OK. I guess my point is that if we ultimately reduce 'semantic' to pointing symbols...that at some point AI may satisfy our intuition. — path

IMV, Derrida was making the kind of point that I'm trying to make, dissolving some pure subject or consciousness into social linguistic conventions. — path

There is an infallible predictor,...

Nozick avoids this issue by positing that the predictor's predictions are "almost certainly" correct, thus sidestepping any issues of infallibility and causality.

It isn't possible to win $0 or $1,001,000 and so those alleged outcomes ought not be considered. — Michael

The A.I. produces “elaboration graphs" on a screen. For the MacBeth question, the program produced about 20 boxes containing information such as “Lady Mac­beth is Macbeth’s wife” and “Macbeth murders Duncan.” Below that were lines connecting to other boxes, connecting explicit and inferred elements of the story. — Frank Pray

I think Searle was a bot. — path

Why is he so sure that he is swimming in something semantic? An appeal to intuition? 'I promise you, I can see redness!' — path

And what do those symbols refer to? Not the symbols themselves, but actual chips and dip. So somehow you need to get the symbols to relate to actual chips and dip. — InPitzotl

This essay says it much better than I ever could https://aeon.co/essays/your-brain-does-not-process-information-and-it-is-not-a-computer — Wayfarer

I challenged researchers there to account for intelligent human behaviour without reference to any aspect of the IP metaphor. They couldn’t do it, and when I politely raised the issue in subsequent email communications, they still had nothing to offer months later. They saw the problem. They didn’t dismiss the challenge as trivial. But they couldn’t offer an alternative. — Robert Epstein: The Empty Brain

I'm not sure that being sexually attracted to other races is proof of lack of racism. — Hanover

The racism of me subconsciously favoring my tribe is a universal problem facing us all, — Hanover

So the picture one might choose — unenlightened

Well, I did try to keep my wordcount to a minimum. — TheMadFool

Perhaps that's where the fault lies. — TheMadFool

A clear distinction cannot be vague. Clear and vague are antonyms. — David Mo

What Whitehead would call perception in the mode of symbolic reference which comes after causal efficacy and immediate presentation. — prothero

And this is why using "consciousness" (self knowledge, self reference, self awareness) as a synonym for "experience" creates a problem. — prothero

Consciousness is a special kind of experience but without the lower orders of experience there would be no consciousness. — prothero

It [panpsychism] “explains” why my socks and bubblegum are conscious, even though no one thought they were, but it doesn’t explain why the human brain is conscious the way the human brain is conscious, which is what we actually want to know. — Zelebg

Really? So get a newborn, poke it with a sharp stick, does it feel anything? — bert1

At what point in the chain of being “existence” or “life” do you think this ability disappears working your way down. Do higher animals have experience? Ants? Bees? Flowers? — prothero

Somewhere below Primates, Cetaceans and possibly Elephants. — Isaac

Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.
— Pfhorrest

No, but it is usually implied by it. — bongo fury

Which direction do you mean that implication to go? — Pfhorrest

Eliminativism is the view that consciousness is not real — bert1

Ok, so "first person perspective" wasn't some innocuous physical concept to do with frames of reference.
— bongo fury

I , as a panpsychist, think it is. — Pfhorrest

It’s only emergentism that makes it out to be anything metaphysically weird. — Pfhorrest

not invoking anything in addition to physical stuff, just a different perspective on that physical stuff. — Pfhorrest

Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism. — Pfhorrest

That person is not providing any answer at all to the question of phenomenal consciousness. — Pfhorrest

We don’t know if they think there is no such thing, — Pfhorrest

if it somehow emerges from nothing — Pfhorrest

And this perspective was already on the physicist's menu, or not?
— bongo fury

It depends on the physicist’s philosophical views. — Pfhorrest

some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective — Pfhorrest

If he’s an eliminativist — Pfhorrest

then no, he denies that there is such a thing. — Pfhorrest

If he’s an emergentist then yes, — Pfhorrest

some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective — Pfhorrest

where that completely different metaphysical thing started happening — Pfhorrest

Panpsychism simply says that... — Pfhorrest

No, I think it has already also required,

"some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective"
— Pfhorrest

but doesn't seem keen to admit it. — bongo fury

It says that there is a first person perspective that is had, — Pfhorrest

Panpsychism simply says that [...] — Pfhorrest

some mysterious metaphysical having of a first person perspective — Pfhorrest

It [panpsychism] “explains” why my socks and bubblegum are conscious, even though no one thought they were, but it doesn’t explain why the human brain is conscious the way the human brain is conscious, which is what we actually want to know. — Zelebg

So what we think of a as — Pantagruel

then you can begin to see how immaterial things can participate in what we call consciousness — Pantagruel

I actually felt sorry for him! This sounds exactly like a machine figuring out that this whole consciousness thing was just something it was programmed to espouse. — hypericin

Sometimes a psychologist's most assiduous accounts of phenomena of mental imagery have the flavor of tracts by impassioned believers in flying saucers. — Goodman: Sights Unseen

The 'image' and the 'picture in the mind' have vanished; mythical inventions have been beneficially excised. — Goodman: Sights Unseen

After we spend an hour or so at one or another exhibition of abstract painting, everything tends to square off into geometric patches or swirl in circles or weave into textural arabesques, to sharpen into black and white or vibrate with new color consonances and dissonances." — Goodman: Ways of Worldmaking

You might find this old thread interesting : https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1308/aphantasia-and-p-zombies/p1 — csalisbury

Here's an account by a man who, at 30 years old, realized that other people could visualize things without seeing them.

https://www.facebook.com/notes/blake-ross/aphantasia-how-it-feels-to-be-blind-in-your-mind/10156834777480504/

He never could, and was unaware that anybody else could. He thought that phrases like 'mind's eye,' were figures of speech.

The medical term for this condition is called aphantasia. — The Great Whatever

How our lookings at pictures and our listenings to music inform what we encounter later and elsewhere is integral to them as cognitive. Music can inform perception not only of other sounds but also of the rhythms and patterns of what we see. Such cross-transference of structural properties seems to me a basic and important aspect of learning, not merely a matter for novel experimentation by composers, dancers, and painters. — Goodman: Languages of Art

I am not sure if Dennett's is an anti-representationalist stance. — Graeme M

There is no mirroring going on. — jamalrob

find the concept so incredulous. — Isaac

Perhaps what the salient parts of the disagreement are depend on what camp you're in? A difference that looks different from both sides. — fdrake

That's the question that's being asked. Is that thing that's missing for people with blindsight something that happens "in the head" of the rest of us or is it a property of the external world object? — Michael

that thing that's missing in cases of blindsight — Michael

What are dreams? — Harry Hindu

It wer a col nite but we wer warm in that doss bag. Lissening to the dogs howling aftrwds and the wind wuthering and wearying and nattering in the oak leaves. Looking at the moon all col and wite and oansome. Lorna said to me, "You know Riddley theres some thing in us it dont have no name."

I said, "What thing is that?"

She said, "Its some kynd of thing it aint us but yet its in us. Its looking out thru our eye hoals. May be you dont take no noatis of it only some times. Say you get woak up suddn in the middl of the nite. 1 minim youre a sleap and the nex youre on your feet with a spear in your han. Wel it wernt you put that spear in your han it wer that other thing whats looking out thru your eye hoals. It aint you nor it dont even know your name. Its in us lorn and loan and sheltering how it can."

I said, "If its in every 1 of us theres moren 1 of it theres got to be a manying theres got to be a millying and mor."

Lorna said, "Wel there is a millying and mor."

I said, "Wel if theres such a manying of it whys it lorn then whys it loan?"

She said, "Becaws the manying and the millying its all 1 thing it dont have nothing to gether with. You look at lykens on a stoan its all them tiny manyings of it and may be each part of it myt think its sepert only we can see its all 1 thing. Thats how it is with what we are its all 1 girt big thing and divvyt up amongst the many. Its all 1 girt thing bigger nor the won and lorn and loan and oansome. Tremmering it is and feart. It puts us on like we put on our does. Some times we dont fit. Some times it cant fynd the arm hoals and it tears us a part. I dont think I took all that much noatis of it when I ben yung. Now Im old I noatis it mor. It dont realy like to put me on no mor. Every morning I can feal how its tiret of me and readying to throw me a way. Iwl tel you some thing Riddley and keap this in memberment. What ever it is we dont come naturel to it."

I said, "Lorna I dont know what you mean."

She said, "We aint a naturel part of it. We dint begin when it begun we dint begin where it begun. It ben here befor us nor I dont know what we are to it. May be weare jus only sickness and a feaver to it or boyls on the arse of it I dont know. Now lissen what Im going to tel you Riddley. It thinks us but it dont think like us. It dont think the way we think. Plus like I said befor its afeart."

I said, "Whats it afeart of?"

She said, "Its afeart of being beartht."

I said, "How can that be? You said it ben here befor us. If it ben here all this time it musve ben beartht some time."

She said, "No it aint ben beartht it never does get beartht its all ways in the woom of things its all ways on the road."

I said, "All this what you jus ben telling be that a tel for me?"

She larft then she said, "Riddley there aint nothing what aint a tel for you. The wind in the nite the dus on the road even the leases stoan you kick a long in front of you. Even the shadder of that leases stoan roaling on or stanning stil its all telling."

Wel I cant say for cern no mor if I had any of them things in my mynd befor she tol me but ever since then it seams like they all ways ben there. Seams like I ben all ways thinking on that thing in us what thinks us but it dont think like us. Our woal life is a idear we dint think of nor we dont know what it is. What a way to live.

Thats why I finely come to writing all this down. Thinking on what the idear of us myt be. Thinking on that thing whats in us lorn and loan and oansome.

— Russell Hoban: Riddley Walker

Misstatement? — frank

The problem is stated as "The set of all sets that do not contain themselves as subsets members." — EnPassant

I think this is the correct answer from Snakes Alive: — frank

All sets that do not... — EnPassant

The entity — EnPassant

The problem is stated as "The set of all sets that do not contain themselves as subsets members." — EnPassant

Subset is transitive — EnPassant

I am not asking why a banana is a banana. — bizso09