Quite so.It largely doesn't even make sense as a coherent concept — Mijin
It is an “agenda” of the white male id — capricious, short-fused, anxious, paranoid, jealous, demanding of control but resentful of the burden of responsibility control brings — the nihilism of privilege.
...how can we be certain of the reality of the world within which the Matrix is sustained? — Janus
Bertrand Russell had just finished giving a public lecture on the nature of the universe. An old woman said “Prof. Russell, it is well known that the earth rests on the back of four elephants, that stand on the back of a giant turtle.” Russell replied, “Madame, what does the turtle stand on?” The woman replied, “You're very clever, sir. Very clever. But it's turtles all the way down".
Yes!It seems to me that he cannot know that he knows on his own. "I know that I know ..." is pure pleonasm. But it is an important feature of my attributing knowledge to someone that, by passing on the information that he knows, I endorse the knowledge. So "know" not only has space for endorsement by other people, it is built in to the concept as an unavoidable commitment. If I want to avoid commitment, I say that they believe that p. (If I actually disagree, I can say that they think that p.) — Ludwig V
There's a tension in his writing that it might be best to acknowledge rather than to try to sort out. This is an issue I;ve raised a few times with @Sam26. I read Wittgenstein as saying, for instance, that if knowledge is justified true belief, then we don't know we are in pain - becasue the justification just is the pain - but he also insisted we "look, don't think", and so that nevertheless he would note we do use "knowledge" in this way. There was a time, when cars became commonplace, were the corpses of slow-witted dogs littered the streets, their mangled remains a common sight that might well be used to explain how one felt after surgery. Wittgenstein understood Pascal's use, and so her meaning. In his own terms, he was being obtuse. The conclusion, perhaps unpalatable to Sam, is that we do use talk of knowing in ways that are not only about justified true beliefs.Wittgenstein doesn't think I know about them... — Ludwig V
How does asking oneself whether one believes that p differ from asking oneself if p is true? The response here must be much the same at the one you just gave to Tim... "I believe that is it true" is pure pleonasm.But when I ask myself whether I believe that p, surely I need to consider whether p? — Ludwig V
Well, yes, and the issue there is the same as elsewhere - finding a balance between being able to express an opinion while not being permitted to incite or induce violence. Looking at other jurisdictions might show that the approach in the US, expressed hereabouts as a naïve acceptance of a refusal to forbid any speech, is fraught with inconsistency. We must acknowledge the capacity of speech to injure, beyond mere offence.My problem with hate speech laws is based on just what I see here in the United States. — BC
Notice that you are not asking if p is true, but how you find out if p is true, and so again asking about an attitude. The facts that help you decide on your attitude are irrelevant to whether p is true or not.Would the facts necessary (to find out whether X is true) be the exact same ones cited as my justifications for believing X? — J
I don't like "hate-speech laws" and "hate crimes" either. Their meanings are far too vague, which makes them useful for suppression of speech that someone doesn't like. — BC
Imagine that an African American man boards a public bus on which all the other passengers are white. Unhappy with the newcomer, an elderly white man turns to the African American man and says, “Just so you know, because I realize that your kind are not very bright, we don’t like niggers around here,…boy. So, go back to Africa…so you can keep killing each other…and do the world a favor!
Do we say that, since the act of shooting was not constitutive of the utterance of the first man, that he bears no responsibility for the killing? I think not. The consequences of an act might well be considered as part of that act.Two men stand beside a woman. The first man turns to the second, and says "Shoot her." The second man looks shocked, then raises a gun and shoots the woman.
This comes out in an anecdote related by Fania Pascal, who knew him in Cambridge in the 1930s:
I had my tonsils out and was in the Evelyn Nursing Home feeling sorry for myself. Wittgenstein called. I croaked: “I feel just like a dog that has been run over.” He was disgusted: “You don’t know what a dog that has been run over feels like.” — On Bullshit Harry Frankfurt
No. But it has to be true. This was my first reply to you in the present conversation:Do I have to know that X is true in order to use it as the T in a JTB statement? — J
Seems to me that folk read JTB as the claim that in order to know something, we must know that it is true. It's hard to get across that this is not what the JTB account is saying. It's not that the proposal is justified, believed and known to be true, but that it is justified, believed and true. — Banno
I'm told that empathy is now an unpopular term. It's application has become quite selective. The opinion piece cited considered more than Kimmel.we should refuse to show empathy — NOS4A2
I'm not sure whether you are talking logic or child development here. — Ludwig V
...you... — ssu
Is the term used outside of polemical discourse, or is it just a snappy way of repackaging the notion of vilification and threats to harm? — Tom Storm