I want to establish is that we have good reason to believe that there are no uncaused causers. The same reason we give for believing there are no unicorns or Yetis. We’ve looked and haven’t found any or even the effects of any. Moreover, for uncaused causers, we have found a massive volumes of contradictory evidence (conservation of energy and momentum) which is not even the case for the unicorn or yeti. What’s wrong with that as an argument? — khaled

It's question begging, that's what.

When a difference between what is actually the case and what we think is the case cannot be afforded for the purposes of survival. — khaled

That's going to be self-defeating. The reason why is, frankly, above your intellectual pay grade, but I'll explain anyway because I'm phenomenally nice.

The actual existence of epistemic reasons would make no difference to our chances of survival. All that's needed to survive, is to 'believe' that we have epistemic reason to believe some things - such as that 2 = 2 = 4 - and not others - such as that 2 + 2 = 89. There does not need to be any actual epistemic reason to believe those things in reality.

Thus, you would end up having to conclude that epistemic reasons do not exist - that is, that we do not in reality have any reason to believe anything.

And that's self-defeating, because you'd think there's reason to think that.

You have failed this class.

Baby steps. In the OP I expressed disagreement with one of Strawson's claims, namely the claim that it is impossible for us to satisfy his condition on moral responsibility (the condition I agree with - and agreed with implicity in the OP, for why apart from agreement with it, would I otherwise explain how we can satisfy it and thus can, in principle, be morally responsible?)

So, once more - and I have to be honest, I think a five year old could understand this - Strawson thinks more than one thing. I disagree with one of the things he thinks. But I agree with another thing he thinks.

One thing I disagree with. One thing. Not all things.

Most of that was just question begging.

The only point of note was your appeal to the possibility of an evolutionary discrediting account of our rational intuition that we are morally responsible.

The problem is that if evolutionary accounts of how we have acquired our rational intuitions discredit those intuitions, then all of our rational intuitions are going to end up being discredited. And that's self-defeating (because our evidence that there is a sensible world in which evolution operates itself involves appealing to rational intuitions).

So, it is not in general the case that rational intuitions are discredited by having evolutionary explanations. Rather, one must distinguish between when such an account discredits the intuitions and when it does not.

What's your account? When does an evolutionary account of our rational intuitions discredit them, and when does it not?

I also think more than one thing. — counterpunch

Really? Who's a good boy!? You are. Yes you are.

you were inviting me to make as ass of myself. — counterpunch

You didn't wait for me to invite you.

and mock your clumsy attempts at boxing me in. — counterpunch

I can't box fog.

Erm, Strawson thinks more than one thing. He thinks one thing - A - that I agree with. And he thinks another thing - B - that I do not.

He thinks that if the causes of your decision trace to external events, then you are not morally responsible for that decision.

I agree with that. That's 'A' above.

He also thinks that it is impossible for it to be the case that the causes of our decisions will not trace to external events.

I disagree with that. That's B.

Presumably you are very puzzled by doors that have 'push' written on one side and 'pull' on the other. I pulled it to get in, so manifestly I must pull it to get out. That's you reasoning about opening the door.

Problem is, you don’t actually specify in any way what this “uncaused mover” does or how it works. — khaled

And I don't have to. It is sufficient for the argument to go through that it is metaphysically possible for there to be such things. If it is metaphysically possible for there to be such things, then we no longer have any epistemic reason to doubt we are morally responsible and also have reason to conclude that we are such things - that we are uncaused causers.

One can have excellent evidence that X is the case, without having to know 'how' it is the case. For instance, I have excellent evidence my computer is working - it is working - yet if you ask me 'how' it is working, I haven't a clue. By your logic, of course, the fact I haven't a clue how it is working would constitute evidence that it isn't working!

It gets worse for you. Not only have you reasoned fallaciously once more - fallaciously thinking that if one can't explain how something works, then one has evidence it isn't working - you also demonstrate conceptual incompetence. For what do you mean by 'how does it work?' if not 'explain the causes of the uncaused causer's causings?' Which is, of course, conceptually confused.

The rest of what you say is once more flagrantly question begging. Rather than following the argument to its logical conclusion - which we've already established you have great trouble doing - you are just appealing to the conventional assumption that we are physical bodies. Oh, and you commit further fallacies - you think that as there is no empirical evidence that we are uncaused causers (how could there be?), that means there is empirical evidence that we are 'not' uncaused causers. Which is fallacious. Are you being sponsored? I mean, it's actually quite impressive to commit that many fallacies in such a small space. It's almost like you think fallaciously exclusively.

I have some slight suspicion that your congratulations are not sincere, and yet - I accept your congratulations sincerely because I am a philosopher, and as such can only respond in my own terms, in reference to my tradition. — counterpunch

They weren't remotely sincere. And no philosopher would say

I am a philosopher, and as such can only respond in my own terms, in reference to my tradition. — counterpunch

.

So you're not scoring too highly on the sincerity scale.

If you demand I respond directly to the OP - I can, but only to point out that there you said Strawson is wrong, and now you say:

Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C?
— Bartricks — counterpunch

Well if you were a philosopher - or, indeed, just a careful reasoner - you'd realize that my disagreement with Strawson is not over the truth of that principle, but rather over whether it is metaphysically possible for us to make decisions to which it would not apply. He thinks not - hence he concludes that moral responsibility is impossible - whereas I am arguing otherwise. So, kudos for seeing inconsistency where it isn't. Quite an achievement.

It's 'moral' responsibility - of the desert variety - that Strawson is talking about and arguing is impossible. So other kinds are irrelevant. For instance, if we were discussing whether minds can be split, then the fact that there are other kinds of split - Sundae splits, for example - would be irrelevant to that discussion.

The term 'moral responsibility' has at least two distinct meanings. Sometimes it is used to denote 'being a moral agent' - that is, being someone who has moral obligations. So, I am 'morally responsible' in that sense of the term just if I am someone who is subject to moral obligations.

Then there's 'moral responsibility' in the 'desert' or 'retributivist' sense used by Strawson and most others working on the issue of free will. Here is denotes the idea that we can, in principle, be deserving of benefit or harm depending on how we have behaved. That's why it is associated with free will.

It is entirely possible for someone to defend the idea that we are morally responsible in the first sense, yet deny that we are morally responsible in the second. There are some moral theories that actually entail this, such as utilitarianism. This is because the desert-based notion of moral responsibility is essentially deontological. If you deserve to come to harm, then it is good if you come to harm even if no benefit accrues from the harm being visited on you. So, what one deserves in terms of retribution is a function of what one has done, rather than a function of the consequences of giving it to you.

I understand. — khaled

Hmm....

Ok. How do you then get premise 2? Because

“It is possible and it seems to be the case so it must be the case” Is a weak argument.
— khaled — khaled

It's not a weak argument at all. You really don't seem to understand the dialectic here. The best evidence one can ever have for anything is powerful epistemic reason to think that it is the case and none to think that it isn't. Right?

Okay. Now, we have extremely powerful epistemic reason to think we're morally responsible. Billions - I mean, literally billions - of people have rational intuitions that represent themselves and others to be morally responsible. There's about as much evidence that we're morally responsible as there is that there are trees.

Strawson's argument - if it worked - would have been a source of countervailing epistemic reasons. So, Strawson's argument - if it worked - would have raised a reasonable doubt about whether we really are morally responsible.

It doesn't work. So now the way is clear - we have powerful epistemic reason to believe we are morally responsible and no epistemic reason to think otherwise.

I don't know why you keep drawing a parallel with antinatalism. Nobody - including prominent antinatalists - denies that the antinatalist conclusion is counter-intuitive on its face. Antinatalists accept that they have the burden of proof and then they seek to discharge it.

Any other properties? Is it physical? What happens to it after its body dies? Etc — khaled

It's not 'it'. It's 'me'.

No,I don't appear to be a physical thing - I, the morally responsible thing, appear not to be my sensible body. And if you believe sensible bodies are physical bodies, then I appear not to be a physical body. Physical bodies - if any exist - are the kinds of thing that come into being. That is, they don't seem to exist uncreated. So, given that I appear to exist uncreated, I appear not to be a physical thing.

I don't know what will happen to me after my sensible body dies. But it seems likely something very bad awaits us after our sensible bodies die, for our reason tells us to do pretty much all we can to avoid sensible death unless we are in absolute agony. So, that suggests - but doesn't entail - that what awaits us after our sensible demise is worse than here, but not absolute agony.

Well done for not addressing anything in the OP.

Do you agree with Strawson and myself that if one is in no way morally responsible for A, and in no way morally responsible for B, and A and B are wholly causally responsible for C, then one is in no way morally responsible for C?

What you did was show that it is sufficient. But then since the only other alternative is impossible it becomes necessary. — khaled

No. I said that if we are prime movers then we have what is 'in principle' needed to be morally responsible. That doesn't mean that it is 'sufficient' for moral responsibility. Once more: saying 'this is needed for moral responsibility' is not equivalent to saying 'this is sufficient for moral responsibility'. (Strawson isn't talking about what's sufficient either).

So what the heck is this “You” exactly? — khaled

Me.

I am afraid that I do not understand what you are saying or how it relates to anything I have argued.

Why mention strawson at all then? — khaled

See the OP.

Well you’ve argued that being an uncreated being is sufficient for moral responsibility as far as I can tell. — khaled

No, my arguments imply that it is 'necessary' not that it is sufficient. It is your poor reasoning skills - your tendency to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent - that convinces you otherwise.

The rest, I shall charitably assume, is you being obtuse for the purpose of some kind of sadistic amusement.

Ask them to clarify the question. It's gibberish. Ask them to ask it again without using the words 'prove' and 'epistemology' and 'is the only correct way of thinking'.
Keep asking them this until something intelligible comes out of their face front.

If something is "quite obvious", does that mean it is no longer possible for it to exist only as a judgement? — Judaka

If strawberries taste nice, does that mean I own a mercedes?

Even a dog or a chimp will become irate if it believes it has been treated unfairly. — Judaka

So? I don't think any premise of my argument mentioned irate chimps or dogs. All it does is suggest that dogs and chimps recognise that they deserve things - that is, that dogs and chimps have a rudimentary faculty of reason and recognise that others are morally responsible for their behaviour and owe them certain kinds of respect and so on. It doesn't address anything in my argument or Strawson's.

I see moral responsibility as a judgement made by an intelligent being because it only exists as something asserted by an intelligent being. — Judaka

And I think that's confused nonsense.

You're confusing beliefs with their objects. I believe I am sat on a chair. that doesn't mean that chairs are beliefs, right?

I believe I am morally responsible.

That doesn't mean moral responsibility is a belief.

Note, this thread is not about what moral responsibility 'is'. That's a topic in metaethics. (Your view is thoroughly confused - and you've arrived at it via fallaciously - but that's beside the point). This thread is about what's needed to be morally responsible. Strawson thinks you need to be a self-creator. I think you just need to be uncreated.

Where else can we see moral responsibility? If there is a circumstance where it's more than an idea then where can someone see it? — Judaka

Where can you 'see' moral responsibility? In the cabinet between love and numbers.

As I understand you use “We are uncaused movers” to show that we are morally responsible. — khaled

No. The opposite! We are morally responsible, therefore we are uncreated things.

I have argued that moral responsibility requires being an uncreated thing, right? That's the first leg. That's the important leg - it's the part where I disagree with, and hopefully refute Strawson.

That leg establishes the truth of this premise:

1. If I am morally responsible, then I am an uncreated thing

Am I morally responsible? Well, I now have every reason to think I am - for my reason represents me to be - and no reason to think I am not. If you think otherwise, you need to show some fault in the first leg.

So, this premise is now one I have every reason to think is true, and none to think is false:

2. I am morally responsible.

From which it follows

3. I am an uncreated thing.

This isn't hard. If Strawson was right, then we had excellent reason to think that we are not morally responsible. For if it is not possible to be morally responsible, then we're obviously not morally responsible and that our reason says otherwise would have to be deemed an occasion where our reason lets us down.

But Strawson is not right - or so I have argued - and thus we do now have excellent reason to think that we are morally responsible, for a) our reason represents us to be and b) it is possible for us to be.

Yes and I’ve asked a while ago what you mean by “uncaused” if not that your physical bodies are uncaused. You didn’t reply so I assumed that’s what you meant. Apparently not. — khaled

Are you being obtuse or is English not your first language? I can't take seriously that you are failing to understand this. I did reply - I said that my sensible body appears to have been caused to exist.

I have not been caused to exist.

My sensible body has.

I have not.

My sensible body has.

Am I a created thing? No.

Is my sensible body? Yes.

Clear enough for you?

But was your creation not caused by the creation of your sensible body? — khaled

Er, no. I will try and express it in a way you can understand. "I is uncreated thing. Body is created thing. I not be created. Body created. I not be. Body is be. I not be body be."

If you wish to dispute this you’d have to show a “person” that doesn’t have a body. A tall order. — khaled

No. Just no.

On the other hand we know when certain things happen to the body “You” no longer exist. So that provides evidence that “You” require your body to exist. Or do we disagree there too? — khaled

Christ.

I have yet to see a human that was uncaused. So I don’t understand what you mean here. If a mind exists uncaused it’s definitely not a human mind. — khaled

You're just not following the argument. Yes, human bodies - sensible bodies - seem to be created things. Not in dispute. We have empirical evidence that it is true.

Don't just assume that you are your sensible body. You don't have any evidence for that. You have evidence that you 'have' a sensible body. But that is not evidence that you 'are' a sensible body. I have a car. I am not a car. I have a house. I am not a house. And so on. I have a sensible body. Am I my sensible body?

It would seem not. I have prima facie evidence I am morally responsible, for my reason represents me to be and I shouldn't just ignore what my reason says arbitrarily. I have prima facie evidence that moral responsibility requires being an uncreated thing, for reasons already gone through at length above. I have prima facie evidence that this is a valid argument:

1. If I am morally responsible, I am an uncreated thing
2. I am morally responsible
3. Therefore, I am an uncreated thing

I therefore have good evidence that I am an uncreated thing.

I have good evidence my sensible body is a created thing.

I have good evidence that this is a valid argument:

1. If I am my sensible body, then I am a created thing
2. I am not a created thing
3. Therefore I am not my sensible body.

So, I have good evidence that I am an uncreated thing and, as such, not my sensible body.

That's not a conventional belief. So what?

But I didn’t attack you personally did I? — khaled

Nor I you. If you accuse someone of committing fallacies when they are clearly not - which is, incidentally, to accuse someone of reasoning badly - then you should expect to be told that you are reasoning badly if you yourself are committing fallacies.

And aren’t you an object of that kind? — khaled

Again with the bad reasoning. The following argument is not fallacious:

1. If I am morally responsible, I am an uncreated thing
2. I am morally responsible
3. Therefore, I am an uncreated thing

I have provided an argument in support of 1. To be morally responsible - as Strawson agrees - it needs to be the case that one's decisions do not trace to exclusively external causes. The only way that condition can be satisfied is if I am an uncreated thing. So, 'if' I am morally responsible, then I am an uncreated thing.

I am morally responsible - or at least, I have epistemic reason to believe I am and none to believe I am not. So premise 2 is true beyond a reasonable doubt. The conclusion follows as a matter of logic.

So, by simply asserting that I am not an uncreated thing you are committing another fallacy - the fallacy of begging the question.

Your parents, and whatever factors influenced their decision to have you are all external to you. — khaled

Yes, and I have not disputed that. But it is a conventional belief - and not a truth of reason - that we are our sensible bodies. That's just the view of the current age, not evidence that it is true. Philosophy is about figuring out what's true, it is not about just parroting what's conventionally believed.

So, my sensible body appears to be a created thing. i seem to have good evidence that it came into being at a certain time, and that before that time it was not around.

I also have evidence that I am an uncreated thing.

Therefore, the evidence that I am an uncreated thing is also evidence that I am not a sensible thing.

Thus, though my sensible body was created, I was not and thus I am not my sensible body.

Not a conventional view at the moment, but so what?

Yes really. And hopefully the mods. — khaled

Stop being such a snowflake. You accused me - falsely - of committing fallacies while committing at least one yourself.

I assumed this meant "uncaused" as in "nothing caused its creation". — khaled

Yes, that's what it means. Some objects exist and have not been caused to exist. And some objects can cause events to occur without having been caused to do so. We can know this by rational reflection.

If we ourselves are objects of such a kind, then our decisions will not trace exclusively to external causes. And, as such, we would then be capable of being morally responsible.

But no apparently the creation of something can be caused by external factors, yet the thing can still be an "uncaused mover". — khaled

I haven't the faintest idea how you have reached that conclusion. That's not my view. If an object has been created by something external to it, then even though that object may well be able to cause events to occur without being directly caused to do so, the simple fact is that its existence traces to external causes and so the condition on responsibility will not be satisfied if we are objects of that kind.

To satisfy the condition on moral responsibility we would need to be objects that have not been created. As it is metaphysically possible for us to be such objects - for such objects clearly exist as events could not occur without them, and what is actually the case is also possibly the case - then Strawson is wrong in thinking that it is impossible for anyone to be morally responsible.

Why are you talking confidently about Strawson's argument when you clearly haven't read the article in which it appears or understood my representation of it?

Yes, Strawson is arguing that we have powerful epistemic reason to believe that we are not morally responsible. At what point did I deny that this is what he's arguing?

I am taking issue with his case and arguing that he has not provided us with epistemic reason to believe that we are not morally responsible.

Mainly, he assumes determinism and goes on to see that therefore we are not responsible for our actions. — khaled

Er, no he doesn't. It doesn't matter whether determinism is true or not - he thinks that's a red herring - for what one needs, he argues, is the ability to create oneself. That's not something that either determinism or indeterminism can give us. Hence why he concludes that moral responsibility is 'impossible'. So you demonstrably do not understand his case.

Your birth is an event. And your birth clearly had causes. — khaled

Er, yes. And where did I dispute those things? I am not an event, right? Events are events. Objects are objects. Big difference. All you're doing is pointing to events and pointing out that they have causes. Which is not something I dispute.

Ad homs and an aggressive tone say more about you than me. — khaled

Not really, but who cares.

When exactly? — khaled

I explained. I argued that to be morally responsible you need to be a prime mover, right? You then asserted that my view was that if we are prime movers, we're morally responsible. That's not my view and the only way you could possibly have thought it was, beyond just randomly plucking views out of the ether and attributing them to me, is if you had committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

This view: 'if you are morally responsible, you are a prime mover' is not equivalent to this view 'if you are a prime mover you are morally responsible'.

Again, you're just being tedious and attacking assumptions that are not in dispute. This thread is not about fundamental issues in epistemology. But when it comes to establishing that a proposition is true, the most we can do is establish that there is powerful epistemic reason to believe the proposition is true, and no epistemic reason to think it is false.

If Strawson's argument - an argument you haven't said anything about - is a good one, then it will furnish those who understand it with an epistemic reason to believe that no one is morally responsible.

Anyway, this is all beside the point - which, by now, is clearly something you are not going to be able to recognise.

There is still a fallacy and I'll get to it. — khaled

Er, that argument was valid by all the canons of logic. So if you think it is fallacious - and note, we've already established that you're rubbish at detecting fallacies, for you committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent - you're just underlining what's already clear: that you don't know how to reason well.

How so? You want to claim that we exist uncaused. That is equivalent to claiming that our birth did not have causes no? Or else what exactly is the "We" that you claim exists uncaused if not our physical bodies. — khaled

No, I don't 'claim' that we exist uncaused, I 'conclude' that we do. Big difference. And I don't 'want' to conclude it - I'm not expressing my desires - I am simply noticing that it follows. I don't 'want' to believe that there is a computer in front of me, but I conclude that there is becasue there appears to be.

So, I conclude that we exist uncaused. You think that this means I think that not all effects have causes. Quite how you got to that conclusion is your business, but it doesn't follow from anything I have said. I am a 'thing' - an object. I am not an 'effect'. An 'effect' is an event. Events have causes. But not all objects have causes. If they did, then we'd have an infinite regress of events. And that's not possible. Thus, though all events have causes, not all objects do.

So, what you have done is make a category error. You have confused events with objects. What is self-evident to reason is that all events have causes. It is also self evident to reason that no actual infinities exist. And from that we can conclude that some events must have objects that cause them rather than other events (for otherwise we will have to posit an actual infinity of events). Those objects - the objects that initiate causal chains - have not been 'caused'. They are not events.

Why is that? Because we have the intuition that we are therefore it is reasonable to believe it? But we also have the intuition that every effect has a cause. You have to favor one and discard the other arbitrarily. — khaled

Yes, what our reason represents to be the case, we are default justified in believing to be the case. So, we are default justified in believing that we are morally responsible. That isn't the issue.

You keep insisting that I have denied that every effect has a cause. Where, precisely, have I done that? I agree that our reason says that every effect has a cause. You are simply conflating quite different claims. (The claim that some things exist uncaused is not equivalent to the claim that some effects lack causes). So it is simply untrue that I am arbitrarily dismissing some rational intuitions over others. Rather, I am saying one thing and you're thinking I've said another.

Compatibilists might have something to say about that. — khaled

No they wouldn't. I'm a compatibilist myself!

No, I would only need to argue that we are not such things. That WE do not exist uncreated. — khaled

Er, no. You're just confused. Look at what premise 2 says. It says that the only way in which it would be true that our decisions are not the product of external causes is if we create ourselves.

I am disputing that premise. I am saying that there is another way in which it would be true that our decisions are not the product of external causes, namely if we exist but have not been created.

Now how on earth would insisting that we have been created do anything whatever to challenge my claim? My claim is not about what we in fact are - that's what I 'conclude' , not what I assume - my claim is that there is a metaphysically possible way in which it can be true that our decisions are not wholly the product of external causes.

So you're simply confused about what you need to do to challenge my case.

Which is fallacious. — khaled

No it isn't. What fallacy does this argument commit then:

1. If we appear to be morally responsible, and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible, then we are justified in believing that we are.
2. We appear to be morally responsible and it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible
3. Therefore we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible.

Now, if we are justified in believing that we are morally responsible, and there is only one way in which it would be possible for us to be - and that's what I have argued - then we are justified in believing that such conditions obtain. That is, we are justified in believing that we are prime movers.

There's no fallacy committed there. None.

You just keep replacing what I've said and argued with quite different claims and arguments. Note, I have not said that if we are prime movers we are morally responsible. I have concluded that if we are morally responsible, then we are prime movers. You're the one committing a fallacy - the fallacy of affirming the consequent. My conclusion: if we are morally responsible, then we are prime movers. Your inference: if we are prime movers, then we are morally responsible. Fallacious - that's to go from 1. If P, then Q, to 2. Q, to 3. Therefore P.

Being a prime mover is a 'necessary' but not 'sufficient' condition on being morally responsible.

And as for that argument re antinatalism - well, though clumsily laid out, doesn't commit a fallacy. This argument is valid:

1. If antinatalism is false, it is ok to have kids
2. Antinatalism is false
3. therefore it is ok to have kids.

Again, that's valid - it's not fallacious!! It's not sound - premise 2 is false - but it is valid.

I have argued that we are morally responsible!

Look, why does Strawson think we're not morally responsible? Because he thinks it is impossible to be morally responsible. That's why. If he thought it was possible for us to be morally responsible, he'd no doubt agree with me that we are indeed morally responsible.

So, where do we - Strawson and myself, that is - disagree? We disagree over whether it is metaphysically possible for us to be morally responsible. That's the issue.

What's his case for thinking that it is metaphysically impossible for us to be morally responsible? This:

1. In order to be morally responsible, our decisions need 'not' to have been caused by events that we had nothing to do with.
2. All of our decisions will have been caused by events that we had nothing to do with unless we have created ourselves.
3. Therefore, in order to be morally responsible, we need to have created ourselves
4. It is not metaphysically possible to create oneself
5. Therefore, we are not morally responsible

Which premise have I challenged? Premise 2. So the issue is whether premise 2 is true. The issue is not whether we are morally responsible or not, for if premise 2 is true, then I agree with Strawson that no-one is morally responsible, and if premise 2 is false, then Strawson would no doubt agree that we 'are' morally responsible. So, again, the issue is whether premise 2 is true. That's what it all hinges on.

Now I presented an argument against 2. That argument you have ignored. So, I'll make it again.

Remember: I agree with Strawson over 1. I agree that to be morally responsible, your decisions must not trace to external causes - causes you had nothing to do with. Maybe you disagree with that - but both Strawson and I and, to date, virtually everyone I have discussed this with, has shared the rational intuition that yes, indeed, if a decision's causal story traces entirely to external causes, then one is not morally responsible for that decision. And there is no question the intuition is widely shared, for it is the key intuition that motivates incompatibilist positions on moral responsibility-grounding free will. And for as long as there has been debate over exactly what that kind of free will involves, there have been those - normally the majority - who defend incompatibilist views about the matter.

So, premise 1 is very well supported by rational intuitions - as both Strawson and I and everyone else who knows anything about this debate or has thought about it seriously for more than a few minutes would agree.

The issue, then, is not over the probative value of rational intuitions. No-one seriously doubts their probative value, for all arguments for anything appeal to rational intuitions. Hell, the validity of an argument is itself something that we can only tell by rational intuition. So, no matter how much you want to dispute the probative value of rational intuitions, that's beside the point for a) to do so is to do no more than demonstrate confusion and b) their probative value is not at issue.

Back to premise 2 then. What was my case against it? Well, I pointed out that if we are prime movers - so, if we have not been created - then the conditions of premise 1 would be met.

What Strawson has done is assume that there is only one way in which the conditions of premise 1 would be met - namely, if we create ourselves. What I am pointing out is that there is another way. Namely, if we exist uncreated. If we exist uncreated, then our decisions will not have causal histories that trace entirely to events outside of us.

To counter my case you would need to argue that it is impossible for something to exist uncreated. That's a tall order. We seem to know by rational reflection alone that if anything exists, at least something must exist uncreated, for if anything exists it has either been caused to exist or it exists uncreated. And if it has been caused to exist, we must eventually posit something that exists uncreated to operate as the originator of the causal chain that produced it. Plus, you have to argue that it is positively impossible for something to exist uncreated, not just that nothing in fact exists uncreated.

You're being tedious. That was an example of how we can arrive at the conclusion that we are prime movers. It was not my argument against Strawson, an argument I have now explained to you several times and that you seem determined to ignore.

You don't seem to understand what the issue is. The issue is whether it is 'possible' to be morally responsible. If it is possible, then it is reasonable to suppose we are, as that's what the appearances say. With that Strawson would not disagree. The disagreement is over whether it is possible or not..

Imagine that punishing Jane for a crime you know she did not commit would nevertheless be extremely helpful and deter others from committing such crimes (for everyone else is convinced Jane did it). Well, even if it is overall justified to punish Jane, it is quite obvious that she will have been dealt an injustice.
Why? Because she doesn't 'deserve' to be punished.
Moral responsibility is not an 'idea'. It is something we have an idea 'of'. That doesn't mean it's an idea. I have an idea of you. That doesn't mean you are an idea. Yet that is how you are reasoning, yes? We have an idea of moral responsibility, therefore moral responsibility is an idea? If that's not the fallacious basis upon which you've come to your now no doubt irrevocable conclusion, kindly provide the valid means by which you did so.

I am assuming that we appear to be morally responsible and that as such Strawson has the burden of proof. This isn't something he'd deny, so I am not begging the question.
He has an argument - I described it - that appears to show that to be morally responsible requires something impossible, namely the power to create oneself from scratch.
I argued that this is false and that the evidence he adduced actually shows that what's needed is that one not have been created by anyone or anything external to oneself.
That condition - a negative condition - can be satisfied.
If it is possible for us to be morally responsible - which Strawson denies but I defend - and we also appear to be - which is not in dispute - then the conclusion it is rational to draw is that what could be the case is in fact the case.
You are focusing on the wrong issue. The issue is whether moral responsibility requires something impossible - self creation - or something possible- absence of creation.

Yes. Indeed indeed.

er, I said nothing about it being 'as' clear. I can see a table. I can see a tree. I'm using sight to see them both. By your logic I have just claimed to be able to see both equally clearly.

Dunning and Kruger. The less they know, the less they know it.

Why would I do that? A person who thinks that if it is useful to believe X, X is therefore true, is too foolish to be worth arguing with. As someone said "no amount of evidence will convince an idiot".

Do you mean "our intuition"? — khaled

Our reason is a faculty. It's deliverances are 'intuitions'. It is by intuition that you know this argument is valid:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

That is, if your reason is working well, anyway.

But 'intuition' is a term of art and is sometimes used to cover beliefs too. That is not how I use it. By talking about deliverances of our reason it is quite clear what I am talking about. If instead I used the word 'intuition' it would be less clear, precisely because that term is used to cover far more than just deliverances of our reason.

And I could argue that in order to arrive at the conclusion that we are morally responsible for our decisions you have to assume we are rational movers. — khaled

Go on then.

I explained why that's mistaken. Again: it is by reason - so, by means of a rational intuition - that I am aware I am morally responsible. And it is by rational intuition that I am aware that I would not be morally responsible if everything I did traced to external causes. So:

1. I am morally responsible
2. If I am morally responsible, not everything I do traces to external causes

And by rational intuition I can see - and so can you, surely - that it follows from these two apparent truths of reason that:

3. therefore not everything I do traces to external causes.

Those who can't reason well - that is, those who do not have very good faculties of reason, or those who just don't bother using their faculties of reason well - may not be able to see that this conclusion follows. But it does.

If by reason alone we could know that we are morally responsible Galen Strawson and many others wouldn't have made the argument in the first place. — khaled

Strawson is appealing to reason too. I acknowledged this. I then explained why his case fails. That is, I explained why, if we attend more closely to what our reason says and stop importing conventional assumptions, we will see that his case fails.

Strawson appeals to the rational intuition that I appeal to as well - the one expressed in 2 above. He too thinks that we are not morally responsible if everything we do traces to external causes. But he falsely assumes that the only way in which this would 'not' be the case is if we create ourselves. I am pointing out that this is not the only way in which tis would not be the case: if we are prime movers then not everything we do traces to external causes.

Which behaviors and attitudes? — Joshs

Those behaviours and attitudes that presuppose we are morally responsible for what we do. They're known as the 'reactive attitudes' and would include guilt, resentment and forgiveness among others.

Strawson advocate in terms of dealing with crime? — Joshs

I don't know - probably some kind of consequentialist approach.

It's irrelevant though, as it doesn't have any bearing on the credibility of his case. The practical implications of a conclusion don't tell us anything about its truth.

Because it is a rational intuition. Our reason tells us that if we make a decision, then we are morally responsible for having made it - that is, we are in principle blameworthy or praiseworthy for it. That doesn't mean we are morally responsible, it just means we have prima facie evidence that we are.

By contrast we cannot, by reason alone, come to the conclusion that we are not prime movers. You have to feed in certain beliefs - and then reason from those beliefs - to get to that conclusion.

For example, I cannot by reason alone know that there is an external sensible world. And so I cannot, by reason alone, arrive at the conclusion that I am a sensible object. And yet it is on the basis of the belief that we are sensible objects - which is the conventional belief of the age we live in, or at least the conventional belief of the educated classes in the age in which we live - that one comes to the conclusion that one is not a prime mover, is it not?

So you do not arrive by reason alone at the conclusion that you are not a prime mover, rather you arrive at it by first coming to believe that you are sensible object and then coming to believe that sensible objects have external causes of their existence and that you, as one such object, have an external cause.

But if we stick ruthlessly - as we should - to following reason, then we will come to the conclusion that we are prime movers. For we can, by reason alone, know that we are morally responsible for what we do. And we can, by reason alone, know that for this to be the case, we would need to be prime movers.

That's a different issue. This one bears on it, of course, for if we're not morally responsible then a whole range of attitudes and behaviours are based on a mistake - the mistaken belief that we 'are' morally responsible.

So really Strawson’s claim amounts to more of a semantic gloss than a deep examination of the the ethical implications of concepts of moral responsibility. To grapple with those is to deal with how our motives and intents are shaped in our relations with the world. — Joshs

I don't know what that means. Which claim of Strawson's are you talking about? It's complete gibberish, methinks.

Change does not require time given that an event in time changes from being future to being present to being past. So change is required for time to pass.

And Heraclitus is clearly wrong. One can step in the same river twice. I stepped in the Avon yesterday and I stepped in it today.

Presumably you think Newton's most important contribution was the sterling job he did as head of the Royal Mint, and that Jesus' excellent joinery is unjustly overlooked.

What you say sounds correct to me. As I read him, his point is that the thought "I exist" is necessarily true whenever or wherever it occurs. But its existence is not necessary. That is, though it will invariably be true 'if' it occurs, whether it occurs or not is a contingent matter. As such though I can know for certain that I exist, my existence is nevertheless contingent. So the most certain of matters is contingent, not necessary.

I take it the article was about 'buck-passing' accounts of moral value (according to which 'moral value' is reduced to 'something we have normative reason to value')?

I think such views are false. But putting that aside and answering your question: no, the difference between saying 'reasons' or 'a reason' is not significant. Nevertheless, there are different sorts of normative reason and so anyone who offers a buck passing account of moral value should be asked to clarify whether they are grounding moral value in just one kind of normative reason - moral reasons, one imagines - or 'any' kind of normative reason. Their view will be implausible no matter which answer they give, but it's as well to clarify.