To my knowledge, conscience only gives general principles; it does not inform us of the specific morally right action for the specific situation; which can only be obtained by reason. And I think the first principle is "act justly" or "obey the golden rule".

Example: For a given situation, even if lying would make things easier on me, I choose to tell the truth, because truth is what I would want to hear in that situation.

(1) The criteria or standard to evaluate the moral value (goodness or badness) of an act is justice.
— Samuel Lacrampe
That's your opinion. — BlueBanana

Example: mercy isn't always just, but it could be argued to be morally right. — BlueBanana

Can you give a concrete example of merciful act? I cannot think of one where the morality is contrary to justice.

(2) Justice is defined as: equality in treatment among all men.
— Samuel Lacrampe
No, that's just equality. Is killing everyone for no reason just? Justice is defined through morality, not the other way around. — BlueBanana

I think you agree with me that killing everyone for no reason is unjust. And it is unjust precisely because there is an unequal treatment. In this case, because you treat the victims as what pleases you; not them.

It's not clear whom you are responding to. — T Clark

My bad. I was responding to the OP. I have changed my previous response above.
While I am here, I might as well respond to your previous post.

For me, impulses from the heart underlie all moral action. It may or may not pass through reason on its way to implementation. — T Clark

I agree. The first principles of morality come from our 'conscience', or likely what you call 'heart'. Then reason is used to determine the correct actions that comply with these principles.

That said, reason is necessary for morality because only reason can know universals, as is the case for first principles of morality. I think 'ethics' is also called 'practical reason'.

Hello. You are correct that intention or will is a necessary ingredient to morality.

In general: Morality is treating each being according to its proper ontological value (value as being). I.e., treat God as God, man as man, animals as animals, plants as plants, and objects as objects. Any other combination would be immoral. E.g., treat God as an object or an object as a god.

Concerning man only: All men have equal ontological value, therefore it is moral to treat all men as equal, including yourself. Thus we get the Golden Rule of ethics: do unto others as you would want them to do unto you. Failing the Golden Rule entails that there is an unequal intention of treatment somewhere.

[...] If they coincide with real things, then they are particulars. That is what I was arguing, if we want to give concepts real existence, we must reduce them to particulars, either as the form of a particular thing, or as an ideal universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You presuppose that all beings are particulars. Why is that necessary? I would agree that all physical beings are particulars, due to having particular spacial-temporal properties. But this would not apply to non-physical beings.

All this demonstrates is that we judge these few things in a similar way. It doesn't demonstrate that we have the same concept. However, the fact that we each described our concept of "triangle" in a different way does demonstrate that we each have a different concept of "triangle". — Metaphysician Undercover

It can also mean that we judge these things in the same way. I thought we previously agreed that different descriptions can still refer to the same thing.

I think we've been away from this discussion for too long, and we've both lost track of what each other has been arguing. perhaps we ought to give it up. Why must a concept be connected to a "real being"? A concept may be completely artificial. An architect designs a building. The concept is completely in the architect's mind, then on the paper. it is not connected to a "real being". Or do I misunderstand you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand that it has been a while. It is unfortunate, but it's reality. Yes, we can leave it at that. This was fun. I think I will post a new discussion at some point, to start fresh with the things I have learned here. I have still answered below your questions for completeness, but I don't expect a response afterwards.

Concepts must be connected to real beings, because if not, then no proposition ever spoken can be said to be true, because truth means reflective of reality. Thus if I say "the apple is red", there must exist a real being for the apple, and a real being for the property red, in order for the proposition to be true.

Yes, concepts may also be artificial, as is the case for man-made things like a house or guitar. In this case, the concept precedes the being that is built from the concept. But for non man-made things like 'apple' and 'red', the being precedes our concept of them. E.g., we would not grasp the concept 'red' if red things did not exist.

So your argument is that we each describe the same thing with different words. But this does not necessitate that the thing we are each describing with different words is the same thing. So your argument just creates a possibility, it doesn't produce anything conclusive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, it does not make it necessary but possible; and this possibility is sufficient to refute your argument that, since we give different descriptions of concepts, then the concepts must be different. We are therefore back to the starting point obtained from the principle of parsimony, namely that concepts coincide with real things, because it is the simplest hypothesis.

Now, in the case of a concept, how are we going to point to it to determine whether it's the same thing which we are each talking about? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that for particular physical beings, we can validate that we are talking about the same thing by pointing to its spatial-temporal properties. Also, this cannot be done for universal concepts because I argue that they are not physical beings. However, we can get close to certainty by testing numerous particular physical beings that have the universal concept as its genus. For example, we can test if my judgement of the shapes here, here, and here match with your judgement that they have 'triangle' as their genus. Since our judgement is based on our respective concept, then the more objects we test, the closer we get to certainty that our concept is the same. Another way is to see if we agree with each other's description, despite their minor differences. I personally believe this way is also legit, but I know you don't because you demand complete sameness in descriptions. So on to the next section below.

I do not believe that different description can refer to the same concept because I believe that the concept is the description itself. [...] If you want to support your position, in which the concept is something other than the description, something referred to by the description, or described, you need to point to the concept, show it to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I find that position surprising. Recall that if the concept is not connected a being in reality, then the consequence is that no proposition ever spoken can be true, that is, reflect reality. Up to now, I thought your position was that our concepts are connected to real beings, and although they may fail to accurately match the real beings, they nevertheless come close to it. I was willing to take that position seriously. But now, it seems your new position is that a concept is nothing but the description itself, not referring to another thing, thereby completely severing its connection to any real being. Consequently, no truth can ever be spoken. I hope I am misunderstanding something, because as it stands, your new position leads to absurdity. It forces you to give up on metaphysics (which is ironic given your name), and by extension, truth, and by extension, philosophy, which is the search for truth.

Just to clarify, I was not accusing you of self-contradiction, but rather pointing out the limitations of such a topic as whether truth can be attained. Yes, scientific topics also start with hypotheses, but do not end there, because these hypotheses can be validated empirically. This topic on truth however can never be validated, by its very content. This is why we are reduced to rely on the principle of parsimony. There is simply no better approach here. But it's not as bad as what you make it sound. The principle states that it is more reasonable to retain the simplest hypothesis that explains all the data. Your "dark spot" example is not a correct one, because it gives no explanation, and so does not satisfy the principle. But a simple explanation would be adequate, and would still leave the inclination to investigate further for validation (if possible).

In your example, we both have different descriptions, and you are assuming that we are describing the same thing. That assumption is not sufficient. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

My point was that even when we are describing the same thing like a duck (and we know this by pointing to the same object), then it still happens that we can give different descriptions.

In the case of the concept, I point to the idea in my mind, and you point to the idea in your mind, and we are pointing to different things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure what you mean by "pointing to the idea in my mind". Concepts or ideas are like signs that point to something else. If I have the idea of a specific chair in mind, I would not "point to the idea in my mind", but point to the specific chair in reality, which the idea is about.

However, the whole point of my argument is that there is a distinction to be made, between "similar" and "same". If you agree that there is a distinction between similar and same, then in making this distinction there can be no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference, because this would allow that two similar things are the same. And that would negate the distinction between similar and same which we would have agreed to uphold. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are making an error. Yes, you are correct that it is impossible for similar things to be one and the same thing. However, it is possible for similar descriptions of a thing to be about one and the same thing. And as shown previously, it is very probable that our description of the same duck will have insignificant differences in words and order of words.

I accept your clarification about "coming to an agreement" on things that were not previously agreed upon.

I don't see any problem with this, no self-contradiction. It's like the statement "any statement may be doubted". That statement may be doubted too. But there is no self-contradiction unless I state that it is undoubtable that any statement may be doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are correct that there is no self-contradiction in the sense that the statement "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing toward reality, is implied by human agreement" must be necessarily false. However, there is a self-contradiction in the assertion of the statement, as in "it is completely true that we cannot obtain complete truths". To escape the contradiction, the statement must remain in the state of hypothesis. Now on the other hand, there is also a flaw in saying "it is completely true that we can obtain some truths completely", because it creates circular reasoning. Indeed, the very nature of the topic is such that we will forever remain in the state of hypotheses regardless what position we take, and never be able to rise to a higher level of certainty. And this brings me to the point on the principle of parsimony.

The principle of parsimony is very weak as a proof. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, but given the nature of the topic as shown in the previous paragraph, this principle is unfortunately the best method we have left. As such, if I perceive some thing, it is more reasonable to assume that the thing perceived is the real thing, than not, until a flaw is found in the hypothesis. And you claim to have found one, as follows:

I say that the differences, the peculiarities, which we each have, "point to" the lack of a real universal form. I support my claim by pointing to differences, and saying that there are no examples of human concepts which are "the same" between individuals. So the assumption of "the same" is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

This depends on the degree of difference. Let's take a common-sense example: You and I both observe the same duck, and we describe it to a third person. I say "it has a beak, two wings and is brown". If you say "it has a trunk, leaves, and is green", then I agree that this type of difference is significant enough to debunk the 'sameness' conclusion, and by extension refute the 'complete truth' hypothesis. But if you say "it has wings, a beak, and is beige", then even though there are differences in the description (different words in different order), this type of difference is not significant enough to debunk the conclusion that we are describing the same thing, by common sense. As such, your demand for complete sameness is unreasonable. Then I claim the differences are for the most part insignificant, as demonstrated in the example of 'triangle' way back then, where I described it as "a flat surface with 3 straight sides", and you described it as "a plane with 3 sides and 3 angles". Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions.

Agreement is necessitated by differences. — Metaphysician Undercover

That does not sound right. You and I surely agree that the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 and nothing else. Here is an example of agreement with no difference. Are you perhaps mixing the concept of 'agreement' with 'tolerance' or 'compromise'? Regardless, I think the first two points above are more decisive to the topic.

Hello MU. I am back; at least temporarily. Though it has been a while, I hope you are okay to resume this conversation. I will resume it in the next post below.

Hey MU. Sorry for not being as responsive as last year. Obligations are getting in the way. This trend may continue for a while, but I do plan to answer all the objections above at some point.

(1) Yes, but I was raised in a society in which monogamy is valued.
(2) and (3) I think that you might have understood me in my "genetic tool for survival" claim-- I am talking about empathy, a real biological phenomenon; your given examples have nothing to do with how empathy works. Levels of empathy vary by individual, but the vast majority of the human race feels emotional distress when they see that another is in pain, the same way we feel nauseous when we see someone vomiting. This is natural for social animals. But again-- the amount of empathy one feels depends entirely upon the individual, and some individuals lack it entirely. They have no intuitive understanding of what is considered right or wrong, and no qualms whatsoever about harming other human beings. — bioazer

Your explanations are incomplete as they only push the mystery one step back. (1) Why is monogamy valued? (2) and (3) Why do we feel empathy? For both questions, the answer can be 'justice', which completes the explanation.

...so the Golden Rule is the plumb line between good and evil, huh? How does that apply at all in the Trolley Problem? Whatever happens, you are still running people over with the trolley, no matter how altruistic you might be-- does "do unto others as you'd have them do unto you" really apply here? — bioazer

If you did not place the people there, then you are not morally responsible for the outcome, because your intentions were not bad, and you did not fail the Golden Rule. If you did place them there, then you are morally responsible, because that was your intentions, and these failed the Golden Rule. After that, one may argue that we should choose the path that saves the most amount of people; but this is once again a rational problem, not a moral one.

What about war? — bioazer

See the Just War Theory. War is sometimes the right thing to do, as would be the case when going to war against the Nazis. Its underlying principle is still justice, as indicated in the name.

It is certainly not true that people will always want you to do unto them what you'd like them to do unto you, which is why rape is a crime. — bioazer

You misunderstand the term 'rape', which is defined as non-consensual sex. By definition, nobody wants to be raped. The rapists themselves cannot consent to rape, because that would be consenting to non-consensual sex, which is contradictory.

What is your reasoning for using specifically the Golden Rule? What line of reasoning led you to that "objective" conclusion? — bioazer

As stated in a previous post, 'justice among men' is defined as equal treatment. The application of equal treatment can be found objectively, and therefore justice is objective. Then the Golden Rule is simply a derivation of the concept of justice, and is a practical test that ensures we act justly.

If you use "true" or "truth" in a less strict sense, then we can say that if human beings agree, that this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand you correctly, your position is that our concepts are not completely true, but are consistent among all humans, and this indicates that we are close to truth. I see a few flaws with this view.

(1) There is a self-contradiction in the assertion that "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing to reality, is implied by human agreement". If complete truth can never be obtained, then this statement can never be validated to be completely true.

(2) It fails the principle of parsimony: If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. Thus if everyone perceives the same concept, it is reasonable to assume the concept is pointing to the real thing; until it is invalidated. But it cannot be invalidated, for the same reason that your position cannot be validated, as shown in (1).

(3) You wish to escape the absurdity that no judgement can ever be determined as true or false, by arguing that we can have mutual agreements among everyone, and claim "this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality". I agree that we can have mutual agreement among everyone, but why is this an indication that we are pointing toward reality? If the concept of a single individual is not true, then why would the whole group, which is nothing but the sum of all individuals, be any more true?

I will once again opt out of the "problem of induction" discussion, for the purpose of focusing on the one above.

If morality is objective-- universal-- where do you draw the line between good and evil? — bioazer

Golden Rule.

How do you solve the Trolley Problem? — bioazer

As I said in the OP, intention of good and evil is a necessary component of morality. As long as your intentions are not evil (don't violate the Golden Rule), then there is no moral mistake, only possible rational mistakes.

we also know that the basics of morals are remarkably similar across cultures — Pseudonym

To add to this statement, the Golden Rule "do unto others as you would want them to do unto you" is called that way because it "occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition." Source.

Additionally: Occam's Razor, please.
Are we required to make more assumptions by asserting that moral codes [...] are sets of taught acceptable behaviors and views, coupled with a genetic legacy for survival in social groups — bioazer

Yes; your hypothesis that our moral sense is merely a genetic tool used for survival is insufficient to explain the complete moral sense. Do you agree that your moral sense tells you that the following acts are immoral?
(1) Cheating on your spouse, even if it is guaranteed that he/she never finds out about it.
(2) Turning a nation into farming animals for quick reproduction, and thus securing the survival of the species through sheer numbers.
(3) If your own survival is guaranteed (by, say, super powers), then all acts become moral because the end of surviving is already met.

Finally, what do you reply to a person that says "I don't care about the survival of the species, and so don't act towards that end"? You cannot say they are objectively wrong, if you do not believe in an objective morality.

This is not a disproof of the subjectivity of morality-- in fact, it is the opposite. Your logic is deeply flawed. The contradiction you think to be so crippling to the philosophy of subjective morality only presents a problem if you actually presuppose that morality is objective! — bioazer

Hello. You are correct that my argument (1) does not disprove moral subjectivism. However, it does showcase the consequences of believing in our western moral system in a subjective way, namely, that it is contradictory. And there is no need to presuppose the objectivity of the moral system to see the contradiction; just logic. In other words, either the western moral system is objectively real, or it cannot exist, even in a subjective way, without contradiction.

That is right. Moral principles, like "do unto others as you would want them to do unto you", and "treat everyone equally", are innate. Then in practice, acts are judged either morally good or bad by checking if they abide to the moral principles or not, for a given situation. Since this is relative to the situation, determining the morally good course of action can sometimes be challenging if the situation is complex. Nevertheless, morality is objective as actions can be judged objectively against the moral principles.

I am open to suggestions.

So if we assume that the universal form is defined independently from human judgement, we have no way of knowing whether our definition matches the independently existing definition, whether our understanding of the universal form matches the real universal form. — Metaphysician Undercover

We already covered this issue here. It is solved by making the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge of the universal form or concept. The implicit knowledge is obtained through abstraction from observing particulars; and then if our explicit definition agrees with the implicit knowledge, then it is the true definition. This explains why we all sense that the definition of justice for humans, "equality in treatment", is a more accurate definition than "don't steal".

If the definition of concepts is only produced by a human judgement, even if agreed upon by all men without dispute, then the definitions would not point to anything objectively real, and thus no judgement could ever be true or false, that is, point to reality or not; which is absurd.

Furthermore, even the particular form of individual things is defined by its properties which are all universal forms or concepts, aside perhaps from the x, y, z, t properties. E.g. The particular form of this individual chair is: A chair (concept), made of wood (concept), red in colour (concept), located at position x, y, z, (not a concept I think). If it was not so, then we could never know any general knowledge like "chairs made of wood can burn", without testing every individual wooden chair.

Let me see if I understand what you're saying. The universal becomes a particular, as per my arguments, and is represented as (1). Now this particular, may be a member of a class (which itself is a universal), and therefore also a particular. So you say that there is no contradiction in claiming that the universal is really a particular, as the particular may be unique, distinct, yet also the member of a class(2). — Metaphysician Undercover

You are correct. This was not what I was saying, but I was mistaken because I forgot that universals may be a members of higher universals, like the human genus is a member of the genus of living beings.

[...] The existence of the universal, the genus is dependent on human judgement. The question is how do we assign real existence to something which is dependent on human judgement.[...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree that concepts or universal forms are dependant on human judgement. The reason is that judgements can be either true or false: if the judgement points to reality, then it is true; and if not, then it is false. Thus the reality or existence of the concepts in the judgement precedes the judgement. If concepts or universal forms were dependant on human judgement, then no judgement could be either true or false; which is absurd.

Hello.

Is THAT concept, stripped from images, when communicated via a sensible medium- sensible or insensible? — Daniel Smith

The concept itself must be insensible; because if it was sensible, then we would have no use to communicate the concept through a second layer of sensible images and examples, which are numerous, as you said.

Do ideas and concepts exist apart from the sensible images of which they are composed? — Daniel Smith

I would also say yes, by pointing to the concept of "justice". We all understand the concept, and yet have no clear sensible image of it. The image of a scale is merely a symbol of it, not the real thing.

Let's consider again the two statements below.
(1) Each universal form is particular because if it was not so, then they would fail the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles.
(2) A universal form cannot be a particular because a particular is defined as "used to single out an individual member of a specified group or class."

I don't see a contradiction in the statements; only an ambiguity in the term "particular". The term in statement (1) means "unique only". The term in statement (2) means "unique yet belonging to the same genus as other particulars".

If it is true that all humans are humans, and all rocks are rocks, then the universal forms of human genus and rock genus exist. It is possible that these genera cease to exist if all humans and rocks cease to exist; but nevertheless, the human genus is a different thing from the individual humans it comprises.

What if we learn the morals without being taught? What if they exist independently of humanity, and can be observed? — BlueBanana

That is precisely my point, that if moral knowledge cannot be taught, then we must acquire it through observation of our own innate knowledge of it. Unless you are suggesting it can be observed elsewhere?

To demonstrate why the P3 doesn't work: It is absurd to suppose that knowledge of anything is taught. If it was, then who was the first teacher, and "why would he tell us?!" — BlueBanana

Knowledge of most things can be observed empirically. Once observed, then it can be taught to others who did not observe it. The absurdity is valid only for morality, because other than through innate knowledge, we cannot observe morality directly; only acts which we then judge to be morally good or bad. But then this judgement presupposes a moral knowledge.

I appreciate that you guys are consistent in your belief system, that if morality is wholly subjective, then Hitler and the Nazis were indeed not objectively morally bad. I also appreciate that you believe they were morally bad, according to your personal moral system. Now I will attempt to refute your claim that morality is subjective, in two ways.

(1) While it is good that you are of the opinion that Hitler was morally wrong, even if it is a strong opinion, it is nothing but a mere opinion if morality is subjective, and is no stronger than the opinion that chocolate is the best flavour of ice cream. Now according to our moral system, we should be tolerant of others' opinions for subjective topics, as is the case with the flavours of ice cream. But then there is a contradiction because on one hand, our moral system does not tolerate immoral acts, and on the other hand, it says we should be tolerant of subjective differences.

(2) Justice among humans can be roughly defined as "equality in treatment". Under that definition, Hitler and the Nazis were clearly unjust, for they did not treat Jews as equal to themselves. Now, can it be possible for justice to be morally bad, and injustice to be morally good? These statements seem to be as contradictory as "a squared circle".

It is just a misunderstanding on how the term "particular" is defined. The way you use it for the universal forms, I now understand it to mean that each universal form is unique; and I agree.
According to the dictionary here, particular is defined as "used to single out an individual member of a specified group or class." In this strict sense, universal forms cannot be particulars because they are synonymous to "specified group" or "class" in the definition, and this would not make sense. In this strict sense, only things like individual rocks can be particulars because they are individual members of the universal form of rock-ness.

Morality and goodness are wholly subjective. — charleton

Does it follow that Hitler and the Nazis were not objectively morally bad during the Holocaust, and that they were simply the minority in terms of opinion on the treatment of the Jews?

Hello.
I think you are close to the mark. Let's make the distinction between principles of morality, and then moral rules. The first principles are things like "do good and avoid evil", and "all humans have equal ontological values". These are innate. From there, we can deduce second principles like "do unto others as you would want them to do unto you", and "treat everyone equally". First and second principles are unchanging.

Then, we can deduce more detailed moral rules like "don't kill, steal, or lie". These rules are relative to the situation, and are judged good or bad based on if they meet the principles, for a given situation. Since situations are numerous, complex, and changing, then moral rules can evolve to account for the evolving situations.

Is it the individual's survival, or survival of the species as a whole? If the former, then your morality can be reduced to the survival of the fittest. If the latter, then would you judge a society where humans are farmed like animals in order to increase the population growth, as a morally good?

So the feeling of guilt is what makes us no longer attuned to the Holy Spirit, and thus the removal of the feeling would make us attuned again, is that correct? What follows is that the feeling is a false feeling because we are not truly guilty of anything. But then the Bible is counter-productive, because you claim it gives the message about the feeling of guilt, but then it also teaches people that they are sinners, thereby feeding the feeling of guilt on whoever reads it.

My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point — Samuel Lacrampe

Yeah I said that. I did not mean it in the sense that individual persons must have individual ontological value, or do not share a common human nature. I meant it in the sense that I am me and not you, and you are you and not me. From this, we conclude that we have separate identities or individual forms (called soul in this case), although we both participate in the same universal form or species of human.

The point I made earlier in the thread, is that this perfect universal is "the ideal", and as the ideal, it is no longer a universal, it has the characteristics of a particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am trying to understand what you mean by this. Each universal form or concept is "particular" in the sense that it is unique relative to other concepts. If it was not, then they would fail the principle of indiscernible; and to this, I agree. But if you mean that concepts are particulars in the same sense that this rock is a particular, then this cannot be. As per Aquinas, matter is what gives universal forms their particularity. Therefore universal forms without matter cannot be particulars.

If you still mean the latter, then what reason do you have to support the claim that the ideal is necessarily a particular?

Back! Happy New Year all! >:O >:O >:O

The problem is that we make mistakes, we find out later that our universals were not accurate, so we change them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, the very fact that we can determine that our description of universals are inaccurate proves that we have knowledge of the real universal; because if we did not, then we could never judge our description to be inaccurate. You might reply that if we knew the universal, then we could always accurately describe it. This is very much the Meno's Paradox: "If we know what we're looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. If we don't know what we're looking for, inquiry is impossible. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible."

To solve the paradox, we need to make the distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. As per Aristotle, we have implicit knowledge of universals, obtained through the process of abstraction, and we are searching for the explicit knowledge. The ability to describe the universal accurately is the explicit knowledge, and the ability to judge if our description is accurate is the implicit knowledge. This is how the socratic method works. This also explains why we can all use the concept of 'justice' correctly and meaningfully in a sentence (e.g. "the holocaust was unjust"), but have trouble coming up with the perfect definition of 'justice'.

Regarding the universe as the One: I will put this topic on hold for now to focus on the one above.

Hey MU. My turn to apologize; I will be busy and likely not as responsive on the Forum, possibly until the beginning of next year. I hope to resume this conversation at that point, and get to the bottom of this reality thing.

Cheers.

Hello everyone.

I apologize for the delay in responses. I have been very busy lately and will not be as responsive on the Philosophy Forum, possibly until the beginning of next year. I do however intend to get back to you at some point.

Cheers.
-Samuel

Hello. Nice writing; very poetic. I just want to analyze some of it.

Something (we call them gods) plucked us from our habitat and taught us “right from wrong”. This is the knowledge of good and evil that brings....guilt. Guilt is what severs our connectivity with the divine. This is why sacrifices were implemented. It doesn’t undo sin, it absolves guilt. This is why FAITH in Christ absolves all sin. — Steve

You make it sound like the gods were the cause of our guilt, which in turn separated us from the divine; and then another god, Christ, removed our guilt. This seems counter-productive.

When you believe that you are forgiven you have no guilt so you can connect with the divine and renew your role in creation. — Steve

Is it real forgiveness, or merely the belief of forgiveness which removes the guilt? I think the former makes more sense than the latter.

Hello.
What would be the criteria to determine the good or bad ticks?

Hello.
Are you asking if the knowledge is within the subject? Yes, knowledge is always in a subject, for only subjects can know things. However, the knowledge is about objective moral goodness.

If "helping out others" and "remaining safe" are both nothing but desires, and there is nothing else to influence our behaviour, then it follows that the behaviour simply follows the strongest desire. But then there is nothing praiseworthy or virtuous about the behaviour, because desires are involuntary.

What is praiseworthy is selecting those desires, the following of which is beneficial for society. — Inter Alia

Are you saying here that we have the power to select between desires? If so, then this power cannot itself be another desire, but something above it. Do you agree with free will then?

the intuitive pull of your example comes from empathizing with the emotional upset feeling of being neglected that we can readily imagine. [...] Emotional harm is sometimes tricky to deal with because we often feel injured when in reality we have not been. Not being given a bonus that you were never promised is not an injury; your co-workers getting one and not yourself might be insult, but not injury. — VagabondSpectre

I want to clarify that the emotional pain is an effect of the immoral event, not a cause. I.e., the victim feels upset because the event is immoral, and not the other way around, that the event is immoral because the victim feels upset. As a mere effect, the emotional pain cannot be the criteria to determine if the event was immoral. It must be something else, like the fact that the treatment is unequal among employees.

I would say that an employers freedom to give away un-promised bonuses however they choose is more important than an employees desire to gain unearned money or not feel somehow excluded. — VagabondSpectre

The employer is free to act this way in the legal sense, but he is not "morally free" to treat different employees with different levels of respect. I.e., the unequal treatment remains immoral, even if there is nothing the employee can do about it.

My view (and I think the Thomists') claims that individuals are true identities as the starting point; and from there, we find genera (genus in plural apparently), that individuals participate in. This view allows for both individual forms and universal forms.

Unless I misunderstood, it sounds like you claim that the whole, the universe, is the one and only true identity as the starting point; and then from there, associate individual things as the divided parts of the whole, like body parts are to one body. Where does the individual form fit in, if individuals do not possess true identities? Also, is your view pantheism?

For example, if you're caught and go to prison you have done harm to yourself — Sam26

But in this case, the harm is an effect of the act, and so not part of the act itself. Another way to look at it, is that if you are caught, then you could defend yourself on the grounds that the act is not immoral until you are put away, because no harm is done to yourself or your loved ones before you go to prison.

In this case is there harm done? I would contend that there is harm done to your character and/or to your psyche, that is, any normal thinking human being would know and understand that since they were willing to take the life of another that that diminishes them in some way. Over time, I think any normal functioning person, would be affected by the memory of such an act. — Sam26

I agree, but this harm is again an effect of the immoral act, and so does not make the act immoral. In other words, the person is harmed because the act is immoral; and would not be harmed if the act was not immoral. And so, we have yet to determine what makes the act immoral in the first place.

let's say that the person is incapable of feeling empathy, and as such there character and/or their psyche is not affected by this act. Moreover, there is no detectable harm done, then I would say that the act was not immoral. It's not immoral, not only because there was no detectable harm, but it's probably not immoral because this person's brain is not normal, that is, they're impaired in some way. It's still a crime, but the person may not be morally responsible (at least in theory). — Sam26

Your logic is circular. In this example, you claim that not feeling harm after committing an immoral act is not normal, thereby implying that the act is the criteria to determine how we should feel. But on the other hand, you claim that harm is the criteria to determine if an act is immoral or not.