No, because I know my command of the English language is such that I would be able to understand any coherent explanation. It doesn't follow though that I would necessarily agree with it. Are you one of those who think that you are so right that if anyone disagrees with what you write, they must therefore not understand it? — Janus

Your replies are indicating that you do not understand what I write. They are not indicating that you do not agree with me. You say things like "that passage reads like nonsense", and "Gobbledygook".

The obvious conclusion is that either you are incapable of understanding me, or unwilling to try. Either way, to me, it appears as if you have an intellectual disability. I apologize for saying "mentally handicapped". Google tells me that this is outdated and offensive, and that I should use "intellectual disability" instead.

Do you recognize that replies like that would indicate to me that there is some sort of intellectual disability on your part?

Or, is it really the case, that you just disagree with me, but you are incapable of supporting what you believe, against my arguments, so you simply dismiss my arguments as impossible for you to understand, feigning intellectual disability as an escape?

It is possible to be a Philosophical Realist and a Nominalist, which is the view that universals and abstract objects do not exist in a mind-independent world (Wikipedia - Nominalism) — RussellA

You can say this, as many do. But the point I made is that nominalism provides no ontology to substantiate the existence of particulars. Particulars are nothing other than perceptions in the mind, as Berkeley argues. Then to validate ontologically, the idea that particulars have independent existence, as a philosophical realism requires, the only principles which will do, are those of idealism. That's why Berkeley needs God. That's why I say that all forms of realism are grounded in idealism. You can readily claim to believe in incompatible ontologies when you do not understand the principles.

However, a body would not accelerate if there were no external force acting on it, — RussellA

This is not true. When a body is caused to accelerate, it may continue to accelerate long after that cause has ceased acting. And, that physicists conceptualize this type of causation as "force" is just a convention. Furthermore, I can cause my own body to accelerate without requiring any external force, as causation, simply by getting up and moving. That's an internal force acting which causes it to move.

Your particular beliefs is no evidence either for or against your living in a deterministic world.

It is possible to believe in free will even in a deterministic world. — RussellA

Well of course, a belief is not evidence of the thing believed. And so, by extension, even if everyone believes in something this ought not be considered to be evidence of the thing believed.

However, beliefs do influence the way that we behave. And, I argue that this is in a non-deterministic way. So I don't see any point to what you have said here.

Fundamental particles and fundamental forces are both physical in the world, even if we have concepts for them in the mind. — RussellA

This is a serious problem with the beliefs of many physicalists. They claim that things like "forces", and "energy" are physical, and they also deny the reality of Platonic realism. However, upon analysis, it can be demonstrated that these things are purely mathematical conceptions. The physicalist will commonly ignore this, and insist that these terms refer to something independent from the conception, which the conception corresponds with, but that is really nothing more than claiming that there is an independent idea, which the human conception corresponds with. And that is exactly what Platonic realism is.

For example, the physicalist might say that there are independent "laws of nature" which correspond with the humanly conceived "laws of physics". Or, one might believe that there is a number "two" which corresponds with the conception of two. There are many examples of Platonist beliefs which physicalist have, and generally they will continue in to incoherently argue against Platonism. I will argue that all forms of realism are reducible to, or dependent on Platonic realism, for ontological support. So, if you are a realist, you are a Platonist.

The force on the Moon because of the Earth does not depend on our knowing the spatial relation between the Moon and the Earth.

The equation f = ma is a human assumption that has been found to work through numerous instances. We know the equation works, but we don't know why it works . It is an axiom. It could well be that tomorrow it stops working, unlikely but possible. The equation f = ma is a conceptualized relation that has been found to describe what we observe in the world. It doesn't describe why f = ma — RussellA

It's very evident here, that you have no idea what "force" actually means. Force is a quantity. It is a figure produced from measurement and application of mathematics. Therefore it is very clear that any force between the earth and the moon is the product of human knowledge of the relations between these two. To say that there is a force which is independent of measurement, as that which is measured, is incoherent. This is because "force" is complex, a product of multiple properties, as "ma" signifies. Very clearly it is a human creation.

If we cannot coherently conceive of something being real without it existing somewhere at some time or everywhere at all times then that tells against your position. — Janus

I can very easily conceive of something being real without existing somewhere at some time, or everywhere at all times. However, if explained to you, you dismiss such writing with phrases like "that passage reads like nonsense".

Do you recognize that this may indicate that you are in some way mentally handicapped? Or is this an attitudinal problem, a refusal to put in the effort required to understand such conceptions? Are you by any chance determinist, thinking that effort is not required to understand, believing that either the universe will make you understand, or not understand, as fate would have it?

Possibility for example, doesn't exist anywhere, at any time.

You reason it through. If you have a large glass then you will feel tired. If you feel tired then you may miss the train. If you miss the train then you may be stuck in the city. If you get stuck in the city then you will have to pay for a hotel. But you have no money on you. You therefore conclude that you will stick to a glass of water. — RussellA

Well, I strongly believe that reasoning through anything is an awful lot of work. And if the world is deterministic, it's obviously unnecessary work. Therefore, it's very reasonable not to reason through anything, but just do what you feel like doing, if you believe in a deterministic world. We can avoid all that unnecessary work, and have much more fun this way, if we believe in a deterministic world.

The Universe is, according to theory, constantly expanding, and as a result (or many results of said result) will, allegedly, succumb to "Heat Death."

This is a widely accepted scientific theory. — Outlander

I wouldn't call this "scientific". To be science requires convincing experimental evidence.

What I'm saying is, perhaps the speaker of the message is simply aware of the inevitable result of such, which, no matter how long it lasts (say X as freedom), it will inevitable turn into a certain state (say Y as lack of freedom). — Outlander

I can't see how this is relevant. I'm going to die, therefore lose my freedom, long before the proposed heat death of the universe, so how is this relevant?

In simple terms, say you're in a desert next to an oasis. The person is telling you that oasis, the water within, and as a result all life situated next to it that makes it unique from the barren desert-scape around it, is temporary. This is a fact. You consider what is temporary as a permanent concept, because, for all you know, and have ever known, it logically seems to be -- while the other person has seen that it is in fact, not. At least, that's a reasonable counter-argument to the aforementioned quote of yours. — Outlander

Sorry, i still can't see the relevance. Are you suggesting that RusselA is arguing that determinism is permanent? How is that relevant? How could determinism be any thing other than permanent?

Not an infinite regress, as we eventually arrive at the (indivisible) fundamental particles and forces.

There are four fundamental interactions known to exist: Gravitational force, Electromagnetic force, Strong nuclear force, Weak nuclear force. — RussellA

Like I explained, there is a big difference between fundamental particles, and fundamental forces. One is matter, the other is concepts. Which are you proposing, fundamental forces (idealism), or fundamental particles (materialism)?

There is also a strong argument that ontological relations don't exist in the world but only the mind. As numbers and mathematics only exists in the mind (are invented not discovered), these relations are expressed in the mind mathematically. — RussellA

So, are you saying that "forces" only exist in the mind, since forces are relations expressed mathematically?

Current scientific thinking seems to be that fundamental particles and forces exist in the world. Accepting that ontological relations between these fundamental particles and forces only exist in the mind, there is no necessity for space to be understood as a real active substance. — RussellA

But "forces" are relations between particles, and as such they only exist in the mind, by your principles. How do you propose that we can provide an ontology for real active forces in the world, without allowing for a medium of activity? This could by "space", as a real active substance.

As I see it:

The fundamental particles and forces exist in the world as ontological Realism

The relations between these fundamental particles and forces exist in the mind as ontological idealism — RussellA

I think you need to reconsider this position. "Forces" refers to conceptualized relations between material objects. Consider the traditional formula, f=ma. How is this anything other than a concept concerning how the motion of one object can affect the motion of another object? If you want to believe that forces are real things existing in the world, you need some substance for them to exist as. Otherwise "forces" will continue to refer to conceptualized relations between objects.

Words exist in a mind-independent world in two ways, in the same way that 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 exists in two ways.

They exist as physical matter, whether as electrons or the pixels 0 and 1, and they exist as spatial and temporal relations between these electrons or pixels.

Your mind perceives not only the pixels on your screen but also the spatial relations between these pixels on your screen

Even when not looking at your screen, these pixels and spatial relations between them exist on your screen. — RussellA

Let's consider "pixels". You say that there are pixels which have spatial relations between them. But a pixel, which is normally thought of as a fundamental element of a picture, is actually composed of smaller parts which have spatial relations. And if we think of "physical matter" in this way, we get the appearance of an infinite regress, because each time we find what looks to be the fundamental elements, we then find out that they can be broken down into further spatial relations.

There is a strong argument for the ideality of spatial relations. We use mathematical tools of numbers and geometry, which are concepts, and we try to represent the supposed independent reality with those concepts. Intuition tells us that reality cannot exist solely of spatial relations, there must be some material in these relations, so to the infinite regress may be avoided with the positing of fundamental particles, "matter". However, nature throws a curve-ball, and complicates everything with the fact that time is passing, and spatial relations are continually changing. Now, "spatial relations" may be replaced by "spatial activity".

So, the primary intuition was to believe that there must be some form of foundational matter, substance which exists in spatial relations that are expressed mathematically. However, the passage of time necessitates that we understand this as activity, and the supposed foundational matter appears so rapid, that it makes the activity of any proposed fundamental matter unintelligible.

Now we have a second possible intuition. Perhaps there is no fundamental matter at all, and the activity is simply the activity of space. What was represented as particles of matter existing in 'changing spatial relations', may actually be just 'changing spatial relations' without any real particles of matter. These 'changing spatial relations' are what is known as the field, and the wavefunction.

The developing problem, is that as described above, the "spatial relations" are ideal, conceptual mathematics and geometry. And, unless there is some form of substance existing, in these relations, we lose any form of physical realism, relying solely on Platonic realism, to understand these ideal features, fields and wave functions, as real. This is why space itself needs to be understood as real active substance. Traditionally, space was known to be an aether, and the waves of electromagnetism was understood as the activity of that aether. And this is what is missing from our current understanding.

We have removed the substance, fundamental matter, which is proposed as existing in active spatial relations, to understand the activity simply as active spatial relations. The supposed matter, particles, simply cannot exist in the contradictory relations represented by the mathematics. So the accurate representation is just mathematical relations. However, unless the substance of space is identified, and properly observed, all we have is a Platonic idealism within which these mathematical relations are the substance of the universe.

To forget about making an effort assumes free will. In a deterministic world, your decision to forget about making an effort has already been determined. — RussellA

That looks like an infinite regress in the making. You are telling me to forget about forgetting about making an effort, because whether or not you will forget about it has already been predetermined.

In effect, you are telling me to forget about having any freedom, because you don't have any. That might work on some people, but you can't pull the wool over my eyes.

Words must physically exist in some form in the physical space between where you exist and where I exist, otherwise we would not be able to exchange ideas. — RussellA

Of course, but the question is how. Do they consist of matter, or do they exist in some other way?

Deliberation is part of a process that is determined in a deterministic world. — RussellA

Sure, but if I have no choice as to whether or not I do something, isn't it illogical for me to deliberate? I mean deliberation requires a lot of effort, which is stressful, often difficult, annoying, and even frustrating. If it is something which is determined, by a deterministic world, then I'll just forget about making that stressful annoying effort. I'll just go with the flow, and let the deterministic world force deliberation upon me, if and when it must. If I believed in determinism I would not take up that painful and hypocritical position of deliberating voluntarily. Why would anyone, if they truly believed in determinism?

My main point is that the clocks A and B will continue to show the same time, not because of any external connection between them, but because of their particular internal structures. IE, there need not be a universal time in order for these two clocks to show the same time. — RussellA

I don't know about that, relativity theory says they won't necessarily show the same time, depending on external conditions.

Tables and chairs may not exist in the world as physical things, but "tables" and "chairs" do exist in the world as physical things, as physical words. — RussellA

But the issue is, how do these things, words in this example, exist in that medium between you and me? Is the concept of "matter" required to explain that medium?

Scenario one. A white ball hits a red ball, and the red ball moves.

Scenario two. A white ball almost hits a red ball. I put my hand between them and the red ball doesn't move.

Both scenarios are consistent with being in a deterministic world.

In scenario one, there is the conservation of momentum.

In scenario two, living in a deterministic world, I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball.

In both scenarios, there is a necessary and deterministic continuity from past to present. — RussellA

You can make that conclusion, but it displays a gap in understanding. What is the source of that freely willed act?

To say "I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball" is not a good answer. It denies the usefulness of deliberation, which is not a good thing to do.

So I believe that determinism is a cop out, a refusal to address a huge aspect of reality.

For example, consider two identical clocks both set at 1pm that slowly move apart. The times shown on their clock faces will remain the same, not because of some external connection between them, but because Clock A is identical to itself, clock B is identical to itself and clock A is identical to clock B. — RussellA

The law of identity denies the possibility that two distinct clocks, named as A and B, are identical. So your example, although referring to the law of identity, really violates it.

I don't believe so. Newton like others of his period was deist. Deists believed that God 'set the world in motion' but that thereafter it ran by the laws that Newton discovered. Hence LaPlace's declaration (LaPlace being 'France's Newton'), when asked if there were a place for the Divine Intellect in his theory, that 'I have no need of that hypothesis'. — Wayfarer

I've read a lot of Newton's material, and I think you misunderstand him. He clearly believed his laws of motion to be descriptive. He did not believe that he had discovered God-created laws which govern the world. This is very evident in his work, especially on optics. He was a very good scientist, looking to describe the natural world, and very respectful of the fact that anything he produced could be a mistake.

Therefore he clearly did not believe himself to be discovering divine laws, which would allow no possibility of mistake. Or would you think that there is an infinite number of laws out there to be discovered, and one set is "The Divine Set". If so, how would one distinguish "The Divine Set" of laws from the infinite other possibilities, when searching for these divine laws.

I don't understand your reference to LaPlace. It seems self-contradicting. If Newton believed that he had discovered divine laws, then clearly there is a requirement for Divine Intellect as creator of those laws. But this is not what scientists do. They do not seek to discover divine laws, they seek to describe the world. That is the point of the scientific method, a method to ensure what is known as "objective" descriptions. The scientific method gives no direction about prospecting for divine laws. That's more of a metaphysical interpretation of what the scientist does. A very faulty interpretation, I might add.

For Malebranche, God not only started the world but ensures that it keeps running.

So the cause of the red ball starting to move is not the white ball but the mind of God. The only necessary connection between the white ball and the red ball is the mind of God — RussellA

This is the inevitable conclusion when we take the reality of free will, final cause, to its extreme. To allow the reality of choice, we must allow for real possibility at each passing moment of time. This implies that there is no necessary continuity from the past, through the present, into the future. The observed continuity is supported by the Will of God. The determinist perspective, which dictates that the white ball, in the past, will necessarily cause the red ball to move, in the future, assumes a necessary continuity through the present, thereby eliminating the possibility of choice.

For example, consider that the white ball is moving toward the red ball, and by physical projections will cause the red ball to move in the future. Let's assume that the hand of a human being (analogous to the Will of God), can interfere at any moment to prevent that occurrence. And if we look to the source of the movement of that hand, we might consider energies in the human body, but ultimately it is the free will, a free choice without any prior efficient cause. In this way "final cause" puts an end to any proposed chain of causation, as an action which begins without prior causation. Now, we have a source of activity which theoretically, at any moment in time could interfere with the inertia or momentum of any existing object, at any moment in time. If this is the case, then there is no necessary continuity of existence of an object from past to future.

This supports the mystical perspective that each and every existing physical object, and the entirety of the physical universe must be recreated at each moment of passing time. From this perspective, the continuity, and consistency which we observe as inertia, mass, and momentum, cannot be taken for granted. If the world is recreated at each passing moment, then it could be created in any random way, so the observed consistency needs to be accounted for. In the theological metaphysics, the recreation is supported by the Will of God. God willingly re-creates the world at each passing moment, in the consistent way that we observe, allowing us to predict from past to future.

For Berkeley, it initially seems that God no longer needs to control every interaction because He has created the Laws of Nature. For example, the conservation of momentum. The interaction between the white ball and red ball is now controlled by a Law of Nature rather than God directly. — RussellA

This is what naturally followed from Newton's project of the laws of motion. Newton was able to describe the observed continuity and consistency of temporal existence, in the form of laws, "what is given", thus creating the illusion of necessity. Therefore instead of understanding the consistency in the passing of time as dependent upon the choice of God, to choose from future possibilities, we actually exclude real possibility with "Laws of Nature", and end up with a determinist physical world. Hume is very helpful toward understanding this lack of necessity which the idea of "Laws of Nature" negates with imposed necessity.

That is not something that Newton himself would have said. It’s true that his discovery of inertia fundamentally changed the conception of matter, but I don’t think Newton had any doubt that physical objects were really physical. Newton didn’t eliminate “matter” from his vocabulary or ontology — he simply avoided metaphysical speculation about it. — Wayfarer

I did read somewhere, that Newton himself declared that his first law of motion depended on the Will of God. Newton was religious. Newton had no doubt that physical objects were physical, just like Berkeley had no such doubt. But Newton did eliminate "matter" from his ontology. He replaced it with 'the Will of God', which is the mystical perspective described above. He then represented the effects of the Will of God, for the purpose of physical understanding, as inertia and momentum. Effectively, God as a loving, caring supreme being, has a Will which we can depend upon. This provides for us the necessity of inertia and momentum, which is not an absolute necessity but dependent on God's choice.

So, what he did was quantify matter as "mass", and this is not consistent with Aristotelian "matter", as quantity is formal, and there is a categorical separation between form and matter.. Therefore he gave matter itself, a fundamental quantifiable property, "mass", which effectively supplants "matter". The one must replace the other as the two are inconsistent with each other. This is why today, "matter" is just a philosophically and scientifically useless, ambiguous term, without any rigorous convention.

Recall that in the newly-emerging physics — Wayfarer

In the newly emerging physics, Newton had done something very interesting with his first law of motion, commonly known as the law of inertia. What Newton did, is replace the concept of "matter" with "inertia", as the defining feature of a body. We can understand a body as having inertia, instead of understanding it as having matter. So the emerging physics, which understood the principal property of a body as inertia, rather than as matter, rendered the concept of matter as redundant.

The concept of inertia was revolutionary, because it allowed "momentum" which is the opposing equivalent of inertia, to be transferred from one body to another as "force". Matter did not have this capacity, it was fixed within the body. The new physics did not require "matter" as a concept, "inertia" serves the purpose in a far more versatile way. And, that we could adequately understand the external reality without this concept, "matter", is what Berkeley argued.

For him, perhaps it was; but nonetheless "matter" is very useful as a working assumption (like e.g. the uniformity of nature, mass, inertia, etc) for 'natural philosophers' then as it is now; certainly, as we know, not as "useless" of a "concept" for explaining the dynamics in and of the natural world as the good Bishop's "God" (pace Aquinas). — 180 Proof

I argue above, that "inertia" effectively replaced "matter", making it a useless redundancy. The problem for many people, is that "inertia" is apprehended as far more abstract than "matter", and many cannot get their heads around the notion that a body is composed of inertia, something completely abstract. They like to think of "matter" as something non-abstract, which could provide the substance of a body. In reality, "matter" is absolutely abstract as well.

The trend at the time was to overthrow all Aristotelian principles of physics. Matter was an Aristotelian principle. Inertia was used to replace matter, and inertia's inverse principle, momentum allows that force is transferable from one body to another. Matter" could not provide this. So this theoretical principle, which replaced matter with inertia allows for the reality of energy-mass equivalence.

So, what is really the case, is that overthrowing the Aristotelian concept of "matter", leaving it in the dustbin, in preference of "inertia", is what enabled modern physics. That allowed for the mass-energy equivalence. Berkeley was quick to recognize that the concept "matter", had become obsolete, and was useless to science.

I take post-consumption to imply a deification process, where theory becomes live and kicking, in the subject, from its reified static and external state. — Pussycat

I don't buy this. He says that it disappears into experience. So the best we can say is that it becomes a part of experience. As such, you would think it is govern by the whole, like Adorno's food analogy. The food is consumed and the nutrients are used within the living being which has consumed it. The food is not alive and kicking within the subject, it is now a part of a system. But, it plays a very special role, and this is why you say it is "live and kicking". Think of the food you eat as energy, in a sense it is "live and kicking" as energy is active, but we tend to believe that it is controlled by the system that has consumed it. In the analogy, theory is consumed by experience, but it maintains a very special, active role, which is why you say that it is live and kicking. Nevertheless, we tend to believe that it is governed by the subject which consumes the theory.

Do you think we can figure out the special role which Adorno assigns to theory, after it disappears within the intellectual experience of the subject? To me, it seems like the subject is first repulsed by non-identity within the theory, and reacts by retreating into itself. This might be like a sort of toxicity in the food. So a separation of difference is still maintained after consumption, between subject and object, the object being theory here. There is a reciprocal relation between theory and intellectual experience, but theory is very limited and cannot fully provide what is desired by the subject, which is freedom, the ability to move.

The result is a dialectical movement, and this rebels against the system. So, is "the system" here, that which consumed the theory, the intellectual experience of the subject? Does theory now, from within the subject, in this immanent, authentically dialectical process, being open-minded self-consciousness, rebel against the very intellectual experience which consumed it? Is that what is meant by "Both
positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each other’s critique, not through compromise."?

But specifically for Berkeley, as an Immaterialist, he does not believe in a world of material substance, fundamental particles and forces, but he does believe in a world of physical form, bundles of ideas in the mind of God. — RussellA

I take Berkeley to be arguing that we can do without the concept of matter. We can have a sufficient understanding of the external word, without the concept of "matter" to support substantial existence. In fact, I believe that the principal point he made is that "matter" does absolutely nothing for us, in aiding our understanding of reality. I think he believed it to be a completely useless concept.

Why would that necessarily be so? For all we know there is nothing more fundamental than quarks. There does seem to be a limit to the possibility of measurement, that much is known. — Janus

As I said, the the evidence is experiential. Not long ago atoms were the smallest particles.

Quarks have not actually been produced in isolation, because of the unintuitive nature of the strong force. So it is just the result of an unintuitive theory, that quarks are believed to be the most fundamental particles.

Measurement problems are temporary.

Do you have a reference or an argument for your 'fundamental matter/ energy' claim? — Janus

You mean the claim of infinite regress? The evidence is experiential. Every proposed fundamental particle has been broken down into further particles in experimentation, implying infinite regress.

Should we take science as our guide to determine which seems more plausible, or should we take our imagination, intuitions, wishes and so on? — Janus

Science provides no guidance on this. It is a metaphysical question. The fundamental matter/energy assumption falls to infinite regress in scientific experimentation. Since science demonstrates that fundamental matter/energy is problematic, the deity is posed as an end to the infinite regress. So science gives us no guidance as to which is more plausible. Neither, the infinite regress of matter/energy nor the deity is supported by science.

Theory, in the passage I attempted to interpret, is not like the theory in the passage after. — Pussycat

I think we need to assume Adorno was attempting to be consistent, and not ambiguous or equivocal. So I see the difference as a matter of perspective. That is why I spoke of pre-consumption and post-consumption, from the perspective of a particular subject. Consider that theory is fed to the subject as an educational tool in the form of ideology, in the process of the subject's intellectual experience. Also, the subject might freely choose theory for consumption. But post-consumption, theory is within the subject, and is then a tool of that subject. The analogy is one of eating. Food is fed to a child, who then learns to choose one's own food. But in both of these cases, after consumption the food is then used by the subject who consumes. The difference is an external/internal difference, and the point you appear to be claiming is that there is a difference between the thing when it is external, and the thing after its been internalized.

Experience is proper to the subject, yes, but I think its also more broad than that, as to all the happenings in the world. For example, Auschwitz was an experience, no matter if we didnt experience it. And since Adorno's death in the late sixties, new experiences were added in the world: the moon landing experience, the sixties movement, the bringing down of the Berlin wall, the internet experience, now the AI experience etc. Have our philosophical theories been able to keep pace with technological progress? Because progress seems to be running pretty fast, and our heavy feet are a problem. — Pussycat

I'm sure that we can learn from the experience of others, but that involves the process of internalizing the external which is described above. So if I say that your experience is "an experience", I need to respect that difference. It is an external experience. And if you approach me with that experience, and attempt to educate me, I should also understand that this is a case of you using theory as a tool.

I don't think there is an issue of keeping pace. The process of internalizing external experiences is not hindered by slow pace, it is hindered by faulty direction. Even this process of internalizing external experiences, can be divided into two, those which are force fed to us as a child, and those which we choose as an adult. The philosopher has the will to choose, but one's direction is most often still guided by educational systems. Because the ambitious person is strongly motivated, I do not think that keeping pace is an issue. What is an issue is finding direction.

I agree that science depends on the working assumption of a reality that is what it is, independent of us. That’s the stance of objectivity, and it’s indispensable for observation, experiment, and prediction. But that stance is methodological, not metaphysical. It’s a way of working, not a complete account of what reality is. — Wayfarer

I don't think it is the case that science depends on the "assumption of a reality that is what it is, independent of us". I believe that idea is a misunderstanding of the true "objective" nature of science. Experimentation involves human action, and what we are looking for with this activity, is a reaction from our environment. So the experiment, being derived from hypothesis, is directed by the hypothesis.

This implies that any assumptions about a reality which is independent of us, are hypotheses dependent. In many cases, of scientific experimentation, the implied assumption is actually the opposite of that. This is clearly evident with the use of relativity theory in the creation of hypotheses. Relativity theory is based in the assumption that if there is a reality about what is, independent of us, this reality is irrelevant to our modeling of observed activities. In other words, the premise of relativity theory is that we can produce an adequate understanding of activities without assuming "a reality that is what it is, independent of us".

So, our attitude toward "a reality that is what it is, independent of us", need not be one of affirmation or negation, when we engage in scientific experimentation. And, I would say that this attitude, be it relativistic or non-relativistic, greatly influences the type of experiments which we design. Notice in the paragraphs above, the experiment is directed by the hypothesis, and the hypothesis is directed by the underlying assumptions or attitude.

Phenomenologists like Husserl showed that even the most rigorous scientific observation is grounded in the lifeworld — the background of shared experience that makes such observation possible in the first place. This doesn’t mean reality depends on your or my whims; it means that what we call “objective reality” is already structured through the conditions of human knowing. Without recognising this, science risks mistaking its methodological abstraction for the whole of reality.

So yes, objectivity is crucial. But it is not the final word — it’s one mode of disclosure, and it rests on a deeper, irreducible involvement of the subject in the constitution of the world - a world in which we ourselves are no longer an accident. — Wayfarer

According to what I wrote above, "reality" to a large degree does depend on the whims of individuals. That is the whims of the scientists devising the experiments. Of course these whims are shaped by the social environment, and the ideology which informs the scientific community. Notice the modern trend, which is greatly influenced by the relativistic perspective, is toward metaphysics like model-dependent realism, and many-worlds. These are ontologies which deny "a reality that is what it is, independent of us", or perhaps could be described in the contradictory way of, 'the reality that is what it is independent of us is that there is no reality which is what it is independent of us'.

But still, there's a twist in the story, with Adorno there always is, and even this sarcastic and ironic jab can be transformed: instead of the diner eating the roast, the roast eats the diner. — Pussycat

Well, I think you're grasping at straws Pussycat. Invisible straws at that! There is clearly no reason whatsoever, to interpret this as "the roast eats the diner". Here's the complete context, notice that one "lives by ingesting" the other.

If a standpoint is demanded of the latter, then
it would be that of the diner to the roast. It lives by ingesting such; only
when the latter disappears into the former, would there be philosophy.

So it seems that I was half-right: the diner to the roast is the old-school wrong traditional epistemology, and the diner (theory) being devoured by the roast (experience) is the correct one. — Pussycat

Well, if you look back at the passage, "experience" is the former, and "theory" is the latter.
Look:
"The scientific consensus would probably concede that even experience would imply theory."
And he says, "the latter disappears into the former". So it is clear that he is saying that theory is devoured by experience.

Question for you Pussycat. Why do you need to make "theory" analogous with the diner, and "experience" analogous with the roast, so that you end up with the diner being devoured by the roast? Why not just make "theory" analogous with the roast, and "experience" analogous with the diner? Then you have experience devouring theory just like the diner devours the roast, without the absurdity which you propose.

So after all this, we get the impression that Adorno crowns experience king. Alas no, yet another twist, as he is preparing for his dialectical moment which continues in the next paragraph. — Pussycat

"Experience" is proper to the subject right? "Theory" is a bit more complex though, because it may be ideology (objective), or it may be speculative (subjective). Notice above, that experience consumes theory. But in the next paragraph, post consumption, theory can also be used to resist ideology.

I'm starting to believe that the "diner to the roast" is the wrong old school model. And that experience is consumed into theory, not the opposite. — Pussycat

I don't think it's a matter of seeing that there is a right way and a wrong way of describing things. I think it's a matter of understanding the way that he describes things. if, in the end, it doesn't work for you, you cannot perceive what he is describing, then reject it. Is that what you are doing?

But "unregimented thought" is only a part of negative dialectics. It is the part where thought steps beyond the methodology of dialectics. — Jamal

Yes, at the beginning of that little section, Adorno specifically mentions "the subjective share of intellectual experience".

Ideology lurks in the Spirit which, dazzled with itself like
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, irresistibly becomes well-nigh absolute.
Theory prevents this. It corrects the naiveté of its self-confidence,
without forcing it to sacrifice the spontaneity which theory for its part
wishes to get at. By no means does the difference between the so-called
subjective share of intellectual experience and its object vanish; the
necessary and painful exertion of the cognizing subject testifies to it.
In the unreconciled condition, non-identity is experienced as that which
is negative.

There's a number of interesting points made here. The first thing I notice is the "painful exertion" of the subject. This, I believe refers to the effort and disillusionment required to approach the reality of "non-identity". Non-identity is apprehended as negative, so it is like a problem which is being forced upon the subject, such that pain is induced, and effort required for resolution.

The second thing is that a reconciliation is implied. It's not quite clear to me yet, what that reconciliation might be. I don't think it's a rejection of the retreat into the subject, but something which happens after the subject confronts the limitations of one's fullness. I would describe this process as how the subject's attitude toward its object is reformulated. After the negative experience described above, and the subject apprehends its limitations through critical self-reflection, it can then approach the object with "open-minded self-consciousness". This is a completely different approach to "the ability to move", a new understanding of freedom, and a new attitude toward the object.

So, I am very interested in Adorno's proposals for the objective share of intellectual experience, the new approach to the object. In your description you said that intellectual experience refers to a mode of thinking which progresses by "immersing itself in particulars", but I haven't really seen this yet from Adorno.

I've mentioned a number of times, that Aristotle's resolution was the law of identity. This, as "a thing is the same as itself", puts the identity of a particular thing into the thing itself, as a sort of relation between the thing and itself. This recognizes the temporal extension of a thing, allowing that an object changes as time passes, yet maintains its identity. Aristotle reacted to the sophistry exposed by Socrates and Plato, so we can say that his reaction was a reaction to the non-identity in the ideology of his day.

Now, I think Adorno has outlined his proposal with his discussion of free thinking at the end of the section. Notice that the ability to move is described as a double process. The first stage is "the authentically dialectical", but the second is "something unfettered which steps out of dialectics".

Since free thinking is very subjective and idiosyncratic, I'm very interested to see how Adorno describes the unfettered which steps out of dialectics. Strangely, this would be the objective share of intellectual experience. This makes the freedom to move, of the particular, the individual, subjectivity in general, something objective.

That seems to be factually incorrect at least when it comes to philosophers: — Janus

Philosophers make up a very small percentage of the population. So your proposed facts are irrelevant.

That passage reads like nonsense―can't find anything there to respond to. — Janus

Well, aren't you special.

We're both right. In that passage Adorno describes the retreat into the subject as a danger or temptation faced by thinking, one that can be resisted with critical self-reflection, which is characteristic of intellectual experience. Thus in the end intellectual experience is the avoidance of retreating into the subject, even if it has to go through it (or successfully resist the temptation) first. — Jamal

Well perhaps, but I do not see any mention of "danger" or "temptation". Nor do I see that the retreat is "resisted". I see that it is a special reaction to the consumption of ideology.

The point being made earlier, is that theory is related to experience like the roast to the diner. Only after theory disappears into experience (is consumed by the subject), "would there be philosophy". Intellectual experience therefore, as a special type of experience which requires the consumption of theory, produces that retreat. Perhaps the retreat isn't necessary, but recognition of the reality of falsity within the ideology, the non-identical forces that retreat, as a response. So if the theory had no falsity there would be no retreat, but then there would be no need for philosophy either.

To resist, or avoid that retreat would be to deny the possibility of philosophy, and I believe it would be to resist "intellectual experience" in general, thereby falling into the idealist trap which I mentioned above. The idealist trap is to maintain the independent existence of ideas and theory in general, as eternal independent truth. To resist the retreat into oneself, would be to refuse or resist intellectual consumption, which is to understand, by simply taking the principles for granted, as given, posited as "the truth". When principles are taken for granted as eternal fact, there is no need to understand them, and this is a denial of intellectual experience.

The response to the consumption of theory, is the subjective retreat. It is the reaction to a world which is false to its innermost core. I believe that Adorno thinks the reaction is unavoidable, it is intuitive, reflex, and negative dialectics, as the proper form of philosophy is only possible after this retreat, whereby the subject comes to grips with its own limitations. If Adorno described the experience of consuming theory in a different way, he might describe a resistance to that retreat.

This provides an approach to your questions:

QUESTION: Is Adorno recommending a mode of thinking---he often says so---or is he just describing his way of thinking? Do all philosophers necessarily conflate these? — Jamal

I think he is describing a mode of thinking which is what he believes is the only adequate response to the existence of non-identity in identity ideology

But he also describes it as a stage that thinking has to go through. This is intellectual experience as a dialectical process, which has as one of its moments a retreat from the non-identical back into itself, step 1 below:

1. Negation: when confronted with the non-identical, the subject negates it by retreating into itself in its "fullness", i.e., its preformed, comprehensive, comfortable systems of concepts, ideologies, etc.
2. Negation of the negation: critical self-reflection says no to this, bringing the subject's thinking back out again.

Neat huh? — Jamal

I don't really agree with #2. Where does he imply a negation of the negation? Critical self-reflection brings out the limitations to the subject's fullness, and this avoids solipsism. If a subject were complete this would entail solipsism. But there is no negation of the subject's retreat. After recognizing its own limitations, the subject moves toward freedom.

So, he then proceeds to talk about "unregimented thought", and this I believe is negative dialectics. It is only a negation of the negation in the sense that it is a resistance to the non-identical, as the negative aspect of positivist idealism. So it is not a case of the subject saying no to the retreat into itself, it's a case of the subject saying no to the non-identity, falsity, of the ideology. The world is false to its innermost core, and freedom for the subject can only be produced through resistance to the ideology. After retreating, and acknowledging its own limitations, the subject seeks its own means for freedom, and this is described in the following passage:

Theory and intellectual
experience require their reciprocal effect. The former does not contain
answers for everything, but reacts to a world which is false to its
innermost core. Theory would have no jurisdiction over what would be
free of the bane of such. The ability to move is essential to
consciousness, not an accidental characteristic. It signifies a double
procedure: that of the inside out, the immanent process, the
authentically dialectical, and a free one, something unfettered which
steps out of dialectics, as it were. Neither of them are however
disparate. The unregimented thought has an elective affinity to
dialectics, which as critique of the system recalls to mind what would
be outside of the system; and the energy which dialectical movement in
cognition unleashes is that which rebels against the system. Both
positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each
other’s critique, not through compromise.

Im confused... How is this different from what I said?? — Pussycat

It's not an equality relation, which is purely ideal, i.e. this concept is equal to that concept. It is an identity relation which is more like correspondence, truth.



I read somewhere that dogs have very special genetics, genes which are abnormally conducive to mutation. This is why they were very successful in domestication, and readily provide all sorts of different breeds for different purposes.

I haven't seen any argument for that conclusion. Can you briefly state what " inconsistencies, problems, failures" are to be found with empiricism? Be concise, no hand-waving. — Janus

I mentioned what I called the "primary" example:

So, as I mentioned earlier, the nature of time can be taken as an example, or even the primary specific or "particular intuition". The empirical model is based solely on the past. Only the past has been sensed or experienced in any way. From this, we project toward the future, and conclude that we can predict the future, and this capacity to predict validates the determinist perspective. However, the intuitive perspective knows that we have a freedom of choice to select from possibilities, and this negates the determinist perspective. Unless we deny the intuitive knowledge, that we have the capacity to choose, the difference between these two perspectives indicates that the relationship between the past and the future is not the way that the supposed "empirical reality" supposes that it is. — Metaphysician Undercover

No clue what you're taking about — Apustimelogist

I conclude that it was someone other than you then.

Let's grant for the sake of argument that (intellectual) intuition sometimes might give us an accurate picture of the nature of reality ("reality" here meaning something more than mere empirical reality, that is things as they appear to us, rather some "deeper" truth metaphysically speaking). How do we tell when a particular intuition has given us such knowledge? — Janus

It's not a matter of intuition giving us an accurate picture of reality. That's not what I have been arguing. I have been arguing that the picture given by empiricism, the supposed "empirical reality", is incorrect, false and misleading. When we can point out inconsistencies, problems, failures, in the "empirical reality", as I do repeated throughout this forum, then intuition provides us with the conclusion that there is a deeper metaphysical truth which is not provided by the "empirical reality".

So, as I mentioned earlier, the nature of time can be taken as an example, or even the primary specific or "particular intuition". The empirical model is based solely on the past. Only the past has been sensed or experienced in any way. From this, we project toward the future, and conclude that we can predict the future, and this capacity to predict validates the determinist perspective. However, the intuitive perspective knows that we have a freedom of choice to select from possibilities, and this negates the determinist perspective. Unless we deny the intuitive knowledge, that we have the capacity to choose, the difference between these two perspectives indicates that the relationship between the past and the future is not the way that the supposed "empirical reality" supposes that it is.

No, you and Wayfarer share an idiosyncratic definition, and surprise, surprise! you are both idealists. — Janus

Idealism is the predominant metaphysics in western society. Surprise, surprise!

This can be framed in terms of prediction, inference, model construction. It is called active inference, a corollary of the free energy. — Apustimelogist

Did I discuss this with you before, or was that with someone else who referenced the same woefully inadequate model?

Hold on, I was under the impression that "object" means anything that can be known or cognized, the philosopher's subject-matter, like justice, beauty, science, etc, basically everything that is not subject (ourselves). — Pussycat

I don't think that this is the case for Adorno. He clearly distinguishes between the object, and the subject along with theory, and concepts, which are in some relation to the objects. We cannot say that there is a relation between concepts and objects unless we allow a difference between them. Otherwise we'd be talking about the relation between one object and another object, not the relation between concept and object.

For example, I want to know what justice is. I take it as object, camel case, then Justice. And then try to conceptualize it, using the concept of justice (lowercase). Then identity thinking is the equality, justice = Justice: my subjective conception of Justice (justice) equals to Justice - the object (of conceptualization).

I'm way off, you think? — Pussycat

This is not how I understand Adorno's reference to identity thinking. I understand that he is talking about an identity relation between concept and object. Jamal seems to have a slightly different understanding which allows object to object relations. I see no reason at this point, to think of internal aspects of concepts, theories, or even conceptual systems, as understood by Adorno to be object to object relations.

Thus we can see negative dialectics, and especially the idea of intellectual experience, as the philosophical elaboration of this instinct: resisting the reduction of experience to its empiricist concept, while insisting that such resistance is not a retreat into irrationalism, nor even a retreat into the subject, but rather a materialist critique of rationality itself. — Jamal

I would not agree with this. Intellectual experience, as described by Adorno in this section, is explicitly "a retreat into the subject".

By no means does the difference between the so-called
subjective share of intellectual experience and its object vanish; the
necessary and painful exertion of the cognizing subject testifies to it. In
the unreconciled condition, non-identity is experienced as that which
is negative. The subject shrinks away from this, back onto itself and the
fullness of its modes of reaction. Only critical self-reflection protects it
from the limitations of its fullness and from building a wall [Wand:
interior wall] between itself and the object, indeed from presupposing
its being-for-itself as the in-itself and for-itself.

You see, the subject does retreat into itself, in this way, recoiling from the "negative" effects of non-identity (a world which is false to its innermost core). Only "critical self-reflection" saves it from building a wall of isolation, solipsism. It appears to me that you are completely ignoring what Adorno says about "intellectual experience" in this section, along with my apt interpretation of it presented above, to present your own understanding of "intellectual experience". But what you present does not appear to be consistent with what Adorno says here, in this section. I recommend that you read the last two paragraphs thoroughly.

All that we do is predict what happens next. All that we have to be able to do is know how to navigate. — Apustimelogist

This is not really the case. In most instances the goal is to create what happens next, i.e. we want to shape the future, not predict it. The ability to predict is just a means to that further end.

The noumenal world does exist independently. — J

This is exactly the wrong attitude. By giving the name "world" to the noumenal, you imply that what exists independently is in some way similar to our conception of "the world".

There is no need to assume that what exists independently is in anyway at all, similar to how we represent it. For example, the word "world" is in no way similar to the concept we have of the world, yet in some way, that word signifies that concept. Likewise, our conception of the world might be in no way similar to the independent reality, yet it could still in some way signify it. There is no reason to believe that the signifier is in any way similar to the thing represented by it. This means that if the concept "world" represents an independent reality, there is no reason to believe that the independent reality is similar to that concept which signifies it.

Wayfarer wants to insist that his own idiosyncratic definition of 'existence' is the correct one, which is absurd given that the meanings of terms are determined by (predominant) use. — Janus

Hmm, seems like the same accusation was leveled against me. That indicates that the person making the accusation is really the one with the idiosyncratic definition.

The relevant idealism is the view that reality is mental (in Hegel, rational-spiritual). It's the reduction of objects to correlates of thought. — Jamal

This I see as self-contradicting. "Correlates" implies a duality, so "the reduction of objects to correlates of thought", is inherently incompatible with "reality is mental". "Reality is mental" implies all objects are thoughts.

As to what identity-thinking is, I refer back to my post on page 2: — Jamal

There's a lot of ambiguity in that post. What you call "subject-object identity" is the identity which I've been addressing. However, you also propose "object-object identity", and this would be the only possible form of identity if the phrase "reality is mental", is the position being addressed. However, objects as "correlates of thought" implies subject-object identity. These two types of "identity" are very distinct, and if mixed would constitute equivocation.

To avoid these problems of ambiguity, Aristotle proposed the law of identity, which puts identity in the object itself, as distinct from thought. Adorno does not seem to address the law of identity.

We certainly do have the faculty of being able to experience. — Janus

Here's the problem. You describe the unity of the five senses as the faculty of experience, defined as "being able to experience". And, you attribute knowledge to this faculty. But the ability for something does not necessitate its actual existence. Therefore your descriptive terms "the faculty of experience" cannot account for, or describe, the actual existence of experience, nor can it account for the actual existence of knowledge.

So you propose an "ability to experience", which supports the ability to sense, but all this amounts to is a meaningless, nonsensical, interaction problem. By your terms, human beings have the capacity to experience. That in no way accounts for the reality of actual experience. I, as a human being have 'the capacity' to do a whole lot of different things, but having 'the capacity' does not account for why I do some and not others. Therefore your proposition makes no sense as a proposal to account for the existence of knowledge. Knowledge is active in the world. It blows very hard, regardless of whether it gets anywhere or not.

So-called intellectual intuition does not give us reliable knowledge, it consists mostly of imagination applied to ideas derived from experience. — Janus

The question was " By what faculty other than experience could we know anything (apart from what is logically necessary) ?". "Intuition" answers that question. It's "reliability" is relative, and context dependent, so your dismissal is just an attempt to avoid the reality that it answers your question, regardless of whether answering your question gets us anywhere or not.

You are simply leading our discussion in a meaningless, nonsensical direction, so that my replies to your questions can be met with "just blowing hard, and getting nowhere".

If you want to get somewhere, then let's go!

Quit limiting the discussion to the ability to do something, and address actually doing something, if you want to get somewhere. Obviously though, you don't want to get anywhere, because that would require breaking free from your nonsensical presuppositions, which produce an interaction problem.

What makes you say that? — Jamal

The argument for Platonic realism, is that ideas have existence independent from human minds, as "objects". This is produced from the assumption that different people have the same ideas. So you and I are supposed to each have the same idea of "two" for example. Since the notion of two in my mind is thought to be the same as the notion of two in your mind, it is concluded that each of our minds partakes of an independent idea, "Two". In Platonic realism the independent idea is supposed to be an object.

The problem is that something needs to support the existence of these independent ideas. It might be God, or the existence of these independent objects might somehow be thought to be supported by an objective State, as a part of the State, ideology. In one case the independent (objective) ideas are attributed to God, in the other they are attributed to the State. In each case they have existence independent from individual subjects, hence they are "objects", or "objective" and this is idealism.

So, when theory (ideas), are consumed by the individual subject, becoming a part of that subject's "intellectual experience", as described by Adorno, the theories (ideas) necessarily become subjective, regardless of whether or not they had independent objective existence. They are a part of the subject's intellectual experience, and are therefore subjective. This is what enables philosophy, theories and ideas being a part of the subject, i.e. subjective. However, this necessarily negates any notion of ideas as objects, the objectivity of ideas in general, and idealism overall. The philosopher cannot do philosophy and also assume idealism, because philosophy is only possible when ideas are subjective, within the subject. The division between subject and object is annihilated when the subject consumes the object.

Each of the five senses are perceptual faculties, as well as interoception and proprioception. All together they constitute the faculty of experience, not of particular experiences, but of being able to experience. — Janus

As I said, you have presuppositions which make no sense. How do you propose that the senses are united into a single faculty called "experience", or "being able to experience"? Your proposal, that we have a single faculty known as "being able to experience" is nonsense.

That's idealism. — Jamal

Not really, Idealism involves a belief that concepts are objects, but not all objects are concepts. So that is not the identity relation referred to by Adorno.

And didn't you, yourself, say that society was no more than a concept? — Jamal

I think society is a concept, but I do not think it is an object. So I don't assume any identity relation between "society" as a concept, and any object, because there is no object which bears that name.

Those who believe that there is an object called "society" might assume that there is an identity relation between our concept "society", and the object which bears this name. The identity relation is what constitutes "truth" in the sense of correspondence. This idea of "truth", as a relation between subject and object when theory (therefore concept) has become a part of the subject in post-consumption, is very important at the end of this section.

Only critical self-reflection protects it from the limitations of its fullness and from building a wall [Wand: interior wall] between itself and the object, indeed from presupposing its being-for-itself as the in-itself and for-itself. The less the identity between the subject and object can be ascertained, the more contradictory what is presumed to cognize such, the unfettered strength and open-minded self-consciousness. Theory and intellectual experience require their reciprocal effect. The former does not contain answers for everything, but reacts to a world which is false to its innermost core.

The very act of consumption, when theory disappears into experience, is what denies the reality of idealism. In this act (which in general is education), theory is brought from the external, where it may be perceived as consisting of Platonic objects, and internalized by the subject. That is intellectual experience. In this post-consumption position it enables philosophy, but as part of the subject, therefore subjective. Therefore philosophy must reject idealism, or else it denies its own ground.

You contradict yourself. — Janus

Clearly then, you misunderstand me.

By what faculty other than experience could we know anything (apart from what is logically necessary) ? — Janus

Experience is not a faculty. And, we are born with knowledge, it's known as intuition. This is why you can't understand me, and you think that I contradict myself, you have presuppositions which make no sense. Those nonsense presumptions make it impossible for you to understand some things, rendering some statements in the appearance of contradiction.

It is the assumption that objects are identical to their concepts. — Pussycat

I don't think anyone believes that objects are identical to concepts. I think the idea is more that concepts identify objects in a sort of relation of correspondence. There is a relation of identity between subject and object which is conducive to truth.

Adorno offers a better image of intellectual experience, a transforming rather than a spectating one: the diner to the roast. It's about digging in, not merely observing from a distance. In eating, neither the diner nor the roast remain unchanged. — Jamal

But, I think the point was that one of them is actually consumed by the other. So theory, being what is referred to as "the latter", disappears into the former, experience, and this I conclude, is what produces "intellectual experience".

Now there is a very significant issue, and that is what happens to "theory" in general, after it is consumed and becomes integral within intellectual experience. And this I believe, is why the prior/posterior distinction is important here. Notice, that "only when the latter disappears into the former", is "philosophy" possible.

Now, in post-consumption, theory confronts ideology as philosophy. It corrects the naiveté of Spirit's self-confidence. Only in this posterior condition do we get the subject/object division. Theory, having been consumed, now inheres within the subject, and the failures of theory, "a world which is false to its innermost core" are what constitutes non-identity.

So, I believe that the posterior position of theory is important to negative dialectics. It is only in this condition of "philosophy", when the theory has been consumed, that the separation between subject and object is produced. Theory is within the subject, therefore subjective, it is not out there as objective property of God, or the State. The separation is known by ideology as a form of unity between subject and object, identity, but that's an illusion which only veils the falsity. The philosophizing subject, which already apprehends the subject/object division as a result of the theory having been consumed, apprehends it as a division of untruth, even as a wall between subject and object, which prevents intellectual freedom, incapacitating the ability to move in general.

At least I recognize that there is a problem, and I'm acting toward resolution. That's a lot better than you, doing nothing, thinking that everything's fine. Eventually I'll find the way out, through my trial and error, while you'd be still sitting there thinking everything's fine, until your dying day.

The following references are an attempt to explore the question of the grounding of reason, in something other than formal logic or scientific rationalism. — Wayfarer

The grounding of reason is necessarily something outside the bounds of reason. This makes it unreasonable or even irrational. The grounding feature, the irrational, will always be a part of any instance of human reasoning, and this is what makes human reasoning impossible to be imitated by AI. In a broad sense, this feature is known to philosophers as intuition.

'Universe' just means 'the sum of what exists', so it refers to everything that exists, and is thus not a fiction at all. — Janus

That looks very naive to me. If reality includes more than just what exists, then this part of reality is not part of the universe. How would we establish a relationship between the universe, and that part of reality which does not exist?

For example, you seem to imply a separation between what exists and what is fiction. The fictional cannot be part of the universe, by your definition, but we still must afford it some kind of reality which i assume would be somehow outside the universe. What kind of reality does the fictional have, when it is outside the universe?

What are you disputing? — Janus

As I said, I am disputing the concept of "the universe". By that concept, it is correct and coherent to say that the universe existed before there was human life. However, I believe that concept is faulty, and does not provide an accurate representation of reality. Therefore the conclusion that the universe existed before there was human life is unsound, because it is derived from a false premise, that "the universe" provides an accurate representation of reality.

On what basis do you claim that spatial expansion and dark matter indicate that the idea of a universe is a "failed concept". What do you mean by "failed concept"? — Janus

There is much evidence that reality extends beyond what is known as "the universe". If "the universe" is intended to refer to all that is, then the evidence indicates that it is a failed concept.

Again, it can obviously be said that every concept is derived from experience, in which case noting that is pointless. All our concepts "may be completely misleading in relation to the way reality actually is", but then what could that mean? — Janus

It means that we must go beyond experience if we desire to understand the nature of reality. Since many people believe that truth is limited to what can be known from experience (empiricism), but others do not believe this, then it is very important, and not pointless to note this distinction.

So, if you insist that "every concept is derived from experience", then we need to look beyond conceptualization to understand why those people do not believe in empiricism. The reality though, is that not everyone believes that all concepts are derived from experience. Therefore, the fact that "it can obviously be said" that every concept is derived from experience is what is pointless, because people can say whatever they want.

Yet you have failed to give any argument for why we should agree with you. What's your argument? So far you are just looking like a blowhard. — Janus

Yes, I'm blowing very hard, just like the wind. Be careful, the wind can be dangerous. But I'm still waiting for a definition of "existence" which would prove that I am wrong. Unless you can provide me with one, I think that's a good argument for why you should agree with me.

Wouldn't you think that equating thinking with pleasure, is identity-thinking? — Pussycat

Clearly not a case of "equating". But what exactly do you think "identity-thinking" is?

I haven't said it is necessarily true that a Universe of things existed prior to humans existing. I've said that all the available evidence points to its having existed. You seem to be conflating logical necessity with empirical evidence. — Janus

Well sure, but my point is that the thing referred to here as "it" is a fiction. Therefore all that evidence does nothing for you. It's like pointing to a whole lot of bumps in the night, and telling me that all the evidence points to there being a ghost in the other room. And you can go right ahead and dismiss any logical arguments which go against what you've concluded through the "available evidence", because you prefer evidence over logical necessity.

What I dispute is the concept of "the universe", I think it's a fiction, like the ghost in the other room. Of course the narrative which supports "the universe" is going to make it look like all the evidence points to the truth of "the universe". And if you neatly ignore all the logical arguments against "the universe", insisting that empirical evidence is more important then logical necessity, you'll be restricted to believing in your fictitious story because all the available evidence points that way.

To exist is to be real, actual as opposed to imaginary. — Janus

This definition is based in human experience. You define "exist" as what is not imaginary. So you base the definition in imagination, and say whatever is not imagination, exists. But that's self-refuting, because your definition is itself imaginary, you are imagining something which is not imaginary, i.e. exists, but by that very definition, it cannot exist. So what you say "exists" cannot exist, by your own definition, because you are just imagining something which is not imaginary. The proposed not-imaginary thing is nothing other than something imagined. This gets you nowhere fast.

There are two logical possibilities―either the Universe existed prior to humans or it didn't. — Janus

You haven't paid attention to what I've said. What I dispute is the truth of "the universe". So your two logical possibilities are irrelevant. It's like saying either you've stopped beating your wife or you haven't. Well, obviously we have to validated the initial proposition first. I readily agree, that under the conception of "the universe", it existed prior to humans. What I disagree with is the truth of "the universe".

So, what we need to determine is whether that conception is an adequate representation of reality. And, I've argued that it clearly is not. There is much evidence like spatial expansion, and dark matter, to indicate that "the universe" is a failure as a concept.

This is why the subject of the thread is very helpful. It can help us to understand that all these concepts like "existence", and "universe", are just constructs derived from our experience. They may be completely misleading in relation to the way reality actually is.

That is not, in my experience, how 'existence' is generally understood, and it is certainly not how I understand it―it is merely your own idiosyncratic, tendentiously stipulated meaning. There is no reason why others should share your prejudices. If you want to live in your own little echo chamber that's up to you. — Janus

Well, I am waiting for someone to explain how "existence" could be understood in any other way. I've provided no "idiosyncratic, tendentiously stipulated meaning" so that charge is false. I've just challenged anyone to provide a description or definition which isn't based in human experience, or simply begging the question, because i strongly believe that is impossible. Your proposal above obviously fails miserably. It provides no basis for any sort of understanding whatsoever, of what "existence" means, only self-contradiction, which is incoherency. So it narrowly avoids begging the question, but only by being incoherent.