Trial and error is how we learn, yes, but not necessarily as individuals, that is to convoluted. We get most passed on by our parents, society at large, by tradition.... and then we can work with that and try out some things, sure. But almost nobody has the time, energy and the genius to make that sort of strategy work purely as an individual. — ChatteringMonkey

You think trial and error is convoluted, it's actually extremely simple compared to trying to explain how we learn from others.

If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next? — Mww

I've given it considerable thought, and I just cannot understand Hume's description of perception as a succession of individual perceptions, related to each other through resemblance. This seems to be completely inconsistent with my experience.

If I take an experience of sitting and paying attention to my senses, I have the experience of a continuous act of perception. That a large part of what I am perceiving with my vision is remaining the same, as time passes, indicates to me that this is one continuous act of perception. Yet I know that it is extended temporally because my perception does not remain the same, perfectly. The sense of sound especially, provides me with many changes which are not evident in my visual field. There are sudden sounds for example, a bird, a dog, or continuous changing sounds, like a car passing or other machinery operating. These aspects of change which coexist with my continuous visual perception of many things remaining the same, vary greatly in the way that they punctuate the continuous perception. The sound of a gun shot for example, is sudden and quickly disappears, but in the visual field, the sun moving across the sky is slow and persistent, requiring a willful reference to memory to be noticed. In none of this, do I experience a succession of distinct perceptions which are related by resemblance, as is required to be consistent with Hume's description.

So I think that Hume manufactures this description, by throwing in artificial interruptions. By hypothesizing a succession of interruptions, Hume creates the illusion of a succession of distinct perceptions. But it's not really a succession of distinct perceptions, it is the continuous act of perception with numerous interruptions. Or, it might be a number of distinct acts of perception, each being a continuous act, but for a limited duration of time.

And if I look at the act of the conscious mind, as willful, intentional thinking, I do not find that this is consistent with Hume's description of a resemblance relation either. The progression of thoughts is not related by some form of resemblance, rather the thoughts are related by principles of conception, or other associations, and habits produced over time, and by training. There does appear to be what can be referred to as distinct thoughts, probably due to the use of distinct words which are like united bundles of meaning, but they are not related to each other in the way that Hume says perceptions and impressions are related to each other.

Even if I look for something that fits in between my act of paying attention to my senses, and my willful thinking, something like dreaming, where my mind appears to run free without influence from the senses or conscious intention, I do not find what Hume describes. I find that I might describe this as a succession of distinct impressions, but I do not find that the impressions are related by resemblance. In fact I see it very hard to see how the distinct impressions of a dream are even related to one another because it is not consistent with my conscious habits of association and training. It appears like there's a large aspect of randomness in my dreaming.

So I find that Hume's description of perception is not at all consistent with my experience. He doesn't properly consider the continuous act of sensing and proposes interruptions to break this act it up into distinct perceptions. But this is only done to make perception consistent with thought, which seems to employ distinct objects. Then he tries to manufacture continuity out of these distinct objects, through a resemblance relation, and this cannot provide him with continuity as we know it, in its basic, intuitive form, as derived from continuous perception. So he insists that this manufactured continuity is erroneous, a falsehood. And yes, it is a falsity, but only because it does not adequately recreate the continuity which continuous perception gives us, it is a synthesized continuity. Therefore he does not disprove continuity, as an erroneous idea, like he claims, he just proves that this synthesized continuity, which he has manufactured from interrupted perception, is not an adequate representation of the true continuity of perception.

Predetermination of what it will be IS an existence so, coming into existence is voided by this language. — ucarr

Predetermination is not existence. You might like to claim some sort of principle like, only something existing could predetermine, but I think the proper position is that only something actual could act to predetermine, as cause. And it is not necessary that an act is an existent. I think that is the point of process philosophy.

Also, how does predetermination of what will be come into existence? Infinite regress. Why? When you try to speak analytically regarding existing things, you plunge into infinite regress. This is why useful analyses begin with axioms. — ucarr

I don't see this problem of infinite regress. I only see infinite regress from your proposal that only an existent could act to predetermine an existent. This produces an infinite regress of existents, as each existent requires an existent as its predetermining cause.

As above, "randomness" is an existing thing. Your language indicates this: ...there would just be randomness... — ucarr

No randomness is not an existing thing. It's a principle which we talk about, but very far from being an existing thing. Not everything we talk about is an existing thing.

This seems overly simplistic. Banno can do better. — jgill

This is Banno's patented bullshit story, which Banno knows is bullshit, yet will continue to defend until the very end of Banno's time. Simply put, you see yellow on one side, and you see red on the other. You do not see yellow changing to red, nor do you see red changing to yellow, as the latter assigns a priority to red, and the former assigns a priority to yellow.

This bullshit is just a ploy by Banno to create ambiguity in the meaning of "change", so that equivocation can be effectively used in the practise of sophistry. It is examples like this which display the reason why I accused Banno of dishonesty in the truth thread.

But my general point is that every choice we make is done in a situation of infinite possibilities and without anyway to know we have done the best or correct thing. — Andrew4Handel

Your approach to 'what should I do?' is far too complex and convoluted. You are asking, after I've done what I choose, how will I know whether I've done the best thing. Give this up, only an omniscient being, like some assume God to be, could ever answer that, and we are only human. Furthermore, being human we also know that we could always make mistakes. Therefore it doesn't even make sense to even try to do the best thing, because doing the best thing, even if you could know what that is, is often beyond your capacity as well. So forget all that nonsense, it's a very poor approach to decision making which will paralyze you in fear of not doing your best.

So, I suggest that you start with a simple trial and error type of approach. Choose a random thing to do. After you've done it, take note of some coherent observations of the act itself, and of the consequences. Then, see if you can judge whether it was a good thing or a bad thing. Do this a few times, and see if you can start to produce some sort of scale, definitely bad, could have been better, definitely good. After a while you'll be able to start to understand what sort of consequences you prefer (good), and which you dislike (bad). Assuming you are not in jail by this time, you can proceed toward judging the observations you've made in your trial and error process. You'll be able to see what type of actions produce a favourable result and which produce a bad result. This ought to help you in the future, to decide what to do.

Existence precedes essence. — ucarr

Not really. When a thing comes into existence it must be already predetermined what it will be, or else there would just be randomness, consequently no thing, as a thing has structure. Therefore a thing's essence, (what it will be), must precede its existence, (that it is).

As a math person what immediately comes to mind when the word metaphysics arises is Leibntz's notion of the infinitesimal. These tiny things cannot possibly exist, yet they can be used to develop profound mathematical results. — jgill

Yeah, these are tiny fictions which are used to resolve mathematical problems. I have a more accurate description for them "white lies".

The rest of the section, 213-218, is pretty much a rehash of what has been already stated, with little new material. He states a challenge at the beginning of 213:

Let it be taken for granted, that our perceptions are broken, and interrupted,
and however like, are still
different from each other ; and let any one upon this -
supposition shew why the fancy, directly and immediately, proceeds to the belief of another existence, resembling these perceptions in their nature, but yet continu’d, and uninterrupted, and identical; and after he has done this to my
satisfaction, I promise to renounce my present opinion. — 213

Here we have complete evidence of Hume's mistaken interpretation of the philosophical concept of "identity". Notice that he uses "identical" here, and this is indicative of how he interprets "identity". For him, "identity" is a continued invariable existence which he earlier called "perfect identity". But in philosophy, the law of identity, and even in vulgar uses of "identity", the word is used to refer to a thing which remains being the same thing despite undergoing changes. So it is not at all meant to indicate invariable existence as Hume supposes.

So "identity" does not equate with "identical", and the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, is actually intended to provide for the changing nature of a thing. It allows that we can say the identified thing, X, at one time has the property A, and at another time does not have the property A, all the while continuing to be the same thing.

The entire section therefore, has Hume attacking a strawman "identity", due to his misunderstanding of identity. So his purported causes, or reasons, why we assume an independent existence (dual existence), being a fanciful imagination, are incorrect, and his claim that the dual existence is unjustified is equally incorrect.

To get to the real causes for the assumption of dual existence, look at Hume's premise above. "Let it be taken for granted, that our perceptions are broken, and interrupted, and however like, are still different from each other". "Interrupted" refers to a break in temporal duration. And, although it is true that sense perceptions do get interrupted, it is also true that they have a temporal duration inherent within them. A perception requires a temporal duration. So each perception has an extent of duration, and does not exist as an atemporal, timeless, static moment. This duration provides us with an uninterrupted perception, during which time we perceive the activity of change.

Now, we can understand that sense perception is fundamentally an uninterrupted observance of activity, which occurs through temporal duration. Hume throws interruptions into the sense perception, and these interruptions (being caused for a multitude of different reasons) are very real as well. So the fundamental constituent of perception is continuous uninterrupted activity, which is change. But, these perceptions may also be interrupted. When they are interrupted we perceive the before and after of change, and we do not perceive the activity of change itself. So we posit the independent object, as the thing which is changing, to account for the reality of the changes which occur that we do not perceive when the perception is interrupted. Accordingly, any time that I perceive things (such as my chamber) to be different from the last time I perceived it, having been an interruption in my perception, but due to a very high degree of resemblance remaining, I am inclined to believe that if my perception had not been interrupted, I would have perceived a continuity complete with the activity of change, then I invoke the "independent object" to account for this deficiency (interruptedness) of my perception. The change, which I did not observed, happened to the independent object while I wasn't looking.

So you can see that rather than assuming an independent, invariable, unchanging "identical" object of Humes "perfect identity", what the "identity" of philosophy, and common use, refers to is a changing object. This misunderstanding has completely misled Hume as to what causes us to take the independent, distinct and continued object for granted. The independent object is not an imaginary, fanciful ideal, of a perfectly invariable, unchanging object with "perfect identity", as Hume presents us with, rather it is a continuously changing object which philosophers and the vulgar take to be the independent object with "identity". And such an independent object is assumed not as something from the imagination, as completely fictitious and erroneous, but it is assumed with good reasons. We assume it to account for the difference between continuous, uninterrupted perception, and the interruptions in perception, which naturally occur for many different reasons.

More evidence of Hume's mistake can be seen at 215. Here he repeatedly refers to the idea of continued existence, as something imaginary, in complete denial or ignorance of the fact that continuity, or continued existence is derived directly from sense perception. We sense activity, motion, and this requires an uninterrupted duration of time, constituting a continuity of existence. All of our five senses detect motion, activity, therefore continuous existence, and the idea of continued existence is derived from this, not from the imagination.

Consider the following:

The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new
fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy,
by ascribing these contrary qualities to
different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the
continuance to objects. — 215

He does not assign continuance to perceptions. If he properly assigned continuance to perceptions, which is necessary due to the fact that we actually perceive motions and activities, which can only be described in terms of temporal continuity, then he would see that the presented contradiction inheres completely within sense perception itself. We have continuous perceptions which get interrupted. Therefore continuity, "continuance" in this case is a feature of the perception itself, and we do not need to assume an independent object to account for the reality of continuity. Continuity is inherent within our perceptions. However, we do assume the independent object to account for the interruptions in our perceptions. When the continuity of sensation is interrupted, and we have good reasons to believe that there was continuity, then we need to assume the independent object to account for these good reasons.

Notice that the assumption of the independent object is not a product of the fancy, or imagination, as Hume claims, it is the product of good reasons. Hume's strawman "identity" as a perfect, ideal, invariable continuity of an object, rather than the changing existence of true identity and true objects, is what misleads him into thinking that the idea of an independent object is a product of the imagination rather than a product of good reason.

Again, we see a similar issue at 216. He says that we must make any supposed external objects to resemble internal perceptions. But he does not respect the duality of perception which I've pointed out. We perceive some aspects of a perception as unchanging, and some aspects as changing. And it is this dual nature of perception which leads to the contrariety which he refers to, rather than a difference between sense and reason. Some aspects of the perception appear to continue unchangingly, and other aspects of the perception are changing. Both of these are inherent to the perception itself.

So finally, p217, we see a very clear expression of how Hume's misunderstanding of "identity" has misled him.

'Tis a gross illusion to suppose, that our
resembling perceptions are numerically the same ; and .'tis
this illusion, which leads us into the opinion, that these
perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even
when they are not present to the senses. — 217

Clearly, it is the activity, and motion of our perceptions which incline us to believe in the continuity of perception. The resemblance between interrupted perceptions does not lead us to believe that they are identical, or "numerically the same", thereby causing us to create this imaginary fiction of continuity as Hume claims. The idea of continuity has already been created by our perceptions of activity. The resemblance between one interrupted perception and another, which is not a "perfect identity", only inclines us to believe that there is a continuity of activity, or change, which unites the two, thereby validating what we tend to believe, that they are not perfectly the same. So it is change which we attribute to continuity and identity, not sameness. The independent, identified thing, is assumed to be continuously changing, not maintaining a "perfect identity", as in "identical" like Hume has presented.

This is just assertion. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I'd say it's specualtion, and it would require a long discussion to get through all the reasons for that speculative assertion, but I did provide a brief explanation, and some examples.

I thought physics supported the idea of the world being made fundamentally of probabilities and constant activity, individuation of objects is something we do, which is clearly helpful for all kinds of reasons. So I am unclear here of your example. — Manuel

I think the point is that both perspectives are supported. This is why we can't say that one or the other, sense or mind is correct, they are each tuned in to different aspects of reality, kind of like each different sense is tuned in to a different aspect. It wouldn't be correct to say that one apprehends truth and the other falsity.

That's why I argued that reality is complex, and referred to Aristotle's system by which everything is composed of both matter and form. These two aspects seem to be completely incompatible, but somehow things consist of both. The mind has a wonderful way of making incompatible things appear to be compatible, like the number line of real numbers, makes distinct and discrete units, numbers, appear to be compatible with a continuous line.

I'm going to go try to finish reading the section now, and will report back.

The issue is, is it correct to say that a perception of say, a curtain NOT moving in the wind, that is, appearing static, count as a distinct perception? — Manuel

Where I have a problem is with the idea of a distinct sense perception. I do not believe there is such a thing, and therefore I think this idea is a misrepresentation. As you agree, sensation always occurs over a duration of time, and we might add that there is always a spatial element as well. What could possibly constitute the spatial and temporal boundaries of a perception, boundaries being required to make the sense perception properly distinct from other perceptions? Time appears continuous, so it seems that any temporal divisions would be completely arbitrary, imaginary and fictitious. And a spatial boundary for a distinct sense perception could not be well defined either, as sensations seem to just get blurry, fuzzy, or confused, toward the sense's spatial limits.

My proposal would be to completely dismiss the idea of a distinct sense perception, as unreal, and misleading. Then, if there is such a thing as a distinct perception, this would be something which the mind has created with the imagination. And, we can see that we do this (create the illusion of distinct perceptions), for a reason. The mind is fundamentally analytic in its desire to understand, so it breaks down the sense information into composite parts, which you might call distinct perceptions. We can see this analysis and comparison of parts, in the mind's treatment of each and every one of the five senses, and also in its comparison between what the various senses provide. So the idea of a "distinct perception" is something the mind produces from its own way of dealing with what it derives from the senses, The senses themselves, in no way produce distinct perceptions.

But plainly we must attribute distinctness to perception, if we didn't, then we wouldn't register anything, just movements of events. — Manuel

I think that this is exactly the case. All that the senses provide is movement information. We need to pay attention to the very close relationship between senses and the brain, and recognize that the brain is not a sense organ. So whatever the brain adds to sensation, this is not coming from the sense. And if our proposed separation is between mind and sense, then we would say that since it's not coming from the sense, but from the brain, it must be contributed by the mind.

This is a basic problem with Hume's approach. His proposed separation appears to between the senses, and reason. But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area.

It does, and I think we can venture to say - based on current evidence - that "higher" mammals tend to perceive this particular aspect of the world similarly, they seem to sense continuity in a single object. But we know that isn't the case, though Locke pointed this out several times, we now have advanced physics that tells us so. There are no fixed objects in nature. It's just the way we see the world. — Manuel

What higher mammals have, which allows them to perceive the world in this way, is greater brain capacity. This is not a greater sense capacity. And it's very interesting to look at the sense capacity of some of the lower mammals, rodents, and even creatures like reptiles and insects. Some of the specific sense capacities are unbelievable. So the term "higher" here is used to refer to the creature's brain capacity, not its sense capacity. And when you say that higher mammals perceive the world in a specific way, this is attributable the type of brains that they have, not to their senses.

If we adhere to the principles then, we sense continuity, but the brain wants to break up the continuity into discrete, or distinct parts for the purpose of understanding. Therefore, individual, fixed and distinct objects is a creation of the brain, hence mind (even reason?) rather than senses. Now Hume says that this is an unjustified creation, an erroneous fiction. However, we must pay respect to the fact that we call these creatures with the advanced brain capacity "higher" mammals. And, we consider that this analytic aspect of the mind which breaks the sensations into parts for separate comparison and understanding is an advantage. Therefore we ought not conclude that this separation into distinct objects is an erroneous mistake, as Hume does. Furthermore, the science of physics supports this position of distinct individual objects with the concepts of gravity, mass, and inertia. And so, we really ought to conclude that it is the senses which are misleading us, with the appearance of continuity, not the mind or brain with its assumption of distinct objects.

Of course, that is an oversimplification because we really need to separate space and time to distinguish whether one of these is responsible for the intuition of continuity, and the other responsible for the intuition of distinct objects. That's what I mentioned earlier in the thread, that there is a fundamental incompatibility between continuity and distinct objects, though Hume simply classes these together and talks of the continued existence of a distinct object. If, for example, we say that an object's spatial existence is discrete, or distinct, and its temporal existence is continuous, it appears like we might have both distinct and continuous within an object. However, as the ancients knew, objects are generated and corrupted in time, so that temporal continuity is a bit elusive, and as we now know from things like gravity and electromagnetic fields, objects overlap each other in their spatial presence, so that spatial distinctness is a bit elusive as well.

Senses are very good at what they do: react to what they're supposed to react to. But we know that senses alone, absent some mental architecture, however minimal, would leave us no better than an amoeba or some other creature with a rather poor nature.

So, if reason is a problem, and senses don't help with objects, it is correct to postulate something else, call it nature, instinct, negative noumena - SOMETHING, that renders this intelligible. Even though Hume concludes that the imagination misleads us here, it is a faculty not explored enough, that can also be postulated. — Manuel

So the problem here is with the sense/reason division. As described above, there is vast area of activity which fits neither category, it lies between these two. We can find other ways of dividing, sense/brain, or body/mind, but each has its own problems of not being able to properly account for everything, sp we get aspects, parts of reality which have no category. This indicates that this sort of division is not the best way to go. The same problem is evident in the distinct perspectives of Parmenides and Heraclitus, and Plato's attempts to resolve the issue with the mind/body dualism.

This is why Aristotle proposed a completely different system. The proposed division is between actual (formal) and potential (material). The difference here, which made his system so useful is that all elements of reality are considered to consist of both aspects (although he did leave open the possibility of pure, separate form). This means that instead of classifying all aspects of reality as either of the mind or of the body, we say that within each individual part of reality which is presented to us for consideration, there is a formal aspect and a material aspect. From this perspective, the difficulties we incur in our attempts to understand, (such as that presented by Hume), are due to our inability to properly differentiate the formal (actual) part of the thing from the material (potential) part of the thing.

In any case, knowledge of objects brings with it the idea of something not quite being right with naive, "vulgar" pictures of the world. — Manuel

The vulgar or naive perspective fails to account for the complexity of reality. It is a simplistic view which serves us well in all our mundane activities, so it has become the dominant view, a simplistic monism. The philosopher seeks a higher understanding and quickly uncovers the problems inherent with the simplistic view. The difficulty for the philosopher is in finding a system which can resolve all the problems in a coherent way.

One part of the paradox, which he states but does not expand on, is the topic of the duration of these perceptions. Although not in the section you are discussing now, he uses examples of closing his eyes or turning his head and then states that these perceptions are new. — Manuel

The subject of duration in relation to sensation is very intriguing, and actually quite difficult. Suppose we take your example, the chamber, and you observe it in a way one would describe as continuously. Now when you think about it, you are only ever actually perceiving the chamber at any given moment of time, at the present. The rest of your supposed continuous observation is in the past. So you always have a moment of perception, now, and memories of past perceptions, and this constitutes your continuous observation.

If I ask you to describe what you see, you might be inclined to describe a static scenario, walls windows, chairs, desk, etc.. It is this idea of a perception, that a perception is of a static thing, or static array of things, which produces the problem of identity which Hume describes. This is because you would also refer to past static descriptions, a few moments ago, as perceptions, and there would be some slight changes to your perceptions, as you say.

But what if you described activity instead? The curtain is moving in the wind, a dog is running outside the window, someone has walked into the chamber and is now moving a chair. Isn't this really the way that we describe what we are seeing at any given time? We sense activity, and this is very clear with hearing. And when we describe what we are sensing, these are observations of activity..

The issue here is that perception is not ever at an instant in time which is the moment of the present. We tend to assume that there is a moment at the present, which constitutes the instant that sense perception is taking place, but in reality sense perception only occurs over a duration of time. So what the senses are really picking up is motion, activity, and we actually directly observe change with the senses.

So, if someone represents our observations of change as seeing the way things are at one moment (a perception), then seeing them in a different way at the next moment (the next perception), and we conclude with the use of reason, that change has occurred between these two perceptions, this is really not the way that we actually sense change. Through the senses we are actually perceiving change directly. And this, perceiving change directly, as activity and motion, is what leads us to believe in continuity. Instead of seeing the chair here at one moment, and there at the next moment, we see someone moving it. We see the curtain moving in the wind. And this, sensation of activity, is what produces the propensity toward believing in continuity. So when our sensing is interrupted, as it often is, and we see that the chair is in a different place than it was yesterday, we assume a continuity of change between these two perceptions, because this is what we would have seen if we kept up the observation.

The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. As Aristotle demonstrated, change is what occur between is and is not. A thing goes from having a given property, to not having it, and "change" refers to the intermediate, neither having nor not having the property. But reason tries to describe change as a series of static pictures, of is and is not. Things were like this, then like that, and finally like so. Notice that change is always what occurs between the static pictures which reason likes to employ. So this is the incompatibility between sense and reason. Sense gives us a picture of continuous change, while reason says that at any step of the way it must be describable as either this or not this, and if it is changing from being this to not being this, it must be describable as being something else.

If you are willing, I will proceed further with the reading of the presented section. I believe I broke off at page 208 where he is in the midst of supporting the claim that continuous identity is an erroneous, fictitious principle.

He continues on with this argument, proposing the possibility of assuming an external object, independent from the perception. Such a 'dual existence' could resolve the contradiction, allowing that perceptions are interrupted, and the independent object maintains identity as a continuously existing object. This, assuming an external object independent from perception, is what he called "feigning a continu’d being". He says that this is done to support "identity". We have perceptions from one time to another, which appear to be perfectly identical, so we want "identity" despite the interruptedness of perception, and so we assume an independent object to support "identity".

This feigning of continued being is attributed to the "vivacity of the idea". (We ought to have proper respect for the fact that "vivacity" implies activity, change.) The vivacity involves a smooth passage from the present impression (I assume this is a strong sense perception) to the idea. But this description is rather convoluted, as it involves smooth passage between numerous impressions, and also the "propensity of the imagination". So the vivacity of the idea is really a very complex concept, involving numerous impressions, memory, and imagination. In any case, the vivacity of the idea is what leads to, or causes the feigning of a continued being, identity.

Simply put, we have impressions which through the use of memory appear to be perfect resemblances, but interrupted in time. The interruptions are caused by us (lack of attention etc.). And so we ascribe continued existence to independent objects.

So we have the foundation here for dual existence. The perceptions, separated by time, though providing the appearance of perfect resemblance, are known not to be perfect resemblances. |Perfect resemblance" of these impressions is a falsity. So they do not provide a reasonable approach to identity (209). However, the resemblance is very strong, vivid, producing the propensity for the idea of "identity". Thus philosophers have assumed "identity", and independent objects, to account for what is believed to be a deficiency in perception. Perception is incapable of providing the reason for an independent object, but the false principle "identity" provides a philosophical remedy to this deficiency.

Now he proceeds with descriptions of experiments which demonstrate that perceptions themselves do not have any independent existence. They are dependent on the organs of the body. So philosophers adopt a separation between perception and the object. This is a principle Hume calls "palliative", as a supposed remedy for the senses' inability to provide us with true identity, a vivid idea which we have a propensity toward due to the resemblance of perceptions.

So again we have the sort of paradox exposed (211). We start with the assumption that our only objects are our perceptions. We are led from the appearance of perfect resemblance amongst the impressions, toward believing in a continuous identity. But the perceptions are also known to not actually give a perfect resemblance. But resemblance itself produces a propensity to believe in identity, so we assume independent objects to support identity. But this negates the starting point, that our only objects are our perceptions. (A sort of Hegelian dialectics here.)

So at this point (212) we have two contrary positions, the vulgar, that our only objects are our perceptions, and the dual existence proposed by philosophers, that there are independent objects, distinct from our perceptions. The stumbling point between these two is "identity", and the supposed continuous existence which is the only support for this principle..

Thanks for the added information. However, what you've provided, I think, only confuses the issue more. It's been a long time since I picked up that book, and I never read it in completion. I suppose I was unimpressed by Hume's perspective.

I do not like the idea of classing all things which appear to the mind, together as perceptions. Clearly a sense perception has a completely different type of existence from an emotion. How can we say that an emotional feeling such as anger, for example has the same type of existence and effect on the mind as a visual image? Aren't emotions affections, implying that the mind has already been affected by the time that the emotion exists. The emotion seems to have an inner source, and is directed outward toward something external, while the sense perception seems to have an external source making an impression on the internal.

And I really think we need clarity on what Hume means by "reasoning". Where does reasoning fit in to this structure? It is clearly not the same as sensing. But if sensing is the means by which the mind creates sense perceptions, what does reasoning create? Is there a different type of perception created by reasoning, or does reasoning just do things with preexisting perceptions?

We’ve been granted the very thing we’ve no warrant to trust. The skeptic cannot defend his reason by reason, so how does he defend it, or does he not bother defending the very thing by which he acquires his ideas? — Mww

Here's the thing. By what means can we say that ideas are acquired by reasoning? Without a separation between the different types of things which are present to the mind, we have no basis for saying that some perceptions are produced from the senses, and some are produced by reasoning. This comes back to the issue of the difference between sensing and dreaming. If we cannot make any separation between the things within the mind which are directly derived through sensation, and the things which are directly created by the mind itself, then we will be hopelessly lost when approaching skepticism. Since there is always elements of uncertainty in anything we do, the only way to get beyond skepticism is to set up some divisions, some categories to properly classify the different types of things which are present to the mind, thereby attempting to isolate the uncertainty. Without this, the uncertainty will appear to be everywhere.

I think these relations are, let's say, of the mind, but not present to mind; that distinction belongs exclusively to perceptions, and the relations among perceptions are not themselves perceptions. — Srap Tasmaner

If only perceptions are in the mind, and relations are not perceptions, then where are the relations? Does this mean that they have separate, independent existence? But this doesn't seem right, because when we say that something is bigger than another thing, this is a judgement made in the mind. Now we could say that this relation, "bigger than" is an idea in the mind, but since this idea relates perceptions, one to another, it must be something other than a perception. This is why we need to allow distinct categories of the different types of things which exist in the mind.

What are they then? I think they are something like laws. — Srap Tasmaner

This is where the issue gets very tricky, and difficult, I believe. Relations such as the one mentioned above, "bigger than", can be described as laws, like you propose. However, these laws are universals, the same law is applicable to the relations between many different individual perceptions. But when we assume that perceptions are particulars, individuals with a unique identity, as Hume does, then applying the universal laws reveals the uniqueness of each individual's particular relations with others. This we know as measurement. So in a sense then, we assume universal laws as a means for determining each individual's unique relations. This means that the relations are of the particular, the thing being measured, not of the law, which is the thing being applied in measurement.

The laws of nature are there in somewhat the same way the laws of inference are in an argument. We have our premises, we pass from one formula to another, reaching a conclusion, but if we rely on modus ponens or conjunction elimination, they are not there in the argument as premises, but as the laws that carry us from one formula to the next. We're used now to axiomatic deduction systems in which the rules of inference are explicitly chosen — and thus part of the system though part of no argument — but in olden times, modus ponens would be present only implicitly, and perhaps postulated, or discovered, as a legitimate way of getting from some claims to others. — Srap Tasmaner

This is why it is important for us to determine exactly what Hume means by "reasoning", if there is any understanding to be found here at all. We do not really follow laws in reasoning, the laws are just stated in attempts at formalizing reasoning, describing what reasoning consists of. So for example, if I say all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal, I draw this conclusion without following any rules or laws. I just know somehow, that if everything in this class is mortal, and Socrates is in this class, then Socrates is mortal. It's because it makes sense to me, it is reasonable to me and everyone else, that it becomes a rule. It is not reasonable because it is a rule. We can see this more clearly with something like the law of noncontradiction. Contradiction does not make any sense, it is unreasonable, and so it was unacceptable long before anyone formulated the law of noncontradiction. So reasoning doesn't follow laws, the laws follow from the reasoning.

With those analogies in mind — and I think they're close to Hume's intentions and world-view — most of the book is an exploration of the mechanisms by which we pass from certain perceptions, be they impressions or ideas, to other perceptions, generally (but not always) to new ideas. He says something like this on almost every page of the book — we pass smoothly from this one perception to this other one because of the resemblance between them, that sort of stuff. It's everywhere, because it's the whole point of the book. But those resemblances, for instance, they're something we can reflect on and have ideas about, as he has done, but they are not themselves perceptions present to the mind. (There's a regress argument here, but I'm not sure it's Humean. It's the same problem you would have if you had nothing with the status of an inference rule, and had to take modus ponens as a premise. That doesn't work.) — Srap Tasmaner

This does not seem like a good way of describing reasoning, the act of passing from one perception to another. It does not account for the creative aspect of reasoning. Reasoning creates ideas. Consider the example above, All men are mortal, Socrates is a man. What is created by this reasoning process is the idea that Socrates is mortal. So we start with a universal law, and make a conclusion about a particular. And of course there are other forms of reasoning, like inductive, where we take particulars and create a universal.

Our subject here, the belief in body, I believe is something like one of these laws of thought, not an idea we have but how we pass from the lamp impression to the lamp object belief, from the book impression to the book object belief, and so on. — Srap Tasmaner

Th problem though is that Hume gives an account which is incoherent. So we must ask why, determine where his mistakes lie, which render the subject as incoherent.

But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head. — Manuel

I think that this is the key to the issue, the concept of unity. Thinking, or reasoning, is not a simple matter of successive perceptions. There is a unity of perceptions created, through categorization, or logic or other means. So when Hume talks about recognizing resemblance relations, this is only a part of the operation. Such relations allow us to categorize things as being of "the same" type, thereby creating a unity of different things that are the same type. But we do not believe that the things classed as the same type, and being part of that unity, are the very same thing, in the sense of perfect identity. So reasoning concerns itself with creating unities out of distinct parts, and it really has no interest in whether the distinct parts have a proper. or "perfect\" identity within themselves. Reasoning is only concerned with the identity assigned to the distinct parts, as member of such and such categories, the part's position in the unity.

"Unreasonable" cannot be the right word here. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it's a fair word, because he states in the very first sentence of the section, that the skeptic concerning the existence of body, "cannot defend his reason by reason". Therefore we can conclude that this is unreasonable.

I think your disagreement is with Book I Part I Section I, where Hume claims that all our ideas are derived from impressions. Thus, no innate ideas. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so the premise is clearly stated at that part of the book. Now we ought to dismiss this premise as false, mistaken,for the reasons discussed.

So, no, Hume is not ignoring other causes that arise from within your own body: they are all impressions. — Srap Tasmaner

This cannot be true. He describes the perceptions (or "impressions" if you prefer) as having "relations" with each other. Relations are different, distinct from the things which are related. Yet the relations are necessarily present within the mind, and are part of the mind. Therefore it is false to claim that the mind consists only of impressions, or perceptions. It is becoming very clear that this is Hume's mistaken premise. Look at his description of mind at 207 for example:

As to the first question ; we may observe, that what we
call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different
perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos’d,
tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and
identity. — 207

The problem is, that Hume's former premise, that the mind consists only of perceptions, or impressions, is what is actually proven to be false here. The concept of identity is not proven to be false. This scenario, of perceptions passing in and out of the mind, while maintaining continued, independent and distinct existence, is supposed to be the falsity, the error, which he exposes. But if this were really the case, of how the mind exists, then what constitutes being in the mind, is having "certain relations". Now, in this scenario, where perceptions have identity, "relations" are what is essential to being in the mind, not perceptions, as the perceptions maintain their identity in a continuous manner, even while outside the mind.

If it is the case that having relations with other perceptions is what constitutes being within the mind, as this is what is necessary to justify the belief in independent objects, then we need to account for what having a relation is, because this is now the essential aspect of the mind. The perceptions are allowed to exist independently, so perceptions by this description can no longer be considered to be the essential aspect of mind. The mind now must be understood as this activity which produces these relations between perceptions. So we have Hume implying that having "certain relations" is what is essential to being within the mind when he tries to justify independent existence from the premise that the only thing present to the mind is perceptions.

So he starts with that premise, that the only thing present to the mind is impressions, or perceptions, and then he tries to justify our belief in continued distinct (independent) existence of body, from this premise. The attempt to justify this belief in body fails, and he is inclined to say that the belief in independent continuous existence is an error of judgement. However, he has really demonstrated that this premise is wrong because it is inconsistent with his other premise, the belief in independent bodies, which he says we cannot deny. In other words he has taken two incompatible premises. The premise, that mere perceptions are the only thing present within the mind, is not consistent with the belief in independent bodies. To establish consistency with the belief in independent existence, he must reformulate the premise, so that the mind now consists of relations between perceptions, and these relations are what is essential to being within the mind, rather than simply perceptions themselves.

But all that aside, you’re right, I think, in that Hume didn’t identify a sufficient cause for continued existence of our impressions. And I think there is a very good reason why he didn’t carry his theory further, re: he mistakes that all perceptions of the mind, which are only one of either impressions or ideas, can only be derived from “experience and observation”, and that impressions and ideas are necessarily connected to each other. — Mww

I think I am beginning to see things your way, more and more. Hume seems to rely here on two important premises, or principles. The first one is stated clearly and explicitly, that we cannot doubt the existence of body, that to do so would be unreasonable. The second premise appears to be a bit more obscure, but it has to do with what is present to the mind. Simply stated, the principle seems to be that the only thing present to a mind, is perceptions. This is made very evident from his description of mind as a simple unity of perceptions.

Because of this second premise, only perceptions are given real causal efficacy within the mind. So as a case in point, identity is seen as a mistaken idea because it is demonstrated to be impossible that identity has been derived from perception. However, to maintain this conclusion, it is necessary that identity could not have been truthfully, accurately, or reasonably derived from a source other than perception. That the idea of continued identity has a valid cause which is other than perception would make it more than just an imaginary and erroneous fiction.

Now, when we look at the tradition involved with the law of identity, it was proposed by Aristotle as a way to account for the reality of what was demonstrated by Socrates and Plato, that our conceptions of the way that things are, is often wrong, i.e not consistent with how things actually are. So Aristotle proposed a separation between how we perceive and conceive things, as abstract forms, and how things really are in themselves, as particular material forms. The identity of a thing is the latter, the thing itself, as a material form.

Since this principle, the law of identity, implies that individual, particular things are actually different from the way that we perceive them, our perceptions of them, it is necessary that the law of identity is derived from something other than perceptions. We cannot conclude directly from our perceptions that things are not as we perceive them to be.

And, we can also understand that a human being having itself a body has access toward understanding the nature of body, or in Hume's perspective, the human being has causes which influence one's understanding of body, which are other than perceptions. We have a vast array of emotions, desires, and intentions, which influence the judgements made by our minds, which do not appear to the mind in the form of perceptions.

Here we can turn to the Platonic tradition of "the good". For Plato the good is the source of, and cause of all true understanding. But the good is not properly apprehended by the mind, like a perception would be. Also, Aristotle proposed intuition as the source of knowledge and intuition as a cause of judgement, does not appear as a perception either.

Ah, I see, sure in this sense we are talking about then, "instinct" is rather similar to "the human condition". In both cases, funnily enough, these are innate considerations not drawn from, nor extracted by, experience. — Manuel

I believe "instinct falls into the category of things I mentioned above, intuition, intention, and the good. These things have a great causal efficacy over our idea formation, yet they do not necessarily exist within the mind as perceptions. So Hume, by narrowing the field of things which are present to the mind to perceptions only, wrongfully excludes the influence these other things have within the mind. Then, when he considers identity, and continued existence, and finds these not to be supported by perceptions, he wrongfully concludes continuous identity to be imaginary, fictitious, even erroneous. But this is only because he doesn't consider the other category of influences in the mind, the causes which come directly from one's own body, instinct, intuition, desire, intention, and the good. Therefore if we allow that we can derive valid information about "body" directly from one's own body, without the medium of perception, these ideas about the nature of body, identity, and continuous existence, may be supported that way.

Still, consider the times. In the treatise, Hume mentions God four times. Count ‘em. Four. In however-many-hundreds of pages. This goes great lengths to show the separation from the philosophical standard of the time he is making, and for which he is, as ↪Manuel says, definitely of historical importance. Can’t really blame the guy for not getting the finer points out in the open, when he was the first to seriously open the box out of which his successors would step. — Mww

It was a time when human beings were stepping away from God as an explanation for what is natural. This was opening up the field of natural philosophy allowing speculation into other causes as to the existence of natural things (previously attributed to God). This was relatively early in the study of natural philosophy, so the fundamental principles were still being established.

From Hume’s point of view, from the Treatise, you mean? I’d agree with his premise, or principle, that our reason is insufficient for grounding the certainty for the existence of bodies. But it isn’t reason by which that certainty arises anyway, so his claim with respect to reason does nothing to prohibit some other means by which the certainty of the existence of things is given. — Mww

The issue is not so much certainty about "the existence of bodies", as such, because we take that for granted, with great certainty. But the uncertainty arises when we question what does this mean. What does it mean to be a body, and to exist. Then we find great uncertainty. And this is why we have the contrariety. There is extremely little certainty concerning the meaning of a phrase which we accept with great certainty.

Here is a brief exegesis of the next section (p205-208):

After determining that the idea of continued existence is a fiction, he proceeds to question why we produce such an idea. So he considers the following contradiction:

The smooth passage of
the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted
manner of their appearance makes us consider them as
so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear
after certain intervals. — p205

This contradiction causes an "uneasiness" within us, and begs to be resolved. One or the other, of these contrary principles must be sacrificed. The notion of identity supports smooth passage of our thoughts, so we are very reluctant to give up that idea in favour of each perception existing as a distinct being. So we turn to that side, the idea that our perceptions are not interrupted. However, the interruption can be so extensive that we are forced to consider that the perceptions may have existence independent from the mind.

Now there are two questions raised (p207) relating back to the stated contradiction. How can a perception be absent from the mind without ceasing to exist, and how can it become present to the mind without creation, or become present again to the mind without some form of recreation. So he proposes that a mind is nothing more than a unity of perceptions, united by relations, allowing that any particular relation may be broken and outside the mind, thus allowing the separation of a perception from a mind, thereby apparently resolving both of these two questions.

The problem I see with this proposal is that he does not ascribe a cause to these relations. The mind exists as a unity of perceptions, such that we have a "connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a. thinking being". But "thinking" is an activity, and he has posited no real cause to account for his proposal of a unity of perceptions in the act of thinking. There is no cause given for a perception to establish a relation and become part of the unity, and no cause given for a perception to break its relation and become independent from the mind.

Because of this problem. the assumption of continued existence is said to be a "feigning" (208). If we could identify the cause of perceptions coming into the unity (which is the mind) and going out of the unity, then we would have the reason for this, and we would not have to resort to invoking a feigning to account for this. So the issue here is that thinking is an activity, and thoughts or perceptions come into and go out of the thinking mind, but we have no identified cause of this activity.

If we had an identified cause, we could accurately, and truthfully say (without feigning) whether the perceptions are recreated each time they come into the mind, and annihilated when they leave it, or whether they are passed off whole into an independent space, and later come back from that independent place.

Because the cause is not identified, Hume is left saying that we "feign" continued existence. He then proceeds to analyze why we have a propensity toward believing this idea which has been feigned.

You know…..it’s awful hard to maintain the conceptual schemes of outdated philosophies. One has to keep in mind what the original author knew about, and from which his terminology derives, even if he himself alters its meaning. For instance, perception. Perception now means something very different than how Hume wanted it to be understood with respect to his “new” philosophical approach. The concept of mind itself was still taken to be one half of the entirety of human nature, while in later times it became merely an apex placeholder, having no exacting import of its own, at all. — Mww

I try to maintain a chronological order to my understanding of philosophy. It is always good to put a philosopher's writing into a temporal context. This is why I believe it is imperative toward understanding philosophy, to have a good training in ancient philosophy. This allows one to conceive of ancient ideas, how things were understood in those times, and grasp how different ideas evolve over the course of time through different influences.

...what you are emphasizing, are the reasons for the belief,... — Manuel

Sure, that's what Hume has explicitly said is the subject of this section of the book. The section is not really concerned with the vulgar beliefs themselves, it focuses on the causes of these beliefs. And, when it is found that a principal cause of one such belief is an error, this presents us with a problem.

If his reason cannot be trusted with respect to determining the existence of bodies, why would it be trusted to reasonably ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted? Furthermore, why would we be “induced to believe”, when the principle which grants the existence of bodies has been given to us, insofar as Nature has “….not left this to his choice….”? — Mww

I believe that this is exactly the unresolvable inconsistency which Hume finds himself up against. Overly simplified, it's reasonable to take the existence of bodies for granted, But it's also reasonable not too. What I think this indicates is that we ought not claim certainty about the existence of bodies.

"We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (p.187) — Manuel

The conclusion that continued existence is an erroneous assumption is not completely inconsistent with the assumption of body. It just means that body does not exist in the way that we commonly think that it does. In mysticism and some religions we find the idea that the whole world, every single body uniquely., must be recreated at each moment of passing time. We are led toward this idea because of the reality of change, and the reality of the free will. This constant recreation, which is done in a way that produces the appearance of continuity to us (consider the analogy of a succession of still frames producing a film), is attributed to the Will of God. It is necessary that God acts at every passing moment to maintain the appearance of continuity, the continuance of order, which is known to us as the laws of nature.

What he is discussing here is not the existence of these objects, it's that the reasons we give for our belief in their continued existence to be far weaker than what we ordinarily suppose. But he does not believe that we are deluded or fooling ourselves when we conclude that there are bodies. — Manuel

Yes, "far weaker" indeed. He explicitly describes the reasons for our belief in continued existence as an error, and deception. You can rationalize this however you please.

That's his own conclusion and although he says "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable — Manuel

What you quoted clearly supports what I've said. Hume believes perceptions to be distinct from each other, therefore not of a continuously existing body.

"Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu’d existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that tho’ all sects agree in the latter
sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it. There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214) — Manuel

Yes, this is the point here. Most philosophers except that there is not continuity to our sense perceptions. The necessary consequence of this is that the idea of continuous existence ought to be rejected altogether. However, philosophers, except some skeptics (such as Hume) are reluctant to reject this idea of continuous existence.

I think it is important to point out, that in Hume's use of the term, "fiction", does not mean what we mean by it today, something not being "real", or belonging to mythical tale or a novel. It simply means "more than is warranted by the empirically available evidence." It is real, in the sense that we do experience the identity of objects, but when we look at the evidence, it turns out to be weaker than we would like. — Manuel

Let me assure you, Hume is using "fiction" in a way which is very customary to us. It means something created solely by the mind, and not representative of reality, non-factual. Of course the fictitious is not warranted by the empirically available evidence, as you say, but it is more than just this, it is also a fabrication. And, if the fiction is believed to be, or presented as, a true representation of reality, it is an error, and a source for deception.

This fiction of the
imagination almost universally takes place ; and ’tis by
means of it, that a single object, plac’d before us, and
survey’d for any time without our discovering in it any
interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity. — 201

That speaks of your concerns that each perception is different, and it is by resemblance that we posit continuity. True. Now he says, on p. 204:

"I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions
by the strongest relation and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. "

Italics mine. Each perception is new, and he does not want to distinguish between objects and perceptions. Yet he still speaks of "my chamber", if he didn't have a notion of identity, he couldn't speak like this, because he would have no way to separate his chamber from anything else.

An important, passage, I think, is this:

"We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continu'd existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is forrn'd, and principies from which it is deriv'd."(p.206) — Manuel

This is an example of what Hume calls the "error" of identity at page 202. The error is caused by believing that the fiction, is true reality. Fiction misleads us into error.

To enter, therefore, upon the question concerning the
source of the error and deception with regard to identity,
when we attribute it to our resembling perceptions, notwithstanding their interruption ; I must here recall an observation, which I have already prov'd and explain'd. — 202

The error he describes, is when the mind associates one idea with another, easily passing form the one to the other, because of some relation between them, such as resemblance, causing us to judge them as the same. This disposition, to judge them as the same causes the error of identity. They are not the same. He explains this on 203. The ideas, or perceptions are not the same, they are distinct, yet they cause a similar "disposition" of mind within us, causing us to judge them as the same.

So we have here exposed by Hume, our error of identity. This error is a form of self-deception which further inclines the mind to create a fiction of the continued existence of an object. We readily associate distinct impressions with each other, and we have a disposition to judge them as the same. This judgement of same is an error, and this error causes us to believe in the continued existence of an object.

Yes, he uses "my chamber" to refer to an object with continued existence, in the "vulgar" manner, because this is the only way that we have of speaking, but he is explaining why this is an error. The general population, being unphilosophical, are misled by that error, but philosophers see through it to the reality.

That I may avoid all ambiguity and confusion
on this head, I shall observe, that I here account for the
opinions and belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence
of body; and therefore must entirely conform myself to their
manner of thinking and of expressing themselves. — 202

The persons, who entertain this opinion concerning the.
identity of our resembling perceptions, are in general all the
unthinking and unphilosophical part of mankind, (that is, all
of us, at one time or other) and consequently such as suppose
their perceptions to be their only objects, and never think of
a double existence internal and external, representing and
represented. The very image, which is present to the senses,
is with us the real body; and ’tis to these interrupted images
we ascribe a perfect identity. But as the interruption of the
appearance seems contrary to the identity, and naturally
leads us to regard these resembling perceptions as different
from each other, we here find ourselves at a loss how to
reconcile such opposite ,opinions. The smooth passage of
the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted
manner of their appearance makes us consider them as
so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear
after certain intervals. The perplexity arising from this
contradiction produces a propension to unite these broken
appearances by the fiction of a continu’d existence, which is
the third part of that hypothesis I propos’d to explain. — 205

This makes Hume a direct realist, in contrast to Kant, who puts back a separate external existence as the unfathomable, (and to Hume, absurd) Noumenon. — unenlightened

Notice, what Srap says, it is a world of perceptions only. It is when we attempt to talk about something which is beyond the perceptions, something external, that the error described above, occurs. We erroneously judge distinct perceptions which resemble each other as the same (btw, this is a central part of Wittgenstein's private language argument, the question of how we can judge two distinct sensations as the same), and then we create a fictitious temporal continuity between these perceptions which have been erroneously judged as the same. We create this fictitious continuity because that's what the judgement of "the same" requires in this case of temporally separated instances, uninterruptedness. Then we assign the "uninterruptedness" to a supposed external object. So this error forms the basis of our assumption of a distinct, external object, with continuous existence.

Yeah, this will be interesting to discuss, I'll get back to you sometime tomorrow, there's a lot to say here. — Manuel

Here are what I consider the key points. First, the "broken perceptions". Sensation is often interrupted, (for whatever reason is unimportant), so that we sense the environment at one time, and then again at a later time. Through memory we compare, and observe "resemblance". But resemblance is not the same as "perfect identity", and this inclines us to believe that the object of the past impression was annihilated and replaced by a new object. Therefore, the principal task for justifying the continued existence of an object is to establish consistency between "resemblance" and "identity", what he refers to under "Secondly" at the beginning of page 200.

But Hume explicitly doesn't care.

Same page is where he says all these mental phenomena (perceptions, feelings, ideas, what have you) are 'on the same footing.' And he assumes they are presented to the mind as discrete, already individuated packets.

He is absolutely *not* going to say they are shaped by the mind, because that suggests there is something to be shaped, something that already has a distinct existence outside the mind. But he explicitly wants only to look at perceptions etc. insofar as they are dependent on the mind: for Hume they exist at the moment we are conscious of them, and that's it. — Srap Tasmaner

Actually things are the opposite of what you say here, he explicitly does care about this matter. He is asking about "distinct existence", and this requires that the individual, the person or self, is separated from the rest of the world. It's a sort of inverse way of looking at things, but this is why he mentions the subject of personal identity. Then he explicitly concludes that the senses themselves cannot produce this separation. The senses don't distinguish what is part of yourself, and what is not.

So we cannot say that he assumes that the senses provide discrete individuated packages. He actually seems to say the exact opposite, that the senses cannot perform such a feat of individuation. This is why the senses cannot produce a dual existence.

It may be the case that he believes that perceptions exist only at the moment we are conscious of them, but he has very clearly stated that he is interested in causation, and this implies what is prior to that moment. His enquiry is into the causes of our belief in the existence of body:

The subject, then, of our present enquiry is concerning
the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of
body

If he does not separate that which is derived from the senses from that which is created by the mind, he is left with the appearance of one cause, rather than "causes".

Hume accepts the usual argument as a step toward considering perceptions only, however they appear to the mind — Srap Tasmaner

I think you are hiding behind the ambiguity of "perception". Haven't you already said that "perception" includes all things apparent to the mind. So a belief must be a perception, and he has distinctly stated that he is enquiring into the causes of a particular belief, therefore a particular perception. So he cannot be considering perceptions only, because this would imply an infinite regress or circular reasoning, where only perceptions cause other perceptions. Rather, he is considering the causes of perceptions. In the enquiry concerning the causes of what appears to the mind, we have to have some way to get outside "what appears to the mind", or else what appears to the mind is caused by the mind itself, and all reality becomes hallucinations and dreams.

So we take the existence of "body" for granted, as something outside the mind, and we say that it has causal effect within the mind. But if we did not assign causation to body, then we are just left with the mind doing all the causing, hence creating the illusion of "body", and we would still be in the same place, unable to justify the existence of anything outside the mind. So, we must determine that body has real causal efficacy to escape the skeptic's trap. Though it is true that only perceptions, within the mind, appear to the mind, it is also true that through the concept of "causation", we might be able to conclude the existence of something outside the mind. This would get us past skepticism.

I don't see how this follows. I mean, one can use the example of the Ship of Thesus: we replace on part of the boat with new wood and discard the old parts, it's literally not the same object - as it has new pieces in it, but we still recognize it as the same ship.

Likewise, if we are looking at a flower, miniscule parts of the flower are blown off by the wind, so it's literally not the exact same object one moment to the next, but we still recognize it as the same object. You can think of it as flower at T1 and flower at T2. — Manuel

Well, The Ship of Theseus is usually presented as an example of how complex and difficult the subject of identity really is, not as evidence that identity is something simple as you seem to imply here. However, I would agree with you, that the law of identity allows that a thing might remain 'the same as itself' despite undergoing many changes, thus maintaining its identity as the thing which it is despite changing. But this idea of identity presents us with a stack of logical problems.

First, we would not be able to associate identity with any type of description of the thing, because we are wanting to say that the thing remains the same thing and continues to be the same thing, despite changing and therefore requiring a different description. Furthermore, we would not be able to associate identity with any type of determination as to "what" the thing is, meaning a specified type of thing. This is because by allowing that a thing can change, and still maintain its identity by always being the same as itself, we'd have to allow that the thing could even change type, and still remain its status as the same thing. And even if we tried to establish a boundary between types, and tried to enforce a rule whereby the thing if it crossed that boundary would stop being itself, the thing that it was, to become something different, a new thing, then we'd need some principle to create this boundary. And what sense would it make to say that the thing stopped being itself, to become something different from itself.

To get back to the text, we need to pay close attention to what Hume says about "identtiy" from page 200 onward. Hume does not interpret the law of identity in the same way that you and I do. We accept that a thing changes yet continues to be itself, thus the same thing that it was, thereby maintaining its identity despite changing. Hume thinks that a thing must remain exactly the same, perfectly unchanged, to maintain its identity, by the law of identity. He attributes "identity" to invariableness:

We cannot, in any propriety of speech, say,
that an object is the same with itself, unless we mean, that
the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent
at another. By this means we make a. difference, betwixt
the idea meant by the word, object, and that meant by ifself
without going the length of number, and at the same time
without restraining ourselves to a strict and absolute unity. — p201

So you see he interprets the law of identity in a way completely different from you and I by associating "identity" with invariableness, remaining unchanged. Furthermore, this must have a profound effect on how he understands continued existence. If, to have continued existence, and maintain its identity as the thing which it is, a thing must remain unchanged from one time to another time. This is completely different from how you and I understand continued existence, which presumes that a thing continues to be the thing which it is, despite changing.

There is an issue around the individuation of perceptions.

There's that passage where Hume claims perceptions are exactly what they appear to consciousness as, etc etc, so he's basically claiming they are self-individuating. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem I have with this, is that I do not see the basis for claiming that individuation is something carried out by the senses, therefore inherent within the sense perception, rather than something produced by the mind which is apprehending the sensations. The problem again is in the ambiguity of "perception". If "perception" refers to what is created by the mind, then there is no need for any sense input, like what Manuel describes above. But when we say "sense perception", then a necessity for sense input is implied. However, in the case of sense perception, the part which is created by the mind is not distinguished from the part input by the senses. So even if we say perceptions are self-individuating we don't know for sure how much of this is done by the senses, and how much is done by the mind. So we still do not get at the source of individuation

Reading between the lines, it seems to me an inscrutable fact about how we experience the world. We strongly believe in the continuity of objects, but they change all the time. As do our perceptions. — Manuel

The problem though, is that "continuity of objects", and "they change all the time", is inherently self-contradictory. So the proposition that "we strongly believe" in this, cannot be properly supported. If an object has continuous existence, it must continue to be the object which it is, or it becomes something else. That's what change does, it annihilates the object as being what it was, to be something else. So change negates the continuity of an object, by always making it something other than it was.

Hume's mistake in the outset, is to class "continued" and "distinct" together, and try to analyze them as both the same type of property. There is a fundamental inconsistency between "continuous" and "discrete", which makes classing these two together impossible. So his analysis of sensation is a bit off, because he presumes sense perceptions to exist as individual occurrences, rather than as a continuous experience. Since we continually sense through a duration of time, the perception itself is actually changing. Each and every sense perception occurs over a duration of time, so it contains change within it. Then if we try to break up a continuous perception into distinct perceptions we can never remove the activity from the sense perception. Notice page 192, where Hume attributes motion to sensation.

So what Hume refers to as a "single" or "distinct" perception cannot really be applied logically to sense perception, because the single perception would involve activity, hence an object being in more than one place at the same time. That is because motion, and the continuity of activity inhere within sensation. Therefore, there is a logical inconsistency between Hume's "single", or "distinct" perception, and a true description of sense perception. The true description would say that sense perception consists of a duration of time, and each act of sensation could logically be broken down into a multitude of distinct frames. This implies that the double existence, and resemblance relation referred to, is already inherent within any supposed "single" sense perception itself.

In reality, what we ought to conclude from this, is that there is an incompatibility between "continued existence" (what the senses provide us with the appearance of), and "distinct existence", (what reason tells us that a sense perception must consists of). While sensation provides us with a continuity of activity, without a division, or individualization of distinct parts, or objects, reason wants to break this down into individualized parts, or distinct parts, for comparison, and analysis of different rates of change occurring to the different objects within the continuous sense perception.

So the idea of distinct objects is assumed by Hume to be derived from imagination. And, when we take this idea of distinct objects, and apply it toward our sense perceptions, sensations, we assign to the sensations, objects with a continued existence, to match up with, or to be consistent with, the "continued existence" which sensation gives us.

He describes the role of memory in this imaginary creation of an object at 196. When the sound of the door is so similar to his past experience of the sound of the door, that it could not be anything else other than the sound of the door, he concludes that it would be contradiction to say it is not the sound of the door. Therefore, he has created in his imagination, an object, "the door", and the object thus entitled must have continued existence, to account for numerous appearances.

However, in criticism of Hume, notice that the claim of an object is dependent on something else, it's dependent on the memory, and this dependence makes the assumption of a "distinct" object imaginary, created by the mind to account for the similarity between instances of memory. That the object is "distinct" is fictional, imaginary, because that claim is a product of a need to account for similarity in instances of memory. Therefore, that the object is continuous is supported logically, but that the object is distinct is not. This is the consequence of him trying to make the assumption of "object" (as a distinct individual) consistent with sense perception which is continuous. The object loses its status of being a real distinct individual, because it requires the dual status, of two separate instances, and memory to relate them. And the separate instances are similar rather than the same.

At this point, p199, he proceeds to replace "distinct" with "coherent", such that the defining features of an "object" would be "continuous and coherent", and he says that "distinct" might be assigned later, perhaps as an after thought. The use of "coherent" instead of "distinct" allows for changes to the object between one appearance to the mind, and another, so long as the changes can be reasonably accounted for as coherent. Otherwise, each appearance of the supposed object, to the mind, would be distinct from any other, due to accidental differences. And then we'd have to say that these were distinct objects.

But textually, I see no easy answer. In my own opinion, putting Hume aside, it's not evident what this necessary effect would be. — Manuel

The "necessary effect" is the assumption itself, the assumption of a body, or an object. If we have no choice in this matter, as Hume says, then this assumption must be taken as necessary. Whatever is necessary must be caused, as the effect of that cause. Therefore there must be a cause which necessitates this effect (the assumption of bodies and objects) giving it the status of necessary.

Not what I intended at all. I was, I thought, following Hume's usage in using the word 'perception' to cover both impressions and ideas; so a perception is something present to the mind, of whatever source, a perceiving that is done 'by the mind's eye' we might say. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, my mistake then, but I tend to think that "perceive" and "perception" are most often used to refer to what the mind apprehends through the medium of sensation. When the mind creates something which is not the result of sensation we normally would use "imagination", or even "conception".

As I watch the birds flitting about in my front yard, I have an impression of a bird first here, then there, then there, as it moves from tree to tree. On a naive view, we might say there is a body, some force is applied to that body, and thus the body is caused to move through the air. We can see in the bird's flight inertia, which carries it along a certain path (modified by gravity and drag) until it flaps its wings again, adding a new vector which modifies its course, and so on.

Now consider me watching this: I have an impression of the bird; that impression is replaced by a different one with the bird elsewhere. Did my impression of the bird move? Of course not; I'm sitting on my porch and all my impressions of the bird are in the same place. Did my impression of the bird acquire an inertial force carrying it from one place to another? Perforce, no: my impression did not move; my impression had no such force applied to it. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think this is quite right. What Hume seems to be asking, on behave of the skeptic, is why do you believe that you have an impression of a distinct and continuous object which you call "the bird" in the first place. You seem to have a continuous visual image, but it is full of motion and change, so why do you believe that there is a continuous, distinct object as part of that changing scenario, which is the bird?

All the following ideas, inertia and Newton's laws follow from this idea, that there are objects which have continued and distinct existence. We take it for granted that there are such objects, bodies, like the bird, because it appears like we have no choice in the matter. But if we have no choice in this matter, then there must be a cause of us taking this for granted. And if there is a cause of us taking the continued and distinct existence of objects for granted, we ought to be able to determine that cause.

So he proceeds to show that the cause is not sensation, or the senses. The reason why we believe in the continued and distinct existence of objects is not because that is the way sensation presents the world to us. Now we might be led toward something in the mind, like imagination, as the source of this belief in continued and distinct existence, but we still need to determine what causes us to have this idea.

We grant to each what it desires (nature and reason), but it is something we do,we don't have a choice. — Manuel

This is the key issue, saying "we don't have a choice". If we do not have a choice, then this is determined by fate or something, so there must be a cause of this belief. Where is that cause? It's not from sense nor from reason. Furthermore, the skeptic says that we do have a choice in this matter, and even that our belief in such objects is unfounded and therefore a bad choice. So skepticism affords us the capacity to believe what you say we have no choice but not to believe. And to validate this statement "we don't have a choice", we need to determine the cause which produces this as a necessary effect.

Of course you can disagree with Hume; but can you make a case against his view?

For instance, Hume's view as I'm presenting it (not sure I'm getting him right) could be tweaked to more closely resemble relatively mainstream psychology: to claim some physical law governs the behavior of external objects is to describe our expectations about their behavior, which will for us just be particular sensory experiences and that's what we're actually predicting.

There's (not coincidentally) a similar perspective flip in the subjective account of probability (and thus of statistics).

So what's the critique of such views beyond mere disagreement? — Srap Tasmaner

The critique is that this way of looking at things posits sensory experience as the cause of all mental ideas. Thinking, mind, ideas, and mental activity in general, is represented as being dependent on perception, therefore caused by perception. This perspective is strongly determinist, and does not allow for the reality of free will. Free will requires that ideas may come from a source independent from bodily influence (sense perception).

The offending part is this:

There is no claim that perceptions are the only kind of objects, or that all objects are really perceptions, but only that the only kind of object in our minds is perception.

The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking, we do not suppose them specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions and durations. But of this more fully hereafter.

And that's the pointer to our section, Part IV Section II, where he will refer back to this section: — Srap Tasmaner

I haven't found where you've taken this quote, but I do not think you interpret it correctly. You represent the conceptions of external objects as being dependent on, or necessarily caused by, perceptions. This denies the possibility that a representation of external objects could be entirely fictitious, imaginary, created completely by the mind. But I do not think that Hume intends this, he seems to give imagination a very strong role.

To be fair to Hume now, he seems to be more inquisitive of this perspective, that perception plays a necessary role in the conception of external objects, rather than firmly attracted to it. That's why he starts with the premise that the continued existence of external objects, cannot be justified, it's something that we just take for granted. So he moves then, to ask what causes us to believe in continued and distinct existence, what causes us to take it for granted, rather than asking what causes continued and distinct existence itself. And this leads him toward imagination.

We may, therefore, conclude with
certainty, that the opinion of a continu’d and of a distinct
existence never arises from the senses — 192

It's a funny turn around, and a bit deceptive if we don't analyze and understand the position properly. If we truly took continued existence, (what I call temporal persistence) for granted, as a real thing, then we'd move to inquire into the cause of continued existence. But Hume is taking the skeptical position, saying the idea is not justified by our perceptions, and that it's an idea that we take it for granted even though we do not have proper justification for it. This inclines him to ask what causes us to believe in continued existence, rather than to ask what causes continued existence. And it is within this hidden premise, that a belief must have a cause, if we accept it, that Hume could actually lead us to negate free will, for the sake of determinism. That is, if we accept Hume's notion that the belief in continued existence must have a cause, rather than attributing this belief to free will, and accepting continued existence as real, something to be taken for granted, and searching for the cause of it.

It's best that you give proper context to "continu'd existence". This is what is expressed by Newton's first law, the law of inertia. In general terms, this law states that what has been, in the past, will continue to be in the very same way, into the future, unless caused to change. This is the temporal continuity of existence, inertia, or temporal persistence. This law states that staying the same as time passes is to be taken for granted, and it says that change requires a cause. Notice that the reversal of this law would take change for granted (process philosophy, Heraclitus), and state that staying the same (continued existence, or temporal persistence), requires a cause. Though Newton stated his first law in such a way as to take continued existence (temporal persistence, inertia) for granted, he is also known to have said that this law requires the Will of God for its truth. That is to say, that continued existence, or inertia, is caused by God's Will. So his first law, the law of inertia, takes the Will of God for granted, in order for it to be a valid "law", effectively denying God the capacity of free will to alter what we know as continued existence, setting up the grounds for determinist physics.

Specifically what Hume is saying here is that we can have no idea of existence, an idea that we might join to another idea, as a way of having the idea of something existing. It's about our conceptions, not logic, not language. Might Hume have taken another line? Might he, for instance, have said, that to imagine an object differs from imagining it as existing in that the latter is more vivid, or more complete, or something like this? There would still, I think, be no distinct conception of existence. Even if he were to say that conceiving an object as existing is the usual conceiving but accompanied by some particular feeling, that leaves the conception the same, and this is Hume's only point.

...

Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind [ argued earlier ]; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.

That is, when we try to conceive the 'external objects' that occasion our perceptions, we have nothing but perceptions to work with — we have no other material with which to construct a conception of 'object', no material that would make such a conception a distinct sort of thing from a perception.

Or: try as you may to conceive, for once, of an external object, itself, you will only produce another idea, an idea derived from previous perceptions, impressions and ideas. It's all your mind can do; there is only one sort of object available to your mind, a perception, and any attempt to bring some other kind of object, whatever it may be, into your mind will fail utterly or substitute an idea of that other kind of object. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think Hume is correct in these points. We can pull from the imagination, a completely imaginary conception of what it means to exist, or a completely imaginary conception of what it means to be an external body, without reference to sensation. This is what happens with so-called pure mathematics, mathematicians come up with completely imaginary ideas about objects, and orders, without referencing perceptions.

In reality, we generally do reference perceptions in order to validate these conceptions, but it's not necessary to the conceptions. So we really dream up imaginary conceptions independent from our perceptions, and then we relate them to each other, conceptions to perceptions, in an attempt to validate each other. But the validation is not just one way, in the sense that the conceptions must conform to the perceptions, because sometimes conceptions can prove the perceptions to be wrong. Therefore we cannot assume, as Hume seems to, that all conceptions are based in perception.

THE TODDLERS HAVE SPOKEN!!!!!! — Mww

Yeah, let's see if the two-year-olds can validate the reality of an inertial frame of reference. Doesn't this require the reality of a straight line? Hahaha, the joke is on us.

There are authors who have written books or novels about fleeting of life or moments. One of the aspects I am agree with them the most is the fact that ephemeral is beautiful. I mean, if we consider a nettle as “pretty” is not due to their physical appearance but the brief of the moment where the flower grows up and then withers. This “transitoriness” is another perspective of how we see death. Instead of being a taboo topic, it can be understood in an artistic portrayal. It sounds so poetic, doesn’t it? — javi2541997

It does sound poetic, but true. The most beautiful things are the most ephemeral. I think that it fills us with awe to see so much complexity packed into a very short period of time. This is what music gives us, and the overlapping of temporal themes is very important. A large part of beauty seems to be associated with this temporal layering, 'occurring at the same time'. We can say that a single flower is beautiful because of its own arrangement of parts, but it doesn't even compare with a garden, or field of flowers, because the single flower always has to exist within its background, or context. That's why the unique sunset is so beautiful, because it encompasses the entire field of view. The natural and the artificial arrangement, each has its own type of beauty. But no matter how you look at it, beauty consists of a synchronicity of elements.

I think you need to be careful though to distinguish between living and dying. The transitoriness which you refer to is a property of living. It is not a property of death, because having been forced into the past (death) is permanent. Dying is the process whereby the permanent overcomes the transitory.

If living (being at the present) requires effort, then dying is an incapacity in relation to this effort. These two perspectives, looking at life as living, and looking at life as dying, are fundamentally different, like the difference between believing in free will, and fatalism. Fatalism has been demonstrated to be an attitude which incapacitates.

So the proper perspective is, to ask the question of what can I do in my act of living, rather than what can I do in my act of dying. This is because the latter, to die, is to negate one's capacity to act, and such an act would be suicide, which contradicts "what can I do", as it provides only one option, death.

At 85 turning a heavy page can irritate an arthritic finger . . . but worth the effort. — jgill

I think I'll be happy if I can still manage the keyboard at 85.

We have to keep in mind the fact that Thomas Mann saw death as an artistic expression. But in the correspondence maintained with Herman Hesse it looks like he increased the sense: without death we are meaningless. — javi2541997

I look at death as having been pushed into the past. To live, to be, to exist, is to be present in time. And at the present, the future is a massive force exerting substantial pressure over all that is at the present. Feeling the pressure which is the force of the future, is the source of excitement, anxiety, and stress. This is the passing of time, the exerting of pressure over all that is, forcing all that is, into the past, and this is known as the law of entropy.

To be at the present, to live, to exist, requires effort. We disguise the effort required to be at the present, by taking the persistence of mass for granted in the law of inertia. This law reverses our perspective, so that being at the present is taken for granted, instead of requiring effort. From this perspective, "force" is required to alter being at the present. That is a negation of the effort required to be at the present, produced by taking being at the present for granted. This makes dying, (being forced into the past) unnatural, as requiring an external force.

I want to put an example I was thinking about.
The main substance of flowers is to perish, right? Well, that's what it makes them so beautiful. Whenever a rose, nettle or sunflower flourish you enjoy it because it is beautiful and colourful. But trust me on the fact that we will end up getting tired of "perpetual" flowers in our garden for seeing them everyday in our lives.
I think this examples fits the concept of transitoriness so well. The aesthetic concept of a flourished flower is ephemeral. — javi2541997

Creativity, beauty, and all aesthetics, are a matter of the way that one exerts effort in being at the present. We can resist death, resist being pushed into the past, making oneself strong, solid as a rock, but we know that this is a futile effort. Instead, we as living beings, have learned that it is far more productive to exert our efforts towards making an appeal to others. This instinct has evolved so that now, being at the present is not a matter of long term perseverance, attempting to fight the futile battle of being solid as a rock and preventing oneself from being forced into the past, it is a matter of doing something productive for the sake of others, during one's brief time at the present. That's what we see in the beauty of the flower.

So effort is best placed, not in attempting to extend one's time at the present, indefinitely, as this is futile. Effort is best placed in doing something spectacular in a very brief moment of being at the present. So we sense the most beautiful things as occurring in the most brief periods of time, like the flowers, music, and all our moments of joy, which are but a flash in the pan, so to speak.

Yet that assumption might be like someone reading a book and believing that once a page is turned it no longer exists, or someone believing the pages that haven't been read yet do not exist until one turns the page It makes me wonder what is around me in the universe. — javi2541997

Yes, this is exactly the perspective one ought to take. To exist is to be at the present. The pages in the past no longer exist, yet we have learned from them. And the important thing to note is that the pages of the future have no existence until the prior page is turned. The living being, existing at the present, is not the one turning the pages though. The page turning is being forced upon us, and if we do not move to the next page, (which has no existence until the previous is turned), by creating a place for ourselves on that page, or even better, creating a spectacle for others, on that page, then we get forced into the past.

I believe the "agent" is anything you want it to be in game theory, so long as it is acting. This is why game theory has a very wide range of applicability. You could probably even adapt game theory to be applied to quantum physics, where fundamental particles are the agents involved in decision making.

True enough, but couldn’t that be conditioned by natural evolution? — Mww

We could say that natural selection is a process whereby different structures of order are selected for, but it doesn't account for the cause of the ordered structures which are selected for.

Again, true enough, but that kind of intelligence isn’t human, nor could it be, and human intelligence is the only one we have non-contradictory grounds to discuss. — Mww

I agree that this type of intelligence isn't the same as human intelligence, but neither is the intelligence of dogs and other animals, the same as human intelligence. This is why I said to Creative, that the way one defines "intelligence" makes a difference. But why would we define "intelligence" in such a way so as to exclude the possibility of intelligence which is not human intelligence? It makes much more sense to look at what it is which is referred to as "intelligence", and define the term accordingly. This would clearly allow for the possibility that there is intelligence which is not human intelligence. Then the argument I provided necessitates that there is intelligence other than human intelligence, if we use that open definition.

Or, we could go the other route, which I proposed above. We can maintain that definition of "intelligence" which limits it to human intelligence, as a product of the human brain, and look for another name to account for that other source, or cause of order. This name has been proposed as "soul", which is intelligence-like, but not quite the same.

Pick an explanation, I guess, run with it ‘til you trip over it. Metaphysical reductionism can only go so far before it defeats itself, right? — Mww

I don't think it's a matter of picking an idea and running with it, it's more like back and forth, back and forth, like the trial and error process I referred to above. Take a set of premises, and produce a conclusion. The conclusion is never completely satisfactory so we go back and make some changes to the premises. The conclusion is still not completely satisfactory so we revisit the premises again, and so on.

In traditional Christian theology, I believe the will is considered to be independent from the rational part of the intellect. It does not necessarily follow reason, nor does it necessarily follow concupiscent feelings. This is what makes it free, and not necessarily following reason accounts for the fact that a person can knowingly do what one knows to be wrong. This renders the cause of willed activity fundamentally unknowable, and the will itself, as that cause, is fundamentally unknowable.

[

You guys are exhibiting inconsistencies between comments. — Mww

Creative and I seem to be on completely different planes of understanding. So I really don't understand why Creative engaged me after the thread had gone dormant for a number of days. We could have both foreseen that any attempt at discourse would not get far, based on past experience. Maybe it was a matter of boredom.

I didn’t get from your comments, that you hold the senses are existentially dependent upon an intellect, or that the intellect orders the individual parts, that is to say, the biological structures, of the senses. — Mww

I think this is the position I was arguing. The biological structures, which include the senses, must be ordered in such a way so as to fulfill each one's purpose. In this case the structures which constitute the various forms of sensation must be ordered in the way required for the senses to sense. The argument is that it can only be an intellect which creates this biological order, the order which is necessary for these parts to serve their various purposes.

That there is no intellect without the physiological structures sufficient for it, is given, but that structure is the brain and ancilliary connectivity, not mechanistic sensory devices. — Mww

So "the brain" presents an interesting problem. If we equate intellect with brain, or say that intellect is dependent on brain, (as produced by it or something like that), then when I present my argument that the physiological structures which are responsible for sensation require an intellect, we could just reduce this to say that they require a brain. But the problem is that the brain itself is an organized biological structure. And the argument is that any such order in material bodies requires a cause of that type of order. And, the cause must be an intellect of some sort. So this places an intellect as prior to the brain, and impossible that the intellect is a product of, or dependent on, the brain.

You mentioned how we have exceeded our innate capabilities, or words to that effect. — creativesoul

Yes, every person exceeds one's innate capabilities, that's what learning is. We learn how to do more, and to know more than what we are born with.

The intellect is existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception(biological 'machinery'). — creativesoul

This is what you insist, but you have not justified it. And it really depends on how one defines "intellect". A materialist will define it such that the thing described in the description depends on sensory perception. A dualist sees as I do, the need to allow for some sort of intelligence as the cause of order in the living body, therefore existing prior to the "biological machinery", and "intellect" gets defined in a way to allow that it is not dependent on physiological sensory perception.

There is really no correct or incorrect definition of "intellect" here, one's preferred definition is a reflection of one's world view. However, how one proceeds from the definition makes a difference to the way that one would understand the reality of the living person.

So, I can accept your proposal, that "The intellect is existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception(biological 'machinery')", and we could define "intellect" in this way, as a function of the brain or something like that, but we still need to account for the cause of organization, and order in the living being which constitutes the material body, the cause of existence of what you call "biological machinery".

This is what I believe Aristotle proposed, a separation between "mind" (intellect), and "soul". Prior to him, "mind" and "soul" were used interchangeably, so there was much ambiguity and confusion between those who insisted as you do, that the mind is a product of the biological machinery, and those who insisted like I do, that the immaterial soul must precede the biological machinery as cause of its existence. So Aristotle separated the concept of "soul" as the immaterial cause of the material body, from the concept of "intellect", as an attribute of the soul, which is dependent on the material body.

So, the intellect orders the parts that it later doubts? — creativesoul

Yes, that would be the case. And there is really no problem with that idea, because we always proceed in our activities without absolute certainty. So we order things, move them around, with healthy doubt and skepticism, then look back at the consequences with the same skepticism, to see where we have had successes and failures. In its basic form this is trial and error, and in a more complex and structured form it is the scientific method of experimentation.

But now I've proposed a distinction between the mind (intellect) and the soul, to help you to understand this matter. Let's say that the immaterial soul is prior to the material body, as the cause of that order, and the intellect is posterior to the material body, as dependent on it, like you say. In this way, we have also a direction, or guidance toward sorting out the difference between innate knowledge, and leaned knowledge. We can attribute some sort of "knowledge" to the soul, which inheres within the living body, in its capacity to act, and which must have preexisted the living body, as the cause of it coming into existence as the very body which it is, and we can also attribute a different sort of "knowledge" to the intellect, as knowledge which is learned by the living being.

When A is existentially dependent upon B then B is necessary for the emergence of A. When something(A) is existentially dependent upon something else(B), the former(B) cannot precede the latter(A). — creativesoul

This is what I say is begging the question. Your claim was that A cannot precede B. You attempt to justify this by defining A as "existentially dependent" on B. But that's just using different words to state your conclusion as your premise, begging the question. What you needed to do was to show, give a demonstration to prove, that A is existentially dependent on B.

That would require that the intellect exist in its entirety prior to the parts that it arranges into order. — creativesoul

How do you get this conclusion of "in its entirety"? There is nothing to necessitate your conclusion that the named thing "intellect" cannot be changed as a consequence of its own actions. In fact, that's exactly what learning is, changes being made to that thing "intellect", changes being made by the actions of itself and of others. It makes no sense to insist that the intellect must exist "in its entirety", prior to learning. And, the process of trial and error, and the scientific method mentioned above, are changes which the intellect makes to itself. Why insist that the intellect must exist "in its entirety" both prior to and after such changes? How could these even be changes to the intellect, if the intellect must exist in its entirety both before and after the change?

I've no reason whatsoever to believe that the intellect is even capable of remaining intact(in it's entirety) in the complete absence of those structures. — creativesoul

I really have no idea what you could possibly mean by "in its entirety" when you refer to the intellect. The intellect is something constantly changing, learning, bettering itself. It could never be complete except possibly in omniscience, but then it wouldn't even be an "intellect" which always has the objective of learning.

Therefore your argument along these lines really is not useful. You observe an intellect using specific biological structures, and you call this an intellect "in its entirety", so as to exclude other forms of "intellect" which are using other biological structures, or even no biological structure at all, from being an intellect "in its entirety".

To use your word "tool", the biological structure is a tool of the intellect. It shapes that tool in its learning process (neurological patterns), so the intellect is actually conforming the tool to suit its purpose. Why would you not consider the possibility that it created the tool altogether?

Or, do you think that when living creatures were evolving on earth, there was a specific point in their evolutionary advancements which constituted "having an intellect" in its entirety? All creature without this definable attribute had no intellect, and those with it have an intellect. How would you propose to draw this boundary?

Whereas there is no evidence to the contrary. — creativesoul

I don't see where you derive this idea from. All the evidence points exactly in the opposite direction of what you claim. First, there is no such thing as the intellect in its entirety. Next, it is exceedingly clear, that the intellect uses the biological structures as a tool. Neurological patterns are shaped in the learning process, for various purposes. And, it is only the particular purpose, the specific end, which is dependent on the tool. The existence of the thing using the tool is not dependent on the tool. Only the particular end desired by that thing is dependent on the tool.

So you seem to see a biological structure, which has been shaped and formed toward some particular ends, and you conclude that the thing using this tool, (the biological structure), depends on it for existence. But you are not respecting the proper relationship between the user of the tool, and the tool. The user of the tool is only dependent on that particular set of tools, for obtaining that particular set of ends. You are not respecting the reality that if the thing which is using that set of tools (the intellect in this case), was inclined toward completely different ends, it would be using a completely different set of tools.

In other words, you observe in the world, human intelligence inclined in a specific way, depending on its tools (biological structure), to achieve its desired ends. And you conclude that the evidence indicates that the intellect is "existentially dependent" on that biological structure. This is fallacious logic. The intellect is not existentially dependent on that biological structure. Only the fulfillment of those specific ends is dependent on that biological structure. So now, you will move to define "intellect in its entirety", as the capacity to fulfill some specific set of ends, and insist that "intellect in its entirety" is dependent on that biological structure.

All things begin simply and grow in their complexity. — creativesoul

This is obviously a false premise which seems to be misleading you. The second law of thermodynamics indicates that the natural process is for the complexity of things to break down over time. So the starting premise needs to be the reverse of what you propose here. All complex structures naturally break down, and lose their complexity as time passes.

So, if things are observed to grow in complexity, we need to assume a cause of this. So I proposed "intellect" as the cause of this order and organization. You prefer that we define "intellect" in another way, which makes the intellect dependent on, as emergent from this organized complexity. I will consent to this, but will you consent to my proposal now, that "the soul" is the cause of this growth in complexity? Then we can have a proper separation between the soul and the intellect.

I've not given any argument. Answer the questions. — creativesoul

I didn't bother because I thought Mww gave a satisfactory answer. But I really didn't understand your use of "tool". Why do you think that the intellect has to use tools? Wouldn't the intellect be best represented as a tool itself? And as a tool, it is distinct from the senses, which might also be represented as tools. So the intellect would be a tool which we use without the requirement of trusting the senses.

In fact, in the Platonic tradition, we use the intellect to question, doubt what appears to us through sensation. That's how people figured out that the earth orbits the sun. So we have established a relation of non-trust between the intellect and the senses, and that's why the scientific method is so strict in relation to observation, such that multiple observations are always compared. This is because sensation is not trusted. So science, through the use of intellect and distrust of the senses, has led us to understand the reality of all sorts of things which we cannot directly sense, like molecules, atoms, subatomic particles, photons, and waves.

So all valid conclusions are necessary in your view? Seems our notions of "necessary" differ. — creativesoul

Yes, that's what constitutes a valid conclusion. The conclusion is necessitated by the premises. Some people call it entailment or "logical consequence".

Logical consequence is necessary and formal, by way of examples that explain with formal proof and models of interpretation. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_consequence

My claim is supported by the evidence. — creativesoul

Since "evidence" is empirical, this statement is a fallacious argument called "begging the question", which does not qualify as valid justification. You need to demonstrate logically, why the evidence shows that it is impossible to give priority to the intellect, over the senses. Simply insisting, that this is the way it is, and that the evidence supports this, does not justify your claim. Justification requires a logical demonstration.

Plato's is supported by logical possibility alone. — creativesoul

I provided you with the logical demonstration. This is not "logical possibility", it is a logical necessity. A conclusion produced by valid logic, is a necessary conclusion, not a logical possibility. Since the logic is valid, and the conclusion is necessary, you need to address the premises, if you do not believe that the conclusion is sound.

Which premise do you believe to be unsound, that a living body is an organized body, consisting of ordered parts, or, that an organized body consisting of ordered parts requires an intellect as the cause of the ordering? And, how does "the evidence" support your belief of unsoundness?

I don't quite see how it's a science or religion situation? — Agent Smith

That's right, we ought not limit our investigation of such problems just to "science or religion". The majority of "conceptual confusions" which we tend to take for granted, but are massive logical cesspools, leaky as a sieve, and spewing waste over the entire planet, are to be found in mathematics.

You claimed that we ought not trust our senses but rather our intellect. I claimed it was impossible. — creativesoul

Actually, I claimed that was Plato's message, and I explained why. You still haven't justified your claim.

To negate a number is to subtract it from zer — Andrew M

Again, we were not talking about mapping. Your analogy was stated explicitly as "To be across from something means to be reflected in a line, point, or plane."

"To be across from something" as in opposite to it, does not imply mapping. If you would have been up front in the first place, and said that you were describing opposite as mapping, instead of as a reflection, I would have rejected that right off the bat. Instead, you tried to use the ambiguity of "opposite" to lead you to "across from", then on to "reflection", and finally "mapping". That's nonsense to describe "opposite" as "mapping".

How's that going for you? — Real Gone Cat

It's going very well, thank you for asking. I find it quite amusing, a lot of fun, and a good source of entertainment. I sincerely hope it is as much fun for you as it is for me. Then we're both winners here.

You're equivocating. The subject is numbers, not statements. — Andrew M

The subject is "inverse", and "opposite", and whether mathematics uses a perverse meaning for the words, which allows that a term such as "zero" might be opposite to itself.

In our inquiry as to whether this is the case or not, we can either adhere to the logical definition of "negation", or move to some perverted definition of "negation" which you propose, ("To negate a number is to subtract it from zero"), devised by you to be consistent with a perverted meaning of "opposite", and "inverse".

Of course, we ought to adhere to the logical definition of "negation" and not succumb to the perverted definition, because then we would not grasp the perversion which is present, and not see that mathematics has perverted the meaning of "opposite" and "inverse", to allow zero to be opposite to itself.