What triggers Hate? Do you embrace it?

Is hate a good or evil attribute for us to have?

Is it a Yin that we must have, to go with our Yang, --- to be at our best? — Gnostic Christian Bishop

I don’t find that love and hate mutually necessitate each other. Up and down, or left and right, these are dyads where the presence of one necessitates the presence of the other; the two are in truth two aspects of the same given. However, if hate is extreme dislike - that can lead to enmity and, in turn, hostility toward that which is hated - then hatred will always necessitate some type and degree of self-love from whose reference point the dislike commences. In other words, it is impossible to hate in the complete absence of love.

To first clarify: One’s love of oneself – of whatever type or degree – is a requisite for the living of life. Devoid of any iota of self-love, life would terminate – be it out of apathy or due to more forceful reasons. This same self-love can, via empathy and the like, be to varying extents then expanded to include others ... I'd say almost as an extended self, such that love of other, imo, is itself impossible without some form of love of self. While this is debatable and can easily lead to complexities, my main point here is that even egotistic love is a form of love. Albeit, a rather base variant of it.

That said, take any particular moment of one’s life. When one has hated some given one has always also loved some other given. Even self-hatred stands in relation to an ideal of one’s self - of what one's self should be - that is loved, here broadly speaking. However, there are at least some occasions when one has loved some given in the complete absence of any sensed hatred. Love can exist just fine in absence of hatred and, depending on perspective, can be argued to best thrive when hatred is absent.

So, in short, love devoid of hate can be experienced. Hate devoid of love cannot. The two don’t necessitate each other as do the dyads of, for example, up and down.

To the first question: Hatred then is triggered from a desire to defend that which is loved. This typically self-defense doesn't need to be physical; most often it is not. As an aside, one can well defend oneself physically against a physical attack in the absence of experienced hatred.

As to embracing hatred – here solely interpreted as extreme dislike – if one doesn’t embrace an extreme dislike for injustice, for instance, one will more likely than not be or else become unjust. So, to me, the merits of embracing hatred are very much contingent upon what hatreds one holds.

No, we're definitely all going to die. Especially you. — frank

Right. Facts are facts for us mortal folks. Why the "especially" part?

We have all these sunk investments in coal, oil, and gas we are all loathe to abandon. — Bitter Crank

At least 6.3% of global GDP is spent on subsidizing fossil fuels (on welfare for the oil industry). And how much is spent to subsidize renewable energy?

Talk about a non-existent free market.

So the scientists of the world really are conspiring against us in diabolical ways? The so called facts of approximately 50% of the planet's tropical forests having been destroyed only within the last 70 years are all bogus? Or maybe this massive loss of flora is insignificant?

So its known, there is a connection between loss of flora and climate change. According to them scientists at any rate.

Yes, we have logical possibility and real potential. You could say real potential is actual in the sense that it is, in at least some sense, active; it can activate, bring about, change, future actualities. But what is possible - potentiality - is not yet actual; we don't want to lose that distinction. — Janus

Ah, got it. Thanks.

Yes, we have logical possibility and real potential. You could say real potential is actual in the sense that it is, in at least some sense, active; it can activate, bring about, change, future actualities. But what is possible potentially is not yet actual; we don't want to lose that distinction. — Janus

Feel like I'm being singled out here. Darn it. :yikes: Well, my limited comprehension on the matter is that there are actual potentials and potential actualities ... such that the first entails the second. A non-actual potential to me reads as "fictional potential", as in something devoid of reality, hence truth-value as expression, that someone makes up. Are not "possible potentials" liable to the same dichotomy?: that of actual possible potentials and that of non-actual possible potentials. Or maybe I misinterpret something in your post?

Besides, I could argue on and on about how nobody can know how being first started. All such stories to me are creation myths, useful in some regards, but none of which can be knowledge regarding why being is.

To sum things up though, you seem to believe that being can arise out of non-being. — javra

No. I believe that beings can arise from BEING (the power to create). G*D is non-being only in the sense that she is not a creature, but the creator. The relationship is similar to Plato's ideal FORMS as contrasted with real material instances (copies) of the unreal immaterial concept or design. — Gnomon

You lose me a bit with your terminology. All the same, from a previous post:

I do assume that the Omega Point would be Real (hence, being). And Zero represents no real things (hence, non-being). To avoid confusion, I would refer to "G*D" (BEING) as infinity, and to "Zero" as the state of the Big Bang Singularity prior to the bang (still only potential). — Gnomon

In your system of representations, is "Zero" (non-being) the same as "G*D" (infinite BEING as transcendent potential)? If yes, they why all the comments on how they are different? If no, then how do you not start off with zero/non-being so as to arrive at being?

To be honest, though, the more I reread your posts, the more confused I get about what you're trying to say. Maybe its because I'm rather tired; still, I have a hard time discussing and/or debating something which I cannot make heads or tails out of.

I don't completely agree with this, because I don't see how you jump to the position of drawing any conclusions about the present. The point of the thread was to approach the present from the position of recognizing a difference between future and past. When it becomes necessary to conclude that there is a difference between these, then the conclusion of a present, as necessary to complete the separation between them becomes justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe a misstep on my part. In fairness, my point was to illustrate the difference between experience-based epistemology of time, and reasoning based appraisals of what time is ontically, this via the example of the present moment. And this as an analogy to discussions regarding the past and future. Your mention of how the bird chirp is already the past at the moment we hear it (a moment which is the experienced present, but not the experienced past) is by my appraisals one of reasoning based ontology regarding time - but, again, not a description of how the present is experienced by us: (at the risk of being repetitive) we experience the present to be the present; it's our informed reasoning that tells us that what we are aware of at any given moment occurs in the past. Nevertheless, you bring up a very established interpretation of the present - one that I don't have a desire to debate against. And this thread isn't about the present but about past and future, as you rightly point out.

What it says is that the world is such, or the reality of being, existence, is such that we can make true and false statements concerning events of the past, but we cannot make true or false statements concerning events of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I acknowledge that. The past is determinate; the future is in many ways contingent. Because of this, one does not place truth values on statements regarding the future in almost all cases. (I'm thinking of exceptions such as, "it's true, rather than false or else uncertain, that the natural laws will apply tomorrow as they have today," but examples such as this are likely not what you were addressing.)

But don't you agree that the determinacy of the future is distinct from the determinacy of the past, being grounded or justified in a different way? — Metaphysician Undercover

In the context of your full reply, its almost a trick question for me: yes when addressed epistemologically, but no when addressed ontologically - ontologically they're two different facets of the same overall process.

Whereas we’ve previously mostly addressed past and future epistemologically, we’re now starting to mainly address them ontologically. By analogy:

If we are to address the present epistemologically, the present is that portion of time in which we (in part) hold direct awareness of everything that is not past and future. I’ve bracketed “in part” because, on one hand, the present is also where we intend things (with intentions always extending toward the future) as well as – hopefully not making this overly complex – being a time-span during which we are also aware of the past (memories) and the future (expectations). Still, when I’m aware of a bird chirp in the present, for example, this awareness pertains to neither the past nor the future.

But once we address the present ontologically, our views should take into account and thereby encompass all individual, intra-personal, experiences of the present. Many views can be found in relation to the issue of an objective present. My own – again, very difficult to justify in a forum setting – is that the objective present is a non-deterministic version of the theory of relativity’s notion of the present: the objective present, to my understanding (here summarized), consists of pockets of causal interactions between individual observers (or agents). For example, when two or more people interact, they will ontically share the same present moment; when there is no interaction between persons, there then is no guarantee that their two or more intra-personal present moments will be synchronized. (But a) this is a mouthful and b) again, other perspectives on the ontology of the present moment can also be found.)

The jump from the epistemological to the ontological consideration of the present requires different approaches. So too with the jump from the epistemological to the ontological consideration of the past and future. I'll try to explain myself better below.

And since things are caused to change, determinacy of the future is made complex by the need to understand causation.

Both forms of determinacy are complicated, but they are made complicated by different elements. So we cannot make one determinacy-indeterminacy spectrum, we would need two, one relating to the past and one to the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given what we've so far discusses and in large part agreed upon, we could argue that the objective past - though stored in memories (both unconscious and consciously recalled) - is solidified (another way of saying fixed or determinate). Whether or not our experiences of the present are, for example, hallucinations also gets solidified by their noncontradictory accord to our past.* As to the future, I can only address this via my own philosophical understandings; these include a determinate, Aristotelian telos which entails certain natural laws (such as that of gravity, for one example - notice how gravity can be extrapolated to be a noncontradictory coherency between gives that produces mass to which other gives are attracted ... long story though). Epistemologically, yes, we know gravity will continue to occur due to an upheld causal continuity between past and future. But, for me at least, ontologically, gravity is as determinate a property of existence as is this Aristotelian telos. Any hypothetical personal experiences of gravity not being as it always was can only be discovered in the future to have been hallucinations. At the same time, and with the same aforementioned determinate givens, I do subscribe to a limited freedom to choose between alternative means toward goals. Keeping this as simple as I currently can: This ontological interplay between determinate, time-invariant aspects of being (which thereby persist throughout the future) and partly indeterminate decisions on the part of agents in the present, is then one facet of a reality wherein there is a mixture of interacting indeterminacy and determinacy (of chaos and order).

While I did state "stratifications" in the plural, when it comes to ontological appraisals, I also find that the determinacy of the past and of the future are two different facets of the same overall ontological process. But I get that this is imposing my own worldview into this discussions in manners that I cannot properly justify on a forum platform. Still, to provide an example of the way I think of things in relation to the past and the future:

* You see an oasis in the dessert; at this moment, your drinking of water in a little while (the future) is plausible because the present experience currently isn't contradicotry to the past. But once you arrive there and there is only sand, you now know that the experience of the oasis was only a mirage - because this conclusion is now the only one that is not contradicotory to the entirety of your solidified past. To this logic is implicit a desire to avoid the dolor of chaos that comes with extreme unpredictability. This impetus in us is not something we have a freedom to choose but is rather a predeterminate facet of our being - one that, roughly speaking, predetermines and also facilitates our capacity to choose goals and alternatives toward them - those that to us seem to optimally minimize our overall future dolor (in a mixture of both short- and long-term appraisals). Due to this determinate facet of our being, we will generally not freely choose to believe (although we could when metaphysically appraised) that a physical oasis was there but then it progressively vanished physically as we approached it. This would shatter the solidity of our past and, along with it, of our present - as well as most, if not all, our expectations of what will be in the future. And this would be exceedingly unpleasant. So, instead, we typically choose to appraise the oasis as a mirage.

Hope that example made some sense (I can easily see how it wouldn't to some/many). To try to recap, our past is solidified, determinate, fixed, though only composed of memories, for reasons aforementioned. Our future is, at least to me, a mixture of determinate and indeterminate states of affairs - in which we seek to obtain, or actualize, goals via a limited freedom of choice but, importantly for me, due to a fully determinate innate impetus to minimize overall dolor that (to me) is part and parcel of all sentient beings. And it is due to this same impetus (that is always conjoined with the future) that our past is as determinate as it is.

Now, I get that I've said a lot, and that a lot of it might be confusing, so I'll stop short and wait to see how the cookie crumbles. Short on time so I posted. I'll try to regroup if I need to.

While I admire the enthusiasm for philosophy you appear to have, I disagree with a number of your premises - as best as I can make them out. I, for example, do agree with @Metaphysician Undercover that potential devoid of actuality is technically nonsensical.

If you are referring to deChardin's Omega Point [...] — Gnomon

No, I wasn't referring to deChardin.

Awareness and Consciousness are metaphysical, and do not exist in any physical sense. But they do exist as functions (not things) within the created universe, not as disembodied souls or ghosts in some parallel universe. — Gnomon

Nor as unicorns, bears, or mountains. I take it that by expressing the sentiment I've boldfaced you presume it stands in some measure of contrast to my own views. It does not. We were talking about the awareness of lifeforms, right? Meanwhile, since the statement, "they exist as purposes (not things)," makes no sense to me, do you mean something along the line of awareness being a mathematical function? If so, yes, this is one of the premises I disagree with.

To sum things up though, you seem to believe that being can arise out of non-being. This, however, is not something I find any value in entertaining.

That's right there is a fundamental continuity, expressed in a very simply form as Newton's first law, inertia, which makes future events somewhat determinate. — Metaphysician Undercover

I conceptualize it differently. Something more akin to stratifications along a determinancy-indeterminacy spectrum. But I greatly doubt I'd be able to properly explain myself in the soundbite form that forum discussions require.

Still, as a best attempt to sum things up, one aspect of my thoughts on the matter is that certain determinate states of affairs supersede indeterminate states of affairs in their causal influence (in more Aristotelian terms, something akin to a universal telos and the natural laws it necessitates being a prime example - but this phrase may not express too much). This while indeterminate states of affairs play an active role in existence. To me, the future is partly determined by those states of affairs that supersede the causal influence of all others, and partly undetermined due to ontically indeterminate states of affairs. Kind of thing.

Here's the basic problem with "force". By Newton's fist law, a force is what interrupts the continuity of predictability. In Newton's second law, the force itself is described as being predictable according to the principles of the first law. However, the predictability of the force itself may be interrupted by another force. This produces a potential infinite regress, exposing a fundamental indeterminateness. This indeterminateness indicates that we do not really understand the nature of force. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know I have hindsight on my side, but Newton loses me with his premise that the space of the universe has a singular geometric axis point. (Nope, it doesn't.) As I've previously mentioned, I'm not a determinist, but a causal compatibilist of a Humean type (not of the type that specifies freedoms of this and that nature to be themselves fully deterministic yet still existent as freedoms - which I take to be metaphysical bs). Which is to say that I easily accept your argument against Newtonian notions of deterministic force. Yea, I'm of the view that there is an interplay of ontic chaos and order within existence. Nevertheless, imo, tackling causation in its broadest sense - to include Aristotle's four causes - is not something that is ever easy.

you might then, prefer to look at the work of someone like Amishi Jha — Isaac

Hey, cheers. Will do.

I see we have to subscribe. :rofl: — TheMadFool

Darn. Did a copy and paste on the web address from a web search and ... buggers. :grin: But I tweaked the address and now it's worked for me in the thread.

In short, the article says that we quite often learn new knowledge of what drugs work almost exclusively via trial and error, and not via improved knowledge of biology and related fields. Also, we typically learn of how drugs work only long after we find out that they do (decades sometimes), and there are well known drugs that work to which we still don't know the mechanisms.

Thanks for letting me know about the link problem

If so then I'm afraid (dull as it is) "She instinctively knew the right answer to the question." simply becomes "She automatically knew the right answer to the question." — Isaac

Thank you for the info! To my ear, though, the second sentence doesn't seem to convey the same connotations as the first - even thought the term automaticity, thus defined, does convey the intended concept. I think it's because "instinct" clearly applies only to sentient beings whereas "automaticity" sounds - at least to me - like something that an automaton or machine would do. Though you're right: it's definition is well enough established for wiktionary. I'll mull it over some. Thanks again.

Kant either uses the word "instinct" in a way which is different from what we understand to be instinctual behaviour; or else he is a moron. — god must be atheist

I used instinct as a shorthand. I am not sure Kant uses the word. What is meant is resisting said conditioned responses, among other things, in favour of a deliberative process which Kant calls rationality. — Echarmion

An open ended, somewhat tangential, question regarding proper use of terminology. “Instinct” has two senses: that of a) innate (genotypic) complex behavior and that of b) complex behavior performed in manners devoid of conscious thought. In both cases, instincts are distinguished from reflexes, these being simple behaviors.

In the first sense, to say “learned instincts” is to express a logical contradiction. In sense (b), however, all habits – for one example - are instinctive and acquired from past conscious experience (that has been somehow internalized and automated, this for use in respective contexts).

Academia – in fields of both ethology (study of animal behavior) and modern psychology – favors sense (a) of the term.

That said, sense (b) is still a valid definition of “instinct” and, importantly, there is no other word that I know of which comes close to expressing “a complex behavior that is performed in the absence of conscious reasoning”; an abstraction which can then be further categorized as either innate or leaned.

Examples of sense (b): She instinctively knew the right answer to the question. He instinctively caught the hurled ball. And both these behaviors are not innate (purely genotypic) but are contingent on former learning of how to perform activity X.

So: If use of the term “instinct” is improper to differentiate between innate and learned “complex behaviors automatically performed” - this due to its current academic usage - what alternative term would adequately convey the just quoted meaning?

Or is “instinct” the only term for this quoted meaning? In which case, the distinction of learned instincts v. innate instincts would naturally follow.

ps. I don’t feel this issue deserves its own thread, so I’m asking it at this point in this thread. Obviously, no one is obliged to answer, but opinions would be welcomed … as well as being somewhat relevant to where the thread is currently at.

In support of these posts:

One big myth about medicine: We know how drugs work - from The Washington Post

Its a bit outdated, written in 2015, but I think it helps with the officiality of it all.

In support of there being no such thing as an omni-somthing guy on top clouds: I was young, had a good childhood up to and some time after this period, and noticed that there was a hell of a lot of injustice in the world. Conclusion: no such thing as an omni-benevolent all-controlling ubiquitously-aware psyche can exist. Yes, Epicurus beat me to the punch. All the same, its a simple but quite sound argument.

But this doesn't prevent one from being earnestly spiritual in something like a Naturalistic Pantheism way. Spinoza being a good example of this. Other similar approaches can also be found.

And I second @god must be atheist's belief that @Gnostic Christian Bishop is not an atheist.

I think you mean abstract object. A number is an abstract object. — frank

Yea, abstractions we're aware of are conceptual to us.

Is that what temperature fields are? — frank

Well, you're the one who brought up temperature fields. I was only using temperature and pressure as an analogy. I thought you'd know what they are when bringing them up.

More soberly, temperature - as in cold and hot - is a cognitive abstraction relative to the particular makeup of lifeforms. Scientific models of temperature are entwined with our cognitive abstractions of cold and hot. But this bring the conversation into fields far removed from that of the thread.

Temp and pressure relate by way of volume. They only track with a constant volume. — frank

Wanted to add that they also relate by way of causation, specifically they (to the extent they are considered different) bidirectionally cause each other. But this can get into tricky issues, I think.

Cool. What kind of object is a temperature field? — frank

A conceptual object?

A temperature field is not the same thing as an electromagnetic field, though they occupy the same space. — frank

So then I'll ask: if a temperature field and an electromagnetic field occupy the exact same space at the exact same time, in which way are they two different physical givens? (Rather than being two ways of appraising the same physical given.)

Hm, not my field of expertise. To simplify things for shmucks such as myself: I'd imagine that if they do occupy the same space at the same time, it would be analogous to temperature and pressure being two ways of viewing the same physical given. But not two separate physical givens.

Fine. Two fields can occupy the same space. How's that? — frank

:grin: Fields of what?

Na, I'm in general agreement with @petrichor on this one. Were two fields to occupy the exact same space at the exact same time, they'd be one and the same field. Edit: For greater precision: this for that span of time in which the exact same space is occupied, even if this now singular object is in some way a type of hybrid of it's previously two or more parent objects.

Physical objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. — SophistiCat


They do at the center of a black hole, don't they? Time stops, so I don't know if "same time" means anything there. — frank

As does space. Gravitational singularities - the center of black holes - are currently either considered to be volumeless or unknowable in terms of space. Its part of the spacetime paradigm, from which gravitational singularities were first predicted.

At any rate, it's understood that there are no separate objects at the center of black holes. The vacuum field comes to mind, but even then, there wouldn't be individual particles in gravitational singularities - this from everything I've read up on. Their spatiotemporal location is determined by surrounding givens that are spatiotemporal.

Nevertheless, Zero could also represent Transcendence (infinity, eternity) in the sense of absence of physical objects (no real things; nothingness). — Gnomon

Hypothesize with me for a moment that the supposed omega point of existence is that of a universal Moksha, or Nirvana - a non-hyperbolic complete liberation from, or doing away with, samsara on a universal scale. In this hypothetical that borrows from Eastern concepts, causal information - a term I've been using so far that is very similar to that of EnFormAction - would no longer be when this here hypothesized omega point is actualized.

Since it is information that ratios things, that limits and binds things, that gives being(s) form(s) - and since it is a new way of addressing pre-Socratic logos when conjoined with action and/or causation - in the complete absence of information (causal or otherwise) - i.e., in the complete absence of logos - it would be logically true that what would remain would be devoid of form, of limits. It would hence be a state devoid of thing-ness.

But here is what I take to be one pivotal ontological issue: Do you understand this hypothesized omega point of Moksha/Nirvana to be non-being? (this in regard to your use of "nothingness")

Certainly, Buddhists and Hindus do not. The only pivotal gripe between these two worldviews in this respect is whether or not this omega point can be considered "a self" or not. Either way, it is what awareness is hypothesized to someday become - this contingent on the choices of agents. The awareness just specified still holds being. It is not non-being from these interpretations - but, instead, hypothesized to be perfected state of being. It is - supposedly - a perfect, boundless (hence limitless and, hence, both infinite and eternal), quantity-devoid wholesome-ness of awareness that is furthermore devoid of ego (here meaning: any and all separation/distinction between self and other). It is pure being devoid of the information that divides it - and, hence, non-hyperbolically selfless. Alternatively stated, it is pure being devoid of the samsara that is existence (existence in the sense of that which stands out to being - one of the senses of samsara is "ever-changing world"). You seem to agree with this implication in your latter posts - but I'd like to verify whether or not you do.

Secondly, again here entertaining the thought experiment just offered, do you take this omega point of Moksha/Nirvana to be unreal? (this in regard to your use of "no real things") [Tentatively upholding this view of the omega point, it is obviously not yet actualized, so it dwells only as potential; yet, if this omega point if ontically real, this potential is nevertheless all-pervasive - and, as such, is actual in its typically tacit influences upon, at the very least, all agents.]

I ask this second question because to those who uphold these or similar enough concepts, Moksha and/or Nirvana are considered to be the Real - with everything else being at best a contingent subsidiary (very much including our physical reality).

If you logically find that the hypothesized omega point is (hence, than non-being does not define it) and is thereby real (as opposed to unreal), then, in the system you're working on, 0 cannot be representative of nonbeing. Rather, I'll offer that, within this context, 0 would symbolize a universally actualized Moksha/Nirvana, or some like - a state in which samsara gets turned off, this in favor of limitless awareness, one devoid of "deaths and rebirths" as the Easterners say. Whereas 1 would symbolize not being per se but, rather, an completely integral existent that holds being (something I've yet to discover any evidence for either in contexts of philosophy or in those of the empirical sciences).

BTW, awareness never "stands out" to anybody, not even to the individual whose awareness is addressed. What stand out is various forms of information - such as information regarding my body and its motions that correlate quite well to that which I as awareness sense myself to will (I do not see my awareness when looking into a mirror, but the information that is my body). Hence, in the "stand out" sense of "existence", awareness does not exist. Instead, it strictly holds being. (Terms are of course context dependent, but since we're addressing the ontology which you've elaborated on ...)

All this, btw, mostly concerns not your latest post to me, but previous posts you've made in this thread.

using the basic mathematical language of 1s & 0s (something or nothing, on or off, being or non-being). — Gnomon

Might get back to this later. Short on time for now. If we are to entertain ancient concepts, 0 is a representation of a circle. As per Pythagorean philosophy - a relatively well known example - the perfect circle represents being as a whole, also, arguably a perfect wholesomeness. It used to not represent non-being - as it most often is used to represent today. A circle with a point at its center, represented light - in spiritual terms more often than not: nous, understanding. Also the sun, in more physical representations. Symbolically, the centered point could well be interpreted as the universal telos - Heraclitus's "zeus", for instance - that is ever-present to being, the latter represented by the circle.

Where a distinction is made between being (ousia) and existence (that which stands out to being), 1 then could represent a perfect unity of existence, not so much of being. This, at least, in ancient times by at least some ancients that made use of logos as concept.

I'll be hard-pressed to prove the aforementioned, but wanted to mention it as a possible perspective.

The expression "1" does not appear in set theory or in the lambda calculus (axiomatization of anonymous functions). You can optionally produce the concept of "1" as a necessary result of set theory or of the lambda calculus, but you can happily work in both mathematical theories and derive theorems, without ever mentioning the concept of "1". — alcontali

The concept of 1 - of oneness - is however found. Expressions of quantity are obtained, at the very least, via mathematical object(s) in set theory and via variable(s) in lambda calculus (had to look the latter up to verify). That there can be one or more objects is an expression of quantity. Same holds true with variables.

What matters with quantity - at least I'll so argue - is that we idealize givens (be they concrete or abstract) to be integral wholes - i.e., units that by definition are undivided - that, then, can stand in relations to each other. "1" is simply one way to formally represent a singular integral whole. This concept is entailed in there being an object and not more, or a variable at play and not more.

To be explicit, my main argument being that conceptualization of quantity precedes conceptualization of all maths - in that it is prerequisite to mathematical thought. The aforementioned as just one example.

BTW, to my knowledge, no one has provided a logical or mathematical reason for why 1 + 1 must entail an equality to 2. One does not need to formally account for or even express this concept in order to faithfully apply it - this in ordinary life just as in theoretical maths. The same, I imagine, applies to the axiomatization of "1".

The dominant axiomatization in mathematics, ZF set theory (along with AC), does not even mention "1". If you look at its nine axioms, the expression "1" is literally nowhere to be found. — alcontali

I've browsed the link to the nine axioms. Thank you for the link. Here again variables are made use of. And, again, with these variables is entailed notions of quantity. And the axioms addressing variables come before those addressing functions (or relations between variables). For instance, X and Y are understood to be two variables, rather than one.

For example, is a combinator or a function related to quantity? — alcontali

No, I'd say those are complex relations regarding quantity. In other words, they would be pointlessly meaningless - correct me if I'm wrong here - in the complete absence of expressions of quantity such as that of "1".

I don't think that, for example, category theory even ever mentions quantities. It is rather about structures, mappings between these structures, and possible preservation of structure. I don't think you'd ever see a quantity in that context. — alcontali

I'll be explicitly transparent. Yes, I took calculus in high-school, but I'm no mathematician. Not my thing.
Still, I have an exorbitant degree of confidence that none of the above means anything sans representations of unity, aka quantity. A geometric point, for all its marvels of being volumeless, is yet a quantity, for instance.

If the semantics of "quantity" needs better clarification, let me know. Alternatively, if you find I'm mistaken - but understand that "1" represents an idealized perfect integrity, or unity, of existent stuff - please offer some references to maths devoid of notions of quantity (such as the concept of "1", and its derivatives).

satanically — alcontali


that's says something. — Wayfarer

"Satanists" are the Abrahamic way of describing those whom you dislike.

These are empirical patterns in which people detect some form of consistency. Mathematics is only about that consistency, and nothing else. It is not empirical. The language expression "1+1=2" is handled by math, because it is language. What you see in the real, physical world, is not handled by math. — alcontali

You might be using language in a very specific sense. In which case, yes, relations between quantities is not a human language used to convey meaning. All the same, in a broader sense of language, how is mathematics - which is codified quantity and relations between quantity (right?) - not an abstracted form of language employed by humans for various purposes? In physics, such as for the purpose of understanding the world and for predictions.

Of course. — alcontali

OK. So I take it that we agree that what you previously stated is "epistemically impossible" is actually possible.

Mathematics has nothing to do with real-world experience. It is completely divorced from it. — alcontali

There is no other mathematics left than pure mathematics. — alcontali

I'd say bring it down to Earth a bit. We learn as toddlers about mathematics how? By noticing quantity in reality and the relations between quantities - and by giving these quantities and relations names such as "one" and "plus". 1 + 1 = 2 is not pure mathematics. It is a fact that is thoroughly entwined with the reality in which we live. (And I'm not denying Platonic-like ideals in saying this - after all, logos is logos.)

Mathematics does not compete with physics or with science in general. That is epistemically impossible. — alcontali

I've a former friend (but sticking to the point ...) who got himself a doctorate in maths. According to his learning, one can easily construct a coherent theoretical mathematics that blatantly contradicts everyday aspects of reality such as that of gravity. Axioms are what you want them to be and you simply construct from them. In examples such as this, mathematics does (or at least can) compete with empirical physics and with empirical science in general.

I'm in agreement with @Wayfarer in that Kant focuses on issues that precede the "epistemic knowledge-justification method" of modern empirical science and of history. Both employ reasoning, and Kant's focus was in significant part on what reasoning is constituted of.

What principle would force a bit of sanity in metaphysics? — alcontali

The same overall principle that forces sanity in mathematics: accord to our experiences of what is. No?

Theoretical (pure?) mathematics can get a little disjointed from reality at times, last I heard. And unlike the sciences of biology, neurology, cognitive sciences, etc., physics is quite heavily reliant upon mathematical ideas - M-theory and Everett's many worlds as just two physicist hypotheses that have no falsification ability to them. Yet are nevertheless widely enough endorsed.

As to metaphysics, as an abstract principle to be ideally pursued, make its affirmations falsifiable via reasoning and/or experience.

Furthermore, I do not consider this question to be metaphysical at all. — alcontali

So you're saying that the issue of reality is not a metaphysical issue? I can point to a plethora of references that say it is. Wikipedia being my staple on grounds that it is peer-reviewed.

On what merits to you deny that the study of reality is a metaphysical issue?

There is simply no such thing as "Kantian physics". — alcontali

and Bohr’s ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ is arguably Kantian in many respects. — Wayfarer

A little known fact about Kant that I find pertinent:

The nebular hypothesis is the most widely accepted model in the field of cosmogony to explain the formation and evolution of the Solar System (as well as other planetary systems). It suggests that the Solar System is formed from the nebulous material. The theory was developed by Immanuel Kant and published in his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels ("Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens"), published in 1755. Originally applied to the Solar System, the process of planetary system formation is now thought to be at work throughout the universe.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nebular_hypothesis

Do you know anyone who's actually tried to explain the natural world without recourse to metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, there's not way to explain it without implicit or explicit metaphysics? Physicalism? well, it's right there. Natural laws? again right there — Coben

To further compliment this: Truth is an epistemic criterion that is meaningless when devoid of the concept of reality. Reality is studied by ontology. And ontology is a leading branch of metaphysics. Hence, there can be no comprehension of truths in the absence of metaphysics. Reworded, regardless of how naive or formal, else tacit or conscious, one's understanding of the latter is, there must be some understanding of it if one is to have any understanding of truths.

This produces the distinction between determinate and semi-determinate which you referred to. But why do you think that the future is semi-determinate, not completely indeterminate? Doesn't this confuse the distinction, making it unclear? What produces the idea that the future is in some way determinate? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, unclassified semantics can get in the way. Just checked and wikipedia has this to say:

Indeterminism is the idea that events (or certain events, or events of certain types) are not caused, or not caused deterministically.

(emphasis mine)

So indeterminism proper seems to serve as an umbrella term for any category that is not (full) determinism. This gets further complicated by the semantics of determinate and indeterminate, which are not the same as determinism and indeterminism, respectively. What I was alluding to is that the future is always partly determinate and partly indeterminate, rather than fully indeterminate - as in "not possible to determine" or else "not of a fixed state of affairs".

One example: flick a rock from the top of a mountain onto the mountain side. Its future will be partly determinate: it will move downward along the mountain side. Its future will also be partly indeterminate: whether it will stop descending in a few yards distance, lead to an avalanche, moves leftward or toward the right, etc., are things that cannot be epistemically determined and, contingent on ontology, might themselves be ontologically indeterminate. Nevertheless, either way, because the rock will never move upward once flicked (nor sideways), some aspects of its future will remain determinate. And we justify that it will never move upward via a mixture of coherent memories and reasoning that is applied to this former experience (i.e., to memories).

By "semi-(in)determinate" I basically wanted to emphasize that not all future events are fully indeterminate.

I'm a self-labled compatiblist in a Humean sense of the term, so I'm very comfortable with this perspective - though I can apprehend how others might not be: In truth, for the record, I don't take the past to be *fully* determinate either. Via discovery of new info in the future, on occasion our knowledge of our past changes. On an intra-personal level, false memories can be discovered to so be via new info acquired - again, issues regarding coherency of both personal and interpersonal memory. On an inter-personal level, what we once "knew to be historically true" sometimes changes due to new info: take, for example, our once knowing that the story of Troy was fiction and, after discovering ancient city ruins that correlate very well to the city, now knowing that the city of Troy, at least, was real.

But as generalities go, yes, the past is determinate, fixed, and, hence, unchangable - whereas our future is indeterminate. The further into the future we try to predict, the more indeterminate the details of the future become. Upon seeing a cat walking before me, I can easily predict where it will be in ten second's time - not so in ten hours time, and even less in ten day's time.

Nevertheless, my prediction of where the cat will be in ten seconds time pales in degree of certainty when compared with my memory based certainty of where it was ten second's past. And, as per my first post, I think this distinction epitomizes the difference between memory stored past and the expectation stored future.

So the determinateness of the future is distinct from the determinateness of the past, because it relies on the condition of continuity, whereas the determinateness of the past is based in a corroboration of memories. — Metaphysician Undercover

I very much agree.

Therefore we can say that the advanced nations represent the future of the developing and underdeveloped world. In other words the three divisions of time (past, present, and future) exist simultaneously on earth, visible through the differences in the stage of development of the world's nations. — TheMadFool

I’m currently seeing this as mismatch of ideas. For instance, from the pov of some aboriginal society, our modern western societies might be considered to be over-developed, in a negative sense of the term. Not ripe but spoiled, kind of thing. As argument (myself being firmly planted in ‘over-developed’ societies as a constituent), many facets of the developed world are arguably poisoning the world to the point of us nearing a global suicide of sorts, unless things change. Our glutinous dependency on thing such as fossil fuels – powering this conversation as we speak – being an important cause for global deforestation, some 200 species of life going extinct per day (last I heard), us entering a sixth mass extinction, global climate change, lack of resources needed to sustain future human life, etc. (Its a bummer to talk about, but its not a bad thing to explicitly address.) So, in this example, more and less developed, or advanced, or beneficial becomes very contextualized on points of view held. So we can’t affirm a necessity that advanced nations represent the future state of undeveloped nations.

Aside from which, what you address is closer to notions of B-series time than to A-series time. And I’m under the impression that MU was interested in the latter.

Otherwise I like the twilight-zone thought process to the idea.

I’ll give it a try – here borrowing ideas from some of the previous posters.

Experientially speaking, the past is composed of memories, both long-term and short term. The future is composed of both expectations (anticipations) and intentions. The present is where we use our memories to a) construct expectations of what will be so as to b) best appraise how to optimally satisfy our wants via intentions.

Some caveats: Other than that not all of this occurs consciously, we are not sole selves. Hence all three when experientially addressed - past, present, and future – are contingent on a multitude of selves co-existing and, nearly always for almost all, interacting.

The past as memory is grounded in coherency between all memories. This is applicable both intra-self and between selves. When memories result in logical contradictions, something is amiss and we infer that something about our specified set of memories is wrong. Its only when all recalled memories flow effortlessly into themselves that we hold confidence in them. This applies just as well when we interact with each other. Our history is, experientially, composed of intersubjective memory. To the same extent that our memories, both personal and interpersonal, are found to be fluidly coherent and, thus, devoid of logical contradictions, our past is then determinate for us – unchangable.

Intentions are all goal driven. In Aristotelian terms, telos guided. Add the premise of limited freedom of will to a) choose between different alternatives toward that goal(s) aimed for and b) to choose between different goals and the intention facet of the future becomes to the same extent (semi-)indeterminate. Add the fact that the future is partly created by the intentions of multiple selves, and this same indeterminate aspect of the future becomes even more so.

Expectations hold their own reasoning. They are grounded in that which our memories tells us to be determinate. Given facts and causations of the past, the future will then be inferred to be in this way and not that. This will apply to everything from expectations that one will successfully recall a memory at will when so intending to expectations that tomorrow not all leaves of all trees worldwide will be fallen to the ground. I’m inclined to say this inference of future events is no more “imagined” than are our memories—both, when trusted, are thoroughly steeped in reasoning and justification (tacitly so if not otherwise). But unlike our memories which ground us in a determinate past, expectations, being best inferences, are endowed with far greater degrees of uncertainty (but not necessarily doubt: “the future is uncertain” always works, but not “the future is doubtful/dubious”). Experientially, this uncertainty of inferences (most of which will be explicitly inductive) will likewise make the future indeterminate. When conjoined with the indeterminacy of intentions on the part of all selves, this will hold even more so.

So the past, when we are (and hold good reason to be) certain of it, will be experientially determinate for us. The future will, however, be experientially semi-indeterminate (for it is still bound to the determinate facts and causations of the past which we hold in our memories). And the present is where we hold awareness of the past and of the future, as well as where we actively intend (edit: with intentions always extending from the present to the future wherein the goal dwells).

To (again) quote a little jingle that I like from a Tom Waits song, “Time is just memory mixed with desire.” This, at the very least, when experientially addressed.

Of course, all this imo.

Chomsky is an exemplary air-conditioned modeler. Banksy is an aesthete, and made shrewd use of an anti-corporate aesthetic that gibed with the radiohead-era zeitgeist. Now he does gallery shows and stunts at Sothebys. I don't know Amy Goodman and will look her up. — csalisbury

Yes, still, every drop in the bucket counts, is my concise view. I get most worried when no body talks about anything – outside of pounding their fist on tables in support of duckspoken stances or else cheering for such individuals to succeed.

Amy Goodman is the leading figure of Democracy Now, a publicly supported, non-corporatized, left-leaning news organization. On occasion they go overboard (by my tastes) but generally speaking, whats not to admire about news organizations that aren’t governed by corporate cash. The Intercept also comes to mind as an investigative news organization of the same ilk.

Thanks for clarifying your stance in relation to political talk, btw.

As regards eusociality and what you said about fertility, consider the problem of homosexual behavior in both humans and bonobos. How to explain it? It is non-reproductive. Some have argued for eusocial explanations. In humans, such things as celibacy for certain members of the group also might have a eusocial explanation. — petrichor

I can see that argument. I don't know of recorded homosexuals among bonobos, though. They are, however, well documented to be bisexual.

I'd have to give it some further thought, but at the moment, it occurs to me that sexual engagement can serve multiple purposes. And since bonding hormones are involved, social bonds might be solidified. — petrichor

:up: I very much agree. Have gotten into one or two arguments where I asked, paraphrasing, "But if sex is only about reproduction, then what the heck do you make out of oral and anal sex??? To not even address french kisses and the like." Yes, I'm one to strongly believe that social bonding is a very big aspect of sex (a roundabout path to the content of my first post on this thread).

As to the rest, I'm very much inclined to agree.

Did I suggest otherwise? — petrichor

Yes, here:

There are probably eusocial factors at work there for one thing. — petrichor

Anyway, I think what you say about bonobos fits into the basic picture I am trying to paint here, which is simply that our taboos reflect our evolutionary interests. — petrichor

OK, I'm not opposed to the general idea. But how do you figure that our human touchiness in relation to sexual intimacy relates to our closest living evolutionary kin? Well at least one of the two: bonobos.

Of course. We could also get into why human lips turn redder when we get sexually aroused, especially amplified in females with rouge lipstick. But this will likely deviate quite a bit from the theme of this thread. As to bonobos, good ol' wikipedia to the rescue:

Sexual activity generally plays a major role in bonobo society, being used as what some scientists perceive as a greeting, a means of forming social bonds, a means of conflict resolution, and postconflict reconciliation.[42][4] Bonobos are the only non-human animal to have been observed engaging in tongue kissing.[43] Bonobos and humans are the only primates to typically engage in face-to-face genital sex, although a pair of western gorillas has been photographed in this position.[44] [etc.] — Wikipedia entry on bonobos