But the world is made of facts, as opposed to be made of objects. — Tate

Facts are composite. What is composite cannot be fundamental. The possibilities of objects occuring in states of affairs is in the objects themselves (2.0121)

Per the SEP — Tate

You left out the next sentence:

Facts are existent states of affairs and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of objects.

It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts. The possibility of such combinations is in the objects themselves. This was discussed above: Here

The problem, as I see it, is not the claim that there are simples but naming them. If we cannot name them we cannot give an analysis of elementary propositions. The following is then nonsense:

4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names.

I’m not against the idea of something fundamental but rather that Witty isn’t doing anything to defend his claim. — schopenhauer1

In the absence of a cogent argument against simples does this need to be defended? Can simples be denied without also denying complexes?

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. — Tate

There can be no states of affairs without the objects that combine to create those states of affairs:

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.

2.0121 If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.

2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)

2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world.That is why they cannot be composite.

2.024 The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

He just starts with this assumptions and hopes you fall for it. — schopenhauer1

We are in agreement regarding his a priori assumptions. The idea of something fundamental, however, is as old as western philosophy itself. It persists in modern science. That is not to say it is correct, but do we know it is incorrect? What are the alternatives?

The Tractatus is wrong if it fails to prove the very foundation it stands on. — schopenhauer1

Does his failure to prove the assumption that there are elemental building blocks mean that it is wrong?

Physicists have identified 12 building blocks that are the fundamental constituents of matter. Our everyday world is made of just three of these building blocks: the up quark, the down quark and the electron. This set of particles is all that's needed to make protons and neutrons and to form atoms and molecules. — Fermilab

The larger problem is not the ontological assumptions but the linguistic ones, that is, the elemental names that name the elemental objects and combine to form propositions. More precisely, the ontological is the linguistic - what is said and thought about what is. When all is said and done, what stands outside the limits of what can be said, what shows itself experientially remains. The problems of life, the aesthetic and ethical.

At first glance it looks like W is justifying correspondence theory by saying the world is linguistic in form. — Tate

He does not say that the world is linguistic in form. He says that the world is LOGICAL in form. It is this logical form that makes it possible for language to REPRESENT things in the world.

That doesn't comply with the quote you gave though. — Tate

How so? No single quote can capture the whole of the steps of his interrelated argument.

Plus for some reason you have brought up the T schema. — Tate

Do you mean this?

Whether or not a proposition is true is determined by comparing it with reality. — Fooloso4

To compare a proposition with reality means that reality is not a mental construct. The facts, what is the case, is not a matter of how we conceive things to be.

What problem? — Tate

The problem you raised about limits:

How does this work then? I compare a proposition to the state of a world that is limited by my language. — Tate

There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world, matters of ethics and aesthetics.
— Fooloso4

Not according to the quote you provided:

The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world. — Tate

The metaphysical subject is not found in the world. It is not a relation between things in the world, but, rather, between the self and "my world".

How does this work then? I compare a proposition to the state of a world that is limited by my language.

This actually sounds like empirical idealism. — Tate

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight — Wittgenstein Culture and Value 47

The proposition "The cat is on the mat" is true if the cat is on the mat. The limits of my language play no role here. The problem Wittgenstein is pointing to does not occur in the world, but only at the limits of the world.

How would logic pervade the world? Because it pervades language, it pervades the world? — Tate

The structure of the world is logical. It is what makes language possible. That is, propositions about how things are in the world, the propositions of science. They are not dependent on a subject.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

This is heavily idealistic, isn't it? — Tate

Note that he calls it "pure realism" (5.64) This continues:

The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

5.641 What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul,
with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world— not a part of it.

The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world, matters of ethics and aesthetics.

The limits refer to what can be said, propositions about things in the world, and what stands outside those limits. Statements about ethics and aesthetics are senseless in that they do not point to what what is the case. They are not statements of fact. But this does not mean that they are meaningless in the sense of having no significance for us.

Wittgenstein wasn't a realist, then. — Tate

In the Tractatus objects and their relations are independent of the mind. The logical structure that underlies language is also independent of the mind. Whether or not a proposition is true is determined by comparing it with reality. But:

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits
of my world.

5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
...
We cannot think what we cannot think; so
what we cannot think we cannot say either.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world.

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.

5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

Well, the standard reading, after Anscombe, would maintain that elementary objects can't properly be said to even exist - they are "shown" by their relations to each other. — Banno

But he does not state any elementary propositions either.

This turned to the idea that we choose whatever elementary objects we wish to treat as simples, in accord with what we are doing. — Banno

Which is a rejection of the ontology (objects), epistemology (analysis), and metaphysics (logical structure) of the Tractatus, as well as the idea that there is a final analysis.

See PI §48 — Banno

This passage mentions Plato's Theaetetus, but does not make the connection explicit. The subject of the dialogue is knowledge.

I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even “itself” or “that” or “each” or “alone” or “this” or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason;they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. (201e - 202b)

He goes on to give an example:

The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables ... (202e)

Note that Socrates does not present this as his own view. See the first sentence. Words are not derived from the combination of letters of the alphabet. He goes on to show how problematic such an analysis is.

As you point out, what we treat as simple depends on what we are doing. In §60 he considers an analysis of a broom:

Then does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed in the brush?—If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought specially of the broomstick or specially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular.

But if we are making or repairing brooms the broomstick and brush might be thought of as two things rather than one. The brush then might be regarded as one thing or a combination of bristles. At the atomic level (the choice of terms is deliberate) the broomstick, the brush, and the bristles are all composites. In the final analysis what serves as a final analysis depends on what we are doing. It may be, however, that there is no final analysis. An atom was once thought of as simple, indivisible, but we now know that what we call an atom is not an atom it its original sense. Whether or not there is something or things that are simple and indivisible remains an open question. It may be an a priori mythology.

That seems to be beside the point. — Banno

It depends on what one from an exegesis. Some may regard the fact that elementary objects, names, and propositions are assumed a priori is satisfactory for understanding the text, but others might think the inability to identify them a significant problem that calls the truth and meaning of the text into question. After all, he does say:

2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori.

One can give an exegesis of the picture the text presents without raising the question of whether it is true or false, but if the exegesis includes the question of the truth of what is presented then it is not beside the point.

This is your view, and not exegetic. — Banno

How do you explain the absence of even a single example of an elementary object or name or proposition? Or did he identify any elementary objects or their relations?

I have not read enough Kripke or Davidson to say anything that would not demonstrate my ignorance.

I expect this could be a right reading. But I'd like to know whether this means, for you or for W, that

"a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation? — bongo fury

As I understand it, as they are used here those symbols denote any two elemental objects. There may be conventions that I am not aware of, but I assume 'x' and 'y' or something else could have been used instea.

My turn to ask a question: do bongos infuriate you or do you play the bongos furiously or something else?

Ok. And you prefer single inverted commas, but the reader infers, from your use of the word "term", that you use these single marks as quote marks. We aren't sure why you decline to clarify with doubles, when invited, but never mind. — bongo fury

Single quote marks are also sometimes used in academic writing, though this isn’t considered a rule. Specialist terms that are unique to a subject are often enclosed in single quotation marks in both U.S. and British English. This is very common in specific disciplines, particularly philosophy or theology.

https://grammar.yourdictionary.com/punctuation/rules-for-using-single-quotation-marks.html

If you mean, names were for W those symbols that referred to simple or elementary objects, that doesn't sound any different to ordinary usage of "name" in logic. — bongo fury

In general, logic uses proper names. Wittgenstein specifies how he is using the term in the Tractatus:

2.02 Objects are simple.

3.22 In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.

3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.

The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so a relation cannot be a name? — Fooloso4

Do you mean,

The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation cannot be named (referred to by a name).
— Fooloso4

? Or,

The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so a relation cannot be a name?
— Fooloso4 — bongo fury

The parenthetical remark does not appear in what is quoted. Square brackets [ ] should be used. They should also be used when adding words to a quote: [sign] objects. Wittgenstein distinguishes between a sign and an object. There are no "sign objects".

3.221 Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives.

A relation cannot be named because a relation is not a object. A relation can, however, be given a sign 'R'.

Do you mean,

"a" and "b" are not names either but refer to
— Fooloso4

... any two particular names, according to context?

Or do you mean, "a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?

Or something else? — bongo fury

The full sentence is:

'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. — Fooloso4

'a' and 'b' are variables.

Sure, all that. It's not clear to me what you are saying, or even if you are agreeing or disagreeing with the suggestion I made. — Banno

What I disagreed with is:

... while for Wittgenstein the simples are states of affairs. — Banno

The simples are not states of affairs, they form states of affairs.

In the Tractatus, objects are only understood in terms of their relations to each other; we talk about, and hence understand, objects only indirectly via their relations. Fooloso4 seems to disagree with this, but that runs against the text of the Tractatus. — Banno

Yes, I disagree to the extent that if elementary objects are not identified, that is, known, we cannot say what their relations are. It is clear that they stand in relation to each other, but just what those relations are is left unsaid and cannot be said unless we know what the simple objects are.

This does run against the text of the Tractatus, but, as you know, Wittgenstein came to reject the text.

He used the term 'name' in a way that is different from the way we ordinarily use it. Names referred to the simple or elementary objects. What they are, he never said. The relation between these objects is not another object and do a relation is not a name. 'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. An elementary proposition is a picture of the relation between the objects. What that relation is is shown by the proposition.

2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.

2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.

He later abandoned this line of thought.

This sounds incredibly arrogant. — Tate

The classic example is the fate of Socrates. As a result Plato and Aristotle had to be much more circumspect in order to protect themselves and their work, but also because philosophy posed a threat to the city. Certain things had to be hidden in their writings. For Descartes and Spinoza there was the example of what happened to Galileo. Descartes took as his own Ovid's motto: "He who lived well hid himself well". Spinoza's signet ring was engraved "caute". Wittgenstein witnessed how often his students misunderstood him. He thought it better to hide certain things to avoid misleading them. It was only those who are "like minded" who would have the key to unlock the rooms he kept hidden.

That causes a lot of confusion. — Tate

Why they do this is an interesting question. To begin to answer it requires looking at specific examples, but this does not yield a single answer that applies to all cases. In some cases it has more to do with language than with deliberate intention. The meaning of words change over time and pick up meanings that were not in use at the time of writing. But I think that in other cases it is deliberate. A philosopher may have a unique way of thinking that is reflected in a unique use of terms. There may also be a rhetorical intention. Begin with what seems familiar. I don't think we should disregard the possibility that the reader is being deliberately misled. Nietzsche, with his disdain for "the idle reader" comes to mind, or something is being hidden from the reader. Wittgenstein is aware of the need for this:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside! The honorable thing to do is put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the rest.
— Wittgenstein Culture and Value

Ah, I see. He's using the word in a unique way. — Tate

It is a common mistake to fail to see when a philosopher, and not just Wittgenstein, is using terms in a unique way.

A proposition is not generally considered to be a representation. I'm glad to see that he didn't use that word. — Tate

4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.

4.021 A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation
that it represents.

2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.141 A picture is a fact

2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the
possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.

Although a picture, that is, a representation or proposition is itself a fact, he makes a distinction between the representation and what is represented. A fact, the existence of a state of affairs shares the logical structure that enables propositions about a state of affairs, but the state of affairs depicted is not the same fact as the depiction.

2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as
the elements of the picture.

2.18 What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.

2.21 A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.

Pictures are not the reality, the facts, they represent. There are false picture. They do not correctly represent the facts.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between facts and propositions which are representations of facts.

The proposition "the tree is 3m tall" exists in the mind. — RussellA

The proposition, a statement about the height of the tree is true if and only if the tree is 3m tall. There is no measure 3m tall in a "mind independent world', but the height of the tree is not dependent on our measuring it. It may, for example, block the sunlight from trees that are not as tall. The statement "the tree is 3m tall" depends on the use of a standard of measurement, which is not mind independent, and what is measured, the tree, which is as it is independent of the mind.

You might argue that there are no trees or anything else independent of the mind. Certainly there no propositions independent of the mind, but whether this tree blocks the sunlight from shorter trees is not dependent on the mind.

From what you wrote, we agree that objects and names are not what folk mean when they talk of the atoms in Wittgenstein's logical atomism. I suggest that, whereas in Russel the atoms are things and predicates, the atoms in Wittgenstein's logical atomism are the relations, aRb. — Banno

"Atomic facts" and "atomic propositions" are Russell's terminology. Wittgenstein did not use this terminology. He refers to "elementary propositions" "Elementarsätze". An elementary proposition is a combination of simple or elemental names.

4.221 It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions
which consist of names in immediate combination.

Wittgenstein never names the names in elementary propositions. They are assumed a priori. Further, although he states the form of elementary propositions he never identifies an elementary proposition. 'a' stands in relation to 'b', but without identifying 'a' and 'b' we cannot say what the relation is between names or elementary objects.

And yet:

4.26 If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of
them are true and which false. An elementary proposition is simply one that cannot be further analyzed.

Did you get the chance to review Russell's comments in the introduction? What do you take to be the difference between Russel's and Witti's accounts? — Banno

In his introduction Russell says:

Facts which are not compounded of other facts are what Mr. Wittgenstein calls Sachverhalte, whereas a fact which may consist of two or more facts is a Tatsache: thus, for example “Socrates is wise” is a Sachverhalt, as well as a Tatsache ...

Socrates is not an uncompounded fact. 'Socrates' is not the name of a simple or elemental object and cannot be part of an elementary proposition. Russell's atomism maintains no such distinction between Wittgenstein's elementary propositions about unnamed names of simples and propositions about complex things such as Socrates.

Sure, objects are simples. But...

↪Sam26

The question here is on of exegesis, not ontology. — Banno

My initial post:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/717045

Sam's post is in agreement with what I had posted prior to him.

For Wittgenstein, the atoms are relations between objects. — Banno

The German is:

2 Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.

The Pears/McGuinness translation:

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.

is more accurate. There is no term that in the German that corresponds to atomic facts. It is the Sachverhalten, the states of affairs, the facts that are relations between objects.

what is the point of 3.1432 — Banno

3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’

The statement that follows clarifies this:

3.144 Situations can be described but not given names.

'R' is not the name of the relation between 'a' and 'b'. What that relation is is determined by 'a' and 'b'. Simple objects contain within themselves the possibilities of their combinations.

I would take the opposite route from Fooloso4. — Tobias

Do you mean the opposite route to the same destination or one that leads to the opposite or a different destination?

I think it important to keep in mind Socrates "human wisdom", which is to say, his ignorance. The question arises as to the possibility of humans attaining "divine wisdom", that is, wisdom that goes beyond knowledge of our ignorance. Put differently, the question is whether the full realization of human nature is possible. It may be that it is something to which we aspire but never realize. Human wisdom would then entail the ability to discern what is best in the absence of knowledge of what is best. Human wisdom, then, requires moderation, an acknowledgement of our fallibility.

I'd taken it that the world in the Tractatus is all that is the case, not a collection of simples. That is, the difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's logical atomism is that for Russell the simples are particulars (objects), while for Wittgenstein the simples are states of affairs. — Banno

The first part is correct. The world is not a collection of simples. The second part, simples are states of affairs, is incorrect. It is the relation of objects that determine a state of affairs. Simple objects contain within themselves the possibilities of combination. It is by combination that facts are produced.

Objects are simple.
— T 2.02

Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.
— T 2.021

The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented—only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.
— T 2.0231

It [substance] is form and content.
— T 2.025

Space, time, colour (being coloured) are forms of objects.
— T 2.0251

Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.
— T 2.0271

In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.
— T 2.031

Wittgenstein took stats of affairs as the building blocks. — Banno

A state of affairs is the configuration of the building blocks, that is, at its most elemental state the simple objects, which combine to form more complex states of affairs.

The world is those propositions in logical space which are true — Banno

A proposition is a picture of reality.
The proposition is a model of the reality as we think (denken) it is.
— T 4.01

Smolen is a big fan of Leibniz. He has pointed out that it is only fairly recently that scientists have ignored or disparaged philosophy. He points out that scientists of Einstein's generation had more than a passing interest in philosophy.

Perhaps there is a connection with the influence of logical positivism and its disregard for philosophy's past.

Retrieve what? — Jackson

Short answer: the truth (alethea) disclosed at a particular time and place.

Most philosophy departments offer classes in ancient Greek philosophy. — Jackson

And some regard it as nothing more than quaint and misguided ideas that are primitive and from which he have progressed.

I think Heidegger was on the right track when he said that in the movement of thought some things are occluded. Hence the importance of retrieval.

Philosophy is very different from science. In science people do not talk about past science. In philosophy, people still talk about Plato and Aristotle as live topics. — Jackson

Some people think that the continued interest in Plato and Aristotle is regressive. I do not agree.

Progress toward what end?

The goal or assumption of progress in philosophy might be regressive.

The Greek term translated as virtue is arete. It means the excellence of a thing. Human excellence is the realization of human potential. Someone who has attained human excellence is wise.

Someone who lacks courage has not realized or actualized her potential but this does not mean that courage is the same as human excellence or virtue. In fact, an excess of courage can lead to rashness or even ruthlessness.

@Art48

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein attempts to construct the world beginning with what is simple or elemental. Corresponding to simple objects are simple names. Wittgenstein never identifies any simple object or name, but assumes they must exist as constitutive elements of the world.

Logic underlies the compounding of simple objects and names. It is this logical structure that makes possible saying anything about the world. Propositions are true if what they say is what is the case. That the word is a totality of facts not things means that it is not the simple objects or things that make up the world but rather their combinations. The most rudimentary combinations are "atomic facts". Atomic facts combine to form complexes.

He uses the term "world" to mean the totality of these complexes. He also talks about "my world", the world as it is for me. But the "I" is not part of the world in the same way as the eye sees but is not what is seen.

I did not mean a "mental picture", which would just be us picturing something to ourselves, which, as he says, is analogous to a picture like a painting. All those quotes are about a picture in the sense of a theoretical framework — Antony Nickles

In his later work he blurs the lines between seeing and saying, seeing and thinking. Seeing is active, conceptual, constructive. Language reflects this. A mental picture might be analogous to a painting, but it may, in other cases, be closer to a map or diagram or schematic or blueprint. It enables us to visualize something in a sense that is related to but is not the same as the painted image. It can make connections that are not apparent in the painting.

Consider the various senses of "I see". What does it mean to visualize something? There is here a variety of things that have a family resemblance that extends to a theoretical framework.

A "point of view" in the PI is not a cohesive theory; it is an attitude, in the sense of an inclination, a disposition. — Antony Nickles

(I once read somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words "Look at this", serves as a proof for certain Indian mathematicians. This looking too effects an alteration in one's way of seeing.) (Zettel, 461)

The question is what is it about us that creates the picture of something hidden? And the answer is our desire for crystalline purity, of knowledge that is certain enough that we will know right from wrong (abdicating responsibility for choosing), that we will not be surprised or accused by others, that we will have justification sufficient to satisfy our disappointment with the world and ourselves. — Antony Nickles

The presupposition is that the world is intelligible. But the world of our ordinary experience is messy and does yield to our understanding. One response to this is that the truth of things is hidden and must be uncovered. Another is a form of skepticism that I think Wittgenstein accepts. In On Certainty he quotes Goethe:

In the beginning was the deed. (402)

Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination. (OC 475)

A language game is an extension of primitive behavior (Z 545)

Instinct first reason second (RPP 689)

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. (OC 166)

Added: There are different forms of skepticism, some of which he clearly rejects.

However, there is a sense of "picture" which is what I am trying to make clear--what hides the ordinary from us (what is in plain view). — Antony Nickles

As I understand it, what is at issue is the status of a mental picture. It is not as if he is arguing for the elimination of mental pictures, but that a picture does not settle the matter. A picture may lead us astray, but a picture may also represent a "fertile point of view". The mental pictures we construct must be investigated not eliminated. They too are part of our ordinary way of seeing things.

Added: It is not pictures but the picture of something hidden that he rejects.

...but this is different than a picture, which I would equate with a theory. — Antony Nickles

You may equate a picture with a theory, but that is not how Wittgenstein used the term. In the Tractatus a picture represents a state of affairs. He has a theory of how this is possible, but a picture or representation and how is able to do that are two different things. In PI he rejects this theory but picturing remains important.