I am not sure what you mean by

trying to take the Pilate reference seriously. — Valentinus

He did ask that question, or did if the bible is accurate. And no doubt Jesus would have taken him seriously. But, as Francis Bacon put it "what is truth? asked jesting Pilate, but would not stay for an answer".

Anyway, as this is a philosophy forum and the question "what is truth?", like the questions "what is morality?" and "what is time?" is squarely philosophical, I am attempting to answer it.

The answer, it seems to me, is that truth is a performative of Reason. An answer likely to please Jesus, of course, as this would make Reason into God.

How about blending all of these various positions and look for truths that correspond to reality, are useful and cohere with whatever that needs cohering, IF that's possible. — TheMadFool

Well, because some of those theories are false and some are not competitors (because they're different kinds of theory).

For example, the correspondence theory of truth does not seem to be a theory of truth at all, but a theory about when a proposition is true. So it is not a rival view. It is a vacuous view about something else.

Everyone agrees that a proposition is true when it corresponds to reality. But what does it mean - are we any the wiser about what truth itself is? No, for it is really to say no more than that a proposition is true when it is true. It can't be denied, but it says nothing substantial.

As well as being uninformative, it doesn't even address the question. For the question is not "when is a proposition true?" but "what is truth?" My answer to that question is that truth is made of Reason's assertions. That is, what it is for a proposition to be true is for its content to be being asserted by Reason.

Why try and blend a theory with others when the theory in question appears to be true and rival views appear false or vacuous or to be theories about something else?

What about pragmatism and truth? — TheMadFool

This was addressed in the OP. A useful proposition can still be false, as is manifest to the reason of virtually everyone. So pragmatism is false.

On the basis of what would reason assert anything to be the case? Is it not possible that the bases could differ in different contexts? — Janus

If she thinks something is the case, then it is the case. On what basis does she think things? Well, I am not sure. Surely some thoughts are just basic - they are not 'based' on anything else, they are just thought.

Face value. What is that? — Valentinus

I mean taking it as a sincere question.

I think Pontius was trying to ask that question along with the others. — Valentinus

Doubt it, as he didn't stay to hear the answer.

But anyway, I am asking the question sincerely and I am offering an answer to it.

it was actually radical feminist Firesmith (Firestone) that wrote that it wouldn't be until women were freed from the burden of reproduction that they could be truly equal. — Grre

Yes, that sounds correct to me.

I often feel the same when I'm waiting in line at the drugstore to get emergency contraception at nine in the morning while my boyfriend gets to stay in bed and sleep off his hangover. — Grre

If mother nature had so arranged things that men's penises would get an inch shorter after every successful impregnation, I'm sure he'd be at the drugstore before it even opened (indeed, pregnancies would be a rarity). Mother nature is a misogynist and no friend of Reason.

Jolly good. It was hurtfully accurate wasn't it?

An example of your reasoning:

Bartricks: Truth is a performative of Reason

Creativesoul: Sparrows depend on worms, therefore truth depends on worms

Bartricks: eh? This thread is about truth, not sparrows

Creativesoul: Do you agree that the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true?

Bartricks: Well, no - I don't think sparrows depend on worms. But even if they did, how would the truth of that proposition show that truth depends on worms?

Creativesoul: Because if the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true, then truth depends on worms, because it is only if sparrows really do depend on worms that the proposition is true.

Bartricks: That doesn't follow at all. I am talking about what the property of truth is. The fact that the proposition "Sparrows depend on worms" is true - not a claim I have made, incidentally - does not show that truth itself depends on worms.

Creativesoul: do you agree that worms?

Bartricks: eh? that doesn't make sense.

Creativesoul: well, I'm calling bullshit on this - you clearly don't even know what a worm is.

I'm calling bullshit here. — creativesoul

Well, bullshit isn't a performative of creativesoul. It isn't bullshit, it is an analysis of truth that you simply do not understand. Not my fault.

I've shown how your criterion for what counts as "truth" can be satisfied by falsehood. Truth cannot be false. Therefore, your criterion is rejected. — creativesoul

I have already replied to this unargued for claim, and you have just blithely ignored what I said.

Tell you what, you tell me what the status of "this proposition is false" is (is it true, or false, or both?) and then we'll see if your answer - your answer - is consistent with my analysis of truth (pssst, it will be).

I thought you were going to argue for true propositions having the property of truth. But, if you do not know what propositions are, then that's a bit too much to expect and/or ask of you... — creativesoul

Er, yes, true propositions have the property of truth. Duh.

I do know what propositions are, but this thread is not about them. This thread is also not about sparrows, which is why I am not talking about sparrows. I know what a sparrow is, but this thread is not about them.

I am taking the question at face value. It really doesn't matter why Pontius Pilate asked it, or whether he was sincere in asking it.

Truth is a property of propositions. — Bartricks
Do you believe that that statement is true? — creativesoul

Yes, clearly. I am being sincere.

If truth is a property of a proposition, and all propositions are existentially dependent upon language, then so too is all truth. That is what you obligate yourself to hold... on pains of incoherence, self-contradiction. — creativesoul

Yes, if those dubious theses are true, then truth could not exist independently of a language.

So? How does that contradict my analysis of truth?

Again - I don't sign up to those claims (not until I see powerful evidence in support of them - which there may be, of course). I am just pointing out that none of them are inconsistent with my analysis of truth.

This is getting painful.

Truth is a property of propositions.

That is not an analysis of truth. Nor is it an analysis of propositions.

For an analogy, "water is wet". That's not an analysis of water. Not is it an analysis of wetness.

Now, my view about truth - truth and not another thing - is that it is made of Reason's assertions. That is, for a proposition to be true, is for it to be being asserted by Reason.

That's not a theory about propositions. It is a theory about truth.

So, again, my theory is about truth, not propositions. In saying that truth is a property of propositions I am not thereby taking a stand on what propositions are, anymore than in saying that apples are spherical I am taking a stand on what shape is.

So... I've misunderstood then.

What is truth a property of? — creativesoul

Propositions.

But what I am interested in - what we are being asked when we are asked "what is truth?' is not what a proposition is, but what this property of truth is.

A proposition - whatever one of those is - is true when it is asserted by Reason. That is, the property of 'truth' and the property of 'being asserted by Reason' are one and the same. As long as we agree that propositions can be asserted, it does not really matter - for the sake of my analysis of truth - exactly what a proposition is.

Nope. Not what does reason think when it's thinking, but how if ever it "knows" that anything that it thinks is true. You can define true as you like. As a "performative of reason" is pretty good and better then most, but it just doesn't get there, except as a definition. "What is 'true'"? "True is what my reason says is true." "How does it know?" "By definition: if (my) reason is thinking it, then it's true." "Is reason always correct with respect to knowing that what it thinks is true?" Answer: of course not. And what do you do with that? — tim wood

I haven't defined truth, rather I've provided an analysis of it. That is, I am trying to understand what truth is, in and of itself. Literally, what is it made of?

I have also argued for my view, not simply announced it. So yes, one can say what one wants about truth - one can say truth is the number 10, or truth is a giraffe. That is easy. But I have not done that, rather I have presented a case - a reasoned argument - for thinking that truth is a performative of Reason.

My view changes in your quote - my view is that truth is a performative of Reason, but in your quote it suddenly becomes a performative of 'my' reason. But 'my' reason (and 'your' reason) are faculties, not Reason itself. Just as there is what is seen and sight and the two are not the same.

You ask "how does it [Reason] know?" - but if this presents you with a puzzle it is only because you have rejected the analysis. There is no puzzle if the analysis is correct, for to know something is to have a justified true belief. What does that involve? Well, we know from the analysis - and note, you'd be begging the question if you reject it without argument - that truth is a performative of Reason. And we know too that to be justified in a belief is to have acquired it in a manner Reason approves of (for that is just what a justification is). Thus, again, there is no puzzle understanding how Reason knows this. Perhaps you could explain why you think there's a puzzle here, for I do not see one.

Again, I stress again that in your quote above you conflate my view with a quite different one. My view is that truth is a performative of Reason - so, when Reason says something is true, her saying it makes it so, for 'being true' just is to be asserted by Reason - not 'our faculties of reason'. When I talk about our reason I am referring not to Reason, but the faculty by means of which we are aware of Reason.

What's the argument and/or reasoning in support of your objection here? — creativesoul

I am not sure what you're talking about - this thread is about truth and I have offered an argument in support of a distinctive analysis. But you're talking about propositions. And I do not see how anything you have said about propositions casts any doubt on what I have said about truth.

So... you're compelled to hold that propositions do not depend upon language for their very existence. I'm compelled to hold that they are. — creativesoul

I'm not 'compelled' at all. I did not express a position on propositions, I simply showed how nothing you had said about them (dubious though I think it was) casts doubt on my view about truth.

To believe something is to think it true. Now it is that property - the property of truth - that I am trying to understand. So what beliefs do or do not depend on seems entirely beside the point.

"True" is what we call sentence tokens that bear repeating on their own terms, which is to say, without contextualising in the manner of "... is untrue because..." or "... would be the case if not for..." etc. — bongo fury

I still do not follow or see on what basis you are rejecting my analysis. I have argued for the truth of a view that seems quite different to yours, and as such my arguments - if they go through - refute your position. Truth is not the name for some practice of ours - our practice of calling some sentences 'true', for clearly we could have that practice and some of the sentences we call true could be false. Truth is, as I have argued, the assertive activity of Reason: a proposition is true when Reason asserts it.

A lot to be said for this, if not looked at too closely.We might ask, "How does reason know?" - Or is that irrelevant? Or, we may allow reason to ground a claim that this or that proposition is true, but that doesn't reach truth itself. — tim wood

I do not yet see how inspecting it more closely throws any doubt on it. If truth is a performative of Reason, as I have argued, then it is easy to answer the question "how does Reason know", for knowledge involves having a true belief that has been acquired in a manner that Reason approves of - and so Reason knows what she knows because truth is in her gift as is justification. So, "how does Reason know" is akin to asking how I think what I think (answer: I think what I think by thinking it).

Ok got it. Are you saying then if there exists at least one true proposition, then, they must be logically necessary/ logical necessity? — 3017amen

Not sure I understand the question.

My analysis of truth, if correct, permits there to be no true propositions, for it is possible for Reason not to assert anything.

Clearly there are true propositions, which just shows that Reason does assert some things.

As it seems clear enough to my reason that whatever a person asserts, they are able not to assert - and as Reason must be a person in order to be able to assert anything - then I do not think any of Reason's assertions are asserted of necessity. That is, I do not believe any proposition has its truth of necessity. All true propositions are true contingently, not of necessity (including, of course, that one).

Something is true for someone when all he deems relevant sources agree it is true — khaled

But first you're talking about when someone believes a proposition is true, rather than about what the property of truth itself consists of. Second, to believe something is to believe it is true - so now we have truth, the concept we want elucidated, turning up in the analysis - that makes it circular and thus unhelpful. For an analogy, let's say the question is "what is water?' (as in, what does water consist of, rather than 'please identify some water for me'). Well, no good saying "people believe they have water when they believe that every source verifies it is water", for first that's not an answer to the question (which is about water itself, not about beliefs) and second it is circular as you've said "people believe they have water when they believe they have water" (true, but unhelpful).

I don't think it makes sense to ask what is truth in some ultimate sense without referring to the individual. — khaled

Why? The question has been asked - not just by Pontius Pilate, but by many others including many contemporary philosophers, so the question is a prima facie coherent one. That doesn't mean it is coherent, but it does mean a case is owed for thinking it is not.

Plus I've addressed the question and proposed an answer - if the question makes no sense then you'd need to show that my answer to it makes no sense.

Reason is thinking about thought and belief. It's not an entity in and of itself capable of doing stuff. So, it would be helpful if you stopped personifying reason. — creativesoul

Why would that be helpful? If my view about truth is true - that is, if truth is constituted by Reason's asssertions - then Reason must be a person, for only persons can assert things.

It seems to me that you've decided in advance - in advance of listening to what Reason has to say about the matter - that Reason is not a person.

Again, Reason must be a person if truth is constituted by Reason's assertions, for only persons can assert things.

Well the obvious question has to be, if there are no true propositions, then how does this forum exist? — 3017amen

I did not say there are no true propositions. Clearly there are. I said I think it is possible for there to be no true propositions. There's a world of difference between the claim that it is possible for there to be no true propositions and the claim that it is true that there are no true propositions.

I would worry about equivocating between “true” and “the truth”. One is a description; the other is the nominalization of that description. One describes things (propositions), and the other is a thing. — NOS4A2

Yes, I too worry about that and so made avoiding such equivocation a priority.

However, it seems to me that such equivocation is what proponents of other views engage in - especially those who defend correspondence theories.

So are you saying that it is logically impossible for there to exist no true propositions? — 3017amen

No, I don't see how anything I have said implies that. I think it is possible for there to be no true propositions.

If that's inconsistent with my view that truth is constituted by Reason's asssertions, then I'll change my view - but it seems entirely consistent with that view that it would be possible for there to be no true propositions, as it seems entirely possible for Reason to assert nothing.

Our disagreement is the bit about interdependence between belief and truth.

In order for a proposition to be true, there must first be a proposition. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Language... belief. Therefore... true propositions are existentially dependent upon belief.

True belief exists prior to language. So too does truth. Thus, truth cannot be what you say it is. Besides that, Reason - and following the rules of entailment in particular - can lead to falsehood. See Gettier or any of the historical examples of conventional false belief. — creativesoul

I agree that in order for a proposition to be true, there has to be a proposition (for that is self-evident to my reason and to the reason of virtually everyone).

Then you claim that propositions depend on language. Well, I doubt that, but even if we grant it for the sake of argument the rest of what you say does not follow. How do you get from that to "truth exists prior to language"? If - if - propositions cannot exist without there being a language (not a claim I accept, I stress), then truth - as it is a property of propositions - cannot exist prior to language. So I do not see how you're arriving at these conclusions or what, about my position, you are challenging with them.

What if, as you say, someone asserts this proposition:

1. This statement is false.

Using your words, our Reason enables us to assert such proposition. ' When reason asserts that something is the case, it is the case.' In that case, is the proposition true or false? — 3017amen

The conclusion of my case is not that truth is constituted by some assertion of ours, but rather of Reason. So, it is when Reason - not you or I - asserts the content of a proposition that the proposition in question has the property of truth.

As for that specific proposition - well, it'd be true if Reason asserted it. Needless to say, the possibility of such propositions generates apparent counterexamples to the law of non-contradiction.

But if my view is true then they don't, as Reason clearly asserts the law of non-contradiction to be true and does not assert "this statement is false". (Plus were she to assert "this statement is false" then the law of non-contradiction is false, which is now consistent with it also being true).

True is what we call sentences which prevai — bongo fury

What do you mean?

Bartricks, you are up to your old bar tricks. I wish bar tricks would be barred, but barring that, a bar would be nice to have, that would bar your bar tricks from being seen by those who don't want to see your posts. — god must be atheist

The OP was started by me and you're free to ignore it. You are not experiencing oppression. And try to keep in check the oh so common desire to ban that which you cannot understand. And try - try - to stick to addressing the arguments. And when that goes badly - when you're refuted at every turn - don't take it personally. Here endeth the lesson.

Truth, to me, can be boiled down to two categories. The metaphorical truth, that is the abstraction of truth in pursuit for pragmatism, and the objective truth, the truth that is literal, observable, and can be proven time and time again. — ep3265

But in the OP I provided an argument that appears to refute your view. For I provided an argument in support of the view that a proposition is true when Reason asserts its content to be the case. In order to defend your view, then, you need to show that what I said in support of my view either does not support my view, or that your view enjoys even stronger support.

Not necessarily true conclusion. Just because someone does not value a quality in himself, does not mean that he has no high amounts of that quality. Your conclusion, Bartricks, is false. — god must be atheist

It depends on what the quality is. For example, take the quality of self-approval. Well, clearly if someone does not value a quality in themselves that does entail that they do not have as much self-approval as someone who values everything about themselves.

To be reasonable essentially involves caring what Reason says and believing things precisely because she says to believe them (so, it matters not just what you believe, but how you believe it). As such someone who does not care that much about what Reason has to say on a given matter - someone who, for instance, will not believe something Reason says if it conflicts with something they care about more - is not as reasonable as someone who cares more about what Reason says. So it does follow and you're wrong.

The criterion you've put forth for "truth" can be satisfied by falsehood. — creativesoul

How?

I have argued that what it is for a proposition to be true is for Reason to be asserting that its contents are the case. How can that possibly be satisfied by falsehood, given that what it is for a proposition to be false is for it not to be true?

Note too, I am not offering a criterion for truth, but saying something about what truth consists of.

It is one thing to say when a proposition is true, it is another to say what the truth of it consists of.

For example, saying that the sky is blue is one thing, saying what blueness itself is is another.

It seems that you do not recognize the existential connection between truth and belief. — creativesoul

I am sure that works wonders on drunks in bars, but I know what those words mean and it's nonsense. Something can be true and no-one believe it, and someone can believe something and it not be true.

If true belief is prior to language, then either so too is truth or true belief can exist without truth, which is nonsense. — creativesoul

I am talking about 'truth', not beliefs. They don't depend on each other, contrary to what you've asserted, as a moment's reflection reveals. Once again, the fact a proposition is true does not entail that it is believed. And the fact a proposition is believed does not entail it is true.

That's not a definition. Water is H2o is not a 'definition' of water, for instance.

No, not until you show me their relevance to the question.

Whatever answer I give, it has no bearing on the credibility of my answer to the question "what is truth?".

Focus.

Are you denying that true belief exists prior to language? — creativesoul

Er, what? I'm talking about 'truth'. I have said nothing whatsoever about beliefs and language. Nothing.

I haven't defined truth, so you're attacking a straw man.

Truth is correspondence. — creativesoul

Until you provide some kind of an argument, that's like saying "truth is green" or "truth is blossom".

Argue, don't assert.

Arguing for any claim is an appeal to Reason. — creativesoul

Yes, that's my point - my point. So, you can't reject my argument on the grounds that I am appealing to reason, then, can you? Or that reason is unreliable - for any evidence that Reason is unreliable will itself have to involve an appeal to reason, and thus place some trust in Reason.

Again, then, the first step in my simple argument involves no more than acknowledging this - acknowledging that we (reasonable people, that is) will only be fully satisfied that we have a true theory of truth on our hands if we are all sure Reason asserts it to be the case.

You seem to be confirming, not denying this now.

Truth is one such thing, as is true belief, meaning, and Mt. Everest. — creativesoul

Question begging in this context. You shouldn't, in the context of a debate over what truth itself is, assert what truth is. You need to argue, rather than just blankly state.

Please defend that claim without appealing to reason (which is impossible, of course, but that's the point - either you're just asserting things, which unless you're God counts for nothing, or you've got some kind of evidence to provide me in support of them, in which case you're appealing to Reason).

Truth is correspondence between thought and/or belief and what's happened, is happening, and/or will happen — creativesoul

That's the correspondence theory of truth and I've already addressed it in the OP. It isn't a theory of truth, but a theory about when a proposition is true (which is different).

I don’t value ‘reason’ quite as highly as you do, by my estimates. — Possibility

Then you are not as reasonable as I am. I think our reason is our only guide to what's true. You, I suspect, like to put yourself in the mix as well and will only listen to reason if she seems to be saying things you already agree with.

Truth is a shared meaning achieved without ignorance, isolation or exclusion of any kind. — Possibility

I have no idea what that means or why I should endorse it given that you have provided no argument whatsoever in support of it, whereas I have provided an argument - an argument you have ignored because it had assumptions (like, you know, every argument ever) - in support of mine.

o, you’re making an assumption that anyone who disagrees with your definition is not ‘reasonable’ — Possibility

Yes, if you disagree - and are reasonable - you will make a case against my claim, rather than simply point out that I have made it. You can't make any case for anything without having to make assumptions. A reasonable person does not object, then, to the mere fact an assumption has been made, but rather subjects the assumptions in question to reasoned scrutiny. Clearly by presenting my case here I am inviting people to do precisely that. Unfortunately reasonableness is also in short supply here, as the internet is populated largely by fools and dogmatists.

You’re limiting the parameters of the discussion to manipulate the ‘truth’ your claim. — Possibility

No, you can try and prove me wrong. I haven't just pulled this stuff out of my bottom. So, once again, if it is clear to the reason of reflective people that theory X is the true theory of truth, then isn't that the best possible evidence that theory X is true? If you think not, explain to me what could possibly be better evidence.

I commend your honesty in acknowledging fear as your main reason for trying to corral the discussion. But I would argue that the truth of your answer, as it is structured, is entirely dependent on a shared meaning of ‘Reason’. — Possibility

Eh? My fear is fear of the stupidity of some people - the stupid inferences that some people make - and a fear of derailment.

The question is what is truth. I have argued - argued, mark you - that truth is the property of being a proposition the content of which Reason asserts to be the case.

Now, you have asked "who or what is Reason?". That is a distinct question - one that does not bear on the credibility of my answer.

For instance, let's say I say - and I wouldn't, because it is mad - that Reason is a Platonic Form. Well, a case would need to be made for that - but if such a case could be made, that would not affect my theory of truth.

Another analogy: let's say that the best theory about what cheese is, is that it is congealed milk. Okay, well asking "what's milk?" is a legitimate question to ask, but it does not affect the credibility of the 'cheese is congealed milk' theory. And two people could coherently agree that cheese is congealed milk, yet disagree about what milk is (one thinking it is a basic substance, the other that it is made of tiny molecules, for instance).

But what (or who) is Reason? — Possibility

That's the next question. It is the question it is appropriate to ask if my answer to the "what is truth?" question - namely that 'truth' is the property of being a proposition whose contents Reason asserts to be the case - is true.

But we can agree that my answer is true, even if we subsequently disagree about who or what Reason is. So I hesitate to say who or what Reason is for fear that many will think my answer to that question will discredit my answer to the "what is truth?" question (which it doesn't).

Aren’t you basing all your ‘truth’ on an assumption that everyone knows this particular ‘truth’. — Possibility

Not sure I follow. I am assuming that upon reflection all reasonable people will agree about the form the answer to the question must take. That is, it must take the form of a proposition that the faculties of reason of most of us seems to endorse.
And then I am assuming that reasonable people will agree that if we'd all agree that "theory X" is the true theory of truth if our faculties of reason represent Reason to be asserting its contents to be the case, then by default we should assume that truth itself is synonymous with that property.

For an analogy: if we'd all agree we have some congealed milk on our hands if we have cheese on our hands, then it is reasonable to have as one's working hypothesis that cheese is congealed milk.