The relevant philosophical dispute is that distal objects are not constituents of experience and so that our experience only provides us with indirect knowledge of distal objects. — Michael

Therefore, Big Ben is not a constituent of a photograph of Big Ben? Surely Big Ben is a component of the photograph. It's the subject of the photograph.

Indirect realism opposes direct realism based on the fundamental meditative role brain-produced phenomenal experience plays in our contact with the world. Illusion, hallucinations, and error are consequences of, and are only possible because of, this mediation. — hypericin

I would say that illusions and hallucinations are phenomenal experiences, instead of saying that they are the consequences of phenomenal experiences. It is worth noting that illusions require the perception of an external object, whereas hallucinations are phenomenal experiences in which the external object/stimulus is absent, by definition.

That contact with the world is mediated by an appearance that is itself not the world can only mean that contact with the world is indirect. The fact that direct contact with the world is not possible does not constitute an argument against this. — hypericin

What do you mean by "direct contact with the world"?

You say that our contact with the world is indirect because it "is mediated by an appearance that is itself not the world". Firstly, the mediation is the perception/representation that provides the appearance of the world to us. Secondly, I don't expect a perception of the world to be the world, just as I don't expect a photograph of a lion to be a lion. You are implying that a mental representation must become the external object that it represents (i.e. a representation must become the represented) in order for us to have direct contact with the world. This makes no sense to me.

You seem want to argue that because direct, immediate experiential contact with the world is impossible and even incoherent, therefore, there is direct, immediate experiential contact with the world. No, if unmediated experience of the world is impossible, experience of the world is therefore mediated. — hypericin

The world as it is in itself is the unperceived world. It is incoherent to perceive the unperceived world for then it would no longer be unperceived. The way our perceptions represent the world to us may not reflect the true nature of the unperceived world, but they nevertheless represent the world to us. There is no such thing as perceiving the unperceived world, but this needn't imply that we can only perceive perceptions. We can still perceive the perceived world; the world as it is represented by our perceptions.

Or, as I asked ChatGPT to re-word the above for clarity:

The world in its unperceived state exists independently of our perception. It's logically impossible to perceive this unperceived world, as doing so would contradict its unperceived nature. While our perceptions may not perfectly mirror the true essence of the unperceived world, they still offer us a representation of it. We cannot directly perceive the unperceived world, but this doesn't mean we're confined to perceiving only our perceptions. Instead, we perceive the perceived world— the world as it's presented to us through our perceptions.

Again, if we do not perceive/experience/have awarenesw of internal objects, what are we perceiving/experiencing/aware of when we hallucinate? External objects? — hypericin

The lack of external stimulus is what marks it as a hallucination. Hallucinations are distortions of perception, which can be contrasted with undistorted perceptions that involve an external stimulus.

The representational theory of perception that claims that perceptual content is some mental phenomena (e.g. sense data or qualia) that represents the external world is indirect realism, not direct realism.

Direct realism, in being direct realism, rejects the claim that perception involves anything like representations. — Michael

This is the distinction between non-naive realism and indirect realism. Indirect realists holds that we perceive perceptions or mental representations, whereas non-naive realists holds that perceptions are mental representations and that they represent external objects. Returning to the photograph analogy, a non-naive realist would say that the photograph (perception) is a representation of a real object, whereas (I imagine) an indirect realist would say that the photograph (perception) is a representation of a representation. A naive realist, on the other hand, might say that there is no representation involved at all. This demonstrates how non-naive realism differs from both naive realism and indirect realism, refuting your claim that non-naive realism is the same view as indirect realism.

What do you mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" when you say it is false?
— Luke

I don't say that it's false. — Michael

You said:

Given that indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are of distal objects" is false... — Michael

You said that indirect realists believe it is false. Since you are an indirect realist, then you believe it is false. So, what meaning do you give to this false statement?

"I experience X" doesn't just mean one thing. I can say that I feel pain, I can say that I feel my hand burning, or I can say that I feel the fire. I can say that the schizophrenic hears voices. I can say that some people see a white and gold dress and others see a black and blue dress when looking at the same photo.

These are all perfectly appropriate phrases in the English language, none of which address the philosophical issue that gave rise to the dispute between direct and indirect realism (as explained here). — Michael

I agree that none of this addresses the relevant philosophical issue. Direct realists believe that we perceive external objects whereas indirect realists believe that we perceive internal objects. You continue to avoid this difference between the two views by claiming that they are the same view.

If indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are of distal objects" is false but believe that "our perceptions are caused by distal objects" is true then when they say "our perceptions are not of distal objects" they are not saying "our perceptions are not caused by distal objects." — Michael

I acknowledge that it was a mistake to give a causal explanation to account for the "of" in "our perceptions are of distal objects". My causal explanation was an attempt to account for why we might say that "our perceptions are of distal objects". This was not intended as a statement of synonymy.

To correct my earlier statement, what direct realists mean by "of" in "our perceptions are of distal objects" is the same as what we mean by "this photograph is of Big Ben" or "this painting is of Mr Smith". Just as photographs or paintings represent their subjects, perceptions represents distal objects. However, this is not to say that we have perceptions of perceptions. Similarly, we would not say that a photograph of Big Ben is a photograph of a photograph.

The dispute between non-naive direct realists and indirect realists is an irrelevant semantic dispute. They agree on the philosophical issue regarding the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael

This is mere assertion.

What does it mean to say that something is the content of perception? — Michael

Perceptual content includes the sensory information of the perception and the quality of the subjective experience. Direct realists say that the perceptual content represents external objects. Indirect realists say that the perceptual content represents internal objects.

Perhaps you'll find that what indirect realists mean by "X is the content of perception" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "X is the content of perception", and so once again it's an irrelevant dispute about language. — Michael

I do not find that they mean the same thing. Direct realists say that we perceive external objects. Indirect realists say that we perceive internal objects.

What does "our perceptions are of distal objects" mean?

Given that indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are of distal objects" is false but believe that "our perceptions are caused by distal objects" is true, it must be that "our perceptions are of distal objects" doesn't mean "our perceptions are caused by distal objects". — Michael

What do you mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" when you say it is false?

If what indirect realists mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" then you are equivocating. — Michael

How does that follow?

Assume that by "our perceptions are of distal objects" non-naive direct realists mean "our perceptions are ABC".

Assume that by "our perceptions are of distal objects" indirect realists mean "our perceptions are XYZ". — Michael

It is not a dispute over different meanings of the phrase "of distal objects", is it? Also, indirect realists do not believe that our perceptions are of distal objects; they believe that our perceptions are of mental representations or sense data.

Where is the disagreement? — Michael

Even if there were no substantive dispute over whether our perceptions are of distal objects, you have still not addressed the other difference that I noted between the two parties: their different beliefs regarding perceptual content.

So given that both indirect realists and non-naive direct realists believe that "distal objects are causally responsible for my experience" is true, what is the difference between being a non-naive direct realist and being an indirect realist? — Michael

I've already answered this:

Non-naive realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data. Likewise, non-naive realists believe that our perceptual content can be about distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptual content is only about mental representations or sense data. — Luke

Do you deny that indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data? Or do you refuse to accept that non-naive direct realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects?

Do you deny that indirect realists believe that our perceptual content is only about mental representations or sense data? Or do you refuse to accept that non-naive direct realists believe that our perceptual content can be about distal objects?

It seems to be that their only disagreement is over what the phrase "my experience is of distal objects" means. — Michael

Does it? You have not at all addressed my comment regarding perceptual content and you continue to avoid discussing intermediaries.

Sorry, you've lost me. You were arguing that indirect realism was the same as non-naive direct realism. You seem to have abandoned that to ask me what it means to say that an experience is "of" some distal object. I answered that and you said that an indirect realist would agree. I'm no longer sure what you are arguing for or where you disagree.

The indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience. — Michael

Okay, but you asked me:

What does it mean to say that some experience is of some distal object? What is the word "of" doing here? — Michael

If the indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience, then I'm not sure what to make of this:

Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body. — Michael

Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body.

What does it mean to say that some experience is of some distal object? What is the word "of" doing here? — Michael

Are we no longer discussing whether indirect realism and non-naive realism are the same view?

What it means to say that an experience is of some distal object is that the distal object has somehow interacted with one's senses to cause the experience.

So-called "non-naive direct realism" is indirect (non-naive) realism. Their use of the word "direct" in their name is an unnecessary confusion. — Michael

Do you have an argument to support this assertion?

Indirect (non-naive) realists believe that experience does not provide us with direct knowledge of the external world because they believe that we have direct knowledge only of experience and because the external world is not a constituent of experience. Knowledge of the external world is inferential – i.e. indirect – with experience itself being the intermediary. — Michael

Non-naive realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data. Likewise, non-naive realists believe that our perceptual content can be about distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptual content is only about mental representations or sense data. Therefore, non-naive realism is not the same view as indirect realism.

The answer to all of your questions depend on the meaning of the word “direct” which you have already admitted mean different things to the indirect realist and the non-naive direct realist.

According to the indirect realist’s meaning, perception of distal objects is not direct1.

According to the non-naive direct realist’s meaning, perception of distal objects is direct2.

If you replace the word “direct” with each group’s underlying meaning then you’ll probably find that indirect and non-naive direct realists agree with each other, which is why they amount to the same philosophical position regarding the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael

In my earlier post, I stated:

The naive realist defines direct perception in terms of perceiving the world as it is in itself (the WAIIII), and they say we do perceive the WAIIII.

The indirect realist also defines direct perception in terms of perceiving the WAIIII, but they say we do not perceive the WAIIII.

The non-naive direct realist agrees with the indirect realist that we do not perceive the WAIIII, but does not define direct perception in these terms. For the non-naive direct realist (or for me, at least), direct perception is defined in terms of perceiving the world, not in terms of perceiving behind the appearances of the world to the WAIIII. — Luke

According to the non-naive direct realist's meaning of "direct", we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are in themselves, but we can directly perceive distal objects, because they are not perceived via an intermediary.

According to the indirect realist's meaning of "direct", we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are in themselves, because they are perceived via an intermediary.

I do not find that indirect and non-naive direct realists agree with each other or that they amount to the same philosophical position.

So what you're saying is that what indirect realists mean by "direct" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "direct", and so that it is possible that experience isn't "direct" as the indirect realist means by it but is "direct" as the non-naive direct realist means by it, and so that it is possible that both indirect and non-naive direct realism are correct because their positions are not mutually exclusive. — Michael

Unless indirect realists also hold the belief that we can directly perceive distal objects without needing to perceive an intermediary, then I don't believe that the two positions are "not mutually exclusive".

This is the very point I am making. Non-naive direct realism is indirect realism given that they both accept that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of experience, that experience does not inform us about the mind-independent nature of the external world, and so that there is an epistemological problem of perception. — Michael

The fact that non-naive direct realism and indirect realism both reject naive realism does not make them the same. By analogy, that would make any two religions the same because they both reject some third religion.

Any "disagreement" between indirect realists and non-naive direct realists is regarding irrelevant issues about grammar (e.g. the meaning of the word "direct"). — Michael

If the disagreement is merely semantic, then you should be willing to acknowledge that we can directly perceive distal objects without needing to perceive an intermediary. If you are not so willing, then the issue is not merely semantic.

Semantic Direct Realism ("I feel myself being stabbed in the back") and Semantic Indirect Realism ("I feel the sensation of pain") are both correct, compatible with one another, and compatible with Phenomenological Indirect Realism. — Michael

This does not address the issue of direct perception vs indirect perception via an intermediary.

I don't believe a non-naive direct realist would say something like "I feel myself seeing a distal object".

Also, if a non-naive direct realist were to say "I directly feel myself being stabbed in the back", would an indirect realist therefore say "I indirectly feel the sensation of pain"?

Merci! :grin:

I have yet to hear a meaningful description of non-naive direct realism. Every account so far seems to just be indirect realism but refusing to call it so. — Michael

The naive realist defines direct perception in terms of perceiving the world as it is in itself (the WAIIII), and they say we do perceive the WAIIII.

The indirect realist also defines direct perception in terms of perceiving the WAIIII, but they say we do not perceive the WAIIII.

The non-naive direct realist agrees with the indirect realist that we do not perceive the WAIIII, but does not define direct perception in these terms. For the non-naive direct realist (or for me, at least), direct perception is defined in terms of perceiving the world, not in terms of perceiving behind the appearances of the world to the WAIIII.

Edited to add: Perceptions provide the appearances of the world (as it appears to the perceiver) so it is incoherent to talk about perceiving behind the appearances. The concept of perceiving the WAIIII is therefore incoherent, so direct and indirect perception should not be defined in terms of it.

You can call this seeing the screen or you can call this seeing a visual sensation. It makes no difference. That’s simply an irrelevant grammatical convention. — Michael

According to grammatical convention, we would normally say that we see a screen, not a "visual sensation". The "visual sensation" is the "seeing".

The relevant philosophical concern is that the visual sensation is distinct from the screen, that the properties of the visual sensation are not the properties of the screen, and that it is the properties of the visual sensation that are inform rational understanding. Hence why there is an epistemological problem of perception. That’s the indirect realist’s argument. — Michael

The indirect realist's argument is that a perception is distinct from its object (of perception)? I would have thought that we could all agree on that.

If it makes no difference whether we call it seeing the screen or seeing a visual sensation, then it should also make no difference whether we call them the properties of the screen or the properties of a visual sensation. Surely that’s simply an irrelevant grammatical convention.

It appears that you only want to argue against naive realism, which is fine, but I think I've addressed that in my post above. You follow the naive realist in adopting the presupposition that there is a "correct" way to perceive the world, which is to perceive it as it is in itself.

What's the intermediary?
— Luke

Sensations. — Michael

You don't see the screen; you see sensations?

A ghost zombie. Hadn't thought of that.

What's the intermediary?

Whether, for example, I can see the screen in front of me, or whether I am seeing only an intermediary of the screen in front of me.

It becomes a question of whether we can perceive the world or only an intermediary of the world.

"Correct", "Veridical", or not, is the wrong framing. — hypericin

And yet you argue that we can never know if the smell of smoke indicates that there is smoke (or that one perceives smoke), due to the possibility of illusion, hallucination or error.

Naive realism and indirect realism are both based on the presupposition that there is a “correct” way to perceive the world, which is to perceive the world as it is in itself. Naive realism supposes that we do perceive the world as it is in itself. Indirect realists oppose naive realism based on the possibility of illusion, hallucination or error.

If this presupposition is rejected, then it is no longer a question of whether or not we perceive the world as it is in itself directly, but a question of whether or not we perceive the world directly. The latter does not require a superhuman form of perception that can infallibly see "behind" the appearance of the world, but simply a form of perception that provides an appearance of the world, fallible or not.

Neither point of view shows the "correct" orientation of the external world because there is no such thing as a "correct" orientation. — Michael

The argument that there is no "correct" orientation or "correct' way of perceiving the world seems to me help make the case for direct realism rather than for indirect realism. Direct realists think it is possible for our perceptions of the world to be veridical, despite there being no "correct" way to perceive it (whatever that might mean). It is indirect realists who seem to think it is impossible for our perceptions to be veridical, and this seems to be because we either do not perceive the world "correctly" or because we cannot know whether we perceive the world "correctly".

Why stick to mental representation? That just leaves us with phenomenal consciousness and leaves out the bulk of representational content. — frank

Because my comment, to which you replied, was made in the context of the GPT response posted by @hypericin, which specifically referred to "mental representations".

I take this to mean that the phrase "mental representations" can sometimes be used to refer to, or to include, unconscious states/processes, which is unlike how the word "qualia" is typically used.
— Luke

I would take that to mean that representation is sometimes in the form of innate nervous responses (like algorithms) that don't involve phenomenal consciousness. — frank

I don't see that as being different to what I said, although let's stick to mental representations. And emphasis on the "sometimes".

You have had the thought of another person. Nothing more direct could be perceived, I don't think. — AmadeusD

And yet:

So, in the Telepathy case, 'perception' retrieved or received data directly from another's mind with no interloping/interceding/mediating stage or medium - but the brain still has to make that into an experience of hearing words (or whatever it might be). — AmadeusD

Are you saying that even telepathy would be indirect, despite it having "no interloping/interceding/mediating stage or medium"? Without any "mediating stage", what would make it indirect?

However, we (or at least I) have apparently been misusing the phrase "mental representation". According to ChatGPT, this refers to a pre-conscious mental state, not qualia itself. Which is confusing, since (at least I maintain) that qualia themselves are mental represntaitons. — hypericin

That's not how I would read the response. The response states that: "Some mental representations might be unconscious or lack a subjective quality, and thus would not be considered qualia." This does not state that all mental representations are "pre-conscious". I take this to mean that the phrase "mental representations" can sometimes be used to refer to, or to include, unconscious states/processes, which is unlike how the word "qualia" is typically used.


I also made some further enquiries with ChatGPT, and received a response that I think gets to the heart of our dispute (my emphasis):

User
can this distinction [between awareness and perception] also be collapsed?

ChatGPT
Yes, the distinction between awareness and perception can also be collapsed or blurred in certain contexts or philosophical perspectives.

Some philosophical theories, such as direct realism or naive realism, argue that perception and awareness are essentially the same thing. According to these views, when we perceive the world, we are directly aware of external objects as they are, without any intermediary mental representations. In other words, perception is immediate and unmediated, and our awareness of the world is synonymous with our sensory experiences.

On the other hand, certain forms of idealism or phenomenology propose that awareness and perception are inseparable aspects of conscious experience. From this perspective, our awareness of the world is not just about recognizing sensory stimuli but also involves the active interpretation and structuring of those stimuli by the mind. In this view, perception is not a passive reception of sensory data but rather an active engagement with the world that shapes our awareness.

Additionally, in everyday language and common usage, the terms "awareness" and "perception" are often used interchangeably or in overlapping ways. People might say they are "aware of" something when they mean they perceive it, or they might describe their perceptions as a form of awareness.

So, while there are philosophical distinctions between awareness and perception, they are not always rigidly maintained, and the relationship between them can vary depending on the philosophical framework or context of discussion.

Where I disagree with you is in your apparent view that perception is merely "a passive reception of sensory data", which awaits our awareness (or not). I find it difficult to separate this view from the homunculus view.

"Experience" here is certainly not what we have been calling "perceptual experiences", aka qualia. — hypericin

Why "certainly not"? It's what I have been calling perceptual experiences, aka qualia.

Reading through the GPT definition, I see little substantive difference with my own. — hypericin

Did you note that the GPT definition differs from yours? The GPT definition of indirect realism does not state that our awareness is mediated by mental representations or ideas. Instead, the GPT definition states that our experiences are mediated by mental representations or ideas. The GPT definition contrasts this with "directly perceiving external objects themselves". I would consider the perceptual experiences of tasting, seeing, hearing, etc. to be experiences.

Also, the GPT definition states that we perceive perceptions; a point on which you have disagreed previously (my emphasis):

According to indirect realism, when we perceive the world, what we are actually experiencing are mental representations or perceptions that are caused by external objects. These mental representations are often considered to be in the mind and are distinct from the external objects they represent.

In other words, indirect realism suggests that we do not directly perceive external objects such as tables, chairs, or trees. Instead, we perceive representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes. This theory acknowledges that there is a real external world but asserts that our understanding and experience of it are indirect and mediated by mental representations. — GPT definition of indirect realism

The "taste" and the "awareness of the taste" verbally designate parts or aspects of what may be the same thing: the perceptual experience of tasting strawberries. As I've said before, my argument does not hinge on these being ontologically distinct things. — hypericin

Your argument hinges on the "taste" and the "awareness of the taste" being, at least, conceptually distinct things. That is, your argument hinges on your awareness of the object being distinct from your perceptual experience of the object. If your awareness of the object were indistinct from your perceptual experience of the object, then your awareness could no longer be mediated by your perceptual experience. You can't say that it doesn't matter if these are indistinct, because otherwise your position becomes direct realism. If the "taste" and your "awareness of the taste" were indistinct then there would be no intermediary and they would both be directly of the object.

In other words, you claim that we have indirect awareness of external objects because our awareness is mediated by our perceptual experience, but you also find no problem in collapsing the distinction between our awareness of our perceptual experience and our perceptual experience. If you collapse this distinction, then you lose the indirectness.

Direct perceptual experiences are representations.
The representations are of real objects.
Therefore, Direct perceptual experiences are representations of real objects.
and
"Direct perceptual experiencs" are of real objects
but not
"Direct perceptual experiences" are directly of real objects — hypericin

If I recall correctly, you introduced the phrase "direct perceptual experiences". I don't understand why you would refer to them as "direct" if they are not directly of real objects. What is "direct" intended to signify here, otherwise?

I would rather say
"Direct perceptual experiences" are indirectly of real objects — hypericin

??

ChatGPT
Yes, in that case, it would be sensible to refer to awareness of your perceptual experiences as "direct."
The term "direct" in "direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" is used to denote an immediate, unmediated apprehension of your perceptual experiences. This is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world," where your awareness of the world is mediated by your perceptual experiences.
In this context, "direct" and "indirect" serve as contrasting qualifiers that give meaning to each other. Therefore, even if there is no indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, the term "direct awareness" still retains its meaning because it is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world."
So, the statement "Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" would be false in this context. — hypericin

Fair enough. I concede this point.

However, I still have doubts about your version of indirect realism, in which awareness of external objects is mediated by perceptual experience.

ChatGPT offers the following definition of indirect realism:

User
what is indirect realism

ChatGPT
Indirect realism, also known as representationalism or epistemological dualism, is a philosophical theory regarding perception and reality. It posits that our experiences of the world are mediated by mental representations or ideas, rather than directly perceiving external objects themselves.

According to indirect realism, when we perceive the world, what we are actually experiencing are mental representations or perceptions that are caused by external objects. These mental representations are often considered to be in the mind and are distinct from the external objects they represent.

In other words, indirect realism suggests that we do not directly perceive external objects such as tables, chairs, or trees. Instead, we perceive representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes. This theory acknowledges that there is a real external world but asserts that our understanding and experience of it are indirect and mediated by mental representations.

One of the key proponents of indirect realism was the philosopher John Locke, who argued that the mind receives sensory information from the external world and constructs perceptions based on this information. Other philosophers, such as George Berkeley and David Hume, also contributed to the development of indirect realism, albeit with variations in emphasis and interpretation.

The definition of indirect realism offered by ChatGPT states that our experiences (presumably our perceptual experiences) are mediated by mental representations or ideas. It contrasts this with "directly perceiving external objects themselves", i.e. direct realism.

Instead of the view that our perceptual experiences of external objects are mediated by mental representations or ideas, your version of indirect realism is that our awareness of external objects is mediated by our perceptual experiences. That is, you claim we have awareness of perceptual experiences of external objects.

If yours counts as a version of indirect realism, then I find the distinction between perceptual experience and awareness of perceptual experience to be problematic. You seem to agree with the direct realist that perceptual experience of external objects is direct (or you don't appear to argue for an intermediary between them). However, if your perceptual experience is, e.g., the taste of strawberries, then is your awareness of the taste of strawberries different to your perceptual experience of the taste of strawberries? How does the perceptual experience mediate the awareness? You said earlier that a perceptual experience entails awareness of that perceptual experience; that it entails its own awareness. In that case, what does awareness of the perceptual experience add to the perceptual experience that the perceptual experience itself lacks?

I don't allow for direct perceptual experience of real objects. Perceptual experience is representational, we are aware of it, and the representation is of real objects. But this doesn't mean we have direct perceptual experience of real objects.
— hypericin

It seems to follow that it is. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then the “direct perceptual experience” is of real objects.
— Luke

I deny that the premises entail:
direct perceptual experience of real objects

You counter by affirming that the premises entail:
"direct perceptual experience” is of real objects.

These look somewhat similar but are totally nonequivalent. The conclusion I deny says that the perceptual experience of real objects is direct. This is just direct realism. They conclusion you affirm says that direct perceptual experience, aka phenomenal experience, merely is of real object. But this is innocuous, and compatible with direct and indirect realism: the direct realist says it is directly of real object, and the indirect realist says it is indirectly of real objects. — hypericin

In the first quote above, you say that "Perceptual experience is representational" and that "the representation is of real objects". This strongly implies that perceptual experiences are representations and that these representations (i.e. these perceptual experiences) are of real objects. However, if perceptual experiences are merely "representational" without being "representations", then what are these representations of real objects? Where do representations fit in amongst awareness, perceptual experiences and real objects? Is there an intermediary between the representation and the real object, or is it a direct relationship?

This was not me making any ontological claims, I don't need to. I was only defining the terms I use. If it turns out that awareness and the experience are two aspects of the same thing, no problem. — hypericin

I think it is a problem if you cannot distinguish between a perceptual experience and a (direct?) representation of a real object.

Just curious. What did you ask of it, to get that statement? — Mww

User
true or false: Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences. The "direct" qualifier has no contrast, so it doesn't mean anything.

ChatGPT
The statement is true. In philosophical discourse, the concept of "direct awareness" typically implies an immediate, unmediated apprehension of something. However, to establish the notion of direct awareness, there must be a contrasting concept, such as indirect awareness. If there is no possibility of indirect awareness, then the qualifier "direct" loses its meaning because there is no alternative mode of awareness to contrast it with. So, without the possibility of indirect awareness, the term "direct awareness" becomes vacuous.

I also asked ChatGPT about the discussion topic and got this response:

User
is perceptual experience direct or indirect?

ChatGPT
Perceptual experience can be understood as both direct and indirect, depending on how one defines these terms.

In a strict sense, perceptual experience is often considered direct because it involves the immediate apprehension or sensing of objects and events in the external world through the senses, such as sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. This directness implies that there is no need for conscious inference or interpretation for the experience to occur.

However, some philosophers argue that all perception involves a degree of interpretation or processing by the mind, even if it happens very quickly or subconsciously. From this perspective, perceptual experience could be seen as indirect because it is mediated by mental processes that shape or filter the raw sensory input before it reaches conscious awareness.

So, whether perceptual experience is considered direct or indirect depends on the philosophical framework and the specific definition of these terms used in the discussion.

This doesn't work. What if I had rephrased P2 with the equivalent:

P2. If the representation represents real objects...

Then your substitution yields "Direct phenomenal experience represents real objects". — hypericin

I asked ChatGPT whether the argument is valid:

User
Is this argument valid:
P1. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation; and
P2. If the representation mentioned at P1 is of real objects; then
C. The “direct perceptual experience” is of real objects

ChatGPT
The argument you've presented is valid.

This argument follows a valid form of deductive reasoning known as hypothetical syllogism. The conclusion logically follows from the premises. If the "direct perceptual experience" is indeed a representation, and if that representation is of real objects, then it logically follows that the direct perceptual experience itself is of real objects. Therefore, the argument is valid.

If this is logically valid, how can inconsequential differences in how the premises are phrased yield totally different results? — hypericin

User
Can P2 be re-phrased as "P2. If the representation represents real objects"?

ChatGPT
Yes, you can rephrase P2 as "If the representation represents real objects" without changing the meaning of the argument. Both "If the representation mentioned at P1 is of real objects" and "If the representation represents real objects" convey the idea that the representation within the direct perceptual experience corresponds to real objects. Therefore, the rephrased version maintains the validity of the argument.

Whether or not it is an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of (I don't think it is), all that is necessary to my argument is that we are aware of it. — hypericin

You treat the perceptual experience not as part of your experience, but as an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of. This was your earliter attempt to separate your awareness of your perceptual experience from your perceptual experience:

The "perceptual experience of smelling smoke" refers to the qualitative, ineffable smoky smell. The "awareness of smelling smoke" or "awareness of the perceptual experience of smelling smoke" refers to the binary fact (or 0-1 spectrum) that you are consciously cognizant of that qualitative, ineffable smoky smell. — hypericin

I am saying that these are inseparable. You are also saying that these are inseparable when you say that the perceptual experience entails its own awareness. Therefore, the perceptual experience cannot simply be "the qualitative, ineffable smoky smell" that is somehow independent of your awareness; that you may or may not be aware of. Both your awareness and your perceptual experience are of this smoky smell. The perceptual experience is not an independent objective odour that you smell using your awareness. Your perceptual experience and your awareness of the perceptual experience are equally of the real world object.

Talking about awareness, awareness of perceptual experience is direct, awareness of real world objects is indirect. A clear contrast, I don't see the problem. — hypericin

Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences. The "direct" qualifier has no contrast, so it doesn't mean anything.

As ChatGPT states:

In philosophical discourse, the concept of "direct awareness" typically implies an immediate, unmediated apprehension of something. However, to establish the notion of direct awareness, there must be a contrasting concept, such as indirect awareness. If there is no possibility of indirect awareness, then the qualifier "direct" loses its meaning because there is no alternative mode of awareness to contrast it with. So, without the possibility of indirect awareness, the term "direct awareness" becomes vacuous.

"A representation is of real objects" is a nonsensical claim. — hypericin

You are taking this out of context. The context of our exchanges followed from what you said earlier in the discussion, namely:

If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then:

The “direct perceptual experience” is a representation of real objects

Which I agree with. — hypericin

You referred to "a representation", and I followed your usage. If this is a nonsensical claim, then it's one that you also made.

A representation may be of anything. Rather, "the representation is of real objects". "The" means we are talking about the representation in "Phenomenal experience is a representation". — hypericin

I wasn't referring to any other sort of representation. I was referring to the perceptual experience as being the representation. That is, I was referring to the representation in "Perceptual experience is a representation".

You cannot then substitute in "phenomenal experience" for "representation" in "the representation is of real objects", because that sentence is modifying the representation in "phenomenal experience is a representation".. — hypericin

I can substitute it in because the perceptual experience is the representation. That sentence is modifying the representation, but because the perceptual experience is the representation, then it is also modifying the perceptual experience.

Look at your earlier argument again:

P1. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation; and
P2. If the representation is of real objects; then
C. The “direct perceptual experience” is a representation of real objects

The two sentences are equivalent to "phenomenal experience is a representation of real objects". That sentence s definitely not equivalent to "phenomenal experience is of real objects". — hypericin

According to P1 of your argument, the perceptual experience is a representation. According to P2 of your argument, this (the) representation (mentioned at P1) is of real objects. As you note: ""The" means we are talking about the representation in "Phenomenal [perceptual] experience is a representation" (i.e. at P1). P1 allows the substitution of "the perceptual experience" for "the representation" into P2. Therefore, via substitution into P2, the perceptual experience is of real objects.

Your perceptual experience of the smoky smell is just the smell itself, which you may or may not be experiencing or consciously aware of?
— Luke

Yes. The perceptual experience may necessarily entail the awareness, as we discussed earlier. But all that is required for my argument is that we are aware of it. — hypericin

You don't see any issue with your perceptual experience being the smell itself, which you might not experience? How can your perceptual experience be something that you don't experience?

If the perceptual experience entails the awareness, then it is not possible to have a perceptual experience that you might not experience or be aware of.

Therefore, the perceptual experience cannot be "the smell itself", acting as an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of.

But I think a stronger argument against your view is that it is meaningless to refer to your awareness of your perceptual experience as "direct", because it is just as meaningless to refer to your awareness of your perceptual experience as "indirect", If it is impossible for your awareness of your perceptual experience to be indirect, then it is also impossible for it to be direct. The "direct" qualifier doesn't add anything; it's meaningless. It would make no difference for you to refer to your awareness without the qualifier. And if you can't qualify your awareness of your perceptual experience as direct, then you can't use this as a basis to qualify your awareness of real objects as indirect.

That is not a valid substitution. "A representation is of real objects" does not mean that "a representation" equals "of real objects". — hypericin

But “a perceptual experience is a representation” does mean that “a perceptual experience” equals “a representation”. Therefore, if a representation is of real objects then (via substitution) a perceptual experience is of real objects.

The "perceptual experience of smelling smoke" refers to the qualitative, ineffable smoky smell. The "awareness of smelling smoke" or "awareness of the perceptual experience of smelling smoke" refers to the binary fact (or 0-1 spectrum) that you are consciously cognizant of that qualitative, ineffable smoky smell. — hypericin

Your perceptual experience of the smoky smell is just the smell itself, which you may or may not be experiencing or consciously aware of?

If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then:

The “direct perceptual experience” is a representation of real objects

Which I agree with. No logical move lets you just snip out "a representation" in this proposition. — hypericin

The logical move that lets me snip out “a representation” is substitution. A perceptual experience is a representation and a representation is of real objects. Therefore, a perceptual experience is of real objects.

I then made it clear, with the example of smelling smoke, that it is not the same awareness in both cases.

So now what? — hypericin

What distinction do you make between your awareness of smelling smoke and your perceptual experience of smelling smoke? How are these different? If you prefer, what distinction do you make between your awareness of the smell and your perceptual experience of the smell?

What could it mean for the relationship between your awareness and your perceptual experience to be indirect?

I don't allow for direct perceptual experience of real objects. Perceptual experience is representational, we are aware of it, and the representation is of real objects. But this doesn't mean we have direct perceptual experience of real objects. — hypericin

It seems to follow that it is. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then the “direct perceptual experience” is of real objects.

Unless you acknowledge that you are using “awareness” as a substitute for “perceptual experience” and “perceptual experience” as a substitute for “representation”, then I don’t think you are an indirect realist. The indirect realist says that our perceptual experience is of some perceptual intermediary. They do not say that our awareness is of some perceptual intermediary.

By close analogy, the words you type presumably are representations of your thoughts. I am directly aware of the words you type. But I am only indirectly aware, by any definition of 'indirect', of your thoughts. The words are the intermediary. — hypericin

Even if the words were identical with my thoughts, you would apparently still say that you were only indirectly aware of them, so the analogy doesn’t help.

Sorry, I should have said, you can know there is smoke in the room, but never with absolute certainty. Knowing empirical facts always entails doubt, because we always know them indirectly. — hypericin

I should have said this earlier: I don’t see what makes you an indirect realist, because I don’t understand what is your perceptual intermediary. Awareness? Perceptual experience? You seem to allow for direct perceptual experience of real objects, but that is direct realism.

No i don't, and I am utterly done with going int he circle you lead yourself in. Your words are getting you into a muddle that i have tried for two pages to bring you out of. I don't need to be correct to note this particular issue you're having. — AmadeusD

Suffice to say, as a final thought on the actual disagreement in position, that this line above is utterly incoherent and again, a perfect exemplar of what I have tried for at least two pages to avoid, directly addressing where your terminology is either 1. nonsense, or 2. unhelpful and attempted a coming-to-terms. — AmadeusD

I fail to see any argument amidst all this bluster. Oh well, thanks for trying to show me the way.

Precisely, you can never know.

A (Direct): The phenomenological olfactory experience of smoke
B (Indirect): That the olfactory experience belongs in the category "smoky"
C (Indirect): That there is smoke in my room
D (Indirect): That there is a fire somewhere nearby — hypericin

I find it hard to accept that we can never know that there is smoke in your room. If the smell isn't enough, you could move closer to the source of the smoke to satisfy yourself. You might also see the smoke and/or start coughing from the smoke. It's absurd to say you could never know that there is smoke in your room. How did you learn how to use the word "smoke" in the first place if nobody ever knew that it was smoke?

Note how each of the indirect awarenesses, they can all be wrong. B, there might be a chemical leak that happens to smell somewhat similar to smoke, my categorization is mistaken. C, I may be recovering from COVID, and my sense of smell is messed up, the smell is hallucinatory. D, a maniac might be pumping smoke into my house. — hypericin

If it's B or C, then you can always investigate further to find out the cause of the smell. Take a bigger whiff, move closer to the source, use your other senses, check if other people also smell smoke, etc. If there's a fire next door, then you can know that it is smoke you are smelling.

If it's D and a maniac is pumping smoke into your house, then the smoke being pumped into your house would explain the smoky smell. You can again know that it is smoke you are smelling.

It may be a hallucination or an illusion, but it cannot always be a hallucination or an illusion.

But they couldn't possibly be this. It isn't a move open to you, and you have rejected the two possible versions where it's true: physical objects in your mind, or non-mediated vision. — AmadeusD

You continue to equivocate on the meaning of “perceptual experience”. In what sense is vision mediated? It is only mediated in the production of the perceptual experience, not in the experience itself. In other words, we do not perceive the process(es) of perception which produce the perceptual experience. Yet, that is the indirect realists’ reason for why our perceptual experiences are indirect.

The weird notion that I have to provide some actual perceptual system that is 'more direct' — AmadeusD

The issue is not whether our “perceptual system” is direct, as you seem to assume. The issue is whether our perceptual experiences are direct. Perceptual experience is the final product of the perceptual system and we directly experience the world regardless of the number of “way-points” of the perceptual system.

My position is not “”literally indirect realism” because I argue for the idea that our perceptual experiences are of real objects and I argue against the idea that our perceptual experiences are of any perceptual intermediary.

You simply ignore the definitions of direct and indirect realism, instead you see only that our perceptual system involves representation and so you jump to the conclusion that our perceptual experience must therefore be indirect. And all without any argument.

You accept that our perception is necessarily indirect — AmadeusD

Nope.

by understanding that our visual system doesn’t give us a visual of any actual objects, but representations of them. — AmadeusD

Direct realism is the view that we perceive real objects. We do have "a visual" or a perceptual experience of real objects.

Representations are required in order to have perceptual experiences, but this need not imply that we have perceptual experiences of representations.

To put it another way, a perceptual experience is a representation. For example, a perceptual experience such as a "visual", a sound or a smell might represent some distal object, but it does not represent a representation (unless the distal object itself represents something else).