Both those quotes appear to be about Moore's realism with regard to the physical world, rather than about his intuitionism with regard to good. — Banno

From the article:

To say, as he did, that goodness is a non-natural property detected only by intuition, i.e. by thought and not by perception, is to treat it as a Platonic entity, inhabiting some transcendent realm of being.)

It means that it is not a product of the mind or a deduction or arrived at by analysis. It is known independently of all else.

Seems to me that introducing Plato only servers to add more fog. — Banno

It was a deliberate choice that does not add more fog but clarity. Moore himself said in a letter to a friend:

I am pleased to believe that this is the most Platonic system of modern times. (Hylton, p. 137)

I was not aware of this, I found it just now while looking for support. I found it here

From the same article:

Hence Moore's version of realism, as it claimed the constituents of reality to be unchangeable non-spatial non-temporal entities with which we are in contact only in thought, is a kind of Platonism.

Moore's "intuitionism" was only that moral truths are not derived from any other sorts of truths. That is, it is an error to ask for a reason to conclude that something is morally good.

So no, nothing much to do with the nonsense of Platonic forms. — Banno

To say it is a form of Platonism is not to say that there is a form the Good, but that it is a type of Platonism in that it consistent with Platonist claims, that is is something known in itself by themselves by the mind itself.

Is Moore's intuitionism a form of Platonism? What does it mean for goodness to be intuited? Noesis of goodness?

Don’t they have their colleagues to spar with? — Noble Dust

More often than not that sparing only occurs in a formal setting - via books, papers, and conferences. The free flow of ideas is stymied by the desire to establish and maintain one's territory and reputation. Professional jealousy is common. The number of contingent faculty is increasing. Adjuncts often feel isolated and are regarded as second class citizens.

That is why I said:

Plato argues against the claim that the man, that is, each person is the measure, and thus is able to refute it — Fooloso4

Plato himself made the 'man is the measure' doctrine sufficiently clear in the Theaetetus. “just as each thing appears to me, so too it is for me, and just as it appears to you, so too again for you” — magritte

But we do not know that this is what Protagoras claimed. Perhaps his point was not about "me" and "you" but about how things appear to us.

The meaning of 'appears' was and still is ambiguous because the ancients couldn't have a clear distinction between sensation, psychological perception or insight, and logical judgment based on memories of personal experience. — magritte

I think you underestimate what they were capable of. But yes, I agree that 'appears' is ambiguous.

... today's public scientific facts are not in the scope of subjective philosophy. — magritte

This is changing with cross disciplinary approaches such as cognitive science.

Plato argues against the claim that the man, that is, each person is the measure, and thus is able to refute it.
— Fooloso4
No he is not able to do any such thing. — magritte

If what each man says is true then if Protagoras says man is the measure and Socrates says man is not the measure, then according to Protagoras what Socrates says is true, in which case what Protagoras says is false.

Plato saddles his opponents with one or more absurd premises just for the purpose. — magritte

Yup, but not just Plato. On another thread on academic philosophers I just made a similar point with regard to commentary.

Unfortunately this scientific method in search of forms, occupying an intermediate position between knowledge and ignorance, does not come up in the Theaetetus. — magritte

@Paine made the point above that the forms play no part in the Theaetetus.

For a student of philosophy, sure. — SophistiCat

Aristotle, for example? This is not the whole of his work but still an important part.

Commentary has always been used as a rhetorical strategy. A way of minimizing resistance to something new and different or controversial. It is not uncommon for philosophers to misrepresent those who came before them.

Philosophy is self-reflexive and dialogic. What others have said is not separate from what one says about world, existence, reality and truth.

Original ideas and concepts have always been the exception.

A lot of academic philosophy is focused more on itself than on concepts of "world, existence, reality and truth." Much of what is taught and published is exclusively devoted to the study of philosophers and their texts — SophistiCat

It is for some the former via the latter.

You are responding to something I did not say. I did not say anything about a unity of mankind or uncontestable measurement. Whether it is Parmenides or Heraclitus or their followers or anyone else, whether they have different standards or not, the measure is always taken by man.

If Protagoras had been allowed into the argument at this point he would have thanked Plato for properly developing Protagorian subjective knowledge. The difference is that subjectively I can always be certain of my knowledge of this moment and thi — magritte

What the claim that man is the measure means is still a matter of dispute. Plato argues against the claim that the man, that is, each person is the measure, and thus is able to refute it. But if man means mankind a stronger argument can be made. If we are not the measure than who or what is? That man is the measure can be understood to mean that this is how things are for us human beings, in distinction for example from how things are for the gods.

If we dismiss the Forms as abstract nonsense then which way should we look for an answer? — magritte

I don't the alternative is abstract nonsense. Socrates describes his "second sailing" (Pheado 99d-100a). Rather than looking at things themselves:

So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.”

In the dialogue Parmenides, after his criticisms of the Forms Parmenides says that one who does not “allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same" will “destroy the power of dialectic entirely” (135b8–c2).

Something like the Forms underlies (hypo - under, thesis - to place or set) thought and speech.

Since the dialogue takes place when Socrates was a young man the implication is that whatever Socrates says in other dialogues is informed by this. This is not a historical claim but a literary one.

Rather than refute the claim that man(kind) is the measure it supports it. This is how we human beings make sense of things.

In contrast, it is often said that Platonism posits a higher, real world and deprecates what we nowadays take to be the real world i.e. the sensory domain. — Wayfarer

This is a good reason to separate the works of Plato and Platonism. Just as Socrates spoke differently and said different things to different people, Plato manages to say different things with the same words. He presents a salutary teaching and a philosophic teaching, an exoteric teaching suited for most and an esoteric teaching suited to a few, an image of truth and the truth that such "truths" are not available to us.

In pointing elsewhere Plato is at the same time pointing us back here. It is against the backdrop of an imagined world in which all things are fixed, seen clearly and unambiguously that we turn to the reality of our ignorance, our not knowing, and the indeterminacy of life. The famous turning of the soul is both a turn to and a turn away from this imagined other world. The move is dialectical. Socrates' claim that philosophy is preparation for death works in the same way. In death he says there is knowledge, but in truth we know nothing of death. In death is the promise of rewards and punishment for how we live, but he also says that death may be nothingness. In either case we are turned back to an examination of how we live.

Trust and hope in a transcendent reality is one option, one that I held at one time. Accepting that this world here and now is beyond our limited comprehension is enough. No need to imagine a true world beyond this one.

This is clearly derived from or descended from Parmenides, is it not? — Wayfarer

He is referring to what we know as Parmenides fragment three:

A couple of translations:

... for this is the same, to think and to be

... for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be

I think the argument in the Republic goes in a different direction. It points to the limits of what can be thought and known and said.

I was stunned to learn how prevalent this interpretation is. — Paine

I think there are two reasons for this. The first is, as you point out, a deliberate attempt to separate readers. The second, which you hint at, is that many academics do not bother to do the painstaking work of careful interpretation. Questionable claims get passed on, and sometimes, as is the case here, these things become a subject of interest in and of themselves. JTB is argued about, and whether or not this conclusion is supported by the dialogue is not even questioned.

Because the dialogue is given through the form of a drama, perhaps this has a double nature. — Paine

Too little attention is given to the function of dialogue. Things have improved but there are still some who regard it as being a matter of style with little or no philosophic importance. The argument is abstracted from the character of the person making the argument.

Perhaps nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the Meno. He asks whether virtue is taught, acquired by practice, or comes by nature or in some other way. The question becomes more significant if we know something about him. Meno's question can be rephrased to ask whether he can be taught virtue, that is, whether an ambitious and ruthless young man can be taught to be virtuous. Further, Meno thinks he already knows what virtue is. In line with his ambitions he thinks it is the ability of a man to manage public affairs for the benefit of himself and his friends and harm his enemies.

Asking whether someone like Meno can be made virtuous is not the same as asking whether anyone can be made virtuous. It is against this that Socrates introduces the myth of recollection. There must already be something in us that "recognizes" virtue, if one is or is to become virtuous. Of the options given by Meno I think "by nature" comes closest to the matter. The answer to the question depends on the kind of person you are. Given Meno's lack of virtue together with the fact that he thinks he already knows what it is and that he is already virtuous, the answer in his case is no. But others can be taught to be virtuous. As in the case of the slave boy being led to solve a complex mathematical problem, some can be led to virtue.

He once said:

“You see the mob takes the Fifth. If you’re innocent, why are you taking the Fifth Amendment?”

Edit: I'm slow. I didn't pick up that you were quoting him.

Trump pleaded the 5th more than 400 times for the New York AG deposition a couple of days ago. A prudent move given that anything he said would likely confirm his guilt.

I’m going to allow myself to take exception to Plato’s notion of “the good”, preferring to relegate the idea to the irreducible ground for a specific moral philosophy. — Mww

Socrates Argument For Why the Good Cannot Be Known

The argument is not easily seen because it stretches over three books of the Republic, as if Plato wanted only those who are sufficiently attentive to see it.

I begin by collecting the releverent statements. Bloom translation. Bold added.

"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a)

"Knowledge is presumably dependent on what is, to know of what is that it is and how it is?"
"Yes."
"While opinion, we say, opines." (478a)

"If what is, is knowable, then wouldn't something other than that which is be opinable?" (478b)

"To that which is not, we were compelled to assign ignorance, and to that which is, knowledge."

"Opinion, therefore, opines neither that which is nor that which is not." (478c)

“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

"You," I said, "are responsible for compelling me to tell my opinions about it." (509c)

“... in applying the going up and the seeing of what's above to the soul's journey up to the intelligible place, you'll not mistake my expectation, since you desire to hear it. A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true. At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with considerable effort, is the idea of the good …” (517b-c)

He makes a threefold distinction -

Being or what is
Something other than that which is
What is not


And corresponding to them

Knowledge
Opinion
Ignorance



The middle term is somewhat ambiguous. What is not is something other than that which is, but to what is not he assigns ignorance. Opinion opines neither what is nor what is not. Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not.

What is entirely is entirely knowable. The good, being beyond being, is not something that is entirely. The good is then not entirely knowable. As if to confirm this Socrates says that he is giving his opinions about the good, but that what is knowable and unknowable is a matter of fact. As to the soul’s journey to the intelligible and the sight of the idea of the good, he says that a god knows if it happens to be true, but this is how it looks to him. He plays on the meaning of the cognate terms idea and look, which can be translated as Form. A god knows if it “happens to be true” but we are not gods, and what may happen to be true might also happen to be false.

The quote at 517 continues:

… but once seen, it must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that is right and fair in everything—in the visible it gave birth to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence —and that the man who is going to act prudently in private or in public must see it. (517c)

But it is not seen, for it is not something that is and thus not something knowable, and so no conclusion must follow. In order to act prudently, he says, one must see the good itself. Whether one is acting prudently then, remains an open question. The examined life remains the primary, continuous way of life of the Socratic philosopher. A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers.

If having a PhD in philosophy and teaching philosophy courses counts as an academic philosopher then I am or was an academic philosopher before I retired. But the logic and philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science is not my area of interest.

A few comments in support of what you said:

In the Apology Socrates says:

Finally I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of knowing practically nothing, and I knew that I would find that they had knowledge of many fine things. In this I was not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to that extent they were wiser than I. (22d)

Note how often knowledge and its cognates are used in the text I bolded. Far from denying knowledge he says that he and others have knowledge. What he denies is having knowledge of anything "πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ", very much or great and good or beautiful. (21d)

With regard to justified true belief, this is a long standing but, in my opinion, incorrect interpretation of the Theaetetus. The question is: what is knowledge? The first thing to be noted is that one must have knowledge in order to correctly say what knowledge is. The proposed answer, justified true belief, is Theaetetus', not Socrates. It proves to be inadequate. It faces the same problem. What justifies an opinion? After all, the Sophists were skilled at giving justifications for opinions, both true and false. In order to determine if an argument is true, to have the ability to discern a true from a false logos, requires knowledge. But this knowledge is not itself a justified true belief.

I am hesitant to discuss Aristotle for two reasons. First, I simply do not understand him. Aristotle Hides (see section on Aristotle in the link) and I have not done enough work to adequately sort things out. Second, although both Plato and Aristotle use the term eidos or Form there are significant differences. There is for Aristotle no "equal itself" existing by itself timeless and unchanging.

But, as I have argued elsewhere, Plato's Timaeus points to the inadequacy of a world of static Forms.

I don't think we have any common ground from which to proceed, so vaya con dios! — frank

The common ground is Plato's texts. Something you have avoided citing. The real problem seems not to be that there is no common ground but that the dialogues do not give you grounds to support your claims.

since it's about the Soul, — frank

As quoted above, the argument is about "all things which come to be". If the soul comes to be then the soul perishes. If all things that come to be come from their opposite then what is the opposite of soul that it comes to be from?

I don't know what you're asking. — frank

You told me you would tell me how you have always done it:

Yes. And then there's my all time favorite Platonic argument: the Cyclic Argument, which shows that there can be no "bigger" without the preceding "smaller".

So tell me how you resolve this, and I'll tell you how I've always done it. — frank

... take all animals and all plants into account, and, in short, for all things which come to be, let us see whether they come to be in this way, that is, from their opposites ... Let us examine whether those that have an opposite must necessarily come to be from their opposite and from nowhere else, as for example when something comes to be larger it must necessarily becomelarger from having been smaller before. [emphasis added] (70e)

I'll tell you how I've always done it. — frank

Your turn

But the suggestion is not that we arrive at the idea of equality by seeing empirical objects of equal size, because empirical objects are not absolute, which the idea of equality is. — Wayfarer

Right. But as I said, I don't find the argument persuasive. The question is whether we would see things as equal if we did not have the idea (eidos, Form) of equality. According to the Divided Line mathematical knowledge of geometric figures comes from making images of them. These imperfect images give us adequate if imperfect knowledge of what a circle or square is. The point is made that they do not have knowledge of the circle itself and the square itself. It is eikasia and dianoia, images and reason, from which mathematical knowledge is derived.

Physical things.

The argument refers to things not Forms. What is bigger comes from what is smaller.

From the Phaedo:

Now it seems to me that not only Bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the same time, but also that the bigness in us will never admit the small or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the Small, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. (102 d-e)

I suggest you're not finding it persuasive for the reason that the empirical philosophers always give in such instances - that it is derived from experience. The counter to that is that we already have to have the conception of Equals to arrive at such judgements. — Wayfarer

The argument is that equal things remind us of "the equal itself". That we get knowledge of the equal from things:

Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? (74b)

Rather than looking at it in terms of empiricism, I look at it in terms of practice. A carpenter determines that two boards are of equal length. If they are not then one will either not fit or be too loose. A merchant puts things on a scale. They are of equal weight or not. They either balance or not. Rather than thinking of it in terms of equality they might be thought of in terms of bigger and smaller or the same.

In accord with the argument from recollection we are reminded of the Forms Bigger and Smaller or Same and Different. The problem is that if each Form is one, singular and distinct, then we must confront the problem of dyads. Bigger is unintelligible without smaller, same is not intelligible without different. So too, equal cannot be separated from unequal.

But underlying its emergence is a much more significant switch: from using Plato as a source of ideas to think with to treating him as an object of study. — Christopher Rowe

My reading of Plato is informed by the idea of the reader as active participant, to think along with what is said, to take into consideration who he is talking to as well as the setting or circumstances, to raise objections, to work out implications, in a word, to think.

We should take seriously the fact that Plato is only mentioned in a few places in the dialogues and never speaks. We should not be too quick to assume that what Socrates or anyone else says represents Plato's own opinion. He is intentionally once removed. In the Phaedo it is reported that Plato was absent. The thoughtful reader will consider the significance of this.

There was some discussion of Equals

[Added]

I don't find the argument persuasive. Socrates says he is not talking about one thing being equal to another (74a), but I think that is where we get the idea from. We can see that one thing is larger than or more than another. The less the difference the closer they come to being equal.

This is a good overview.

Sure frank. You claim that my interpretation is a brand of neoplatonism, but when you cannot support that claim you say it is a moot point. If it is a moot point then why make the claim?

I think it odd that you think that in offering an interpretation I must "admit" that it is an interpretation. What else could it be? What does the qualification "personal" mean here?

What is at issue in interpreting Plato, for reasons I cited above, is how closely the interpretation tracks to the text. How well it makes sense of the particulars and fits them together to form the whole. Whether one comes to a better understanding of what Plato is saying. Whether it helps you see things that went unnoticed. Whether the interpretation helps you see it in a new light,

But, it should go without saying, this is not the only way to interpret a text or even a Platonic text.

That's the point I was making. — frank

You have made one point that I agree with:

Let's drop it, now — frank

And one that I partially agree with:

... we've [you've] derailed the thread long enough [much too long] — frank

This makes no sense. You claimed that my interpretation is a brand of neoplatonism. You have not been able to make an argument in defense of that claim. Now you claim it's a moot point. It is not a moot point, unless by moot you mean nonsense.

But any novel interpretation could be labeled "a brand of neoplatonism.". — frank

You could label it this way, but who else labels it this way? Unless you can cite this as established usage by historians it means no more than that you can label anything any way you want.

An academic approach to Plato would not settle in any one interpretation, but would just explain what we know about the times and the various ways Plato has been interpreted since. — frank

An essential part of contemporary Plato scholarship includes not only how he has been interpreted but how he is being interpreted. Arguments are made in favor or against various interpretive claims but nothing is settled.

Contrary to anything being settled I have repeatedly pointed to the indeterminacy, the openendness, the aporia of Plato's work.

Your approach to Plato is like the theological approach where you're using your own intuitions to guide you in arriving at a meaning. In particular, this is a Protestant approach. — frank

I do not use intuitions, I investigate hunches and possibilities to see whether they are supported by the text and help make sense of it. If they don't I try something else to help me make sense of the text. There is nothing "theological" or "Protestant" about this approach.

But I'm sure you agree that each of us needs to be honest and say, "This is my interpretation." — frank

Again you raise the issue of honesty. Why? Of course my interpretation is my interpretation!

In the Phaedrus Socrates compares the well written work to a living animal with each part having a function working together to form a whole. This tells us how a well written work should be read - as a whole, with each part having its function working together in a particular way to form that whole. On the assumption that the Platonic dialogues are well written works, Plato himself tells us how they are to be read.

So any interpretation of Plato that presents a cohesive narrative is neoplatonist?