought we do regardless of our needs and preferences. These problems likely have no objective answers based on the failures of the last 2500 years of study by incredibly bright people to find any. You are advocating potentially condemning people to endless, unresolvable debates which will provide little to no objective help in resolving common moral disputes.

Third, the MACS perspective is the most useful objective basis that I am aware of for judging whether cultural moral norms fulfill or do not fulfill their function of increasing the benefits of cooperation (increasing the benefits of living in a society). Contrary to your claim, most moral disputes are about when cultural partnership moral norms will be enforced such as "lying, murder (or 'killing'), stealing" and following the Golden Rule or if domination moral norms and marker norms will be enforced. Virtually no one, except philosophy majors, argues about the ultimate source of morality as consequentialism, virtue ethics, and the like.

I see the MACS perspective as culturally useful for resolving common moral disputes. It is essentially silent regarding solving the foundational questions you seem most interested in.

Maybe that silence is a good thing. That means MACS does not directly threaten the intellectual edifices that have been constructed regarding your foundational moral questions.

What's your actual proposal? To turn morality into a science? To assert it'd be anti-scientific to go against whatever scientists proposed was the objectively correct way to cooperate? — Judaka

My proposal is that people understand that all cultural moral norms can be explained as parts of strategies to solve cooperation problems. That knowledge is instrumentally useful for resolving disputes about when or if to enforce those moral norms because it:

1) Shows that mystical explanations from religions or cultural history are, at best, suspect.
2) Provides an objective, rather than subjective, basis for resolving those disputes. (What better basis do you suggest for resolving moral norm enforcement disputes?)
3) Resolves those disputes in ways most likely to achieve the benefits of cooperation (to achieve the benefits that have made human beings the incredibly successful social species we are).
4) Provides an objective moral principle for resolving moral disputes that otherwise does not exist (so far as I know).

Perhaps your objection is that the above requires rational thought about enforcing cultural moral norms?

Sure, people benefiting from domination norms will commonly find themselves unable to reason rationally about those norms. So what?

People who are being exploited by domination moral norms will find themselves able to think rationally about those as soon as they see the advantage to themselves. So at least half the argument about enforcing domination norms can commonly have an objective basis in science. That is a big advantage in resolving disputes about enforcing cultural moral norms.

You keep pointing out that disputes exist. Again, so what? My point is that understanding why cultural moral norms exist is useful for resolving those disputes regardless of anyone's "world-view".

The OP is on the right track. Not just consequentialism, even Kantian deontological ethics is about cooperation. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." ~ I. Kant (Categorical Imperative). However, in me humble opinion, cooperation is morally ambiguous (re the Italian Mafia, the Chinese Triad, the Japanese Yakuza, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, etc.). — Agent Smith

Claiming something like “Cooperation is moral” fails for just the reasons you describe. People can, and too often do, cooperate to exploit outgroups.

The recast claim “Solving cooperation problems is moral” does not suffer the same failure.

This recasting can recognize the cooperation and self-sacrifice within criminal organizations as moral, while rejecting the goal of that cooperation, the exploitation and harm to outgroups, as immoral based on it creating cooperation problems – the opposite of the function of cultural moral norms.

I wonder if you are taking morality to be man-made? And our moral choices to be made consciously? — Judaka

The point of my OP is that the cooperation strategies that compose past and present cultural moral norms are innate to our universe. So, no, morality as cooperation strategies is not man-made. People adapt these strategies as they see fit in terms of definitions of who is in ingroups and outgroups and markers of both and the like.

People make moral judgments virtually instantaneously based on their emotional responses from their moral sense. (See Hume, plus Jonathan Haidt for a modern data-driven version.) So no, moral choices are not commonly based on conscious thought processes. What can be based on conscious thought processes is resolving disputes about cultural moral norms, again as described in the OP.

This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:

1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies). — Mark S

Why do you imagine the cooperation must be on the scale of a nation? Isn't it naive to expect people to join together and cooperate on a culture-wide basis? What objective basis is this? You're privileging one type of cooperation over another, and yours is less pragmatic and goes against our tribalistic nature. — Judaka

Cultures will decide what they want to about who is in ingroups who deserve full moral regard and who is in outgroups who can be ignored or exploited. Science is silent on the matter. Again, from the OP:

What about its limits? This observation’s usefulness in resolving moral disputes is limited by its silence on important ethical questions. It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. — Mark S

I’m wondering how you would respond to Jesse Prinz’s moral relativist argument, which grounds moral values in innate emotional responses which become culturally conditioned to form an endless variety of moral values across the cultural landscape. — Joshs

I agree with Prinz that our moral judgments (values) are initially grounded in innate emotional responses. But my consideration of higher levels of causation for these phenomena causes me to part company with Prinz.

Why do we have these strange emotional responses which often motivate acting in ways (moral ways) that can appear to be against our best interests, at least in the short term?

We have these emotional responses because they are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. Our predecessors who experienced these emotions were better cooperators, left more descendants, and became the vast majority of our ancestors. Our predecessors who did not experience these emotions almost all died out.

What is the source of these cooperation problems? Their source is in the nature of our universe which can be expressed in the simple mathematics of game theory's cooperation/exploitation dilemmas.

From the same basic observation, Prinz makes a moral relativist argument and I see the basis of a species and time-independent universal morality.

Prinz would
argue that no cooperative meta-theory could bridge
the gap in values between core Trump supporters and social leftists. The best that could be hoped for is the use of rational argument to persuade both parties that neither side’s values are THE objectively correct values, and therefore each side’s perspective needs to be tolerated and even respected.

Do you think that MACS can achieve some better mutual understanding than this? — Joshs

I doubt that MAGA people who benefit from the domination (exploitation) moral norms and values they find so attractive will be convinced by any rational argument. However, the MAGA supporters being exploited - the poor, women, the elderly, immigrants, and other outgroups could be motivated (once they realize how they are being exploited) to understand and advocate for rational arguments that explain what is being done to them. So yes, MACS could be a powerful force (at least on the side of the exploited outgroups) in arguing against domination moral norms.

This thread seems to fall to the same criticism as the other - deriving an ought from an is, but not in a good way. — Banno

I derive no 'oughts' from 'is' in either OP's thread.

You might read my above reply to PhilosophyRunner which rebuts your claim.

At the moment, this is what I see you doing, in order:

1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods
2. Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like and leave only those you like based on your values.
3. Presenting this as what "is" and claiming scientific methods. However it is not a scientific observation, it is a pruned version filtered by your values. You have already introduced imperative oughts here, but done so through the back door.
4. Deriving an "ought" from what you presented as an "is" in step 4. This runs into the is/ought problem — PhilosophyRunner

Items 2., 3., and 4. are inaccurate.

More correctly,

1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods – Specifically that the function (the principle reason they exist) of past and present cultural moral norms is that they solve cooperation problems.

2. Proposing that

what is morally normative to be “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” (similar to Gert’s SEP definition of normativity https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/ ). — Mark S

3. Providing reasons that the “consequentialist definitions of morality combined with the limitation that behaviors to achieve them solve cooperation problems” is more likely to meet the above normativity criterion (what all well-informed, rational people would advocate…) than the bare consequentialist definitions of morality.

That’s it. I see no derivation of ought from is or "Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like."

For convenience, the reasons that “Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism” are:

First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and “cooperation” implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called ‘moral’ behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people”.

Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral ‘means’ of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to.

The presence of innate motivating power in the MACS part of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles provides a second reason that these claims are more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged normatively moral.

Third, the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS’ feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. MACS cross-species universality provides a third reason that the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims would be more likely to be judged normative than bare consequentialism. — Mark S

What conflicts could you resolve by explaining what would be useful for us? We're already doing that anyway and usefulness depends on your position, you can't explain what's most useful for everyone, right? — Judaka

Consider some cross-culturally common moral norms:
Do to others as you would have them do to you.
Do not lie, steal, or kill.

Contrary to your claim, people do not commonly try to compute the behavior that would be most useful to them when making moral judgments. Rather, people experience motivation to follow the moral norms they grow up with such as those above. This motivation comes from the biology underlying our moral sense and from the potential punishment of at least reputation damage if they are seen to violate their culture’s moral norms.

People commonly have serious conflicts over when it is moral to follow the above norms and when it is not. The mystical origins of religious and cultural moral norms tend to make rational discussion difficult and these conflicts virtually unresolvable.

The empirical observation that all cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies punctures that mysticism and provides an objective basis for agreeing on when it is and is not moral to follow the above moral norms.

From the OP,
[quote="Mark S;d13929"
]This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:
1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies).[/quote]

We profoundly disagree. I'll post a response in a day or two.

Janus
13.2k
The more important moral norms are, in my view, pretty much universal for merely pragmatic reasons and this ties in with Kant's deontology (which is a kind of non-particular consequentialism writ large). Any society that condoned lying, theft, rape and murder could not survive, let alone thrive — Janus

I agree. As I said in the OP regarding why this is true:

the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS’ feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. — Mark S

I don't think MACS achieves what you claim it achieves. MACS is just as susceptible to the problem you outline. MACS would show human coorporation often has an out group that is excluded. It does not rule out causing massive harm to a few in order for the many to coorporate - this has been pointed out to you in the previous thread I think. — PhilosophyRunner

MACS begins as an observation about all past and present cultural moral norms (including the nasty exploitation of outgroups you mention) being parts of cooperation strategies. I agree, we cannot include the exploitation component of these norms that create cooperation problems as objectively moral means. (The morality of simple exclusion without exploitation is a more complex issue I want to do more work on.)

MACS as I envision it in the above consequentialist/cooperation moral principle defines 1) moral means as solving cooperation problems and 2) immoral means as creating cooperation problems. This evolved form rejects as immoral the exploitation component of domination moral norms.

I can see I need to do a better job of explaining how that evolution happens. Thanks for pointing that out.

I don't think this holds. In fact my observations of "what is" recently, suggests that MACS would motivate those already motivated, and not motivate those already not motivated. Try to motivate an anti-vaccine person by bringing out more scientific studies. I think you will fail more often than succeed. And that failure would be because the motivation is values driven rather than technocratic. — PhilosophyRunner

Science can tell us about the motivating emotions produced by the biology underlying our moral sense.

These motivating emotions can be taken to be empathy, gratitude, anger (at moral violations), shame, guilt, and elevation (a mix of pride, satisfaction, and optimism in the cooperative company of friends and family). All of these motivate either components of cooperation strategies or, in the case of elevation, are pleasurable biological rewards for cooperation.

Since these motivating emotions, like past and present cultural moral norms, were selected for based on their ability to solve cooperation problems, moral norms that solve cooperation problems can be innately motivating by our moral sense. A norm to initiate or maintain indirect reciprocity can be motivated by empathy and gratitude. A norm about punishing moral norm violators can be motivity by righteous anger (regarding others) and by shame and guilt (regarding ourselves). Elevation can motivate cooperation as a way of life.

Thus, I am confident that MACS components are innately motivated for everyone with a normal moral sense. Obviously, it would not be innately motivating for a rational psychopath.

To wit: reducing 'suffering' by any means which does not increase or exacerbate 'suffering'; increasing 'well-being' by any means which does not descrease or impair 'well-being'. "MACS" is possibly one such "means" in either case depending on, I think, how it is practiced. — 180 Proof

To reduce suffering (or increase well-being) for all as an end, I have been thinking that moral means will sometimes include a cost to be paid by those who are suffering less, or who have higher well-being. That is, a cost to those who can afford it that benefits the worst off.

I am not comfortable agreeing that a means can be found that “does not decrease or impair 'well-being'” or “increase or exacerbate 'suffering'” for anyone, ever.

That said, I like MACS for this task of regulating the means to morally achieve consequentialist goals for two reasons.

First, it advocates cooperation strategies which are positive-sum games. These strategies offer the possibility that no reduction in well-being or increase in suffering will be required of anyone – the best result.

Second, coercion is ruled out since the means are cooperation strategies. Ruling out coercion implies any reduction in well-being or increase in suffering is accepted willingly to help other people who are worse off – an intuitively morally acceptable means.

Such a thread should include not just the implications for philosophy , but the metaphysical pre-suppositions of the biologically-based science of human cooperation that researchers like Nowak have contributed to and Curry and Haidt build on. — Joshs

I am happy to address all of those. But I can't talk about everything at once, particularly as I aim for 600 to 1000 words per post.

Nowak's theology is a curiosity, but I am unaware it has influenced either the data he presents, his highly respected work in game theory, or his broad conclusions. And Curry and Haidt have some poorly supported ideas about cross-cultural commonality somehow implying normativity that they mention in passing, but the data they have gathered is high quality and untainted.

Please let me know immediately if you see any data or conclusions I present that appear tainted by theology.

Imperative ought are really just conditional oughts. ...
And even then I'm not even sure instrumental oughts are oughts. — PhilosophyRunner

I prefer “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” after Bernard Gert's definition in the SEP as my basis for what is morally normative, an imperative ought.

I did not realize "instrumental oughts" is a controversial idea.

You might have a look my most recent comments above to ↪SophistiCat. I address at least some of your points.

Science can only "dubunk" the mysticism of moral norms when it is opposed to mystical narratives concerning their origins and operation, such as those offered by some religious traditions. But we are not talking about that. There is no mysticism involved in accepting moral norms without or independently of an awareness of history and mechanism. (The "queerness" of which Mackie wrote is something else - it concerns moral "properties" when viewed alongside items in a naturalistic ontology of properties.) — SophistiCat

I should not have mentioned the explanatory power for Mackie’s “queer” properties of bindingness and obligation. I am trying to limit this thread to how this science reveals useful instrumental oughts relevant to refining cultural moral norms. Please ignore my mention of Mackie.

What it (science) cannot do is advance the discussion of norms as such - that is, whether one ought to accept them - except indirectly and arationally, similarly to how learning and life experience can over time affect one's moral outlook. — SophistiCat

Right, there is nothing in the science (or in what I have said here) that addresses normativity. Justifying normativity is outside science’s domain.

I want to limit this thread to only 1) introducing the science and 2) arguing for this science’s instrumental usefulness (the same kind of instrumental usefulness provided by the rest of science – “If you want to achieve that, do this”).

But perhaps you are wondering how these instrumental oughts for refining moral norms can be useful without an argument that people somehow ought to follow their moral norms?

People already follow their culture’s moral norms such as Golden Rule and “Do not lie, steal, or kill” and will continue to do so. No philosophical reasoning about normativity is required. So I don’t see the lack of imperative oughts from science as affecting this science’s usefulness for refining cultural moral norms.

On the other hand, this science does reveal the exploitative origins of domination moral norms and can debunk their mystical origins. Again, I don’t see the lack of imperative oughts against exploiting others as a serious hindrance to using the science to refine moral norms.

What about any implications this science might have for normativity, the metaphysics of morality, and so forth? I look forward to exploring these topics but prefer to have that discussion to the next thread where I can start with a fresh OP focusing only on that.

Morality is a social institution, and just about anything having to do with sociality involves cooperation strategies - even conflict above individual level. "Solving cooperation problems" can describe everything that goes on in society, from family life to wars. — SophistiCat

Exactly right. As Martin Nowak likes to say, we are SuperCooperators. Our ability to cooperate is what has made us the incredibly successful social species we are.

We are near time to start a new thread on philosophical implications. That may be more interesting for this audience.

Science is about how things are, ethics is about what to do; these are very different questions.
At the core, that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate. — Banno

Of course, science and ethics answer different questions.

“How should I live?” – this is a question for moral philosophy about what to do.

“Why do cultural moral norms exist?” - this is a scientific question about what things are.

“That we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate.” Right. To think otherwise would be a category error confusing what is with what ought to be.

Where do you think my OP or the rest of my comments contradict either of your two points?

We all have different goals and values they are not all compatible. — Andrew4Handel

You are correct that people have different moral goals that they feel everyone should conform to. How does that contradict what the science of morality reveals - the subject of this thread?

As I said in the OP about the science of morality:

It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

When the science of morality explains that "past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies", it explains what moral ‘means’ are, not what moral ‘ends’ (goals) are.

And there is nothing “imposed” on people by this science except a better understanding of reality. Like the rest of science, this science is useful when it reveals instrumental oughts.

Here, that instrumental ought can be expressed as “If you want to increase the benefits of cooperation in ways that will better achieve your goals, then you ought to follow your cultural moral norms when they will predictably solve cooperation problems and abandon them when they will create cooperation problems”.

↪Mark S Sorry Mark, I am unconvinced and the arguments seem nebulous.

Women who are being exploited and are questioning the morality of that exploitation should be easily convinced.
— Mark S — Tom Storm

It is Ok with me that you are not convinced. We can simply disagree.

Science has empirically shown it is a powerful means for understanding what ‘is’ and how it works.
— Mark S

This is taking the view that reality can be understood - a metaphysical position. — Tom Storm

The idea that reality can be understood is a metaphysical position.

I took your implication to be that I was improperly basing the empirical observation "past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies" on an unjustified metaphysical premise. I am not.

Science has empirically shown it is a powerful means for understanding what ‘is’ and how it works. That means the idea that important aspects of what is in our reality and how it works can be understood is a provisionally true, highly robust, scientific hypothesis - not a premise.

Again, if you want to disagree, that is fine with me.

But I must ask. Do you then conclude that there is no point in doing science at all? And if some science is worthwhile, how do you distinguish what is worthwhile from what is not? Perhaps just how you feel about the answers provided?

Curry believes his approach bypasses philosophy by using Popperian science to treat moral questions. However , rival views of the role of science (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rouse, Rorty) reveal Popperian science (as Curry calls his approach) as stuffed with philosophical presuppositions — Joshs

I understand Curry’s two main claims for Morality as Cooperation to be that cross-culturally universal moral judgments 1) solve cooperation problems (an empirical claim about what ‘is’ that I agree with) and 2) cross-cultural moral judgments solving cooperation problems are also somehow(?) normatively moral (a position about normative moral oughts that Curry does not adequately defend IMHO).

I try to be careful to only rely on Curry’s empirical observations which appear to be good scientific data. I have not been able to follow Curry’s arguments for Morality as Cooperation’s normativity and in no way rely on it.

Which do you think communicates better, “marker norms” or “signaling norms”?
— Mark S

"signalling" sounds more appropriate and it may fit well with analogous notions used in animal ethology (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_theory) — neomac

I am moving to agreement that, in part because of its increasing usage in the science of morality literature, "signaling norms" may be preferrable to "marker norms".

I'm very much interested in this topic and I'm sympathetic to your views so I hope we can discuss it further but I would like to finish to read Oliver Curry’s Morality as Cooperation — neomac

I'm glad to hear of your interest! Proposing the potential relevance of the science of morality to questions in moral philosophy and practical ethics can be a lonely business on philosophy websites.

How do you get buy in for this when many people think morality comes from - gods/s, higher consciousness, a Platonic realm, etc? — Tom Storm

Consider getting buy-in for understanding domination moral norms such as “women must be submissive to men” as cooperation to exploit an outgroup.

Women who are being exploited and are questioning the morality of that exploitation should be easily convinced. The scientific explanation of the shameful reasons such norms exist should be attractive to them. I don’t see a problem with getting them to buy in.

Men who enjoy the benefits of this exploitation and are not concerned with the morality of it will be resistant if not impossible to convince. But at least those being exploited have some objective reasons for arguing against the normal mysticism of religious and cultural domination norms.

You begin with a metaphysical position - that reality can be understood by humans and that science is the chief tool in this enterprise. — Tom Storm

No. The metaphysical position I take is not a premise. It is an empirical provisional truth from science. Science has empirically shown it is a powerful means for understanding what ‘is’ and how it works. Science has not shown it is a suitable means for understanding what ought to be or what we imperatively ought to do. They are different categories of things.

No one has discovered a truth value to moral claims or moral instructions. — Andrew4Handel

So you find no truth value in the OP? Humm…

I think there is an equally, if not more, important affective dimension; the moral sense. The moral sense is based on love, for those closest to one, and general compassion for others. — Janus

But our moral sense can also judge domination moral norms as right and even obligatory, such as extreme cases in the middle east of killing one’s daughter to “protect family honor” because she eloped with a neighbor boy the family judged unsuitable.

The thing to remember is that the selection force for the biology underlying our moral sense is the reproductive fitness benefits of the cooperation it motivates. That reproductive fitness benefit is what encodes the same partnership and domination cooperation strategies in our moral sense as is encoded in cultural moral norms.

Where did you get this classification? Is it yours? — neomac

I was hoping someone would ask about the nomenclature.

The sociologist Riane Eisler coined the names of the basic patterns of cooperation in societies as partnership and domination morality in her 1987 book The Chalice and the Blade.

I’ve not seen her nomenclature (or any good alternatives) used in the science of morality literature. But her’s seems wonderfully appropriate, so I thought I would try it out here. Previously, I have referred to these categories as “ingroup” and “exploitation” (cooperation to exploit an outgroup) moral norms but now prefer Eisler’s names. What do you think?

Nomenclature in the science of morality field is still in flux. Perhaps by having a better name, the domination subset of human morality will get more of the attention it deserves. The present science of morality field’s focus (such as Oliver Curry’s Morality as Cooperation and Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations work) is on partnership moral judgments, with unfortunate neglect of domination moral judgments and norms.

“Marker moral norms” has been used in the field for some time (and the strategy in game theory they implement has been called the “green beard” strategy). More recently, these norms have been called signaling norms (signaling membership and commitment to a more reliably cooperative ingroup) as in this 2021 paper:
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rstb.2020.0294

Which do you think communicates better, “marker norms” or “signaling norms”?

Yes, but you are making an ought - that there is a way to approach this using empirical observation (and the norm model) which are values which need to be justified to those who believe in moral truths which come from theism or a Platonic realm, or similar.

Seems to me that your model only works if everyone who comes to a study of ethics shares your initial axiom - which requires a commitment to a particular worldview. — Tom Storm

Yes, understanding the function of past and present cultural moral norms as solving cooperation problems does require a worldview – one that accepts, rather than rejects, science as a powerful way to understand what ‘is’ in our universe and how it works. But don’t we agree about that?

If that scientific understanding of past and present cultural moral norms is, like the rest of science, instrumentally useful for achieving our relevant goals (here achieving the benefits of cooperation in our societies), then is not that useful science?

Note that I am not proceeding to say “This is the benefit of cooperation (flourishing or reduction in suffering) you ought to pursue.” This would be claiming an ought which would have to be justified.

Identifying an instrumental ought (you ought to do X if you want to achieve Y) from science does not imply any oughts that must be justified. Are you still thinking it does?

There is something very specific about the continued stigmatisation of homosexuality in various cultures. Why did the writers of the bible care about it?

It really seems very arbitrary. I don't see the creation in groups and out groups as a moral system as opposed to a hierarchy.
But I don't see what the benefit in this case is of condemning homosexuals (to the point of neuroticism) If a morality evolved from such irrationality it seems unreliable. — Andrew4Handel

What kind of threat are homosexuals to society? An imaginary one.

Being imaginary does not prevent right-wingers in the United States and other places from advocating against the threat of the “gay agenda” to families and children to demonize homosexuality. Why would people do that?

Demonizing homosexuality can be beneficial for the people doing it. First, among Christian fundamentalists, it marks them as ‘moral’ people worthy of respect at little cost to themselves. It even marks them as leaders fighting to defend innocent families and children.

Do they know the threats are imaginary? I don’t know. I do know that when it is in someone’s self-interest not to understand something, they are unlikely to ever be able to understand it.

Why do Christian fundamentalists who are not trying to be leaders believe it, often against the evidence of their own experience? Beyond the religious teachings calling for the execution of male homosexuals (Leviticus 20:13), they can believe it because it feels good. Due to our evolutionary history, cooperating to defend our groups (here families and children) triggers pleasurable emotions of pride, elation, and righteous indignation. There is an emotional feedback system in biology underlying our moral sense that can be hijacked to resist the threat of even imaginary threats.

Marker strategies are often random. If they don’t make any sense, then people who follow them must be sincere and committed to the ingroup and therefore likely to be good people to cooperate with.

For example:
The many food and sex taboos including the execution of male homosexuals (Leviticus 20:13);
Stoning of those who curse (Leviticus 24:10–16),
Stoning of those who work on the Sabbath (Exodus 31:15)
Do not wear clothing woven of two kinds of material (Leviticus 19:19)

What about moral norms such as the prohibition of homosexuality, the acceptance of slavery, the inequality of the sexes, the application of the death penalty and so on. — Andrew4Handel

From the OP:

...the coherence, diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of past and present moral norms people typically argue about are products of three major norm categories: (There may be other categories of moral norms specific to cooperation by kin-altruism and hierarchies that are less often debated.)

Partnership moral norms – Parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems between people with equal moral standing. These include heuristics “Do to others as you would have them do to you”, “Do not steal, lie, or kill”, and “Be loyal to your group” which advocate initiating indirect reciprocity. (Cross-culturally moral norms are partnership moral norms.)

Domination moral norms – Parts of strategies to cooperatively exploit an outgroup to benefit an ingroup. These include “Slaves must obey their masters” and “Women must be submissive to men”.

Marker moral norms – Markers of membership in and commitment to a more cooperative ingroup. Preferentially cooperating with members of an ingroup can reduce the chances of being exploited and thereby increase the benefits of cooperation. These markers include “eating shrimp is an abomination”, “masturbation is immoral”, and other food and sex taboos. — Mark S

1) prohibition of homosexuality – The simple prohibition is a sex taboo marker norm of membership and commitment to a more reliably cooperative ingroup. But the effect of this moral norm on ingroup cooperation can be enhanced by claiming that homosexuals are somehow a threat to the ingroup that all must unite against. Due to our evolutionary history in small groups, we are strongly inclined to increase cooperation when our ingroup is threatened. So claiming that homosexuals are both evil and somehow a threat to society is an example of a domination moral norm which exploits an outgroup, homosexuals, as an imaginary threat to the ingroup (the society).

2) Moral norms condoning slavery and the inequality of the sexes – Both are examples of domination moral norms.

3) Acceptance of the death penalty – Moral norms are cultural norms whose violation is commonly felt to deserve punishment. Laws about the death penalty are in a different category. But a relevant moral norm could be “Do not kill people for fun; that merits execution”. Executing people who kill for fun is a punishment component of cooperation strategies. For cooperation strategies (composed of moral norms) to be stable in the face of free-riders and other exploiters, there must be punishment of violations. The relevant insight science provides is that execution can be parts of cooperation strategies encoded in a society’s moral norms. Whether or not to advocate for such norms can be an instrumental choice based on which option will most likely increase the benefits of future cooperation. Of course, this is only an insight into what the moral norm ‘is’, not what the moral norm ‘ought’ to be. We both might advocate that moral norms whose violation merits death also be judged based on a Rawlsian view of justice and minimizing suffering. Remember, science is silent about what moral norms ought to be. Science can only tell us what moral norms ‘are’.

Is does not debunk ought. A naturalistic theory of morality does not have it as a consequence that moral imperatives are false, invalid or obsolete. — SophistiCat

Moral norms are just a different kind of norm, and they are not derivable from anything non-moral, though many things can influence them. — SophistiCat

I am an admirer of Hume and, perhaps like you, have yet to find any convincing argument for how to derive an imperative ought from what ‘is’ – they are different categories of thing.

The “mysticism” of cultural moral norms that science debunks is the mystery of their origins and why they have the strange intuitive properties (that John Mackie described as queerness) of bindingness and violations deserving punishment.

By explaining the “queerness” of our intuitions about cultural moral norms as subcomponents of cooperation strategies, science debunks the mysticism that shields cultural moral norms from rational discussion.

This mysticism is not in the category of imperative oughts.

Science reveals an objective basis for evaluating cultural moral norms as instrumental oughts. If you want the benefits of cooperation, you ought not follow cultural moral norms when they predictably will create rather than solve cooperation problems. That seems simple to me.

On the other hand, consider a stoic, a consequentialist (perhaps for flourishing or reducing suffering), and a religious divine command theorist. What implications, if any, does this science have for their answers to “What is good?” and “How should I live?”? There are no necessary implications at all. They are about different categories of thing.

Past and present cultural moral norms are subcomponents of cooperation strategies. We know this is true in the normal provisional scientific sense based on the hypothesis’ incredible explanatory power for known past and present cultural moral norms, plus meeting other relevant criteria for scientific truth such as simplicity and integration with the rest of science.

I am not making an ethical proposal of the form “You imperatively ought to do such and so” which would require an explanation of where the ought comes from.

Rather, I am first reporting an empirical observation that virtually all past and present cultural moral norms can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies. It is the nature of empirical observations that is not necessary to explain why they are what they are and not something different (in this case different from cooperation).

Second, I am arguing that this empirical finding is useful for resolving many disputes about cultural moral norms since:

With this empirical knowledge:
• Any perceived imperative oughts are debunked. (Despite our intuitions, the Golden Rule, do not lie, steal, or kill, and other cultural moral norms do not have any innate, mystical, imperative oughtness. They are only heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies.)
• Agreement on if or when moral norms will be advocated becomes an instrumental choice. If people want the material and psychological benefits of cooperation in their society, they should (instrumental ought):

o Advocate following cultural moral norms when they will predictably solve cooperation problems and
o Advocate not following those moral norms when they predictably will create cooperation problems. (Not following the moral norms when, as fallible heuristics, they act opposite to their function.)

The scientific study of cultural moral norms reveals that, as heuristics for cooperation strategies, advocating or not advocating cultural moral norms can be justified as an instrumental ought. — Mark S

In biology two kinds of relationships exist:

1. Parasitic: in a relationship, one gains and the other loses
2. Symbiotic: in a relationship, both register a gain

Morality is, by the looks of it, all about symbiosis and reducing parasitism. — Agent Smith

Right. You are talking about what is, at bottom, a cooperation problem that symbiotic relationships have solved by gene-motivated behaviors selected for by the reproductive fitness gains both partners obtain. My subject is about how cultural moral norms solve the same cooperation problems. Nice parallel. Thanks.