The move from ens rationis to ens reale only works if we already accept that "existing in reality" is a necessary property of the greatest conceivable being. — Banno

But the proof at hand does not assume that, and it nevertheless succeeds in drawing the conclusion. It does not assume that "existing in reality" is a necessary property of the greatest conceivable being. There is certainly no premise to that effect. So you have to deal with the proof. With the paper. If the paper is right then the theory you have on paper turns out to be wrong.

(I think a lot of this comes back to the way you simply overlook Klima's "ampliation".)

So you can't just write g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) without a problem, becasue it may be that there is no greatest individual. — Banno

It sounds like you're saying that we can't have a being of reason if it isn't a being. Or in other words: we can't think of what doesn't exist. "X doesn't exist, therefore we cannot think of it." This is what section 1 addresses.

But of course Klima has no premise which says that there is a greatest individual.

But if you manage that, you have the analogue of the transfinite numbers - no sooner have you defined g as the greatest, and then you can bring to mind something greater than g, and the problem repeats itself.

So even as there is good reason to think that it is not possible to make sense of "the largest number", it is difficult to see how to make sense of "the greatest individual". — Banno

So you are disputing (3), then? Because that is precisely the premise that bears on how the "greater than" predicate cashes out.

-

IF the argument is valid, and it shows that something exists, then that must be assumed in the argument somewhere. That's how logic works. The problem isn’t just that the argument assumes its conclusion, since as Tim pointed out all valid deductive arguments do that. — Banno

Then I will quote this for the second time today:

(Some of my own philosophical arguments have been accused of something very like ‘begging the question’ – I concede the phrase was not used – simply because they were formally valid arguments for a conclusion the accusers thought was false. Their reasoning seems to have been something like this: if the conclusion of an argument can be formally deduced from its premises, then that conclusion is, as one might put it, logically contained in the premises – and thus one who affirms those premises is assuming that the conclusion is true. As R. M. Chisholm once remarked when confronted with a similar criticism, ‘I stand accused of the fallacy of affirming the antecedent.’) — Peter van Inwagen, Begging the Question

(The quote is from a book on ontological arguments.)

The argument becomes "God exists therefore god exists". — Banno

Do you say that such a thing is begging the question, or not?

I think it's worth taking a moment to say something here:

I'm gonna Pontifications from 30,000 feet again. The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere in the argument. The task for the logician is to find out where.

They must do this because existence cannot result from a deduction. It can only be presumed, either in the argument or in the interpretation. — Banno

To be sure, it is not clear that the definition g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) can be made coherently... — Banno

The trouble with the 30,000 foot view is that everyone is right in their own book at 30,000 feet, as it's just a matter of so-called (see my bio quote from Hadot on this point). Thus the atheist sees an argument for God's existence and he knows it must be wrong. He sees the conclusion and he infers things about the premises. All he is doing is begging the question (even though it is sometimes practical to beg the question).

The same sort of thing is happening here:

...it is not clear that [it] can be made coherently... — Banno

Okay, but that sounds like a hunch, much like, "It doesn't smell quite right to me." "It's not clear it can be made coherently." At this point the engagement with the text is minimal (and I will get to the elaboration). "Not clear it can be made coherently," is not a substantive objection to a premise.

The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere in the argument. — Banno

This is also very similar to the question-begging atheist:

1. All valid ontological arguments beg the question
2. This is a valid ontological argument
3. Therefore, this begs the question

But how does the inductive (1) get to be so strong? And even beyond that, what is "an ontological argument"? As the very first sentence of Klima's introduction implies, that whole label is anachronistic. Certainly Anselm would wonder how one can know that a whole bundle of loosely-affiliated arguments are known to be faulty a priori.

Similarly, the argument, "Some beings of reason are not beings (simpliciter), therefore this being of reason is not a being (simpliciter)," doesn't cut. Klima acknowledges that not all beings of reason are beings. Why think that Klima's (g) is relevantly similar to the idea of a largest number in the first place?

So there is not a lot of rigor in these blanket approaches, and this is why I want to get away from the 30,000 foot view. Luckily, Klima helps us get down to concrete points.

I was wrong about the paper. Sorry for being so stubborn and impatient, and for unnecessarily derailing the thread. — Banno

Cool, thanks Banno. I guess we're on the same page that quoting someone accurately or inaccurately makes no difference. Syntactical "formatting" is just a sideshow. Obviously you won't mind that I changed some of the "formatting" of your post. :up:

On my computer screen Klima's html version reads as follows:

(1) g=dfix.~(∃y)(M(y)(x))

Or if we look at the official book chapter, linked in the OP:

g =_df ix.~(∃y)(M(y)(x))

(where in both cases i = the descriptor)

g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) — Banno

That is what Klima writes, is it not?

I am wondering why <this post> of yours is misrepresenting Klima? Why does it contain symbols and steps that do not appear in Klima's paper? Don't you think we should represent his argument accurately?

I did fix the ugly: g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x). I asked you if it was acceptable, and did not yet get a reply. — Banno

Your misrepresentation is still there: (1) g=dfix.~($y)(M(y)(x))
(As well as the other lines of the proof where similar problems occur)

That post of yours is the first place in the thread where Klima's formalization of Anselm's proof occurs, which is why I would like it to be accurate. It is a thread on Anselm's proof, after all.

The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere int he argument. — Banno

Are you just saying that ontological arguments beg the question? This is a common charge that Klima is aware of. But it must be demonstrated that someone has begged the question. It can't just be asserted.

So the argument will not be of much use in convincing non-theists. — Banno

I am amused that you claim to have read the paper.

But Banno, if you want to do analytical philosophy, this is a thread for it. That's why I made it - because all these folks think they want rigorous analytical philosophy. Well, this is it. It requires reading, patience, careful thought and interpretation.

No. Kids will ask wha the highest number is. Takes them a while to see that there isn't one. — Banno

Okay, so you're not actually objecting to step (2) of the proof?

Notice that the existence (as a thought) of such an individual is here just assumed. — Banno

Klima is explicit that step (2) is a supposition and that step (1) is a definition, so I'm not sure what you're attempting to disagree with.

What a mess. So god is not the thing greater than everything, but the thing greater than the thing greater than everything. — Banno

We can come back to this, but you seem to be missing the ampliation entirely. The key point of the paragraph you here quoted is the ampliation on "thought," so the fact that your assessment leaves out thought entirely is strong evidence of a misinterpretation. This common misinterpretation is precisely why Klima included that paragraph along with the buildup on ampliation.

Might be. — Banno

Well can you go back and fix your misrepresentations of Klima? If you are going to call his argument "ugly," at least give his argument instead of some weird symbols that do not occur in his paper.

What? Those are the symbols in the HTML text you linked. — Banno

Maybe check the book chapter version above. Your web interpreter may be misinterpreting the html encodings (although that would be a bit surprising - I still think it is a copy/paste encoding error).

- Good. This is what I mean by "engaging the paper." Pontifications from 30,000 feet are something that should only come after we've worked through the paper, in the "free for all" phase.

($y) — Banno

As above, Klima gives (∃y), not ($y).

In fact, much of your quote is a misrepresentation of what Klima writes in the paper. You were presumably copy/pasting without checking to see if the output was accurate. A bit more care would be welcome, given how much people struggle with formal logic even before you start incorporating symbols like $, ", ®.

Consider an analogous argument defining the highest number as that number which is higher than any other number. The definition is fine, except that there is no such highest number. — Banno

You are saying the number does not exist, but you also require that the thought object of the number does not exist. Is that what you are claiming? That there is no thought object "the highest number"?

Or: that there is no thought object of God as defined by Klima?

Damn, that's ugly. — Banno

"What Is It Like to Be a Troll?" by Banno with a preface by Thomas Nagel.

followed the guidelines — Banno

You haven't engaged with the paper at all, so clearly you're not managing to follow the guidelines.
Or in other words: you're derailing another thread, like you always do.

In what way? — bongo fury

In the way that quantification brings with it ontological commitment.

Not necessarily, but the claim wants explaining. What is meant to be wrong with the slogan, and what has the doctrine of quantifiers being second order predicates got to do with it? — bongo fury

Quine is meant to be part of the background for common contemporary interpretations of Anselm, but some of the connections get made throughout the first section. See for example footnote 6:

6 W.V.O. Quine: “On What There Is”, in: Quine, W.V.O. 1971. p. 3. By the way, it is interesting that Quine apparently never asked himself: to whom does the name “Wyman” refer? — nobody? — then how do I know that Wyman is not the same as McX? For despite the fact that nothing in the world “wymanizes”, let alone “mcxizes”, Wyman and McX are quite distinguishable imaginary characters in Quine’s paper: Wyman, e.g., is introduced to us as a “subtler mind”, than McX. As we shall see, these questions are easily answerable on the basis of the theory of reference advanced in this paper. Not so on the basis of Quine’s. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1

The three dogs are you, me, and the pooch. — Moliere

Does "pooch" refer to the three of us equally? Do you see how if I adopt your methodology we will be unable to communicate?

I'd call you a sly dog in order to demonstrate that "dog"'s referrent isn't fixed by convention — Moliere

I've only said that reference is fixed by convention about a dozen times now. Even within our conversation I have said it a number of times. Here is one example:

Right: the (conventional) association between Truman and 'Truman' is already "affixed" before the true sentence is uttered. — Leontiskos

-

but it's not like conventions make reference factual — Moliere

If I can know your intention then I can know the "fact" of what you are referring to. And to say that we can never know someone's intention seems a bit crazy.

What I take from this is that it doesn't need to be one or the other, verbal communication can contain information about and reference both things and the speaker's intentions about things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I think this is a key point.

But if the alignment of determinate intentions is possible, then I think there is a strong sense in which reference must be. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and when we teach someone a new language we are teaching them about the intentional relations that attach to words (namely, the intentional relations of a language community via convention). I think a big part of the problem is that this tradition flowing from Russell can't understand or incorporate intention. It is as easy to talk about reference apart from intention as it is to talk about cars apart from engines.

See Klima's, "Three Myths of Intentionality vs. Some Medieval Philosophers."

To even make the inscrutability argument, one has to assume that determinate intentions exist, so that one is given, but then it obviously seems possible to communicate them as well. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Definitely. :up:

This whole thread has largely been a bouncing between the two poles of "obvious/tautological" and "absurd/incoherent." What this indicates is that, on a natural reading, Quine was simply wrong. Or else, he said some strange things because he was reacting to and critiquing a very strange idea about reference. But since the thread is not interested in that context, we are left with the idea that Quine was either saying something obvious or something incorrect.

Hell, even poorly trained dogs can communicate well enough to direct our attention to what they view as a threat. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:lol:

Quine, as a nominalist, would rather not encourage any similar assumption about a predicate. — bongo fury

Right, ergo:

Consider now Quine's insight, on which the quantifier account is based, that it is bound variables rather than singular terms that carry ontological commitment. To implement this insight, Quine simply eliminated singular terms from the language. — Ontological Commitment | SEP

So back to your original quote of Klima:

[Russell's] account, coupled with the Kantian-Fregean idea of existence as a second-order predicate, i.e., a quantifier, quite naturally leads to Quine’s slogan: “to be is to be a value of a bound variable”.[2] — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1

My understanding is that you are saying Quine rejects the idea that existence is a second-order predicate, and therefore Klima is mistaken in his claim, "[this] quite naturally leads to Quine's slogan..."

Now I don't quite see how your quote from Quine substantiates this, for he literally says, "[The doctrine] is also espoused in my own first book." Regardless, it makes sense to me that Quine would not want to call the quantifier a second-order predicate per se, but that he would nevertheless admit that it does bear on existence in a second-order manner. And in any case, Klima has tied "existence as a second-order predicate" to a Kantian-Fregian confluence, not to Quine, so I don't find the claim about Quine in Klima.

Or am I misunderstanding the motive for your quote? Are you instead affirming Quine's intimation that proposing existence as a second-order predicate lacks coherence?

Ultimately Klima is going to propose existence as some kind of first-order predicate, and he is going to outline an idea which was very well developed in the medieval period, namely an idea that differs from Quine (but also Meinong) with respect to ontological commitment, and Kripke with respect to reference.

Part 2: The Proof

(Here is a link to Anselm's Proslogion for those interested.)

In this section Klima formulates Anselm's proof according to the principles of the first part of the paper. He gives this formulation in a natural language argument, and then in quantification theory. I will again quote the first paragraph:

With this understanding of Anselm’s conception of the relationship between existence and reference we can see that his argument constitutes a valid proof of God’s existence without committing him either to an ontology overpopulated with entities of dubious status or to the question-begging assumption that the referent of his description exists. In fact, we can see this even within the framework of standard quantification theory, provided we keep in mind that in the context of Anselm’s argument, this context being an ampliative context, we should interpret our variables as ranging over objects of thought, only some of which are objects simpliciter. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 2

Though supposing we were in this room and there were three dogs — Moliere

But you've changed the scenario. There is one dog, not three. Or do you think it is not possible to have a room with one dog? So you've reiterated the problem that elicited my question to you:

"There are no fixed referents," vs, "We could be wrong some of the time." Do you see how the latter does not justify the former? — Leontiskos

You claim that there are no fixed referents, then you say that we could be wrong some of the time (which doesn't justify your claim); and then you repeat the whole thing by refusing to talk about a room with one dog and insisting on talking about a room with three dogs. As I said:

Presumably we all agree that words signify by convention ("nomina significant ad placitum").

So then a token like J-o-h-n will be indeterminate if there is more than one person named John (or if our interlocutor knows more than one person named John).

If that is all that is meant by inscrutability of reference then it strikes me as trivial. — Leontiskos

- So is the idea that Quine is here implicitly abandoning this doctrine that is "espoused in my own first book"? Is Quine here abandoning his idea that, "to be is to be a value of a bound variable"?

But I won't be defending this at any length as an alternative. — Banno

Odd to continually bring up things that you aren't willing to support or defend. It's almost like you're just a bored old man who wants to stir up controversy and is uninterested in doing actual philosophy. You just snipe from the bushes and then flee into the woods.

Try to make it past the first sentence before finding an offending whole two words that "render the paper obsolete." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, the Troll hath arrived, as anticipated:

I will make a thread that includes the topic of intentional reference/identity sometime in at least the next month. It will be a reading group, so trolling will not be tolerated. — Leontiskos

Banno polled the recent fads in Anglo philosophy and found that Kripke is more popular than Russell. If he had managed to read past the first sentence he would have learned that the paper actually spends more time on Kripke than Russell. But for Banno to read a whole sentence is a remarkable event that should be celebrated. Would that philosophy moved beyond fad-following.

First, even if one supposes that Klima, being a medieval specialist, absolutely cannot be well acquainted with modern philosophy of language (dubious) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note that the book in which this chapter is contained was published in 2000. Alongside primary sources, Klima's secondary sources for modern views are from the 1980's and early 90's. Which means that he is 10-15 years ahead of the epoch that Banno remains stuck in.

Gyula Klima is Hungarian, and began his philosophical career in Hungary. Clearly he is more familiar with figures like Kant and Frege, who have a much wider reach than the parochial set of Anglo philosophers from the mid 20th century. But upon moving onto the Anglo-American scene Klima no doubt began to encounter this philosophical descendant of Logical Positivism which encloses Banno's horizon.

The relentless grind of progress, eh. Philosophical ideas certainly have short use-by dates in our day and age. — Wayfarer

Even old as he is, Banno may live long enough to see all of the philosophers he believes to be so important forgotten in the same way his Hare has been forgotten. Even Banno's big names like Wittgenstein and Kripke are virtually unknown outside of the English-speaking world. So there is more than a little irony here - like the man scoffing at the out-of-date fashion of others while wearing bell-bottoms with a choker.

Why? I'm not making McDowell's argument. If you think he has a case, then you can make it. — Banno

Because you said:

The "Need" McDowel sees to "distinguish the experience" suggests a profound misapprehension of Davidson's much more subtle argument. — Banno

So you want to critique and call out McDowell while simultaneously avoiding giving any substantive account of what you think McDowell is saying. If Pierre-Normand doesn't even have a clear account of what you are accusing McDowell of, how is he supposed to engage with the content of your accusation? :chin:

The other technical part of this section concerns "ampliation":

According to this conception, in an appropriate ampliative context we can successfully refer to what we can think of according to the proper meaning of the terms involved. But thinking of something does not imply the existence of what is thought of. Thus, in the same way, referring to something does not imply the existence of what is referred to, or, as the medievals put it, significare (‘to signify’) and supponere (‘to refer’) ampliate their object-terms to nonexistents in the same way as intelligere (‘to think’, ‘to understand’) and other verbs signifying mental acts do.[14] — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1

The idea here is that we can think about something without thinking that it exists, so why can't we signify and refer without presupposing existence? The medievals are very interested in argument and the natural way we use language. If we are to mount compelling arguments we must be able to do in a technical sense what we already do quite naturally in everyday settings, namely we must be able to reference thoughts, theories, suggestions, postulations, etc., in order to apply the rigors of argument and reason.

In a source from footnote 11 Klima begins with a simple argument:

(1) Bucephalus is dead
(2) What is dead does not exist
Therefore,
(3) Bucephalus does not exist
Therefore,
(4) something does not exist

In my opinion, this is a conclusive argument for the thesis that something does not exist. As is well-known, however, many philosophers regard this thesis as paradoxical in a way, and, consequently, they would raise several objections to the simple reasoning that led to it above... — Klima | Existence, Quantification and the Medieval Theory of Ampliation

"Bucephalus is dead, and therefore does not exist." When we utter such a thing we are abstracting time away from Bucephalus, and thinking of him in a timeless sort of way. He does not exist now, but he did exist in the past, and in talking about him now we are talking about something that does not exist. This is an example of what the medievals called ampliation, and in this case it is ampliation with respect to time. Cf. footnote 14.

Thoughts?

And the premise you stated [...] is arguably false, and clearly designed for the purpose of that refutation. It looks like a very clear cut example of begging the question to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's how arguments work. You design premises to reach a conclusion. — Leontiskos

A fun quote from Peter van Inwagen:

(Some of my own philosophical arguments have been accused of something very like ‘begging the question’ – I concede the phrase was not used – simply because they were formally valid arguments for a conclusion the accusers thought was false. Their reasoning seems to have been something like this: if the conclusion of an argument can be formally deduced from its premises, then that conclusion is, as one might put it, logically contained in the premises – and thus one who affirms those premises is assuming that the conclusion is true. As R. M. Chisholm once remarked when confronted with a similar criticism, ‘I stand accused of the fallacy of affirming the antecedent.’) — Peter van Inwagen, Begging the Question

And in that I would hope we can still use the concept of reference but in this context of fuzzyness, indeterminacy, vagueness. Reference isn't about look-up table or translation manual in your head. — Apustimelogist

I will say that Moliere and I are referring to the same thing with 'chair' or 'rabbit'. Someone else will come along and tell me that there is a 0.1% chance that we might disagree on what is a chair or a rabbit. And then we can argue about whether that 0.1% chance secures some particular thesis of "inscrutability of reference." To me it seems like this is really stretching the meaning of that word "inscrutability."

Perhaps the modern focus on quantity makes it hard to understand reference. If reference has to do with the extension of sets then there is nothing arbitrary about a 0.1% offset. If that is right then it's back to the old question of nominalist collections vs. universals and genera.

Perhaps your landlord? — Banno

Presumably we all agree that words signify by convention ("nomina significant ad placitum").

So then a token like J-o-h-n will be indeterminate if there is more than one person named John (or if our interlocutor knows more than one person named John).

If that is all that is meant by inscrutability of reference then it strikes me as trivial.

Islamaphobia is obviously made up. — AmadeusD

"Islamophobia" - "Homophobia" - "Transphobia"

Whenever someone tries to attach a term from psychiatric diagnostics ("phobia") to the person they disagree with, you can be sure they are full of crap and have no real argument to offer.

reference is a social act whereby we make a judgment call that could be wrong, some of the time — Moliere

"There are no fixed referents," vs, "We could be wrong some of the time." Do you see how the latter does not justify the former?

If you and I are sitting in an empty room with a dog, and I say, "The dog," there is a fixed referent. You know exactly what I am referring to. So it looks like there are fixed referents (i.e. referents that are fixed between at least two individuals).

I'm not convinced that <chair-concept> is the object being referred to in using 'chair' -- I'd say that it's the chair being referred to, rather than the <chair-concept> — Moliere

Well you just used the word 'chair'. What chair are you referring to? And do I know what you are referring to?

In fact there is no chair, and yet you used the word successfully. That is, I know what you are referring you despite the fact that there is no individual chair being referred to. That is what it means to say that we both have the same concept of a chair. Back to the original point, if we do not mean the same things by the words we use, then we cannot now be communicating.

But that there's a fact to the matter doesn't affix the reference, is what I'm contending. — Moliere

And I just showed how it does. You and I mean the same abstract thing by 'chair', therefore the reference is fixed.

It's just not a metaphysical or ontological connection -- only a collective effort, or social dance. — Moliere

Sure, but conventions are factual.

1. "Moliere understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
2. "Leontiskos understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
3. "Therefore, Moliere and Leontiskos understand 'chair' to refer to the same kind of object."

(1) and (2) are either true or false, and if they are true then on your definition they represent a fact. No one is saying that there are chair-concepts floating about in the Platonic ether. The point is that we both have an abstract notion of a chair such that the word signifies equivalently for each of us.

(Perhaps I should clarify that "same kind of object" != chair-concept. The idea was rather that a chair is a kind, namely a kind of object. The concept is what connects different chairs to that same kind. If you are a descendent of Frege then you can explicate this in terms of sets and extension. The point is only that "chair" is a reference common to us both, i.e. it is fixed between the two of us.)

I’m not sure he could do otherwise, could he? — Mww

I mean, for hundreds of years Christian theologians had been incorporating Aristotle into their work and refusing Occasionalism, which is pretty close to what Berkeley promoted. See, for example, Aquinas on secondary causality. To say that Berkeley is not representative of Christian theology up to that point would be an understatement. And isn't Berkeley reacting primarily to John Locke, who was himself religious? Berkeley may have been opposed to realism, but that doesn't mean religion is opposed to realism.

The reason for the fable is we are misled by being able to refer in our language into thinking that there is some fixed reference. — Moliere

Okay, so now you are saying that reference is inscrutable even to fellow language-speakers. Or more precisely, that there are no fixed referents amongst fellow language-speakers.

But that doesn't seem right. If you and I are sitting in a room together there will be any number of fixed referents available, e.g. "table," "chair," "dog," "television," "photograph," etc. So how does that work? Do you mean something very specialized by "fixed reference"?

A fact is a set of true sentences. — Moliere

"Moliere understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
"Leontiskos understands 'chair' to signify <chair-concept>."
"Therefore, Moliere and Leontiskos understand 'chair' to refer to the same kind of object."

Those are three propositions, and if they are a set of three true sentences then on your view they would be called a "fact." If this is a fact, then it looks like there are facts of the matter with respect to reference.

So when I say Truman is dead that is a true sentence about Truman. That Truman is dead, however, does not affix the reference of "Truman" -- nor do any other true sentences. — Moliere

Right: the (conventional) association between Truman and 'Truman' is already "affixed" before the true sentence is uttered. If it were not then the true sentence would not be true.

You ever read about feral and dramatically maltreated children? — Moliere

I've read some, and I agree that it seems to substantiate my thesis.

My solution is that if I check in with you and ask "Oh, do you mean this Truman or that Truman" we can refer in a given conversation, rather than that "Truman" always refers to Truman because of this or that theory of reference. — Moliere

I definitely agree that there is more than one person named "Truman."


I think what you and some others are trying to say is this: "Reference cannot be fully and exhaustively explained." I would say that it depends what tools we have to hand and what we mean by "fully and exhaustively explained."

- Thanks.

Science let it be known humans could have things, could do things, entirely on their own, or at least enough on their own to call into question isolated external causality of the Berkeley-ian “un-constructed” spirit type... — Mww

Yes, but is it just modern science? Because there is plenty of philosophy between Plato and Berkeley that manages to avoid Berkeley's idealism. I'm sure if I investigated the way that Berkeley was reacting to Locke I would have a better understanding of this issue.

---

- Okay, thanks. :up:

it's inscrutable from the perspective of a person without knowledge of the language — Moliere

But that's a mundane claim, isn't it? Almost tautologous? The stronger and more interesting claim is that something is inscrutable in that it cannot be fixed. I hope Quine is doing more than uttering a tautology.

My take-away here is that since there's no fact of the matter that affixes reference, but we are able to refer, there must be something other than the facts which makes us able to refer. — Moliere

From the early pages of this thread I have objected to this vague use of the word "fact." What is it supposed to mean? Does it mean anything to say there is no fact of the matter? If it did, then what would it look like if there were a fact of the matter?

It takes two to refer. — Moliere

Will someone raised apart from language and people be able to identify food, such as berries? And will this be a cognitive identification, such that they might find they are hungry for berries and decide to go out looking for them? Because if so, then it looks like they can refer to berries without two.

- In a general way, how do you see Kant relating to Berkeley?

- Very informative post. :up:

To me, thinking that such a premise is true, just demonstrates a lack of understanding of Berkeley, — Metaphysician Undercover

What you are accusing him of is ignoratio elenchus, not begging the question. — Leontiskos

I received a PM from someone essentially asking, "What's the fuss?" — Leontiskos

What is a way into the paper? In footnote 3 Klima points to Frege's Kantian criticism of Anselm's proof. Let's look at that source:

§ 53. By properties which are asserted of a concept I naturally do not mean the characteristics which make up the concept. These latter ate properties of the things which fall under the concept, not of the concept. Thus “rectangular” is not a property of the concept “rectangular triangle’; but the proposition that there exists no rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle does state a property of the concept “rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle”; it assigns to it the number nought.

In this respect existence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number nought. Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down. But oneness* is not a component characteristic of the concept “God” any more than existence is. Oneness cannot be used in the definition of this concept any more than the solidity of a house, or its commodiousness or desirability, can be used in building it along with the beams, bricks and mortar...

* [I.e. the character of being single or unique, called by theologians “unity”.] — Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, tr. Austin (1960)

Frege seems to be appealing to some notion of extensionality. He thinks that existence is a property of concepts insofar as number is assigned to concepts. For example, what number is assigned to the concept, "Moons orbiting Earth"? The answer for Frege is '1', and in virtue of this "denial of the number nought" there exists a moon orbiting Earth. Rather, that is what existence means for Frege. Similarly, if Frege wanted to tell us that there do not exist any motorcycles that are orbiting Earth, what he would say is that the concept, "Motorcycles orbiting Earth," is to be assigned the number '0'. Such is his account of existence.

So when considering Anselm's proof Frege tells us that 'oneness' (namely, the variety of non-noughtness traditionally accorded to God), "is not a component characteristic of the concept 'God'..." That is, the concept "God" does not have an intrinsic property '1'. In Kleine Schriften he will talk about a concept being "not empty." Klima follows Haaparanta in tracing some of this back to Kant, who was a strong influence on Frege and who Frege agrees with vis-a-vis Anselm's proof.

So on Frege's proto-extensional understanding, Anselm is saying that the concept 'God' has a component characteristic of oneness (which entails that the concept is not nought or not empty, ergo, that it exists). Frege claims that this is false and that the proof therefore fails. He says, "No, Anselm, the concept 'God' is not non-empty qua concept."

Like I said, I haven't read beyond section 1, and I don't want to go too fast, but this is at least the foil that Klima is using in setting out a medieval approach—in setting out a more accurate way to interpret Anselm's proof.

"All that is can be thought," does not imply "all that is thought is." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and I think the quotes you highlight are important:

At this point, however, anyone having qualms about “multiplying entities”, indeed, “obscure entities”, should be reminded that the distinction between objects, or beings (entia) simpliciter, and objects of thought, or beings of reason (entia rationis) is not a division of a given class (say the class of objects, or beings, or entities) into two mutually exclusive subclasses. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1

So what is going on here? On the modern scene it is well accepted that a term can refer to beings (entia), such as deer, socks, trees, etc. But then when it is proposed that a term can also refer to beings of reason or objects of thought (entia rationis), the common objection is that this will "multiply entities" and thus transgress Occam's Razor. Specifically there is the idea that it will require two mutually exclusive ontological subclasses, one subclass for beings simpliciter and one subclass for beings of reason.

We actually saw this play out two days ago in the midst of a discussion on Mario Bunge, who admits of conceptual existence and who treats existence as a first-order predicate. A response was as follows:

A few notes on treating existence as a predicate. We can of course do this, with some cost. The result is a logic that ranges over things that exist and things that do not exist. That is, it in effect has two domains, one of things that exist and one of things that... do not exist. — A Response to Mario Bunge

(Consider also footnotes 7 and 12. The assumption here derives from Quine's opposition to Alexius Meinong, who posited two ontological subclasses of a sort.)

That is, the assumption is that Bunge must be working with two mutually exclusive subclasses, at least "in effect." This is the sort of objection that Klima has in his sights. How does he address this objection?

...Mere beings of reason, therefore, are not beings, and mere objects of thought are not a kind of objects, indeed, not any more than fictitious detectives are a kind of detectives, or fake diamonds are a kind of diamonds.

Qualifications of this kind are what medieval logicians called determinatio diminuens, which cannot be removed from their determinabile on pain of fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.[11] Accordingly, admitting objects of thought, or beings of reason, as possible objects of reference, does not imply admitting any new objects, or any new kind of beings, so this does not enlarge our ontology. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1

First, there are not two ontological subclasses. In an ontological sense there are only beings (entia). But then how do beings of reason (entia rationis) fit in? According to Klima, beings of reason are not beings, but they can still be objects of reference.

For example, suppose Fido is a dog but Jordan thinks Fido is a cat. Jordan's thought or understanding of Fido as a cat does not refer to any being, given that Jordan is mistaken. Nevertheless, we can still refer to Jordan's cat-Fido thought because it is a being of reason and we can refer to beings of reason. Referring to Jordan's thought, we might tell him, "The way you are thinking about Fido is not correct." We refer to Jordan's thought without granting it ontological status as something that enlarges our ontology (and this is a generic move that can accommodate many different sub-theories).

Klima's point about "fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter" is effectively that there are rules against reifying beings of reason and shifting them into beings (simpliciter). If you fail to keep track of what is a being and what is a being of reason, or try to "pull a fast one" by swapping out a being of reason and swapping in a being (simpliciter) when no one is looking, then you're committing a fallacy. When beings of reason are allowed as referents new rules are added to make sure we don't mix up the two.

Modern thought sometimes has more difficulty with this to the extent that it has eliminated a solid understanding of, or ground for, the distinction between act and potency... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. Good point.

- Good stuff. :up:

I'll just stick to the opening section for now. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sounds good. I haven't even read section 2 yet. :cool:

I think it's probably a good idea to stick to section 1 before moving on to section 2; section 2 before moving on to section 3, etc. It looks like each section will have enough content to sustain its own discussion, questions, confusion, etc. Bite-sized pieces will also make participation easier, for myself included.

First, I will point out that the distinction... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Great thoughts. I've been on the road all day and need a nap, but I will come back to this. :smile:

You are neglecting a key point, the need to have truthful premises, in order for the conclusion to be sound. — Metaphysician Undercover

And Johnson thinks it is true, as does Tallis. If you think it is false then what you need to do is argue against it, not cry "fallacy!" Note that you haven't managed to address Tallis' argument at all, and Tallis is defending (1).

Designing your premise for the purpose of producing a specific conclusion with disregard for the truth or falsity — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are just imputing specious motives to Johnson. I see no reason to impute such motives, and that sort of psychologism/mind reading is bad philosophy. If you have an argument, offer it. If all you are going to do is say, "I did some mind-reading and found a bad motive," then you're not doing philosophy.

- Thanks. :up:
A mod is welcome to delete the whole mixup.

(My edit <here> is somewhat explanatory of what was going on.)

- I would prefer to delete but it's up to you.

@tim wood, @Banno

Oops. This was a PM. I wrote it out so that I could preview it, and I accidentally posted it here instead of in the PM. I've deleted it, but I will leave the part about Banno if he wants to dispute it.