it's pretty easily to prove that false — Darkneos

we made up morality (among other things). — Darkneos

What does 'a difference between an intuition and reality cannot be afforded' mean? It's gibberish. — Bartricks

Just express it in this form

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q — Bartricks

Your premise 2 is fallacious. You cannot say that we are morally responsible simply because we seem to be and that it is metaphysically possible. As it would have seemed to us that we are morally responsible regardless of whether or not we actually are.

You tried to refute this by bringing up epistemology. But epistemology is not in the same boat as moral intuitions. Epistemological intuitions, if wrong, would get is killed. So we have good reason to think they’re correct. — khaled

Deductively valid argument — Bartricks

Nope. You just can't construct a deductively valid argument that has the negation of one of my premises as a conclusion and has rationally compelling premises, can you? — Bartricks

Yes it does. Christ. — Bartricks

No parallel at all. — Bartricks

You've just ineptly dismissed all rational intuitions — Bartricks

The rest was just you question beggingly expressing your conventional views. — Bartricks

Present valid arguments that have the negation of my premises — Bartricks

Erm, yes there is. — Bartricks

What. On. Earth. Are. You. On. About? — Bartricks

Premise 2 says that if I am morally responsible, then not everything I do traces to external causes, yes? — Bartricks

Am I morally responsible? Well, I now have every reason to think I am - for my reason represents me to be - and no reason to think I am not. If you think otherwise, you need to show some fault in the first leg.

So, this premise is now one I have every reason to think is true, and none to think is false:

2. I am morally responsible. — Bartricks

b) you're too conventional and thus you think that if a conclusion is unconventional that itself is evidence that it is false. I mean, can you seriously not see how that assumption is question begging? Seriously? — Bartricks

There's no empirical evidence that nothing that exists exists uncaused — Bartricks

an argument you've done nothing to challenge any premise of. — Bartricks

So, insofar as you've thought at all about your position, you have simply assumed that all objects that exist are sensible objects. — Bartricks

If you think that an evolutionary account of a rational intuition serves always and everywhere to undermine that rational intuition's credibility — Bartricks

And that principle had better not be one that, when applied consistently, would undermine the credibility of our rational intuition that we have reason to believe things. — Bartricks

Here's what I'd say. If we have a rational intuition that seems - intuitively - to be inconsistent with the rest, and if we can in addition see that this particular rational intuition is one that seems highly adaptive, then we have some reason to suppose that that alone is why we are subject to it. That intuition can then be reasonably discounted. — Bartricks

It's question begging, that's what. — Bartricks

There does not need to be any actual epistemic reason to believe those things in reality. — Bartricks

All that's needed to survive, is to 'believe' that we have epistemic reason to believe some things — Bartricks

Thus, you would end up having to conclude that epistemic reasons do not exist — Bartricks

Most of that was just question begging. — Bartricks

What's your account? When does an evolutionary account of our rational intuitions discredit them, and when does it not? — Bartricks

If it is metaphysically possible for there to be such things, then we no longer have any epistemic reason to doubt we are morally responsible — Bartricks

One can have excellent evidence that X is the case, without having to know 'how' it is the case. For instance, I have excellent evidence my computer is working - it is working - yet if you ask me 'how' it is working, I haven't a clue. By your logic, of course, the fact I haven't a clue how it is working would constitute evidence that it isn't working! — Bartricks

fallaciously thinking that if one can't explain how something works, then one has evidence it isn't working — Bartricks

For what do you mean by 'how does it work?' — Bartricks

you are just appealing to the conventional assumption that we are physical bodies — Bartricks

Oh, and you commit further fallacies - you think that as there is no empirical evidence that we are uncaused causers (how could there be?), that means there is empirical evidence that we are 'not' uncaused causers. Which is fallacious. — Bartricks

Okay. Now, we have extremely powerful epistemic reason to think we're morally responsible. Billions - I mean, literally billions - of people have rational intuitions that represent themselves and others to be morally responsible — Bartricks

The best evidence one can ever have for anything is powerful epistemic reason to think that it is the case and none to think that it isn't. Right? — Bartricks

Antinatalists accept that they have the burden of proof and then they seek to discharge it. — Bartricks

I don't know what will happen to me after my sensible body dies. But it seems likely something very bad awaits us after our sensible bodies die, for our reason tells us to do pretty much all we can to avoid sensible death unless we are in absolute agony. So, that suggests - but doesn't entail - that what awaits us after our sensible demise is worse than here, but not absolute agony. — Bartricks

Okay. Now, we have extremely powerful epistemic reason to think we're morally responsible. Billions - I mean, literally billions - of people have rational intuitions that represent themselves and others to be morally responsible — Bartricks

No. I said that if we are prime movers then we have what is 'in principle' needed to be morally responsible. — Bartricks

Once more: saying 'this is needed for moral responsibility' is not equivalent to saying 'this is sufficient for moral responsibility'. — Bartricks

“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument. — khaled

So what the heck is this “You” exactly?
— khaled

Me. — Bartricks

the scholastic research which predominates here — Ken Edwards

However, I think he hasn't because there isn't really any evidence that you need positively to have created yourself in order to be morally responsible for what you are subsequently caused to do. What we have evidence for is a negative condition: that you need 'not' to have been created by alien forces. After all, if - per impossible - we did create ourselves from nothing, the reason that would make us in principle capable of being morally responsible for what we subsequently do is surely because under such circumstances nothing outside of ourselves would be responsible for us being how we are. So, the plausibility of Strawson's positive condition rests on the more fundamental negative condition: that to be morally responsible for how you are, you need 'not' to be a product of forces that have nothing to do with you. — Bartricks

But that’s a technicality since the alternative is impossible. — khaled

The rest, I shall charitably assume, is you being obtuse for the purpose of some kind of sadistic amusement. — Bartricks

“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument. — khaled

This also applies to having children being correct. Possible, metaphysically. Also what our reason represents to us (at least, demonstrably what most people’s reason represents to them). Does that make it the case? Or are you going to say that our reason does not represent to us that having children is ok? — khaled

So what the heck is this “You” exactly? — khaled

No. The opposite! We are morally responsible, therefore we are uncreated things. — Bartricks

I have argued that moral responsibility requires being an uncreated thing, right? — Bartricks

1. If I am morally responsible, then I am an uncreated thing — Bartricks

2. I am morally responsible. — Bartricks

But Strawson is not right - or so I have argued — Bartricks

a) our reason represents us to be and b) it is possible for us to be. — Bartricks

Am I a created thing? No. — Bartricks

2. I am morally responsible — Bartricks

I have epistemic reason to believe I am and none to believe I am not. — Bartricks

But when it comes to establishing that a proposition (in this case that we are morally responsible) is true, the most we can do is establish that there is powerful epistemic reason to believe the proposition is true, and no epistemic reason to think it is false. — Bartricks

I have epistemic reason to believe I am (morally responsible) and none to believe I am not. — Bartricks

Yes, and I have not disputed that. But it is a conventional belief - and not a truth of reason - that we are our sensible bodies — Bartricks

Thus, though my sensible body was created, I was not and thus I am not my sensible body. — Bartricks

You accused me - falsely - of committing fallacies. — Bartricks

If an object has been created by something external to it, then even though that object may well be able to cause events to occur without being directly caused to do so, the simple fact is that its existence traces to external causes and so the condition on responsibility will not be satisfied if we are objects of that kind. — Bartricks

To satisfy the condition on moral responsibility we would need to be objects that have not been created. — Bartricks

As it is metaphysically possible for us to be such objects — Bartricks

I am not an event, right? Events are events. Objects are objects. Big difference. All you're doing is pointing to events and pointing out that they have causes. Which is not something I dispute. — Bartricks

We would satisfy the negative condition if we are uncaused causers - that is, if we are prime movers. — Bartricks

But when it comes to establishing that a proposition is true, the most we can do is establish that there is powerful epistemic reason to believe the proposition is true, and no epistemic reason to think it is false. — Bartricks

There is still a fallacy and I'll get to it.
— khaled

Er, that argument was valid by all the canons of logic. — Bartricks

An 'effect' is an event. — Bartricks

But not all objects have causes. — Bartricks

we've already established that you're rubbish at detecting fallacies — Bartricks

you don't know how to reason well. — Bartricks

for you committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent — Bartricks

1. If we appear to be morally responsible, and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible, then we are justified in believing that we are.
2. We appear to be morally responsible and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible
3. Therefore we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible.

Now, if we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible, and there is only one way in which it would be possible for us to be - and that's what I have argued - then we are justified in believing that such conditions obtain. That is, we are justified in believing that we are prime movers.

There's no fallacy committed there. None. — Bartricks

That is an argument with the conclusion that “It is reasonable to suppose we are morally responsible”. Obviously everyone here agrees with this. Because if they disagreed they would be in jail and wouldn’t be here.

But you haven’t argued that we are morally responsible. If all you wanted to say is that it is reasonable to assume that we are then I can get behind that. That’s weirdly along pragmatist lines even though you disagree with the view. — khaled

I have argued that we are morally responsible! — Bartricks

So you're simply confused about what you need to do to challenge my case. — Bartricks

(The claim that some things exist uncaused is not equivalent to the claim that some effects lack causes). — Bartricks

No they wouldn't. I'm a compatibilist myself! — Bartricks

If he thought it was possible for us to be morally responsible, he'd no doubt agree with me that we are indeed morally responsible. — Bartricks

to date, virtually everyone I have discussed this with, has shared the rational intuition that yes, indeed, if a decision's causal story traces entirely to external causes, then one is not morally responsible for that decision. — Bartricks

To counter my case you would need to argue that it is impossible for something to exist uncreated. — Bartricks

We would satisfy the negative condition if we are uncaused causers - that is, if we are prime movers. We know already that there must be some such things, for otherwise we get a regress of causes. So, some things must exist uncaused. If we are ourselves such things, then the negative condition on moral responsibility will be satisfied. — Bartricks

And as the default is that we are indeed morally responsible, we now have reason to conclude that we are indeed prime movers. — Bartricks

I think you are making his point. He doesn't discount that these chemical processes are happening. He even alludes to them earlier in the quote. Rather, as a person with motivation, goals, wants, etc. it sort of becomes meaningless, laid bare, "going through the motions" such that one is playing a farce of what is "supposed" to be what people normally do. — schopenhauer1

The issue is whether it is 'possible' to be morally responsible. If it is possible, then it is reasonable to suppose we are, as that's what the appearances say. — Bartricks

I am assuming that we appear to be morally responsible — Bartricks

1. I am morally responsible
2. If I am morally responsible, not everything I do traces to external causes

And by rational intuition I can see - and so can you, surely - that it follows from these two apparent truths of reason that:

3. therefore not everything I do traces to external causes. — Bartricks

Our reason is a faculty. It's deliverances are 'intuitions'. It is by intuition that you know this argument is valid:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

That is, if your reason is working well, anyway.

But 'intuition' is a term of art and is sometimes used to cover beliefs too. That is not how I use it. By talking about deliverances of our reason it is quite clear what I am talking about. If instead I used the word 'intuition' it would be less clear, precisely because that term is used to cover far more than just deliverances of our reason. — Bartricks

And by rational intuition I can see - and so can you, surely - that it follows from these two apparent truths of reason that: — Bartricks

The conscious mind braincells — Ken Edwards

Our reason tells us that if we make a decision, then we are morally responsible for having made it - that is, we are in principle blameworthy or praiseworthy for it. That doesn't mean we are morally responsible, it just means we have prima facie evidence that we are. — Bartricks

So you do not arrive by reason alone at the conclusion that you are not a prime mover, rather you arrive at it by first coming to believe that you are sensible object and then coming to believe that sensible objects have external causes of their existence and that you, as one such object, have an external cause. — Bartricks

For we can, by reason alone, know that we are morally responsible for what we do. — Bartricks

It is necessary that the ends be one where everyone's appetites are satisfied, but that is not sufficient. — Pfhorrest

or said that there was something still morally wrong even though everyone's every need was met like that, then that person would just be incorrect. — Pfhorrest

your post was left unanswered for quite some time. Then when you volunteered that you didn't notice how old it was - I knew that was it. That unanswered post was grinding on you for days - an insult to your ego. No-one can ignore little Khaled! — counterpunch

Are you policing this public space? Do you see it as your role to tell people what they can and can't say? — counterpunch

You don't know the context. This thread is a continuation of a discussion on another thread - of which you were not a part. The apparent form, to which you are responding, is not where the meaning lies. Those observations refer to mistakes in thinking identified on the other thread, of which Issac may or may not have been aware. — counterpunch

Don't call me a prick again! — counterpunch

Thank you so much. — counterpunch