“The opposite of love is not hate, it's indifference." — Elie Wiesel

I wonder what Elie Wiesel would tell us the opposite of hate is.

I am still trying to ingest this message. In particular, this:

So, there is no separation of "is" (fact) and "ought" (value), because awareness is both objective (fact-based) and subjective (value-based). Ethical fact and value constitute the two poles of empathy. — Galuchat

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory — Wayfarer

Perhaps I am not giving this idea its due or perhaps what I am talking about is considered elsewhere, but the premise I'm contemplating has the "ought" at a subordinate level of encapsulation. Peoples' ethical model include the "ought" in order to support the superior "is" existent within group selection. The "is", just in case this is too muddy, involves the statistical disadvantage of maladaptive principle selection.

Now, questioned about this, we must reject it. A contrived "ought" is no good. Normative theories only have true weight when we can implement them righteously.

Sort of a painfully obvious question occurred to me that is more of a 'houskeeping' matter: do you think Darwinian ethics included discussing all branches of Philosophy? — 3017amen

As a descriptive effort, and this is how I first approached my question in the OP, it was a consideration from a meta-ethical perspective. I think the answer then is yes. Since that posting my mind has been flipping -- a la the necker cube. At one point I will see this as a matter of fact Darwinian process, wherein the various schools and strains of ethical thought are caught up in the neural web (not of individuals but of groups of individuals) working to an imperfect effort of group survival, in various degrees unreflective of their subordination to the true objective (those that die out can talk all they want about fact-value to their hearts content in their oblivion).

At the next moment it occurs to me how perfectly trivial and meaningless the premise is (my concept, not others' conceptions). And in those moments I look at my question as one of sociology, not precisely ethics, and how ethics, or morality, supersedes the descriptive effort.

I don't imagine this is new, but it is rather new to me.

My follow-up post in the thread talks about the utility of the descriptive effort and I think that one still makes sense to me. The descriptive/normative interplay as well as the self-referential aspect of an ethical theory that incorporates other ethical theories in the mesh has me grasping.

It got me to thinking about MC Escher and the Droste Effect. Escher left a hole in the middle of this work and it has been left to others to understand how it ought to be resolved. I imagine a hole in our ethical theories where the ought and is come together, perhaps never to be resolved.

I've also been thinking of computational ethics, in as much as everything I tend to do ends up falling back on data -- because that's what I do. I will work on a new discussion with that topic when I get a chance.

It would be an objective measure, at the least. The problem is how we get from an objective descriptive fact to an objective normative rule.

Honestly the search for "objectivity" in moral philosophy is kinda weird. What would it even mean for some moral rule to be "objective"? — Echarmion

I've appreciated the responses in this thread as it is helping me get my head around the topic. I'd never come across 'ethical naturalism' prior and so this is helping me read further on the subject of ethics.

I would think that we look for an objective standard in order to justify applying that standard to others. If we regard moral propositions as purely subjective, enforcing law and order amounts to nothing more than 'might makes right', right? Even if that is what it means, it's not how we treat them or talk about them.

There's really only one kind of broad ethical theory that underpins all these questions, and it is utilitarianism. — Wayfarer

I agree that what Darwinian Morality implies is a baseline utilitarian goal, the good of group survival, the ethical systems at work subordinate to that goal need not be consistently utilitarian, do they? I'm thinking now of how we value individuals, even the indigent, such that we take them to the hospital when they are in critical need, even in cases where the cost outweighs any obvious societal benefit (and then let them die rather than give them a million dollar heart transplant). There is a utilitarian argument there, but it strikes me as a bit tortured. It's easier, I feel, to defend it on deontological terms.

I think the ease with which a religious philosophy is categorised and cast off ought to be questioned here. — Wayfarer

There is an argument (I believe either Dawkins or Hawking voiced it) that suggested a disbelief in God because he is "not necessary".

Both in that as well as the quote you cite, the dismissive attitude is disappointing. I can appreciate a certain detachment, but the perfunctory declarative tone comes across as smug.

The structure and fabric of the universe may at once produce a species prone to create (many different) creation myths without denying the existence of a God. I prefer to contemplate the variety of faith beliefs as many avenues to wisdom.

I'd like to know what you mean by
If I could, with enough information, tell you which moral principles will tend to develop in which environments (and possibly with what justifications) does that undermine theories of moral relativism?
— JosephS

Does the ability to predict a set of moral values confer objectivity to morality?

I agree that predictability indicates a rationale. I don't follow the step to objectivity?

Also what exactly do you mean by environment? I consider morality to be social being and in my opinion that makes environment synonymous with society itself. If that's the case then doesn't it amount to saying different people/societies develop their own unique morals and that sounds like subjectivity rather than objectivity. Perhaps you have something else in mind when you use the word "environment". Please clarify.

Understanding objectivity as truths, fixed and unchanging, and usually determined through consensus of opinion, I think we'd be better off looking for common moral values that cut across all cultures and peoples. — TheMadFool

The baseline claim is that moral systems and the principles that are encapsulated by that system are selected for like many other Darwinian effects. It is normative in as much as if you value group survival in your environment (cultural, technological, philosophical, geographical=area+climate+resources, competitive) you will choose these principles (alternative configurations might give equally likely survival chances so this doesn't rule out multiple solutions). And if you don't -- you'll be replaced by a group that will. If you go extinct, voluntarily or not, you are maladapted -- objectively.

Objective truth is reflected in how the theory tells us if you adopt these mores in this environment you will (likely) thrive. If you don't, you will probably not. It does not rule out crosscutting rules, neither does it rule them in.

This effort stands like those who were trying to piece together the periodic tables. Disjointed islands that eventually came together. Is the logical conclusion of the questions asked an overarching theory of ethical selection?

Oh, someone who can 'actually support their argument' eh! — Bartricks

Carly Simon, is that you?

The article, "Darwinian Morality" is yet another exercise in infinite regress, as well as a complete misunderstanding as to what "reason" is. Seriously, the author utterly misunderstands formal knowledge. — alcontali

I think I can appreciate what you're saying about the infinite regress. In considering a normative theory of ethics and applying it to the present environment, one which seeks to consider actions from a Darwinian perspective gives rise to unresolvable regress, hence no clarity can be established as to how we ought to act. Did I get that right?

In contrast, my initial thought process entailed a descriptive theory, rather than a normative one. It still bodes poorly for applying any predictions on our present environment, in as much as the theory will take itself into account as part of the environment. Might this settle down to some equilibrium (dynamic or otherwise)? I suppose, or it could blow up.

But, if I may float a bit, there exists a hope of utility in the way I initially perceived it.

I am going to throw out the most rank of naive hypotheses, for the purpose of demonstrating a hypothetical benefit, and for no more. That hypothesis is that social acceptance of homosexuality is positively impacted by a broad perception of reaching population equilibrium. That the social "current" and its promotion of child bearing is strongest when there is a newly encountered expanse to be populated (or captured) and that this current wanes when neighbors encroach or resource utilization reaches its perceived limits (progressively, not acutely). That the weakening current allows the frustrated forces (eddies in the flow) to present themselves and sexual heterodoxy to gain a measure of recognition.

If this were not a straw dog hypothesis, I might look to collect data on cultures and periods, including where homosexuality was strongly inhibited and where, alternatively, homosexuality was accepted. I would have to consider the impact of other factors that might confound -- agrarian vs post-industrial, monogamous vs polygamous, evidence of religious dogma.

Say for the sake of argument that the hypothesis is eventually validated. Well, the good news is that we might be able to predict continuing evolution of social policy in the US towards acceptance of homosexuality.

But what does this indicate for the future? Look forward to efforts to colonize the stars. The Earth will likely get to and remain in a state of equilibrium, population-wise, in as much as getting any appreciable number of people out of our gravity well is infeasible (even with a Space Elevator - I read about the intractability of moving a human population off-world but can't find the cite at present).

Given our previous, fictional, result, in an environment with broad availability of resources (asteroids for mining) and energy, but with a need for workers, on our space ships/moons/terraformed planets, retrenchment could be a predictable result.

And this is where the utility lies. If we can predict the flourishing of discriminatory mores, based on our review of how people in a given environment evolve with respect to values and ethics, we have a chance to intercede. We can seek to inhibit what, without a thorough understanding of sociology and ethics, would otherwise typically arise. Public campaigns, anti-discrimination laws and charters, used proactively to anticipate and mold perceptions prior to the onset of negative signals. Using normative ethics (which it outside of theory scope) to impact a scientifically predictable, but undesirable, change in social mores.

With the last paragraph, I've stood my entire premise on its head -- that 'good' can be understood in terms of its statistical/predictive growth and perpetuation. Does this mean that by frustrating it, I am doing 'bad'? At this my brain gets just muddled by contemplating that the normative effort entailed in short-circuiting the predicted result might itself be incorporated as part of the descriptive theory -- but only after the fact, bringing it back to 'good' (assuming success).

After reading an article on Darwinian Morality, I started a separate thread on the topic. I am using predictive success as a reflection of objectivity (I'm not well versed in ontology, but if I can hand wave i'm not talk about anything that is truly 'real' as much as a reflection of that truth that can be modeled such that the model matches our senses consistently).

Objective is a description of the meta-ethical theory as it reflects its predictive capability in assessing suitability of a more to an environment. Hypothetically, if the addition of a more or principle to an environment reduces its competitive advantage that principle is liable to selected against (against a sample of groups that unsuccessful principle is less likely to be prevalent).

So any particular principle may not be predicted for an environment, the theory as a whole would provide an objective view of human ethics. I'm not looking to author it. I just want to see where this idea is likely to falter.

Quite right. My first concern in asking is whether the question is meaningless or trivial. What I'm trying to understand is whether we can say 'thou shalt not kill' is 'good' because in the environments we're familiar with those groups that failed to adopt this precept were outcompeted and either withered or went extinct.

Can this sense of 'good' as correlative of group success (within certain environments) be the basis for an 'objective' moral good? Two groups that are equally successful (equal against what measure and what time frame?) might still differ on this principle. Both A and ~A might both be 'good' if, within the confines of their moral system, their differences balance out. State ownership of capital in China and individual ownership of capital in the US might both be 'good' within their disparate environments.

Related is a cultural belief in an ultimate moral authority (God) and how this anchor impacts selective advantage. I've read on studies that related how the action of non-believers differ with respect to believers vis-a-vis rule following. A theory on Darwinian selection might be expected to tell us how the trend towards atheism in the US would impact our cultural principles as reflected in law.

I have no doubt this is not novel. I'm more interested in the critical issues surrounding this perspective on morality, or whether it is simply not well considered.

This is not Social Darwinism as a moral theory as much as it is Darwinism in meta-ethics. How do moral theories compete. At least that's what I intend.

Link fixed.

When you mentioned Nuremberg, I heard 'crimes against humanity'.

Did Nazi Germany sign onto any treaties that would have supported the sort of penalties they faced?

I was hoping that this was going to be a proposal on how we could augment/modify our ex post facto jurisprudence in the wake of monstrous harm.

It is a bitter side effect of our justice system that some people aren't punished for acts that ought, reasonably, be punished. What would be the impact of implementing retroactive laws? If nothing else, it may undermine our social sense of predictability in law.

As a thought exercise, what bounds might cordon these retroactive applications of law? If we can agree that unchecked use risks (a) politically motivated attacks and (b) inefficiency created by the fear of violating laws not enacted, what parameters might guide when and how this exceptional process is allowed to progress?

Some ideas:
Severity of impact (casualty count? economic impact?)
Ability to be foreseen (should this not already be covered by laws on negligence? how might that be expanded?)
Corporate use only (eliminate the fear that this could be used against an individual who is not a corporate officer)

Other ideas? Problems?

As with other principles, creating exceptions breeds conditions for those exceptions growing to abuse.

Here's an article from a Michigan State scholar on ex post facto exceptions relevant to sex registries.

A. The Ex Post Facto Clause

The ‘Ex Post Facto Clause’ states, “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Ex Post Facto law.” 10 The clause only applies to criminal sanctions and “assures that citizens are on notice of criminal statutes so that they can conform their conduct to the requirements of existing laws.”11 As Blackstone stated, “it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and unjust.”12 Thus, Ex Post Facto laws are unfair because they deprive individuals of notice of the wrongfulness of their behavior until after the fact. 13 The Clause ensures that legislative acts “give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.”14 Such notice is vital in the context of criminal law where deprivations are greatest.15

The Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause was in Calder v. Bull. 16 Justice Chase described the specific categories encompassed within the clause as follows:

1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.17

In the past, the Supreme Court has focused on two major elements when deciding if a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. First, the Court is guided by the overall purpose of the clause. Second, the Court looks to specific tests and factors developed over time.

1. Historical Purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause

As noted in prior commentary, there were few Ex Post Facto cases in the first two hundred years after its enactment.18 However, when the Court did deal with Ex Post Facto Clause challenges, it identified two major purposes: “1) preventing ‘arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation’” and 2) “providing notice to the general public that their actions have been criminalized prior to prosecution.” 19

The goal of preventing vindictive legislation surfaced in the first case to consider the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Calder v. Bull, which contains the classic Supreme Court take on the clause, Justice Chase, speaking of the history of Ex Post Facto Laws, stated, “[w]ith very few exceptions, the advocates of [Ex Post Facto] laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice. To prevent such, and similar, acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder; or any Ex Post Facto law.” 20 Additionally, in Miller v. Florida, 21 the Court stated that the first historical purpose of the Clause, as derived from Calder v. Bull22 was to “assure that federal and state legislatures were restrained from enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation . . . [and to] preventing legislative abuses.” 23

The second historical purpose, also derived from Calder and other early sources, is to “‘give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’” 24 This is essentially a notice requirement.25 The two historical purposes of the Clause have traditionally been discussed in Court cases as a foundation or a framework for the specific Ex Post Facto analysis.26

2. Ex Post Facto Factors and Test

Generally, the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents Federal or State legislatures from enacting any law “‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’” 27 Therefore, the Court has stated that in order for a criminal law to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause it must “be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” 28

However, it is not always clear whether a law has criminal or civil implications. The court employs a two-part test, what has been called the “intent-effects test,” in order to make this determination.29 According to this test, the court “must initially ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.”30 This inquiry determines whether the legislature either “expressly or impliedly” desired the statute to carry a criminal or a civil label.31 If a court determines that the legislature wanted the statute to carry a criminal label, then they need not proceed any further and all applicable Constitutional protections will apply. If, however, the court finds that the legislature intended the regulation to be civil, it must then determine whether “the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention” to deem it “civil.” 32

In order to make this determination, the court uses a multi-factor test, including:whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.33

Each factors is relevant to the inquiry, and as the Court noted they “may often point in differing directions.” 34 In the past, the Court advised that no one factor is dispositive and that this may not be an exclusive list of considerations.35 Additionally, a court will only look at the face of the law, not its enforcement, to see if the Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated. Finally, the Court stated that the legislature’s express or implied intent that the statute be civil in nature will be overcome only by the “clearest proof” that the statute is actually punitive.36 However, as subsequent sections will describe, as the courts have dropped the twin historical aims, the multi factor test is left without a framework or foundation. Additionally, the “clearest proof” has thus far been an impossible standard to meet in federal courts.

Can't the process of judging value be made objective?

So, while a subject values x or not the valuation itself is objective? It would be like someone using an instrument (objective) to do the measurement instead of without one (subjective) — TheMadFool

I'm interested in this line of argumentation. If the genesis of moral codes derive and are patterned, a la the capability for language, in our brain via selective processes that support group survival, does a statistical correlation of principle development against survival support derivation of a moral code, in an objective sense?

In this regard, narratives aside, some of the rules of behavior that arise as part of the group dynamic are described as 'moral'. Our actions, the prohibitions and prescriptions that surround them, are tied to the environment in which we develop. The narratives (e.g. God, Gaia, philosophical arguments) of their defense and their application, even if by force, are borne as a 2nd level rationalization and are part of the selection process.

This does not imply that the moral principles are fixed. They may very well develop and morph in a dynamic environment. This premise may support the development of physical/social principles, independent of a specific, human situation (e.g. alien species, animal species) predicting the development of specific social mores and actions within a group.

Is this unreasonable? If we, sociologically/ethologically, can develop statistically valid predictions of which actions (and under what narrative) are likely to give rise to counter-action (social stigma, physical aggression), does this not deserve the label of 'objective'?

This does not deny a subjective component to morality any more than the subjectivity of pain doesn't deny the objectivity of neuronal patterns consequent with the expression of that subjective mental state. Am I missing the boat?

I haven't thought of dimension like that, but now that you mention it it's sure to be an interesting trip, i'll be checking the link before the day finishes. if you have any other interesting topic like this one feel free to mention me so i can catch up later! — Ariel D'Leon

A couple of other videos regarding the genesis and promise of string theory:
String theory explained
Brian Greene

This reflects the sort of scalpel-wielding that I find incredibly engaging.

I love the Numberphile videos. In this case, it appears he's working off of the conundrum faced long ago regarding the 5th postulate.

The best part of science (and math) for me is reading about the incisive minds in the field and how they wedge their scalpels into the seams and expose to the layman a world that is bursting with novelty.

At one point a thought crossed my mind around dimension itself. Reviewing the math behind fractional numbers, negative numbers and 0 as an exponent on Numberphile, I wondered whether dimension, seemingly incontrovertibly discrete, had any meaning as a fraction.

And, of course, it has been considered.

I have on my list of questions for God (or the FSM or the Great Pumpkin), if I ever get the chance, whether existence is at some level "closed" or whether it is, alternatively, infinitely interesting.

So, how to address this admittedly relatively minor problem? — T Clark

The way I resolve it is by not reading the threads that are titled in a way which seem to poke at those who maintain a religious faith. It's been a long time since I've had a religious faith, but I have very little interest in reading or sharing ideas with iconoclasts.

What I don't want them to do is to stop talking about what they believe to folks who will listen. It is only by talking and talking (and sometimes taking the time to insult those who they feel have too much control over their environment) that they may work out their issues.

They do me the favor of labeling their threads in a way which telegraphs a certain contempt.

Isn't the solution of supporting multiple threads (as this forum currently does) sufficient to task?

Consent seems more or less like a red herring to me. The problem is more basic than that: can we even make an argument about what kind of moral subjects should exist? — Echarmion

Is it not legitimate to judge, and in some cases prohibit, the creation of certain living things?

Is there no legitimate application of principle regarding those who might take a human/non-human chimera through gestation to raise it (I'm contemplating something more human than non-human)? Take the example of those who raise fainting goats for the purpose of novelty and amusement. It seems rather cruel to me. Potential for suffering seems a legitimate concern here and one which me might leverage to inhibit (if not prohibit) the conception of these animals. And even if fainting goats are fine, human imagination maintains hitherto untapped veins of horror.

The question of consent arises because there are cases where we allow adults (but not children or those acting for children) to weigh risk and potential for suffering. There is a boundary to be considered around risk and benefit for those who cannot consent.

The negative of self-extinction, for me, is a sufficient counter to the categorical case. I raised the embryonic genetic selection/modification case as a class of actions where some instances could be considered unethical to proceed on.

The special case is creating new moral subjects in the first place. We could apply the same logic to the question of whether or not it is moral to create human-level-intelligence AIs for menial tasks (essentially as slaves). — Echarmion

You've pointed out here an off-shoot of this area of ethical inquiry that bears further investigation. The mainline argument, that human procreation is, as a general practice, unethical has been treated fairly here (and with more consideration than I would give it) and found wanting.

The question of artificial consciousness and what concern is due with respect to its creation (and destruction) is one which may well have relevance in the 21st century. The side benefit is that the question of consent will again be played out. In as much as dollars are in the mix here, we can expect that the question will be answered (or not answered) in a way which maximizes profit, so the quandary might find itself pushed out again.

Another tangential concern is that of embryonic genetic manipulation. If we assume that the resolution of things that are almost uniformly considered deleterious (e.g. sickle cell) meets no serious objection, we arrive at body enhancements. Under what conditions is it acceptable to 'enhance' a child, in utero, without their consent? Personally, I think a third thumb could be quite useful. Are there situations where the impossibility of getting consent would be treated as tacit permission for the enhancements?

Dealing with these two, foreseeable concerns may result in progress on the question that undergirds the premise of the antinatalist position.

That's one of those times when someone is so intelligent that they sound stupid. The converse may be true on other occasions. Humanity, it seems, is at the mercy of the bungling idiot and the mad scientist. — TheMadFool

And I’m no Russell fanboy, I disagree with his philosophical outlook in almost all respects. But I still honour him as a teacher, and admire him for joining demonstrations. — Wayfarer

I came across Russell in this regard via von Neumann who I had been reading on with respect to the development of the von Neumann machine (Hungarians, including von Neumann and Erdos, are the closest things to aliens that I have encountered, brilliance -- clear in its display but inscrutable in its breadth and genesis -- I wonder if this doesn't have at least a little to do with their native tongue).

I knew of Russell as a philosopher and a pacifist, but nothing beyond that (my library on Russell is limited to 'Why I Am Not a Christian'). When I found von Neumann had advocated a first strike it was shocking, but not entirely surprising, if that makes sense. However, when I read Russell's name at the same time, it floored me. My comments aren't a criticism of Russell. They are reflective of a spike in curiosity as to how a pacifist can simultaneously hold that unleashing an unprovoked! nuclear holocaust can be justified. That's just goddamned interesting.

If you say why not bomb them tomorrow, I say why not today? If you say today at 5 o’clock, I say why not one o’clock? — von Neumann

To von Neumann's question at the time I developed an appreciation for the good side of self-doubt and dithering. Non-action because you just don't trust that you are smart enough to have considered the action sufficiently. Perhaps having people at the button that are smart enough to know they aren't smart enough is a good thing.

He and Bertrand Russell drafted the Russell-Einstein manifesto, and from memory, Russell was literally arrested protesting against atomic weapons (which is one of the reasons Russell is forever on my Good Guys list.) — Wayfarer

And yet Russell and von Neumann both advocated for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.

If the whole world outside of Russia were to insist upon international control
of atomic energy to the point of going to war on this issue, it is highly
probable that the Soviet government would give way (...). If it did not, then if
the issue were forced in the next year or two, only one side would have
atomic bombs, and the war might be so short as not to involve utter ruin — Russell, 1947

I should like to see (…) as close a union as possible of these countries who
think it is worthwhile to avoid atomic war. I think that you could get so
powerful an alliance that you could turn to Russia and say: ‘It is open to you
to join this alliance if you will agree to the terms; if you will not join we shall
go to war with you’. I am inclined to think that Russia would acquiesce; if
not, provided this is done soon, the world might survive the resulting war
and emerge with a single government such as the world needs”. — Russell, 1947

Russells Advocacy

Based on their words, Bartricks and his tribe hate the world and they hate people. They write off three billion years of our existence based on their brief, pitiful view of life. They sneer at human emotion, loyalty, community, and love. How can recognizing that not be part of a philosophical response to their positions? — T Clark

I appreciate your difference with those that seemingly come from a misanthropic worldview. It repels me as well.

But I also reflect on where I've been and some of the mistakes I've made. As an adolescent I had a real antipathy towards Nietzsche, such that I couldn't get past it to try to make contact with the argument. I have since looked back and realized that it was emotion that blocked intellectual development. I've managed to develop an admiration for the manner in which he attacks the subject matter. I've never had that sort of reaction against Marx, but I've seen it expressed that he was an evil man for no other reason than his writings. At the time the argument was made it baffled me. In reflecting on this person and his reaction to Marx (and comparing it with my reaction to Nietzsche), it helped me unwind some of the less useful mechanisms that I was prone to.

It's not as if that stopped while I was young. When I read about Peter Singer, I was incensed. Since, though, I've been able to mute the reaction to understand the argument. I still refuse to agree, but in as much as it is at no threat of becoming law, emotion strikes me as a limiter to understanding. Understanding not just of the other side, but of my own thought processes.

I don't find the arguments made here (in this thread) to manage weight or credibility. My expectations of those who would persuade would be not only to stake their claim but also to consider the counters and the consequences and to speak to these. When I called the arguments here sophomoric it is due to this seeming obliviousness to the stark results that would arise from universal acceptance of the claims.

The best sorts of philosophical discussions I've been party to have been where the opposing sides helped each other with their arguments, filling in gaps, helping perfect the syllogisms. When we're too married to the result, rather than to the philosophy of the matter, it approaches rhetoric, or worse.

Since being introduced to the website, I've witnessed some interesting, thought provoking threads. I've also read threads like these which seem to be little more than philosophy-cum-politics, where signal-to-noise is depressingly low.

Characterizing an argument is not dealing with the argument qua argument. It is placing it in a box so as to not actually tackle the questions it poses head on. However, you somewhat redeem this statement by saying that antinatalism, at the least, allows us to explore how it is that we believe certain foundational ideas such as why we believe having more people is good. I think you cannot go into a philosophy forum and expect all arguments to conform to only mainstream views on foundational beliefs. In fact, that might be going against the spirit of philosophy itself, which in its essence, is about questioning foundational beliefs, whether that be in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and value. — schopenhauer1

Thinking about the topic is certainly helpful for me as I work through questions that I previously haven't considered. Among other things it has sparked an interest in understanding avenues for explanatory results from a neural net. This has generally been a limitation in comparison to other algorithms, such as decision trees.

In considering the topic at hand, I find myself considering propositions (narratives) around the good of human existence, the difference between the good of the individual animal vs the good of the species (why its worse to eat the last dodo in existence vs any particular dodo among many), how the prevention of suffering compares with respect to these goods. What I don't find myself doing is taking seriously human self-extinction as a good.

My rational intuition tells me that there is not much we can do about this either way, assuming no catastrophic intervention. — T Clark

I'm in general agreement with your outlook but I do have an objection as it applies to public policy and how we can minimize the risk of resource misallocation. I wonder if the issue of failing to price externalities into our individual economic decision-making might lead to civil discord as we are forced to deal with this misallocation. As an example (and I'm not sure this is properly considered an externality), we can look at a rising national deficit and how we, as a country, have a spendthrift economy. The perception that we have more headroom than we do may have us having more children than we can economically bear and may give rise to conflict as natural resource allocation provides smaller margins with a larger population.

Rational policy as it applies to pricing individual economic decisions may help reduce the risk as we work towards a population equilibrium.

As you may have seen, I have a strong angry reaction to the anti-natalist argument. — T Clark

Where do you feel the anger comes from? I'm asking because I don't have an issue with Shakers not procreating. Neither do I have an issue with those who feel it unethical to have children holding the position. The only place where an issue arises, for me, is where it crosses the threshold to claim a justifiable imposition, and then only when it has a risk of political uptake.

I admit to an occasional twinge of pique when those in the anti-natalist camp make a claim to some inherent ethical contradiction in those of us who have children. After reflection, though, I find my emotional reaction is unjustified, in as much as I'm dealing with anonymous people on the Internet.

The sophomoric nature of the argument made and its radical departure from modern life (universal acceptance of the claims would lead, clearly, to extinction) lead me to reflect on them as I would conspiracy theorist claims. It's interesting as an exercise in dissecting how we arrive at what we believe, but doesn't move the needle with respect to foundational belief.

I guess I'm asking is whether you feel dispassionate argumentation is somehow flawed. Where does emotion serve a purpose?

The 'resonance' wouldn't be there since there is probably no kept history of the universe; however, all eventualities should still repeat, in their turn, even exactly you if the quantum resolution was fine enough. In this way, the universe is kind of its own history. — PoeticUniverse

Resonance, here, is metaphoric. No expectation of connection outside of a certain similarity. Consider the observable universe of this instant (T-0) as a frame of 10^80 particles in a particular configuration (state S@T-0). The set of states {S@T-1} reflect the possible states specified by applying physical laws to S@T-0.

I suppose part of this thought process on my part is influenced by Wolfram and A New Kind of Science. Looking at the universe through the lens of cellular automata. Part of me says that looking at the universe through this lens is functionally equivalent to the many worlds interpretation as it applies to the prospect of immortality.

If I'm not misreading you, I agree with the 2nd half of your quote -- that is that no history is required because the imperfect maintenance of history is reflected in the state expression (e.g. my memory encoded in the neuronal structure of my brain reflected in the state of the universe).

Critiques of quantum immortality seem to rely, in part, on the identity expressed within a 'branch' rather than the entire 'tree'. Is this because any reasonable measure of identity dissipates with the distance between branches (the measure of 'you' if we have to go back to a branch that separated at 5 years of age -- because all other branches died out -- need be no closer to 'you' at present than a sibling or kindergarten classmate)?

OK, carry on talking among yourselves; the philosophy world seems as cliquey as any other. — David Rose

Maybe the true relevance of this discussion relates not to A.I.-produced texts but to the poststructuralist literary Theorists' argument that all literary texts are purely derived from preceding texts, as all linguistic statements are articulated from the pre-existing language; so literary texts might just as well be generated by computer programmes as by writers. That was part of the ideological anti-humanist stance of the poststructuralists, once fashionable although now sliding into the old-fashioned. — David Rose

I wish I had a well considered response to your comments, but I have to say I've never knowingly read a poststructuralist literary theorist. What I recall of my education regarding Duchamp is limited to analysis of Nude Descending a Staircase. My comments are at least one if not two or more rungs down the ladder of artistic analysis. What I have read on is articles regarding music generating programs that can produce never before heard compositions half way between Brahms and Beethoven.

I've written my own comments and topics which, as brilliantly conceived and executed as they are, have received absolutely no response in this forum. It is as pearls before swine, I tell you. :-)

When did it become art? When the picture was done printing? When it was put in a frame
and hung on a wall? Or my assertion, it became art as soon as the viewer thought of it as art? — ZhouBoTong

I don't have any problem with your assertion. Someone else may have a more developed position on the 'coming to be' process. The underlying premise is that the label art is a subjective attribution.

Your definition of art seems to include some aspect of sharing that experience with other humans. So I could not create anything just for myself that would be considered art? — ZhouBoTong

It's not so much that the definition of art requires sharing as much as for me to ascribe artist to what might be, rather, a non-conscious automaton, I include the process of sharing perceptions as part of the verification process. A question might follow of the artist who refuses to engage the audience ("let them think of it what they will"). In this case there is a certain presumption of art. Is it part of an exhibit? Is the artist paid as an artist? Do they claim themselves an artist? The refusal of a human to engage still presents the ability for mutual adaptation as that choice to not engage may be interpreted as a principled effort to not provide preconceptions to the audience (or they just might hate talking to art aficionados).

But you just said that if the creator did NOT intend to create art it is not art. Couldn't the programmer say they were not trying to create art, they were trying to create a computer program that generated previously unknown pleasant sounding noise? — ZhouBoTong

Not sure if there is any real space between 'pleasant sounding noise' and 'art', but I would take the programmer at their word that they were not trying to create art, even if a melodic ditty results. At that point, as with the example of the unintentional lyrical voice or colorful buoys arranged seemingly without artistic intention, art derives from not from the naturalistic source but from the perceiver, framing it, recording it, sharing it.

Again, someone may have a more developed concept here that distinguishes between a 'producer' of art (painters, sculpters, singer) as opposed to a 'recorder' (photographer, naturalist audio recorder).

I think saying that "art" can only be created intentionally, is quite limiting and can result in music, paintings, poetry etc NOT counting as art. Meanwhile, EVERYTHING that is created by humans counts as art IF the person that made it said it is art? This seems problematic. — ZhouBoTong

To suggest that anything a person claims as art, even a blank canvas, is art, is a liberally expansive definition of the word. I don't have any problem with that, even if it does lead some rather tasteless results (brings to mind the performance artist with the speculum who would sit naked and invited viewers to peer inside her as part of an exhibit). So the artist saying "this is art" as a sufficient condition to label art doesn't present any obvious problems to me (with certain caveats around sincerity and the nature of the thing saying it). Even saying "this isn't art" doesn't prevent the viewer/recorder from deriving art from it, at which point the viewer becomes the artist in extracting it/framing it.

Things artistic, if I understand your meaning, are [1] things that might be considered art. Arguably unbounded. How about [2] things closely related in form or type to other things that are already typically perceived as art. Art and artists, as social disruptors, should rightfully chafe at this restriction. If the label art is essentially subjective so is artistic. It remains that my morning commute isn't art (it's a pain in the ass, daily slog) unless I call it so, and at which point you tell me that my art is lame-ass crap, which I agree with.

Is the set of things artistic larger than the set of things that are art? With definition [1] above it would seem the proposition is true. [2], to my eye, is not as clear. If 'artistic' gets us to the clouds that look like Mickey and Minnie Mouse, but doesn't include my latest bowel movement, or if artistic includes my dog barking Chopsticks but not the sound of me coughing up phlegm, this proposition is not nearly as clear cut.

It's music and music is an art form. But I'd have difficulty calling the software the artist.

Where does that leave us? I suppose until the AI can be considered as having an identity separate from the programmer, it means the artist would be the programmer.

If I speak in a lyrical tone but insist that I'm not trying to sing, it may sound as art but that would be unintentional. Should a cloud that combines characteristics of Donatello's David with Michelangelo's be considered art?

If you record my voice or photograph the clouds it might be appreciated as art. In these cases the person most responsible for bringing it to the attention of the public would be you. You are the witness that framed the phenomena and raised it to public attention. I have a friend who took a marvelous photo of colored buoys on a pier. He was the one with the artistic eye, regardless of the fishermen who (unintentionally) arranged the buoys. At some point, since I'm not a complete moron, I'd "discover" the musical nature of my voice and insist on a cut. Just means that we're dealing with a certain ambiguity in artistry shared between two creators (Rogers & Hammerstein).

I'm in the process of potty-training a puppy we just got. She's in the process of adapting to my positive reinforcement towards having her relieve herself outside. I, in turn, am adapting my behavior to her to better the efficiency of that reinforcement. A consistent tone and wording of command, consistent praise and timing of reward. We are modifying each other.

When an AI can engage in artwork that involves not just novelty but mutual adaptation as part of the reflection on the art, as art, I'll be satisfied we're dealing with art (maybe not good art). When we can share a common mental space where art, as a term, means something to both, where the AI can answer my question on the genesis of its artwork and I can give feedback and it can acknowledge and appreciate that feedback.

And just as neither Beethoven's mother nor father were responsible for his composition, the programmer must be sufficiently distinct from the creation. I couldn't predict my child's passion for the piano prior to his birth (I would have designed him, rather, with a passion for cosmology that he lacks if it were up to me).

I wonder if this is realistic to expect.

Ah, but suppose there is something unique to our little sector of the galaxy which makes it the only habitable place for advanced life. In that case, two alien civs bumping into each other wouldn't seem so remote. Is this little patch of the Milky Way we're in that special?
— @RogueAI

No, you've misunderstood how things work on the forum. Here's the way it's supposed to work - You tell me I'm wrong, and then I make up lame excuses why I'm right after all. — T Clark

My mom says I'm special. I suggest that makes our little galactic neighborhood special, by implication.

To be clear, I share your skepticism for what remains of the logical chain from the first post. Maybe non-aggression ends up being the best strategy, but it sounds like the beginning strategy rather than a consistent practice over time.

It sounds particularly foreign in comparison to how human history has played out.

My knowledge is tuned to practical application vs having internalized the implications of a Bayesian perspective. Until I came to grips with the nature of subjective probability as reflective of belief (and why a Bayesian probability for the existence of extra-terrestrial intelligence makes sense), I was utterly confused.

Honestly, and I suspect its due to my relatively late learning, using the same term, probability, for both frequentist as well as Bayesian measures, frustrated my learning process. I kept expecting the concepts to meld into a powerful, abstract union. At some point I learned just to pocket them separately in my mind.

I skimmed over the post you replied to. I figured your question was around detecting a cheating dealer. I remember doing something akin to this that involved Bayesian likelihood measurement to conclude whether a die was fair or unfair.

I read again the post you replied to.

Personally, I can't make heads or tails of it, but I doubt my post is relevant.

Regardless, I think your contention that everything is a probability calculation holds significant weight, interpreted as a reflection on subjective probability and its relationship to belief.

I know yours was probably a rhetorical question but I would, after a sufficient number of iterations, see if the measure of likelihood supported the claim that the dealer was almost certainly cheating me.

https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/2641/what-is-the-difference-between-likelihood-and-probability

Did I win? :-)

I'm not sure of your concern with the gambler's fallacy.

From Bostrom's paper:

What has all this got to do with finding life on Mars? Consider the implications of
discovering that life had evolved independently on Mars (or some other planet in our
solar system). That discovery would suggest that the emergence of life is not a very
improbable event. If it happened independently twice here in our own back yard, it
must surely have happened millions times across the galaxy. This would mean that the
Great Filter is less likely to occur in the early life of planets and is therefore more likely
still to come.
If we discovered some very simple life forms on Mars in its soil or under the ice at the
polar caps, it would show that the Great Filter must exist somewhere after that period in
evolution. This would be disturbing, but we might still hope that the Great Filter was
located in our past. If we discovered a more advanced life‐form, such as some kind of
multi‐cellular organism, that would eliminate a much larger stretch of potential locations
where the Great Filter could be. The effect would be to shift the probability more
strongly to the hypothesis that the Great Filter is ahead of us, not behind us. And if we
discovered the fossils of some very complex life form, such as of some vertebrate‐like
creature, we would have to conclude that the probability is very great that the bulk of the
Great Filter is ahead of us. Such a discovery would be a crushing blow. It would be by
far the worst news ever printed on a newspaper cover.

My contention that the farther away the better derives from Bostrom's concerns around finding independently arisen, extinct life in our backyard. Farther away correlates to a lower rate for life developing in the universe and perhaps a better chance that we are, indeed, the outlier.

For example, if someone says they love you or that they find a movie really good, how can you ever know they're not lying, since you don't have direct access to their minds? — AnonThinker25

Well maybe not yet.

Team IDs Spoken Words And Phrases In Real Time From Brain’s Speech Signals

What if we could measure intent to deceive along with those spoken words?

I wonder, if feasible and accurate, whether involuntary use of a brain scan will be held as violative of our 5th Amendment rights. Remaining silent will take on new purpose.

The probability the only two advanced species in the galaxy are near each other is very low. Therefore, it's probable there are more than two advanced species in the galaxy. If you run into a nearby one, you can conclude there are probably a lot, which raises the possibility of one nearby you.
@RogueAI

This doesn't make any sense to me. — T Clark

Makes sense to me. Independently evolved advanced species in close proximity supports a prediction that the population of advanced species in the galaxy is relatively large (relative to a scenario where distances between advanced species is great). With a large population and without evidence that our civilization is more advanced than the norm, it is reasonable to expect other advanced civilizations in the vicinity and that the distance to the nearest civilization more advanced than us is relatively short.

Brings to mind a comment on the Great Filter as a solution to the Fermi Paradox.

This is why Oxford University philosopher Nick Bostrom says that “no news is good news.” The discovery of even simple life on Mars would be devastating, because it would cut out a number of potential Great Filters behind us. And if we were to find fossilized complex life on Mars, Bostrom says “it would be by far the worst news ever printed on a newspaper cover,” because it would mean The Great Filter is almost definitely ahead of us—ultimately dooming the species. Bostrom believes that when it comes to The Fermi Paradox, “the silence of the night sky is golden.”

For those who find the Great Filter hypothesis compelling, I expect the greater the distance to the nearest extinct extra terrestrial life the better.