If "this lectern" is a type, and as types are usually thought to be universals, who is correct, the Realist, the Nominalist or the Conceptualist ? — RussellA

What I said, is that if "this lectern" is identified by essential properties, then "this lectern refers to a type rather than a particular. That is because types are identified by essential properties, not particulars. Each accidental property is essential to the identity of a particular.

The reference of "this lectern" is fixed by an act of "initial baptism" which designates a very real physical object with an observable property, such as "this lectern is made of wood". — RussellA

The problem is that "this" is demonstrative, as says. It does not serve as an identity. And when when that demonstrative refers to "lectern" it only identifies a type. So if Kripke points to an object and says "this lectern", he has said that the object pointed to, is that type.

The identity of the thing is within the thing itself, as indicated by the law of identity. So identifying an object as a type does not provide the object's true identity. And, if someone moved to identity all the essential properties of the named thing (the properties which make the thing the very thing which it is), they would have to name all the accidentals. The accidentals are what make a particular particular. Naming essentials always results only in a defined type, not a particular. Therefore we cannot produce the identity of a particular lectern by naming essentials, we would only produce a type of lectern.

It depends of which properties are essential for an object to be the same object. — RussellA

The need for this judgement, as to which properties are essential and which are accidental, is what is eliminated by the law of identity. This law puts the identity of the thing within the thing itself, therefore the thing's identity is not based in any human judgement of essential properties.

This forms the difference between the identity of a thing, and the identity of a type. A type is identified by essential properties, " a lectern must be... in order to be a lectern", for example. A statement of essential properties is a statement of the necessary criteria for a type. It cannot be a statement of the necessary criteria for a particular thing, because it's a human judgement, and human judgements are fallible. Even if we say something like "the essential properties of this particular lectern are...", all we are doing is making "this particular lectern" into a type. That is because "essential properties" is what defines a type.

So the best we can do as human beings is to set the criteria for a type, by naming essential properties, and judge the particular as to whether it fulfills the conditions of that type. If we desire to set the conditions for a particular, we need to name also the accidentals because a particular consists not only of essential properties (of its type), bit also the accidentals (of that particular). But the accidentals change at every passing moment, and we cannot know them all, so our attempts to identify a particular in this way, are not a true identity.

That is why we must insist that any claim to know the identity of a particular, made by human beings, is mere sophistry. All these human beings are doing is naming a type (essential properties), and claiming that there is only one of this type. But that is not really an instance of producing the identity of an individual. To produce the identity of an individual would require naming all the accidentals.

And assuming the goal is truly productive, sharing of ideas, collaborative effort, the new depersonalized modalities may actually be limiting progress rather than enhancing it. Which is why I think focusing on the idea of civil dialogue is a legitimate topos, and not a snoozer. — Pantagruel

Oh I strongly agree, it's very important, not a snoozer. In this world of electronic communication we need to practise the skill of respectfulness, because it does not seem to come naturally, it takes effort. So this forum provides an excellent platform for this exercise. We all need the practise.

A person can maintain their identity as the same thing yet at the same time have different properties.

But how can an object maintain its identity as the same thing yet at the same time have different properties ? — RussellA

When the object "requires a new description", it is because it has changed, therefore it's not "at the same time". It's not at the same time, it's over a duration of time. A thing changes, yet continues to be the same thing, therefore it has contradicting properties, but not at the same time.

There is a significant difference between a barroom and a classroom, but even so... incivility in a barroom might earn a punch in the nose. Even between friends, incivility might not be tolerated. There is certainly a place for raucous slash and chop discussion (usually lubricated with beer), as long as everyone accepts the terms of discussion. — BC

I believe that the issue here is that face to face discussion is fundamentally more civil than the distanced interaction on a computer screen. When we are face to face there is an intuitive trend to respect the other person as a fellow human being, regardless of the amount of alcohol involved. The fear of a punch in the nose may contribute to this respectfulness, but it goes a lot deeper than this, to the basic apprehension of the other as a human being.

This is a problem which has permeated to all levels of our modern technologically advanced society. When people communicate without face to face interaction, this gives them a sort of freedom to escape their own identity, and behave in a way which is unbecoming. So when we communicate with email, text, etc., we lose a degree of civility because the "personal" aspect of the conversation has been removed. We often do not talk to the other as a friend, whom we hang around with face to face, but as an associate whom we have an obligation to deal with. This opens up a struggle for power, like a need for superiority.

At its extreme, we feel safe that the punch in the nose, to put me back in my place, cannot come. However, this is a false sense of security, because an employee can be fired, and a member of TPF can be banned. We've seen this scenario develop, and become very evident with "road rage". For years, being in a car has provided that slight separation between people, giving them the opportunity to act rudely toward others, hiding behind one's car, knowing that retaliation cannot come. But now, that has become a false sense of security because there is no telling what tricks the other driver might hold up the sleeve.

matter and form or not combinable. I think form is a result of the matter. — val p miranda

Matter and form are combined in the material world. A material object has both matter and form. This principle is known as Aristotle's hylomorphism.

It is impossible that form is the result of the matter, because "form" refers to the object's actuality, what it actually is, and "matter" refers to its potential to be otherwise.

Now, the issue is that an object must have form, without this it has no actuality, and is not an object at all. This is how Aristotle excludes infinite potential, "prime matter", as a concept which has no real representation in the material world (in other words its a falsity used in deceptive ontology).

So, when an object comes into being it is necessarily the object which it is, it cannot be other than it is, by the law of identity. That's a statement about the nature of temporal (material) existence. And, the matter (potential) which an object has is necessarily ordered, by the object having a form (actuality). Therefore the form of the object is necessarily prior in time to the object's matter. This principle is covered in Plato's Timaeus, though Plato does not express the logical arguments given by Aristotle.

How can that be ?

In logic, the law of identity states that each thing is identical with itself. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz expressed it as "Everything is what it is". Wilhelm Wundt credits Gottfried Leibniz with the symbolic formulation, "A is A". — RussellA

Yes, each thing is identical with itself, everything is what it is. And, things are changing as time passes. Therefore being identical with itself, or being what it is, means changing as time passes. There is no inconsistency between the two.

If it were the case that when a thing changes it is no longer the thing that it is, then an object could not have any temporal extension. At every moment, as time passes, and the object changes, it would become a new object. So, in order that an object can have temporal extension, and maintain tis identity as the thing which it is, while time passes and it also changes, Aristotle proposed the law of identity. This is the reason for his "hylomorphism", a material thing has two aspects, form and matter. The form is changing (actual) and the matter stays the same (potential).

If object A changes into Object B over time, even if it has lost only one molecule, then object B cannot be the same as object A. — RussellA

This is where we have to be careful not to be fooled by sophistry. When object A requires a new description (because it's properties change due to the passing of time), this does not mean that it has become a different object. That's the very reason for the law of identity, to allow us to say that a thing maintains its identity as the same thing, which it is, despite changing as time passes.

Without this law, all sorts of logical sophistry ensues. Instead of being within the object itself, as is the case with the law of identity (as the same as itself), an object's identity is what we say about a thing. And as Banno is demonstrating, we can say very strange things about objects, and show how these strange things are consistent with our axioms of identity. Of course, when the fundamental axiom is that the object's identity is what we say about it, rather than what it is in itself, we can make its identity whatever we want, and there is no truth to the matter.

Logic has advanced... — Banno

"Declined" is probably a better word to use here. Look at the confused mess of quantum mechanics as an example.

Unfortunately with all that going on, there is no chance of any quiet sitting. — unenlightened

This is the problem, isn't it? The noise is occurring within, and we don't even need the outside to have the infinite feedback referred to by Art. One could have infinite volume within.

My awareness expands into the room and I am back where I started. — Art48

That's why the feedback loop is not infinite, you allow that outside interference to break it up. Work harder! If you start to approach the infinite volume you'll figure out how to utilize the outside interference as a balance, to effectively shut off the internal noise.

I thought it was obvious that I was not referring to numerical value, but maybe I needed to make that clear. — PhilosophyRunner

The way I see it, numerical values are values just like ethical values are values. So there is a broad meaning of "value", which is roughly speaking, the worth of something. We might attribute a numerical "worth" or we might attribute a moral "worth", along with other forms of "worth", like monetary, or any type of measurement which employs a scale.

It also can be that the psychological and emotional aspects of beliefs are regarded as the 'truth'. In this, the underlying premises and assumptions are not put under examination. This may be the route source of many philosophical mistakes and fallacies, as an an antiphilosophy approach, of being unable to stand back and analyse the nature of ways of seeing and forming judgements. — Jack Cummins

I'd agree with this. It is actually quite common to have beliefs without logic or evidence to support them.

I think science should strive for a value free ideal,,, — PhilosophyRunner

You do realize that mathematics works with values, don't you? Do you think it's possible to have science which is free from mathematics?

And you continue to mix the law of identity with the identity of Indiscernibles. — Banno

You continue to demonstrate that you have no idea what the law of identity actually states. You state your rendition as "A=A", but you continue to show that you have no idea what this represents.

I'll maintain that Metaphysician Undercover is mistaken and that an object's properties may be subject to change and that it makes sense to talk of essential an non-essential attributes. — Banno

Not only do you have no idea what the law of identity states, you totally misrepresent what I say. Look at the following, what I said, and please retract what you said about me above.

The law of identity allows that a thing could continue to be the same thing, despite undergoing change. That is the temporal extension of a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Regardless of whether a thing changes or not, a thing is necessarily the thing which it is, by the law of identity. And, at any given point in time, all of its attributes are necessary to it being the thing that it is. Therefore all of its attributes are necessary. That is implied by the law of identity (a thing is the same as itself). If it does not actually have all the attributes which it has, it is not the same as itself. Therefore all of a thing's attributes are necessary, by the law of identity.

However, this would be inconvenient for humans in navigating their world if everything they saw in the world was continually changing. — RussellA

This is the difficulty. The law of identity allows that a thing could continue to be the same thing, despite undergoing change. That is the temporal extension of a thing. So the status of "thing" simply implies some form of temporal continuity. From this perspective we understand "change" as relative to the supposed temporal continuity (Newton's first law for example). But this assumed temporal continuity is inductive in nature, and it cannot actually be proven due to the reality of change which is happening everywhere, to everything, all the time. Therefore the law of identity, along with the prerequisite assumption of "things" (a "thing" being a temporal continuity of sameness) presupposes without justification the necessary existence of things, and the necessity of temporal continuity of sameness. Because of this, it is fundamentally defective.

This is why Hegel attacked the law of identity, giving logical priority to "becoming", making being and not being, and therefore the existence of actual things, simply a human judgement which we impose on the world of becoming. The idea that the existence of external objects is intuited rather than saying that the external object has real independent existence, I believe is basic to phenomenology.

@Wayfarer
Do you mind if I refer to you as "the woo-peddler"? — Metaphysician Undercover

In exchange, you can call me "the obfuscator". That's fun too.

Sorry, @Jamal, I've gone off topic and need moderation. Someone needs to summon @the team.

But this brings up a question closer to the topic of the thread. If, and when, someone flags a post, thereby reporting it to the moderating team, do we have access to that information, as to who makes the report.

Oops, sorry team, I think I accidentally flagged Sophisticat's post, checking out that feature.

@Wayfarer
Do you mind if I refer to you as "the woo-peddler"? That's a fun name. It beats "the crank". I see why @BC changed names.

I don't see a need to be notified whenever someone mentions me. — SophistiCat

I agree. I don't see the point. They just start calling you "the crackpot" or "the crank", or some other name, when they'd prefer not to engage with you, anyway.

I was struck by something Rorty said about truth. 'We don't need to define truth, we know how to use it.' I kind of feel the same about morality. I'm not generally big on definitions, actions are more interesting to me. Anyone can say any kind of guff about ethics and principles. But what is it that we do? — Tom Storm

But this is what leads to misunderstanding and confusion. That's what Plato showed in his dialogues. Different people all 'know how to use' the same word. But when you ask each of them what they mean when they use that word, they come up with different answers. This is clear evidence that there is misunderstanding when that word is being used, and knowledge of the subject is elusive.

Suffering bad. — Tom Storm

"Suffering is bad" is theory. It doesn't require a long statement to be a theory. In fact, it appears like the theories which people hold as being the most important (like 'God exists' for example), are the simplest, short and sweet.

Again, this odd interpretation has the result that when one says the lectern might have been in the other room, one is talking about a different lectern. — Banno

That's right, as it should be, as Janus indicates. That's because if the lectern we are talking about is in the other room, it is a different lectern from the one we know to be in this room, necessarily. "Necessarily" here is supported by the law of identity which is the premise which forces this conclusion.. Just like, if the lectern we're talking about is made of plastic, when this one we know to be made of wood, we would necessarily be talking about a different lectern.

That's how the law of identity works to prevent sophistry. It's very intuitive, and restrict us to saying things we truly believe, while sophistry is a matter of saying deceptive things. You don't truly believe that the lectern which is in this room might be in the other room, do you?

Yes, "might have been" implies a different time, and so we can allow that the lectern might have been in a different room, at a different time, but to use "might have been" to imply at the same time, is just deceptive speaking.

As if "The lectern might have been in the other room" were false. — Banno

Yes, it's false because it is deceptive speaking. It's deceptive speaking because it employs ambiguity, as "might have been" implies a different time, whereby the described possibility would be acceptable, but it is used to mean at the same time, whereby the described possibility is unacceptable (by the law of identity).

That's why I asked, do you really believe that the lectern which is in this room might be in the other room. If not, then what are you saying with "might have been"?

I've always assumed that one's personal preferences are derived by enculturation. But I should have also said that there are likely to biological factors. I'm not really trying to nail down a totalizing explanation for all things. — Tom Storm

I think the common standard is to attribute personal preferences to genetic predisposition. This predisposition may get amplified through practise and enculturation.

For me morality is in the doing not in the theory. I generally hold to human flourishing as a key guide. — Tom Storm

Well, we surely need some theory to be able to judge the doing as good or bad. Whether or not "human flourishing" makes an acceptable principle is debatable. I suppose we'd need to start with a good definition of "flourishing".

This is not a science and should be an open, ongoing conversation. — Tom Storm

I agree with this.

This is interesting to me. Even though don't think I can incorporate it into my worldview. — Tom Storm

I think that the vast majority of knowledge is not "about reality". Knowledge mostly consists of how to do things. You being pragmatist must recognize this. But this gives moral philosophy a supreme position on the epistemic hierarchy, because it deals with what we should and should not do. But then we must go even higher than this, to ground our moral principles, so we turn toward understanding reality, and this is metaphysics.

Interesting. I think I'm a monist - I just do things and rarely reflect (no doubt I am the unremarkable product of enculturation). :razz: The advantage I have found is that I am almost always content and in positive relationship with others. :wink: — Tom Storm

Contentment is not always good. We ought not be content in a bad situation. And one cannot judge the situation by one's contentment, saying if I am content, then the situation is good, because we need to base goodness in a view toward the future. Understanding what "the future" is, is a subject of metaphysics, and this is why we need accurate metaphysics for a good moral philosophy.

Personally I think metaphysics and ontology mostly come down to personal preferences — Tom Storm

I perceive a little inconsistency between this (metaphysics and ontology are just personal preferences), and your earlier statement, that you are the "product of enculturation". How do you suppose that one's metaphysics and ontology could escape one's enculturation, to acquire the status of personal preference? See "personal preference" points to taste, but "metaphysics" points to an understanding of reality. So how could one's understanding of reality be more like the product of taste than the product of enculturation?

But keeping with Kripke's judgement that being made of wood might be essential property of this lectern.. — RussellA

Being made of wood is not essential of being a lectern. However, if we are talking about a particular thing, that lectern in particular, then every property is essential to it being the very thing which it is. That is the law of identity. So when we talk about particulars, every property is essential, and there is no need to make the arbitrary judgement of which properties are essential.

Someone could say that there is a possible world where this lectern could have been made of plastic, which is highly likely. However, there can be many definitions of "possible worlds", but this is not what Kripke's means by "possible world". For Kripke, a "possible world" is a world in which this lectern keeps its essential properties. — RussellA

This is where things get difficult for Kripke. By the law of identity all properties of a particular individual are essential properties. So if he wants to bring a particular into a possible world (where a particular could have properties other than it does), he violates the law of identity. This is why the standard, traditional procedure, is to represent the particular object as a logical subject. Then we maintain the separation between the logical subject, which may partake of may possibilities, and the material object which by the law of identity is what it is, necessarily, and therefore allows of no other possibilities

Therefore, this lectern, which is made of wood, has the essential property of being made of wood, meaning that in all possible worlds it is still made of wood. This lectern is necessarily made of wood in all possible worlds, because by definition, if this lectern is made of wood in the actual world it must also be made of wood in all possible worlds. — RussellA

The problem I see here is the judgement factor. That particular lectern is judged to be made of wood. That is a human judgement which could conceivably be wrong. So we cannot say that it is necessarily made of wood, that might be a mistaken judgement. However, we can represent that particular object as a subject, named "a wooden lectern". This subject is necessarily made of wood, because it is stipulated. Then we can place that subject, a wooden lectern", in whatever possible world we like, where it is always necessarily made of wood. The point here being that we make a distinction between the material object which is always exactly what it is (by the law of identity), and what we say of that object. The possible worlds consist of what we say. This allows for the reality that we may be mistaken in our judgement of what is a property of any particular object.

I agree to some extent, but most of the folk I know who privilege science would say it allows us to understand the aspects of reality humans have capability to understand, (or access to) not 'ultimate reality' - which is a different speculative metaphysical postulate. And science is an approach which develops and morphs. — Tom Storm

The problem is that science consistently employs speculative metaphysical propositions, in the form of the hypotheses which it tests. The scientific method is to test hypotheses, but it dictates nothing about where these hypotheses are derived from. So, science plays a role in helping us to understand the aspects of reality which we are capable of understanding, but it does not provide that understanding by itself.

Now, consider your claim that science develops and morphs. Isn't it true that the directions which science goes in are greatly formed by the metaphysical hypotheses which are presented to it, to be tested. Your proclaimed "skeptical pragmatism" ought to help you to understand this. There is always reasons why the hypotheses which are drawn up, are drawn up, and this is what gives direction to the morphing and development of science. But what happens if science starts to get its direction from bad ontology, and bad metaphysics?

What do you propose to be kinds of knowledge about reality we can attain without science? — Tom Storm

I'm dualist, and I believe that all human knowledge requires both aspects, theory and practise. Science, as a method is a form of practise which validates theories. Theory without practise is not knowledge, nor is practise without theory. There is however a special type of knowledge described in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, which is called intuitive knowledge, and I believe it involves the relationship between practise and theory. I would not say that this type of knowledge is necessarily "about reality" but it is necessarily prior to science, and it is necessary in order to have any understanding of reality.

Kripke wrote: "To state the view succinctly: we use both the terms ‘heat’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ as rigid designators for a certain external phenomenon. Since heat is in fact the motion of molecules, and the designators are rigid, by the argument I have given here, it is going to be necessary that heat is the motion of molecules." — RussellA

Kripke's misuse of "necessary" is very well displayed at the point where he states "if the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice". By using the conditional "if...", possibility is implied. So necessity here, only follows from the fulfillment of that one possibility. This makes "necessary" contingent, which is a category mistake.

He employs this fallacy (category mistake) as a sophistic trick to bring "necessary" into the category of "contingent". Whether or not the table is made of ice is always a human judgement. And a human judgement is intrinsically fallible, therefore does not provide the conditions required for "necessary".

So propositions like "the table is made of ice", and "the table is not made of ice" can never express anything which is necessary, because those statement are contingent on that empirical judgement which is fallible. Kripke repositions the contingency of such a proposition, from the judgement to the conditional "if...then necessarily...", to create the illusion that the conditions of necessity may have been fulfilled. However, the proposition is conditional therefore the conditions have not been fulfilled, and "necessary" is just an illusion created by him.

Then Kripke proceeds to misuse "necessary", as in your example.

Is it intrinsic to this particular blind spot that its enactors are often blind to it being a blind spot? Is this when a blind spot bites? When it is not recognized as a limitation? — Tom Storm

I would say that blind spots are intrinsic to the nature of theoretical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge has limitations, and when the knowledge is put into practise the limitations may become a problem. The issue with being blind to the blind spot is that often the limitations cannot be known in advance, they only become evident as a result of practise.

So scientists use the scientific method to experiment and observe, and this helps to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the various theories, as a sort of practise. But experimentation occurs in a very controlled environment which doesn't properly represent the natural environment where free practise occurs.

That's true and unless you're unremittingly scientistic, that would be well understood. Not many actual scientists seem to be members here, but there are a number of folk who consider science to be a more reliable pathway to understanding 'reality' than many other approaches. Where is the line drawn? Seems to be about where you think reality begins and ends. — Tom Storm

This points to the issue I mentioned near the beginning of the thread, the difference between the inside of an object and the outside of an object. Science is always looking from the outside in. That is the scientific way, to observe through the senses, and this is to put oneself outside the thing being observed, thereby producing objective observations. On the other hand, the subjective "introspection" gives one a look at what is going on inside an object. So we can come to understand that these two ways of looking at an object give us very distinct and different understandings of what an object is.

Now, what I must insist on, and what is so difficult to get across to the hard headed scientistic people who claim "science to be a more reliable pathway to understanding 'reality'", is that this is 'reality'. So it is completely incorrect to assume that science is the more reliable path towards understanding reality because it only has a method toward understanding a part of reality. The true reality is that there is such a difference between inside and outside, and that is why dualism has been the principal ontology for thousands of years.

Scientism tells us that science has brought us beyond dualism, and that there is no longer a need for dualist ontology because science is the only method required for understanding reality, as you imply with that statement. But the true reality is that science alone, by its current method, cannot deliver to us adequate principles for drawing a line between where the outside ends and the inside begins. It looks at everything from the one direction, and cannot give us the principles required to designate properties of "the inside". And without adequate principles for what constitutes the inside, science cannot make an accurate differentiation between inside and outside.

On the other hand, dualism starts with a much more accurate description of reality, the fundamental difference between inside and outside, thereby providing us with the basic premise required for the differentiation, and a true understanding of reality. That's why dualism has been the standard ontology for thousands of years, and has only recently gone on the decline due to the increase of scientism.

It does seem to me that this problem either clicks with people or does not click. What exactly is the difference? Is it world view or experience or an actual blind spot? — Tom Storm

So I would say that the difference is a difference of "world view". Science takes from the inside (theory), and applies what is taken from the inside, to the outside (practise). The application effectively proves and disproves what has been given by the inside, and this is the scientific method. Scientism denies the importance of the inside, insisting that the scientific method is all that is required for the existence of knowledge, thereby creating a blind spot for itself, its reliance on the inside. So science does not create the blind spot, nor does science reject dualism, it's the scientistic philosophy which rejects dualism, dissolving the difference between inside and outside, thereby producing a philosophical (not a scientific) blind spot.

Actually it's your conclusion which is non-sequitur. The scientist, just like everyone else in the world is confronted with problems which are not scientific problems. I.e., many problems we face cannot be solved with the scientific method. So, that the problem is not a scientific problem does not mean that scientists are not confronted with it.

One can make a valid argument, free of sophistical persuasion, and still be wrong. — Paine

Sure, but we need to differentiate between being valid and being sound. From what I understand, valid logic means that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. This does not mean that the conclusion is necessarily correct, because the premises might not be correct. The truth or falsity of the premises affects the soundness of the conclusion. A sound conclusion requires both valid logic and sound premises.

So it's not that the neuroscientist has a "blindspot" as you stated here
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/771468
and actually that it is only a "hard problem" for idealist (or subjectivist) philosophers '. I agree. — 180 Proof

You seem to misunderstand. Neuroscience has a blind spot, I think that's obvious, as described by the analogy of @Olivier5. Having a blind spot, what I described as having a weakness, is not necessarily a problem though. So long as we all recognize our own weaknesses and we work around them, the weakness is not a problem.

When someone does not recognize one's own weakness, that will be a problem because the weakness will manifest in a mistake when unexpected. This is not "the hard problem" explicitly. The hard problem is something more like the difficulty of recognizing the weakness, seeing the blind spot.

I too find fallacies curious. — PhilosophyRunner

We could start with the basic fallacy, non sequitur, which means that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, or that the reasoning is not valid. I believe that what is meant by "valid", is that the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion. Validity is based in this idea of necessity, that if the premises are true, it is impossible that the conclusion not be true. So the fallacy of non sequitur would be to misjudge this necessity, to attribute necessity when its not warranted, to say that a conclusion is necessary when it is not.

Can you give me an example of a neuroscientist you think is committing this error? — Isaac

I described the conditions which would qualify as an error. I have not intent to judge any particular individual unless you bring the person here to take part in the discussion so we could make that judgement. Sorry if this disappoints you.

So "the hard problem .." is not a scientific problem like I've stated. — 180 Proof

No not really, because the specific problem I stated is not explicitly "the hard problem". To tell you the truth, I still don't really understand the supposed "hard problem". I'm dualist so I don't see "the hard problem", it appears to be the consequence of unreasonable premises and poor ontology. I see a lot of hard headed people though.

I explained in the last post. The problem is when the incapacities (blind-spots, to use the term introduced by Wayfarer) of the science are not recognized by the scientist. So for instance, a neuroscientist who believes that neuroscience is giving a representation of consciousness, such that the neurological activity being studied is equivalent (or something like that) to consciousness, would be a problem. Look back to this analogy:

I know smoking kills; My attitude is generally a don't-give-a-damn one; My belief is quitting should mean I get to see my grandchildren; My practice, chain smoker. — Agent Smith

Let's see, this looks simple. Smoking kills, dying is not wanted, therefore do not smoke. It's very similar to: eating poison kills, and dying is not wanted, therefore do not eat poison. The latter rule is easy to obey, the former is not. Why? The issue is "habit". This is why Socrates and Plato argued that virtue is not a form of knowledge, contrary to the sophists who insisted that they were teaching virtue. The reality of "habit" makes us inclined to do things which we know are wrong. Therefore virtue consist of something more than just knowledge.

We can apply this principle to the process of reasoning. Even when it's been demonstrated to us, that a certain type of reasoning is fallacious, we will continue to do it, because reasoning is an habitual activity, and habits are not broken simply by recognizing them as undesirable.

.. which is only a "problem" for philosophers and not for neuroscientists. — 180 Proof

I'd say that's exactly why it's a problem, because they don't see it as a problem. If a person notices one's own deficiencies and incapability's, the person will have a healthy respect for those weaknesses, and work around them, knowing that they are weaknesses (blind spots). But when a person does not recognize one's own weaknesses, that person will forge ahead in blind confidence toward inevitable mishap.

Of course there is no appearance of a problem for the person forging ahead in blindness, at that time of forging ahead in blindness, the problem is only apprehended by the observer who understands what's going on.

If you select any text in a post, — Wayfarer

If I didn't already know how to use the quote button, I would not know what it means to "select" a text, and I'd be lost already.

Can you explain how to do the @so and so? I always forget and do it wrong.

I wonder about this, in both the construction of logic and the interpretation of evidence, especially as both logic and evidence based research are meant to come from a perspective of rationality and neutrality. In his discussion of logical fallacies, Withey points to many assumptions which are logical fallacies in philosophy arguments, including ad hominem arguments, appeal to emotion, faith, fear, tradition and nature, as well as hasty generalisations, moralistic fallacy and magical thinking, as well as straw man thinking. — Jack Cummins

I would be interested to investigate what constitutes a fallacy. Fallacy is defined as reasoning which is invalid, and Wikipedia for example, gives a list of specific forms of fallacy. Each named form is a type of reasoning which has been designated as invalid, therefore an unacceptable part of the reasoning process. We could say that these are mistaken actions in the reasoning process.

Now the question is, what justifies each specific named type of fallacy as being called a mistake (invalid). Since reasoning is a human action one might think that "mistake" would be justified through reference to some moral principles (Plato implies this with his conception of "the good"), but this does not seem to be the case. It appears like the characteristic of "fallacy" is meant to be supported with evidence. That is, if a certain course of reasoning can be shown to give unfavourable results, it is designated as mistaken, and receives a name as a fallacy. But even if this is true there is still a matter of stipulating what constitutes a favourable result, and what constitutes an unfavourable result.

There are many named types of fallacies, but before creating divisions of types I think it would be preferable to determine exactly what constitutes a mistake. We'd also need to separate inductive reasoning from deductive reasoning, because they are so different that mistakes of the one would not be the same as mistakes of the other.

Just this first paragraph is hopelessly confused. It seems to say that describing things is not to describe them... — Banno

Of course it seems like that to you, because you think that describing is an essential aspect of using mathematics. One cannot use mathematics without using it descriptively. So when I say that using mathematics is not necessarily descriptive, it appears to you like "describing things is not to describe them".

As I explained, that's where your essentialist attitude (the use of mathematics is descriptive in any possible world) misleads you. The essential property must be proven as such, and induction is fundamentally fallible.

Sure, counting can be describing, and mathematics can be used to describe things. But counting, and mathematical predictions are not necessarily descriptions. That's where the problem lies, and why I said "using mathematics to make a prediction does not imply that the process has been described".

This is the fallibility of essentialism. Essential features facilitate deductive conclusions, so we assume essences as necessary features, to facilitate logic. When the essences are eternal Platonic ideas, mistake is impossible. But if the named essential features are just the product of human judgement then they may not be true essential features, (like description, a posteriori, is not a true essential feature of mathematics, a priori), so the premise is unsound and the logic misleads.

So, back to the example. Heat diminishes in one body, and increases in another. Mathematical models can accurately predict this. But the process which you referred to as heat moving from one body to another, has not necessarily been described. The success of the mathematics doesn't provide you with the premise to even say that heat has moved from one to the other, as this in itself is a description which is unsupported. The mathematics shows coincident loss and gain of heat which is predictable.

All this to say it's high time neuroscience takes thinking as seriously as musicologists take music. No musicologist worth the name would use orchestra heat scans to explore Mozart. — Olivier5

That seems like a good analogy.

You've a very odd view on things, Meta. A mathematical model that makes accurate predictions is not for you a description. — Banno

Very obviously not, for the reasons I gave. Simply put, to count something is not to describe it. And no description is required for a count because the basic count is nothing but order. That's why there is a difference between quantity and quality.

The heat moves from one body to the other, in a process that can be described with mathematical predictability. — Banno

Using mathematics to make a prediction does not imply that the process has been described. That's why Thales could predict the solar eclipse without knowing the proper orbits. And it's also why quantum physicists can make accurate predictions without knowing what's going on.

Is banning someone as difficult as firing someone? I guess not, when the person is Bartricks.

That's the problem with monism. It has no proper ontological principles to separate what's within the mind from what's independent of the mind. So we have Banno insisting "the actual world is a possible world". And the ensuing sophistry of "the alternative would be to claim that the actual world is impossible".