"Accident" is not a synonym of unnecessary. "Accident" is not the correct term to convey what you actually mean. — Harry Hindu

It is not what I mean, it is what Wittgenstein said. In an earlier response to you I quoted the following from the Tractatus:

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental. — Fooloso4

Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. — Harry Hindu

No. It means that the way things are is not by necessity.

I wasn't suggesting that W. was dogmatic about the connection between meaning and use — Sam26

I quoted the text in order to support what you said.

quote="Sam26;720827"]It sounds like you're saying that meaning is found in the proposition ...[/quote]

If that is what it sounds line then I failed to express what I was saying clearly. The meaning is not found in the proposition but in what the proposition points to. That is:

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. — Fooloso4

The thing a proposition refers to is not itself.

There is a difference between the inner experience and the outward manifestation. — Sam26

I agree. What I was objecting to is this:

It appears to me that Wittgenstein is saying that language takes its meaning entirely from behaviour, from use, and only from a third-person, external standpoint. Pain and other sensations do not refer directly to the private feelings but to the public expression of those feelings; to how you (and others) act when experiencing those sensations. Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke

Pain and other sensations do not refer to anything. The expression of those sensations refer to the sensations, which can be expressed in various ways. The problem is that referring to what my own sensations is not like referring to something public. I cannot point to it. But if no one felt pain what we might consider pain behavior would not be considered pain behavior. The experience of pain itself enters the picture.

First, I don't know about you. but for me, "meaning as use" has it's limitations. It seems rather obvious that not all "uses" of a word, equate to meaning. — Sam26

What is often overlooked is what I have bolded:

PI 43For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes this possible.

In the Investigations reference is problematic when it comes to such things as sensation. If I am in pain I am not referring to some public thing that can be pointed to for others to see or experience. But this does not mean:

Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke

I can be in pain whether I express it or not. If there is a tribe in which no one feels pain, to be told that I am in pain is meaningless. It does not refer to anything they have any acquaintance with. But if I tell you I am in pain, you know what I mean. It does, in that sense, refer to something. Sometimes we need to stop doing philosophy. If a child tells you they are in pain the appropriate response is not to point out the ways in which this is philosophically problematic. We may ask where it hurts and respond accordingly.

That metaphysical claims are nonsense. — Tate

Metaphysical claims are nonsense but:

5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it.

6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do
with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.

The metaphysical self is not part of the world (5.633), and so claims about it are meaningless (Bedeutung). That is, it does not signify or represent anything in the world. But what is outside the limits of the world is what is, for Wittgenstein, meaningful in the sense of being most important. It is like the relation between the eye and what it sees. The eye sees but is not something seen. It is outside the visual field (5.6331).

The question is how are thoughts, which is one case, be about another entirely different case (not thoughts), like the movement of tectonic plates, if not by some form of causation (energy transfer, information transfer, etc.)? — Harry Hindu

Thought has a transcendental logical structure. You cannot think illogically (3.03) The relations of simple objects share this logical structure. The movement of tectonic plates is accidental.

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

My concern here is understanding Wittgenstein. It seems clear to me from the many references that he did regard music as a kind of language. Addressing the question of whether he is right or wrong is best asked once we are clear what it is he is saying.

to say "music is language" is a metaphor. — RussellA

See "Metaphors We Live By", George Lakoff and Mark Johnson.

Wittgenstein came to see that language is more that just a logical relation between words.

Meaning can only be expressed in a proposition, such as "the apple is on the table". — RussellA

As he points out, a proposition need not be stated in words. Instead of saying "the apple is on the table" I can put an apple on a table. (3.1431)

Tactatus 4 "The thought is the significant proposition" — RussellA

Translating sinnvolle as significant is not wrong, but can be misleading if we are not clear what significant means in this context. It means to signify, to have a sense:

4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.

A thought represents a state of affairs, for example, "the apple is on the table". But this representation must also be logical. Thoughts refer to states of affairs and can do so because they have a common logical structure.

3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.

But this is a picture Wittgenstein comes to reject:

PI 115. A. picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.

According to Normal Malcolm, it was the following event that led to this:

Wittgenstein was insisting that a proposition and what it describes must have the same ‘logical form’ Sraffa made a gesture, familiar to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with an outward sweep of the finger-tips of one hand. And he asked: “What is the logical form of that?” [Malcolm N., (2001), Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford, Oxford University Press.]

Added:

In editing this some things were inadvertently deleted.

3.1 P/M In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.

This is another way in which:

4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.

The proposition can be perceived by the senses. When a thought is expressed it can be perceived by others. They can know what I am thinking.

A limit cannot be drawn to thought (Preface) because we cannot think illogical thoughts:

3.03 Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.

We cannot think illogically but we can say things that are illogical. Here we see the difference between thinking and saying.

We talk about the language of music, but this is a metaphor, in that music is like language, not that music is language. Music is like language in that there is a relationship between the individual parts. — RussellA

I think it more accurate to say that the language of music is like a language of words. Both are languages but not the same language.

In the Notebooks he says:

Musical themes are in a certain sense propositions. [40]

What does he say that leads you to the conclusion that this "certain sense" is a metaphorical sense? Or is this just your assumption?

Music has a grammar, a logical structure.

Music, some music at least, makes us want to call it a language; but some music or course doesn't. [CV 62]

In several places Wittgenstein refers to the language of music.

PI 527. Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding a sentence lies nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme. Why is just this the pattern of variation in loudness and tempo?

The right tempo is also important to understanding Wittgenstein's sentences:

Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the right tempo. My sentences are all supposed to be read slowly. [CV 57]

Feeling is an emotional state, whereas thinking requires judgement, reasoning and intellect. — RussellA

Understanding a musical theme is not simply having a feeling.

The strength of the thoughts in Brahm's music [CV 23]

Music, some music at least, makes us want to call it a language; but some music or course doesn't. ]CV 62]

The broader issue, however, is the relation between thought and language. The earlier examples cited, such as this from the Tractatus:

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.

show that propositions need not be linguist, that is, a proposition need not be thought or expressed in terms of words.

Plato sets up what is at issue in Socrates' opening statement. He attributes the Thessalians' reputation for wisdom to their love of the sophist Gorgias because of his wisdom, and his ability to give "a bold and grand answer to any question you may be asked, as experts are likely to do." Socrates will not provide such an answer to the question of whether virtue can be taught. He claims that not only he, but neither Gorias nor anyone else knows what virtue is. The dialogue Gorgias raises doubts as to his wisdom and virtue. He is a skilled rhetorician who can give bold and grand answers, although the truth of those answers is something else.

But it is not Gorgias but Meno himself we must look at. Xenophon gives a damning account of his character. Meno's question can be rephrased to ask whether he can be taught virtue, that is, whether an ambitious and ruthless young man can be taught to be virtuous. Further, Meno thinks he already knows what virtue is. In line with his ambitions he thinks it is the ability of a man to manage public affairs for the benefit of himself and his friends and harm his enemies.

Socrates' acknowledgement that he does not know stands is stark contrast. Meno thinks he knows what virtue is and will do what he thinks he knows is virtuous. Socrates does not know and thus will live the examined life. He strives to live virtuously through examination, knowing that he does not know.

He brings up the bees not simply to make the point that Meno is giving him a swarm rather than a single answer to what virtue is, but to raise the question of the nature of bees. Behind the question of the nature of bees is the question of the nature of man. The virtue of a man is not distinct from the nature of man.

Regarding the myth of recollection ( anamnesis ) if one does not already have some sense of virtue how can it be recognized? If virtue is completely absent then it cannot be taught. It must in some sense already be present in a person. Meno's initial question is revealing:

... can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?

What does it mean for virtue to be teachable? It is not to putting knowledge in the soul in which virtue is absent. Teaching and practice are related. It is not teaching or practice, but teaching through practice. It is only if men do to some extent possess it by nature that it can be fostered.

In the Tractatus, a name is the thing it denotes. So one cannot say the meaning of a name. One can only show it, by pointing, or by using the name in a sentence. — Banno

But he gives no examples of using simple names.

He struggles with this in the Notebooks 1914-16:

And nothing seems to speak against infinite divisibility.
And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing.[62]

If there is a final sense and a proposition expressing it completely, then there are also names for simple objects. [64]

The division of the body into material points, as we have it in physics, is nothing more than analysis into simple components.
But could it be possible that the sentences in ordinary use have, as it
were, only an incomplete sense ( quite apart from their truth or falsehood), and that the propositions in physics, as it were, approach the stage where a proposition really has a complete sense?
When I say, "The book is lying on the table", does this really have a
completely clear sense? (An EXTREMELY important question.)[67]

Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one. [68]

The simple sign is essentially simple.
It functions as a simple object. (What does that mean?)
Its composition becomes completely indifferent. It disappears from view. [69]

Now when I do this and designate the objects by means of names, does that make them simple?
All the same, however, this proposition is a picture of that complex.
This object is simple for me! [70]

Those who support a resolute reading.

1 The world is all that is the case.

Is this nonsense? What does that mean? Is it not true that the world is all that is the case?

Toward the end of the Tractatus he says:

6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do
with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.

Is this nonsense? Is it nonsense to say that there are propositions of natural science? Is it nonsense to demonstrate to someone that he has failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his proposition? Does this mean that he has successfully given a meaning to these signs? If it is nonsense to say that philosophy has nothing to do with natural science, why does he say this? To what end?

Why do those who support a resolute reading spend so much time and effort reading, interpreting , and arguing over interpretations of Wittgenstein? What do the hope to gain from obsessing over nonsense?

And in the middle:

4.112

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

Is this nonsense? Does this mean that philosophy is a body or doctrine and/or not an activity?

He continues:

Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’

Is this a philosophical proposition? What about 1? Is this proposition not philosophical proposition? Certainly it is not a scientific proposition. If it is nonsense is it not true or can something be both true and nonsense?

6.5 If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.

Nonsense? Are there then questions that cannot be answered?

But:

When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words.
The riddle does not exist.

Is it then false that the riddle does not exist? Does all this "nonsense" point to the fact that there are legitimate philosophical questions and problems?

6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

This has often been put in the form of a question: Why is there something rather than nothing? Some ask this question is hopes of an answer, but others as an expression of wonder.

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.
They are what is mystical.

Is it nonsense that there are things that cannot be put into words? Nonsense that these things make themselves manifest? Nonsense that they are mystical?

Preface:

The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.

Is the whole sense of the book that it is nonsense? Is it nonsense to say that what we cannot talk about must be passed over is nonsense? If this proposition is nonsense, does this mean that what cannot be put into words should not be passed over in silence?

Wittgenstein wrote in his Notebooks 1914-16: "Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language." — RussellA

The statement continues:

For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition. — Notebooks 1914-16, p.82

Thinking is a kind of language because it is a logical picture of the proposition. This kind of language, however, need not be a language of words.

The thought, the book is on the table, might occur as a picture in the mind. Without words. And can be expressed that way by a photograph or drawing.

The proposition in picture-writing ... [7]
The proposition onfy says something in so far as it is a picture! [8]
A situation is thinkable' ('imaginable') means: We can make ourselves a picture of it. [24] — Notebooks

The thought that the situation is tense or dangerous or comical can be expressed in music.

Musical themes are in a certain sense propositions. [40] — Notebooks

A picturial or musical language means that the claim that thinking is a kind of language is not the same as the claim that we think in words. Thinking is not silent speaking. A thought is not uttering something silently.

Consequentialism is related to phronesis, practical wisdom. Deliberation regarding ends and practical means to achieve them. It is opposed to Kant's notion of "good will" which, for which, according to Kant, consequences play no role.

Unintended consequences do not vitiate the concern with consequences.

"The good" is not a Platonic Form. It is not independent of particular needs and interests. The lack of unity, like the inability to predict the future, is not a failure but a condition for moral deliberation.

@RussellA

What do you make of this? Where does language enter the picture?

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.

Wittgenstein in Tractatus proposed that thought is language
4 "The thought is the significant proposition". — RussellA

From the preface:

Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts ... It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn ...

A thought is expressed in language. This does not mean that a thought is language. The expression, language, is not what is expressed, the thought.

3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.

I climbed it. I got it. It's not really that complicated. — Tate

Scholars have been debating the meaning of the text ever since it was published, but you read an article in the SEP and went from:

I'm going off the SEP article right now. I'm reading the text as well. — Tate

to declaring you have climbed the latter in a few hours.

To quote you:

This sounds incredibly arrogant. — Tate

You don't even know enough to know that you do not know. From the SEP article you are relying on:

The Tractatus is notorious for its interpretative difficulties. In the decades that have passed since its publication it has gone through several waves of general interpretations.

The interpretive difficulties remain. But you have it all figured out.

I am reminded of something William Buckley once said:

If you think Harry Jaffa is hard to argue with, try agreeing with him.

Wittgenstein uses the terms 'Sinn' in two different ways. What is "meaningful", as used in the SEP article, is what has a referent in the world. But what cannot be said is meaningful in the sense of being important or significant for us.

In a now famous letter to von Ficker he says:

The book's point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing. I have managed in my book to put everything firmly in place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book.

Because one must first climb the ladder before throwing it away, the propositions should not simply be dismissed by someone who has not climbed the rungs. After all, he would not have written it if it is just to be disregarded by a novice reader.

Reading Schopenhauer would prime you to get it, though. It's similar stuff. — Tate

In a remark to Drury:

Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from King Lear: ‘I’ll show you differences.’

It means that what he just wrote literally has no sense. — Tate

And what does this mean? Hint: do not assume it means what you think it does based on how it is used elsewhere.

It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts
— Fooloso4

I didn't say otherwise? — Tate

You said:

But the world is made of facts, as opposed to be made of objects. — Tate

States of affairs are not opposed to objects, they are objects in actual as opposed to possible states of affairs. The possibility to combine to form states of affairs is in the objects themselves. But not all possibilities are what is actually the case.

Your prior claim:

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. — Tate

There are no states of affairs without objects. If the states of affairs are dependent then they cannot be fundamental.

2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)

What does he or you mean by we cannot name them. — schopenhauer1

He does not claim that we cannot name them, but he does not name them. He claims that they are the elements of elementary propositions, but without naming them there can be no elementary propositions.

But the world is made of facts, as opposed to be made of objects. — Tate

Facts are composite. What is composite cannot be fundamental. The possibilities of objects occuring in states of affairs is in the objects themselves (2.0121)

Per the SEP — Tate

You left out the next sentence:

Facts are existent states of affairs and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of objects.

It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts. The possibility of such combinations is in the objects themselves. This was discussed above: Here

The problem, as I see it, is not the claim that there are simples but naming them. If we cannot name them we cannot give an analysis of elementary propositions. The following is then nonsense:

4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names.

I’m not against the idea of something fundamental but rather that Witty isn’t doing anything to defend his claim. — schopenhauer1

In the absence of a cogent argument against simples does this need to be defended? Can simples be denied without also denying complexes?

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. — Tate

There can be no states of affairs without the objects that combine to create those states of affairs:

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.

2.0121 If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.

2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)

2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world.That is why they cannot be composite.

2.024 The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

He just starts with this assumptions and hopes you fall for it. — schopenhauer1

We are in agreement regarding his a priori assumptions. The idea of something fundamental, however, is as old as western philosophy itself. It persists in modern science. That is not to say it is correct, but do we know it is incorrect? What are the alternatives?

The Tractatus is wrong if it fails to prove the very foundation it stands on. — schopenhauer1

Does his failure to prove the assumption that there are elemental building blocks mean that it is wrong?

Physicists have identified 12 building blocks that are the fundamental constituents of matter. Our everyday world is made of just three of these building blocks: the up quark, the down quark and the electron. This set of particles is all that's needed to make protons and neutrons and to form atoms and molecules. — Fermilab

The larger problem is not the ontological assumptions but the linguistic ones, that is, the elemental names that name the elemental objects and combine to form propositions. More precisely, the ontological is the linguistic - what is said and thought about what is. When all is said and done, what stands outside the limits of what can be said, what shows itself experientially remains. The problems of life, the aesthetic and ethical.

At first glance it looks like W is justifying correspondence theory by saying the world is linguistic in form. — Tate

He does not say that the world is linguistic in form. He says that the world is LOGICAL in form. It is this logical form that makes it possible for language to REPRESENT things in the world.

That doesn't comply with the quote you gave though. — Tate

How so? No single quote can capture the whole of the steps of his interrelated argument.

Plus for some reason you have brought up the T schema. — Tate

Do you mean this?

Whether or not a proposition is true is determined by comparing it with reality. — Fooloso4

To compare a proposition with reality means that reality is not a mental construct. The facts, what is the case, is not a matter of how we conceive things to be.

What problem? — Tate

The problem you raised about limits:

How does this work then? I compare a proposition to the state of a world that is limited by my language. — Tate

There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world, matters of ethics and aesthetics.
— Fooloso4

Not according to the quote you provided:

The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world. — Tate

The metaphysical subject is not found in the world. It is not a relation between things in the world, but, rather, between the self and "my world".

How does this work then? I compare a proposition to the state of a world that is limited by my language.

This actually sounds like empirical idealism. — Tate

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight — Wittgenstein Culture and Value 47

The proposition "The cat is on the mat" is true if the cat is on the mat. The limits of my language play no role here. The problem Wittgenstein is pointing to does not occur in the world, but only at the limits of the world.

How would logic pervade the world? Because it pervades language, it pervades the world? — Tate

The structure of the world is logical. It is what makes language possible. That is, propositions about how things are in the world, the propositions of science. They are not dependent on a subject.

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

This is heavily idealistic, isn't it? — Tate

Note that he calls it "pure realism" (5.64) This continues:

The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

5.641 What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul,
with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world— not a part of it.

The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world, matters of ethics and aesthetics.

The limits refer to what can be said, propositions about things in the world, and what stands outside those limits. Statements about ethics and aesthetics are senseless in that they do not point to what what is the case. They are not statements of fact. But this does not mean that they are meaningless in the sense of having no significance for us.

Wittgenstein wasn't a realist, then. — Tate

In the Tractatus objects and their relations are independent of the mind. The logical structure that underlies language is also independent of the mind. Whether or not a proposition is true is determined by comparing it with reality. But:

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits
of my world.

5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
...
We cannot think what we cannot think; so
what we cannot think we cannot say either.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world.

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.

5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

Well, the standard reading, after Anscombe, would maintain that elementary objects can't properly be said to even exist - they are "shown" by their relations to each other. — Banno

But he does not state any elementary propositions either.

This turned to the idea that we choose whatever elementary objects we wish to treat as simples, in accord with what we are doing. — Banno

Which is a rejection of the ontology (objects), epistemology (analysis), and metaphysics (logical structure) of the Tractatus, as well as the idea that there is a final analysis.

See PI §48 — Banno

This passage mentions Plato's Theaetetus, but does not make the connection explicit. The subject of the dialogue is knowledge.

I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even “itself” or “that” or “each” or “alone” or “this” or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be expressed by reason;they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. (201e - 202b)

He goes on to give an example:

The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables ... (202e)

Note that Socrates does not present this as his own view. See the first sentence. Words are not derived from the combination of letters of the alphabet. He goes on to show how problematic such an analysis is.

As you point out, what we treat as simple depends on what we are doing. In §60 he considers an analysis of a broom:

Then does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed in the brush?—If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought specially of the broomstick or specially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular.

But if we are making or repairing brooms the broomstick and brush might be thought of as two things rather than one. The brush then might be regarded as one thing or a combination of bristles. At the atomic level (the choice of terms is deliberate) the broomstick, the brush, and the bristles are all composites. In the final analysis what serves as a final analysis depends on what we are doing. It may be, however, that there is no final analysis. An atom was once thought of as simple, indivisible, but we now know that what we call an atom is not an atom it its original sense. Whether or not there is something or things that are simple and indivisible remains an open question. It may be an a priori mythology.

That seems to be beside the point. — Banno

It depends on what one from an exegesis. Some may regard the fact that elementary objects, names, and propositions are assumed a priori is satisfactory for understanding the text, but others might think the inability to identify them a significant problem that calls the truth and meaning of the text into question. After all, he does say:

2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori.

One can give an exegesis of the picture the text presents without raising the question of whether it is true or false, but if the exegesis includes the question of the truth of what is presented then it is not beside the point.

This is your view, and not exegetic. — Banno

How do you explain the absence of even a single example of an elementary object or name or proposition? Or did he identify any elementary objects or their relations?

I have not read enough Kripke or Davidson to say anything that would not demonstrate my ignorance.

I expect this could be a right reading. But I'd like to know whether this means, for you or for W, that

"a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation? — bongo fury

As I understand it, as they are used here those symbols denote any two elemental objects. There may be conventions that I am not aware of, but I assume 'x' and 'y' or something else could have been used instea.

My turn to ask a question: do bongos infuriate you or do you play the bongos furiously or something else?

Ok. And you prefer single inverted commas, but the reader infers, from your use of the word "term", that you use these single marks as quote marks. We aren't sure why you decline to clarify with doubles, when invited, but never mind. — bongo fury

Single quote marks are also sometimes used in academic writing, though this isn’t considered a rule. Specialist terms that are unique to a subject are often enclosed in single quotation marks in both U.S. and British English. This is very common in specific disciplines, particularly philosophy or theology.

https://grammar.yourdictionary.com/punctuation/rules-for-using-single-quotation-marks.html

If you mean, names were for W those symbols that referred to simple or elementary objects, that doesn't sound any different to ordinary usage of "name" in logic. — bongo fury

In general, logic uses proper names. Wittgenstein specifies how he is using the term in the Tractatus:

2.02 Objects are simple.

3.22 In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.

3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.

The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so a relation cannot be a name? — Fooloso4

Do you mean,

The relation between these objects is not another object and so a relation cannot be named (referred to by a name).
— Fooloso4

? Or,

The relation between these sign-objects is not another sign-object and so a relation cannot be a name?
— Fooloso4 — bongo fury

The parenthetical remark does not appear in what is quoted. Square brackets [ ] should be used. They should also be used when adding words to a quote: [sign] objects. Wittgenstein distinguishes between a sign and an object. There are no "sign objects".

3.221 Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives.

A relation cannot be named because a relation is not a object. A relation can, however, be given a sign 'R'.

Do you mean,

"a" and "b" are not names either but refer to
— Fooloso4

... any two particular names, according to context?

Or do you mean, "a" and "b" are two particular symbols with no fixed denotation?

Or something else? — bongo fury

The full sentence is:

'a' and 'b' are not names either but refer to any simple object. — Fooloso4

'a' and 'b' are variables.

Sure, all that. It's not clear to me what you are saying, or even if you are agreeing or disagreeing with the suggestion I made. — Banno

What I disagreed with is:

... while for Wittgenstein the simples are states of affairs. — Banno

The simples are not states of affairs, they form states of affairs.