Carry on with your terribly misguided philosophy (if one can call it that) then.

According Kripke, his wooden lectern is made of wood in every possible world where that lectern exists. There are all sorts of properties we could change and still have the same lectern, but being wooden isn't one of them.

It's an essential property. Do you disagree with him about this? — frank

Trying to get through to Banno is like banging your head on a brick wall. Banno's been trying to argue that the essential property (what's common to every possible world), is the individual.

Kripke brought up possible worlds as an aid to understanding how modality works. There are ways of parsing modal expressions that turn them into nonsense, and I think MU would be inclined to do that. He'd say we can't assert that Nixon could have lost, because if he lost, that wouldn't be Nixon.

I think this confusion arises from trying to do something ontological with modal expressions, when that's not the intent behind them. We're generally just playing with logical or metaphysical possibility, and that's the way possible worlds should be taken: as logical hypotheses. — frank

Yes, that's exactly the point, "an individual" speaks of something in a completely different ontological category from what a "logical hypothesis" speaks of. So Banno's attempt to bring the individual into the logical hypothesis was a category mistake.

We see this same mistake quite often when people speak of "possible worlds". They will say for instance, that one of the possible worlds is the actual world. But the possible worlds are just representations, logical hypotheses, and although one of the possible worlds might be judged as the correct representation, or some feature might be common to a whole set of possible worlds, it is still not the actual world, as this is a distinct category from the representation.

So yes, an individual "exists" in numerous, maybe even uncountable, possible worlds, because there are numerous, maybe even uncountable, logically-possible propositions, predicates, etc that we can say of a given individual. — busycuttingcrap

No, that's the category mistake described above. An individual does not exist in any possible worlds. As frank explained, possible worlds are logical hypotheses. Individuals are actual objects in the physical world. There might be individuals represented by such hypotheses, but no individuals exist in these hypotheses

Banno is operating on a very false idea of what an "individual" is. A name which picks out an individual designates an object in the world. If we represent possibilities for describing that individual (possible predications), each possible world is a different representation, therefore each would signify a different individual. If some of the representations have something in common, this does not mean that they represent the same individual. To represent the same individual would require that the representations (possible worlds) have everything in common.

If there was a single feature of the designated individual which was common to all possible worlds, we would say that this is a necessary, or essential feature of the individual. We could not entertain the possibility of a representation of the individual without including that feature.

Face it Banno, you're wrong. An individual cannot exist in numerous possible worlds. If the designator picks out something which is common to numerous possible worlds, it is clearly not an individual.

It looks like you're pretty firmly wedded to the idea of a Cartesian theatre. — frank

No, actually I'm not, I think it's a very simplistic representation of dualist principles. I just hear people asserting that this representation has been disproven (when to my knowledge it hasn't), and I want to know if I've missed something, or if someone has come up with something new. But all you had was the false representation of infinite regress, which I've seen before.

I'm not, but it does occasionally jar me to know that I'm a product of chemicals and customs. :grimace: — frank

If it jars you then why believe it? When something is so highly counter-intuitive, then you ought not believe it unless it is well proven. That it's pop-culture obviously does not imply that it's been proven.

We know that a rigid designator picks out the very same individual every possible world. — Banno

There is no such thing as the same individual in different possible worlds. That's a bad fiction which allows that the same individual has contradicting properties in different possible worlds, which implies that they cannot be the same individual. In other words, violation of the law of non-contradiction occurs if you call them "the same individual". Therefore "the individual" must be proper to one possible world only, and any other possible world would have a different individual. Never the twain shall meet. Frank's got the right idea, you are lost.

It's just clear that who you are is culturally and chemically mediated. Whether you are a lawyer or a gangster, that stuff depends on your environment. Was there lead in the water you drank as a child? Did you inherit schizophrenia? Were you sexually abused? Was your father a billionaire? Did you become a heroin addict?

You'll be a very different person in each of these cases, with very different emotions and cognitive functioning. This leads us to ask what the homunculus is supposed to be. — frank

I don't see how this is relevant. The homunculus is what allows oneself to adapt to such a wide range of environmental factors, like what you describe. Without such an "inner being" the living creature would not be able to change itself in the ways required to make the best of those various different circumstances. Simply put, it allows us to learn, which is to make changes to ourselves. So it is the homunculus itself which allows for what you describe, that every person is a very different person according to one's adaptations, yet still a person.

The idea of a Cartesian theatre is subject to the development of an infinite regress if we imagine that the stream of data coming into the CNS is being witnessed by an internal person. — frank

This proposed internal regress is bogus. The Cartesian dualism holds that the supposed "internal person" is non-material, therefore its method or mode of witnessing the data cannot be represented as a stream of data which needs to be witnessed again. Therefore the propose infinite regress is actually broken at the very first step, and only created by a strawman representation which does not properly represent substance dualism.

Yes, the faulty premise is that the psyche is a full fledged being that is somehow independent of the body and the body's environment. For a lot of reasons, we know that can't be what's happening. The homunculus fallacy is just part of that. — frank

How do you understand "independent" here? Does it simply mean not dependent on? Obviously it is completely unrealistic to present the two substances of substance dualism as completely independent of each other, and no form of dualism actually makes this claim. Platonic dualism for example, places the material as dependent on the immaterial, as the immaterial is understood as prior in time to the material.

So representing the homunculus as "independent of the body" is not necessarily a faulty premise. If we adhere to Platonic dualism, the homunculus could be properly independent of the body (not dependent on it), while the body is dependent on the homunculus. Further, since the homunculus is supposed to be of a completely different substance the infinite regress is avoided.

The question then can be apprehended as an issue of how the homunculus can observe, and interact with the material world. This interaction is understood through the concepts of intention, final cause, free will, and choice. When we understand that the homunculus is not dependent on the material body, we have the premise required to apprehend these concepts, because we establish the order of necessity in its proper one-way representation, as required by the one-way nature of time. Time makes necessity a one way direction.

The homunculus is prior in time to the body, such that the existence of the body is dependent on the homunculus, as the effect is dependent on its cause. But the reciprocal relationship is not one of necessity. The cause is not dependent on the effect. Nor is a cause necessarily an effect, because this would produce the dreaded infinite regress which we must avoid. The body has a relation with the homunculus which is a relationship of necessity, the homunculus is necessary for the existence of the body. But the homunculus has a relationship with the body which is not a relationship of necessity, the body is not necessary for the homunculus. The body therefore is contingent, and its posteriority in time, from the perspective of the homunculus, makes its existence better described or understood in terms of possibilities. This is what allows for the reality of the freedom of choice, and the reality that the internal homunculus is better described in accordance with the principles of dualism as the operator of the body, rather than the passive "sitting inside your head looking out" which Banno stated.

So the homunculus is only a logical problem if we're using it to explain something about consciousness. — frank

I really don't see why the homunculus is a logical problem, maybe you could explain this problem for me. I realize consciousness presents us with a problem, but I think it's more of a problem of premises rather than a problem of logic. If the homunculus is inconsistent with some other premise, maybe it's the other premise which is the problem.

I would say creativity is the reordering of things that exist into a concept that you have not encountered before. — Philosophim

Creativity must be more than just a simple reordering of parts because it produces a unity out of things (parts) which were previously not unified. This is why a whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Prior to the creation, the things which will become the parts cannot be said to be "parts" because their existence is completely separate from each other, and independent. The creative acts makes them into "parts" by unifying them.

So the creative act, by being an intentional act, gives something to the creation (the whole) which cannot be attributed to any of the parts, nor to the sum of the parts. Often this is called "meaning", or it's sometimes called "beauty", sometimes "function", and there are various other terms which are used to describe what the creative act gives to the created thing which cannot be attributed to the parts themselves, and therefore must be the product of the act itself, or the intention of the act.

In any attempt to understand the nature of creativity it is very important to recognize the reality of what intention gives to the creation, as a separate aspect, independent from what the material parts give to it. This importance manifests in the choice of medium, as each possible medium (material aspect) presents the artist with different restrictions (impossibilities), along with different freedoms (possibilities).

There is an artistic exercise which can be carried out to help one understand the important role of intention. We can attempt to completely remove the role of intention from the creative act, proceeding without any prior images or ideas of what will be created. Then we work completely "in the moment", creating in a random way, doing whatever comes to mind as time passes. Through this exercise the disunity of bits and pieces caused by lack of intention becomes very evident.

The problem is that you refer to a number of very different acts "sensations, thoughts, and so on", and conclude that they comprise a single act called "consciousness". Don't you think that the unification of these vastly varying acts requires something like a "homunculus"? Or do you appeal to magic as the source of such a unification?

I'd call consciousness the act (activity) of having sensations, thoughts, and so on; a more active notion than taking it as a thing that does the experiencing. A step further form the homunculus. — Banno

How does this step us away from the homunculus? If consciousness is an activity then there must be something which is doing that activity. It cannot be the human body which is performing this activity because there is no observable act of the body which could be called the act of being conscious. So the thing which is performing this act of consciousness must be something other than the body, but it sure appears to be within the body. Therefore we are lead from consciousness is an act, to the homunculus as the actor.

Quote when I did this. — khaled

OK

Considering I defined them to be the same I would say my intent is pretty clear: — khaled

Just when I thought we were starting to make some progress, you take us right back.

On the other hand we have accounts of how numbers are used in our everyday practices, which can include, for the mathematicians amongst us, quite complicated and sophisticated machinations. Numbers are to be understood not by setting up definitions from first principles, but by learning to make use of them. — Banno

This is really not the case, as the process of learning mathematics is more complex than what you represent it as. At the most basic, fundamental level, we simply learn usage, as you say. But then as we progress in our education, we must enter into a learning of abstract concepts. At this point there is a change, so that the student's mind evolves from learning simple operations of using numbers, to learning specific rules for use. That is actually a big difference, and you might see that it aligns roughly with the difference between arithmetic and mathematics.

The point here is that we cannot accurately make blanket statements like yours, " Numbers are to be understood not by...but by...", because "numbers" in the sense of arithmetic, and "numbers" in the sense of mathematics, is two different uses of the word.

We would verify his definition by comparing it to our use of the number two, checking that what Russell defines is indeed adequate for the everyday tasks we set for that number. We would verify or falsify his definition by comparing it to our use of "two". after all, any stipulated definition is evaluated by comparison with the empirical facts of language use.

That is, the use of the number two has priority over any contrived stipulation. — Banno

In light of the difference described above, this statement is very problematic. In the higher levels of mathematics we are definitely taught to follow stipulations, axioms, while in the lower levels of arithmetic we are taught to follow demonstrated usage. The difference marks the development of the student's mind from practical application, to the understanding of theory. The understanding of theory is based in the learning of rules, rather than a simple learning of use.

The result is that within mathematics we have a sort of struggle, or disequilibrium between theory and practise. You say that practise has priority over theory (your statement "the use of the number two has priority over any contrived stipulation"), but this is not really the case. Mathematics, being a high level abstract form of logic, proceeds in the opposite way, theory is prior to practise. This is obvious in the history of modern math, theory precedes the application, and therefore shapes practise.

The difficult issue is that the theory must be derived from somewhere, and it is common practise in the development of mathematical axioms, to produce axioms which are derived as a description of common usage. This creates the appearance that usage has priority over theory.

That presents a problem which I've pointed to numerous times on this forum, of which many members are ignorant, and even actively deny. If the proposed axioms are meant to be a description, or representation of usage, and they are not an accurate representation, then falsity is allowed to enter into mathematics. Mathematics is such that the rules must be followed, and the rules are given priority over usage, so rules which are supposed to be representations of usage, which are faulty representations, must be followed, thereby allowing self-deception within mathematics. Usage appears to have priority over theoretical rules, because the theory appears to be a description of usage. But in reality, the theoretical rules are what shape usage, and that this is true is evident from the fact that faulty descriptions may be used as rules.

Do you think math is discovered or created? — khaled

I think it's very obvious that mathematics is created by human beings. But I also think it's pointless to discuss such an issue with you, because I've come to see that when there is an obvious difference between two things, (like the value and the thing valued), you just define one so that it is the same as the other, deny the difference, and argue your point from a position of denial.

So I'm quite sure that if we proceed in a discussion as to whether mathematical axioms are created or are discovered, you'll end up defining "discovered" in such a way that it has the same meaning as "created", just like you defined the "value" given to the point at which something boils, to be the same thing as "the point at which something boils".

So for example, when human beings 'discovered' consistency in the way that water boiled, and that there was a point which boiling came from not boiling, and we 'created' a value for this point, you will simply define this creation of the value to be the very same thing as the discovery of the thing which is valued, and deny the separation between the discovery and the creation.

Here's an example to elucidate the difference. say you are walking in the wilderness, and you discover something new, never before seen by a human being. You go back to your fellow human beings and describe and discuss that thing. A name is created, and given to the thing. Do you apprehend, and accept the difference between discovering the thing, and creating the name for it?

No it isn't. Let's first assume that all the items are boxes without a doubt, for simplificiation. Regardless of what system we make up, there will be a correct answer within it, not so for pure fiction. — khaled

This is just begging the question. If you assume a realist premise, you will get a realist conclusion. If we want a correct answer to how many boxes there are, the first thing we need to do is stipulate what qualifies as "a box", otherwise there can be no correct answer.

You assume that the choice has already been made, as to what does and does not qualify as "a box", and therefore someone has already gone through and sorted the items, effectively counting the objects already. That's how you conclude that there will be a correct answer. Who do you think, makes this decision as to what qualifies as a box and what does not, God? Do you think that God has already counted the boxes?

What problems arise if we consider values to be real in the same way that boiling point is real? — khaled

I think the principal issue is that there are different ways to derive "the value", as I described. Each formulation of "the value" is correct in accordance with its formula, though they are different. This is fundamentally a relativistic perspective. The value assigned is relative to the formula employed, and is correct, but different from the value assigned relative to another formula.

Now, when we point at something "real" in the world, like a pot of water which starts to boil, we want to know the cause of that activity, and this is where the problem of thinking that the value is real arises. If we think that the formula produces a value which is real, we might tend to believe that any specific formula provides a true representation of the cause. So for example, if we think that 100 degrees Celsius is a "real" value for the boiling point of water, then we would tend to believe that the real cause of the water boiling is that it reached that temperature.

However, as I explained already, this is not a true representation, air pressure is just as important, but not expressed in that formula. Therefore thinking that the value is real, misleads us into thinking that the faulty representation which the formula is derived from, is a true representation. But we know that the representation from which the value is derived, is not necessarily true, because we know that there are different values for the very same thing, produced from different representations, all of which are considered to be correct.

Now the problem is that we have no way to determine the true representation, the true cause, if each is equally correct ('model-dependent realism'). Each is itself a real representation, therefore a true representation, and if they are incompatible, that's just the way reality is, it has incompatible parts. So the assumption leads to the conclusion that reality is impossible to understand because it has incompatible parts. That reality is impossible to understand is not necessarily the truth though, it is just a conclusion produced from the assumption that the incompatible values are equally real.

I think there is a problem with saying values are fictitious, being that if they are fictitious, then changing them should not mean we are wrong.

Take the Santa Clause story. That's fictitious because even if you change the story so that Santa uses flying horses, you're not "wrong". It's a work of fiction after all you can do whatever you want. Santa could be a vampire.

However if you have 5 boxes lined up in front of you and you say there are 4 boxes, you are wrong. That tells me that values aren't works of fiction. They refer to something we commonly understand. — khaled

This is not true, because even in a work of fiction there are conventions which must be adhered to otherwise you step out of that specific fictional story. So if you say that Santa uses horses instead of reindeer, you are wrong, because you've removed yourself from the acceptable convention, and you ought not call your fictitious character by the name Santa. Notice I use "ought" because you still can if you want, but you would be out of line with the convention.

Your "boxes" analogy needs to be revised to be applicable. You premise "5 boxes", so by that premise "4 boxes" is wrong. You need to start with a premise like "a multitude of items", or "a line of boxes" then we have to assign values and there is a judgement to be made. The premise "5 boxes" already makes that judgement. and so by that premise anything else would be wrong, even though someone might argue that one item is not correctly a "box" or something like that. So your analogy needs to premise that the evaluation has not yet been made, then you can see that evaluation is similar to a work of fiction..

Sure, I believe they still exist. And to be clear we are discussing values correct? Like "100 degrees Celsius". I must say that seeing a realist that believes that "boiling point" exists but that its value doesn't exist is a first time for me.

I'll start with asking you, if you think these values don't exist, then what are we referring to when we use them? — khaled

OK, so we're talking about values. That's right then, we have understanding, I do not think that values exist. I believe they are mental constructs, products of the imagination, which like any other objects of fiction, do not exist. So when we "use them", they are used just like a creative work of fiction, from which there is an intent to achieve some sort of goal, or end. So by the same principle that a lie (which intentionally refers to something non-existent) is useful, so also are values (which intentionally refer to something non-existent), are useful.

As an analogy, consider a parent who tells a child a fictitious story about Santa Clause, for the purpose of some goal of culturing love and good will within the child. Be aware though, that fictitious stories can be used for all sorts of ends from evils like deception, cheating, fraud, stealing, to good things like the love and good will mentioned above, along with social institutions, and products created through the fictitious stories of mathematics and engineering.

The value of the gravitational force depends on gravitational constant, the masses of the object, and the distance between them. Which for some reason makes it so that the value of the gravitational force doesn't exist

And yet the gravitational force exists.

The value of the boiling point depends on pressure, the type of liquid, and a bunch of other things. Which for somea reason makes it so that the value of the boiling point doesn't exist.

And yet the boiling point exists.

It's the exact same situation with the exact same logic. I don't know where you got this distinction: — khaled

As I said, the issue is with your statement that "there exists a temperature at which something boils". This is completely different from the statement "the boiling point exists". The former, "a temperature" is a value assigned to the latter, the named thing, "boiling point".

Do you apprehend the difference? Suppose there is a pile of money on the table, a bunch of paper notes. Do you see the difference between the pile of paper, and the value assigned to it? If you do, then let's stick to the value, and inquire whether the value exists. Please do not keep saying that you only want to talk about the pile of paper, implying that you think that if the pile of paper is determined to be existing, we can somehow infer from this, that the value is also existing. That's a pointless exercise in the context of this thread.

So if you just want to discuss whether "the boiling point" exists, instead of your original claim that "the temperature at which something boils exists", this is not even relevant to the thread, and rather pointless to discuss. But if you honestly want to discuss whether the value which we assign to that thing named "the boiling point" exists, the thing which you call "the temperature at which something boils", then I'm ready to proceed.

So the value of gravitational force does not exist since it varies based on what units/formulas we use? Is that what you're saying? — khaled

Yes

But the "boiling point" is on exactly the same level as "gravitational force". We use both in formulas abstractly. And neither are talking about a specific value. — khaled

"The boiling point" when represented as a specific temperature value, (which is what you were saying, the temperature at which something boils) is a specific value. "Gravitational force" is something general and does not represent any specific value. So, the value which is assigned to the "gravitational force" depends on the circumstances and the formula used to figure that value. But the specific value, 100 degrees, which we call the boiling point, is derived from the application of a formula. So the former, the general description of "gravitational force" is a descriptive statement prior to the application of formula, while the latter, 100 degrees, posterior to the application of a formula, as a value produced from that application.

Yes, but in all of these cases, the boiling point exists yes? There exists a temperature at which something boils, although we can use arbitrary units to represent it leading to different values. — khaled

No, there is not a temperature at which something boils. That is the point. There is no such thing as the temperature at which something boils. That's what I've been telling you. The temperature at which a liquid will boil depends on the air pressure. Try taking some water to the moon and see what happens to it. Maybe someone has already done this experiment, google it.

you seem to be working with a homunculus-like view of the self, as if you were sitting inside your head looking out, receiving raw inputs of information that you interpret using a priori scripts. That is a view often attributed to Kant, although there are Kantians who deny it. The homunculus is, for several reasons, to be rejected. — Banno

What's wrong with the homunculus? That seems to almost exactly describe my conscious experience. It seems like I'm inside my head looking out, only not sitting, and I don't know if any of the "scripts" (they seem more like memories to me) are apriori or not.

In this case, I think, there would be no equivocation, as you say, neither any kind of interaction of two types of objects. — Alkis Piskas

Why assume no interaction? I see no need for this assumption, and the human use of mathematics and engineering in creating things in the physical world demonstrates that there definitely is interaction.

Based on my own experiences of not just dreams but also on borderline sleep experiences and lucid dreaming, I would say that they come from some kind of objective source. At times, I have visionary experiences which are like intricate art work and they seem as if they are far beyond my own rational creative power. I would like to do art based on these but it is difficult because I can't recall the exact details when my eyes are open. — Jack Cummins

If I were you, I would not assign the creative power to the rational element. The rational element, by what it means to be "rational" is quite simply conformed through training and societal forces. Training and habituation robs the rational element of the capacity for creativity.

I discussed this briefly recently in the thread called "The Will". the need to separate the will as the initiator of action, from the rational mind, as the judge of which course of action to take.

In this case, where you are looking to promote creativity, originality, it is imperative to separate the will as the creator, from the control of the habituated rational mind which stifles creativity, in order to let the creative juices flow. Meditation might be a good practise, but your description of borderline sleep, and lucid dreaming provides another approach. In sleep, the creative mind is freed from rational influence, so to harness the creative power you would need to have the rational mind play the role of a passive observer, without influencing the direction of the creative power. What I do sometimes is when I wake up after a dream I memorize key ingredients of the dream which appear to possess creative potential.

However, if one does believe in the existence of the collective unconscious as objective, the realm between the personal and collective sphere may be complicated. That is because characters in novels may be sub personalities of the authors. — Jack Cummins

I look at the unconscious as the instinctual, the intuitive, what is given or inherited through genetics. In this sense it is "collective" as what has been collected over millions of years of being, but this might not be "collective" in the way you are using it. Each person's collection of past experiences (prior to one's birth) is unique to the person, and so it is not "collective" in the sense of a person being a part of a united whole, rather "collective" in the sense of being a united whole composed of a collection of parts. It is interesting though, how different people share many identical parts (indicated by genetics), having common ancestors. And then there are mutated parts, which are the source of creativity within the being, and the essential aspect of evolution.

But I didn't say the existence of gravity. I said "gravitational force". Specifically because it is also a value that varies with a lot of factors. But it exists. — khaled

"Gravitational force" is just another way of saying "gravity", it is not an expression of a gravitational value. That gravitational force is just a general reference, rather than a specific value is evident from the fact that the gravitational constant expressed by "g" in the formula "mgh" is applicable in approximation on the earth only. If we want to produce a gravitational value for other places we must employ a different formula. This might be a formula such as you proposed, a relation between two masses and distance, or it might be something more vague like what is expressed in general relativity.

But by your logic, since the gravitational force depends on distance, and the mass of the two objects, it doesn't exist. — khaled

No, by my logic, the value assigned to any specific instance of gravitational force does not exist, because it is somewhat arbitrary depending on the formula chosen to figure the value. Likewise, the value assigned to the boiling point of water at average seal level air pressure might be 100 degrees, or 212 degrees, or even 373 degrees, depending on the formula employed. And this does not even account for the formula required to determine average sea level air pressure.

I am making no claims about whether gravitational force exists, or whether boiling water exists, I am making claims about the measured value of such things.

So "tree" here is a reference to an individual. Is 'two" an individual in this way? — Banno

In set theory, I think we can say that the number two is an individual in this way.

Numbers are abstract objects. They do not actually exist. — Alkis Piskas

It might appear like a very acceptable approach, to say that abstract objects are objects, only a different kind of object from physical objects, but then we need acceptable principles to set the two apart, or else we'll have equivocation between two types of "objects" in logical proceedings. As Banno indicated, this is problematic, because it presents the issue of interaction between the two types.

What Plato showed, is that if there is a distinct class of objects which are abstract (intelligible objects), then we must place all the ideas, including moral ideas such as "just" and "virtue", and aesthetic ideas like "beauty" into this class of abstract objects. Then the subjectivity of the supposed 'abstract objects' becomes apparent.

What Plato described is that the objectivity of abstract objects is provided for by "the good", because the good is the "object", or "objective", in the sense of the goal. Abstract objects are "objective" in the sense that they are useful toward goals.

This sets up the solution to Banno's problem of interaction, the good is the means by which the two types of objects interact. Furthermore, we have the principles here to properly distinguish the two types of objects in an effort to avoid the logical fallacy of equivocation. The abstract, or intelligible objects are associated with intention, (goals), as "the good" which is desired, and the other type of objects, sensible objects, are associated with the material world as particular things, which Aristotle assigned the law of identity to. By the principles demonstrated in Plato's cave allegory, the intelligible objects are more 'real' to us because we understand them directly with the mind, rather than through the unreliable medium of sensation. That this is truly the case is supported by the fact that there is a separation between the identity which we assign to a particular sensible object, and the identity which the object has in itself.

And yet taxes exist.... — khaled

So what? Boiling water exists too. But that wasn't your claim

My point is simple. The amount you have to pay in tax varies a lot. And yet taxes exist. Hence just because the value of it varies does not mean the thing does not exist.

Same with gravitational force. Gravitational force exists even though the gravitional force changes based on distance. — khaled

You've changed the subject with your analogies. You were not talking about whether boiling water exists, you were talking about the existence of the temperature at which water boils. So the existence of gravity, and the existence of taxes is irrelevant. What you were talking about is the specific quantity which is assigned to a thing, a measured value, and whether that measured value exists or not.

The word "two" refers to the objectively real number 2, just as "tree" refers to an objectively real tree. — Art48

That would only be the case if a Platonist ontology is true, that there is such a thing as the number 2. Since "2" is used in numerous different ways, it's very doubtful that there actually is an object referred to by "2".

Definitely a feeling for me. I feel happy. I would also say that there is a deeper state, a disposition, or something like that, which often allows me to overcome the inclination toward negative feelings and maintain, or restore happiness, like tuning in to TPF for example as a diversion. Diversions are very useful.

P.S. there's a math prof on YouTube who questions if real number "really" exist. — Art48

There is no need to assume any such thing as a number. We have numerals which are symbols, and the symbols having meaning which is dependent on the context of usage, like all symbols. The assumption of numbers is just a useful fiction employed by mathemagicians, which allows the ontology of Platonism to overrun the sciences.

Fill your cup and join the brigade of happiness. Its a joyful time of year.

Maths and formal logic are exemplars of disciplines that don't afford much importance to creativity. — Benj96

This is exactly wrong. Pure mathematics is nothing but creativity. That's why math is usually classified as an art rather than a science.

'Creativity is fundamentally the ability to come up with new ideas. An alternative term for it might be free imagination.' — Jack Cummins

Platonists would account for creativity by saying that new ideas are "discovered" rather than created. Ironically, Plato himself demonstrated this description to be inaccurate, turning instead to "the good" as the source of creativity. Appeal to "discovery" is like a cheat, avoid the difficult question of how a new form comes into existence, by saying that it already existed eternally, and was merely discovered. Determinism and "eternalism" use the same cheat, anything which appears to be new is said to have been predetermined for all time.

Happy! When I'm reading The Philosophy Forums I'm happy. Enough said!

I take it you are looking in a mirror when you manifest such words. — universeness

No, see the difference between your attitude and mine? I don't profess to know the right way, I only criticize what is obviously the wrong way, thereby keeping my mind open toward alternatives to the conventional, when the conventional has proven itself to be deficient. You seem to think that since it's the conventional way it's the right way. Then you try to argue that the obvious deficiency is acceptable, and that the ideal can still be held to be ideal despite the obvious deficiency.

Banno is correct, you are wrong! — universeness

The fact that this formulation would require an infinite amount of time, ought to indicate to you that it is actually the "wrong-headed" approach.

Have a look at the response by William Beaty and his use of 'electricity cannot be created or destroyed' and 'electricity generators don't generate electricity,' and also have a look at the 42 comments.
'Electricity is not energy it is a flow of electrons.'
Its the movement of air that causes wind. The 'energy' is the movement. Energy is transferred, due to movement of individual components. Like humans doing a Mexican wave. Each human does not move laterally they only undulate up and down but there up and down undulations cause a cumulative lateral energy waveform. The up and down undulations are conserved/transformed into a cumulative lateral, observable waveform. — universeness

I've seen it explained by Dr. Feynman (a good explainer). We ought not think of the energy as electrons moving through the copper wire, but think of the energy as moving through the field around the wire.

Banno is correct, you are wrong! — universeness

This is the mistake you incessantly demonstrate. You simply assert completely unjustified statements, then go into complete denial when evidence against your assertions is presented. You'd be much better off to keep an open mind toward things which you do not understand, rather than adhere to a prejudice which is derived from who knows where, and prevents you from furthering your understanding.

You can go with the millionaire who refuses the label due to the $100 he/she/hesh can't (in your opinion,) satisfactorily account for, if you prefer. — universeness

If it's a temporal issue, like energy is, that missing $100 becomes a huge problem when we extrapolate. If, the rate of loss is that in every second of passing time there is a 100 missing, then the entire million is gone after 10,000 seconds of time. Banno would say, just figure the loss as a fixed, invariable percentage of the total sum, then the amount missing per second becomes less as the total sum becomes less, and we have an infinite amount of time before its all gone. But there is no justification for the application of Banno's principle. It might well be that the overall quantity per time stays relatively fixed, therefore percentage increases as time passes. The cause of loss is unknown therefore how the rate of loss is fixed or unfixed in relation to the passing of time, is also unknown.

This is what you and the other two in the peanut gallery are not getting. The missing quantity occurs as time passes, all the time, therefore the loss is cumulative over time. If, in extrapolation over very large or very tiny time frames, and large or tiny space frames (according to the relationship between these two established by applicable theories), the cumulated missing or gained amount is not accounted for, these long range and short range projections become useless. And, it is impossible to account for the missing amount because it is necessarily an unknown, due to the nature of "energy" being the product of theory laden calculation.

"Sir, there is a sum of money you must pay to the government called taxes"

"Aha! But this sum of money changes for different people at different times in their life! Therefore there is no sum of money I must pay to the government called taxes! Taxes aren't real!"
. — khaled

That's right, because it's arbitrary. There is no such thing s the sum of money you have to pay, claim some expenses and other deductions, and lower the amount if you do not like it. And so tax issues can either be settled arbitrarily out of court, or become long drawn out court cases.

If only it was that easy. — khaled

You're wrong here though, it's not easy, but more difficult. The easy way is to just give in to what they say, give them what they ask for. The more difficult way is to find all the deductions you are eligible for, and reduce that amount of taxation.

That's the way reality is, the simple representation ('water boils at 100 degrees') is not the truth. The truth is complex and difficult. 'There is a temperature at which water boils' is the simple representation, but it\s not the truth, as the truth is much more complex and difficult.. We simply chop off the complex and difficult aspects, ignoring them, for the sake of making life simple. But that puts us in Plato's cave.

Here's why your wall analogy fails badly. A wall is a physical object, while the law of conservation is an abstract principle, a concept. Various physical objects will be called by the same name, ("wall" in this case), despite all sorts of deprivations. A concept must be exactly as defined, or else it's something other.

:up:
By the way, the wall analogy is not accurate because a "wall" missing a few bricks is still a "wall", but missing a few from "conservation" is not "conservation". And since there is not conservation, the law is false. And it's not a matter of seeking the missing energy, the ideal is not reality. So the thing which appears to you like it is a wall, is actually not a wall at all, because we can walk right through it. You can't stop thinking that it's a wall, and you don't believe in ghosts, so your recourse is to deny the obvious. Keep calling it a "wall", or "conservation", when it is not.

That is a non-sequitor. Just because it varies with another value doesn't mean it doesn't exist. — khaled

As I said, it means that there is no such thing as "the temperature at which something boils", which is what your claim was. The same thing will boil at many different temperatures. Spin it however you want, but your claim was false.

I really don't know, and I'm not inclined to make any judgement on that. Why don't you ask him?

I've tried that route, but maybe we could have greater success in combination.

Lee Smolin is a great contributer to the physics and the human community. I will leave it to him to dispute your sophisticated, skewed interpretations of his work. — universeness

Good, summon him up, I would appreciate that greatly.