How do you deal with that problem? — frank

I Simply see no problem.
They are all inferences. Its hte best description. It may not have an actual answer.

We see the tree by constructing a representation of the tree. Hence, we see the tree. — Banno

Can you think of any other circumstance in which this (imo, quite squarely incoherent) claim could be held?

Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time. I think the contemporary direct realist is trying to steer clear of the problems associated with it? — frank

Im not sure that's true - and I was to quote the Phil Survey response Banno did, so there we go. Banno's explanation of why seems convenience to me, but it's better than anything else put forward in here, imo.

If that is what they modern DRist is trying to do... ha..hah?

According to you, all we have direct access to and thus direct knowledge about is mental representations. — creativesoul

This is, patently, true. This is the crux, and the thing no one has even attempted to surmount, in their attempt to explain 'direct' realism. It then turns out that the conception is in fact, that we receive light directly from the outside of our body.
Sure. That does nothing for the competing theories. Hence, certain levels of "wtf bro".

substitute whatever metaphor you’d like :) the idea being merely “below the surface; oft ignored”

I certainly do not. But this is not a surprising response, at all. Aligns with my understanding of you entirely :)

I like you, though.

I actually do sympathize. I realize I have not explained the entire model yet. Really though the basis of it is fairly simple. Explaining it thoroughly though is a really a matter for yet another thread.

Even in plain English this sentence is not nearly as bad as you claim though. — Chet Hawkins

I don't think you're really understanding much of what anyone is saying to you, most of the time.
You certainly haven't understood the vast majority of what I've thrown your direction.

You've not explained anything adequately.

We may be in the minority, but that is utterly absurd. LOL

We are moral agents. Animals are not. We make laws regulating our behaviors on the assumption we can rise above our primal instincts. Eating meat is probably immoral and I shouldn't do it, but I just don't get that upset about it, and I don't want to give it up. I think future generations are going to judge us harshly for how we've treated animals over the years, and if aliens came down and started eating us, we could hardly complain. — RogueAI

You may enjoy this film for a bit of fun. I disagree with you, and hte film, however.

:snicker: :snicker:

Nice.

The idea that all other animals are able to prey upon their weaker fellow animals and that Humans are especially to side-step this, is infantile nonsense to my mind.
Our higher level of understanding does nothing to this.
I have never heard even a reasonable argument for anything other than following one's internal comfort-metre when it comes to animal consumption.

The way in which animal products are sourced?? Well. That's a can of seytan I wont open.

Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake. — substantivalism

Do you mean moralising in general? If so, I agree.

not some truth but another delusion through which to carve the world up once more. Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake. — substantivalism

I believe this will always be hte case with moralising. It's paradigmatic.

Anger holds its ground against everything. That is the nature of balance. If this is not intuitively obvious, I can go on an on, because every other aspect of reality supports that non-conclusion. — Chet Hawkins

THis is a neat little microcosm of hte senselessness of most of your writing. Unsure whether that reflects on your positions though, because it's so unclear.

Mary Midgely is quite the Mental Midget. — Lionino

A brief overview of what she attempted would have gleaned this apparent fact. Her protestations just make her points all the more poor, given that they are actually points which can be well-argued in the right places.
Her conceptualisation of Philosophy in general as 'the plumbing beneath ideas' is hilariously applicable to most of her views. They are bad, and when you pull up the floorboards, they aren't even sensible.

:ok:

A Catholic Hangover me thinks, for Leontiskos.

Ironic.

Or it could be considered a discontinuity: you are being destroyed and a new entity, an exact physical copy, is being produced. I tend to think there's no right answer; all answers are paradigm dependent. — Relativist

Well, as it is, that is how i conceptualise teletransportation.
My point was that the resulting person is psychologically continuous, and psychologically connected extremely strongly with you - to the point that no one but your original 'self' could be as connected.

Unless you take the Physical continuity, or further fact view, It doesn't seem like anything is being left out of the transmission. You're right that your paradigm informs how to think about the case, but it seems straight-forward to point out what is and isn't involved in these cases (branch-line case being an additional thing to ponder, and other versions). In this way, it seems clear that there are 'correct' ways to interpret the cases on each view
Parfit concludes that the above is all that matters and that 'personal identity' simply doesn't obtain, at all. He's a pretty harsh reductionist.

That they clearly either haven't, or are being pretended as not read and understood.
It's hard for people to squirm away from quotes. I've had to eat em a few times :)

Obviously, its by society. A mischievous fellow who follows your every move who transcended the plurality of the many to confine itself it to your head to critically examine every action or step taken. Perhaps with a gritty or dark monologue or two. Its obviously not you because the big "M", Morality, isn't owned by any one person? — substantivalism

I'm not really sure I'm making of all this (despite noting its probably in Jest).

If 'society' is the light, then its merely mob rule. Morality isn't owned by anyone. It's a free-floating ideal which alters person-to-person and is used internally to guide one's behaviour. Social 'morality' is just "Oh, most of us agree so here's a policy. Nice".

No. If you don't want to be the kind of person that does X, then by definition you deem X immoral. — Leontiskos

Jesus Christ. No.
There are simply things I find unbecoming, and not immoral. Aesthetic disagreement is not moral. I don't want to wear bright Orange pants, or be the kind of person who would do so. Doesn't mean anyone who does is even on my bad side.

I'm neither as cynical, or as bothered, it seems haha.

Not sure what you want me to glean from an opinion piece asserting several faulty claims... in the Guardian. Let's just cut through it:

"To date, I’ve not encountered any direct racism or sexism in academia..."

Nice.

You're both being weird.

Either quote the words, so NOS can respond to them or continue talking past each other :)

she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy. — Banno

She probably is, though, given this is 2024 and not 1954.

but that of the divinity which some appear to establish a relationship with. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. Almost all non-white-male philosophy prior to 1900 was in the exact same mode as best I can tell, just different values.. All heading towards relationship with the divine.

At least Mikie keeps his unhinged insulting crap to the Lounge. Probably hte only reason there hasn't been other-mod intervention with his absolutely appalling behaviour.

I haven't even read your posting, just saw the name and ears pricked up.
Always good to see locals about :)

I agree with the final line. But i think there are ways around it - much less cynical than Du Plessis-Allan.

Rather an obscure source for this arena.

Are you a Kiwi?

Yes, indeed. I think this is very well discussed by Nagel and Parfit, respectively.
Split-brain cases are rather important in considering this. Memories residing in more than one person is very troublesome. In the Teletransporter cases, someone who is not you, is exactly continuous with you.

I will return to this, as I am about to leave work - but I'm also about to finish Reasons and Persons. I have a lot fo thoughts lol.

"I'm not a rather morally respectable Human being." — substantivalism

Respectable by whose lights? ;)

We definitely agree on this point so I will try to synthesize the debate so far as well as transcribe some key passages of MacIntyre.

My position is essentially MacIntyre's position except with a Kantian "boost" as it were to upgrade some of his claims to categorical imperatives. — boethius

Yeah, good.. and fair enough. I reject the categorical imperative, which will do some heavy lifting in justifying my responses further down the post. This is not to say that I think employing hte categorical imperative is erroneous. I think it is inadequate and necessarily simplistic - to a level lower than required to cover actual behaviour.

but I view it as a categorical imperative not to manipulate you; i.e. deceive you into acting against your own objectives — boethius

I do not. People can have objectives against their own interest, and I do not think any obligations prevents us from acting on our own intuitions around that. I don't think we have any obligation to do so, but if someone who suffers from sexomania (lets assume that's a real thing) is going around 'harming' others, my discomfort with seeing that happen will motivate me to stop them. This is me enacting a private moral opinion publicly.
But, I accept that if humans were on-the-whole less capable of assessing this, viz we had some chaotic, inconsistent system of analysis whether mentally ill people should handle their own affairs, and this resulted in huge amounts of 'harm' in the way noted above, my position might be different. To me, the facts matter. There aren't principles that can be universally applied.

we can be coercive without being manipulative — boethius

Personally, coercion seems on the whole a worse way to deal with things. At least lying to someone accepts what you're doing on it's face. I can't see how these would be morally different on a Kantian framework. But, he accepted lying is possibly acceptable in some circumstances, but wasn't too direct about it.

his starting point is exactly that you need a moral tradition in which moral ideas and decisions even have meaning, and it only from the standpoint of one tradition that it is even possible to comprehend the claims of another tradition; one can not be traditionless. — boethius

This is, to my mind, someone pretending their doing something other than trying to convince others of their own values. One can certainly be traditionless on my view. Assuming the bolded is to me read "It is only from..." I think thats absurb, on its face, and upon reflexion. We can understand the solar system from teh confines of the surface of hte Earth.

As you may appreciate, a significant amount of moral-relativists (whether emotivist or straight nihilists or some other flavour) essentially operate by "grandfathering in" a long list of moral rules and social opinions that they take for granted. — boethius

I tend to not see this in anyone who has reviewed their positions, but in the general population, yes, that's pretty common.

what's entailed by that is there is no moral obligation to not torture babies nor interfere with someone so engaged. — boethius

absolutely. And, i think the important aspect in the problem you're outlining is a lack of review/reflection. I think it would be hard to miss these complete contradictions upon reflection.

I strongly disagree here; thought experiments are the primary tool of developing a moral theory. — boethius

My view is that they are helpful in getting the discussion going, but serve no real purpose in ascertaining the 'real' moral position one might have. One can make whatever claims they like when not faced with the position their advocating for in real life.

However, the examples I've provided are not even really thought experiments, they are real examples: people really do torture, murder, rape, extort and take bribes. — boethius

They do. I take those as thought experiments, nonetheless. I accept that they aren't particularly interesting in terms of 'experiment' but giving real-life examples that do not pertain to me is still, I think a thought experiment. I have to think about it, not remember.

are real actual duties ultimately aim to continue humanity. — boethius

I'm unsure these two can go together. Duties in pursuit of that aim? IF that's the inference, yes, sure, that's the position I am essentially saying morality comes down to. Choose an aim, and run with it from there. This is the 'one free miracle' i've, other places, spoken of. Choose your aim, and the math works from there.

It is not a mistake if a question is honest and not a criticism. — boethius

Hmm, perhaps i'm not quite getting how you mean mistake. I think you have erred. Dishonesty not required for that. Just, mistake heh.

Obviously we both prefer no one to be needlessly harmed, so we agree on what is preferable. — boethius

Yes. I think this agreement is viable as a means for organising society. There's no obligation to do so , but when most people agree on the above, we can come to terms, as they say and write legislation. When everyone agrees, it seems irrational rather than 'wrong' not to do what everyone is agreeing to. It seems natural, not obligatory. I think this is hte real reason for the success of society, in self-survival as it were. To that aim, we're going pretty well by my lights.

But of course, even if those premises are all correct, it simply begs the question of whether "society" really is correct about that moral position. Maybe Nazis were right after all. — boethius

Precisely why I think the above is the case.

In a world of no duties, then the surgeon has no duty to perform the surgery to the best of their ability and obviously until completion. — boethius

I agree, and think this is true. However, I am quite happy most people share the same sort of discomfort with neglect as I do. I have no right to will others do so, though, and if this were not the case I do not believe I could change my moral position that people should share that position. But, I like it, as is.

We certainly agree it is better to avoid the situation, but the issue is what duty does the surgeon have to the patient. — boethius

Whatever one he has internally assented to. I think you are able to oblige yourself to your own intentions. This doesn't seem to me the same thing as expecting something from someone else. I expect that I will not tap out simply because I'm out of breath in a Jiu jitsu round. I stick to this. It's a obligation i put on myself. If i do not meet this obligation, I deal with it. There's no moral valence imo.

However, if the truth is there is no duties then there's no foundation upon which society could legitimately demand any of this and no way to maintain a system (with detectives, prosecutors, judges all performing their duties) to enforce accountability to those demands. — boethius

Agree. And think this is the case. We are mistaking common agreement, for obligation.

If you're ambivalent to the continuation of humanity — boethius

ambivalent is probably an unfair framing here. I care. It matters to me (though, in an expected way im sure) - but I don't think anyone else should, or needs to share my opinion (for their sake, it may be better that they dont (this will make sense if you ask what my position is lol)).

so taking up Heydel-Mankoo would perhaps be more relevant there. — boethius

For sure. That's almost all he's relevant for, publicly speaking.

then this isn't too relevant to you — boethius

I will forego responding to all of what this relates to, but yes, I think that's the case. Nonetheless, really appreciate your elucidations.

What I am claiming is bold is that ridiculous levels of political stupidity do not now pose an existential risk to humanity. Of course, if you are unconcerned about humanity continuing, as you say above, then seems an irrelevant point to you either way. — boethius

I may be missing a trick - the underlined seems to imply this issue is irrelevant to any moral outlook? Was there a typo there?

These more fundamental moral changes are mostly a critical mass issue, often happening against the will of the elites; an example of this sort of major change is the reformation. — boethius

For sure, and I suppose this would be 'my version of moral progress' in action, in that its purely a mechanism of common agreement. You could, here, employ 'empathy' as the guiding light. But due to trauma, and the way my mind works, I suffered from sociopathy for several years. I could not accept the above, at that time, and it would be very very strange to say that the rest of society had a right to enforce that norm on me. Apart from anything, 'ought' always has to imply ' could' - and I 'couldn't'. I was lucky in that it was transitive. Most sociopaths are not this lucky.

There is definitely an objective measures of social success, such as people having enough to eat and society at least continuing.

Objective and quantifiable. — boethius

That (and others, obviously) parameter is measurable, and if the bold is your aim it measures success. But consider a society with an aim that can be completed. To reforest a certain portion of hte Earth's surface. What's the use of society beyond that completion? I think it is irrational to have an aim which is forever changing, unless we're going to accept that morality has nothing to do with it. More below..

Then you are using the word success in pretty unusual way. — boethius

I havent used it. That's what Im asking you to point out. THis response seems to be senseless in terms of what I've said to you here.

You may have no problem with society ending, but I don't see why you wouldn't agree that would indeed be society failing in whatever it was trying to do — boethius

Consider, again, a society with a time-restricted aim. The World Lover's Society of 1999. Once it flips over to 2000, the aim is complete, and society no longer has a moral, or practical aim. And it seems to me irrational to claim that a society can have a indeterminate aim, yet be beholden to it. If you're saying merely survival of the society is the aim, how you do deal with evolution of societies? Is British society now inherently different in a way that matters from British society circa 1823? It is the same society, no? But wait... they had entirely different Moral precepts to current British Society. Heck, that's true of 1920s British society vs now. How does this sit? I'm not trying to imply much here. Just curious.

It's good to see you are advanced enough in understanding your own position to realize it is inconsistent. — boethius

This is wrong. And you seem to have misread the quote you have used.

This is why my position is consistent. It doesn't apply to anything but me and my actions. — AmadeusD

I believe it is. This, though, In light of the fact I actually reject something I said earlier. Once that's taken into account, no inconsistencies that I can ascertain.

Your position seems to be that you're fine if it fails as well as humanity as a whole, simply fails and comes to an end. — boethius

Roughly, but obviously I wont be 'fine'. I'll just 'not be'. No valence, again, to have a moral view on. Things end all the time. Humanity is not special.

Your intuitive-spontaneous moral framework is still a moral framework from which you derive your objectives. — boethius

It is quite alright to claim this. I don't think I can argue with it as stated. But it is a non-static framework, if so. This is novel, and so I find it hard to believe it could be consider among other frameworks. It doesn't operate the same way. I reject that there are moral facts, or propositions apt for truth claims.

And this would be the fundamental moral duty I would put forward: a duty to try to be consistent. — boethius

To me, that's nonsensical. Obviously, I don't accept that there are moral duties. C'est la vie, :)

Now, if you are committed to an inconsistent position there is not "arguing against you" per se as you can simply be comfortable with any inconsistency, comfort is your guide, and so there is no problem. — boethius

I am not. In any way. I have no idea where you've come up with that. That comfort is the guide, in all cases, is what the consistency consists in( Hehe. that was a great sentence). To clear, I care about things, and people. I do not, though, think this matters to anyone else. And morally, I don't think it can. I think people, under their framework, insist this is true. But, that is not true. It is a requirement of their framework only. That choice, though, is arbitrary (or, as I posit, and stand by - it is informed by their comfort level with said framework).

but you clearly like to argue so with enough of it perhaps you simply become uncomfortable with inconsistencies and so convert to my avoid-inconsistencies moral code. — boethius

I like to discuss. Arguments suck. And I already meet you criteria :)

If you're ambivalent to anyone doing anything at all, just more comfortable with some happenings over others but that's just you're own feeling of comfort and doesn't give rise to any moral claims (including claims about conscription for example), then I want to be sure you really are ambivalent. — boethius

This is not quite coherent. Ambivalence has to do with valence, not morality. Ambivalence would indicate i have conflicting feelings about whatever it is. Sometimes, this true. Mostly, it is not. I have a clear feeling and emotional response. This does not give rise to any moral position and they aren't particularly connected, unless you accept that people's emotional response to situations is what, without some intervening reasoning, informs their morals. That is my position, because most people have never even tried to review their moral positions outside of the 'moment'. The 'moment' is clearly an emotional one.

they still want to condemn Hitler and assume that's given to them: but obviously it's not, if no one is right or wrong, Hitler is as right as anyone else. — boethius

He's not to me, but I agree. There is no way to understand that anything he did is actually worse in any objective sense, without a particular aim (not killing people, for instance - which it can be very hard to walk back from, when it is such a deeply-held intuition that one ought not do this. But I do).

I said "as laudable" to just mean they are equal (which you can say "equally good" or "equally bad"). — boethius

If so, fair enough. Laudable infers praise, above ambivalence (hehehe). This is also most often, and most apt applied to aims and desires, not states of affairs. So, I see a number of inconsistencies in your language at this stage.

Which seems very much your position, you have no particular gripe with Hitler and the Nazi project: happened, they were clearly comfortable with what they were doing so doing right by their own comfortableness (certainly comfortable enough to carry out their project). — boethius

This is a little bit misleading. I can have opinions on other people's opinions. But they do not relate to anything but my opinion of those opinions. This may be hard to follow, but it is consistent. I can think what I want. That means nothing about whether those other people are right or wrong in their actions, or thoughts. I am extremely uncomfortable with the Nazi project. I do not believe I have the right to insist they are wrong. I can insist, and attempt to reason with them, that their project is ill-conceived. Luckily, they had specific aims to which I could relate these reasons. This is a mechanistic conversation at that stage, not a moral one. If you have aim A, regardless of its morality, you can do 1, 2 or 3 and they will have different outcomes, corresponding to different degrees of success toward your arbitrary aim. This is not inconsistent with my position.

This is exactly why I develop the consequences of society changing its view of right and wrong, that "you shouldn't do X because society will hold you accountable and there will be consequences" is not a valid argument. — boethius

I can't quite grasp what you're saying here - the sentences don't quite string together - so apologies if I get something wrong:
This would be the only possible public notion I could appeal to in trying to change anyone's behaviour or views. And I might do this, If i were uncomfortable enough. "Oh dad, please don't kill the dog. You will probably be arrested and charged. That would suckfor you". But that is speculation, unfortunately. 50/50 whether anyone would care what I've got to say. Maybe less.

When you say "consequences for them" clearly the negative consequences to serial killing personally to the serial killer would be getting caught. But why would anyone catch you if no one thinks serial killing is bad? — boethius

Because they're uncomfortable, and erroneously think that gives them the right to do stuff to other people. Nothing stopping them either, but this would motivate them to do it.

You just rejected, above, any measure of success or failure in evaluating societies, but say here that Western society does something well. You just said Western society has no goal. — boethius

"getting on with it" is no a goal. It is a fact of the society i am observing. We 'get on with it' to degrees of success higher than other societies. We also produce more single-use plastics. Nothing in that suggests a moral valence or social goal. I also didn't reject that the West has a social goal. I'm trying to tease out what your aim is, in instantiating your moral outlook. It seems you're not able to necessarily lay that out.

However, it's simply wrong that there is no shared moral framework. — boethius

It is not. The quote directly after this shows why. YOu have confused some facts about people's emotional reactions to events, and 'morality'. You are, slowly, sliding into accepting that people's emotions are their moral framework.

Where society can afford to muddle is in policy choices that are not existential to the formation of civil society or then any society at all. — boethius

It can afford it anywhere. It seems this is an indication of where you would become uncomfortable, if society did this. That's fine, and again, exemplifies the above assertion.

In some places you seem to hold a total ambivalence to what happens and are not concerned with the social consequences whatsoever, and not only are you unconcerned for what happens to society but there is no way to measure the success of society as such (you're ambivalent to society succeeding or failing and moreover assert there is no measure of success or failure anyways), and in other places you seem to argue society, in particular Western society, is doing well. — boethius

This is entirely wrong, and all the reasons why have been canvassed through the above responses.
You've used ambivalence incorrectly. I am not ambivalent. I have levels of comfort and discomfort which I clearly apprehend - making ambivalence not possible. I will ignore this subsequently.
UNderline: Entirely false. Not sure where that's come from. I've been extremely clear that I, personally, care about what happens to society. I think society is nice. It is what it is, and I like how its going (in the West). This does not give you the correct ammunition for the assertions here. The only thing I have said Western society does well, was pursuant to a specific, arbitrary aim. This is not inconsistent in any way with the rest of what i've said.

Likewise, claiming "other than that they meet a collective emotional benchmark" is another way of saying they aren't arbitrary. — boethius

No, it's not. It's just naming hte arbitrary benchmark used. The benchmark is arbitrary. It's results are just so.

For example, even in your own system you are clearly making the claim that "you should do what you're comfortable with" — boethius

Absolutely not. I am saying i should do what I am comfortable with. It does not pertain, or have anything to do with anyone else. This seems to be a misapprehension you are making quite often here. It is wrong.

Some of you responses are really confusing, in the sense that you directly contradict things i've said int he quotes you've used. Interesting... Till the next one!!

Oh ok, lol sorry. Missed what was being got at. As you were.

Some months ago when I put myself in his Crosshairs, I actually put together a log of his intensely uncivil insulting comments to posters who did nothing of the sort to him. It ran to something like 22 entries, and I got bored trawling back through pages around page 50. So, there's plenty more im sure.

He deleted that comment logging his gross behaviour. He denies it, and continues to pretend that magically the comment disappeared. I have genuinely never seen someone as fragile as this guy.

It seems that most forms of "we cannot know anything about the world," rely on a certainty that there is indeed a world and a real truth about it out there. I just don't know how advocates of these theories can claim to know this given their position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's a bit of an empty claim. It's intuitively true, if you take the position, but in itself, I don't think it's a claim to certainty. Given that the other option is to be certain, which the position rejects... Perhaps language just doesn't do it's job here, though, as there is obviously a difference between being certain about lack of certainty, and being certain about any real-world concrete proposition.

From how you've shown yourself in this thread I don't see that as likely. You need to actually address the things which another has said, and show your reasons for disagreement, instead of repeatedly asserting that the other's position is erroneous, absurd, etc., if you really want a productive discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given that this is precisely antithetical to the exchange (which we can go back and read) I will assume that you're wrong, which gives me hope for my intention to do so :)

And in speaking about such non-linguistic thoughts, only the linguistic portions get communicated — Manuel

This is incoherent. There are no linguistic portions of hte thoughts. You have, again, contradicted yourself. I understand why you did not understand when I pointed this out about a position you took, but this sentence, itself, is contradictory. You cannot communicate linguistic "portions" of something non-linguistic. There isn't a linguistic portion Bear Fur.

If someone could attempt to describe in some manner, non-linguistic thought, it would be interesting to see. — Manuel

This is exactly what (arguably) more than half of humans do. This is the way in whcih non-linguistic thoughts are expressed linguistically. I'm unsure your point is even apt here - "descriptions" are by definition, this process resulting in communication, about half hte time (some descriptions are of images!).

Until we have a better notion of linguistic thought, we are going to remain stuck. — Manuel

Mine is exact, and contrasts exactly with non-linguistic thought. IF yours are grey and iffy, that may explain the disparity between our views.

Come on man. People can use sing language, or sight, as was the case with Hawking, to express thought. But it does come from the brain, not from the tongue or the eyes... — Manuel

I think you're not seeing the distinction I'm making. Hawking had less direct communication than typical speech. It changed even the vessel of delivery, not to mention the medium etc.. as with normal communication.

If you want to call it convention, call it convention. I don't have a problem with direct and mediated. You take mediation to mean indirect. — Manuel

I do indeed. If that's the disagreement, I guess we can discuss that rather than the 'other stuff' I alluded to.

I will once again say, we only have the human way of seeing things, not a "view from nowhere", which is where I assume you would believe directness could be attained. — Manuel

No, I don't take it to mean that. I take it to mean something other than human sensory perception. That is an infinite concept. Telepathy is one possible example (in its strict sense, mind-to-mind, no mediation).

I believe it makes more sense to argue that we directly see objects (mediated by our mind and organs) than to say we indirectly see an object, because it is mediated. — Manuel

To me, it doens't make sense. But i also think this just comes, purely, down to your discomfort with the latter. In a Parfitean sense, its possible this is what's considered an 'empty' question on your terms - but I think the idea of Telepathy is coherent. So, I have a 'contrast' as it were, and on that contrast it is obvious to me that typical communication is Indirect, as to thoughts. It's direct in the sense of it is person-to-person. But, I don't think either of us are trying to make that point (whether pro or con).

but to think his entire framework is wrong, well I think this is simply to dismiss was even contemporary brain sciences say, not mentioning common sense. — Manuel

I see. This may be an issue.

Sure - we have an issue here too, what is an object? It's not trivial. Is it the thing we think we see, is it the cause of what we think we see or is it a mere mental construction only? Tough to say. — Manuel

On my account, it is the item 'in the world' which has a causal relationship with the process of perception which results in phenomenal experience. So, as an example, to see the keyboard in front of me (a token) I must actually cast my eyes on it (I call this 'to look at'). My body then perceives the light, and (insert some other crap about hte process here) eventually I have a phenomenal experience of a mental representation. Its correlative. I do not think it is at all direct. This retains coherence, but could still be wrong.

I think it makes more sense. — Manuel

I also assent to that notion. IN day-to-day life, my conception would be extremely difficult to navigate, I think. But, I don't think convention speaks to 'actual' aspects of things without actually deducing that it does :P

I will grant this as stated. I actually don't think that we disagree all that much on substantial matter, more so the way words are used. And I admit I am using direct in a manner that goes beyond the usual framing as "naive realism", which if anyone believes in that, they shouldn't be in philosophy or science, or I would wonder why they would bother with this. — Manuel

Hahaha, this is an excellent sign off. I am totally on board with this.

This image seems absolutely nonsensical to me, intuitively and reflectively. What does that say? I don't know, and i'm implying anything. Just curious as to your reaction to that. It may say nothing.

Well if you think I have entirely failed to do so, then I assume you have spoken clearly against this apriori argument of value and ethics stated several times. This is the first premise of the argument. You haven't done this. Just tell me how it is that ethics and value are not as I have argued? You haven't touched this. — Astrophel

As noted, yes i have, and you have ignored it (it seems!).
You are asking to me prove the negation of your position. No thank you, Good sir. You fail to provide support your position, I reject it. It ends there. If we keep discussing, cool. But it is not an objection to the exchange that I've not accepted your position.

Well, you don't seem to getting something obvious — Astrophel

I reject your unsupported position. Nothing more.
If it were obvious, I'd think you could convince me. I tend to accept obviousness as obvious, by it's nature. You haven't tried, it seems, to provide anything in that capacity so far. Which is fine, if that's not what you're trying to do. I may be misunderstanding your intent - but based on your arguments, these remarks stand, i think.

Take the ethical case, any will do. Ask yourself, what is in this case that were it to be removed from the case, the case would lose it meaning as ethical. — Astrophel

Human judgement. That my version of the the answer, to any case. Fwiw, I have read Kant. You don't seem to be groking the situation we're in here. I understand your position and reject it.

This is value-in-being. — Astrophel

This is your assertion, which is fine. But you're acting as if you have ringfenced the claim against objection. You have not done so. It is simply your position. Perhaps one shared with many others, but that doesn't ringfence it.
My assumption is that you do not notice when you make subjective judgments, and take them to be somehow pursuant to. If you're suggesting that 'being' has some inherently value, i may need to walk away.

value to the borrower and the owner, then the ethics of the case simply vanishes. You SEE this, don't you?? You should simply say yes, and be done with it. You protest too much, methinks. — Astrophel

You have tacitly accepted my position. I have, in fact, said that this is hte case multiple times. I am now 100% convinced you are not reading, or understanding. This is not a mistake that could be made otherwise, I don't think. The bolded claim requires acceptance of my position. It is those subjects judgment in which the value consists, and therefore the Ethical 'content' of the event. We're good. As noted previously. There are not values free-floating in the World-at-large independent of human judgment.

IT is not incoherent. The hard part hasn't even begun — Astrophel

It is. Which is going to be harsh for you, if you think this isn't the hard part. Heh. I kid.

Sounds like you are somewhere in the vicinity of being a physicalist. — Astrophel

All I can say to this is that I don't think you're understanding much of anything I'm saying if this is the conclusion you've drawn. It is definitely wrong, at any rate.

I am telling you about the procedure of discovering what it means for something to be ethical. — Astrophel

Yes, indeed - and you're wrong, on my view. I have been over this, in discreet detail, a few times (above, three times). You can go back and find that if you wish. I'm not sure why you aren't just saying "Ok, fine, you disagree and that's okay" which it is. We are allowed to do so. That's one of the best parts of Philosophy, imo.

Your point about what the world is? Just say it. I'm listening. — Astrophel

This is an incoherent question. I am rebutting your point about 'what the world is'. I have canvassed two options. One is my position, and one is yours. I'll do a low-effort bit of highlighting:

Your mind is in the world, sure. If you want to ignore that part, have hte cake and Eat it. — AmadeusD

This is a mere side-step of the clear distinction. It doesn't need answering, as the possible disagreement in this passage has been covered at least twice in this exchange: The mind is in the world. The Pain is in the mind. Claiming that your house is in (insert country) and nothing more doesn't help anyone locate it. — AmadeusD

I wont be elaborating, if you can't grok the above. While i am sympathetic if that's the case, I do not have the time. Pain doesn't exist outside the mind(on my view). Whether hte mind is 'in the world' or not, is irrelevant. You are ignoring a clear distinction in order to use poetics instead of clear reason. I shall not. Though, if you're, in fact, an idealist, please say so. That brings the discussion to a new place.

Nerve cells, c fibers, or however you would like to characterize a brain event, are not pain. — Astrophel

*ahem* I brought this fact up. I have repeated this fact. It supports my position, directly. You are either being dishonest or this has gone so far off the rails we need to start again. Yeesh. You're arguing for a physicalist position by ..what..rejecting physcalism? Bizarre. I assume that's not what your intent is, but that is what's being conveyed to me in fairly clear terms.

Sorry, but this is Wittgenstein's idea. — Astrophel

To me, this is explains so much. If you follow Witty, we have not much to discuss. I don't rate him at all. In terms of deducing your positions - I did predict this.

t. You have just reasserted some Nietzschean/Wittgensteinian misleading statements — AmadeusD

;) No need to be sorry. He's a moron (hehehe, I kid).

But there is an problem that instantly arises: to speak of something not in the world is going to be an event IN the world. Speaking is IN the world. — Astrophel

This is the above in action, as an exemplar. These phrases have no meaning, as they are. None of this presents any objections. Though, I take your point here - it would probably have been better to note that, sure, pain is 'in the world' in a sense, but it is located far more specifically than that - It isn't present in the vast, vast, vast majority of the world (well, an instance of pain - and, pain, the abstract concept, obviously doesn't exist 'in the world'. Nothing of that kind does). Oh. It turns out that I infact, did do that, as re-quoted from my own comments above :)

But the trouble with imagined things like this is that they comprise parts of real things, and so even though there are no unicorns, there are horses and horns. — Astrophel

They do not 'comprise' these things. Im unsure how you're formulating that statement. It doesn't make sense. The opposite is true - the concept of a Unicorn is comprised of Horses and Horns. I don't really take that to be the case, but that's another discussion. There are examples where that's the case, to some degree, but you can't imagine parts of a real thing, which don't actually exist. If something is real, it's parts are necessarily real. If a Unicorn existed, it is partially because Horses and Horns already exist. A Donkey can fit this description somewhat aptly.

Phenomena are in the world because they are there at all! And "being there" is sufficient. — Astrophel

As noted above, I take this point but its just floating above the discussion and not actually engaging what is being discussed on my view. If you can point to pain outside the mind, go ahead. If you can't, my position remains and is untouched by this (accepted) reality. But, this is plainly not true of ideas. Which is why, if you're an idealist, this is a different discussion.

Well, I haven't talked about anything except the argument about value and ethics. I haven't given you a single clue beyond affirming that pain is an inherent part of ethical statements that involve pain. If you want MY ontology just ask. See the preceding paragraphs. I read phenomenology. this is Kant through Derrida and beyond. What is real is phenomena. I only bring up physicality because you did, and I was surmising what you might think. Me? I am miles from this kind of naive thinking. C-fibres are themselves phenomenologically reducible to phenomena. — Astrophel

Ah. You are, on my account, not talking any sense in this passage. I would recommend perhaps reviewing your comments as you go through respond to my comments. They are directly related to your utterances, whcih you seem to deny throughout this quasi-review.

As this appears to be an (incredibly) inaccurate overview of what you've said in this exchange, I feel the need to step away. I really appreciate the time and effort you've put in - it's been a fun exchange. But at this stage, it would definitely be diminishing returns for both of us. And that's fine.

Another example of how you make faulty assertions. It seems like you have a tendency to claim that you are sure about things, when your professed certainty really has no foundation, or support of any kind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seem to arguing for the sake of it here. All i put forth was some good faith indication that I expect we are able to have productive discussions. If your response above is not facetious... Wth dude lol. But in terms of hte exchange, this is just more non-engagement.

Let me rephrase .. I hope we can have productive discussions elsewhere on TPF!

You seem to be arguing for no real reason.

Lenin did similarly with Marx. — Vera Mont

Not sure whether this name is allowed here, but Terence McKenna has made much this same point - that originators have no control of their ideas, in a general sense.
Not much could be done about Marxism once it got going. The chances are that Marx would have been shouted down and eventually turned out for trying to correct the Communist project of the early 20th Century. Tbf, I would do that to him anyway.

Let me remind you, that it was your words, you, who said the good comes in contact with human minds. You said: "It literally doesn't come into contact with anything but human minds." — Metaphysician Undercover

This sentence does not make grammatical sense. From what I gather, you're trying to say I painted myself into a corner.
No. As noted, these are your positions I am illustrating the illogic of. I cannot stress enough how backwards you are reading these exchanges.

Now you are saying that what you said earlier is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is pretty clear evidence for the above. You're ascribing my description of your own position to my own position. No thank you, good sir.

Suppose for example, we name a concept "X", and we define X as a thing which transcends human minds. Clearly X must transcend human minds or else it is self-contradicting and incoherent, therefore not a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not the case. It is a concept. A false concept. Things don't just cease to exist because they are contradictory. People hold contradictory concepts in mind all the time. These is very, very confused.
I also note the use of 'must' here relates only to achieving coherence. Nothing else is aimed at. Not an ethical claim.

Therefore regardless of whether the concept X is created by a human mind, it cannot be rejected on any principles of logic, and it must necessarily, by definition, transcend human minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is probably hte worst use of 'logic' to defend the indefensible I have seen since joining TPF, outside of Corvus. Nothing you've described is apt for your claim.

It seems you may be baiting and switching in part through this exchange too. Your use of 'goods' seems to flit between 'products' and 'the good'. This is not something I can engage with sensibly.
"the Good" is apt here, where "Goods" are not apt. They are just objects. If you are trying to say they are the same thing, I reject and simply move on with my life.

It's possible I wont reply if similar comments come back. If so, take care mate - I'm sure we'll have more productive exchanges elsewhere on TPF!

Well that was bizarre. Let's hope Mikie doesn't retreat from every indication he's not being civil.

Very important to see that these are not MY personal ethical values. Anything I bring up is just to serve as an illustration — Astrophel

That's a fair comment - I think what I'm getting at though, is that these examples do not survive without being someone's personal view of the act/event/whatever. They cannot exist, free of the Subject's judgement.
You're right that I may be unfairly ascribing them - take those as examples, also, if you can.

True, I have asserted there is a grounding for ethical state of affairs, but you entirely lose me after this. Popping off? It suggests an arbitrary move. But i have done exactly the opposite. I am saying ethics is NOT arbitrary, and that it DOES have a foundation in actuality. This is the philosophical discovery of value-in-the-world. — Astrophel

Yep. Not sure what's being missed here, but for clarity (as this may meean me ignoring much of your response in light of this):

- I understand this is what you are putting forward;
- I also understand you are attempting to defend the thesis above;
- I am of the view that you have entirely failed to do so, and that your entire position boils down to an arbitrary move. I figured I had been very clear about this, so it's possible I will need to continue pointing out where i Believe you are either ignoring me, or perhaps misunderstand if the above is how you're reading, currently.
Onward...

I think this is alien thinking to you, because most popular thinking these says looks to scientific methods of discovery to determine justified belief in philosophical issues. — Astrophel

Wrong. It's not alien. It's incoherent.

Here, there is a priority discovered in the world's existence. — Astrophel

No. There isn't. ANd so far, you've don't nothing to defend this. All you've done is told me that I don't get it. I get it. It's wrong (is my position). It is a really common attempt to ensure one is making good decisions, based on some framework that isn't arbitrary. But, it is, at base. THe maths works. THe basis is false.

Ask what it IS for something to be ethical. And ask this looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for ethicality. — Astrophel

This, is also incoherent. You are presupposing that there is some objectivity about ethics to be found. There isn't, you've not provided anything that indicates there is other than the assertion. So, i'm left with not much to say.

Not even my c fibers?? Hmmmm. — Astrophel

Err, no. That's an empirical fact. If you are taking this to be the case, either you're a hard-line physicalist or you're making things up to suit your position, me thinks. I did provide an out for the former. THe latter, not so much.

"Where" again is pain? Pain is only one "place": in the world. — Astrophel

No. Not in any way, and you have literally not even bothered to discuss my point. You have just reasserted some Nietzschean/Wittgensteinian misleading statements. It's poetics not philosophy so say pain is "in the world". Your mind is in the world, sure. If you want to ignore that part, have hte cake and Eat it.

When I observe the dreadful pain, or bliss, and say it is in the world, I mean it is there. — Astrophel

Yeah, but you're wrong. So, what are you trying to do here except just in other words restate your position with no argument? "in the world" is absolutely meaningless in these passages, as they are. It may be something you grasp in your mind, but you've not said anything that fills the empty vessel that phrase provides me.

I can see how a "strict physicalist" might try to push this out of existence, but you say you are not one of these. — Astrophel

This is hte exact opposite, and it is now clear that you're not engaging with the Physicalist position I'm mentioning, and that you've misread what I've actually said.
Your position could be supported in strict Physicalist terms. C-fibres firing would constitute pain on that account. You could then claim the pain exist in the world. But, if you're not taking that line, the move isn't open. My understanding of your position here is that you do not know what you're discussing very well, as these things are directly conflicting in your passages.

If it is there, then it is in the world. Even imagined things have a status of being in the world AS imagined things. — Astrophel

This is a mere side-step of the clear distinction. It doesn't need answering, as the possible disagreement in this passage has been covered at least twice in this exchange: The mind is in the world. The Pain is in the mind. Claiming that your house is in (insert country) and nothing more doesn't help anyone locate it.

Only this spear in my kidney (the agony, that is) is not imagined. Just the opposite: it is the least imagined thing one can conceive. — Astrophel

The spear, the injury are not imagined. I have pointed that out.

The pain, resultant from a causal relationship with those things, is. It is in your mind. It doesn't exist elsewhere.

But nothing can mitigate pain. It is not an attitude about something that sucks. It is the Real foundation for ethical possiblity. This is where the argument lies. Value and ethics are like modus ponens and its conclusion: therefore, Q. This IS the point. — Astrophel

Then you're flat-out wrong and I need not engage further. This is against the empirical understanding of what Pain is and how it operates.

It also seems you've jettisonned most of your position now, instead giving me the basis for ethics as:

Physical pain. Alrighty. I reject that. And we're good :)

Simply stating Biden is better than Trump on all issues
— boethius

So you’re just in imbecile? Got it. My bad for engaging. Have fun with your straw men. Bye. — Mikie

LOL. It's like he's writing a Monty Python sketch.