All our science is consistent in indicating that there was a universe, galaxies, star systems, planets and on Earth many organisms, plants, creatures long before there were humans. I see no reason to doubt the veracity of that conclusion. — Janus

Consistency doesn't imply truth. We can make very consistent fictions. And even when the story is consistent with empirical sensations, truth is not necessitated. "There is a ghost in the other room" is consistent with something going bump in the night.

Given that we all and some animals manifestly perceive the same environments and things in those environments there is no reason to consider that the concept applies only to what humans have experienced. — Janus

Well then, give me an explanation of what it means to exist, which is not based in human experience, or simply begging the question.

You seem to be conflating two different things―that 'existence' can be understood to be a linguistically generated concept and the range of the application of that concept. — Janus

Sorry, I don't understand what you are accusing me of.

My point is very clear. Human beings have experience. Whether or not other animals have similar experience is irrelevant. Human beings have produced a concept "existence", which is based on their experiences. Any attempt to explain accurately what "existence" means will necessarily reference human experience. That is why I said it is highly doubtful that what it means for something to exist does not depend on human existence. It's very clear to me, and it ought to be for you as well, that "existence" refers to the specific way that we perceive our environment, and nothing else. "Existence" is defined by experience.

I'm sorry I annoyed you so much. There's little I can do about, except to refuse to engage in order to avoid escalating your annoyance. — Ludwig V

No apology required, I wasn't annoyed at all. How did you get that idea? I was just alluding to lesson #1 in reply to the request you made:

OK. Enlighten me. — Ludwig V

First lesson in learning about the true nature of time, do not accept determinist, fatalist bullshit like 'wait and see', 'que sera sera'. You can cause real change.

I'm waiting. In the mean time, life goes on. — Ludwig V

Yes. I suspect that the suggestion that one can just simply sit and wait for something to happen is unhelpful. — Ludwig V

But you are missing my point. Take your analogy. Suppose someone had said to us just before Copernicus published that everything that we think we know about the sun, moon and stars is wrong. No reaction. Compare someone saying to us in 1690, after Newton's Principia was published, that everything had changed. I would pay attention. Same here. Give me answers that I can get my head around in language that I speak, then I'll pay attention. — Ludwig V

Here's the difference between you and I then. You won't go anywhere unless someone, who has already been there, points the way to you, (and gives you answers that you can get your head around). I'll find my own new direction without anyone showing me the way, simply because I apprehend the conventional as wrong. Someone has to be first or no one will ever go. It will not be you.

If you take a bit of time to consider the true nature of time, you'll come to realize that current conceptions of "the universe" have it all wrong.

You aren't telling me anything. You are promising that you will be telling me something at some point in the future. — Ludwig V

You are not paying attention. I'm not promising to provide for you something new, in the future. I am telling you that what others are providing for you today, and in the past, is wrong. That's it, that's all, no promise concerning the future. I expected that you are capable of crafting your own future. But now you demonstrate that you'll only go where someone else has already been, and this casts doubt on that expectation.

So I understand it will be quite something. I'm waiting. In the mean time, life goes on. — Ludwig V

I see, you like to wait and let life go on. You are not prepared to take the bull by the horns are you?

The expansion of space and dark matter are indeed among the many issues that seem likely to change what we know about the universe. — Ludwig V

It's not a matter of changing what we know about the universe, it's a matter of "the universe" being a false conception. There is no such thing. For analogy, consider ancient people who saw the sun, moon, and planets orbiting the earth. What you say here, is like if someone back then said "indeed, retrogrades are among the many issues that seem likely to change what we know about the way that these bodies orbit the earth". Do you see how this is the wrong attitude? It is not the case that we "need to change what we know about the universe". The whole conception needs to be changed from the bottom up, like a Kuhnian paradigm shift, but even more radical.

I don't see how the idea that there was a universe prior to observers is a misrepresentation of reality. — Ludwig V

What I said is that the concept "universe" is a misrepresentation of reality. There is much evidence to support this claim, things like spatial expansion, and dark matter, demonstrate that what we think of as "the universe" is not an acceptable representation.

Under that representation, there was necessarily "a universe" prior to observers, and so that is a valid conclusion. However, "universe" is clearly a false concept, in the sense of correspondence, so the conclusion ought to be dismissed as unsound.

It's obvious what it means to say there was a universe prior to observers...it means, if true, that there was a universe prior to observers. — Janus

According to the concept "universe", there was a universe prior to observers. But many aspects of that concept indicate to us that it is a misrepresentation of reality. It's really a false premise. So it doesn't mean a whole lot, that the implication of that false premise, is that there was a universe prior to observers.

Similarly we know what it means for something to exist, and it doesn't depend on the existence of humans. — Janus

This is highly doubtful. "To exist" is very clearly a concept structured around human experience. If you think otherwise, I'd be interested to see a good explanation of "existence" which wasn't based in human experience. And a simple definition which begs the question would not qualify as a good explanation.

Experience is what is gained from action, and intellectual experience appears to be sort of like knowledge in general. Theory appears to be something which is prior to intellectual experience, as necessary for action, but also a sort of response to it, as a corrective to the consequent self-confidence.

I would say that we could theoretically distinguish two types of theory, that which is prior to action and intellectual experience, and that which is posterior. But, since it's all a reciprocating process, all theory would in reality consist of both types, as prior to this experience, and posterior to that experience.

But what is the connection between the former passage, about thought-models, with the latter passage, about philosophy more generally. I think it's that the only way of achieving the latter is by the former. The only way of directing the power of system unsystematically to allow objects to speak is using thought-models, which do not reduce objects to instances and specimens. — Jamal

I see that there is a lot said about "theory" in this section. You\ll notice theory mentioned in the latter passage you quoted above.

The section ends with what I interpret as a discussion of the importance of theory. There is a relation between theory and intellectual experience which is referred to. I find "intellectual experience" to be a vague concept.

The scientific consensus would probably concede that even
experience would imply theory. It is however a “standpoint”, at best
hypothetical. Conciliatory representatives of scientivism demand what
they call proper or clean science, which is supposed to account for these
sorts of presuppositions. Exactly this demand is incompatible with
intellectual experience. If a standpoint is demanded of the latter, then
it would be that of the diner to the roast. It lives by ingesting such; only
when the latter disappears into the former, would there be philosophy.
Until this point theory embodies that discipline in intellectual
experience which already embarrassed Goethe in relation to Kant. If
experience relied solely on its dynamic and good fortune, there would
be no stopping.

Ideology lurks in the Spirit which, dazzled with itself like
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, irresistibly becomes well-nigh absolute.
Theory prevents this. It corrects the naiveté of its self-confidence,
without forcing it to sacrifice the spontaneity which theory for its part
wishes to get at. By no means does the difference between the so-called
subjective share of intellectual experience and its object vanish; the
necessary and painful exertion of the cognizing subject testifies to it. In
the unreconciled condition, non-identity is experienced as that which
is negative. The subject shrinks away from this, back onto itself and the
fullness of its modes of reaction. Only critical self-reflection protects it
from the limitations of its fullness and from building a wall [Wand:
interior wall] between itself and the object, indeed from presupposing
its being-for-itself as the in-itself and for-itself. The less the identity
between the subject and object can be ascertained, the more
contradictory what is presumed to cognize such, the unfettered
strength and open-minded self-consciousness. Theory and intellectual
experience require their reciprocal effect. The former does not contain
answers for everything, but reacts to a world which is false to its
innermost core. Theory would have no jurisdiction over what would be
free of the bane of such. The ability to move is essential to
consciousness, not an accidental characteristic. It signifies a double
procedure: that of the inside out, the immanent process, the
authentically dialectical, and a free one, something unfettered which
steps out of dialectics, as it were. Neither of them are however
disparate. The unregimented thought has an elective affinity to
dialectics, which as critique of the system recalls to mind what would
be outside of the system; and the energy which dialectical movement in
cognition unleashes is that which rebels against the system. Both
positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each
other’s critique, not through compromise.

I think that what is implied in the first paragraph, is that intellectual experience is a type of experience which does not require theory. To the contrary, theory requires intellectual experience. But is this really the case?

In the next paragraph "Theory and intellectual experience require their reciprocal effect."

Then, "the ability to move" is brought into the relation, and a "double procedure" referred to..

And, I assume that "both", In the ending sentence refers to the two parts of that double procedure, though it may refer to both theory and intellectual experience.

"Both positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each other’s critique, not through compromise."

Interesting.

I'd like to propose another thread, where we can stage ideas which we may or may not want to bring into this thread to discuss whether we want to create another thread for them? Do you think that someone would start another thread after that, to discuss whether certain ideas ought to be entered into my thread?

Genes are generally understood to provide the information that governs the growth, development and functions of organisms. So, it seems you are right that it is not "the whole of the organism" (whatever we might take that to be) that governs its own growth and development. Should genes be considered "external" though? — Janus

The proposal that "the whole of the organism" is causal in an active sense does not make any sense at all. The concept of "the whole" is just a vague inapplicable idea, if the organism is actively changing in the process of growing, (becoming), without reference to a final goal, the end. Unless we assume an outside designer, who holds "the whole" in mind, and who is putting the parts together toward that end, the idea of top-down causation is inapplicable. The case of the outside designer is what O'Callaghan calls external telos.

In the case of living organisms, O'Callaghan says that they have internal telos, they act with purpose. When an organism acts with purpose this is an instance of selective intentional action. Since it is caused from within the agent, and the agent selects or chooses its action, an action which may or may not be conducive to a larger whole, the existence of any larger whole produced is created through bottom-up causation. A good example of selective (intentional) action, which may or may not be conducive to a larger whole, is sexual intercourse, which may or may not be reproductive. The fact that the selective act only possibly, or potentially, leads to the production of the whole, excludes the possibility that the whole is acting in a top-down causal way.

This I believe, is the key to understanding selective, purposeful acts. The effect is not caused by any determinist necessity, and so the act is selected by a completely different form of "necessity", which cannot be explained as the end causing the means, top-down). That the end causes the occurrence of the means in a top-down way ('the man walks for the sake of heath' in Aristotle's example), is an ancient, outdated, misunderstanding of telos, which is applicable only to consciously reasoned choices where the relation between means and end is understood as a logical necessity. Most selective acts of telos are not reasoned, therefore we have to consider a different form of "necessity" as the cause of those acts.

I feel that we are going to have to agree to disagree here. Perhaps there are no isolated systems but the law of conservation of energy had been incredibly useful and, in fact, you can deduce the deviations and confirm them experimentally. — boundless

The ability to predict how everything will deviate from the proposition doesn't make the proposition true. That everything deviates from the proposition indicates that it is false. The usefulness of it, I do not deny.

Because I believe that even if there are no isolated systems, the usefulness of the laws prove to me that they do tell something true about the 'order of nature'. — boundless

The truth they say is 'I am false'.

I think you're misunderstanding what is meant by "top-down." Can you give an example of what you believe top-down explanation would be? — Leontiskos

There is some ambiguity in usage of the term, but in general, "top-down" refers to a hierarchical system where action or information, derives from the higher level and moves toward the lower. In O'Callaghan's article, he distinctly describes it as an explanation which understands the parts, by their functions in relation to the whole. The whole being the top, the parts being the bottom.

The basic problem with this proposed top-down explanation, is as I explained, logically, it cannot explain causation of the whole. It is logically impossible that the whole organism could cause the parts to perform the functions required for the existence of that organism, because those functions must be carried out in order for that whole to exist. In other words, this would mean that the whole causes its own existence. Clearly, the top-down explanation cannot describe the cause of any living organisms which come into being from seeds or eggs. The organism does not cause its own being.

Furthermore, the top-down explanation is shown by O'Callaghan to only be an acceptable causal explanation , in the case of external telos. But this requires an external force, which acts as the "top". In the case of internal telos, he explains the the being is given a nature which is not a presupposed nature at all, i.e. no nature, therefore there is no proper "whole" at this time, which could act in a top-down way.

Why think that? You won't find that claim anywhere in O'Callaghan's article. — Leontiskos

We do find that, in his description of external telos.

Starting with external teleology, it occurs when something distinct from an object imposes upon an object an intelligible order that is in some sense foreign to it. The object does not have that teleology but nonetheless behaves in a certain way because of the teleology imposed upon it.

This is the only way that "top-down" could be causal. The other way, which relates the parts to the whole by means of their roles, or function, is purely a descriptive explanation, and it requires either an external telos or an internal telos to account for causation. The external telos operates in a top-down way. The internal telos must operate in a bottom-up way because it could not operate in a top-down way for the following reasons.

The internal telos could not act causally in a top-down way, (whole ordering the parts) or else the organism would cause its own existence, which is illogical and inconsistent with evidence. And if God imposed the organism's existence upon it, that would be external telos. But O'Callaghan is clear to distinguish another form of purposeful causation, which is internal telos. There is no top-down option available for internal telos, one being excluded as illogical (self-causation), the other, "external telos", being excluded as insufficient to account for the capacity of intentional acts.

And, the evidence I've described to you is very clear, that internal telos must act in a bottom-up way. It is only through bottom-up causation that life on earth could have begun as a simple organism, and evolved into complex human beings. Otherwise, we are left with random chance, rather than telos as the cause. External telos has been rejected, and it is impossible that the internal telos of the human being could act causally, retroactively, to cause the simple life forms to evolve in that way, to create the complex human being. Therefore we are left with bottom-up causation as the only explanation for internal telos.

Rather, when God gives a being a nature then that being has a nature. Sort of like when I give you a shoe you have a shoe. The second part of your quote has to do with the idea that there is no pre-existent thing which receives a nature, and that the substance receives both its nature and its existence simultaneously (both logically and temporally). It doesn't mean that the substance has no nature. — Leontiskos

I think you need to reread that section. It clearly says that the created being has no presupposed nature at all, the creator "presupposes nothing about them at all". This is basic, and crucial to the distinction between external and internal telos. If, the creator presupposes some specific nature, then that creator creates something according to the prescribed nature, and this would be a case of external telos, putting parts together to make something. However, the creator is described as presupposing "nothing about them". This means that the creator gives to the created, no specific nature at all. All that is given is existence as telos. The telos then creates its own natural being, according to what is required within its environment. And this is the bottom-up process of causation which we know as evolution.

Why is everyone afraid to admit the obvious reality that evolution is a bottom-up causal process? It is impossible that it could be a top-down process unless the hand of God acts at each instance of variance. So, O'Callaghan proposes internal telos, as a means of reconciling the obvious scientific truth of bottom-up causation, with the obvious philosophical truth of purpose within the acts of living organisms. Now we have bottom-up causation through the means of internal telos.

On the contrary, the whole is what gives unity and function to the parts — Wayfarer

That's the physicalist misconception of telos. Notice that in O'Callaghan's external telos, it is not the whole itself which gives unity and function to the parts, it is the telos of an external agent. The physicalist does not like to portray telos as agential, therefore assigns agency to the whole. However, as I explained , it is logically impossible that the whole causes the unity and function of the parts, because the existence of the whole is posterior in time, to that unity.

In living systems, it is the organism that organizes the parts, not the other way around. — Wayfarer

Living systems are instances of internal telos, therefore thee is no external agent acting to give unity and function to the parts, as there is in the case of external telos. And what we understand, through the example of human intention, free will, is that each particular, individual human being is a free willing agent which chooses to be a part of a larger collective, (the army example), and this is the way that the whole gains existence through the agency of the parts.

Living organism, and evolution in general, cannot be understood as having their unity caused by telos which is external to the parts, acting in a top-down way, such that the whole organizes the parts, because the causal activity of the telos must be accounted for. If we try to assign the causal action to the form of the whole, we are stymied by the interaction problem. However, known principles of physics, chemistry, and biology, allow that selection of telos may be involved in the activities of the fundamental parts. But that would be bottom-up causation.

Reductionism typically assumes bottom-up causation: that component parts determine the behavior of the system. But top-down causation recognizes that the formative influence of the whole — the organism, the ecosystem, the developmental system — constrains and governs the activity of its components. — Wayfarer

There is definitely a feedback relation between the teleological activity of the part, and its environment, what physicalists see as the whole, but ultimately final causation must be assigned to the parts. This conclusion is forced logically due to the nature of final causation, as selective. The environment may be portrayed as constraint to the free agent, but teleological agency which is an activity of selection from possibility must be assigned to the parts.

Simply put, governance is not teleological agency. Teleological agency is found within the thing which is governed. Constraints, as a form of governance, cannot provide us with the source of teleological agency. This is found in the free agent which is governed. And, if any type of "self-organization" is proposed, this fact must be respected. What we observe, is that the constraints of the self-organizing system, are actually created by the agency of the parts. There is an appearance of top-down causation, as the constraints seem to restrict the activity of the parts, but the constraint is ultimately self-willed, as will power. That the constraint must be self-willed is evident every time that a part outsteps the boundary of the constraint, which is very common in living organism, as genetic mutations etc..

Take the acorn: yes, its DNA encodes the blueprint for the oak tree. But that blueprint is itself a product of evolutionary history — not just a list of parts, but a living record of how the whole organism has been shaped to grow, reproduce, and interact with its environment. — Wayfarer

If you take O'Callaghan's internal telos as the model, you can understand that the acorn has internal telos. This is a freedom of selection which inheres within the activities which are carried out by it. We look at the DNA as a blueprint, a code of constraints. However, inherent within whatever agency is active in that process, is the selective capacity of telos. This is what allows for variation in what grows from the acorn. The purposeful activity occurs within, and is inherent to the individual active parts. That numerous different parts must have the selective capacity of agential telos is evident from the fact that variation can occur in a number of different ways.

The blueprint of evolutionary history is a self-produced code of constraint. This is analogous with habitual activity. Notice that will power allows the free willing agent to break a habit. Likewise, genetic mutation is a similar breaking of the habit. Notice that the causal agency, the telos which is responsible for breaking the habit, inheres within the part, so this is a form of bottom-up causation, even though we, in our observational analysis, observe it through top down constraint. The true agential telos acts in a bottom-up way.

This has been pointed out to you again and again, but you keep reciting the same basic error to anyone who challenges you. There’s something fundamentally amiss in your grasp of this issue... — Wayfarer

It's very obvious, that I would level the same charge against you. And, since you started this thread, I am offering my assistance to help you get it right. Together we can come up with a better understanding of the reality of the situation.

And I think that's probably the key to unlocking the puzzle. Even though Adorno wants to focus on particulars, and in a fragmented way, it doesn't mean he thinks these particulars are themselves fragmented or necessarily lie, isolated, within a fragmented world. In other words, he does not want to treat objects as self-contained or atomistic. Rather, objects are always already mediated, connected to other objects in a web of history and society. And this mediation or connectivity is constitutive of the objects. Objects are nodes in networks. I think Adorno thereby avoids your dualism. — Jamal

This would be a subject requiring much discussion and debate. In my understanding, to assume "particulars" is to assume a world already divided. To assume "a universe" (system thinking), is to assume something already united, and potentially divisible in analysis. This dichotomy cannot really be avoided, because the way we speak, and the words we use, has to prioritize one or the other, or we end up speaking nonsense. We can go back and forth, but that's ambiguous and it even becomes equivocal and unintelligible.

So Adorno chooses to begin with particulars, and it's not a matter of oscillating back and forth, he is clear with this choice. From this perspective we look toward principles which might cause unity between distinct particulars. Relations are the cause of unity not the effect of unity. Notice Adorno's choice of words, "affinity", which describes a positive, unifying relation. The other perspective, where we assume a united universe to begin with, induces us to look for principles of division, for analysis, so we look for weaknesses and faults, negative aspects, within the existing structure. Adorno has become positive in this sense.

If we were to say that "the true way" would be to describe both perspectives, being careful not to be ambiguous, and maintaining clear separation between the positive way and the negative way, this divisive approach would be to adopt that one perspective, from the outset. So it's sort of unavoidable, that one or the other will be chosen as the presupposed.

I see what you mean. But suppose that a theory tells you that if the conditions are perfect you get 10 and if they aren't you get 9. You never get perfect conditions and you always get 9. This doesn't refute the theory, far from it! — boundless

It would just mean that the theory is completely useless. If a necessary condition of the theory is perfect conditions, and it is demonstrated that perfect conditions are impossible, then the theory can be dismissed as useless, because that premise can never be fulfilled.

So, if there is no 'isolated system' and you observe that energy isn't perfectly conserved it is hardly an objection of the law of conservation of energy if it gives consistent predictions also in the cases where it is expected that energy isn't conserved. — boundless

It's not the law of conservation which produces consistent predictions, as is obvious from the fact that it is inaccurate. Predictions can be produced from statistics, and the statistics might concern deviations form the conservation law. Then the conservation law would not state anything true about the world, it would just be a useful tool for gathering statistics.

I disagree. What your objection actually point to is that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the universe as a whole. Which is BTW interesting, but it doesn't refute the laws of conservation.

Your objection however does raise the problem of how to interpet the fact that idealizations seem never to find a 'realization' in nature. That's a perfectly fine area of inquiry but is different from what we were debating. — boundless

Well, I disagree with what you've presented here. If the law of conservation is an idealization, and idealizations are never realized in nature, then we can conclude deductively that it is impossible that the law of conservation is true. It is necessarily false.

Isn't that exactly what we are debating, whether the conservation law is true or false? You've already decided that it is merely approximate, why not take the next step, and accept that it is false?

Honestly, I am not sure of what you are saying here. When you measure temperature (or internal energy) you don't tranform it to work. — boundless

That's exactly what measuring the temperature is, work being done. The energy acts on the thermometer, and this is an instance of work being done. Therefore taking the temperature is an instance of work being done.

This is why I argue that the idea of energy which is not available to do work, is an incoherent idea. Energy is defined as the capacity to do work. So if we take something like the universe, and assume that it is a closed system, and claim that there is energy within this system which has no capacity to do work, then we must conclude that this energy could not be detected in any way. If it were detected, that would be a case of it doing work, which is contrary to the stipulation. Then what sense does this conception make, energy which cannot be detected as energy?

Although O'Callaghan does not state it explicitly, I believe he holds that internal teleology is top-down. It is the internal natura of a living substance in which all of its parts participate. — Leontiskos

Perhaps, but he doesn't state it, and maybe that's because he recognizes, like me, that the idea of internal teleology being top-down is incoherent. He distinguishes top-down causation from bottom-up, and he also distinguishes external teleology from internal. Then he leaves it to the reader to conclude whether internal teleology could be top-down.

Do you think you could explain how internal teleology could be top-down? What is the so-called internal nature of living substance which could act in a top-down way to keep the parts united? Top-down implies a force acting from the outside inward, yet the term is "internal nature". How could one's internal natur be produced from a top-down force?

If we propose a distinction of separate parts within an individual being, then the teleology must be pervasive to, i.e. internal to all parts. How could this telos get internal to the most basic, fundamental parts, genes, DNA, etc., through a top-down process? And if we take mind and intention as our example, then we see that each individual human being must willfully take part in human cooperation. And clearly this willful, intentional participation is bottom-up causation.

Furthermore, we have the problem which I explained to wayfarer. The whole has no existence, until after the parts unite in cooperation. Therefore the whole cannot be the cause of such cooperation. The cooperation is prior to the whole's existence. It is very telling the way O'Callaghan describes how internal teleology is a case of something coming from nothing. Since a material object always consists of parts, as having a form, the form itself, as intent, or 'internal' teleology, must actually create the parts. Surely this is bottom-up causation, as the whole itself has no existence yet, and all there is is intent. And the intent is internal, therefore it must be within, and this is bottom-up.

Where do you find that in the passage? — Leontiskos

The passage is difficult, so read it carefully. Pay particular attention to the conclusion "And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all." What the creator gives to the being is "its nature", but this nature which is given, is the nature of a being without a nature.

Here:

So even when an external agent imposes external teleology upon some object, it presupposes some internal principle of active or passive response. However, the intelligence that is responsible for the internal teleology of natural causes cannot presuppose their existence, because in giving to some being its internal principle of teleological movement, it is giving to that object its nature. Even as an external agent responsible for the internal teleology of the object, it does not presuppose the nature of the object by which it could passively or actively respond. On the contrary, it gives to the object its nature by which it passively or actively responds to other external but natural agents.

However, a being cannot exist without some presupposed nature by which it actively or passively responds to its environment. So, this intelligent external agent in causing beings to have internal teleology gives to those beings their existence. And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all. If you think there can be beings without presupposed natures, describe one for me in a way that does not tacitly appeal to an intelligible account of what they are.

Top-down sees the whole as primary the parts as secondary, whereas bottom-up sees the parts as primary and the whole as secondary. — Leontiskos

The clear, logical problem with "the whole as primary", is as I describe, the whole has no existence until the parts are united in its creation. Therefore the whole cannot be causal in its own creation. We can assume that something external puts the parts together, creating the whole, in a top-down fashion, but this would be nothing but what is called "external telos".

In the case of living beings we are dealing with internal telos, individual beings who act intentionally. Experience and knowledge indicate to us that intentional acts are based in a capacity to choose. This is what characterizes "purpose" that possibilities are selected. And we also know that the unity produced from the intentional acts of individual beings, is a result of that freedom of choice. When the parts freely choose, by the means of internal telos, to cooperate, unite, and produce a larger whole, this can only be described as bottom-up causation.

QUESTION: I said that the following is a dialectical image of the collapse of Hegelian dialectics: "The thought which may positively hypostasize nothing outside of the dialectical consummation overshoots the object with which it no longer has the illusion of being one with." But since this collapse produces negative dialectics, which is supposedly the better philosophy, how is this dialectical movement not a positive synthesis? — Jamal

I think this relates directly to what he says about system thinking. The idea of negative dialectics is not to reject systems thinking, but to determine its true form. And this displays how Adorno thinks of criticism. To criticize is not to reject, but a way of bettering the thing being criticized.

There's been some back and forth between you and I in this thread, concerning this issue. First there was the question of whether Adorno accepts or rejects Hegelian principles. Also we had the question of whether what Adorno presents is properly called "dialectics" in the context of Hegelian "dialectics". It's becoming apparent to me, that the process is to neither accept nor reject a given principle, but to criticize it. This leaves synthesis as unnecessary, because acceptance of principles, adoption of belief is not the intended end. The process may or may not enable synthesis, and having synthesis as a goal from the outcome would prejudice the procedure.

QUESTION: How does he propose to focus only on particulars, doing philosophy in fragment form, and at the same time uncover a coherent, meaningful reality and the affinity between objects? — Jamal

I think that this is the real issue with the idea of the concept going beyond, or overshooting the object. Relations between objects "affinity" is something categorically distinct from objects themselves. So conceptualization which focuses on objects, and representing objects (identity thinking), really cannot grasp this very significant aspect of reality which is the affinity between objects.

The issue appears to be the difference between the relations between concept and object, and the relations between object and object. When the concept overshoots the object it may establish a scientific relation of prediction. Notice though that this relation is a subject/object relation because that overshooting is directed by intention toward producing an extended conception of the object. What Adorno is interested in is the true object/object relation. This must take as its primary assumption, a separation which produces a multitude, rather than the primary assumption of unity which conceptualizes "the object". The difference being that the primary postulate is separation rather than unity.

Yes, it seems that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the whole universe, but our experiments tell us that when the approximation is reasonable, the results are coherent with conservation laws. — boundless

I do not think that your claim is reasonable. No experiment has provided 100% conservation, so it is actually unreasonable to say that results are consistent with conservation laws. For some reason, you think that stating that the law is an "approximation" makes the law reasonable. What if I told you that 9 is approximately 10, and so I proposed a law that stated 9 is always 10? Would it be reasonable to claim that this approximation justifies the truth of my law? I don't think so. Why would you think that approximation in the case of the law of conservation of energy justifies a claim that the law is true?

Also, when we know the deviations that we expect from a non-isolated system (i.e. when we know 'how much' the system is not isolated), we find a coherent result.
This certainly points to the fact that, at least, conservation laws do point to something true about the physical universe, even if the conditions where they hold without errors are never actualized. Or maybe they are valid when you take the entire physical universe all together. — boundless

What this indicates is that we always expect deviation from the law/. So we find that consistency in the deviation is coherent. Isn't that just evidence that we all actually know that the law is false? Why would people want to deceive themselves, by trying to believe that the law is true, when they always, in fact, expect deviation? How is that in any way reasonable?

Yes, the use of conservation laws does "point to something true about the physical universe". The evidence indicates overwhelmingly, that conservation laws are false. That is the single most important truth that we can abstract from the ongoing use of conservation laws.

Nope, you can measure the increase of temperature (and hence, internal energy) due to friction. But you can't recover it to use it again as work. — boundless

You misunderstand. The very act of measuring the temperature is in fact an instance of using that energy as work.

MU, this is going to be my last word on the topic. You're confusing distinct Aristotelian categories by treating formal and final cause as though they must be opposed. In Aristotle’s account—especially as taken up by Aquinas—the form of a thing is its principle of organization and development, and it is inherently purposive. That’s why formal cause and final cause are not separate domains in living beings: a plant’s form includes its telos to grow, reproduce, and flourish. — Wayfarer

It appears like you are not well familiar with Aristotle's "Physics" within which he draws the distinction between formal cause and final cause. Nor, it seems are you familiar with the two distinct senses of "form", and "actual", which he explains in the "Metaphysics". "Actual" may refer to what is, in the sense of being, having existence, and in this sense it is consistent with formal cause. But "actual" may also refer to what is active, changing, becoming, and in this sense it is consistent with final cause.

With logic, Aristotle demonstrates that what is actual, i.e. being, or form in the sense of formal cause, is incompatible with what is actual, i.e. becoming, or form in the sense of final cause. Therefore final cause and formal cause are necessarily separate domains in living beings. The two are incompatible. Also, Aquinas maintains this distinction. And this is why the form of a material body, as 'what is actual', is distinct from the form which is known as the immaterial soul, as 'what is active'. Therefore dualism is propagated through the Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysical tradition. Notice that O'Callaghan upholds this dualism with his distinction between external and internal teleology.

You however, are denying the dualism which is clearly a fundamental aspect of this metaphysical tradition, by affirming that formal cause and final cause are not separate domains in the study of living beings. But obviously, what a being is, in the sense of its material form, is a very distinct study from the study of the purpose of a being's activities. By classing them both into the criteria of 'formal cause', it appears to me like you are persisting in your conversion to physicalism.

As for O’Callaghan, his description of internal teleology clearly includes non-conscious natural purposiveness—such as organs functioning for the sake of the organism—not just the deliberate intention of agents. That’s why Aquinas can say even non-rational beings “act for an end.” He’s not talking about conscious volition, but about nature acting according to its form, which is exactly what top-down causation refers to in this context. — Wayfarer

The key point is that purposeful action requires agency. Agency is the internal teleology. So if we describe the activities of organs as purposeful, then we need to assign an agent. Traditionally, from Aristotelian biology, the agent is the soul, and this supports vitalism. In Aristotelian principles, the soul is necessary as the source of activity, which actualizes the potentials of the living being, as the powers of the soul. Since the powers of the soul are not always active, they are therefore classed as potentials, requiring actualization, which is a selective process carried out by the agent, the soul. Purposeful action is defined by the selective process which is essential to it.

So no, what I’m describing is not determinist, nor external imposition, nor a confusion of causes. It’s classical metaphysics. — Wayfarer

What you are describing is a confusion of causes. You are conflating formal cause with final cause, and not recognizing the very significant difference between the two which is essential to classical metaphysics, and conducive to dualism. "Formal cause" refers to the constraints of what is. "Final cause" refers to the purposeful actions of an agent, which to be purposeful must be selective. Surely you recognize that these are distinct domains. However you seem intent on conflating the two. Under this conflation you represent final cause as a feature or type of formal cause, in the way that metaphysics of modern physicalism does.

My view, following O’Callaghan (and by extension, Aquinas and Aristotle), is that top-down causation refers to the way the form or structure of a whole gives meaning and function to its parts—not as external coercion, but as internal teleology. — Wayfarer

What you refer to here, as top-down causation, is what is known in Aristotelian principles as formal cause. Teleology studies final cause which is distinctly different from formal cause.

"Internal teleology", under O'Callaghan's description, which I posted above, refers to an agent which acts with intent, and that is final cause. "Internal teleology" is distinguished from "external teleology", the latter being the process by which intent is imposed onto things, giving them order as parts in the form of a whole.

Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things.

I think you misunderstand what is meant by "internal teleology". It clearly refers to final cause, not formal cause which you describe with "the way the form or structure of a whole gives meaning and function to its parts". Final cause refers to an agent acting for an end, which is what O'Callaghan classes as "internal teleology". And he claims that God is required to account for the existence of internal teleology, because the existence of the teleological movement is prior to the very thing which bears it internally.

Yes, quite a positive outlook on translation he has. Which is curious why subsequently he'd write: — Pussycat

Well, he is the translator. You wouldn't expect him to be saying that it's impossible for the translator to translate, would you? So what he does is elucidate the difference between the original and the translation, with the analogy. Then, the part you find "curious" is simply him reminding us of that difference.

But then, if the experience has been enhanced, why should we be wary of the false-color bitmap surface image? — Pussycat

What he describes with the bitmap analogy, is a difference. As I explained, that difference may enhance, or it may degrade the experience, in relation to the original. Further, it may enhance some aspects, and degrade others, and all sorts of different possibilities for "difference". In other words, the translator knows that there are good translations and bad, and might also even know that his translation is lacking in some areas, if he knew that he didn't adequately understand some areas. Therefore he is warning us to be wary of all translations, even his.

Whether languages adapted so that to represent and match the dominating ideologies of the times. — Pussycat

Such a relation would be reciprocal, over lengthy time. Ideology gets shaped by language as much as language gets shaped by ideology. In my reply to Jamal above, the use of profanity in language is described as a rejection of ideology. And, as the profundity of ideology is renounced in the manner described by Adorno, new ideology will fill the void, and this will be shaped by language. Some ideology will severely restrict language use, as was evident with Catholicism and The Inquisition. But ultimately such restriction of freedom induces rejection, then the new ideology which evolves is restricted by the limits of language.

There are situations, however, where the model of a closed system is a very good approximation. — boundless

I have no disagreement with the idea that the law of conservation of energy is "a very good approximation. But the point is that it is not what is the case. Therefore it is not the truth.

Consider the following example. When Copernicus first modeled the heliocentric solar system, the model failed, because it modeled perfect circles, and this produced inaccuracies which were accounted for by unacceptable descriptions.

The point being that "a very good approximation", which leaves aspects of the concept of energy, such as "entropy", accounted for by unacceptable descriptions, is misleading, regardless of whether it is a good approximation.

One explanation is that. Yes, there are no perfectly closed system. But the other one, the one that takes into account 'entropy' isn't based on that. It tells us that a certain quantity of energy can't be controlled.
Friction is a good example of the increase of entropy, in fact. — boundless

The point is that if some energy cannot be controlled, then it cannot be detected, because detection is a type of control. And if it cannot be detected it cannot be called "energy". So "entropy" serves as a concept which consists of some energy which is not energy, and that is contradiction.

I don't understand here your point. Are you claiming that the absence of perfectly closed systems is the reason of irreversibility? — boundless

No, I am saying that a perfectly closed system is impossible and the law of conservation of energy is demonstrated as false because it requires a perfectly closed system for its truth. And, this is due to the nature of time, what is known as the irreversibility of time.

Top-down causation doesn't mean external coercion or denial of agency—quite the opposite. It refers to the way the organization or unity of a system constrains and enables the behaviour of its parts from within (hence organism, organic, and organisation.) — Wayfarer

Enabling is not causation. If, top-down causation "enables" behaviour, then this is not properly called "causation". Further, this is not consistent with what is known as final cause, intention, and free will, because these are known as agential causes, not instances of enabling. If top-down causation simply enables intentional acts, it is not a proper description of those acts, and therefore does not serve us as a representation of teleology, which is the study of those acts explicitly, not what enables them.

In O’Callaghan’s essay, it’s the Humpty Dumpty model: the organism is not built out of self-standing parts that can function on their own and just happen to join up; rather, the parts are what they are because of their roles in the whole. — Wayfarer

The issue though, the philosophical problem which we are addressing, is what causes the parts to have a role in the whole. If we follow the model of final cause, intention, and free will, we must allow that each part purposefully, and freely accepts its role within the whole, without being caused to do so by the whole itself.

The issue can be understood like this. The whole does not have existence until after the parts have taken up their respective positions, to produce the whole. Therefore it is impossible that the whole can cause the parts to each have the role that it has. It is true, as you say, that the parts are what they are, because of the roles that they play in the whole, that is how they are defined, as those parts. However, it is impossible that the whole causes the parts (top-down causation) to have the roles that they have, because the whole has no existence until after the parts have taken their roles. This is why we look to final cause, as a type of bottom-up causation, whereby each individual, which will be a part of that future whole, voluntarily takes up a role toward the creation of the whole.

This is the difference between O'Callaghan's external teleology, and internal teleology. In the case of external teleology, the parts are ordered towards the creation of a whole, by an external cause, which acts in a top-down way. In the case of internal teleology, God creates intention, and each part creates itself (seemingly from nothing but its own intention), such that each part has intention inherent within, as the cause of it producing what it is. Notice that "what it is" is determined by its role in the whole which comes to be from its intentional acts along with those of the other intentional agents.

You can’t reassemble life from pieces. The individual’s capacity for intentional action—say, to enlist in an army—is already shaped by the larger context: language, culture, history, embodiment. — Wayfarer

This model does not work out, because it dictates that you always have to seek a larger perspective as you look backward in time. And that is contrary to the reality of life. When we look backward in time we see that the multitude of variety in current life evolved from a narrower and narrower source. In reality, the individual's capacity for intentional action is derived from biological sources, and that demonstrates a narrower and narrower context. All those aspects you mention, "language, culture, history, embodiment" are the products of individual intentional actions.

Bottom-up causation, by contrast, is the Frankenstein model: assemble a bunch of pieces, energise them with a force, and voila! a system emerges from their interactions. — Wayfarer

This is an example of external teleology. But O'Callaghan is very explicit in distinguishing between external and internal teleology.

So invoking top-down causation isn’t a denial of free will—it’s an attempt to explain how form, meaning, and function arise in organisms, including human beings. You don’t have to be a physicalist to see that. — Wayfarer

I agree, that when you portray "top-down causation" as enabling, or as conditions, or as constraints, it isn't a denial of free will. However, it does not provide proper "causation", which must come from the act initialized by the individual agent. Then the proper representation of "causation" would be bottom-up agency. But if you portray "top-down causation" as properly causal, then free will is denied by that form of causation, and we have determinism. The ambiguity between these two ways of portraying "top-down causation" allows metaphysicians like apokrisis to slip back and forth, in ambiguity and equivocation. You'll notice that sometimes apokrisis claims that the whole provides merely global constraints, to local freedom, which could then have local parts which act freely as intentional agents. But then apokrisis will assign intentionality to the constraints, as if the constraints are the actual cause of what the agent's actions actually are, being fundamentally random chance activity which is constrained externally,.

One of the strengths of Aquinas’ philosophy, and a point O’Callaghan emphasizes, is that God doesn't need to control or micromanage natural beings in order for their actions to be meaningful or purposeful. Instead, God creates beings with their own natures—internal principles of motion, action, and teleology. This means that organisms act from within themselves; they are genuine agents, not mere instruments or puppets. Their purposes are real and intelligible because they arise from their God-given form or nature, not from external control. — Wayfarer

Don't you see that this form of causation you describe here, whereby individual beings are agents, is necessarily bottom-up causation?

The teleology is internal, not imposed from the outside. — Wayfarer

If the teleology is not imposed from outside, but is derived from within, then this is bottom-up causation.

But you've cherry-picked that quote. O'Callaghan then distinguishes between 'creating' and 'making'. He says making 'presupposes something already existing upon which the maker acts'. That is the model for human artifacts. By contrast, 'God in creating all that is in every aspect in which it is, including the causal powers and efficacy of agents that respond actively or passively to other created agents, presupposes nothing other than God’s own being, power, knowledge, and goodness.' And that is nothing if not top-down! — Wayfarer

Yes, I cherry-picked the part where the difference between external and internal teleology is described, because I believe this is a very important distinction to understand. This is the difference I was trying to get Dfpolis to expound on earlier. In the case of living beings, where individual beings, are each observed to have one's own internal purpose (obvious in human intent), the causation here can only be accounted for as a bottom-up form of causation.

That is the point I made in reply to apokrisis' army example. To properly represent intentionality, each member of the army must, by one's own free will, have the desire to act the role. The whole, which is the army, is not caused to be, by some top-down form of causation, by which "the army" causes, through some force external to the individual participants, the unity of the parts. The thing called "the army" is caused to exist through a bottom-up process by which each individual apprehends the need, and willfully takes a role. Simply put, in order to represent the freeness of the free will, which is essential to intentionality, the causal process must be bottom-up. Otherwise, each individual part is portrayed as being forced by an external cause, to play a role in the whole, and free will is denied.

This representation of top-down teleology is the effect of determinist physicalism. By Newton's first law of motion, a body, which is any massive part, cannot be caused to move except by an external force. That is the premise of determinism, which denies that a body could be caused to change its motion through an internal cause, what we know as will. This determinist, physicalist perspective, induces the idea that intentional actions, such as the will to join the army, are caused by some sort of top-down form of causation which is external to the individual agent, because all causation is stipulated to be externally sourced. You can see how this is a misconception. Freely willed, intentional actions must be represented as derived from within the agent, internally sourced, and not be portrayed as caused by some external top-down force of constraint. Like @Punshhh pointed out, constraints are passive, they are not agential causes.

The fundamental problem, as I see it, is the pervasiveness of systems thinking, and the inability of systems theory to portray free bottom-up causation. In systems thinking, there is a separation between internal to the system, and external to the system. There is one proposed boundary which separates the two. What is not a part of the system is external to it, outside it. What is missing is a proper spatial representation which would distinguish what is not a part of the system to the inside. Systems theory has no proposal for a distinction between a boundary to the outside of the system, and a boundary to the inside of the system. This means that there is no epistemological principles describing a way to separate causation which comes form something which is not a part of the system, across the boundary to the internal, from causation which comes from something which is not a part of the system, across the boundary to the external. And because the determinist, physicalist way, is to represent all causation as external, then any causation which is not part of the system but across the boundary to the inside, must be represented as "external" causation. Conflating these two very distinct forms of causation is a misconception.

Here's a passage from your link distinguishing internal teleology from external:

Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things. The external agents of this world can only impose external teleology upon other beings within the world because they presuppose the existence of those other beings, presuppose what they are and seek to modify them by imposing external teleology upon them. External agents imposing external teleology upon objects presuppose the already existing natures of what they act upon, and that those objects they act upon will respond actively or passively according to their own natures. An electron will respond differently to an artificially produced magnetic field than will a neutron, because of the natural difference between an electron and a neutron. A lion will respond differently to being pulled on by a human being than will a dandelion, because of the natural difference between a lion and a dandelion.

So even when an external agent imposes external teleology upon some object, it presupposes some internal principle of active or passive response. However, the intelligence that is responsible for the internal teleology of natural causes cannot presuppose their existence, because in giving to some being its internal principle of teleological movement, it is giving to that object its nature. Even as an external agent responsible for the internal teleology of the object, it does not presuppose the nature of the object by which it could passively or actively respond. On the contrary, it gives to the object its nature by which it passively or actively responds to other external but natural agents.

However, a being cannot exist without some presupposed nature by which it actively or passively responds to its environment. So, this intelligent external agent in causing beings to have internal teleology gives to those beings their existence. And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all. If you think there can be beings without presupposed natures, describe one for me in a way that does not tacitly appeal to an intelligible account of what they are.

I believe that when we consider the way that internal teleology is 'given' to beings, it is necessary to conclude that this is a bottom-up process of creation rather than top-down. Top-down suffices to describe external teleology, but internal teleology, by which teleology is internal to each member, or part, of the whole, is necessarily bottom-up. According to the passage, what is given, is no specific nature whatsoever, but simply the will, or teleology to produce one's own nature. This would be a bottom-up process.

Once again, it is clear that we do not have enough common ground for a fruitful discussion. — Dfpolis

This is not true at all. We've had many discussions in the past, and it is very clear that we have significant common ground. However, when specific points of difference become apparent, it appears like you choose to ignore my criticisms. You seem to be intent on throwing away all that common ground, along with any insight into specific problems which I may be offering. And for what?

The second principle of thermodynamics tells us that entropy increases in a closed system. The first principle of thermodynamics states that the total energy is conserved. No physicist I know of have ever made the claim you make here, i.e. that the increase of entropy entails a violation of the law of conservation of energy. So, in my view, you are in the position to give a justification of what you are saying here. Unless you prove your claim (you can also link to a scientific paper if you want), it is reasonable to think that you are wrong here. — boundless

I don't understand why this feature of the concept of "energy" is so difficult for so many people to grasp. It's actually quite simple and straight forward, yet the minds of individuals are inclined to simply reject it out of principle. So, let me explain, and you tell me where you have a problem to understand.

First, consider the condition "closed system". There is no such thing as a system which is absolutely closed. Second, experimental evidence has indicated over and over again, that the complete amount of energy is never conserved in any active system. That's why there is no perpetual motion system. So, the tendency was always to write off the lost energy, as lost to the system due to incomplete closure. Classically these were losses like heat loss due to friction, and other losses which could not be properly accounted for. No system could even approach an efficiency of a hundred percent, and the classical explanation was that this is because of absolute closure being physically impossible.

However, there are still some people who like to hypothesize an idealistic, absolutely closed system. We can theorize, that fi a system was absolutely closed, energy would be conserved within that system. But evidence indicates that even if such a system could be constructed, energy would likely still be lost to that system, and this loss was called entropy. This probable (probable because an absolutely closed system cannot be produced to test it) loss of energy, to the idealistic, absolutely closed system, (which would be a violation of the conservation law) is understood as a feature of the passing of time, and this is why we know time as asymmetrical.

Please indicate which parts you have difficulty understanding.

There is a translator's note in the pdf, if you would like to read it. — Pussycat

I read the translator's notes, and they say nothing about what you are claiming. There is no mention of "style", and I do not see the issue with style which you are talking about. I can read Plato's dialogues, translated from ancient Greek, which is far more distant to English than German is, and with a decent translation, the style comes through quite well. Some of the meaning is lost though, often because of ambiguity. This is what is referred to in the translator's notes, when he describes how he translates specific words.

Overall though, the aesthetic comes through, and this is what the translator means when he says:

Strange as it sounds, good translations are actually rather like the false
color images of distant planets relayed by spacecraft: Neptune and
Pluto wouldn’t actually look like that to the naked eyes of an astronaut
cruising the dim outer reaches of the solar system in person, but the
reprocessed and rescaled image does justice to the reality, by making
the inexperienceable nevertheless experienceable after all.

Remastering, if it is done well, enhances the experience, it does not degrade it. So the difference between a good translation and a bad one, is the difference between enhancing and degrading the experience. This might be closely linked to how the style is presented by the translator, but there is nothing to indicate that a good translator cannot enhance the style. It takes knowledge of both languages, effort, and skill.

But tell me, do you think that languages are historically conditioned? — Pussycat

I really don't know what you are asking here.

This poses an additional challenge, as english readers can't be helped by language, the dialectic is neither immanent nor immediate in it. — Pussycat

I don't see how you draw this conclusion. You've pointed out differences between English and German, but you haven't indicated why you think one is more conducive to negative dialectics, or dialectics in general, than the other. You simply assert that German is "a highly dialectical language", without explaining why.

It appears like you base this on flexibility. But flexibility is multi-faceted, and your AI report focuses only on flexibility of form. Your AI was baited because you limited it to "grammatical structure" with complete disregard for semantics. Most of that report doesn't even make sense. "Suspense" it says "is useful for complex or abstract reasoning". How does that make any sense? It just speaks nonsense and appears to support the conclusion you wanted it to.

It is clear that you do not understand physics. So, you should not use it as the basis for your theories. — Dfpolis

Such blatant refusals to discuss the topic, only indicate that you know that you are wrong so you will not approach the issue. Why twist the facts of physics to support your metaphysics? If the facts don't fit, then you need to change the metaphysics or else dispute the facts.

If you cannot understand the difference between a wine barrel having a purpose and a wine barrel thinking, further explanation will not help. — Dfpolis

We were not talking about "thinking". We were talking about having "intention". Can you not distinguish between these two?

I believe that thinking is an intentional activity, it is intentionally caused. Therefore intention is prior to thinking, as thinking is caused by intention, so thinking is not a necessary aspect of having intention. Do you not agree with this? Or, are you claiming that intention comes from thinking, is caused by thinking, so that all intention involves thinking? If you are proposing the latter, how would you justify this?

Very interesting post, MU, I like it. I think your interpretative scheme of death/religion, profound/profane, sacrosanct/blasphemy, is inventive and enlightening. I think it's a good model, or instance, of what Adorno is referring to—or else a metaphor (or both). I don't think it reveals his central referent, as you seem to be suggesting, but it's a good way of thinking about it anyway. I particularly like the idea of the critique of ideology as profanity. — Jamal

I think the metaphor works pretty good, even to take it so far as to the expressions of suffering. The use of profanity in language is very often a response to mistake, pain, or wrongdoing, sometimes like a reflexive response to pain. Yet swearing is also a way of rejecting profundity, and not long ago swearing was unacceptable in most social settings. Its expression was a rejection of that taboo. Now, swearing is becoming more and more pervasive, and corresponding with this comes the idea that ideology is bad. We act out the taboo, to swear, and this is a symbolic rejection of the ideology which says don't swear. It's an expression of freedom. But it goes much deeper than a simple rejection, or expression of freedom, because it is derived from those who are being hurt by the ideology, and it is a reflexive response to that pain.

But it's not just that facts are not enough; it's that knowledge in the form of facts is already ideological, is value-laden without knowing it (or without saying so). To uncover the truth then is not just to add more, or different kinds of, information, e.g., including formerly marginalized voices, but to critique the facts themselves to reaveal the truth negatively. You can see this better with a fact like, workers are free in capitalist society because in taking jobs they voluntarily sign contracts. This fact can be criticized to reveal that the company and the worker are not equal parties except in a narrow legal sense, and that the choice between the burdensome job and destitution is no choice at all. — Jamal

I take this attitude toward facts as applicable to all fields of knowledge. At the base of all forms of knowledge, lies the given, the posited. You might call these the brute facts. Wittgenstein posits hinge, or bedrock propositions, and suggests that it would be irrational to doubt them. Adorno actually recommends that we criticize through negative dialectics, these basic facts, the supposed elements of certainty, which constitute the foundation of ideology. So from the positivist perspective, Adorno is irrational.

I take for example, Newton's first law of motion, a basic fact which underlies much of modern physics. You would think that this is just a pragmatic principle which is highly useful toward understanding motion, so this "fact" would be irrelevant toward any suffering caused by ideology. But that is just the tip of the iceberg. In reality, Newton's first law of motion is the basic premise of determinism, which is pervasive, as a backdrop, to materialist philosophy.

Now, I believe that determinist ideology is very harmful and causal toward suffering, because it propagates fatalism and thoughts of helplessness. This, I believe, is how Adorno shows that despite his rejection of idealism, he is in touch with true spirituality. Look at how he talks about finding freedom through resistance to the given facts, and transcending them. Then consider how we describe objects through determinist facts. When this (determinist) objectivity weighs on the subject through the medium of ideology, the expressions of the subject are those of suffering (profanity by the metaphor above). The expressions are symbolic of the desire for freedom.

The speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow
itself to be governed by the given facts, transcends them even in the
closest contact with objects and in the renunciation of sacrosanct
transcendence. What in thought goes beyond that to which it is bound
in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge of the
subject. The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth.
For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it
experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.

This school of thought enlarges the meaning of intent (or value or purpose) beyond that which only conscious subjects are able to entertain. — Wayfarer

I think it is better, perhaps, to use terms like "agency" rather than "intent". The latter generally gets restricted to consciousness. The former may introduce ambiguity, because inanimate agency, as efficient causation, is acceptable language. But when we use "agency" we enable understanding of Aristotle's powers of the soul, the potentia. These are things such as self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. In our understanding of these 'powers', it is common to attribute them to the material aspect of the being, the concept of matter being used to account for that potential.

Rejection of dualist metaphysics leaves the agency involved with the powers of the soul, as efficient causation. However, under Aristotelian principles, the soul is required as the form, the actuality which actualizes the various powers. What is important in Aristotelian biology is the idea that the powers are not constantly in action, sensation takes a break in sleeping for example. This is why the powers are classed as potentials, requiring actualization from the soul itself. We can consider actualization as a form of selection, even choice, at some fundamental level, because something must select which potentials to actualize. Scientism and physicalism will reduce this selection process to efficient causation, and represent it as a sort of reflex action, the organism responds to the activities of its environment in the way of efficient causation. But clearly this cannot adequately account for the way that the organism selects from possibilities in response.

Aquinas made an extensive inquiry and investigation into the nature of "habit". That term as used by Aristotle refers to properties of an organism and the Latin reflects this as what the being "has". What the being has, is a propensity to act in a particular way, and this is a habit. Aquinas inquired as to where the habit is properly located, where does it reside. And, if my memory serves me properly he eventually saw the need to attribute habits to the potential for action, rather than to the action itself. This is a difficult concept, because properties are generally aspects of the form, which is the actuality. So here we are attributing an act, or the inclination to act in a particular way, to the potential itself. This readily translate to the idea that matter itself has a propensity to act in specific ways.

Well, what isn't conserved is usable energy, not total energy. — boundless

If it can be detected, it is usable. If you are proposing a type of energy which cannot be detected, then that's not really energy, is it? Energy, by definition is the capacity to do work. The idea that there is such a thing as energy which is not usable energy is just contradiction.

Deterministic genetic variation and mutation produce variant offspring that are selected by processes guided by the same laws of nature. — Dfpolis

"Selected" implies choice. Do you think that processes governed by deterministic laws are capable of making choices?

Yes, its original purpose will be reflected in its form. That is not the same as the object, itself, having an intention = being a source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

I think you\ll need to explain this proposed difference to me Df. How would you characterize the difference between intentionality in the sense of an object having a purpose, with this purpose being reflected in its form, and an object being a source of intentionality?

To me, any human being, which you might say is a source of intentionality, was actually given that intentionality by its parents, and this is just another case of purpose being reflected in the form. See, your proposed classification "being a source of intentionality" requires that you show that intentionality can actually begin within a thing, as the source of that intentionality. But intentionality is hereditary.

Please! I told you what entropy means. You can accept what I say, or not. But, if it means what I say, it does not mean that the system is subject to indeterminacy. I suggest you read a bit more about entropy. — Dfpolis

You said;
"Entropy measures the number of microscopic states (we do not know) that can produce a macroscopic state we may know."

Clearly, if entropy means that the system "can produce a macroscopic state we may know", and "entropy" refers to the measure of possible corresponding microstates, then indeterminacy is implied. The very nature of possibility is indeterminacy. It is not the case that the physicists believe that the actual corresponding microstate could be known. If that were the case, it would not be called "entropy" because the information would be available to them. Why do you deny the obvious? You are trying to shape the meaning of "entropy" for your own purpose. Indeterminacy is fundamental to the current understanding of physical systems. And "uncertainty" is understood as an aspect of the system which may be measured as entropy.

Of course such systems reflect the intentionality of their makers. Still, there is no reason to think they have an intrinsic source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

Don't you think that it is correct to say that the intentionality is intrinsic to the system? If something is made for a specific purpose, isn't that purpose intrinsic to the thing? I mean, I see how you would separate the cause from the effect, in the case of efficient causation, but in the case of final cause, wouldn't you say that the purpose of an intentionally designed thing inheres within the thing itself, as a defining feature. If something is not used according to its purpose, it is not the thing which it was meant to be.

Take language for example. If we do not assume that the meaning intended by the author, inheres within the written material, then we are free to interpret it in any arbitrary way. However, interpretation must stay true to the author's intent, therefore we must assume that the meaning, the purpose inheres within the words as expressed.

Entropy measures the number of microscopic states (we do not know) that can produce a macroscopic state we may know. As such it reflects human ignorance, not physical indeterminacy. — Dfpolis

That's pure sophistry. If the states are not known, then clearly you cannot assert with any justification that it is "not physical indeterminacy".

But if they were known, then it could not be called "entropy". Therefore it is impossible that they could be known, or else we could not call it "entropy". Since it is impossible to be known, it is necessarily physical indeterminacy.

Interesting. Could you give me a reference, please? — boundless

Look into Plato's "tripartite soul".

Conservation laws have been repeteadly confirmed in experiments — boundless

Actually, every experiment done demonstrates that energy is not conserved. The loss is known as entropy. This is why we cannot have one hundred percent efficiency, or a perpetual motion machine, So contrary to what you say, conservation laws have been disproved repeatedly in experiments.

Finally you might be getting it. — apokrisis

I get it. But as I've told you before, I find it irrational. I find denial of the principle of sufficient reason irrational. I think that anytime we stop trying to understand something, by assuming that it simply cannot be understood, that is irrational. Therefore we must assume that anything, and everything, can be understood. The principle of sufficient reason applies, or else when we find something difficult to understand we will conclude that it is one of those things which cannot be understood, and we will give up on trying. And that is irrational behaviour.

Cause is about the constraint of fluctuation. The world seems organised and intentional because in the end, not everything can just freely happen. Order emerges to constrain chaos. — apokrisis

OK, but don't you think that there is a reason why "not everything can just freely happen"? I mean, if specific constraints apply, then shouldn't we assume that there is a reason why those constraints apply, and not others? So when "order emerges", wouldn't you think that there is a reason why it is this order instead of another order. That is the fundamental metaphysical question of being qua being, as laid out by Aristotle, why is there what there is, instead of something different.

To say that things just emerged that way, for the sake of constraining chaos, "order emerges to constrain chaos", doesn't answer the question. In fact, it's extremely ambiguous. On the one hand "emerges" seems to imply that things evolve this way by mere chance, but "to constrain chaos" implies that there is purpose behind this evolution from the very outset. But even if this is proposed as the purpose behind the evolution, from the very beginning, it is nothing but what you apprehend as the purpose, and that may be completely different from the real purpose.

Notice that if we assign purpose as behind it, we must assume a real purpose, that of the causal agency. This is what happens with the common theory of evolution. We assign the purpose of "survival". But this is just what we apprehend as the purpose, within our theory. But if we assign purpose, in this way, then we need to assume real purpose of a agency behind evolution, and our theory of "survival" may not correctly represent the real purpose.

As quantum field theory says, Nature is ruled by the principle of least action. All paths are possible, but almost all the paths then have the effect of cancelling each other out. That Darwinian competition selects for whatever path is the most optimal in thermal dissipative terms. — apokrisis

This is an example of a theoretical purpose. it's just what the theory presents as "the purpose". But unless we know the agency which acts as causation, and know its reasons for acting that way, we cannot in any way claim that this is the real purpose.

And this is a fact proved to many decimal places. Quantum calculations of physical properties like the magnetic moment of an electron take into account all the more attenuated background probabilities that faintly contribute to the final measured outcome. The tower of cancellations that results in the final sum over histories. — apokrisis

Probabilities prove the accuracy of the statistics, they don't even approach the purpose for the action. So it is false to claim that QFT proves that nature is ruled by the principle of least action. A very small portion of nature, observation of which produces those statistics, supports that principle.

So the basic symmetries of Nature – the Noether symmetries that create the conservation laws – act like boundaries on freedoms. Spacetime is a container that expresses Poincare symmetry. It says only certain kinds of local zero-point fluctuations are possible. All others are prevented. — apokrisis

Now you are blatantly contradicting yourself. Above, you were saying that global constraints are emergent, they emerge to constrain chaos. But here you are positing foundational constraints, fundamental constraints on freedom which are not emergent but prior to, or coexistent with, basic freedom. Where do these constraints come from? If constraints are by nature emergent, then how can there be foundational constraints?

I'm not disputing agency. I'm defining it properly in terms of naturalistic metaphysics. — apokrisis

I would correct this to adequately represent what you say, as 'you are not disputing agency, but describing it in a contradictory, irrational way'.

The maxim is: "If it can happen, it must happen". If something is not forbidden, it will occur. — apokrisis

This, the principle of plenitude, requires the physical reality of infinity, infinite time, for its validity. And acceptance of the physical reality of this principle produces all sorts of absurdities, like the infinite monkey theorem.

Apokrisis’s explanation is effectively that the movement and life force we observe is like water flowing downhill. It doesn’t need an animating force, it naturally flows to the lowest point. The whole biosphere is just another cascade of entropy and once there is no gradient left, the world will return to stillness and we will be just ghosts. — Punshhh

That's a good way of putting it. Life thrives in the eddies of negentropy. It appears like the activities of life are contrary to the overall flow of entropy, but in reality by apokrisis' philosophy, we must accept that these eddies are just a part of that flow.

But I wondered in what way the ideology from which the postulate has been snatched away by our bold consciousnesses was supposed to appear as profound. — Jamal

I believe we must pay attention to what Adorno says about profundity in philosophy, in the preceding paragraph. Profundity is related to death and religion. And profundity appears to be the facade which the speculative moment must break through. This relates to what he says about "the renunciation of sacrosanct transcendence".

What is silenced and swept under the rug is a
theological terminus ad quem [Latin: end-point], as if its result, the
confirmation of transcendence, would decide the dignity of thought, or
else the mere being-for-itself, similarly for the immersion into
interiority; as if the withdrawal from the world were unproblematically
as one with the consciousness of the grounds of the world. By contrast,
resistance to fantasms of profundity, which throughout the history of
the Spirit were always well-disposed to the existing state of affairs,
which they found too dull, would be its true measure.

I believe he is saying that resistance to fantasms of profundity is the true measure of the Spirit. There is a deep issue with the "sacrosanct", which is well represented with the word "blasphemy". This is the difference between the profound and the profane. What he appears to be saying in the final paragraph is that the true measure of Spirit, true transcendence, is found in the renunciation of the profound, i.e. it\s found in profanity. And, in this rejection of that ideology, what is taken as profound, whereby the Spirit breaks those boundaries, is the Spirit's expression of freedom.

This brings us squarely to the issue of suffering. And, I must admit that I do not really know how Adorno relates these two. So I will speculate. I suppose that this resistance to ideology, this renunciation of the sacrosanct, is itself an expression of suffering, as if that profound, or sacrosanct ideology is oppressive. This is similar to what Plato says in "The Republic" about the relation between the philosopher and the ruler, a relation known as 'the philosopher king'. The philosopher knows that the job of ruling is the worst possible job, and in no wants to do that job. So the philosopher will not move to take that position until the suffering of having to live under the punishment of the prevailing rulers is worse than the pain of having to rule. It is the suffering caused by poor leadership which brings out the good leader.

So to relate this to what Adorno says about "the need to give voice to suffering". Ideology gains its power of authority through the appearance of profundity. But the ideology may itself be a medium of oppression, by which objectivity weighs on the subject as suffering. The facade of profundity is what needs to be broken, through the speculative moment. This is the expression of suffering, profanity.

Things stay the same when further change ceases to make a difference. Once things hit the bottom, they can't fall any further. — apokrisis

Doesn't that require a judgement of whether the change makes a difference or not? Anyway, it appears like you believe that change is not caused, it just happens.

I hold that purely physical systems evolve deterministically, because they have no intrinsic source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

Well, the question would be whether a purely physical system, in any absolute sense, is actually possible. As scientists, human beings can design what they like to think of, as purely physical systems. This is what I talked about earlier in the thread, we can have as our purpose, the intent to remove purpose, and this provides us with the closest thing we can get to objective truth. But the purpose of removing purpose can't quite remove purpose in an absolute way.

So, we have to consider the reality of every aspect of a "physical system", to see how successful we can really be. I believe that the reality of entropy demonstrates that no physical system actually evolves in a completely deterministic way. That aspect of the activity of a physical system, which escapes determinability is known as "entropy". Therefore "purely physical systems" refers to an impossibility, if that implies completely deterministic evolution..

Well, it seemed to me that you said that scientific theories are good for explaining the past but you also denied that there is a time 'before' the arising of life. — boundless

I didn't actually deny that. I said it was an unsound conclusion. I do not accept it, nor do I deny it. I just think that it is an assumption which has not been adequately justified to be able to make that judgement.

Interesting. Why? — boundless

Look at the passage. It says "the participation of the blessed in the communion with God will forever increase". The only thing which provides for the premise of "forever" is death. After death, we may be united with God, forever.

For instance, how can we explain the mind-body interactions if the mind and body are different substances? Would such an interaction 'respect', say, the conservation laws that seem to always hold? — boundless

The interaction problem was long ago solved by Plato who proposed a third aspect as a medium of interaction.

Conservation laws do not hold, to the contrary, they are always violated. This is the nature of entropy, that part of reality which is in violation of conservation. It's a loss which we just write off, and work around.

The conservation laws are ideals which do not actually represent physical reality, because physical reality doesn't match that degree of perfection prescribed by ideal conservation. As an analogy, consider how the ancient people thought of the orbits of the sun, moon, and planets, as perfect circles. By logic, perfect circles are eternal, so these orbits were eternal circular motions. That was an ideal, which did not actually represent the reality of physical motion, which is less than perfect. Likewise, conservation laws are ideals which do not actually represent the reality of physical interactions, which are less than perfect with respect to conservation.

I don't know, that seems quite trivial. Where's the frightening part?

And I don't beleive that questioning those things you mentioned is enough to abandon the concept of the 'universe' as a totality. — boundless

We disagree then.

How do you explain the arising of life? — boundless

I don't. And, I don't think anyone can. But I don't pretend.

How do your points here about the past square with what you said before with respect to our understanding of cosmology, biology etc? — boundless

Do you think that you apprehend inconsistency in what I wrote? If so, please point it out to me so I can address it.

I believe that reductionism is wrong but reductionism is not the only possibility for a physicalist. — boundless

As you'll see from my reply to apokrisis, I believe in reduction, but not in physicalism. I believe that reduction is what ultimately demonstrates the necessity of dualism, which I believe in. The modern trend for physicalists is to turn away from reductionism, because it cannot succeed without dualism. At the base of material existence is the immaterial, as cause. So I think that this turning away from reductionism, is a mistake. The physicalists cannot bear the consequences, the necessity of dualism which reduction leads to, so instead of facing that reality, they retreat to a new form of physicalism, which, as it is physicalism, is equally mistaken.

On the other hand, I believe that St. Gregory of Nyssa had a quite dynamic understanding of the state of the blessed (which he called 'epektasis'), where the participation of the blessed in the communion with God will forever increase. In a sense, this means that the desire for the Good will never be satisfied. But at the same time, the blessed do not fall away from the communion because they know that they can't find ultimate peace, happiness and so on anything except God. In a sense, however, I would say that even in this dynamic model the blessed yearning for the good is satisfied in the sense that they stopped to seek elsewhere the source of their happiness. Would you agree at least with this? — boundless

It still looks like death to me.

Force and interaction are synonyms in physics. — boundless

Not at all.

Please do not give your interpretation of my position, as you do not understand it. — Dfpolis

Sorry about that. I just stated what I remembered you telling me in a discussion we had a couple years ago.

In the same way, what gets us from the initial state of the universe to the advent of a species is not simply the initial state, but the continuing and determinate way that state evolves, i.e. the laws of nature. — Dfpolis

Do you not believe in real possibility, real choice? If you believe that the universe unfolds in a determinate way, then you deny the possibility of real choice.

My problem is with all this talk about teleology without God. — T Clark

I agree, I have the same problem. This teleology without God is the "new physicalism". It appears to me, that traditional physicalism, which was basically reductionism, ran into a problem. At the base was found to be possibility, which necessitate the assumption of choice. And classical metaphysics had already posited divinity to account for the foundational choices. Physicalists of course will not accept a divinity, so the modern trend is to reject reductionism because it leads to the reality of the immaterial. Now, physicalists like apokrisis will assign some sort of "telos" to global constraints, making the basic choice not a true choice, but a constrained act. But this is not compatible with intention as we know it, which is found in the freedom of the individual to choose, not in the constraints of "the society" in general. The constraints of society do not cause the individual's choices and actions.

If you take a simpleminded constructive approach to the existence of things, then even the existence of raw matter becomes impossible to explain. — apokrisis

This is why the divinity is needed to explain the existence of matter. Matter being that which stays the same as time passes. But instead of recognizing the need for final cause at the base, to account for the existence of matter itself, the physicalist abandons the whole reductionist enterprise, and proposes a bogus form of telos, as the concept of "global constraint". However, this fails as states "Constraint isn't causation". So you don't actually avoid the need for an external final cause, the divinity, you hide it by proposing a bogus teleology which is not actually causal.

This is a rubbish argument. What distinguishes the coward from the conscientious objector? You are introducing "desire" as a vague preference that could be construed in many ways. What social framing are you going to impose on the situation to make it clear how one is going to interpret the idea of "going rogue"? — apokrisis

Desire is what drives final cause. And there is no need for "social framing" as this motivation to act transcends all social frames. Are you afraid to face this reality?

So finality would "inhere" in the parts – or rather shape the scope of freedoms possessed by those parts – to the degree those parts were actively part of the collective system. — apokrisis

By your own words, constraints are global. So it's contradictory to say that what shapes (constrains) the freedom of the parts, inheres within the parts, as you seem to be saying here.

Shake hands with God. The prime mover.

No thanks. — apokrisis

You ought to try it. At least the concept of "God", as First Cause, is consistent with the truth, according to the knowledge which we have. This is unlike your idea of "top-down constraints" which provides no actual cause.

Each individual member of the army must have the desire to follow the plan, and be a member of the army, or else they go rogue. So final cause must be portrayed as inherent to the local freedom of each part, rather than as a global constraint.

A simple example is to have the functional thing of an army, you have to turn a random mob of humans into battalion of soldiers. — apokrisis

The problem with this example, is that ultimately the principles which turn the mob into a battalion, come from the minds of individuals, members of "the mob" who are the leaders. So your portrayal, global constraints (the army), shaping the raw material (the soldiers), to express the "global purpose driving the whole show" is incorrect. There is no such "global purpose". The purpose comes from the local minds of the individuals who are the leaders of the army. Purpose does not come from this global thing called "the army".

Your inclination to avoid reductionism, yet maintain physicalism is misleading you. To properly understand reality we must follow the reductionist principles, which are correct, to their base, where we find that something further, the immaterial intent is beyond that, as the thing which creates or produces matter itself. This is why @Dfpolis in his Aristotelian representation, places the basic intent to create, as internal to matter itself. It must be local, rather than global. But I think that the proper interpretation of Aristotle puts the basic intent of final cause as transcendent to the matter, but in a local sense. This allows final cause to give matter its basic form, transcending it internally, with the form coming from beyond the boundaries of matter to the inside, while Df thinks its immanent to the matter.

This seems like the whole infinite regress problem. A rock is moving with intention, but the intention came from outside it. Where did that intention come from? From the other rock that knocked into it? Where did it's intention come from? How far back do we have to go? When is intention actually inside something non-sentient? — T Clark

Actually "final cause" was intended to put an end to the infinite regress. Any chain of causation would begin from an intentional act. If it wasn't begun in a freely willed act of a human being, it began as a freely willed act of God. I don't think God can be classified as "sentient".

It struck me just now why I find the teleological approach to understanding the world so distasteful. It's disrespectful to the universe - to reality, to the Tao - to try to jam it into human boxes. It's arrogant and self-indulgent. I really do hate it. — T Clark

I find it odd that you say this, because I think the exact opposite is the case. "The universe" is just a human concept, it refers to the way that we perceive and understand reality. This is analogous to the ancient humans who had a geocentric universe. Our current conception is really not much further advanced.

To say that reality is confined to this human box called "the universe" is an arrogant self-indulgent attitude of certitude. It suggests that we have reality all figured out, and it all fits into this concept, "the universe". But the reality of intention and free will don't fit into this concept, and this demonstrates to us that a significant part of reality actually escapes this determinist concept of "the universe".

Furthermore, the concept of God is meant to remove reality from that human box. It acknowledges that there are all those aspects of reality which do not fit into the human box. It is required, to account for how weak and fallible the human box actually is, and defend us against that confident, arrogant attitude that human beings have it all figured out, and it all fits into this box called "the universe". So contrary to what you say, the scientific approach is to jam reality into the box of human experience, empiricism, while the teleological approach, which accepts the reality of free will and intention, allows for a vast aspect of reality beyond what we can experience with our senses.

I think the deeper philosophical issue here revolves around the problem of self-organisation — or what Aristotle might call self-motion. How can living systems arise from non-living matter? How can purposeful activity emerge in a world governed by entropy? How can something move or structure itself? — Wayfarer

I look at all of this type of concept, "matter", and "entropy", as products of how we relate to aspects of the world which appear to remain the same as time passes. But along with that which remains the same as time passes, there is also change. And change cannot be caused by that which remains the same, it must have another source. Therefore there is no question of how does life arise from matter, or emerge from a world governed by entropy, because those principles only apply to that part of the world which stays the same, while life is a cause of change, therefore it is a completely different part of reality.

Consider that "matter", and "a world governed by entropy", are principles, laws of physics. Laws of physics apply to an aspect of reality which we know as inanimate. However, there is a very significant part of reality which we simply do not know about, and this includes the cause of change, which itself includes life. And when I say "change" here, I'm talking about 'real change', not the deterministic actions of matter, which are predictable by science, which are not real change because they are just a continuation of that which remains the same. If you believe in free will, then you believe in 'real change', change which is not a continuation of that which remains the same, and is therefore not predictable by science.

When we accept free will, and 'real change', there is no issue of how could life arise from non-living matter, because "matter" is a concept which does not allow for real change and doesn't apply. Therefore it is impossible that life arose from matter because the concept "matter" doesn't extend to that aspect where life is derived from. That's why there is dualism. Furthermore, there is no issue with purposeful activity arising from a world governed by entropy, because "entropy" is a similar concept which applies to that aspect of the world which remains the same. But "entropy" is much more interesting because it is the word that applies to the part of reality which escapes that which remains the same. As time passes, energy is supposedly conserved, as a law of that which stays the same. In reality, some escapes as entropy, so "entropy" refers to this part of reality where real change is possible, and happens.

That’s precisely the question I’m exploring through Terrence Deacon’s Incomplete Nature. His project is to show how order can, in fact, emerge from thermodynamic chaos — not through external design or miraculous intervention, but through specific kinds of constraints and relational structures that arise in far-from-equilibrium systems. He calls this “emergent teleology,” and while it’s a naturalistic account, it isn’t reductionist in the usual sense. — Wayfarer

It appears to me like you are getting sucked in by physicalism. Stop that, and look at the true nature of free will.

That’s where something like the Cosmological Anthropic Principle strikes a chord — the idea that the fundamental constants (or constraints?) seem to lie within a very narrow range necessary for complex matter to exist and for life to arise. Whether one interprets that as evidence of design, necessity, or simply a selection effect is, of course, open to debate. — Wayfarer

We need to respect the fact that fundamental constants or constraints do not cover the entirety of reality. There are aspects of reality which escape these, these constants do not apply. This is where we find "entropy" for example. The energy of a system remains constant (fundamental constraint) however, some actually gets lost (entropy). So "entropy" really refers to an aspect of reality which doesn't play by the rules.

The word 'design' almost always implies a designing agency, which is not what I mean by ‘purpose’. Rather, I’m pointing to the deeper philosophical issue of how order emerges from apparent chaos — — Wayfarer

This is what I dismiss as incoherent. We know that order does not simply emerge. The second law of thermodynamics supports this knowledge. Therefore we need to assume an "agency" of some sort as the cause of order. If the agency is said to act with purpose, but not with design, this wouldn't really make sense to most people. How could there be purpose without a goal for direction? However, I fully understand and respect the problem which you are bringing to my attention. I believe I've addressed this in my reply to T Clark above.

I proposed a distinction between intention and purpose. "Intention" implies an end or goal which is sought through action and this is how "design" is commonly used. But we also commonly allow that there are purposeful acts which lie outside the boundaries or constraints of the concept of "intention". This is exemplified by the reality of accidents, and accidentals. An accident is not a part of the intentional design yet it is still purposeful. And accidents are very useful in the production of knowledge as we learn from them. Trial and error for example is full of accidents, and knowledge often progresses through a determination of what is impossible. And this is how I class the so-called random mutations of evolution, as purposeful accidents.

That is how I understand the problem of the appearance of emergent order. Accidentals are the results of purposeful actions of an agent, which appear to be chance occurrences. The issue however, is that this does not completely remove the need for intention and design, in an absolute sense. Accidentals fall outside of the intentional goal which lies behind those purposeful acts that are apprehended as accidents. So it is still necessary to conclude a designing agency, i.e. an agent with a goal of some sort, telos. Even orthogenesis, which you propose, requires a designing agency to support the existence of an overall goal. The problem being how to support the reality of a goal, or end, without it being derived from a designing agency.

But I still don't have enough reasons to say that 'the universe' is a false concept. — boundless

I do have those reasons, and I mentioned some, the failure of science where the current theories reach their limits. These are issues like dark matter and dark energy in physics, and the need to assume random mutations and abiogenesis in biology. As I said, what these failings indicate is not that we need to extend conventional theories further, but that the theories need to be replaced with something fundamentally different, a paradigm shift. Therefore the current concept of "the universe" is a false concept.

if there is something transcendent of it, it can't be known scientifically — boundless

That is the whole point. Evidence indicates that something does transcend what is known as "the universe", and what can be known scientifically. That is why the need for metaphysics is very real, and why physicalism must be rejected. Observation based knowledge is severely handicapped in its ability to apprehend the totality of temporal reality. All observations are of things past, and the future cannot be observed in any way whatsoever. This means that observation based knowledge, empirical sciences, are only accurate toward understanding half of reality, the past, while the future lies entirely beyond scientific apprehension. We can predict what will come to pass, based on observations of the past, but this in no way indicates that we understand the nature of what is in the future.

I don't think that 'being fulfilled' implies that activity stops. — boundless

I think death is what is implied by that statement of Augustine, where he says "rest in You".

agree with that. In this case, the mass of nucleons isn't just the sum of the masses of its components but it is also given by the mass of the interactions. — boundless

No the mass is not given by "the mass of the interactions", it is given by the force. This is the basis of the energy-mass equivalence. And "force" is an extremely difficult concept to grasp, especially if we remove the mass required for momentum, to conceive of a force without any mass, to allow that the energy-mass equivalence represents something real. If the energy-mass equivalence is real, then there must be a force, called "energy", without any mass. This force would turn out to be nothing but the passing of time itself. Since the principles of physics don't allow us to conceive of a force without some sort of momentum, in application the photon must be assigned some mass, to account for its momentum, this is "relativistic mass".

Maybe I’m a bit confused. Are you saying that it makes sense to think of non-sentient objects as capable of having intention? — T Clark

I am not saying that explicitly. There are a number of different ways in which intention can be the cause of the movements of things, without intention being within the thing that is moving. Since we observe the activities of things, and notice that many are moved by intention, while the intention which moves them is external to them, (including chains of causation), it makes sense that non-sentient objects could be moving in intentionally designed trajectories without us being aware of the intention which sets them on their way.

If you define “intention” as a synonym for “purpose,” then you’re just restating the position of the OP - — T Clark

Yes, I am in agreement with the op. But intention really shouldn't be synonymous with purpose. Purpose is the defining word for intention. Generally, the defining word is the broader category. So for example, human beings is defined by mammal, which is defined by animal which is defined by living. In this case, conscious is defined by intention which is defined by purpose.

Often though, there is an inclination to make intention synonymous with purpose. This would mean that all cases of purpose are intentional. However, I think it is probably more productive in the long run to maintain a conceptual separation. This would mean that not all instances of intention are conscious, and also that not all instances of purpose are intentional. This allows versatility to the concept of "purpose", providing freedom from the restrictions of an end, or goal, which "intention" imposes. Purposeful acts could be carried out without being directed toward any specific end, such as in the case of some forms of trial and error perhaps.

I think you’ve restated the argument in the OP, as I understand it, very clearly. Do you find that way of looking at things compelling? — T Clark

Yes, I think it is the only reasonable way of looking at things. What we notice through sensation is specific ways in which things are, and this allows us to generalize. But in order for things to exist in specific ways, rather than absolute randomness, these ways must be designed, and the things somehow ordered to exist in these ways. So, as is the case with human artifacts and all artificial things, the design is prior in time to the thing, and the thing is brought into existence in accordance with the design.

However, like I mentioned above, I think we ought to allow that "purpose" extends beyond the limits of design, which is the restriction that the concept "intention" tends to impose. The need for this is evidenced by accidentals, which are not a part of the design, but are still purposefully caused. Simply put, an accident is not part of the intent, yet it is part of the purposeful act. It is the part which is not consistent with the designed end. And, since accidents still have purpose, as we learn from accidents and they can be very educational, they are in some way purposeful yet not intentional.

Accidents appear to be a significant part of the evolutionary process, in features like mutations for example, and people tend to think of them as chance though they are purposeful. Accidentals are what account for the uniqueness, peculiarities, and idiosyncrasies of the individual. I believe that we must allow that all the vast array of difference which we observe in life, and which I think manifests as the beauty of life, (the number of different colours found in flowers for example), are just as purposeful as all the sameness which we observe.