I’m working on the theme of ‘mental causation’. — Wayfarer

A very interesting and important theme I will say. And, when you get to the part about the criteria by which we judge whether specific instances of mental causation are good or bad, that is probably the most important theme there is.

Back to the Euthyphro dilemma. Is it good because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is good?

Speaking of conspiracy theories, the BlueAnon dupes of Russiagate are in for some more surprises. DNI Gabbard just dropped some frightening info. — NOS4A2

I took a look at the links, and don't see anything new. What is this frighten info that we're supposed to find?

(I'm exploring this topic through phenomology, which I've only begun reading the last couple of years. My current reading list is The Phenomenon of LIfe, Hans Jonas; The Embodied Mind, Varela, Thompson and Rosch; Mind in Life, Evan Thompson, Incomplete Nature, Terrence Deacon; and Dynamics in Action, Alice Juarrero all of which I hope to finish this year.) — Wayfarer

Wow, you do a lot of reading.

But this seems too convoluted for me. It would be much easier to say that the universe is simply fine-tuned in a way that it either necessitates or allows the emergence of life. In such a case, life isn't an unintelligible accident that 'just happened' for no reason. — boundless

It might be easier for you to say this, but that is a matter of avoiding the point. Instead of acknowledging that the concept which we know as "the universe" is a false concept, you are accepting it as true, and proceeding from that premise. Of course it's easier that way, because you have your starting point already laid out for you. However the falsity of it misleads you.

Why physical laws allow life? I don't know and I find it a fascinating mystery which isn't solved by the 'multiverse' either. Just saying that there are other worlds with different physical constants or even physical laws and our world just happens to be one that allows life isn't a good explanation to why life was even possible in the first place. Of course, one might say that there is no 'why' but it is undeniable that life is allowed by physical laws. This is of course a tautology of sorts. But it makes you wonder if there is some reason of this allowance. I don't think the existence of such a 'reason' can be discovered by science. — boundless

Actually, these "laws" you refer to are the product of human knowledge. Human beings have created these laws in their efforts to describe activities observed.

Regardless of the existence of the 'deeper reason', since life are allowed, in no way reductionism is implied. That is if the 'laws of nature' allow life and are a sufficient explanation of it, it would seem to me that properties of the entire world ('laws of nature') explain the arising of life. Hence, life would be explained in terms of the properties of the whole, in the same way as we can understand the behavior of the momenta of single particles as a consequence of the behavior of a whole isolated system, as I explained before: — boundless

If 'laws of nature' are proposed as what the laws of physics are meant to describe, or represent, then we must ask how is it the case that physical bodies can obey the laws of nature. Would you propose that material bodies have access to some set of laws, which they read, or learn in some way, and then conduct themselves in a way so as to obey these laws? If not, then what would you propose as the process by which material things would interpret and obey a set of 'natural laws'?

Since God is the Good, whoever finds communion with the Good stops seeking fulfillment outside that state. — boundless

Why would you conclude this, it makes no sense to me. To begin with, "God" is not defined as "the good". The good is what a human beings seeks, and we do not necessarily seek God. Further, if one does seek God, it is impossible for a human being to know God in an absolute way, so that person would always be seeking to be closer to God, never reaching the fulfillment you refer to.

Yes, but it is assumed that the mass of, say, the Earth is the sum of the masses of its components. — boundless

But this method only works to an extent. If you divide a hadron into quarks and gluons, the hadron has a lot more mass than the sum of its parts. This is a feature described by the energy mass equivalence. The mass is a product of force, the strong force.

Phenomenology has re-conceived intentionality as something much broader than conscious intention, instead identifying it as an aspect of the will to survive (re Hans Jonas The Phenomenon of Life) — Wayfarer

I think that this re-conception of intentionality is the key to understanding your position. Once we understand that conscious intention is just one form of intention, that opens up an entirely new range of possibility for how we understand and study the nature of "telos", teleology.

Restricting intention to human consciousness, such that only human actions can be understood as teleological, is a foundational, metaphysical mistake, which is common and prevalent in the modern western society.

When we understand the common defining term of "intention" as purpose, and see that all sorts living beings act with purpose, then we must accept the reality that restricting intention to conscious human action is a mistake. And, this mistake is very misleading metaphysically. Removing intention from those constraints (consciousness), and respecting it simply as a cause of action (final cause), which is inconsistent with the deterministic causes understood by physics, allows us to develop a much more productive, or constructive, conception of intention.

This allows us to better grasp the reality of intention in its spatial-temporal relations, and in relation to physical existence in general, rather than dismissing final cause, and free will as an illusion. This dismissal is inevitable if we cling to the deterministic causation of physics, and physicalism in general, rejecting the reality of teleological causation.

Further, releasing intention from the constraints of consciousness allows us a much less confusing approach to the principles of panpsychism. "Consciousness" is generally understood as a property of higher level living beings, dependent on a brain. When panpsychism proposes consciousness as fundamental to the universe, this is commonly apprehended as incoherent, due to the fact that "consciousness" as we generally conceive it, is dependent on a brain. So when we release intention from the constraints of consciousness, and understand how intention relates to temporality in a way not at all understood by human knowledge, because temporality is not at all understood by human knowledge, this allows intention as a "consciousness-like" aspect of reality, to be pervasive in its causal role.

The exclusion of purpose was never, and in fact could never be, empirically demonstrated; it was simply excluded as a factor in the kind of explanations physics was intended to provide. Meaning was left behind for the sake of predictive accuracy and control in specific conditions. — Wayfarer

Yes, meaning was intentionally left out from the development of physics, and this formed the division between physics and biology. Physics was specifically designed to deal with the mechanical motions of bodies. The early physicists who pioneered the way, did not exclude the reality of the spiritual, or immaterial, they recognized the division, and knew that physics was being designed exclusively to understand that one aspect of reality, the bodily.

Modern biology, on the other hand, had a highly ambiguous start in this respect. As the material and immaterial were understood to be united within the living being, a division between material causes and immaterial causes could not be apprehended, therefore could not be upheld. As a result, there was a clear separation between the causal propositions of Lamarckian evolution, and the causal propositions of Darwinian evolution. Lamarck proposed habit as a fundamental cause, then Darwin replaced habit with chance, perceiving "habit" as unscientific. To this day, this causal question has not been resolved, and modern understanding of genotypes and epigenetics is pointing back toward Lamarckian principles.

But the further move, so often taken for granted in modern discourse, is the assertion that because physics finds no purpose, the universe therefore has none. — Wayfarer

This ought to be restated. It is not the case that "physics finds no purpose". It is intentionally designed, and employed, so as to avoid purpose. This is what I was talking about earlier in the thread. We can adopt as our purpose, to avoid purpose as much as possible, and this is supposed to be our way toward "objective truth". But purpose is pervasive, and you can easily see how having as your purpose to avoid purpose, does not actually avoid purpose. Furthermore, it becomes evident that all of those determinists who cling to the causation described by "physics" and insist that free will is an illusion, actually have things backward. In reality, the idea that physics can avoid purpose, and provide us with objective truth is what is an illusion.

Ok, I see. But, at the same time, if we deny that we should also explain why it seems to be the case. And, as in everything, we should take the more convincing view. Just saying this is not enough for me to deny that in this world there was a time when no living beings existed. A lot of scientific evidence points to that. — boundless

I agree, but you don't seem to be getting the point. The problem is not with concluding that there was a time with no living beings, the problem is in assuming the concept referred to by "this world" as the premise. Assuming the conventional "this world" is begging the question, because a time with no life is implicit within that concept. So once you assume "the world", the conclusion is inevitable. The problem is with the concept "the world", in general.

To me, philosophy demonstrates that "this world" is a pragmatic concept which serves our mundane purposes, but it is far from reality. The evidence that "this world" is a false concept s demonstrated at the limits of the conception. Where accepted science fails us, it comes to a dead end. The dead ends are not simply a case of needing to go further with more application of the existing theories, they are an inability to go further due to limitations of the theory. This is evidence that much of realty escapes the theories altogether, and cannot be grasped by them, indicating that "the world" s not what it pretends to be. This implies that the theories are wrong, right from the base. Examples are dark matter, dark energy in physics, and the reliance on random chance in evolutionary biology, leading to the acceptance of abiogenesis.

If we could find the 'ultimate truth', I can stil imagine that we might perpetually contemplate and deepen our understanding of it. What we can't do is to reject and trying to find something else in an agitated state. — boundless

There are some very good arguments n Christian theology which indicate that human beings are incapable of apprehending the ultimate truth. In general, this is the difference between human beings and God, and why we can never consider ourselves to be in any way equal to God.

But, at the same time, I don't think that causation implies intentionality, let alone a conscious one. One, however, can still ask why the potentiality of life was there in the first place. — boundless

I agree, but the thing is that once we rule out the possibility of a deterministic physical cause, tthen we seem to be left with two choices. Either its random chance, or some other type of cause. We know that final cause, or intentionality, is another type of cause. Also, we know very little about how final cause actually works as a cause in the physical world, only that it does, from the evidence. Since we cannot actually see final cause in action, only the effects of it, and since our judgements as to which specific types of things are the effects of final cause, are completely subjective, why not consider the possibility that final cause is far more extensive than what is commonly believed? Once we allow that final cause exists not only in human actions, but also in the actions of other living things, then why not consider that the actions of the heavenly bodies, as well as atoms and subatomic particles, which are "ordered", or "orderly", are not also the effects of final cause?

Think about philosophy. When knowledge is gained, philosophy ceases. This doesn't imply that there is no action at all. It does imply, however, a state of fulfillment. — boundless

I don't think I agree with this. Knowledge is always being gained, but philosophy never ceases because there is always more to learn.

I think it would be more appropriate to say "knowledge" in English perhaps; "all men by nature desire to know." This is why the life of contemplation is the highest form of life for Aristotle (Ethics, Book X). The mind, being "potentially all things," can possess all perfections in this way (at the limit). All appetites are ultimately towards a sort of union, and knowledge is the highest form of union. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This doesn't resolve the issue we were discussing. When we put life in general within the context of purpose, assuming that life is purposeful, then knowledge itself is pragmatic, useful toward further ends.

Ok, but how do you explain the fact that scientific evidence seems to indicate just that? — boundless

That is not a fact, and can be equally disputed as it can be asserted. That conclusion is what called misapplied science. The fact that you say it "seems" to indicate that, is evidence that you are speculating, not applying science. In reality scientific evidence, indicates that our representation, which is called "the universe" is faulty, therefore a false premise, as I explained above. We do not, for instance, have an accurate understanding of mass and gravity.

Well, perhaps it's a bit off topic, but I would say that what you said about the good is also valid about the truth. When we learn things, we know some 'truths' but we aren't satisfied, we want to know more. It's possible that there is an 'ultimate truth' and if we knew that truth, we would find rest in it. Just like the case of the good. — boundless

I think that this is very misguided. Human beings, as all living beings, are fundamentally active. That is their primary nature. To propose that the ultimate end is "rest" is contrary to the nature of life, and better associated with death. Perhaps you believe that the end of all life is death, but that would be annihilation of all living things, and by nature we reproduce and carry on, despite individual death.

Well, if the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are right potentialities can be actualized randomly in a way that satisfies the Born Rule, which seems intelligible to me. So, I don't think that it's impossible that potentialities can be realized by 'chance'. That said, one can still ask why the potentialites were 'there' in the first place. So, even if they are realized by chance, it doesn't totally exclude teleology IMO. — boundless

The Born Rule in no way indicates randomness. It indicates the very opposite. If probability can be successfully used to predict outcomes, this indicates that there is an underlying reason for the specific outcome. To say that the outcome is "random" or "chance" is implicitly contradictory to what is indicated by the success of the probabilistic method.

It appears to be your opinion that outcomes which can be successfully predicted through statistic could be chance occurrences. I think this is incoherent for the reason described. What you are arguing is that a meaningful pattern could be created by chance. I would argue that this is fundamentally contradictory. For a pattern to have any sort of meaning it is required that the pattern demonstrates something about its cause. The cause may be efficient cause, like a physical process, or final cause, such as intent. But to say that a pattern demonstrates predictability, is meaningful in that way, but does not demonstrate anything about its cause, is incoherent.

Well, I am sympathetic with this theistic argument, which BTW is not exclusively Christian. But, I am not sure if we can say that the evidence here is 'beyond reasonable doubt'. I actually don't think so and non-theist can rationally reject this reasoning. This doesn't mean that the theistic argument is false, just it isn't compelling even in 'beyond reasonable doubt' sense.
Perhaps you agree with that, as you characterise the evidence as 'subjective'. — boundless

Yes I do agree. Nothing in philosophy is "beyond reasonable doubt", because philosophy is based in doubt.

Well, I think that many different things can qualify as teleology. Of course, when we human beings act with a rationale, our actions are teleological. We act with a purpose in view which we believe it's possible but isn't realized yet. I would say there is also teleology in the actions of a bacterium, which in a rudimentary way strives for its survival and the survival for its specie (not in a conscious way, of course). Perhaps there are even more subtler kinds of teleology. But I am not sure. — boundless

Notice how teleology, as you explain it, concerns itself with actions. How do you cross that category division, to say that the purpose of action is rest?

I think that it is undeniable that there was a time in the past without living being in the universe. — boundless

The point is that if the concept "the universe" is not representative of what we commonly refer to as the independent objective reality, then this statement of yours is rather meaningless. It takes a false premise "the universe", and derives a conclusion from it. According to this conception, the conception of "the universe", which I am saying might be a falsity, there was a time when the universe was without living beings. If the premise is false then the conclusion is unsound.

While I would agree that truth is related to purpose - in fact, I would even say that truth (like the good) is the ultimate purpose of our rational actions - I am not sure how this answer my question. — boundless

I think that this is sort of backward thinking. We know "the good" as that which is intended, the goal, the end. As such, there is always a multitude of goods. In the manner proposed by Aristotle, we can ask of any specific good, what is it good for, and create a chain, A is for the sake of B which is for the sake of C, etc.. If we find a good which makes a final end, as he proposed happiness does, then that would be the ultimate purpose. However, "truth" really doesn't fit the criteria of the ultimate purpose.

Yes, the potency was a necessary condition for the arising of life. But this doesn't imply that the arising of life is necessary for the potency being there in the first place. There is no evidence that outside life there are purposeful actions. — boundless

I don't see how this is meaningful.

And yet... can we truly speak of potency without assuming some form of teleology? — boundless

I don't think that such speaking would be coherent. Suppose that there is true potential, such that as time passed, there was some degree of real possibility as to what happens from one moment to the next. If one possibility is actualized instead of another, then some form of agent must have chosen that possibility as the one to be actualized, and this implies teleology. The alternative would be to say that one possibility rather than another is actualized by chance, because it cannot be a determinist cause or else it would not be real possibility. But it is incoherent to think that it happens by chance, because this would mean that something happens without a cause, which is unintelligible, therefore incoherent.

If the former, however, what is the evidence of that teleology? — boundless

As I said, evidence of purpose is subjective. If you look at Christian theology, any sort of existent is evidence of teleology. This is because in order for us to perceive something as existent, it must be somehow organized, and organization is only produced on purpose. This is why, for them, all physical existence is evidence of teleology.

What do you think qualifies as evidence of teleology?

I really like your post. I guess it helps that I agree with you on just about everything, but I don’t know that I could have expressed it as clearly as you have. — T Clark

Thank you T Clark, compliments are meaningful.

What about the objection, though, that life and consciousness arose in the world many billions of time after the Big Bang? — boundless

The Bing Bang is just the conventional theory. It's just an aspect of the current model, or conception, which represents a universe. But this conception is just a product of purpose. Further, as I explained, we often make the goal of truth, or objectivity, our purpose, so such a representation could have been produced from the goal of truth. In this case, when our goal is truth, our purpose is to remove purpose from our conceptions. Notice that it really can't be completely successful, because truth itself is a goal, a purpose.. And, as much as we may attempt to remove purpose, striving for truth, we are merely human beings, and usefulness toward other ends such as prediction, tend to overwhelm us distracting us from the goal of removing purpose.

I don't think that strictly speaking this means that the actual arising of life was necessary for the very existence of the inanimate. But, rather, as a potency life is an essential aspect of the world. I don't think that this 'potency' can be captured in a mathematical model, which is essential for physics. This to me suggests that life can't be explained in physical terms, precisely because the method that physics uses isn't adequate to explain the properties associated with life. So, the 'unlikeliness' might be explained by the fact that the models neglect some fundamental property of the physical world. — boundless

If the universe is prior in time to life, then potency must also be prior in time to life. It is a feature of time which would be necessary for the creation of life.

A more convincing explanation might be that we know only in part our physical world and, therefore, the 'unlikeliness' is merely apparent, due to observation bias (like, say, that we are more likely to observe brighter galaxies and, therefore, we might understimate the number of less bright galaxies). So, maybe, if we study more in depth the 'arising of life' won't be as 'unlikely' as it seems. But this might imply that, indeed, a more deep study of our physical universe will eventually reveal that the reductionist/weakly emergentist paradigm is simply wrong. — boundless

This is the point I take, above. The existence of a physical world requires intentional being. This is because, as a physical world, is how things are perceived through a purpose based apparatus. Therefore it makes no sense to say that it is unlikely for intention to exist in this particular physical world, because intention is necessary for any physical world.

In this way we turn the strong anthropic principle on its head. All the things which are said to exist in the physical world, physical laws etc., which are required for the existence of life, are really creations of life. These are the products of our purpose driven perceptions. They are conceptions, produced from our perceptions which, rather than being designed through random chance evolution, have been designed purposefully. our perceptions support our endeavours in the world, meaning they are very useful to us, in a pragmatic sense, but they don't necessarily equate to any real truth.

However the question of purpose, or its lack, doesn’t always require invoking some grand ‘cosmic meaning.’ Meaning and purpose are discovered first in the intelligibility of ordinary life—in the way we write, behave, build, and think. The moment we ask whether something is meaningful, we’re already inhabiting a world structured by purposes. Furthermore, the belief that the Universe is purposeless is itself a judgement about meaning. Asking what this purpose might be, in the abstract, is almost a red herring - it doesn’t really exist in the abstract, but it is inherent in the purposeful activities of beings of all kinds, human and other. It is, as it were, woven into the fabric. — Wayfarer

I think we ought to consider that what we know as the Universe, is a construction of human minds, and as such it was created with purpose. What modern physics demonstrates to us is that much of reality is far beyond our grasp, not even perceptible to us. What we take to be the Universe, the model we make, is formed and shaped by usefulness and purpose.

If we extend purpose, and intention to life in general, and assume that purpose is at work in the mechanisms of evolution, then we also need to assume that the way that the world appears to us through our sense organs and brains, is also a product of purpose. If we ask, why does the world appear to us through our senses, in the way that it does, when physics tells us that it is really not like the way it appears, the answer is that it proved purposeful through the process of evolution, to perceive things in this way.

If we want to get beyond this representation of the universe, which was created on purpose, to understand the true reality, the independent, objective world, the reality of which we like to posit, then we need to remove purpose from the representation. This is the purpose of the concept of "truth", to have a representation which is not influenced by purpose. Notice that it is impossible to actually remove purpose, as there is even a purpose for truth, which is to get beyond purpose. But this is about as close as we can get, to creating a representation of the universe which is not influenced by purpose, to have as our purpose, to remove purpose and its influence.

Given the hostility that there so often is between ideologies, I would expect that to be a major factor in how people decide to draw the lines. — Ludwig V

Hostility, in relation to ideology, is very interesting. We can look at it in two different ways, hostility as caused by an ideological difference, and hostility as the cause pf ideological difference. Often, we are inclined to take the simple way of looking at things, and assume that a specific case of hostility is the result of a difference in ideology. This results in each side being rational, yet with distinct ideas about what is true and good. However, since we must accept the reality that people actually draw these lines, which constitute separations in ideology, the matter is much more complex, as hostile action will induce the creation of a boundary.

The issue I believe, is that hostility is related to actions, and actions are not always driven by ideology. There are many different types of causes related to human actions, from reflex, intuition, irrational passions, through to ideological principles. So many actions which create hostility are derived from irrational sources, and only the ones which can be traced to some specific ideology can be described as rational. Because of this, many hostilities have an irrational source, and this justifies the exclusion of the purveyors of such actions from ones ideology. In other words, the ideology is designed so as to exclude the others as acting from an irrational source. The others are portrayed as savages, and whatever ideology they are acting on must be distinctly unacceptable, impossible to understand, as irrational.

I can't disagree with that, except that, at least as things are, the distinction between ideologies is extremely obscure. The lines are drawn on the level of praxis rather than intellect. — Ludwig V

I think any boundaries between distinct ideologies are theoretical and made for a purpose. Consider, that no two people really share all their believes, so in that sense we could say that everyone has one's own distinct ideology. But on the other hand, if we limit a particular "ideology" to just a small set of very. general ideas, then many people have the same ideology. So the drawing of lines between ideologies is complex and purposeful, yet somewhat arbitrary.

Here's a slightly different way of looking at things.

01 - Ideology as “a system of ideas and ideals that form the basis of economic or political theory and policy"

if ideology is a “system” of ideas and ideals, where ideas are about how things are (beliefs) and ideals about how things should be (norms), then those beliefs and norms are somehow interdependent. If ideology is the basis for economic/political theorising and policy, then ideology is a pre-theoretical system of ideas and ideals relevant for economy and politics. — neomac

Under this definition, there is no distinction between ideology, and facts, as stated by the op. The facts, i.e. truths, are the ideology. It is what we believe about how things are, and how things should be.

02 - "The set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual"

If ideology is characteristic of a social group, then ideology is not only a shared system of beliefs, but something that helps us identify social groups. — neomac

Under this definition, we accept that there is division, disagreement as to the facts, the truth, and this division manifests as distinct social groups.

With this way of looking at things, the two definitions are consistent, and not actually describing two different things, but they are just different ways of describing the very same thing. In the first, what is described is the agreement amongst people, as to what they believe, and this constitutes their "ideology". In the second, we acknowledge that not only is there agreement amongst people as to what they believe, but their is also disagreement between people, and this produces a multitude of social groups with distinct "ideologies". So the first describes a general concept, "ideology", while the second describes what distinguishes separate, distinct and specific, ideologies. They both describe the very same thing, but the second simply adds the condition that there is not one system of ideas of how things are and how things should be, facts or truths, which everyone believes.

Though Adorno notes that the responses have been obscure, he wants to speak up in favor of this speculative thinking, or a moment within thinking, whereby the facts, on their face or as read, do not determine thought, but rather produce a facade through his thought must push towards and outward from in order to get closer to the things themselves. — Moliere

I think that we need to make sure that we properly interpret how Adorno uses "facts" here.

The speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow itself to be governed by the given facts.

I believe the "given facts" are what is posited, postulated by positivism, as what is the case. So the resistance spoken about, which is correlated to the speculative moment, is a resistance to the ideology of positivism.

You are giving as granted that I or the child who suffered abuse in the past is now happy. What if the person can never be happy? Although I can agree with you that time can cure the scars and help us to move on, I still see it as hard that a person who passed through that kind of experience could be happy nowadays. I accept that he or she can live a normal life, but nothing more. I doubt they can be happy. For this reason, some of them even start taking drugs. We can pick a random drug addict, and probably this person suffered in the past. I know that there are many different examples and each individual is a different case. But it is difficult to be happy to understand those kinds of circumstances. — javi2541997

I don't see how any of this is meaningful. I took many drugs, chronically, for many years, perhaps as an escape from abuses in earlier life, and I consider myself to have been happy then, and to be be happy nowadays. Happiness is not an unobtainable ideal, nor does it require strict criteria. In fact, the less that you restrict your criteria, the easier it is to be happy. You can provide for yourself, the freedom required to be happy.

Why do you think it is always the right thing? — javi2541997

I think it is always the right thing, because I understand the benefits, and I was trying to explain them to you. Again, I suggest you read some Plato, the dialogues are very entertaining, and enlightening.

You keep thinking that the characters and situations that make me suffer are just narrative. Well, imagine a real alcoholic abusive father. It is not hard too. Unfortunately and sadly, there are hundreds and hundreds of these kinds of monsters. Who is the one who has to forgive here? — javi2541997

If the abuse you talk about is in the past, then the narrative is in your own mind. It is how you describe the person's actions to yourself, via memory. You have that medium, your own memories, between you and the actions which are making you suffer. As that medium is your own creation, your own fabrication, you can construct it in two very distinct ways, or two extremes with a multitude of possibilities in between. You can maintain a narrative which has you sharing in that abusive individual's suffering, or you can maintain a narrative which has you sharing your happiness with the abusive individual. Each is fictional, because the past is gone and the suffering or happiness is at the present. Forgiving involves the latter narrative, sharing your present happiness with the abusive individual.

Nonetheless, the childhood has already been taken away, and they are probably traumatised for many reasons. — javi2541997

I really do not understand what is meant by "the childhood has already been taken away". I understand "trauma", but unless this involves unconsciousness, or coma, this is a matter of receiving experience, not a matter of taking anything away.

We have the risk of passing through serious dilemmas when we are doubting whether forgiveness is the right thing to do or not. — javi2541997

Why doubt? It is not a question of whether forgiveness is ultimate or absolute. But it is always the right thing. And, the knowledge you can develop from understanding the other's actions instead of simply suffering from them, will always benefit you in dealing with the person in the future, even if future actions require you to use physical force against the individual.

Furthermore, this only applies to specific cases that we are close to. I can't 'forgive' an abstract abusive father. I know these exist, but it is true that I don't have direct contact with them. I am affected because of the suffering of others who are experiencing that. This is the main issue. I want to be part of their struggle, and I am comfortable with this for the moment. — javi2541997

The problem here is what I'm trying to get you to understand. That is why I used the word "fiction", as a shock tactic, which disconcerted you. You, "want to be part of their struggle", but it is the struggle of an abstract victim of abuse. There is no particular individual whom you are acquainted with, or even unacquainted with, who is suffering that abuse. It is an abstract idea in your mind. Unless you identify a particular individual, whom you can relate to, and be a part of that struggle, the idea that you can be a part of that struggle is a fiction. How can you be a part of the struggle of an abstract abuse victim? Now you are left attempting to do what is impossible, being a part of the struggle of an abstract, fictional, individual. So you are engaged in a hopeless task, which will never be productive, and always be disappointing. But if you choose a particular individual, to be a part of that person's struggle, you will find that the way is to share your love and happiness with that person, not to share in that person's suffering.

But we the humans also have a soul, and we suffer from what we experience. — javi2541997

As I explained, when others behave badly, you have no obligation to share in their badness. You ought not let them impart their suffering to you, and your moral responsibility is to share your goodness with them. In Christian tradition this is known as forgiving.

https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/adult-health/in-depth/forgiveness/art-20047692
https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/eight_keys_to_forgiveness

Notice in #4 of the second link, that true empathy is derived from sharing your love with the other, forgiveness. This act of giving your goodness to the other, giving your understanding, is the basis of empathy, not a sharing in the other's badness. It is a matter of understanding the other, such that the other feels your goodness, not a matter of feeling the other's badness. This is why true empathy cannot exist through the medium of narrative. Through narrative, the other has no access to your understanding, you merely have access to the suffering of the other.

So, by your submissions then, some wars are good and some wars are evil. Then, please tell me, by who or on what authority can a decision be made that any specific war is good but another war is evil? — Pieter R van Wyk

Again, my suggestion is that you study some philosophy and learn some principles. This will answer your question.

But the starving child still exists, whether you want to accept it or not. — javi2541997

Sure, but my point was that one does not need to empathize with, or share that person's suffering. The better approach is to share one's happiness with that person who suffers. And this requires only that you acknowledge that the suffering is real, not that you sympathize, empathize, or in any way share in that suffering in any way. You just need to take the necessary steps toward sharing your good fortune with the less fortunate, without yourself sharing in the suffering of the less fortunate.

Sorry, but I disagree with you in that part. Trust me when I claim that the characters and plot shown in Dostoevsky's works are far from being 'fictional'. — javi2541997

I'm sorry, "fictional" was not the correct word to properly convey the meaning. Let me call it "narrative". The point is that the words, and form, of the author's narrative are intentionally chosen and designed for the purpose of creating those feelings. So you are not actually empathizing with those particular suffering children, by being in contact with them and understanding them, you are empathizing with that narrative which the author has created. This was the point of the UNICEF example. It's not that I believe those pictures of starving children are fictional, but they are portrayals (a narrative) designed to produce these emotions of sympathy.

Because of this mistake on my part, I request that you please reread the post and replace "fiction" with "narrative", as described above, and this will produce a better understanding of what I was trying to say.

But then, who or on what authority, can a decision be made that any person, with authority to declares any war, is in fact rational or irrational? Surely, any person that declares any war would regard himself to be rational. Also, the people that has given the authority to the person declaring this war, will regard this person rational, not so? — Pieter R van Wyk

You might consult some good philosophy to get to the bottom of this issue. If you are truly interested, then I assume that is what you will do. Happy reading!

By your assertion then: All war is good. — Pieter R van Wyk

Why would you conclude this? Just because you may find a person, or persons, in every instance of war, who would say this particular war is good, doesn't mean that all war is good. Such a conclusion would require equivocation. because these different people calling different wars good, and the wars that others called good, bad, would have conflicting ideas as to what defines "good".

So, you continue to demonstrate that the fatal flaw in your reasoning is faulty generalizing.

But let me explain that it is quite difficult to have motivation for (let's say) participating in the joy and happiness of others. I don't think this is a matter of envy or jealousy. It is just that a person under the spectrum of pessimism is hard to find joy beyond the way he sees the world. — javi2541997

Maybe this is where reading has a role to play. In the case of books, we get a very lucid description of the character, and the feelings, and this inclines the reader to develop a very special empathetic relation with the character. However, we ought to understand that this special connection between reader and character is artificial, created and designed by the author. The author uses descriptive terms which can easily draw the reader into a fantasy of knowing, and empathizing with, a person, but the person is not a real person.

You seem to be attracted to reading material which has negative content, stories with suffering. And you empathize with those characters. But this is not likely to be real suffering, it's a fictional description, produced by the author, so that you are actually empathizing with fictional suffering. We might say, and argue, that the author draws on real life experience, and represents some real instances of suffering, but the descriptive terms, which form the basis of your feelings of empathy, are words of the author's choice, chosen with the intent to draw you in. This is not how you actually perceive any real situation, it is a description created by the author. Therefore, it is not an empathy toward any real suffering, it is a creation of the author, designed to feed on your inclination toward sympathy. For example, you are younger than I am, but years ago we used to get UNICEF commercials on TV, where they would show children in horrible conditions of starvation. These pictures are designed to evoke feelings of sympathy, and encourage donations to the cause.

The reason why I suggested reading Plato, is that this is a person who tried very hard to describe human feelings and emotions objectively, to truly understand them. Because of this true approach to human feelings, we can learn from Plato that the good feelings are just as much, or even more, a real aspect of human existence as are the bad.

Don't you believe that happy people should be the ones who have to empathise with the rest? We are talking about putting some kind of responsibility on someone's shoulders. — javi2541997

What validates this proposal? Human beings have freedom of choice, to choose how to culture their feelings, so long as they are not hurting others. Why do you think that people ought to have a responsibility of empathizing with suffering? That's very counterintuitive. If suffering is harmful, unwanted, therefore bad, why should people have an obligation to partake of, or share in, the badness of others. It makes far more sense for the people who possess the good, joy and happiness, to share this with the less fortunate. And this in no way requires empathizing or sympathizing with the suffering. It just requires acknowledging the fact that those who suffer could enjoy some happiness, and this is something which a happy person such as myself could share with them.

It appears to me like campaigns such as the UNICEF one mentioned above, believe that the way to get people to share the goods with those less fortunate, is to make these people feel, through empathy or sympathy, the pain of the others. And from the effects of campaigns like this, people like you come to believe that you have a responsibility, or obligation, to feel the suffering of others. But this is not at all the case. Your responsibility is only to share your joy, pleasure, and happiness with the others, and this way we all get to feel the happiness. You have no obligation or responsibility to share in the suffering. The problem is that campaigns like the one mentioned, lead us to believe that people will not be inclined to share these goods unless they first feel the pain. In reality though, people are fundamentally reasonable, and naturally inclined toward all forms of human intercourse, and the shared pleasures of life, so there is no need for them to feel pain in order to deliver pleasure to others.

My seek is more focused on human behaviour and personal circumstances which lead us to an incomprehensible suffering. — javi2541997

The focus on human behaviour, and personal circumstances, is good. But why the focus on those which lead to incomprehensible suffering rather those which lead eudaimonia, pleasure and joy? These are the two very different sides of human behaviour.

You might enjoy reading some of Plato's dialogues. He was very well educated in human feelings and behaviours, and wrote about these in a style which is quite entertaining. A couple dialogues which I particularly enjoy, that deal with human relations which are pleasurable interactions, are "The Symposium" (love), and "Lysis" (friendship). After you get a feel for his writing style, you might be inclined to move on to more sophisticated dialogues, such as Gorgias, and Protagoras, where he inquires about the meaning of terms like pleasure, pain, good, and bad in general.

I can’t buy that some suffer and live miserable lives while others have fun just because the dice were thrown to the air and the numbers decided the will of different children. For this reason, I think it is a good exercise to do an act of empathy with them [the people who suffer]. But exactly here is when the paths crossed. If they suffer because they were born in a place where you can’t live (objective suffering) and I suffer because I realise what the human condition is (subjective suffering), then people tend to face dramatic situations rather than happy ones. Accepting that this is the case, I believe it is plausible to wonder why children die rather than why it is raining. The first is a pattern intrinsically human; the second is just trifling. — javi2541997

I think your conclusion here isn't sound. You empathize with people suffering, but not with people who are happy. Why does the one type of person deserve empathy more than the other? And, it is only by choosing this one type to empathize with, that you reach the conclusion that people tend to face dramatic situations rather than happy ones.

Why will you not empathize with people who are happy? Would this make you feel bad (jealous perhaps), because these people are better off than you, truly happy, and you would only be feeling that happiness through empathy? To see others happy, when I am not happy, seems to emphasize my unhappiness, so I direct my attention toward the miserable. Misery loves company. Would empathizing with those who are suffering somehow make you feel good, because they are worse off than you, truly suffering while you only feel that suffering through empathy? If this is the case, then this is not true empathy. True empathy allows you to feel what the other feels. Therefore you ought to see no reason not to empathize with those who are happy. Why not share in that joy?

I maintain that all war is evil. — Pieter R van Wyk

That's a completely unjustified, and I will add unreasonable, assertion.

Please tell me, who or on what authority, can a decision be made that any particular war is good? — Pieter R van Wyk

The authority who declares war on any particular occasion, obviously, decides that this particular war is necessary, and the right thing, therefore good thing, to do.

You may, from a perspective other than the authority who declares the war, decide that that particular decision for war, is a bad decision, and evil, but what would make your decision more authoritative and correct than the other decision that the war is necessary?

I have addressed the point you made. I am patiently waiting for you to explain to the thousands killed in the Gaza war that their deaths was for a good cause. They died for something good, something deeper. — Pieter R van Wyk

I don't see how one particular case is relevant. Your faulty generalization implies that all instances of war and revolution are bad. I gave a clear explanation why your generalization is faulty. No matter how many examples you provide, and claim that they are consistent with your generalization, this does not address the problem I pointed out.

Citing particular instances which support your generalization does not prove that the generalization is correct. All you are doing is providing further demonstration of the flaw in your reasoning. You seem to believe that finding particular examples which support your generalization is all that is required to prove it correct. To prove such a generalization requires demonstrating that it is impossible for things to be other than as described by the generalization. But I have already demonstrated to you how it is possible for things to be otherwise. Yet you continue with your insistence.

I would submit the following argument: "Any decision on what is good and what is evil is made based on what is politically expedient. There is no Law of Nature that provides a basis on which a determination about good and evil could be made. It is, therefore, determined simply by Rules of Man." — Pieter R van Wyk

This definition of "good" does not support your generalization that all war and revolution is bad. In fact it supports what I've been trying to explain to you. Such things are sometimes "politically expedient".

Aquinas, as far as I understand, did think the mind is immaterial. It is not half material and half immaterial (or something like that). In fact, he forwards many arguments for why it is immaterial. Aristotle vaguely alluded to it being immaterial in De Anima, but didn't explicate it like Aquinas did. — Bob Ross

I don't think the answer is as simple as you make it out to be. As a power of the soul, the intellect is immaterial, as the soul is immaterial. However, the human soul is united with the material body, and the human intellect is dependent on this union.

The whole point of the analogy is that if we have a proper intellect (that can apprehend forms with clarity), then it cannot be material AT ALL. — Bob Ross

The problem is that the human intellect is deficient, due to its dependence on the material body. Therefore it is not a "proper intellect (that can apprehend forms with clarity)". Human beings understand forms by abstracting from "phantasms", which are sense impressions derived through corporeal organs. So our understanding of the immaterial is derived from the phantasms produced by corporeal organs.

Q 85 Art 1

I answer that, As stated above (I:84:7), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above (I:76:1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

You still haven't addressed the points I made. The fundamental flaw in your reasoning is your generalization, that "strife, civil disobedience, revolution, and war" are always bad, and therefore blameworthy.

In some circumstances, the suffering of "strife, civil disobedience, revolution, and war" may be good, as I've demonstrated. If specific instances of these are apprehended as good by philosophers, then these will be promoted by philosophers, and philosophers will see no reason to eradicate them, as you believe they ought to.

This provides a completely different approach to "the human condition". The human condition is fundamentally good, not bad as you assume. And the effects of philosophy have guided the human condition even further toward good, and away from bad. Since the human condition is good, there is no need to assign "blame", as you do, and your project is misguided.

Then on to the reason for me stirring up this debate, getting to my fundamental question: Why is the world as it is? One of the questions that has been bugging philosophers for as long as humans have had the capability of abstract thought. Leading to the question whether I have a solution to this problem? — Pieter R van Wyk

See, you present the basic goodness of the world as a "problem". "Problem" implies that resolution is necessary, because failing to resolve the problem would leave people in a bad condition. This attitude, of the need for a resolution to this question "why is the world as it is?" will create stress and anxiety, if the question cannot be answered. That is bad. The 'bad' is created by you classing the question "why is the world as it is?" as a "problem" which therefore needs to be resolved.

If, on the other hand, we approach the question of "why is the world as it is", with the attitude that the world is intrinsically good, then the question is merely a curiousity, a point of interest, which philosophers may address in their spare time. It is not a "problem", so there is no urgency to find an answer. Then, there is no stress or anxiety created by this question, which is more like a rhetorical question now, and the 'bad' that supports your desire to blame, which you have created intentionally, with your will to debate, is completely annihilated.

Speculative Moment.

It appears to me, that the principal point of this section is stated in the final paragraph.

The power of the existent constructs the facades into which the
consciousness crashes. It must try to break through them. This alone
would snatch away the postulate from the profundity of ideology. The
speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow
itself to be governed by the given facts, transcends them even in the
closest contact with objects and in the renunciation of sacrosanct
transcendence. What in thought goes beyond that to which it is bound
in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge of the
subject. The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth.
For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it
experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.

Here's an attempt to understand that paragraph.

The consciousness must try to break through the facades which have been constructed by the power of the existent. This would release (snatch away) the postulate from its relation to the profundity of ideology. That is a conscious resistance, which allows the speculative moment to persist, by not allowing itself to be governed by the given facts [ideology]. This produces transcendence in close contact with objects, through the renunciation of sacrosanct transcendence. When thought, in such resistance, goes beyond that which binds it [the ideology of given facts], this is its freedom. Thought can then follow the expressive urge of the subject. And, since suffering is the weight of the object on the subject, the need to give voice to suffering is the primary condition for all [objective] truth. Therefore what the subject experiences as the most subjective, the expression of suffering, is actually the experience which is most objectively mediated.

Aristotle seems to be regarding the mind (viz., the thinking aspect of the soul) as 'unmixed' with the matter and that, for some reason, this mind is not real prior to knowing something.

It seems like Aquinas picks up on this and leverages it as epistemic points in favor of the mind being immaterial.

I have two questions:

1. What is Aristotle's view of the mind here? Is it a nothingness, a negativity, like Hegel? Is it pure form that is immaterial?

2. How does Aquinas argue for the soul being immaterial? Is it just that thinking cannot have a sense-organ? — Bob Ross

The reason why the mind must be immaterial, is illustrated with the tinted glass analogy. The mind's apprehension of the material world, is like seeing through a glass lens. If the lens is tinted, the person seeing will not correctly see the colour of things. So the person will not correctly see every aspect of the world, because the colour will be incorrect. Likewise, if the mind is in anyway material, it could not correctly know the entirety of the material world.

The analogy is good, but there is more than one way to look at it. If it is the case that the human mind cannot correctly know the entirety of the material world, this may be because the mind is not immaterial.

If the mind is immaterial, then it has to be pure form because there is only form and matter. Are you suggesting an immaterial 'matter' that the intellect would be of? — Bob Ross

No, I'm suggesting that for Aquinas, (following the lead of Aristotle), the human intellect is not purely immaterial, it is dependent on the material body. This is actually the reason Aquinas gives for why human beings cannot adequately know God, and separate Forms. The human intellect is deficient in this sense, and that is why we cannot adequately know God until the soul is disunited from the body.

From my understanding, something that is pure form is not necessarily purely actual; — Bob Ross

I would say that this is a misunderstanding of Aristotle, and Aquinas.

Perhaps you are denying the distinction between potency and matter; but I would say passive vs. active potency are different, and beings with matter have passive potency. — Bob Ross

No, I do not deny that distinction. Matter is a type of potency, or potential, it is placed in that category. This means that potential defines matter, in a way similar to how animal defines human being. All matter is potential, but not all potential is matter. Notice that Aristotle defines the essence of human ideas as potential also. So potency, or potential, is the broader term, such that not all potential is matter. In a similar way "actual" defines form, such that all form is actual. But not necessarily all actualities are form. Aristotle distinguishes two very distinct senses of "actual", one being "what is the case" (the form, or formula), the other being active, activity.

In terms of distinguishing soul and mind, I agree; but that doesn't explain if Aristotle thought the mind is pure/substantial form like Aquinas; and if he does, then how does this not entail a sort of interaction problem even if it is not the same problem as Cartesian dualism? It would be an immaterial mind interacting with a materially body even if the soul is the form of a living being. — Bob Ross

I believe that Aristotle thought the soul is pure substantial form. Aquinas also thought the soul is pure substantial form. However, maintaining the already mentioned distinction between soul and mind, the mind is not necessarily pure substantial form. Aristotle distinguished passive and active intellect, and Aquinas upheld this distinction. Since form is actuality, and the intellect has a passive aspect, I think it is impossible that the intellect is pure form.

The original geological concept makes more sense to me: it’s when a mineral replaces another mineral but takes the first one’s shape. — Jamal

Here's another possible interpretation.

First, this is Spengler:

By the term ‘historical pseudomorphosis’ I propose to designate those cases in which an older alien Culture lies so massively over the land that a young Culture, born in this land, cannot get its breath and fails not only to achieve pure and specific expression-forms, but even to develop fully its own self-consciousness. All that wells up from the depths of the young soul is cast in the old moulds, young feelings stiffen in senile works, and instead of rearing itself up in its own creative power, it can only hate the distant power with a hate that grows to be monstrous.

https://jnnielsen.medium.com/permutations-of-pseudomorphosis-8afafb6771f4

Adorno's use is difficult to understand. But pay attention to the role of the heterogenous in his description. The heterogenous is the content, and both art and philosophy "keep faith" with their content, through a conduct which forbids pseudo-morphisis. Notice, Spengler's 'historical pseudomorphosis' propagates hate therefore it must be forbidden. Each, art and philosophy, keeps faith with its content through its own form of intrinsic opposition. Art will make itself obdurate against its own meaning, while philosophy distances itself from the immediate, by putting the concept in between, as a wall. These forms of negating itself, should actually be considered as keeping faith with its content..

What's interesting is that the geological concept may make more sense in the case of art, because art uses a material medium. But notice in the case of philosophy, the medium (the wall) is the concept, so I think the social concept of pseudo-morphisis makes more sense in the case of philosophy. So ‘historical pseudomorphosis', in Spengler's sense, is forbidden through that use of the wall, the concept, ideology, by which philosophy distances itself from the immediate.

The point is just that the infinite can play a role suggestively, referring to philosophy's inconclusiveness and the endless variety of experience. — Jamal

Point accepted. As I said it's confusing to me, but if it's not too important, that's good. So I assume that he' turns around what "infinity" refers to, so that it's not just a concept, but something real in itself. And that real thing, the real object which "infinity" refers to is demonstrated by philosophy itself, or the traditional way of doing philosophy, which proves to be endless.

"Infinity" is not a concept which philosophy holds in completeness, having it at its disposal, to apply at will. "Infinity" ought to be understood more like a descriptive term which describes the philosophical process. Therefore philosophy is contained by infinity, rather than infinity being contained by philosophy.

So philosophers attempts to apprehended the infinite manifest as philosophy getting lost to the infinite:

The concept cannot otherwise represent the thing
which it repressed, namely mimesis, than by appropriating something
of this latter in its own mode of conduct, without losing itself to it.

That would explain the part about canceling itself out, and "pseudo-morphosis". A quick Google search tells me that this is a concept proposed by Oswald Spengler in "The Decline of the West".

I find this section very confusing and difficult to understand. To me, Adorno misrepresents the concept of "infinity", and misrepresents philosophy, in general, and this leaves it very difficult to understand what he's trying to do.

Since he has already described philosophy as being concerned with the non-conceptual, he now approaches "infinity" which is purely conceptual. Therefore, he has to write it off, as not a proper subject of philosophy. In the lectures he implies that this purely conceptual thing, "infinity", ought to be left to the mathematicians. And, perhaps he believes that mathematics rather than philosophy ought to have sole purveyance over pure concepts. But I think that this would be naive.

Plato thought that the true subject of philosophy is intelligible objects. But Aristotle showed how philosophers (especially metaphysicians) must work toward understanding all aspects of reality, both conceptual and non-conceptual.

Now it appears to me like Adorno is trying to dismiss infinity as a part of reality, because it is purely conceptual, and if we allow that there are things which are purely conceptual, we will be lead into idealism. But this according to Adorno is what philosophy needs to avoid. Adorno's way of describing concepts, is as representing, or having a relation with something non-conceptual, like true art is supposed to represent something. But this leaves the purely abstract, the purely conceptual, as impossible to understand, being in some way untrue.

I believe Adorno's attitude toward philosophy and infinity is well summed up here:

Thinking by no means protects sources, whose freshness
would emancipate it from thought; no type of cognition is at our
disposal, which would be absolutely divergent from that which disposes
over things, before which intuitionism flees panic-stricken and in vain.

So he ends the section with:

What is incumbent on it, is the effort to go beyond the concept, by
means of the concept.

And I do not believe that this is realistic, to go beyond the concept with the concept. It's sort of self-contradicting.

In reality, he ought to accept what is demonstrated by the concept "infinity", is that the concept must go beyond the non-conceptual. This is a fundamental necessity for measurement. In order that all things might be measured we need to allow that the concept (infinity) extends beyond all things. The problem is that this reality is consistent with idealism, and Adorno wants to reject idealism.

Then Adorno describes what spurs philosophy in the direction of infinity in the first place:

What spurs philosophy to the risky exertion of its own infinity is the unwarranted expectation that every individual and particular which it decodes would represent, as in Leibniz’s monad, that whole in itself, which as such always and again eludes it — Jamal

I take this as a misrepresentation of philosophy. I believe that philosophers have always recognized "infinity" to be a concept used in measurement. I don't believe there has ever been an expectation such as the one described here by Adorno.

How does the concept of something not being a multiplicity entail it is a multiplicity that is one? — Bob Ross

Sorry, I don't understand what you're asking here.

For the point in space, assuming it is real, it would be comprised of three parts: location, form, and matter. — Bob Ross

You can describe the point as having these three parts, but it is still indivisible. Therefore your description is false. Those three, location, matter, and form, refer to concepts, which are not actually parts of the point itself, but concepts used to understand its existence. That is like the "spin" of a virtual particle, it's simply conceptual.

This is a common problem with "divisibility". We often assume that a thing can be divided in a way which it actually can't. This problem comes form the mathematical approach, within which we assume that things can be divided any which way, and infinitely, just like we assume with numbers.. So for instance, we assume that a thing can be divided infinitely when it actually can't. Or we assume that we can make perfectly even halves, and things like that. There are real physical restrictions on division which we do not adequately understand.

So then we do agree that two purely ontologically simple beings are impossible, — Bob Ross

No, we do not agree. I think your proposed concept of "complete and perfect simplicity" is incoherent, and itself an impossible, or self contradicting concept. It requires that a multiplicity be one.

However, I am referring to something that is perfectly indivisible by it being ontologically simple. E.g., I am referring to perfect circularity. — Bob Ross

If "perfectly indivisible" is what you are referring to, then why can there not be more than one of these things? Imagine a point in space. It is perfectly indivisible, but there could be a multitude of different points, each at a different place, at the same time, therefore distinguishable from each other, by having a different place of existence, yet each perfectly indivisible.

or Aristotle, apart from an obscure passage in De Anima, thinks of the soul as the form of an organism in virtue of which the organism is alive. It is the self-actualizing principle that unifies the organism into the kind of alive thing it is. This seems to suggest that the soul is not substantially distinct from the body insofar as it is analogous to the imprint of the ring on the wax which makes wax a wax seal. Thusly, it seems like the soul does not survive the body and is not immaterial in the sense that it is pure form (although it isn't matter either: it's the self-actualizing principle of matter in virtue of which makes it alive). — Bob Ross

You say, Aristotle says it is "the form". Then you go on to say it is not "pure form'. That is contradiction. For Aristotle, as "the form", it is pure form.

1. What is Aristotle's view of the mind here? Is it a nothingness, a negativity, like Hegel? Is it pure form that is immaterial? — Bob Ross

I think that the key to understanding this is that Aristotle distinguishes between the soul, and the intellect, or mind, which is a capacity of the soul. He explained that prior philosophers. like Plato, did not properly distinguish between soul and mind, and often used the words interchangeably.

Obviously, I don't understand what you are proposing as "complete and perfect simplicity". If this means "all is one" then obviously there cannot be a multitude of complete and perfect simplicities, because by definition this would all be one.

But that is not what we were talking about. We were talking about being ontologically simple in the sense of being indivisible, And, for the reasons given, I do not see why there cannot be a multitude of ontologically simple (in this sense of being indivisible) things.

Something being ontologically indistinguishable from another thing entails that they are the same thing because the concept of ontological (as opposed to epistemic) indistinguishability is that there is nothing ontologically different about the two things in question. — Bob Ross

But things which are ontologically simple, are not necessarily ontologically indistinguishable.

I don't see why you think that there could not be a multitude of ontologically simple things, which are distinguishable through spatial temporal principles. Why do you think that two ontologically simple things would necessarily be ontologically indistinguishable?