I'm trying to explain that it doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering. — Michael

I think you're saying, "It doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering, and I am going to do my best to prevent suffering."

Morality in the fundamental sense is about how we should act (and, derivatively, why we do act). You think we should act in a certain way (seek happiness and avoid suffering) and yet you refuse to call this predilection "moral," even though any definitions of "moral" that you provide entail that your predilection is moral. Of course, you usually refuse to define it whatsoever, falling in with Moore's non-committal approach.

But I would say that if you think we should pursue happiness and avoid suffering, then you are likely some sort of hedonist. You just won't fully commit because you can't answer Moore's Open Question.

Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this".

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and avoid causing pain either way. — Michael

I would say that those who promote happiness believe that happiness ought be promoted, and given your definition here that would mean that happiness is moral. Is it possible to promote something while not believing that it ought be promoted? When I do something it is because I think it should be done, especially when it is something I've deliberated about.

And if you say that there are moral 'oughts' and non-moral 'oughts', then your definition must be faulty.

@Michael - Good post.

There's an ambiguity in your proposition that "he could argue that pleasure is good". Are you saying that "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" or are you saying that pleasure happens to have the property of goodness? The former is naturalism, the latter is non-naturalism. — Michael

Yes, I realize there is an ambiguity, and I'm glad you brought this up. As I alluded to @Hanover, if the conception of goodness is monistic then we either assume that one ought do what is good and we simply end up arguing about what 'good' is, or else it is not assumed that one ought do what is good and the focus on goodness is a red herring. But neither of these necessarily involves making morality the product of natural science. Pluralistic notions of good similarly have nothing to do with non-naturalism.

I think it important not to get too caught up in the particular labels used. If you prefer, rather than use the labels "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" we can use the labels "Type X" and "Type Y". — Michael

Okay, good.

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

If "this is immoral" means "this causes suffering" then part of my question would contain a logical contradiction: my belief that it is immoral to cause suffering would be true by definition, and so we cannot even ask what would follow if that belief was false. — Michael

Agreed.

But if "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering" then there is no such contradiction and so the question is coherent. — Michael

Coherent but still confused. This is the better question:

Now given the assumption that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering", what does it mean to say that it is immoral to cause suffering? — Michael

The difference between these two questions is a very important part of this thread. One question pertains to implications, another to reasons. That suffering is moral/immoral implies that causing suffering is permissible/impermissible. But the second question presumably asks why it is immoral to cause suffering. You want to know how to answer the second question on a Moorean ethics, namely an ethics that possesses no definition of what is moral or good. In my opinion the crux of this Moorean account is this lack of a definition, not opposition to reductionism (or opposition to naturalism, either).

On some accounts we cannot define the proposition "it is immoral" in any simpler terms. However, given that such claims are intended to be normative, I am assuming that "this is immoral" just means "one ought not do this". At the very least this definition allows us to avoid having to explain why we ought not be immoral.

This then entails that the proposition "it is immoral to cause suffering" means "one ought not cause suffering" (and the proposition "it is moral to seek pleasure" means "one ought seek pleasure"). — Michael

So if someone says it is immoral to cause suffering they mean that one ought not cause suffering, but this does not tell us anything about whether they are a Moorean or a reductionist (a "Type X" or a "Type Y"). That question depends on the "why."

There are other conceptual problems at play, here. The good and the moral are not the same thing, and Moore is concerned with goodness. Second, "it is moral" does not mean "one ought seek pleasure." It usually means, "the seeking of pleasure is permissible." Morality has three categories: impermissible, permissible, and obligatory (and arguably a fourth: non-obligatory). In any case, you are problematically trying to shoehorn morality into a binary scheme where the impermissible is the contradictory of the obligatory, and this is mistaken.

Given that I believe that one ought not cause suffering, what follows if it is a fact that one ought not cause suffering and what follows if it is not a fact that one ought not cause suffering?

The problem I see is that nothing follows in either case. The existence or non-existence of such obligations is inconsequential. It is true that if one ought not cause suffering and I cause suffering then I have done something I ought not, but so what? What is my motivation to obey obligations? — Michael

Good: motivation. A motivation and "what follows" are not the same, unless we are consequentialists. These are two separate questions, and they cannot be conflated. Anglo philosophy has been trying to fight the hegemony of consequentialism for almost a century now.

Here is how I want to phrase your project:

1. The moral is either monistic or pluriform
2. If it is monistic then it must respond to Moore's open question
3. If it is pluriform, then what is the reason or motivation for moral obligations?

And this is actually what I think is the more accurate version:

1. The moral is either defined or undefined
2. If it is defined then it must respond to Moore's open question
3. If it is undefined, then what is the reason or motivation for moral obligations?

You are interested in (3). As far as I'm concerned, you are Socrates, inquiring into the form of the good, desiring an account instead of examples.

(Note well that I chose to use "moral" instead of "good," and that this could become a problem.)

- My point was not that there was only one, but that "embarrassing numbers" is an overstatement, not in evidence. Augustine is lamenting literate, rhetorically skilled Christians who attracted audiences. These are not large in number.

This quote doesn't make much sense except there having been a context where Augustine was under the impression that there were an embarrassing number of Christians who aren't such critical thinkers. — wonderer1

1. @Hanover is simply correct that figurative interpretations have been accepted since ancient times.

2. You claim is not in evidence, for Augustine spoke of an "ignorant individual." Not a lot of folks have time to drum up strange theories, then or now (but especially then), and before the printing press books were extremely costly.

3. Low-hanging fruit is not unique to Christianity. For example, the Enlightenment clarion call of "Sapere Aude!" turned quickly to, "Oh shit, the masses are way dumber than we realized."

That is disanalogous. — Bob Ross

No, it is analogous. Your disjunctive syllogism has saddled you with a square circle.

I am not going to have time to engage this much going forward, but let me say one last thing. The point here is that if you possess moral truths, and these truths are susceptible to reason, then you should be able to convince others that they are true. Yet to convince someone of something, properly speaking, involves utilizing supra-subjective rationality. If a proposition were not susceptible to supra-subjective rationality, then one subjective individual would not be able to convince another that it is true. Perhaps they could convince another who fortuitously shared their non-truth-apt axioms, but they would not be able to convince someone without this good fortune. Further, if something is not rationally demonstrable, then it is not universally knowable and thence not universally binding. Shorter: if your position is not rationally knowable, then it is not binding.

But the non-naturalist isn't a moral skeptic. He's a moral realist. — Hanover

In this thread @Michael is playing moral skeptic.

The point is that Moore is interested in goodness and indirectly interested in naturalism. Even if Moore's question were resolved, my contention is that this would in no way resolve Michael's inquiry in the OP. For Michael the definition of good will not suffice to provide rationale for moral 'oughts'.

And no one is an essentialist anymore. It's like so yesterday. — Hanover

I also wear bell-bottoms and a cape while smoking a pipe.


Anyway, this is a good line for the thread:

I don't follow why Mill is a naturalist but Moore not. — Hanover

Michael was asked who holds the theory he is critiquing ("non-naturalism"). He said Moore. But it is hard to see why Moore is supposed to be a non-naturalist, or what that term even means.

I am an essentialist, but my concern here is that even if we found the magical formula for goodness, @Michael would immediately, given his approach in these threads, say, "I admit that X is good, but why should I do/seek what is good?" I do not object to Moore agonizing over what 'good' means, but the moral skeptic would in no way be satisfied even if Moore were successful. They would say, "Well now we have obtained the commensurability of goodness, but we still don't have 'oughts' or morality." "Non-naturalism," as Michael conceives it, is inherently groundless and irrational.

I'll quote Moore's Principia Ethica — Michael

Okay, thanks. But see my post <here>. Moore's reductionist critique was met with supervenience theories of good (e.g. Hare). Your OP ignores the fact that this critique is no longer relevant. No one is saying that good is reducible to just one thing.

It is in defining goodness in terms of some natural property – in this case, pleasure – that makes it an ethical naturalist theory. And then, according to Moore, deriving the normative claim that we ought pursue pleasure commits the naturalistic fallacy. — Michael

As long as a hedonist does not purport to derive his 'ought' from natural science, he is not a naturalist. He could do this in two ways: he could argue that pleasure is good, but that its goodness is not an object of natural science, or else he could independently claim that the oughtness that attaches to pleasure is not an object of natural science. In either case he is not a naturalist, and all hedonists I have encountered deny that their valuative/obligatory premises are the product of natural science.

I think you are misreading Moore's argument as overdetermined. The so-called "naturalistic fallacy" depends on his Open Question about the ambiguity of goodness. If that ambiguity fails then the fallacy charge also fails.

---

He describes "the good" as having a variety of objectives, and so it is pluralistic, unlike saying the good = that which increases the most pleasure, which would posit a monistic, essentialist definition of "the good. " — Hanover

But what does monistic/pluralistic have to do with naturalistic/non-naturalistic? The idea is perhaps that good motivates, and if an easily identifiable and unified reality is good, then a straightforward (and exclusive) 'ought' will flow from that good (and this is called "naturalism" for whatever reason). Contrariwise, if goodness is pluriform and the various manifestations are irreducible, then the competition between goods can never be satisfactorily resolved and there will be no straightforward 'ought.' Instead there will be a set of 'oughts' that cannot be adjudicated.

Still, I don't know what in the world this is supposed to have to do with naturalism. In this case it would seem to have more to do with whether 'ought' disputes are ultimately adjudicable. Supposing that pleasure were all there is to good, this would not mean that ethics all of the sudden becomes part of natural science. Why is it that if I say pleasure is the only good, I am a naturalist, but if I say honor is also good, I am not? Presumably a monistic scheme would only be naturalistic if natural science could measure and quantify its monistic conception of good. It appears to be a question of commensurability, not naturalism.

That would make my degree in Philosophy all the more impressive. — Michael

You can't manage to answer a three-step syllogism and you expect me to believe you have a degree in philosophy? When it comes down to it all you are able to provide are arguments from authority, and this is a problem even ignoring the fact that you are misreading the authorities.

- You remind me of a Biblical fundamentalist who only accepts the KJV. You have your sacred Wikipedia and SEP along with your idiosyncratic interpretations, and you refuse to consider any other source, even the primary sources for your sacred document. You may have never read an actual philosopher in your life.

Hedonism is an example of ethical naturalism. — Michael

No it's not, and I just gave you an argument for why. Are you able to address arguments?

1. According to Hedonism one ought pursue pleasure and avoid pain.
2. That one ought or ought not do such a thing is not accessible to natural science.
3. Therefore, Hedonism is not naturalistic.

I'm not saying that the natural sciences study the normative value of pain and pleasure. I'm saying that pain and pleasure are natural properties. — Michael

According to basic ethical theories, such as hedonism, they have normative value. Given that the normative value of pain and pleasure are not the object of natural science, basic ethical theories are not naturalistic according to your definition of natural.

And it's not even clear what it means to call them "natural properties." As far as I'm concerned the natural sciences cannot even demonstrate that qualia like pain and pleasure exist. Moore was never able to define what he meant by "natural," so these problems are not surprising.

Moore, as explained in that quote in my previous comment, and also from his open-question argument: — Michael

The aspect of Moore that you are honing in on was rejected, even in English-speaking moral philosophy. Hare showed this most clearly. Thus we can all agree that Moore was wrong about this:

Thirdly, Moore held good to be an independent property that stood on its own, like the property yellow or red, and that was identifiable as such. But this could not be the case. A comparison between good and yellow showed that good was always dependent on other properties by reference to which it had to be understood. For instance, it is clearly legitimate to say that x and y are exactly alike save that x is yellow and y is not. It is not legitimate to say that x and y are exactly alike save that x is good and y is not. If x really is good while y is not, this can only be because x and y differ in some other respect. If x is a strawberry it will be good, say, because it is red and juicy, and y will be bad because it is not. — Peter L. P. Simpson, On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas, p. 4

That's precisely my point. Moral beliefs matter. Moral facts don't. A moral belief being false has the same practical implications as that same moral belief being true (if ethical non-naturalism is correct). — Michael

As far as I can tell this is just a streak of non-cognitivism, but let's look at your reasoning.

Harm, suffering, and pain are natural properties. — Michael

But they aren't. The natural sciences do not study pain and pleasure in themselves, and they certainly do not study pain and pleasure as normative realities. For example, the claim that suffering should be avoided is not within the domain of the natural sciences. Your article hedges precisely where you are begging the question, "Assuming that being pleasant is a natural property..."

In all probability you will be as unwilling to define "natural" as you are unwilling to define "moral," but the notion that the natural sciences study the normative value of pain and pleasure seems highly unlikely. If this is right then the many counterarguments in this thread which you unaccountably label "naturalistic," are in fact not naturalistic.

See here.

I'm asking about the ethical non-naturalist's moral motivation. — Michael

You seem to have skimmed some Wikipedia and SEP articles, constructed a position in your mind, and then constructed arguments against that position. But given that no one holds this constructed position, it seems that all you've done is erected a strawman. Do you know of any philosophers who hold this position you've constructed? It's easy to misread encyclopedia entries on the basis of your own idiosyncratic presuppositions. It's harder to misread actual philosophical positions that have been put forth by actual philosophers.

1. If a) it is the case that one ought not eat meat and b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

2. If a) it is not the case that one ought not eat meat but b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

The practical implication of each b) is each c), but I can't see what the practical implication of each a) is. — Michael

It's very odd to talk about the "practical implication" of truth.

When a human being makes a decision of any kind—moral or otherwise—they always do so for a reason. For example, "The Earth is X distance from the moon because of the parallax measurements I collected."

Now when one says they ought to do something, they have made a decision, and there is a reason for their decision. The reasoning process involves apprehended truth (i.e. that which is apprehended to be true). For example, if the apprehended truths of the parallax measurements are true, and the apprehended truths of the logical inferences are true, then the Earth will be X distance from the moon, and this will inform the amount of fuel needed for a trip to the moon. Or in other words: if the calculations are correct then the conclusion will be correct.

Perhaps this whole thread could be boiled down to a single question, "If you are an ethical non-naturalist, then what is the reason for your 'ought'?" "You say we ought to do such and such, but why ought we?"

That's not an inherently bad question, but I don't think anyone has managed to figure out to whom the question is addressed. Is the "ethical non-naturalist" you have in mind a character in a fiction or a non-fiction book?

If success means accomplishing your aim, and your aim is to do what you think is best for yourself, then I don’t see how this isn’t an example of success in this case. But maybe I am missing something. — Beverley

Can you aim at something that you can't miss? If I can't miss then I sure don't need to aim. To aim at a target implies that one could miss.

I cannot think of a situation where someone would do something purposefully against their own best interests at the time as they see it. — Beverley

Yes, but morality is not purely about intent. We aim at what seems best, and sometimes we miss. When a hunter is pulling the trigger he believes the bullet will hit its mark. If the bullet misses its mark then he knows he was wrong. He will say, "I thought I was right, but I was wrong."

They're practical implications of having the belief. I'm asking about the practical implications of that belief being true.

If eating meat is immoral and I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.
If eating meat is not immoral but I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat. — Michael

"If CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming and I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

"If CO2 emissions are not causing a severe acceleration in global warming but I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

It's almost as if we act on what we believe to be true, rather than on what is true independent of our beliefs. Remarkable. :meh:

3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion. — Michael

I think you misunderstand (3) because you think it means that humans act independent of their beliefs.

non-moral features (e.g. pain, harm, suffering, etc.) — Michael

You beg the question by assuming that these are non-moral features. And you won't tell us what you mean by "moral," so the whole thing's a bust. It's pretty obvious that you think all features are non-moral, and that there is no such thing as a moral feature.

And I'm not necessarily saying that therefore ethical non-naturalism is false. I'm only saying that if it's true then I don't understand the motivation to be moral. — Michael

I'm with . I don't think you understand ethical non-naturalism. You need to find an actual moral theory and critique it, such as Kantianism. You seem to be constructing an incoherent moral theory in your head, which no one holds.

That's not just a gripe. That's a conversation ender. If you have an ethical position that lacks a definition of "ethical," then why should it come as a surprise that the position makes morality irrelevant? — Hanover

Yes and yes. :up: This point keeps popping up like a weed.

Wouldn't that mean that everyone is morally successful, since everyone does what they think is best for themselves? — Beverley

Can there be success without the possibility of failure?

This only works though, if you believe it is impossible for people to think self destructively, or in a way that is not in their own best interests. If you thought otherwise, would there be a way of arguing for the existence of immorality? Maybe, but I think it would be tricky. — Beverley

Error is a difficult concept in general. When someone finishes a math problem they think they have the right answer, but they may have the wrong answer. Believing that something is true does not make it true. While falsehood is easy to identify, pinpointing error and culpability is more difficult, whether in math or morality.

In any case, I think most everyone recognizes that it is possible to act and choose in ways that are not in their best interest. Anyone who has experienced regret should recognize this.

In other words, morality is doing what you think is best for you. — Beverley

If morality is doing what one thinks is best for oneself in the moment, and everyone always does what they think best for themselves in the moment, then immorality and moral error are impossible, as is moral success. But I don't think this is a common view of morality, and those who hold to such a view certainly have nothing to argue about or discuss.

But is moral error, or just error, the same as immorality in the sense I was mentioning? I guess I could kill someone in error, or I could kill someone thinking it was a moral thing to do, but afterwards realize that I was wrong. But if being moral is about doing what is best for you, then making an error is not trying to not be moral, and therefore, it cannot be immoral, can it? — Beverley

The idea is that, if morality is doing what is best for oneself, then one can act immorally (err morally) if they fail to do what is best for themselves. Assuming they did not intend to fail in this way, their immorality would be unintentional and yet real.

What is "best for oneself" is usually conceived of as an objective target that can be hit or missed, such that one must refine their understanding over time in order to truly act in their best interest.

This lawyer does this everyday. It's what he does for a living. He tries to screw people over. — frank

I'd say, "Don't hate the player, hate the game." The U.S. legal system is inherently agonistic, where the judge plays a more passive role than would have been the case in older English common law, and lawyers tend to take center stage (@Hanover can correct me if I'm off). But this is also why representation is provided if necessary. It has its pros and cons.

Thing is, it's pretty hard to craft a perfect legal system. What is your solution? Don't allow companies representation? Make lawyers pass a morality test? See if Plato's Form of the Good would be interested in coming down to Earth to decide all cases personally?

This conversation is pretty stupid btw. — Hanover

I'm just trying to figure out if there is such a thing as immorality. If being moral means doing what is good and best for you, and by extension, that is good for others, then being immoral would mean not doing what is best for you. I'm not sure I'm convinced that this exists or is possible. — Beverley

Right. There is an interesting exchange on this very topic between two groups of philosophers. See my post on a different forum for links to the three papers in question (link).

The idea is essentially that even on a strict consequentialism moral error is possible, but perhaps only in retrospect or else in an especially subtle way. But there are a lot of different ways to answer such an argument... Most theories would say that ignorance plays a role, where one believes they are doing what is best but in fact they are not, and ignorance of what is truly best is a significant moral culprit in the immoral act. For Socrates in the early dialogues ignorance would have been the sole culprit.

If you are new to moral philosophy I would not recommend this thread, as it is excessively complicated and will probably only confuse you!

BTW, sorry if I made a mistake with the quoting thing on my last comment. It was unintentional; I'm just getting used to the site. — Beverley

No worries. A helpful thread may be, "Forum Tips and Tricks - How to Quote." In general when you use the text selection quote shortcut, it is often better to separate outer quotes from inner quotes, especially if you want a link automatically added to each quote. When you quoted me and Michael simultaneously in a single text selection, it only linked to my quote and his quote got subsumed into mine. But some of this is personal preference. :smile:

Welcome to the forum. See also: "Welcome to The Philosophy Forum - an introduction thread."

Nothing detrimental will happen if I disobey an obligation and nothing beneficial will happen if I obey an obligation. So why should I care about such an obligation? — Michael

The question of whether all 'oughts' pertain to punishment and reward is interesting (), but the more fundamental question at play is whether there are 'oughts' which are not driven by inclination or even motivation. This is a more universal question, as it affects non-consequentialists, and your line of reasoning occasionally and imperceptibly dips into this deeper probing. The more superficial line assumes a modern view, where human action is inherently selfish. Kant is influenced by this modern view but he is always attempting to surpass it, and so the problem with Kant (and our modern inheritance) goes deeper than this superficial line.

The existence of the obligation has no practical implication. — Michael

Not all morality is consequentialist. The deeper problem of Kantian morality is not related to implications, but to grounds or reasons. Here is how I put it to J privately:

We always act because we are inclined to act, and this holds even of our highest acts. So for Kant to divorce the moral part of life—or any part of life—from inclination looks to be a non-starter. I think this is a large part of what Simpson has in mind, and the first few sentences of his article reflect this. — Leontiskos

Here is how Simpson puts a similar point:

Kant only secures the nobility and freedom associated with morality at the cost of shifting both into a sphere that lies completely beyond human grasp. The free acts of the will that constitute moral goodness and moral choice are beyond human explanation and comprehension. — Peter L. P. Simpson, Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble, p. 16

So you are latching onto something legitimately problematic in Kant. But the ascendancy of Kant and of his morality comes late in history. For an Aristotelian like myself it is a strange aberration. Yet you refuse to conceive of morality in a non-Kantian manner, and so instead of identifying a flaw in one very localized moral theory, you falsely conclude that all of morality is inherently flawed. Whenever someone tries to draw you out of the Kantian whirlpool, you respond, "You're speaking about pragmatic matters, not moral matters," where "pragmatic" means non-Kantian and "moral" means Kantian.

(Or else you can't see past consequentialism and a selfish psychology and I am giving you too much credit.)

You are confusing something being rationally justified for me in the sense that it wouldn’t rationally justify you in the same circumstances with my position that indexically it is rationally for everyone. But since it is indexical, it can rationally justify me without justifying you if you aren’t in the same circumstances. — Bob Ross

Is rationality different for me and for you? When you provide an argument you are assuming a common standard of rationality, and you are assuming that validity and soundness are the same for you and your interlocutor. Rational justification is similar.

The point here is, "Because I believe it," is not a rational justification (for you or for anyone else). If you think moral claims are truth-apt and some moral claims are true, then you will have to do better than "Because I believe it" to justify the truth of these claims.

Which premise are you contending with? — Bob Ross

I have explained multiple times that I am contending the conclusion of your disjunctive syllogism.

For example, if you said, "I have reason to believe the car is not black, and I have reason to believe that the car is not not-black, therefore I have reason to believe that the car is neither," I would point to your conclusion and give arguments for why it is incoherent.

You may say it is my 'belief' that it is immoral not to eat the meat, or to eat it, but, if morality is linked to survival, then eating the meat means that both myself and my sibling survive, and hence, are moral. — Beverley

In the same post you quoted from I also said, "(although not everyone on each side agrees with one another about the nature of the moral proposition)."

The point here is that "moral" and "immoral" are not univocal terms. They mean different things on different moral theories. This is actually one of the big problems with @Michael's approach: he presumes that "moral" is a straightforwardly univocal term while simultaneously refusing to give his definition or account of what it means.

So depending on one's reasons for abstaining from meat, exceptions may or may not be allowed. My hunch is that for many vegetarians such a moral rule is not exceptionless. It is possible for moral rules to come into conflict, and the robust moral theories are able to account for and deal with these conflicts. The conflict you raise is an especially strong one (survival, or the limit of "in extremis").

But Michael is concerned with the Kantian form of morality, which tends to be exceptionless (cf. ).

It's all a bit of a mess. — Banno

Yes. Once the thin film of the thread is peeled away all that remains are utterly strange moral assumptions that are continually reasserted. It doesn't seem to be going anywhere.

That's not a thing. — frank

Feel free to attempt to address the argument:

Morality is about how humans should act, and humans act in light of their beliefs. Therefore a moral truth is brought to bear on reality via belief. — Leontiskos

What you're saying is in line with moral antirealism. — frank

Nope. Banno and I are moral realists who recognize that moral truths have an effect via belief. Actually I would say that all moral realists believe this. I have no idea where you guys are getting your strange ideas about the different categories of moral theory. @Michael's claim that only ethical naturalism can have "practical" effects is another of the strange ideas.

You're pointing to the practical outcome of believing in moral realism, not the practical outcome of the existence of objective moral rules. — frank

Truths have an effect on the world by being known by minds, and this is especially true with moral truths. You and @Michael are attempting to speak about the effects of truths independent of belief, which is an especially odd approach when it comes to morality. Morality is about how humans should act, and humans act in light of their beliefs. Therefore a moral truth is brought to bear on reality via belief.

Of course I grant that it is easier to speak about the truth, say, of gravity in a manner that circumvents human knowledge of that truth. But moral truths can also have an effect in the absence of human appropriation of those truths in the form of knowledge. For example, if we cannot get along with one another, then the human race will end as a consequence of nuclear war. Those who believe it is morally important to provide for the continuation of the human race will take this (hypothetical) moral truth into account.

@Michael sees moral disagreements and he seeks a way to overcome them, to stand over them with a quasi-infallible method of moral adjudication (including a faux confidence about which claims are moral claims and which are not). But such an approach is like chasing the horizon or searching for the edge of the Earth. All knowledge is, in a certain sense, non-infallible, including moral knowledge. There is no Gods-eye moral position, at least in this life.

Either eating meat is immoral or it isn't. — Michael

True.

Some people believe that eating meat is immoral and some people believe that eating meat is not immoral. — Michael

True.

One of these groups is right and one of these groups is wrong. — Michael

True (although not everyone on each side agrees with one another about the nature of the moral proposition).

What are the practical implications if the former are right? What are the practical implications if the latter are right? — Michael

The practical implications have to do with eating, harvesting, and producing animals, as I already noted.

I can't see that there are any in either case.

Regardless of who is right and who is wrong, those who believe that eating meat is immoral probably won't eat meat and those who believe that eating meat is not immoral probably will eat meat. — Michael

Your word here, "regardless," is the source of the fallacy you are working with. Disagreement does not mean that no one on either side is acting in good faith. In fact the empirical data disproves your thesis, for there are those on both sides who become convinced that they were wrong and change their minds, and this obviously has "practical" (moral) implications. Your sentence here is simply false.

It would be as intelligent to say, "Regardless of who is right and who is wrong, those who are epistemological coherentists will act like epistemological coherentists, and those who are epistemological foundationalists will act like epistemological foundationalists." This is sophistry. People act on the basis of beliefs that they hold to be true. People act not regardless of who is right, but rather because of who is right.* This is so in all fields of knowledge. Stipulating by fiat that there are no real convictions about what is true, whether in the realm of morality or epistemology, is sophistical. You are stipulating that all moral reasoning is post hoc rationalization.

(Although we should again note that by "moral reasoning" you mean "Kantian reasoning," and you think any non-Kantian moral reasoning is "pragmatic" reasoning.)

* You will say, "They act on the basis of who they believe to be right, not on the basis of who is right." Yes, of course. Truth is always filtered through belief. There is no simple fact of the matter about who is right. Here below there is no Gods-eye view that is able to sidestep beliefs. We access truth through our minds and through our beliefs.

Could we verify this empirically? What sort of research project would we construct? — frank

Are moral truths the product of empirical scientific research? Do we go to the physicists with our moral questions? In many ways this whole thread is an ignoratio elenchi, and you've highlighted that fact with this post.

You're arguing that moral realists behave differently from anti-realists. Even if that's true, it doesn't answer the OP. It's not the reality of the moral rules that matters, it's the psychology of believing realism. That said, I don't think it's true that moral realists behave differently. Again, it's all psychology. — frank

In that post I was arguing that the intention of the moral realist differs from the intention of the moral non-realist, for the moral realist understands themselves to be responding to a real reality. Michael's separation of effects-of-moral-agents from moral truths was begging the question, assuming either anti-realism or else the unknowability of moral truths. Supposing moral truths exist and can be known (as moral realists hold), then the moral truths have practical effects.

(Again, I am not a fan of this word "practical," because for Michael every effect is practical.)

Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications. — Michael

The two are connected. Moral realities need to be appropriated by moral subjects, just as scientific realities need to be appropriated by scientific subjects.

For example, if people believe there is fire in the fire pit they will avoid it for fear of being burned. It is the fire itself that ultimately has this effect, and it has the effect by being appropriated by human subjects. For the moral realist morality is parallel, for in that case one is recognizing a moral reality and responding to it. The vegetarian does not create a moral precept so much as respond to animal suffering and factory farming and whatnot, which they hold to be moral realities.

So on the vegetarian account <meat actually being immoral> is the reason one believes meat-eating to be immoral, and is therefore precisely what produces the "practical" effects.

To anticipate your next post, moral realism and ethical naturalism are simply not co-extensive. That one believes there are moral realities which one recognizes does not mean that they are an ethical naturalist or an ethical non-naturalist. And in any case, these terms require more precision given that the is-ought distinction requires more precision.

I don't think that eating meat being immoral has any practical implications and I don't think that eating meat not being immoral has any practical implications. — Michael

But how could you hold such a thing? The obvious practical implications are 1) how much meat is eaten, and 2) how many animals are harvested. These are practical implications, and for many vegetarians they are also moral implications.

Morality pertains to how we act, and therefore all moral precepts will have "practical" implications insofar as all human acts have "practical" effects.

I think there are two moral "lanes," one where morality is transcendent and opaque (Kantianism), and another where morality is transparently rational (consequentialism, virtue ethics, etc.). The OP makes sense with regard to Kantianism, but I don't think it makes sense with regard to transparently rational moralities (cf. ).

This is what happens when you try to run the OP against, say, a form of consequentialism:

I'd say that the consequences of false moral belief will depend on the moral system in question. For example, if a consequentialist holds that killing babies is evil on account of inflicting pain, then the possible world in which the killing of babies is permissible would be a world where babies feel no pain (or where one can kill painlessly). For this consequentialist, the negative consequence of false belief is an increase in pain, or unnecessary pain, or the pain of innocents, or something like that. — Leontiskos

Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds:

1. Causing pain has no moral value
2. Causing pain is morally good
3. Causing pain is morally bad — Michael

I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction.

One of the deeper problems that I perceive is the separation between oughtness and motivation, as noted in the other thread... — Leontiskos

Is that a moral claim, or merely a pragmatic claim?

I suppose an ethical naturalist could claim that a moral claim is a pragmatic claim, but how would someone who is both a consequentialist and an ethical non-naturalist explain the difference between those worlds? — Michael

At this point "moral" is actually defined to be that which has no reason. If a claim has a reason, then apparently for @Michael it cannot be considered moral. This is understandable insofar as it is a Kantian inheritance, but at the same time it makes no sense. If moral claims are, by definition, claims without reasons, then the counterfactual test will necessarily fail for moral claims.

Note too that this consequentialist in question is not necessarily a "non-naturalist." I don't see that the naturalism/non-naturalism distinction is overly relevant to this question. The question is whether any given first principle of moral reasoning is rationally transparent or rationally opaque.

- My post to you in the other thread sort of sums up what I think of your emotion-driven approach (). Those who lead with emotion and are weighed down by atheistic shoulder-chips often struggle when it comes to rationality. Again, if Ross is willing to back your strange argument I might respond.

Do you think you can prove me wrong? — wonderer1

Sure, but I won't bother to do so unless @Bob Ross commits himself to your position, namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim. If he honestly thinks that both of these things are similarly unjustifiable, then I will consider responding to your post. If not then I will not consider it worth responding to.

Such black or white thinking. I presume you have some belief about how tall you are. How is that belief rationally justified? — wonderer1

You don't even believe one can be rationally justified with regards to the height of an object? lol...

Again. It is rational justification for me if “I believe that one ought not torture babies” but not for you. — Bob Ross

Rational justification doesn't work that way. Propositions are true or false. Conclusions are rationally justified or they aren't. "True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion.

Again, if your moral claims do not even pretend to possess rational justification, then clearly your moral system is ridiculous. Your disjunctive syllogism has led you to an incoherent position.

Edit: The way out of this silliness is to recognize that there are certain universal and/or objective values, such as "suffering is bad" or "suffering should be avoided" (). Even Hume recognized this.