No, he does not. Nowhere does Gert claim that the imperative of lessening of harm is (a) descriptively moral and (b) scientifically justified. — SophistiCat

You are correct that Gert does not mention science. My parenthetical “(a subject within science's what 'is' domain)” was meant to be my own clarifying comment. I should not have included it.

Are you thinking “An informal public system applying to all moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system” can be a definition of what is normative?

This definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then the exploitation of slaves with the goal of lessening harm to their masters will be consistent with the definition. This makes sense if the definition is what is descriptively moral as I understand Gert to the saying. But thinking it is a definition of what is normative would be offensive to modern ears, right?

Also, I disagree that for something to even be recognized as a moral code, it has to be acceptable by all moral agents ("rational people"). That is much too restrictive for a definition. — SophistiCat

I understand your concern about all rational people advocating for a moral claim as criterion for normativity. I don’t share that concern for the normativity by Gert’s criterion (or something close to it) of Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) regarding moral ‘means’ due to its basis in objective science.

But no problem, you don’t like Gert’s criterion for normativity. What criterion do you prefer?

But perhaps your preference might be better discussed in a fresh thread? I’d like to keep the focus of this thread on Gert’s perspective.

To me, Gert’s definition of “morality” is descriptive. What I think Gert takes to be a normative definition of morality is the set of rules and ideals he discussed later in his lecture. — neomac

Right!

Both your descriptive definition of morality and Gert’s descriptive definition of morality can account for the fact that “slaves must obey their masters” can be taken as a moral rule. Can’t they? If so, this example doesn’t show us in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. — neomac

Yes, “slaves must obey their masters” has too often been a cultural moral norm enforced by an ingroup to exploit an outgroup.

The reason that "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of what is descriptively moral is that 1) it adds explanatory power, particularly for marker norms such as “working on the sabbath deserves death” and “homosexuality is evil”, and 2) it directly follows from the ultimate source of morality - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

Without "increasing the benefits of cooperation" you can’t say you have a definition of what is descriptively moral that explains past and present moral norms. And you can’t link cultural moral norms to their ultimate source - the cooperation problems that all highly cooperative societies must solve.

In other words, allusions to cooperation strategies should be part of a lower level wrt Gert’s general descriptive definition of morality and a more oriented toward an empirical investigation. — neomac

As I described above, adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" is necessary for a descriptive definition of moral means that applies (as a claimed empirical truth) to all past and present cultural moral norms. That cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is the highest level claim we can make about moral 'means'.

This formulation departs from the meta-ethical question of "what morality is". Stating that the goal of moral precepts is "lessening of harm" tells us what we imperatively ought to follow: we ought to lessen harm. It is morally good to lessen harm and morally bad to increase it. — SophistiCat

You did not ask a question, but I will try to clarify what I have said that is relevant.

As you know, what morality descriptively ‘is’ and what morality normatively ‘is’ are separate questions. In traditional moral philosophy, an extreme version of this idea is that “science has nothing to offer moral philosophy”, implying that what is descriptively moral is irrelevant to what is normatively moral.

Gert contradicts this view by claiming that the "lessening of harm" component of what is descriptively moral (a subject within science's what 'is' domain) is also normatively moral by his criterion “what all rational people would put forward”.

My proposed Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) follows Gert’s line of thinking by arguing that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies that exist because they produced benefits and reduced harm for our ancestors.

Since MACS only describes moral ‘means’ (solving cooperation problems and not creating them), it is complimentary to consequentialism whether those consequences maximize happiness or minimize harm as Gert prefers.

Hence, I see MACS as illuminating and providing a stronger foundation in descriptive morality for Gert’s negative utilitarianism.

It's not clear in what way adding "increasing the benefits of cooperation" improves Gert’s definition of morality. Can you give concrete example to clarify that? — neomac

I see Gert’s definition of “What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” as a descriptive definition of morality, not a normative one.

He has not justified stating this as a normative (ought) claim as you (and perhaps others here) are interpreting it. As he argues in the SEP, any normative claim would be “what all rational people would put forward” - an argument he has not made.

For example, the definition includes the phrase “by those protected by the system”. Consider the moral norm: “slaves must obey their masters”. If those protected from harm by the system are only the slave masters (which was too often the historical case), then this repulsive moral norm would be included under Gert’s definition of what morality ‘is’. This makes no sense to modern sensibilities as a normative claim but is sensible as a claim about what is descriptively moral.

Also, Gert’s claim that “Morality is an informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” appears to be based on Gert’s carefully considered, armchair observations and intuitions. The modern science of morality says he is close, but not quite right, about what morality ‘is’.

My suggested revision, “An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal” more accurately reflects what science tells us of morality’s function – the principal reason what we call descriptively moral behavior exists.

That said, I am frustrated by Gert’s ambiguity in his lecture about whether he means the definition to be descriptive (the only way I can make sense of it) or normative (which he has not justified).

Perhaps Gert did intend it as a normative claim. Then I would argue it cannot be justified as “what all rational people would put forward (advocate)”.

I am a fan of Gert's approach to morality - starting from what morality 'is' and then, given those circumstances, asking, "What would all rational people advocate as moral for their society?"
It is the same approach I take but starting from what I consider a more solid foundation than Gert's about what morality 'is'.

However, I had not seen the video lecture Banno provided.

In case others also prefer to read philosophical arguments rather than hear them, here are the slides and text I found of this lecture Gert gave elsewhere at about the same time. https://sites.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec42951/001.htm

I see MACS as most useful when applied in societies with "pluralist worldviews about values and morality". By explaining what the cultural moral norms 'are' as parts of cooperation strategies rather than mystical entities, people have an objective basis for resolving their disputes.

I've used MACS as moral guidance for about 15 years now. It has worked well for me. It has given me, for example, a different slant on the morality of telling the truth and obeying the law. Neither are moral absolutes. We all know that, but MACS provides a judgment criterion that I find more useful than simple intuitions.

Here's a video you can watch to see what Bernard Gert actually thought about morality.
https://youtu.be/enVFjAUTfI8
He does give a definition of morality (at 15:28) as "An informal public system applying to all moral agents that has the goal of lessening of harm suffered by those who are protected by this system". — Banno

All,

Nice video by Gert. Except for some quibbles, I agree with his points.

Are any of you wondering how Gert’s morality can be so concrete?

He can be concrete because his subject in the video is what morality ‘is’ – the same subject as Morality As Cooperation Strategies (MACS). I don’t hear him making direct claims about what morality we somehow imperatively ought to follow (the standard focus of traditional moral philosophy).

I hear him talking about what morality we rationally would advocate given what morality ‘is’.

Can we all agree that morality ‘is’ something?

In the video, Gert asserts that

What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.

With the new insights from game theory in the last few decades, it would be more correct to say something like

What morality is: An informal public system applicable to all moral agents that has increasing the benefits of cooperation and lessening of harms suffered by those protected by the system as its goal.

This definition of what morality 'is' is empirically true, according to MACS. It explains all past and present cultural moral norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange.

This definition does not tell us what is morally normative. For that, we can apply GERT's SEP definition of morally normative: “… the term “morality” can be used … normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.”

Gert’s ten moral rules are standard cultural moral norms. Why these moral norms? MACS explains that they are all examples of rules advocating initiating reciprocity strategies. These are highly useful heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for MACS.

What does Gert say about when to not follow them?

He says: Moral Rules Require Impartiality - To be justified in violating a moral rule one must be willing for all to know they can break the rule in the same circumstances.

Fine, but what circumstances are those? MACS suggest that those circumstances are when following the rule will predictably not solve cooperation problems and may create them. And this criterion is just what is empirically observed when cultures condone abandoning moral norms.

I see MACS as illuminating and expanding on Gert’s perspective, not contradicting it.

In your experience, who else, aside from Gert, uses morally normative to refer to "a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.”
I know of no one who uses it this way except people that refer to Gert as their source. Gert is providing a useful definition of morally normative.

Defining morality is only one function of religion.
— Mark S
Just the main one, without which the community would tear itself to bits, arguing over what's right and wrong, and nobody could be comforted. — Vera Mont

That is not what I have observed, but I understand that it could be your experience.

Such a religious person could understand that morality exists independently of religion.
— Mark S

I very much doubt that. If it didn't set out moral precepts, what good would a religion be? — Vera Mont

In my experience, it is not unusual for religious people to be able to think rationally about morality. Examples include changing minds within the Episcopalian church about the morality of gay marriage, abortion, women in the priesthood, and homosexuality.

Religions have continuously refined their moralities regarding whatever moral norms become offensive. Read the Old Testament for some strikingly evil things commanded by God. Most of that load of nonsense has been abandoned. It was done so by religious people thinking rationally.

Are all religious people so flexible? No, of course not.

Defining morality is only one function of religion. Religions also provide supportive communities, purpose in life, and the comfort of thinking a supernatural being is looking after you. Those are the more powerful reasons religion exists. Not having a monopoly on morality does not prohibit those functions from maintaining religion.

to rally a community around a rational moral decision about abortion, assisted suicide, gender reassignment or even equal marriage, we always have to deal with people who present as rational - except in their moral belief. — Vera Mont

To what extent can religious people be rational about their religion-based moral beliefs?

Consider:

A person who delusionally interprets their religious experiences, even including conversations with gods, as real could ‘rationally’ hold that their religion’s moral beliefs are true, must be advocated, and enforced regardless of information to the contrary.

Also, a mentally normal person who is poorly informed could believe that gods are the only sources of morality and, therefore, rationally hold that their religion’s moral beliefs are true, must be advocated, and enforced.

So, we might ask:

To what extent can well-informed, mentally normal, religious people be rational about their religion-based moral beliefs?

Such a religious person could understand that morality exists independently of religion. Then if they have their doubts about the morality of a religious moral norm, or if they come into conflict with people about if those moral norms should be advocated, they may be able to enter rational discussions about those moral norms.

They may be able to rationally discuss those norms to the extent they understand that morality exists independently of religion.

I can't quite work out how your system would apply to an individual in their day to day choices or how we would involve a community in discussing or implementing it. — Tom Storm

The first thing to understand about how individuals can apply MACS in their lives is that well-intentioned people around the world already practice heuristic versions of MACS. Remember that past and present cultural moral norms empirically are heuristics (flawed rules of thumb) for MACS.

Normally, MACS practitioners would act according to their existing cultural moral norms just as they always have.

However, two circumstances may arise that would lead people to question if they morally ‘should’ follow a particular cultural moral norm. MACS can then be called on to help resolve their questions.

The first circumstance is that the person may know what the heuristic says to do, for example, versions of the Golden Rule, but intuitively feel doing so would not be right. Such ‘wrongness’ intuitions about following the Golden Rule arise, for example, when dealing with criminals, in wartime, or just when tastes differ. By revealing that versions of the Golden Rule are heuristics for solving cooperation problems, MACS provides an objective criterion for not following the Golden Rule when doing so does not “solve cooperation problems”, but instead creates them. MACS does not tell us we morally should abandon the Golden Rule, but instead informs us about the rare occasions when it might be immoral to follow it.

The second circumstance is that people disagree about the morality of a moral norm, for example, “homosexuality is evil”. MACS reveals that this moral norm has two components 1) a marker norm of membership and commitment to an ingroup which can motivate increased cooperation, and 2) a norm by which an ingroup can exploit an outgroup as a supposed threat to the ingroup, also thereby motivating increasing cooperation in the ingroup. Since the second component creates cooperation problems for homosexuals, it is objectively immoral on that count by MACS based (I argue) on fulfilling Gert’s definition of morally normative.

MACS also is silent about the ultimate goal of moral behavior. When MACS's explanation of moral ‘means’ alone cannot resolve moral disputes (perhaps about abortion, euthanasia, or animal rights), people can try to agree on the ultimate goal of moral behavior in their society. Even if that goal is unique to their society, it can still help promote cooperation to achieve that goal within their societies.

Based on the above description, MACS appears to be easier to apply in one’s life than any other available moral theory I know.

:up:

I still struggle to see how a cooperation strategy is of itself useful or even entirely comprehensible to a diverse community, where cooperation is understood differently and where society is understood differently. A Muslim culture, for instance. Or an atheist culture. When we get to issues like abortion or capital punishment or gay rights, or whether creationism should replace evolution in school learning - how do we determine what is right? — Tom Storm

MACS would assist in refining cultural moral norms the same means cultural norms are refined now - by a chaotic system influenced at least in part by ethicists. The difference would be that ethicists would have available an objective definition of moral 'means', in addition to their concepts of moral goals, to add to their toolkit for resolving moral disputes.

You could ask the same question about "How would it work?" regarding utilitarianism or virtue ethics. There is no magic answer machine for everything we might want to know about what we morally ought to do. We have to do some work.

Another take is that it provides retribution and consequences for a bad deed, which people seem to find psychologically satisfying in a way which may not be easy to measure - psychological wellbeing might be one approach. But I understand your position here. — Tom Storm

Like past and present cultural moral norms, our psychologically satisfying inclination for retribution for evil deeds such as murder is part of cooperation strategies. Specifically, our feeling or righteous indignation motivates the punishment of violation component that is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Indeed, our moral senses’ judgments and our other moral emotions of empathy, gratitude, loyalty, shame, and guilt are also explained as parts of cooperation strategies.

In these three threads, I was trying to simplify my argument by not mentioning the shared origins of the biology underlying our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms.

How do you determine which of these it does? How would a state set up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices people could make in society? — Tom Storm

I don’t foresee states “setting up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices”.

MACS’s principles can be additional criteria for judging how to refine cultural moral norms to meet human needs and preferences better.

Banno, no I don’t see the joke and I expect neither would Bernard and Josuha Gert who have maintained the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the definition of morality for over 20 years. All I see is your assumption of bigotry.

Tom,

You bring up important issues about my adaptation of Gert’s definition of morally normativity – how to judge the normativity of moral claims.

Are Gert’s definition and my adaptation perfect? No, they are just the best I know of.

Without them, I am left with personal preference regarding which moral claims I adopt and advocate. Personal preference is not so culturally useful making that choice method less preferred.

But attempting to resolve such issues about normativity is too complex and important to try to append to the end of this thread.

How about I start a new thread only about Gert’s definition? People can share what they think about normativity.

Can you tell me how would you assess capital punishment as a penalty for, say, killing someone? Is capital punishment morally sound - how do you go about answering or contextualizing this using your method? — Tom Storm

MACS’s claimed universal moral principles about moral ‘means’ are:

• Act to solve cooperation problems.
• Do not create cooperation problems.

The morality of capital punishment can be a mixed bag depending on circumstances.

Capital punishment is part of a strategy that solves cooperation problems. It punishes reciprocity violations about not killing each other with the intended outcome of reducing future killing. Capital punishment can thereby increase or maintain the future benefits of cooperation in societies. This is why it has commonly existed.

But capital punishment also creates cooperation problems by 1) itself being a reciprocity violation about not killing each other and 2) potentially reducing trust and its resulting cooperation in the society by motivating revenge or other bad behavior by friends and family of the executed person.

The morality of capital punishment comes down to if it will, on balance, increase or reduce the trust needed for a cooperative society.

In advanced societies, I expect the answer is that capital punishment is immoral – on balance it reduces trust and cooperation in society. Other remedies, such as long prison sentences, are morally preferable.

A simpler answer would have been nice, but morality is complicated.

We keep coming back to the idea that cooperation is not of itself a sound or neutral moral position, but may be used to dominate, subjugate and murder. Are there not ethical considerations or questions that need to be asked before one can get to morality as a cooperation strategy? Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell? — Tom Storm

Tom, please read my above response to PhilosophyRunner on the same topic.

And consider MACS's actual proposed moral principles rather than some kind of "Cooperation is Moral" idea which I agree would be poor moral advice. MACS's principles are short on exploitation and bad behavior:

Act to solve cooperation problems.
Do not create cooperation problems.

You ask a relevant question "Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell?"

That question I answer in "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies" as

“What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.”

Cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems in the in group. — PhilosophyRunner

This may be true in a sense but is not relevant.

You are still focused in the weeds of our diverse, contradictory, and strange past and present cultural moral norms. You will find all sorts of cultural adaptations such as cooperating to exploit outgroups, markers of membership ingroups, and respect for authority and sacred objects. None are innate to what morality ‘is’ at a its most fundamental level.

Cultural moral norms are only signposts to MACS’s source in the cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

It would help to briefly describe how those cooperation problems, which can be understood as cooperation/exploitation dilemmas, arise in our universe.

Cooperation is commonly beneficial everywhere in our universe. However, cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation because exploitation is virtually always the winning short-term strategy and can be even in the long term. Unfortunately, exploitation destroys motivation to cooperate in the future and its potential benefits. These circumstances create the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

Our ancestors chanced across reciprocity strategies that can solve this dilemma. The solve the dilemma by motivating punishment of people who exploit others. In this way, our ancestors chanced across morality.

Don’t kill, steal, or lie are moral norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. Why? Because they are violations of reciprocity within a society. That unstated reciprocity agreement is “I will not kill, steal, or lie (even when I really want to) and I expect no one will kill, steal, or lie to me”.

Solutions to this innate to our universe cooperation/exploitation dilemma are the ultimate source of MACS’ moral principles:

Act to solve cooperation problems.
Do not create cooperation problems.

Exploitation (of an outgroup by an ingroup) cannot be part of those principles because that would contradict the function of what morality at its most fundamental level ‘is’ - preventing exploitation.

So the foundation of your theory, is based on observing past societies. And in this observation we see that total cooperation including the outgroup is not what is the moral norm, rather the moral norm includes domination of the outgroup.

And so your pruning of the domination moral norm is not justified by the method you use. You claim that the "is" excludes domination moral norms. But the "is" that is observed includes domination moral norms.

If I were to base my morality on past societies, it would be to form an in-group and then dominate the out group - that is what many of the great past civilizations did. — PhilosophyRunner

You are not recognizing the innate pruning of domination norms by MACS’ ultimate source. The ultimate source of MACS is not past and present cultural moral norms. Past and present cultural moral norms are only a signpost pointing to MACS’ ultimate source.

We find MACS’ ultimate source by answering “Why do cultural moral norms exist?”

As I have been saying, cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems. Domination norms which exploit outgroups are creating cooperation problems for the outgroup – the opposite of MACS’ function and therefore automatically excluded (pruned) from the start.

MACS’s moral principles are not based on the morality of past societies. MACS’s moral principles summarize solutions to cooperation problems that are present everywhere in our universe from the beginning to the end of time. That is a much grander and more insightful view of morality,

Observation of past societies show that domination moral norms are just as effective at cooperation. However you are pruning away the domination moral norms by using some other "ought" based morality, but then presenting it as if it were an "is" observation. — PhilosophyRunner

Thanks for posting again, I think I understand you better this time.

Yes, I must show how domination moral norms are pruned (nice turn of phrase) to not be a part of MACS. And there must be no hidden moral oughts involved in that pruning.

From my OP,

... the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims become:

“Behaviors that increase well-being by solving cooperation problems are moral” and

“Behavior that minimize suffering by solving cooperation problems are moral.” — Mark S

Here, I am claiming that “solving cooperation problems is moral ‘means’". (Note I also claim the implied “creating cooperation problems is immoral ‘means’".)

What may not be obvious is that these principles innately exclude domination moral norms – no sneaky separate pruning required. Domination moral norms are excluded because their goals of exploiting outgroups are excluded. Exploiting outgroups creates cooperation problems for the outgroup and are therefore immoral (even while solving cooperation problems for the ingroup).

What is the objective source of the moral claims:
• Solving cooperation problems is moral and
• Creating cooperation problems is immoral?

That source is the observation that the function of past and present cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems. These cooperation/exploitation dilemmas are present everywhere in our universe and must be solved to enable forming highly cooperative societies.

What is the objective source of their imperative bindingness? There is none. This is a claim about what moral behavior ‘is’ in our universe, not a claim about what it ought to be. What ought to be moral is 1) a different category of thing and 2) the focus of traditional moral philosophy.

means to show or investigate protomorality — Agent Smith

Understanding MACS as “protomorality” sounds like a helpful perspective. It could help bridge the intellectual framing gap between how understanding what moral behavior ‘is’ is culturally useful (my topic) and traditional moral philosophy’s focus on what ought to be moral, a different category of thing.

No, the two claims are not contrary.

Does MACS define what we imperatively ought to do? No, of course not. I have no reasons to believe such imperative oughts ever have or ever will exist.

Does MACS define what all (or virtually all) well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral in their society? I argue it does, and is therefore normative, in my post “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”. — Mark S

Your theory does not tell us what we ought do — Banno

As I argue in this thread, MACS is useful for resolving many disputes about moral norms (disputes about what we ought to do) despite lacking arguments for any kind of normativity (and especially imperative ought normativity, which I expect exists only in our delusions). So, yes, MACS, even with no normative claim tells us about what we ought to do.

Being culturally useful without any normativity makes MACS an excellent candidate to evaluate for normativity, as I do in “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”.

By Gert’s definition of normativity – “what all rational people would advocate under specified conditions” MACS is normative in the sense of defining right and wrong. But there is no source of imperative bindingness in Gert’s definition – hence no imperative ought; it can be rational to act immorally.

MACS without normative claims helps resolve many disputes about cultural moral norms. When shown to meet Gert’s definition of normative, MACS tell us much more (but not all) about what is moral and immoral.

Cultural moral norms (cultural norms whose violation is commonly considered to deserve punishment) are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.

But is that what we ought to do? — Banno

Does MACS define what we imperatively ought to do? No, of course not. I have no reasons to believe such imperative oughts ever have or ever will exist.

Does MACS define what all (or virtually all) well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral in their society? I argue it does, and is therefore normative, in my post “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”.

Without considering what all rational people would do (with no assumed normative content), is MACS useful for resolving disputes about when to advocate cultural moral norms? Yes, that is the point of this post as:

This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:

1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies). — Mark S

Why are you starting multiple threads on the same topic? — Agent Smith

Good question!

The three threads are about three different applications of MACS. One long thread on the subject would be hopelessly confusing about which application of MACS was being discussed in each comment.

Also, describing each of the three applications one at a time as they build on each other allows me to refine my ideas and presentation for the successive OP’s based on the much appreciated comments and questions I get.

In review, the separate applications are:

1) “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”

Introduced the empirical data that MACS is based on and described how this data is culturally useful for resolving many disputes about cultural moral norms. It is useful despite having no innate, or argued for, normativity. A simple 'is' observation about past and present cultural moral norms is sufficient to resolve, as described, many serious disputes about enforcing cultural moral norms (which MACS reveals to be heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies). For many, that may be an unusual idea. This thread discusses several controversial questions and is useful as a standalone.

2) “Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism”.

Emphasizes that MACS only tells us about what moral means (moral interactions between people as described by cultural moral norms) ‘are’ and is silent about moral goals such as forms of consequentialism. By defining moral ‘means’ as solving cooperation problems, MACS complements consequentialism by eliminating consequentialism’s well-known ‘means’ flaws such as over-demandingness. Conversely, consequentialist goals complement MACS by providing a definition of what goals of cooperation are moral – a subject MACS is silent on. There are still no normativity claims involved regarding MACS itself.

For people who do not accept the reality of imperative moral oughts, a MACS/consequentialist morality might be their preference for both their society and themselves.

Again, there are several ideas that may be new here and worth discussing on their own.

3) “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”

Could MACS be normative – define what we ought and ought not to do?

Describes the third application of MACS with a normative claim.

I don't think cultural norms track morality only. Sinister elements may too. — Agent Smith

Sinister elements such as domination moral norms and some marker moral norms do of course exist as I described in “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”

Cultural norms track a lot of things. The subject here is cultural moral norms – norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment, though the violator may not actually be punished except by social disapproval.

Does it mean a lot to you, this MACS? — Agent Smith

Yes, it has kept me entertained for about 15 years now. The science was easy. The presentation is devilishly difficult.

I suggest you reread my first post.

“What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”.

It will help clarify that the examples you mention are Domination and Marker norms, not Partnership moral norms.

As I describe in my next post: "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies"

Partnership moral norms conform to MACS’ moral principle, “Act to solve cooperation problems” and are universally moral.

Domination moral norms (and sometimes Marker moral norms) violate MACS’s “Do not act to create cooperation problems”. These violations make them immoral in an absolute sense.

You are more familiar with Prinz and Nussbaum’s work than I am.

But I would reiterate how revealing it is to move up a few levels of causation from emotions being the ultimate source of moral judgments (close to Prinz and Nussbaum’s positions?) into what caused these emotions to exist. It is much more revealing and useful for resolving disputes about moral norms to understand the ultimate source of cultural moral norms not in our emotions but in strategies that solve cooperation problems.

Because you fail to grasp the pragmatic rationality of MAGA adherents relative to their way of looking at the world, you blame them for your failure of understanding and reify this hostility as ‘correctly scientific rationality’ which you will then attempt to shove down their throats with the blessing of your fellow scientists. Just rinse and repeat and we have a perfect recipe for the perpetuation of intercultural violence. — Joshs

You misunderstand me. As I have said, I don’t expect the MAGA adherents who benefit from their ‘morality’ to be swayed by MACS arguments. I expect the MAGA people being exploited or concerned by those arguments (women, gay people, people of color, average people in MAGA areas) to use them as an intellectual moral cudgel they have not had against the oppressors. What I am after is providing intellectual weapons for resolving “intra” cultural (within MAGA) disputes about morality.

True that. I guess one is moral to members of a group you belong to to be immoral to members of other groups. Basically its some kinda military pact between individuals and between groups against other individuals and other groups. However, this is the current version of morality that people are questioning the validity of - animal rights, speciesism, vegetarianism, veganism, eco-movements, etc. are attempts to rectify the problem (from pirates to Jains, we must become). — Agent Smith

These are “circle of moral concern issues”.

From my "What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?" post’s OP: “What about its limits? ,,, It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited.”

MACS’s strategies are silent on all those circle of moral concern issues you bring up.

Science is inadequate to answer those questions. We must look elsewhere.

You're acting like morality exists just to solve problems of cooperation, and this is just entirely lacking in nuance, it's rarely that simple, or innocent. — Judaka

No. I am discussing the cultural usefulness of understanding that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies.

Of course, ethics is a much broader topic than the function of cultural moral norms.

From my OP

What about its limits? This observation’s usefulness in resolving moral disputes is limited by its silence on important ethical questions. It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

As to what I claim, referring once again to my OP,

Cultural moral norms are arguably heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for subcomponents of strategies that solve cooperation problems. — Mark S

I argue that this knowledge is useful for resolving many disputes about when and if cultural moral norms will be advocated in a society. Therefore, understanding that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies is culturally useful knowledge.

Your objection, as I understand it, is there is no normative content to this science telling us what we morally ought to do – the business of ethics as you see it.

Ace! You’ve got it!

But rather than the downfall you see, its lack of normative claims is its power. It provides a culturally useful basis for resolving common moral disputes (as described in the OP) without the necessity for any agreement on moral premises or normativity. No requirements for agreement on moral premises or normativity is a big advantage.

I see the business of ethics as also helping people resolve common disputes about cultural moral norms using the most effective means available. You disagree?

Do you propose to help people resolve their common disputes about cultural moral norms based on sophisticated, complex, unresolved assertions about moral premises and sources of normativity?

Good luck with that. That huge mess is what I am looking to help people avoid. Not everyone is a philosophy major who loves nothing better than endless arguments about moral premises and normativity.

On the other hand, principles that underlie the empirical observations about the function of past and present cultural moral norms may (spoiler alert) turn out to be normative – what we ought and ought not to do. This is possible. We are talking about the function of all cultural moral norms no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange. That function should have something to do with morality.

Coincidentally, I am just finishing a post on the normativity of MACS and will present it in a day or two. I define the universal principles underlying MACS and argue for their normativity. I hope for many good comments.

But that argument is complicated and not one I would inflict on average people looking to resolve a dispute about when to advocate not following the Golden Rule.

Most people trying to resolve disputes about moral norms will be more successful starting with the elementary understanding that cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies.

We ought cooperate in kicking puppies. — Banno

The OP proposes that the function of past and present cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems. That is what cooperation strategies do. How do you imagine kicking puppies solves cooperation problems? You are just making up nonsense.

As I've been trying to point out, the cooperation morality is helping to create is tribal in nature. Conflicts are a part of the nature of morality, it's a healthy part of what it evolved to be. I have no desire to resolve such disputes. — Judaka

The cooperation that morality enables does so by solving problems that are innate to our universe. The nature of moral norms is to solve conflicts. If you have no desire to resolve such disputes, you would not be a good person to associate with. OK.

There is nothing about groups in the cooperation problems that are innate to our universe. Cooperating in groups (tribes) and discriminating against outgroups is just one cooperation strategy, not an innate feature of the problems being solved.

Morality evolved for the purpose of cooperation, but it's much more than that now, just like so many other things about human behaviour. There's money to be made, power to be had, ideals to be upheld and yada yada. And as I've said, it's not about species-wide or culture-wide cooperation. — Judaka

Sure, ethics has grown far beyond cooperation strategies to include answers to broader questions such as “What is good?”, “How should I live?”, and “What are my obligations?”

So? The subject of this thread is “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?” and “Could that knowledge help resolve disputes about moral norms?”

Morality is more complicated than its original function, and how it accomplishes this original function is not through a conscious love of cooperation, it's so very far away from that. — Judaka

Perhaps you are thinking about the complexity added by two powerful human-invented cooperation strategies: money economies and rule of law?

Money economies are fantastically more efficient means of solving cooperation problems than moral behaviors as defined by moral norms. And rule of law efficiently supplies the necessary punishment component of cooperation strategies by reducing the risk of punishment provoking escalating cycles of retribution.

Money economies and rule of law do not directly “complicate” the function of morality. Their chief effect has been to obscure the function of morality as solving cooperation problems.

Prior to the invention of money economies and rule of law, it would have been common knowledge, even obvious, that the function of morality was to increase cooperation. People knew they needed to solve cooperation problems and acting morally was the only means they had to do so, except for inefficient barter or force within hierarchies.

See Protagoras’ explanation of morality as cooperation in Plato’s dialog of the same name. Protagoras described as ancient knowledge that morality as cooperation was a gift from Zeus. Entertainingly, Socrates ignored and did not respond to 1) this correct explanation of morality (correct if we substitute biological and cultural evolution for Zeus) and 2) Protagoras’ main point in the debate about teaching morality. Perhaps Socrates ignored it because morality as cooperation was too commonplace an idea and therefore uninteresting. Or perhaps Socrates had nothing to say to criticize it and commenting favorably did not suit his purposes.

Psychopaths (people with diminished or absent empathy and conscience) will not feel any “love of cooperation” – they only love themselves.

In contrast, the spontaneous feeling of satisfaction and optimism in the cooperative (moral) company of friends and family is a primary source of durable happiness for most people.

Most people already agree on the basics of what's moral or immoral (lying, murder, stealing, etc.). What's disputed are the foundational questions, and you're probably not going to find consistency here. For me, the foundational questions are the real questions. — Sam26

First, remember that "past and present cultural moral norms are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems" is claimed provisionally true science with no innate normativity. People may find it useful or not. No problem if they do not.

Second, the foundational problems you reference refer to (I assume?) what ought our goals be or what ought we do regardless of our needs and preferences. These problems likely have no objective answers based on the failures of the last 2500 years of study by incredibly bright people to find any. You are advocating potentially condemning people to endless, unresolvable debates which will provide little to no objective help in resolving common moral disputes.

Third, the MACS perspective is the most useful objective basis that I am aware of for judging whether cultural moral norms fulfill or do not fulfill their function of increasing the benefits of cooperation (increasing the benefits of living in a society). Contrary to your claim, most moral disputes are about when cultural partnership moral norms will be enforced such as "lying, murder (or 'killing'), stealing" and following the Golden Rule or if domination moral norms and marker norms will be enforced. Virtually no one, except philosophy majors, argues about the ultimate source of morality as consequentialism, virtue ethics, and the like.

I see the MACS perspective as culturally useful for resolving common moral disputes. It is essentially silent regarding solving the foundational questions you seem most interested in.

Maybe that silence is a good thing. That means MACS does not directly threaten the intellectual edifices that have been constructed regarding your foundational moral questions.

What's your actual proposal? To turn morality into a science? To assert it'd be anti-scientific to go against whatever scientists proposed was the objectively correct way to cooperate? — Judaka

My proposal is that people understand that all cultural moral norms can be explained as parts of strategies to solve cooperation problems. That knowledge is instrumentally useful for resolving disputes about when or if to enforce those moral norms because it:

1) Shows that mystical explanations from religions or cultural history are, at best, suspect.
2) Provides an objective, rather than subjective, basis for resolving those disputes. (What better basis do you suggest for resolving moral norm enforcement disputes?)
3) Resolves those disputes in ways most likely to achieve the benefits of cooperation (to achieve the benefits that have made human beings the incredibly successful social species we are).
4) Provides an objective moral principle for resolving moral disputes that otherwise does not exist (so far as I know).

Perhaps your objection is that the above requires rational thought about enforcing cultural moral norms?

Sure, people benefiting from domination norms will commonly find themselves unable to reason rationally about those norms. So what?

People who are being exploited by domination moral norms will find themselves able to think rationally about those as soon as they see the advantage to themselves. So at least half the argument about enforcing domination norms can commonly have an objective basis in science. That is a big advantage in resolving disputes about enforcing cultural moral norms.

You keep pointing out that disputes exist. Again, so what? My point is that understanding why cultural moral norms exist is useful for resolving those disputes regardless of anyone's "world-view".

The OP is on the right track. Not just consequentialism, even Kantian deontological ethics is about cooperation. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." ~ I. Kant (Categorical Imperative). However, in me humble opinion, cooperation is morally ambiguous (re the Italian Mafia, the Chinese Triad, the Japanese Yakuza, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, etc.). — Agent Smith

Claiming something like “Cooperation is moral” fails for just the reasons you describe. People can, and too often do, cooperate to exploit outgroups.

The recast claim “Solving cooperation problems is moral” does not suffer the same failure.

This recasting can recognize the cooperation and self-sacrifice within criminal organizations as moral, while rejecting the goal of that cooperation, the exploitation and harm to outgroups, as immoral based on it creating cooperation problems – the opposite of the function of cultural moral norms.

I wonder if you are taking morality to be man-made? And our moral choices to be made consciously? — Judaka

The point of my OP is that the cooperation strategies that compose past and present cultural moral norms are innate to our universe. So, no, morality as cooperation strategies is not man-made. People adapt these strategies as they see fit in terms of definitions of who is in ingroups and outgroups and markers of both and the like.

People make moral judgments virtually instantaneously based on their emotional responses from their moral sense. (See Hume, plus Jonathan Haidt for a modern data-driven version.) So no, moral choices are not commonly based on conscious thought processes. What can be based on conscious thought processes is resolving disputes about cultural moral norms, again as described in the OP.

This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:

1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ.
2) Revealing the exploitative component of domination moral norms and the arbitrary origins of marker strategies.
3) Piercing the mysticism of religion and cultural heritage that protects moral norms from rational discussion by revealing that cultural moral norms have natural, not mystical, origins.
4) Refining cultural moral norms to be more harmonious with our moral sense (because our moral sense also tracks cooperation strategies). — Mark S

Why do you imagine the cooperation must be on the scale of a nation? Isn't it naive to expect people to join together and cooperate on a culture-wide basis? What objective basis is this? You're privileging one type of cooperation over another, and yours is less pragmatic and goes against our tribalistic nature. — Judaka

Cultures will decide what they want to about who is in ingroups who deserve full moral regard and who is in outgroups who can be ignored or exploited. Science is silent on the matter. Again, from the OP:

What about its limits? This observation’s usefulness in resolving moral disputes is limited by its silence on important ethical questions. It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. — Mark S

I’m wondering how you would respond to Jesse Prinz’s moral relativist argument, which grounds moral values in innate emotional responses which become culturally conditioned to form an endless variety of moral values across the cultural landscape. — Joshs

I agree with Prinz that our moral judgments (values) are initially grounded in innate emotional responses. But my consideration of higher levels of causation for these phenomena causes me to part company with Prinz.

Why do we have these strange emotional responses which often motivate acting in ways (moral ways) that can appear to be against our best interests, at least in the short term?

We have these emotional responses because they are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. Our predecessors who experienced these emotions were better cooperators, left more descendants, and became the vast majority of our ancestors. Our predecessors who did not experience these emotions almost all died out.

What is the source of these cooperation problems? Their source is in the nature of our universe which can be expressed in the simple mathematics of game theory's cooperation/exploitation dilemmas.

From the same basic observation, Prinz makes a moral relativist argument and I see the basis of a species and time-independent universal morality.

Prinz would
argue that no cooperative meta-theory could bridge
the gap in values between core Trump supporters and social leftists. The best that could be hoped for is the use of rational argument to persuade both parties that neither side’s values are THE objectively correct values, and therefore each side’s perspective needs to be tolerated and even respected.

Do you think that MACS can achieve some better mutual understanding than this? — Joshs

I doubt that MAGA people who benefit from the domination (exploitation) moral norms and values they find so attractive will be convinced by any rational argument. However, the MAGA supporters being exploited - the poor, women, the elderly, immigrants, and other outgroups could be motivated (once they realize how they are being exploited) to understand and advocate for rational arguments that explain what is being done to them. So yes, MACS could be a powerful force (at least on the side of the exploited outgroups) in arguing against domination moral norms.

This thread seems to fall to the same criticism as the other - deriving an ought from an is, but not in a good way. — Banno

I derive no 'oughts' from 'is' in either OP's thread.

You might read my above reply to PhilosophyRunner which rebuts your claim.

At the moment, this is what I see you doing, in order:

1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods
2. Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like and leave only those you like based on your values.
3. Presenting this as what "is" and claiming scientific methods. However it is not a scientific observation, it is a pruned version filtered by your values. You have already introduced imperative oughts here, but done so through the back door.
4. Deriving an "ought" from what you presented as an "is" in step 4. This runs into the is/ought problem — PhilosophyRunner

Items 2., 3., and 4. are inaccurate.

More correctly,

1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods – Specifically that the function (the principle reason they exist) of past and present cultural moral norms is that they solve cooperation problems.

2. Proposing that

what is morally normative to be “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” (similar to Gert’s SEP definition of normativity https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/ ). — Mark S

3. Providing reasons that the “consequentialist definitions of morality combined with the limitation that behaviors to achieve them solve cooperation problems” is more likely to meet the above normativity criterion (what all well-informed, rational people would advocate…) than the bare consequentialist definitions of morality.

That’s it. I see no derivation of ought from is or "Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like."

For convenience, the reasons that “Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism” are:

First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and “cooperation” implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called ‘moral’ behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people”.

Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral ‘means’ of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to.

The presence of innate motivating power in the MACS part of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles provides a second reason that these claims are more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged normatively moral.

Third, the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS’ feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. MACS cross-species universality provides a third reason that the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims would be more likely to be judged normative than bare consequentialism. — Mark S