All I've been doing is trying to follow your interpretation of Witt. — Harry Hindu

You want to participate in a discussion of Wittgenstein but refuse to read what he said. Read him and see if my interpretation follows from what he said, and then you might have a better chance of following my interpretation.

It's not how I take the terms, but how most people take the terms — Harry Hindu

Common usage also includes:

2. an event that happensby chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance

Once you start declaring some interpretation right or wrong, you prove my point that what makes some interpretation necessarily right or wrong is what is the case prior to interpreting it. — Harry Hindu

What is the case prior to interpreting a text, is the text itself. The irony is that you have declared my interpretation wrong without even looking at the text itself. In addition, you declare Wittgenstein wrong based on claims of what he said that you pulled out of who knows where.

I was asking for what reason do you reject that there is a reason why things happen as they do. — Harry Hindu

See Aristotle on chance. See Ecclesiastes and Job on the expectation of reasons why.

That is a lot of potential for accidents ... — Harry Hindu

Yes, Wite-Out was a much used product. It is still sold but not used as much since we can easily fix typos with a word processor.

How would you know what is possible if not by referring to what the prior conditions are? — Harry Hindu

The prior conditions are, according to the Tractatus, transcendental.



.

One thing that should not be overlooked is that, as with the question of justice in the Republic, the question of virtue is of concern to those who raise these questions. It matters. That it matters, that we care, is not something that can be taught. It is a necessary condition for it to be taught and learned.

I originally included these when writing my post but decided to eliminate them before posting because I wanted to stress the fact that these relations exist between things and not just the picture.

2.031 and 2.15 both refer to "determinate relations".

The picture shows these relations. that's the point. — Banno

Yes, the picture shows the relation. My point is that there is a relation that is pictured, that is, the relation are not just part of the picture. The possibility for objects to be in relation is a necessary condition for facts.

Look at the context, at the mis-view RussellA expresses. — Banno

Sorry, I jumped in in response to the quoted statement. I too admit I have not been paying close attention to the exchange.

In the Gospel of Thomas, self-knowledge is related to poverty and wealth. Whether you follow a denomination or not, this idea is a powerful player in the way we view outcomes. Can my understanding change my fate? — Paine

How is self-knowledge related to poverty and wealth? Is it the inverse of the popular belief that being wise leads to financial wealth? That those who are rich are poor in spirit?

But, as I explained before, relations are part of the picture, not of the world. The world consists of facts. It therefore does not consist of relations. — Banno

I don't think this is correct.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

The way in which the objects combine is the relation one stands to another.

2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.

A fact is not just a collection of objects but objects standing in a determine relation to one another.

Logic is the transcendent condition for both objects and their representation. In so far as the facts of the world include our representations, the world is not independent of the mind.

But see the shift from the world to my world in his discussion of solipsism, the will, and the "metaphysical ''I".

Although:

6.373 The world is independent of my will — RussellA

when he says:

6.431 So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.

he is referring to my world, the world as it is for me, the world of the metaphysical I.

As to the exercise of the will:

6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

Good luck with that. It's like trying to be clear on what the authors of the Bible are saying. I'm not really rejecting anything Witt is talking about. — Harry Hindu

Many scholars recognize the value of hermeneutics.

I'm taking issue with his improper use of language. — Harry Hindu

You mistake what you take the terms 'accident' and 'necessity' to mean for what the terms mean in their various uses.

For what reason? — Harry Hindu

You assume there must be some reason why things happen as they do. Wittgenstein rejected this assumption. So do I. The issue is not as settled as you assume. This is not the thread to discuss it but see, for example: Sean Carroll:s On Determinism

Logical necessity is just as much a part of the world as any other causal relation. — Harry Hindu

Once again you want to stipulate the meaning of terms. Logical necessity has a very specific meaning in the Tractatus, and what it says is not what you claim.

Yet all you did was infer that you'd either submit your posts or not based on what conditions existed prior to submitting your post or not. — Harry Hindu

The conditions may be there but those conditions might support both A and B or A and N, all of which may be possible under those conditions.

Witt disproves his own assertions by writing his books for others to read. — Harry Hindu

Nonsense! That is not what he asserts. Read the book. Then we can discuss it.




.

I think that "courage" may actually refer to the golden mean between rashness and cowardice — Hello Human

This is Aristotle's formulation. What 'the mean' means, however, is not so simple. For more see Joe Sachs article on Aristotle's Ethics in the IEP Here.

How do you know if it is a "legitimate" form of spirituality? What does legitimate mean here? Is it sufficient to have an experience and call it Gnosis? Or is there a distinction between believing one has gained access to "greater mysteries" and having such access? Can we tell the difference? Do we even know there is such a thing?

The problem with all such promises is that one must first buy into it in order to seriously pursue it, and then when one fails to realize what is expected the blame is put on the person striving for doing or not doing something.

Since this is a thread on Wittgenstein, we need to be clear as to what he is saying about necessity and accident.

Your own view seems to be along the lines that whatever happens happens by necessity. This is something he rejected:

5.135 There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to
the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.

He is not simply denying that we can know what will happen, but that it is necessary that this rather than that will happen. If that rather then this it is not because the latter is the necessary outcome rather than the former.

Off topic so I will keep this brief. A few things that have shaped western views:

The "pre-Socratic" search for what is first or elemental - fire, water, air, earth, Mind.
The God of the Hebrew Bible who creates the natural world.
The Christian idea of the conquest of nature.

I think Wittgenstein is still working to disentangle the confusion of the Tractarian logic. When he says pain in not "a Something" ,I take this to mean it is not a thing or object existing in the world that is represented in thought or propositions.

But this picture of language does not originate with the Tractatus. He begins the Investigations by quoting Augustine and says:

PI 1 These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands ...

If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.

But the remaining kinds of words do not take care of themselves when this picture holds us captive.

The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — Philosophical Investigations

The purpose of the statement: "I am in pain" is not to convey the thought that I am in pain. The sentence does not have the same logical/grammatical form as sentences about things.

But what would it mean that you wouldn't necessarily end up doing what you intended if not that there was some other necessary condition that prevented you from doing it? — Harry Hindu

I might have a better offer. I might forget. I might change my mind and conclude that I am wasting my time.

Not empirical proof that I was alone, but pursuing the possibility I was not alone. Yes, someone can feel alone even when other people are around.

the kami, supernatural entities — javi2541997

To the western way of seeing things they are supernatural, but in Shinto they are part of the natural world.

What one find tolerable or intolerable is not something that must be put to the test. Whatever it is one might be able or unable to cope with has no definitive bearing on what would happen, which might change in time.

I imagine I would spend at least some time and effort trying to find out if I was truly alone, but from where I sit now I don't think the search would be desperate.

One advantage is that I could post on TPF without anyone contradicting anything I said.

Added: Although I might contradict myself.

I don't see how you could have shared it if you didn't want to, or intend to. — Harry Hindu

Wanting to does not mean I have to. Intending to does not mean I would necessarily end up doing what I intend to do.

It appears that the world is necessarily determined by all the facts. — Harry Hindu

That is logically necessary, but:

1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.
2.061 States of affairs are independent of one another.

2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.

It's strange to say that all the facts determine what is both the case and not the case. What is not the case can only exist in a mind as imaginary. — Harry Hindu

What is not the case exists in the logical space of what is possible. Logic is transcendental. It makes possible not only states of affairs but the possibility to think of states of affairs. We cannot think illogically:

3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.

3.03 Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.

So how did you come to quote Witt if the compulsion of Witt writing something, you finding meaning in it and you wanting to share, did not happen? — Harry Hindu

Obviously it happened. It is not, however, necessary that this would happen thought. His notebooks might never have been published. It is not necessary that I quoted him or that I discuss him or post on this forum or that forum exist.

"Wanting to share" is, as you say, something I wanted to do. It is a choice not a necessity.

"Accident" is not a synonym of unnecessary. "Accident" is not the correct term to convey what you actually mean. — Harry Hindu

It is not what I mean, it is what Wittgenstein said. In an earlier response to you I quoted the following from the Tractatus:

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental. — Fooloso4

Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. — Harry Hindu

No. It means that the way things are is not by necessity.

I wasn't suggesting that W. was dogmatic about the connection between meaning and use — Sam26

I quoted the text in order to support what you said.

quote="Sam26;720827"]It sounds like you're saying that meaning is found in the proposition ...[/quote]

If that is what it sounds line then I failed to express what I was saying clearly. The meaning is not found in the proposition but in what the proposition points to. That is:

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. — Fooloso4

The thing a proposition refers to is not itself.

There is a difference between the inner experience and the outward manifestation. — Sam26

I agree. What I was objecting to is this:

It appears to me that Wittgenstein is saying that language takes its meaning entirely from behaviour, from use, and only from a third-person, external standpoint. Pain and other sensations do not refer directly to the private feelings but to the public expression of those feelings; to how you (and others) act when experiencing those sensations. Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke

Pain and other sensations do not refer to anything. The expression of those sensations refer to the sensations, which can be expressed in various ways. The problem is that referring to what my own sensations is not like referring to something public. I cannot point to it. But if no one felt pain what we might consider pain behavior would not be considered pain behavior. The experience of pain itself enters the picture.

First, I don't know about you. but for me, "meaning as use" has it's limitations. It seems rather obvious that not all "uses" of a word, equate to meaning. — Sam26

What is often overlooked is what I have bolded:

PI 43For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes this possible.

In the Investigations reference is problematic when it comes to such things as sensation. If I am in pain I am not referring to some public thing that can be pointed to for others to see or experience. But this does not mean:

Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke

I can be in pain whether I express it or not. If there is a tribe in which no one feels pain, to be told that I am in pain is meaningless. It does not refer to anything they have any acquaintance with. But if I tell you I am in pain, you know what I mean. It does, in that sense, refer to something. Sometimes we need to stop doing philosophy. If a child tells you they are in pain the appropriate response is not to point out the ways in which this is philosophically problematic. We may ask where it hurts and respond accordingly.

That metaphysical claims are nonsense. — Tate

Metaphysical claims are nonsense but:

5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.

6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do
with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.

The metaphysical self is not part of the world (5.633), and so claims about it are meaningless (Bedeutung). That is, it does not signify or represent anything in the world. But what is outside the limits of the world is what is, for Wittgenstein, meaningful in the sense of being most important. It is like the relation between the eye and what it sees. The eye sees but is not something seen. It is outside the visual field (5.6331).

The question is how are thoughts, which is one case, be about another entirely different case (not thoughts), like the movement of tectonic plates, if not by some form of causation (energy transfer, information transfer, etc.)? — Harry Hindu

Thought has a transcendental logical structure. You cannot think illogically (3.03) The relations of simple objects share this logical structure. The movement of tectonic plates is accidental.

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

My concern here is understanding Wittgenstein. It seems clear to me from the many references that he did regard music as a kind of language. Addressing the question of whether he is right or wrong is best asked once we are clear what it is he is saying.

to say "music is language" is a metaphor. — RussellA

See "Metaphors We Live By", George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.

Wittgenstein came to see that language is more that just a logical relation between words.

Meaning can only be expressed in a proposition, such as "the apple is on the table". — RussellA

As he points out, a proposition need not be stated in words. Instead of saying "the apple is on the table" I can put an apple on a table. (3.1431)

Tactatus 4 "The thought is the significant proposition" — RussellA

Translating sinnvolle as significant is not wrong, but can be misleading if we are not clear what significant means in this context. It means to signify, to have a sense:

4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.

A thought represents a state of affairs, for example, "the apple is on the table". But this representation must also be logical. Thoughts refer to states of affairs and can do so because they have a common logical structure.

3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.

But this is a picture Wittgenstein comes to reject:

PI 115. A. picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.

According to Normal Malcolm, it was the following event that led to this:

Wittgenstein was insisting that a proposition and what it describes must have the same ‘logical form’ Sraffa made a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with an outward sweep of the finger-tips of one hand. And he asked: “What is the logical form of that?” [Malcolm N., (2001), Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford, Oxford University Press.]

Added:

In editing this some things were inadvertently deleted.

3.1 P/M In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.

This is another way in which:

4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.

The proposition can be perceived by the senses. When a thought is expressed it can be perceived by others. They can know what I am thinking.

A limit cannot be drawn to thought (Preface) because we cannot think illogical thoughts:

3.03 Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.

We cannot think illogically but we can say things that are illogical. Here we see the difference between thinking and saying.

We talk about the language of music, but this is a metaphor, in that music is like language, not that music is language. Music is like language in that there is a relationship between the individual parts. — RussellA

I think it more accurate to say that the language of music is like a language of words. Both are languages but not the same language.

In the Notebooks he says:

Musical themes are in a certain sense propositions. [40]

What does he say that leads you to the conclusion that this "certain sense" is a metaphorical sense? Or is this just your assumption?

Music has a grammar, a logical structure.

Music, some music at least, makes us want to call it a language; but some music or course doesn't. [CV 62]

In several places Wittgenstein refers to the language of music.

PI 527. Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding a sentence lies nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme. Why is just this the pattern of variation in loudness and tempo?

The right tempo is also important to understanding Wittgenstein's sentences:

Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the right tempo. My sentences are all supposed to be read slowly. [CV 57]

Feeling is an emotional state, whereas thinking requires judgement, reasoning and intellect. — RussellA

Understanding a musical theme is not simply having a feeling.

The strength of the thoughts in Brahm's music [CV 23]

Music, some music at least, makes us want to call it a language; but some music or course doesn't. ]CV 62]

The broader issue, however, is the relation between thought and language. The earlier examples cited, such as this from the Tractatus:

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.

show that propositions need not be linguist, that is, a proposition need not be thought or expressed in terms of words.

Plato sets up what is at issue in Socrates' opening statement. He attributes the Thessalians' reputation for wisdom to their love of the sophist Gorgias because of his wisdom, and his ability to give "a bold and grand answer to any question you may be asked, as experts are likely to do." Socrates will not provide such an answer to the question of whether virtue can be taught. He claims that not only he, but neither Gorias nor anyone else knows what virtue is. The dialogue Gorgias raises doubts as to his wisdom and virtue. He is a skilled rhetorician who can give bold and grand answers, although the truth of those answers is something else.

But it is not Gorgias but Meno himself we must look at. Xenophon gives a damning account of his character. Meno's question can be rephrased to ask whether he can be taught virtue, that is, whether an ambitious and ruthless young man can be taught to be virtuous. Further, Meno thinks he already knows what virtue is. In line with his ambitions he thinks it is the ability of a man to manage public affairs for the benefit of himself and his friends and harm his enemies.

Socrates' acknowledgement that he does not know stands is stark contrast. Meno thinks he knows what virtue is and will do what he thinks he knows is virtuous. Socrates does not know and thus will live the examined life. He strives to live virtuously through examination, knowing that he does not know.

He brings up the bees not simply to make the point that Meno is giving him a swarm rather than a single answer to what virtue is, but to raise the question of the nature of bees. Behind the question of the nature of bees is the question of the nature of man. The virtue of a man is not distinct from the nature of man.

Regarding the myth of recollection ( anamnesis ) if one does not already have some sense of virtue how can it be recognized? If virtue is completely absent then it cannot be taught. It must in some sense already be present in a person. Meno's initial question is revealing:

... can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?

What does it mean for virtue to be teachable? It is not to putting knowledge in the soul in which virtue is absent. Teaching and practice are related. It is not teaching or practice, but teaching through practice. It is only if men do to some extent possess it by nature that it can be fostered.

In the Tractatus, a name is the thing it denotes. So one cannot say the meaning of a name. One can only show it, by pointing, or by using the name in a sentence. — Banno

But he gives no examples of using simple names.

He struggles with this in the Notebooks 1914-16:

And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.
And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing.[62]

If there is a final sense and a proposition expressing it completely, then there are also names for simple objects. [64]

The division of the body into material points, as we have it in physics, is nothing more than analysis into simple components.
But could it be possible that the sentences in ordinary use have, as it
were, only an incomplete sense ( quite apart from their truth or falsehood), and that the propositions in physics, as it were, approach the stage where a proposition really has a complete sense?
When I say, "The book is lying on the table", does this really have a
completely clear sense? (An EXTREMELY important question.)[67]

Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one. [68]

The simple sign is essentially simple.
It functions as a simple object. (What does that mean?)
Its composition becomes completely indifferent. It disappears from view. [69]

Now when I do this and designate the objects by means of names, does that make them simple?
All the same, however, this proposition is a picture of that complex.
This object is simple for me! [70]

Those who support a resolute reading.

1 The world is all that is the case.

Is this nonsense? What does that mean? Is it not true that the world is all that is the case?

Toward the end of the Tractatus he says:

6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do
with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.

Is this nonsense? Is it nonsense to say that there are propositions of natural science? Is it nonsense to demonstrate to someone that he has failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his proposition? Does this mean that he has successfully given a meaning to these signs? If it is nonsense to say that philosophy has nothing to do with natural science, why does he say this? To what end?

Why do those who support a resolute reading spend so much time and effort reading, interpreting , and arguing over interpretations of Wittgenstein? What do the hope to gain from obsessing over nonsense?

And in the middle:

4.112

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

Is this nonsense? Does this mean that philosophy is a body or doctrine and/or not an activity?

He continues:

Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’

Is this a philosophical proposition? What about 1? Is this proposition not philosophical proposition? Certainly it is not a scientific proposition. If it is nonsense is it not true or can something be both true and nonsense?

6.5 If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.

Nonsense? Are there then questions that cannot be answered?

But:

When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words.
The riddle does not exist.

Is it then false that the riddle does not exist? Does all this "nonsense" point to the fact that there are legitimate philosophical questions and problems?

6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

This has often been put in the form of a question: Why is there something rather than nothing? Some ask this question is hopes of an answer, but others as an expression of wonder.

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.
They are what is mystical.

Is it nonsense that there are things that cannot be put into words? Nonsense that these things make themselves manifest? Nonsense that they are mystical?

Preface:

The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.

Is the whole sense of the book that it is nonsense? Is it nonsense to say that what we cannot talk about must be passed over is nonsense? If this proposition is nonsense, does this mean that what cannot be put into words should not be passed over in silence?

Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebooks 1914-16: "Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language." — RussellA

The statement continues:

For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition. — Notebooks 1914-16, p.82

Thinking is a kind of language because it is a logical picture of the proposition. This kind of language, however, need not be a language of words.

The thought, the book is on the table, might occur as a picture in the mind. Without words. And can be expressed that way by a photograph or drawing.

The proposition in picture-writing ... [7]
The proposition onfy says something in so far as it is a picture! [8]
A situation is thinkable' ('imaginable') means: We can make ourselves a picture of it. [24] — Notebooks

The thought that the situation is tense or dangerous or comical can be expressed in music.

Musical themes are in a certain sense propositions. [40] — Notebooks

A picturial or musical language means that the claim that thinking is a kind of language is not the same as the claim that we think in words. Thinking is not silent speaking. A thought is not uttering something silently.

Consequentialism is related to phronesis, practical wisdom. Deliberation regarding ends and practical means to achieve them. It is opposed to Kant's notion of "good will" which, for which, according to Kant, consequences play no role.

Unintended consequences do not vitiate the concern with consequences.

"The good" is not a Platonic Form. It is not independent of particular needs and interests. The lack of unity, like the inability to predict the future, is not a failure but a condition for moral deliberation.

@RussellA

What do you make of this? Where does language enter the picture?

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.

Wittgenstein in Tractatus proposed that thought is language
4 "The thought is the significant proposition". — RussellA

From the preface:

Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts ... It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn ...

A thought is expressed in language. This does not mean that a thought is language. The expression, language, is not what is expressed, the thought.

3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.

I climbed it. I got it. It's not really that complicated. — Tate

Scholars have been debating the meaning of the text ever since it was published, but you read an article in the SEP and went from:

I'm going off the SEP article right now. I'm reading the text as well. — Tate

to declaring you have climbed the latter in a few hours.

To quote you:

This sounds incredibly arrogant. — Tate

You don't even know enough to know that you do not know. From the SEP article you are relying on:

The Tractatus is notorious for its interpretative difficulties. In the decades that have passed since its publication it has gone through several waves of general interpretations.

The interpretive difficulties remain. But you have it all figured out.

I am reminded of something William Buckley once said:

If you think Harry Jaffa is hard to argue with, try agreeing with him.

Wittgenstein uses the terms 'Sinn' in two different ways. What is "meaningful", as used in the SEP article, is what has a referent in the world. But what cannot be said is meaningful in the sense of being important or significant for us.

In a now famous letter to von Ficker he says:

The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing. I have managed in my book to put everything firmly in place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book.

Because one must first climb the ladder before throwing it away, the propositions should not simply be dismissed by someone who has not climbed the rungs. After all, he would not have written it if it is just to be disregarded by a novice reader.

Reading Schopenhauer would prime you to get it, though. It's similar stuff. — Tate

In a remark to Drury:

Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from King Lear: ‘I’ll show you differences.’

It means that what he just wrote literally has no sense. — Tate

And what does this mean? Hint: do not assume it means what you think it does based on how it is used elsewhere.

It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts
— Fooloso4

I didn't say otherwise? — Tate

You said:

But the world is made of facts, as opposed to be made of objects. — Tate

States of affairs are not opposed to objects, they are objects in actual as opposed to possible states of affairs. The possibility to combine to form states of affairs is in the objects themselves. But not all possibilities are what is actually the case.

Your prior claim:

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. — Tate

There are no states of affairs without objects. If the states of affairs are dependent then they cannot be fundamental.

2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)

What does he or you mean by we cannot name them. — schopenhauer1

He does not claim that we cannot name them, but he does not name them. He claims that they are the elements of elementary propositions, but without naming them there can be no elementary propositions.