The problem is that people attribute to noumena some reality it doesn’t have, and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real. — Mww
That’s called naive realism. I’m not one of those.
It’s a tricky topic that deserves its own thread.
Don’t know how he could say so, given it would seem pretty hard to define a thing when we know absolutely nothing about it. The thing-in-itself is not defined by its relation to sensibility because it doesn’t relate to sensibility at all. The “thing” does, the “thing-in-itself” does not. — Mww
This is a another confusing point. The matter of the fact is Kant refers to some ‘thing in itself’ only because of pure intuition. Remove intuition and there is nothing to say, yet to refer to some item, any item - be it of thought or knowledge - must necessarily mean there is an attachment to sensibility and intuition (space and time). The number one is only given as a concept via sensibility, without sensible experience of a multitude of differentiated items of experience there would be no ground for the number one; or rather numbers in general.
The leap is identical from the referent of ‘thing’ which we view as ‘phenomenon’ and delineate between said phenomenon as ‘cat’ rather than ‘dog’ or ‘table’ rather than ‘chair’. There is no ‘chair in and of itself’ and there is no ‘thing in and of itself’, there is phenomenon that is given through sensible experience due to limitation.
Kant went back and rewrote an entire section to help elucidate what he meant - although by doing so he likely fell prey to his previous warning of ‘in trying to be too precise the writer can fall into ambiguity’ (to roughly paraphrase!)
My point about the bit in bold is hard to grasp as we’re immediately doing precisely what Kant warns against - claiming there is a ‘unknown’ we can refer to sensibly. The point here is that we can set up this logical illusion of referring to some ‘unknowable’ and believe we have it nailed down and sewn up neat and tidy. The thrust of the point is we’re limited.
Noumenon is ONLY ever applicable in the negative sense and to talk of noumenon in the ‘positive’ sense (the thing in itself) is an illusion only which Kant willingly partakes in to reveal that the most obvious statement there could be, along the lines of ‘What we can in no way ever know never exists for us no matter how many times removed or distant - such a ‘thing’ is not a ‘thing’ at all. It is, in its nonsense, a concept that is pointing out a limitation,’ or simpler still, ‘We cannot know what we cannot know.’
The positive sense of noumenon (as uttered) is necessarily negative. By revealing nothing Kant reveals the lay of the land not some striving across empty oceans for lands that don’t exist (as he put in his rare analogy).
The relevance to the thread here is likely the miscasting of what can reasonably be called ‘outer’ that isn’t a merely anything but ‘inner’. The phenomenon is all, what more is expected of being other than felt experience? It appears we’re prone to projecting ourselves bidirectionally through time.
Again though, getting to grips with what is meant by ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’ is a matter for discussion I’m willing to partake in in a separate thread.
This subject matter often turns into a big old mess as there is often a lack of willingness to appreciate different interpretations of Kant regardless of agreement. His work has remained fresh because of the divides in opinions about several areas of his work.