Well, yes, but in so far as we are concerned with what we believe - what we hold to be the case - we are in an anthropocentric position.

Hume cannot be absolutely sceptical. — JuanZu

And do you think that he is absolutely sceptical? I don't.

Is the conversation about which bedrock is preferable, or is it about about whether we can avoid bedrock altogether? If the latter, then exactly how?

I do miss stuff - shit, 30,000 mentions... I need to get out more. And there are folk I just don't read, but that does not include you. Thanks.

Nice. We have to take care here with what we do, though. Hume was looking for a justification for the move from specific instances to general rules. If that is our task, there's the danger of circularity.

If we follow Hume, our best theories of physics function because our habits are such as to recognise patterns in the stuff around us, but that we are not justified (or warranted) deductively in recognising those patterns. Induction is a habit, not a justification. No further explanation is given for the fact of that regularity.

If I follow your suggestion, which is somewhat like Apo's, the geometry of space is such that gives rise to the patterns we see. So what is recognised through habit is a result of the structure of space. (Is that right?).

Now here's the potential circularity: we understand the geometry of space because we recognise the patterns. Our understanding of geometry is derived from our recognition of those patterns. We would have geometry explaining the patterns only because those patterns justify geometry.

A response might be - will be - that geometry is not justified by those patterns we find around us, but the condition that makes such patterns recognisable - regularities as the necessary consequence of how experience is structured.

But I'd suggest that this might amounts to saying little more than Hume already said - that there are patterns. I don't see how "constraints on what patterns are possible" is a great change from Hume. He acknowledge that not just any pattern would do, after all. That there is some constraint is one thing; that there is this particular constraint, quite another. Explaining that there must be some constraint is not explaining why there must be this particular constraint.

Putting it another way, perhaps more in line with Wittgenstein, any explanation must have a grounding, something that is taken as granted and against which the explanation takes place.

In any case, Apo will be able to fill you in on more along these lines lines, if you can make sense of it. I remain unconvinced; not that there is not something interesting to be said here, but that it works as a reply to Hume's scepticism and the stuff thereafter.

Cheers.

I'm thinking of laws as being descriptions of observed regularities... You seem to be talking about the theory side. — Janus

Yes, I suppose so. So how to proceed. I suspect that, as with most of these sorts of problems, it's as much about the choice of wording as the way things are. We agree that there are regularities, and that "what we say about things is not the things themselves, and we should try to match what we say with what happens".

I'm interested in the move from what Apo calls "the specific to the general". And I take this to be the focus of Hume's scepticism. Incidentally, that word, "scepticism", seems to frighten some folk (@Count Timothy von Icarus), as if Hume were showing that science can't work - quite the opposite, as @unenlightened points out. Better, Hume takes science as granted, and looks to see how it might work; finds that it can't be based on a logical deduction, and looks for an alternative.

Since it was questioned, let's go over the logic of induction again. Apo said

To go from the particular to the general isn’t that hard to understand surely? — apokrisis

But yes, that is exactly the problem. The move from any finite sequence of specific statements to a general statement is invalid. More formally, from f(a), f(b), f(c)... we cannot deduce U(x)f(x). This is the "scandal of induction". It is a philosophical problem - scientists and engineers just move on without paying it much attention. But it is part of the plumbing of our understanding of the world, and will niggle at those who worry about such things.

And Hume's response is much the same as that of the scientists and engineers mentioned above - just move on. He talked of moving on as a "habit". Since his time others came up with other suggestions. Most famously, perhaps, is falsification, a very clever response. Instead of proving that U(x)f(x), why not assume it and look for a counter-instance - and x that is not f? We can't prove an universal, but we can disprove it... or so Popper supposed. There are problems there, too, of course.

Now all of this is the standard history of the philosophy of science - regardless of what some here think. The scandal of induction has been the central problem for philosophy of science. Check me on this, if you like. There is a distinct eccentricity in suggesting otherwise, presumably a consequence of a desire to highlight the role or Pierce. Quite specifically, neither Pierce's version of abduction, nor the more recent variations, have satisfactorily answered Hume. And by "satisfactorily" here I mean that it has not gained any general acceptance as a way around the scandal. See the SEP articles for more on this. Point is, I'm right about it. Where the answer sits at present is more in Bayesian Calculus, which accepts Hume's point, and instead of looking to justify our scientific theories as true, looks to choose which ones are most believable.

That is the topic of this discussion, so far as I can see.

Now I don't think you and I, and even Apo and I, are really very far from agreement on this. It is, after all, what happened. But the narcissism of small differences keeps the posts... interesting.

The acrimony is a shame, but Apo and I have butted heads since before this forum came about. He's convinced by a form of pragmatism that I find wanting, and as is my want, I like to point out the problems with such things.

By the way, since it is a concern of yours, I did prepare this post using AI. I fed paragraphs in, read the response and then edited the text so as to account for issue identified by the AI. Some of the wording was changed as a result, I think for the better, or I wouldn't have made the change. It perhaps also helped in setting a less aggressive tone than i might otherwise have chosen. I believe this is well within the guidelines of the forum. If you don't like that, you do not have to read my posts.

...and slides away — bert1

Cheers. If there is something in particular that I ought follow up on, let me know.

indeed.

You are not seeing the contradiction in which you choose to live.

Oh well.

Who gives a fuck about validity — apokrisis

That explains quite a bit.

What I advocate for is that there is no way to know anything outside what our brains construct for us. — Copernicus

So you constructed me? You poor thing.

So what do you deduce from the unexpected? — apokrisis

Deduce? Nothing - that's the point!

When are you going to start saying something sensible here rather than posturing? — apokrisis

Soon after you start listening.

Good night.

I can't function without my brain — Copernicus

So you have a brain. The mess gets bigger. Then, a universe, to blur your vision. So are we happy now that there is more than is "inside your head"? Can you begin to see that your doubt is unjustified?

I never sense true or false. — Copernicus

Never? Is that true?

A performative contradiction occurs when the act of making a statement contradicts that statement. Like "I am dead" - the saying of it renders it false.

Or "I never sense true or false".

Sure. But not made by your head.

Then there is error. If everything is in your mind, how can you make sense of being mistaken? You are mistaken when what you take to be the case is not actually the case; if solipsism is true then what you take to be the case just is the case.

Only what I'm saying isn't yours. It comes from outside your head. Surprise, novelty.

So Hume's premises should be accepted over others because he is "doing psychology?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not at all. We know induction is invalid. Hume presents an empirical answer, not a logical one. If you have a better, present it for consideration. We might apply a bayesian calculus to choose between the options...

You brought up solipsism, claimed it for yourself.

I've shown the problem with solipsism, over the last few pages. Your asking me a question shows that you are not a solipsist. You want my answer. Therefore I exist... :wink:

What sort of proof could make sense? What could be clearer to you than that you are reading this now? The doubt you pretend to is unjustified.

Just because an asserted dogma leads to skepticism and materialism doesn't make it "humility." — Count Timothy von Icarus

You seem to miss the bit where Hume is talking about the psychology of knowing, not the logic - having shown that the logic isn't of any use in justifying an induction.

You expect a deductive logic all the way down. So when it isn't there, you invent it.

You've badly misunderstood Hume.

You asked:

how do you say a process of scientific inquiry normally begins? — apokrisis

I replied:

the unexpected — Banno

If you wanted to use your own answer, why bother asking the question...? You are choosing to carve a very human process so that it fits your pet theory, by choosing a starting point. You are the one playing games. Consider:

Something catches the attention as it seems to suggest a causal connection. — apokrisis

Yes! Again, we are not disagreeing with what's been said; I'm just pointing out that this is not logic.

Abduction doesn’t define a relation of consequence between premises and conclusions; logic requires a structured notation, absent from abduction. Abduction might be a good name for a psychological process, but it ain't a logic. — Banno

You already have your causal relation, before you start on the logic of checking it. You bring it in to confirm your bias. That's the criticism.

I agree with both here. — unenlightened

:grin: As do I! Abduction is not a formalisable process that can provide an algorithmic answer to Hume's scepticism.

This is hopeless. — Copernicus

Yep.

Your theory. You tell me. But if you are stuck, try 's "exception" - the unexpected.

Strawman... — apokrisis

...is what folk claim when they don't have a reply.

Odd of you to quote back to me from an article that supports the view I just set out. If there was a point, you dropped it somewhere. If there is something you think relevant in that block of text, set it out.

Here's a bit you left out:

It is a common complaint that no coherent picture emerges from Peirce’s writings on abduction.

Have a look at the article on Abduction, as well, for a slightly wider field of view - it might help you come to terms with what is going on here.

You got nuthin'. Fine.

Peirce developed on Hume's scepticism, as did Popper, Feyerabend, and any one else with an empirical leaning. They didn't reject Hume, so much as have a go at explaining how we do make scientific progress despite the difficulties Hume noted. Peirce's contribution is noteworthy, but far from central, and certainly not the Grand Cathedral you pretend to.

Your approach is preaching rather than thinking, a gran lie with a few bits of truth thrown in to keep the masses confused.

Abduction doesn’t define a relation of consequence between premises and conclusions; logic requires a structured notation, absent from abduction. Abduction might be a good name for a psychological process, but it ain't a logic.

The problem with this topic is in reasoning that if we find some benefit of an action, or a future beneficial state, that proves it's a selfish action. — Mijin

Yep. If we said instead that any action can be described in selfish terms, few would protest; it's be a rare action that had no benefit to the actor. The fallacy is framing this as an account of the intent of the actor, or worse, as the only intent.

So just the usual game of duck and dodge. :up: — apokrisis

I'm here. Offer a clear critique, and I will reply.

Just to be clear, here's my opine on the abductive response to the OP, as stated:

What is abduction, and how does it help? And the answer is quite vague. Abduction is little more than an attempt to formalise confirmation bias. It's presented as "given some evidence, infer the hypothesis that would best explain it" where "best" is left ill-defined. This leaves it entirely open to arbitrarily inferring any explanation to be the best. — Banno

I stand by it. And I don't think anyone here has presented a clear enough account of abduction to give me pause.

By “we”, you mean you. You can’t admit in public to your errors of thought. And so you must thus construct a world in which I am in the wrong for most likely being right.

If you could poke a hole in my reasoning, you would leap at it. Instead you must feign a moral victory in the pose: “Well who could ever understand this guy anyway. Am I right guys? Hey, am I right!”. — apokrisis

More about me. What fun!

In order to address your argument, it would have to be clearly expressed. You have done so in other threads, and I've addressed it. But here - it's a mess. The bits that make sense I pretty much agree with. The rest, when you try to set it out, collapses under it's own weight. That's the problem with tinsel as a construction medium.


But now we have even more certainty, from Tim. In his reply to @unenlightened, that Hume claimed we cannot know anything...

those self-same premises preclude Hume's knowing that his theorizing is true. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course Hume would agree, if not in those terms - he understands that his own philosophy is based in the same empirical and psychological habits it describes. He's not offering a proof of scepticism, he's mapping out, with humility, what can be deduced and what cannot.

Completely arse backwards once more. — apokrisis

Perhaps.

In any case, you don't say why my "it's good scientific practice to change the laws so as to make the exception disappear" is arse backwards. Change "law" to "theory" if that suits your need to be rid of god, I won't object. So your claim is what - that we ought change the evidence to match the theory? Surely not.

Mumbling about patterns doesn't much cut it. The trouble perhaps is, like Dogberry, you are to clever to be understood. So we'll never know.

Perhaps that happens sometimes. — Janus

But hang on. Isn't it a methodological presumption in science that when we come across something that doesn't fit our expectations - an exception - that we change our expectations? That is, we modify the theory so as to explain the evidence...

So of corse there are no 'well-documented occurrences of exceptions to nature's "laws"", as you say... because when they happen, it's good scientific practice to change the laws so as to make the exception disappear.

So are we to say that "the laws of nature are not merely codifications of natural invariances and their attributes, but are the invariances themselves", while also saying that we can change them to fit the evidence? Hows' that going to work? We change the very invariances of the universe to match the evidence?

Or is it just that what we say about stuff that happens is different to the stuff that happens, and it's better if we try to match what we say to what happens?

Assume I do. How can Newton be proven wrong about light if you know only what is in your head? Newton and light are in your head?

It's your epistemology. So you say that we can be certain that Newton was proven wrong... but that

we know nothing outside our heads — Copernicus

I'm just trying to work out how you keep both those ideas in the same head.

He was proven wrong. — Copernicus

Proven? Are you certain?

But you said...

That sounds like a charge without evidence. — Copernicus

Well, no. It's the consequence of your approach.

Your every act is selfish - so you claim. So what we want doesn't count, unless it matches what you want. We don't count.

So why should we do anything for you?

At the very least, you need to learn to play the iterative prisoner's dilemma.

What's wrong with social interaction? — Copernicus

You tell us. You want to be here. But you tell us that we don't count for anything. You shit were you eat.

define it — Copernicus

Supposing that all you need is a definition.

I have a vendetta against poor thinking.

You're free to give feedback. — Copernicus

No, since I don't exist.

I'm forced to accept the social contract involuntarily — Copernicus

You love it. You keep coming back for more. You don't have to be here, after all - go play Counterstrike or something - oh, wait, those are team games... Patience, maybe?

I'm sorry your living arrangements do not meet your needs. Perhaps if you asked nicely...

Oh, that'd require taking others into account...

Remember this?

If you start with the wrong question, you will get the wrong answer. While ethics concerns what I should do, the philosophical question at the core of political thought, modern or otherwise, is What should we do? It's about communal action. That it is about us is the bit that libertarians miss. — Banno

Worse for solipsists.

which is a subjective expression of oneself. — Copernicus

But for you, that's all there is...

I'm not in the mood for trolling, — Copernicus

You seem quite adept at it, even when not in the mood.

I'm quite serious. Your ideas are a nonsense, the result of a failure to realise that you are, like it or not, a part of a community, a member of a group - the very fact that you are writing in English belies your excessive faith in individualism.

Your need to post your ideas on this forum probably indicates that you know this, and are looking for a way out.

The fly and the bottle. But you probably will not get that reference.

I don't exist, so I can't deviate from the OP. Nor can I "swim in solipsism", whatever that might be.

This is the very same problem you aimed at yourself in the The Libertarian Dilemma
thread - the failure to acknowledge the other.

Your own acceptance of solipsism in a post to other people brings out clearly why you are a bit of a dill.

Your version of solipsism is not the one I follow. Something like anarchism vs libertarianism vs liberalism. Close, but different. — Copernicus

It's not my version - I don't exist. It's the reality of your realisation that you are the only mind, closing in on you.

So you are certain that you are never certain about anything. Cool. I'd say that problem was with coherence rather than certainty.

What I argued was that you can't betray your self — Copernicus

You are betraying yourself, by writing as if we were here. We don't exist. There is only what you have in your head.

Again, people, this argument (OP) is not based on solipsism. Don't get distracted. — Copernicus

Yeah, it is. All those threads about not caring for anyone else - that's all part of your realisation that you are alone.

Or that you are mistaken.

I never know FOR SURE. — Copernicus

You seem very certain 'bout that.