Use refers to the activity of building. The meaning is determined by the role of "slab" in this activity. — Fooloso4

A "slab" can refer to a slab of concrete used in a builder's yard or a slab of cake used in a cake shop.

If it is the type of slab used in a builder's yard, it may be described as a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape. But such as slab can have many uses: as a roof, as a road barrier, as a floor, as a counterweight, etc.

But we know the meaning of "slab" even before we have decided what we want to use it for. In fact, we cannot use the slab until we understand what the slab is. Therefore, it is not the case that we have to use something in order to discover what its name is.

When the builder calls "slab" the assistant does not bring a mackerel or an onion. Whatever theory you have about what you think must be going on in his mind, the fact is, he brings a slab. — Fooloso4

If the assistant had no intrinsic theory in their mind as to the meaning of words, they would be bringing onions as often as they brought slabs.

What you ignore is that in this language there is no word for 'bring'. "Slab" does not function simply as the name of an object. "Slab" means bring the builder a slab. "Slab" gets its meaning from its use. Its use is determined by the form or way of life. Nomads do not have the word "Slab". Not because there are no slabs but because they do not build, slabs are not used in this way. — Fooloso4

This is circular. If "slab" gets its meaning from use, then how do you know how to use it before knowing what it means.

I have worked with Bedouin nomads, and we were using the word slab all the time.

And the use of “private” is not Wittgenstein’s; it’s the skeptic’s, the interlocutor’s; it’s the “metaphysical use”; Wittgenstein contrasts that with its “ordinary use”, which has particular criteria and contexts in which it is used, which is, as I said, similar to personal, secret. — Antony Nickles

There is not some “color” in you that someone else cannot see. — Antony Nickles

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein makes the point that Wittgenstein never denied that we can know what we think and feel.

Other philosophers, I believe, are under the impression that Wittgenstein denies that we can know what we think and feel, and even that we can know ourselves. This extraordinary idea comes, no doubt, from such remarks of Wittgenstein's as: "I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking" (II, p. 222); "It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain" (§5!46). But the "can" and "cannot" in these remarks are grammatical; they mean "it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does); it would, therefore, equally make no sense to say of me that I do not know what I am thinking, or that I do not know I am in pain. The implication is not that I cannot know myself, but that knowing oneself-though radically different from the way we know others--is not a matter of cognizing (classically, "intuiting") mental acts and particular sensations.

As Wittgenstein also writes, the sensation is not a nothing.

PI 304 "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it? What greater difference could there be?—"And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing"—Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

If everyone were zombies, and/or if no one had an internal understanding of a word that roughly corresponds to the concept, but its use (outward behavior way they expressed and acted when they spoke or heard the word) was always correct, would you really say that people understand the "meaning" of a word? — schopenhauer1

Exactly. I can say to a robot "bring me a slab", and it would be able to do so, even though it didn't know the meanings of the words.

But it can only do so because a human, who did know the meanings of those words, had programmed it in the first place.

I feel successful language use is only possible when you use language cogently to the situation. — Corvus

Yes, the successful use of language requires several things, of which one is using words in the correct context. Another is knowing the meaning of the words used, in that if the barmaid didn't know the meaning of "bring", she would never be able to bring you your pint of lager.

The other point is that the meaning of words is not learnt by pointing to the objects in the world exclusively, unless it is the case with a child learning language for the first time in her life, or in certain situations such as when you are ordering or buying an item in shops or market — Corvus

We know the meaning of angst, not because we can point to angst, but because we can point to to the visible effect of angst in the world, such as a person's behaviour.

We can have the word "pain" in language because we can point to pain behaviour, whereby the word "pain" replaces pain behaviour.

If not by "pointing", how do we learn the meaning of words such as angst?

I don't see why you would call your personal experience a concept. — Luke

I agree that only part of my personal experience is that of a concept.

If I have a personal experience as a consequence of looking at a wavelength of 700nm in the world, there are two aspects to this personal experience, the phenomenological and the cognitive.

As regards the phenomenological, I have a particular momentary colour experience caused by the wavelength 700nm

As regards the cognitive, at the same time as having the phenomenological experience, I think of this particular colour as "red". Even though all my phenomenological experiences of the wavelengths 625nm to 750nm have been different, there still has been something similar about them, and this similarity is what a concept is. A similarity in different phenomenological experiences.

It is on these concepts existing in the mind that language must be built upon.

The assistant brings the builder a slab because he has been trained to do so. His training consists of being able to identify a slab and bring it to the builder. Being able to identify a slab does not mean forming an inner concept. All that is required is being able to distinguish this thing from the other things he has been trained to identify and bring. All with this one word "slab". — Fooloso4

As regards the thing the assistant brings to the builder, are you a Platonist, such that the slab is a Platonic object that exists independently of the mind and is able to exist through time and space, or a Nominalist?

I am a Nominalist, such that the thing is a particular set of atoms, etc, that exists in the form it has at one moment in time and space, and exists independently of the mind. IE, the particular set of atoms, etc, is one unique, momentary example in the world of what we have in our minds as the general concept "slab".

Yes, of course. I would say to you "What the heck do you mean by that? I have no clue what the bloody non-sense you are talking about." This is a meaningful sentence in our conversation. — Corvus

At least we agree that meaning is an important part of communication.

If "X" simply meant the object, there would be no activity. The meaning of "X" is determined by the activity and not simply by the name of the object. — Fooloso4

True, that's why the foreman doesn't just say "X" but rather "bring me X". The word "bring" determines the activity, not the object "X".

What if the other party didn't know the meaning of "bamba", then what, what would be point of you saying it thinking that you knew the meaning? — Corvus

True, if I said "xx xyx yyxx yxyx", and neither of us knew the meaning of any of the words used, would anything meaningful arise from our conversation?

I recall the first time when I was confronted with the word, I had no idea what it meant, but by reading up the definition in the book, I roughly knew what it meant. — Corvus

We cannot learn the meaning of every word we use in language just from the dictionary, otherwise none of the words we use would have any connection with the world outside language. Sooner or later, there must be some words we use that we learn their meaning directly from the world outside language

The question is, if not "pointing" from the word to something in the world outside language, then how?

Synonyms are not to be used blindly to replace another synonyms just because they are synonyms — Corvus

True, they don't have the same meaning, only similar meanings. As Wittgenstein said, family resemblances.

What do you mean by "successfully" here? Could you please clarify? — Corvus

For the listener to understand the meaning of the sentence.

The word "peffel" can be used by anyone to mean ""part [your] pen and part Eiffel Tower" regardless of your personal feelings about the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower". — Luke

True, once "peffel" has been defined as "part my pen and part Eiffel Tower", anyone can use it in language regardless of my personal concepts of either "my pen" or "Eiffel Tower".

In the same way, anyone can use the word "pain" in language, regardless of anyone's personal sensation of pain.

Violet is not your concept. But your understanding of the concept is accessible to others, depending on how you use it. — Luke

There are public concepts, such that "Violet light is at the higher end of the visible spectrum, with a wavelength from 380 to 450 nm". There are also private concepts, such as my personal experience when looking at something in the world having a wavelength of 400nm.

The point is that our experiences are irrelevant to linguistic meaning; to language use. — Luke

I agree, as with the beetle in PI 293, the beetle drops out of consideration in the language game.

This is obviously not true especially when you consider how a child learns. — Apustimelogist

How can a child successfully use the word "mwanasesere" if they don't know what is means?

Peffel is inaccessible presumably only because its an unusual concept but I see it as no different from a concept like a liger or mule or any other kind of hybrid thing that actually exists in reality and so is therefore an accessible concept. — Apustimelogist

It is true that I can define "peffel" as part "pen and part Eiffel Tower".

But the problem leads to my personal concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", both of which are unique to me, as they have developed over a lifetime of experiences that only I have had.

People can and do use words without knowing the meaning of the word. — Corvus

How can you successfully use the word "bamba" in a sentence if you don't know what it means?

Many things follow from this, but two are central here. The first is that we do not need a theory of the meaning of "slab" in order to do the task at hand - to build the structure. — Banno

In the world is something X that has been named "X". The foreman experiences this something X in the world in his mind as the concept Y. His assistant experiences this something X in the world in his mind as the concept Z.

As shown by PI 293, the beetle, the concepts Y and Z, drop out of consideration in the language game.

It is true that what the something X is in the world is irrelevant as long as foreman says "bring me X" and the assistant brings X.

It is true that the foreman's concept Y may be different to the assistant's concept Z

The foreman may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Y, they would be a philosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to say "bring me X". Similarly, the assistant may look at something X in the world, but if this observation didn't give rise to an inner concept Z, they would also be a philosophical zombie, and wouldn't be able to bring X.

In order for something to happen, for there to be an activity, there must be all the following:

1) There must be an X in the world
2) X must have been named "X"
5) The foreman must say "bring me X"
3) The something X that the foreman looks at must give rise to his inner concept Y
4) The something X that the assistant looks at must give rise to his inner concept Z

If one of these is missing, then nothing will happen. There will be no activity and the assistant won't bring X.

The same principles apply also to "bring" and "me".

If "X" didn't mean X, then nothing would happen and there would be no activity.

What the words "pen" or "Eiffel Tower" mean to you are irrelevant to the meaning of "peffel", which means "part [your] pen and part the Eiffel Tower". Is this not what "peffel" means? — Luke

There are different uses of the world "meaning". The absence of pain means a lot to me and "pain" means "a sharp unpleasant sensation usually felt in some specific part of the body".

In what way is the concept of "peffel" inaccessible to others? You have already defined it for us. Also, in what way is "peffel" a part of any language? Do you ever use the word "peffel" and, if so, how do you use it? — Luke

My concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others as my concept of violet is inaccessible to others. Can you describe in words your personal experience of the colour violet to a colour blind person?

Pointing at objects seems not a key ability to use language. Pointing at objects is primarily for learning words for children.........................Our key ability to use language is, from my point of view, not just uttering simple words, and simple sentences pointing at the object, but also being able to explain the situations, problems as well as trying to solve the problems by giving out some kind of verbal instructions or more information on the object...............I was unsure of your claims that pointing at objects is our key element to use language. — Corvus

We have to learn the meaning of a word before we can use it successfully.

Consider the word "angst".

We could use the dictionary, where "angst" is defined as "a feeling of deep anxiety or dread, typically an unfocused one about the human condition or the state of the world in general". "Anxiety" is defined as "a feeling of worry, nervousness, or unease about something with an uncertain outcome". Continuing, "worry" is defined as "feel or cause to feel anxious or troubled about actual or potential problems". "Troubled" is defined as "beset by problems or difficulties". Either the definitions become circular or are never ending.

The alternative to understanding the word "angst" is by reference to the world outside language. If "pointing" to something in the world cannot be used in our learning of a word such as "angst", then what is the alternative? How do we learn the meaning of "angst" without resorting to "pointing"?

I am using "pointing" to include its synonyms, such as signalling, showing, indicating, gesturing, flagging, labelling, motioning, etc.

So personal and private (as Wittgenstein terms it) are two different things, and you are using the word "private" in the place of both, — Antony Nickles

The experience within my mind caused by a wavelength in the world of 700nm is a private experience, inexpressible to others, in the same sense as Wittgenstein's use of the word.

The point being, if two objects are "red" (based on the context), the color is the same, and not because our personal experiences match up (or that we "agree"). — Antony Nickles

I agree, this is the point of PI 293, that the beetle drops out of consideration in the language game. Within the communal language game we can talk about the colour "red".

If we take the case of someone actually being blind, philosophy would say they have never "experienced" color. But we can still explain the experience of color. — Antony Nickles

I can talk about the colour "red" as being defined as having a wavelength of between 625nm to 750nm, but I can't talk about the private experience within my mind caused by a wavelength of 700nm in the world, as this is inexpressible to others.

Language Idealism presumably means that language shapes reality for humans. — schopenhauer1

A two way process, language shapes reality and reality shapes language.

Richard Gaskin discusses Linguistic Idealism in the YouTube Determinate Content #3: Richard Gaskin on Linguistic Idealism

Suppose someone names an object in the world consisting of the the top half of an apple and the bottom half of an table and names it "appable". Pretty soon people would discover that this object named "appable" had no practical use, and the word would drop out of language. Suppose someone names an object in the world consisting of the top half of an apple and the bottom half of an apple and names it "apple". Pretty soon people would discover that this object named "apple" had a practical use, and the word would become a part of language.

We are told to "bring me an apple". On the one hand, we discover an apple in the world, and are than able to take it to them. Our language has determined not only our conception of the world but also the kind of contact we have with the reality of the world. But on the other hand, the world has shaped our language in that there has been something in the world that has been named "apple" in language.

There has been a synergy between he world and our language. A mutual dependence of which neither takes precedence.

That is to say, there are fundamental things underlying language that means that language might not be the foundational way humans interact with the world. — schopenhauer1

Yes, life began on Earth about 3,700,000,000 years ago, and for about 3,699,900,000 years life managed to survive and evolve within a harsh and unforgiving world, suggesting that language is not fundamental in how life is able to interact with the world.

Thus, we have a direct correlation of object with its "use". — schopenhauer1

There would be no word in language for an object that had no use.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

There are an almost infinite number of possible objects that may be discovered in the world outside language, each of which can be named. Objects found useful outside language may be named, such that the word "appable" is discarded and the word "apple" is kept. This leaves about 500,000 useful words in a typical language.

Wittgenstein wrote that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Within the world outside language, the object appable is as real as the object apple, but within language, the word "appable" may be discarded as of no practical use outside language whilst the word "apple" may be kept as having practical use outside language.

Note that some words such as "unicorn" don't exist in the world outside language but do have a use in language.

Therefore, all possible words have a meaning, whether "appable" or "apple". Yet some of these words are more useful than others, meaning that PI 43 can be reworded as "all possible words have a meaning, but only those words that have a use, whether inside or outside language are used in language.

Embodied embedded cognition...................The theory states that intelligent behaviour emerges from the interplay between brain, body and world. — schopenhauer1

Behaviour emerges from an interplay between brain and world.

George Lakoff talks about Embodied Cognition in the YouTube How Brains Think: The Embodiment Hypothesis

This is related to Enactivism, the proposal that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.

He says that we are born with certain embodied structures in place, within the 100 billion neurons and between 100 trillion and 1 quadrillion connections between these neurons

Within these neurons and connections are embodied concepts. This has the consequence that, in a sense, cognition drops out. When I see a glass of water, it is not the case that "I think I need to drink" but rather "I need a drink".

This is the same point Wittgenstein makes in PI 246:"It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain", because when "I am in pain", there is no point in saying "I know I am in pain".

It may be wrong to describe human behaviour as "intelligent behaviour" if cognition has dropped out of consideration. Unless one defines "a behaviour that allows the body to survive" as "intelligent".

After 3.7 billion years of evolution, the brain has evolved in synergy with the world in which it is living. The structure of the neurons in the brain and their connections is therefore a direct consequence of the particular world in which it exists.

It is then the case that behaviour emerges from an interplay between the brain and the world, accepting that the structure of the brain is a direct consequence of the particular world within which it exists.

That's just quibbling over the definition — Luke

Similar and same mean different things. "The Eiffel Tower is similar to the Blackpool Tower" is true. "The Eiffel Tower is the same as the Blackpool Tower" is false.

Individuals (humans) don't experience Form of Life differently; it's who we are. It's the shared human behaviours and judgements that are common to all humans; our human form of life. — Luke

How can a thirteen year old girl living in Dzivarasekwa, Harare experience the same Form of Life as a sixty year old lawyer living in Bel Air, Los Angeles?

I wrote: Even assuming that in the world there is one Form of Life that encompasses everything within it, whether nature, animals or humans, then the Form of Life will be external to each individual living within it. It may be true that each individual is living within the same Form of Life, but no two individuals can ever have the same experience of it. Each individuals experience of the Form of Life will be different and unique to them.

What is the correct use of Form of Life ?

Since you were able to explain the meaning of the "peffel" concept, then I don't believe this qualifies as a private language — Luke

According to Wikipedia Private Language
In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language – if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others. The private language being considered is not simply a language in fact understood by one person, but a language that in principle can only be understood by one person.

I can define the word "peffel" as "part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower", and I can define "pen" and "Eiffel Tower", but I cannot put into words what the words "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" mean to me, as my concepts of "pen" and "Eiffel Tower" have grown and developed over a lifetime of unique multiple experiences.

Even if I defined "The Eiffel Tower" as "a 300-metre tower built almost entirely of open-lattice wrought iron in Paris", I would then have to define "tower" as "a tall, narrow building". I would then have to define "building" as "a structure with a roof and walls", where a "structure" is "a building constructed from several parts". Definitions are problematic in deciding meaning.

Even in Wittgenstein's terms, as my personal concept of "peffel" is inaccessible to others, it is part of my private language.

What if today assistant doesn't remember which slab he brought to you yesterday, because he delivered so many different type of slabs — Corvus

I would sack him for incompetence.

I guess defining Linguistic Idealism as saying that language is what shapes our understanding more than pre-linguistic or meta-linguistic faculties........However, I would argue there are things that need to be in place for language to even be a thing..............a history of human evolution leading to the ability to use language as humans do................. So in this sense, I would say that leads to a sort of "realism" that gets to a world that has preconditions for his Language Idealism to be a thing — schopenhauer1

I agree that in today's terms, a pre-language Neanderthal would surely be a Realist, with an instinctive belief in the reality of the world with all its present and real dangers.

But the Neanderthal would quickly realise the disconnect between their perception of the world and the reality of the world. In looking for a straight stick, the Neanderthal would initially ignore the stick in the water that appeared half-bent, but would later discover that because a stick is perceived as bent does not mean it is bent in reality. They would also quickly realise that the world didn't disappear when they closed their eyes. They would conclude that things in the world are not perceived immediately or directly. IE, they would not be Direct Realists.

From a review of Dilman Ilham's book Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution: The Question of Linguistic Idealism one reads the following about Linguistic Idealism

Linguistic Idealism is a philosophical concept that explores the relationship between language and reality. It posits that our language is not founded on an empirical reality with which we are in contact through sense perception. Instead, it suggests that our language determines the kind of contact we have with such a reality and our conception of it. Linguistic Idealism is not a form of realism or idealism, but rather an attempt to undermine certain presuppositions of the realist/idealist debate.

In observing the world, we perceive different colours when looking at different wavelengths of light. For some inexplicable reason, even though we perceive the colours from the wavelengths 620 to 750nm as different, we find some similarity between them, and arrive at the concept that can be named "red". This is in a sense Idealism, as our concept only exists in the mind. But in another sense is Realism, as our concept depends on real examples of wavelengths existing in the world. As with Linguistic Idealism, the word "red" is a function of both concepts that only exist in the mind and examples that only exist in the world.

Similarly the Neanderthal must be both a Realist, with an instinctive belief in the reality of the world with all its present and real dangers, and an Idealist, in realising the disconnect between their perception of the world and the reality of the world.

One will never know what slab you are talking about, when you say to your assistant "Bring me a slab." over the phone or in a text message out of blue. However, if you and your assistant are talking facing the piles of slabs in the site, and when you point to a slab from distance "Bring me that slab.", he will know exactly what slab you are referring to. — Corvus

Yes, if me and my assistant are talking facing a pile of things on the site, when I point to one of them and say "Bring me that", he will know exactly what I am referring to.

When pointing to something, I don't even need to name it.

The next day, over the phone, when I tell my assistant "bring me the same thing that you brought me yesterday" he will know exactly what I am referring to.

Once something has been pointed out, it can be referred to without needing to name it again.

Pointing at something in the world is a key aspect in our ability to use language.

I presume that your concept of "slab" is the same as mine, referring to one of the builder's building materials. — Luke

Is the first definition, i), your concept of slab a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape.................If so, then it is the same concept as mine (in this context). — Luke

As definition i) is your definition of a slab but not mine, then we don't agree as to the definition of a "slab". For me a "slab" can be "a large or small, thick or thin, flat or uneven piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape".

I find it hard to believe that two people can have the same concept of any word. For example, in the form that my life has taken, I have designed reinforced concrete slabs, supervised their construction, overseen their movement and have built them with my own hands. Even if you have lived a similar form of life to me, which is probably unlikely, I doubt your concept of slab would be the same as mine.

Form of Life may allow for some relativism between different cultures or time periods, depending on your reading, but it does not allow for relativism between individuals. An individual does not have their own unique Form of Life, just as (and for the same reasons that) an individual does not have their own unique language. — Luke

Even assuming that in the world there is one Form of Life that encompasses everything within it, whether nature, animals or humans, then the Form of Life will be external to each individual living within it.

It may be true that each individual is living within the same Form of Life, but no two individuals can ever have the same experience of it. Each individuals experience of the Form of Life will be different and unique to them.

For many years, I have had the concept of a "peffel" as well as its name, part my pen and part the Eiffel Tower. This word I have found useful when thinking about the ontology of relations, and has been part of my private language, and so far, unique to me.

You may have been butting heads with people (and with understanding the Investigations) because you are saying the word “private” for two things. — Antony Nickles

I appreciate your pointing out that as I don't understand the Investigations, I should be learning from people wiser than me.

The word "private" has many uses, as shown in the Merriam Webster Dictionary. As an adjective:
1a: intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person, group, or class
1b: belonging to or concerning an individual person, company, or interest
1c (1): carried on by the individual independently of the usual institutions, also, being educated by independent study or a tutor or in a private school
1c (2): restricted to the individual or arising independently of others
1d: not general in effect
1e (1): accommodating only one patient
1e (2): staying or recovering in a room accommodating only one patient
2 a (1) not related to one's official position
2a (2) not holding public office or employment
2b: being a private
3a: not known or intended to be known publicly
3b: preferring to keep personal affairs to oneself: valuing privacy highly
3c: withdrawn from company or observation
3d: unsuitable for public display or use
4: not having share that can be freely traded on the open market

So you have been correct to insist that we do have individual feelings, and even experiences that are inexpressible to others entirely (the awe of a sunset)—though ordinary language is perfectly capable of making us intelligible (for us to agree we are like others),..........most of the time your “experience” is just like mine — Antony Nickles

I have a friend who is colour blind. How would you describe to them in words your personal experience of the colour violet?

If it is the case that neither of us can describe in words our personal experience of the colour violet, then how do we know that my personal experience is just like your personal experience?

yes, we might be a “zombie”, a puppet, speaking only others opinions, etc. — Antony Nickles

From Wikipedia Philosophical Zombie: "A philosophical zombie is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal person but does not have conscious experience." A philosophical zombie is not someone who doesn't have their own opinions.

Typically, we don't each play our own individual language-games. It isn't that I have my own concept of slab and you have yours. — Luke

How can you know my concept of Slab? How do you know that our concepts of a "slab" are the same? My Form of Life has been unique to me, the jobs I have had, the countries I have visited. This is the point of Wittgenstein's family resemblances, in that there is no one standard example of a "slab" sitting in a Government Building ready for inspection.

We can agree to the dictionary definition of a slab as i) a large, thick, flat piece of stone or concrete, typically square or rectangular in shape ii) a large, thick slice or piece of cake, bread, chocolate, etc, iii) an outer piece of timber sawn from a log, but many don't see the value in definitions. Definitions can end up circular and change with time.

You wouldn't get very far in the builder's language-game if you repeatedly fetched a hammer in response to the command "Slab!". — Luke

I feel the same in the philosopher's language game.

You are talking about us each having our own private language. Wittgenstein took issue with that idea. — Luke

If concepts didn't exist in the mind, but only in a community, such a community would be a community of zombies, none having a private concept or private sensation.

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein makes the point that Wittgenstein never denied that we have private thoughts and feelings

Other philosophers, I believe, are under the impression that Wittgenstein denies that we can know what we think and feel, and even that we can know ourselves. This extraordinary idea comes, no doubt, from such remarks of Wittgenstein's as: "I can know what 70 * MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking" (II, p. 222); "It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain" (§5!46). But the "can" and "cannot" in these remarks are grammatical; they mean "it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does); it would, therefore, equally make no sense to say of me that I do not know what I am thinking, or that I do not know I am in pain. The implication is not that I cannot know myself, but that knowing oneself-though radically different from the way we know others--is not a matter of cognizing (classically, "intuiting") mental acts and particular sensations.

Having private thoughts and feelings is not the same as having what is called "a private language".

As the analogy of the beetle in PI 293 illustrates, private sensations do drop out of consideration within the language game, not that private sensations drop out of consideration.

Perhaps your idea of Linguistic Idealism doesn't work in various cases.. You can imagine Witt presenting you with a host of language games that breakdown when applied to his theory where it doesn't apply, etc. That is I guess part of his point. So yeah, you can try to pin his theory down in a grand theory of epistemology and ontology, but he would probably say it's a lost cause or something like that. — schopenhauer1

Yes, it may be that Wittgenstein was opposed to theories as any theory can later be shown to be either wrong or incorrect. But if that advice was followed, humans would still be living in caves.

Notwithstanding, PI 43 does set out the distinct theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Even if this theory is shown to be either wrong or incomplete, it is still invaluable in being able to be used as a foundation to develop something better. Because that is how theories work, a gradual improvement with time.

The next step in improving the theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language is to begin to incorporate the principles of Linguistic Idealism, and to clarify the consequences to language of the distinction between Indirect and Direct Realism.

I think there is abundant evidence in PI that Wittgenstein situates language use within the world among a community of speakers, and so there is definitely "a world outside language". For example, he refers to language use as "part of an activity". — Luke

I agree that the Investigations refers to a world of board games, athletic games, ordinary life, civic life, teachers, pupils, communities and other forms of life.

In the Investigations, within the sentence "bring me a slab", I agree that the word "slab" is naming an object in the world. The question is, does this world exist only in language or both inside and outside of language.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

The meaning of the word "slab" derives from its context in the language game being used by the speaker.

When I say "bring me the slab", my concept of "slab" is part of from my language game. When you say "bring me the slab", your concept of "slab" is part of your language game.

But because we have had different forms of life, perhaps you are an engineer in South Africa and perhaps I am a chemist in Ghana , as our language games must inevitably be different, our concepts of "slab" must also inevitably be different.

It cannot be the case that the word "slab" names an object in a world outside language, because, if that were the case, this object in the world outside of language would have to be existing in two different forms at the same time. One form determined by my use of the word "slab" and a different form determined by your use of the word "slab".

I am sure we agree that the object in the world outside language can only have one form. But if that were the case, and my word "slab" names this object, and your word "slab" names the same object, then our concepts and language games must be the same

In fact, everyone who used "slab" in their language must be using the same language game, with the result that within a community there can only be one language game. This would mean that everyone using the word "slab" had the same exact concept of "slab", which is clearly not the case

If Wittgenstein is interpreted as saying that the world of board games, etc did exist not only in the world in language but also in the world outside language, then one consequence would be that everyone's concept of "slab" would be exactly the same, which is clearly not the case.

Wittgenstein is using a method other than what we would "usually call reasoning"; that does not mean it "lacks rationality"; plus that is not a characterization of "ordinary language", so not ambiguous or conflicting with skepticism of our ordinary criteria (not language), which does not come from the desire for self-knowledge, but, if examined, leads to self-knowledge. — Antony Nickles

Cavell in The Later Wittgenstein writes that self-knowledge and ordinary language are two major themes in the Investigations.

p 68 - for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.
PI 132 - We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order.

Self-knowledge naturally leads to scepticism, and the rational justifications of philosophy. But Wittgenstein is not a fan of philosophy.

p 60 - Their method is uniformly what Hume describes as "profound and intense reflection" from which, he says, "sceptical doubt arises naturally"
PI 116 - What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use

However, Wittgenstein does find personal change important, which can only be a result of self-knowledge.

p 72 - Both thought of their negative soundings as revolutionary extensions of our knowledge, and both were obsessed by the idea, or fact, that they would be misunderstood, partly, doubtless, because they knew the taste of self-knowledge, that it is bitter.

I am unclear whether Cavell is making the point that Wittgenstein does or doesn't support self-knowledge. On the one hand it leads to philosophy, which he doesn't approve of, and on the other hand it leads to personal change, which he does approve of.

In other words, your “own understanding” is philosophy’s classic freakout to uncertainty and doubt. — Antony Nickles

As Cavell wrote in The Later Wittgenstein, for Wittgenstein, knowledge starts with self-knowledge, not just simply adopting a method and then blindly accepting its results. Self-knowledge is one of the great subjects of the Investigations.
If the little I have said makes plausible the idea that the question "How do we know what we say (intended to say, wish to say)?" is one aspect of the general question "What is the nature of self-knowledge?" then we will realize that Wittgenstein ·has not first "accepted" or "adopted" a method and then accepted its results, for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.

Skepticism doesn’t come up because of something wrong with ordinary language (and we don’t “believe” in it, or have certain “beliefs” because of it). — Antony Nickles

The Indirect Realist is surely sceptical of the ordinary language of the Direct Realist who, when they say "I see a slab", believes they are directly seeing a slab in the world as it really is.

It's quite isolating though. You are left with your private sensation of pain, and the word pain just becomes this epiphenomenal construction. Also a problem I see here, is that it's hard to see if there is any criteria for anything here. I would normally say the closest epistemology for criteria of meaning would be pragmaticism. In other words, did the usage "get something done in a particular way", but I don't think Witt is saying that either because that has sort of a telos to it (did this usage get this thing accomplished). I don't think he is saying that either necessarily. — schopenhauer1

According to Wittgenstein's PI, what is the purpose of language? Wittgenstein may intend it to have other purposes than as described in the PI, but if we are to take the PI at face value, there seems to be no more purpose for language than to be coherent within itself.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 43 states that the meaning of a word is its use in language. It doesn't continue to say that the use of language is in the world outside language.

Even the phrase "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." as expanded upon in PI 40 can be read as the meaning of a word is its use in language.

It seems easy to read the PI as Linguistic Idealism, whereby language is the ultimate reality, and if this is the case, then language cannot be said to have any pragmatic use outside of language.

It is true that within the PI is the expression "bring me a slab", but what does this word "slab" refer to. It seems to refer to its use within the world of language, not its use in a world outside of language.

Language then becomes an incredibly intricate machine, where one lever hits another cog, which open s a valve which moves a spindle. All meticulously controlled to create an intricate piece of work, such as a Rowland Emett construction. Beautiful in its integrity but having no practical use in a word outside of itself. Each Emett machine is its own language game, each wonderfully coherent but none corresponding to a world outside of themselves.



This may not be the case with the PI, but if so, out of interest, where in the PI is the textual evidence that this is not the case.

PI 293 in giving the analogy of the beetle describes how my private sensation of pain drops out of consideration in the language game. But this is not what I want. I want my pain to have a real world effect outside of language, but this is not something the PI seems to go into.

First, it is a realization so only you can come to it on your own; understanding is not possible without inner change. — Antony Nickles

True, whether I agree or not with the PI is in a sense secondary, as I am using it to help me develop my own understanding of the relationship between the mind and the world using language.

Did you read the Cavell I suggested (attached above starting at p 56?) — Antony Nickles

The two major topics in the PI, self-knowledge and ordinary language, appear to lead into two different directions. Self-knowledge leads into scepticism and Indirect Realism, in that I see a red postbox but this only exists as a representation in my mind, and ordinary language leads into the absence of rationalism and Direct Realism, in that as I see a red postbox there must be a red postbox in the world.

Cavell writes about self-knowledge and ordinary language
p 68 - for the nature of self-knowledge-and therewith the nature of the self is one of the great subjects of the Investigations as a whole.
p 56 - Pole says, or implies, that Wittgenstein regards ordinary language as "sacrosanct"

Self-knowledge comes from self-reflection, from which sceptical doubt arises naturally about the beliefs inherent within ordinary language
p 60 - Their method is uniformly what Hume describes as "profound and intense reflection" from which, he says, "sceptical doubt arises naturally"

Ordinary language is criticised as lacking rational justification and is founded on what the observer believes to be obvious.
p 58 - "We know that there are material objects," "We directly see them," "We know that other persons are sentient," all of which are believed by the vulgar, have been discovered by philosophers to lack rational justification
p 71 - And that is why there is virtually nothing in the Investigations which we should ordinarily call reasoning; Wittgenstein asserts nothing which could be proved, for what he asserts is either obvious (§ 126)-whether true or false-or else concerned with what conviction, whether by proof or evidence or authority, would consist in

From my reading of Cavell, there appears to be a fundamental ambiguity in the PI. On the one hand the lack of rationalism in ordinary language, yet on the other hand a desire for self-knowledge which inevitably leads to scepticism about things such as ordinary language.

As I mentioned, Wittgenstein cites examples of different uses of language at PI 23. He is not saying "the use of a word is meaning is use", as you seem to think. He offers some examples of the different types of uses of language. To quote one of these several examples, a word or sentence could be used for "Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting," to name just a few. These alternative uses of language alone falsify the assertion that language is only used to refer to objects. — Luke

What textual evidence in the PI is there that the PI is not taking the position of Linguistic Idealism?

Linguistic Idealism is the position that language is the ultimate reality. GEM Anscombe in her paper The Question of Linguistic Idealism considered the question whether Wittgenstein was a linguistic idealist.

For the PI , the meaning of a word is its use in language. Within language, a word can be used to describe the appearance of an object, give an order, obey an order, etc as set out in PI 23. But all these things happen within the world of language, not in a world outside language.

It is true that within the PI is the expression "bring me a slab", but what does this word "slab" refer to. It seems to refer to its use within the world of language, not its use in a world outside of language.

It may seem obvious that language must have a use outside of language, but that does not seem to be the position of the PI. If that were the case, then where in the PI is there any connection between the world in language and the world outside language.

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

PI 43 states that the meaning of a word is its use in language. It doesn't continue to say that the use of language is in the world outside language. It doesn't continue to say that language has any use in a world outside language.

Even the phrase "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer." as expanded upon in PI 40 can be read as the meaning of a word is its use in language.

If the PI is taking the position of Linguistic Idealsim, then there is the problem of circularity. As you said "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use".

As I wrote before: "If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world."

If the PI is not taking the position of Linguistic Idealism, with its inherent problem of circularity, then where in the PI is the textual evidence that this is not the case.

The word "unicorn" refers to the definition of the word "unicorn"? Why don't all words do this? — Luke

As @Banno wrote a while ago: I haven't paid this thread much attention, because definitions are not all that helpful, but further, any definition of art will immediately encourage any sensible artist to produce something that does not meet that definition.

If that were true then we could no longer speak about any extinct animal for the names of those animals would no longer exist. — Luke

We only know the "unicorn" by description, not acquaintance. Apart from a few people who have directly seen the fossil of a Tyrannosaurus Rex, most people only know about dinosaurs by description, not acquaintance, as "one of the most ferocious predators to ever walk the Earth. With a massive body, sharp teeth, and jaws so powerful they could crush a car, this famous carnivore dominated the forested river valleys in western North America during the late Cretaceous period, 68 million years ago."

What you have said is similar to: "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use", which is circular. — Luke

Totally agree. I have been trying to get across the idea for weeks that Wittgenstein's theory that meaning is use in language is circular, as I wrote before:
If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world.

To repeat, Wittgenstein opposes Referentialism because it views reference as the only use that words can have. His opposition does not imply that words cannot be used to refer; only that they have more uses than this. — Luke

His theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language requires that words cannot refer to objects in the world.

If I asked you to show me the video game and you constantly referred me back to how you used the code to create the game OR you showed me how you interact with the game using a controller and where people sit in relation to the game, BUT YOU FAIL TO SHOW ME THE GAME ITSELF, something is missing. — schopenhauer1

In Philosophy, some questions are more important than others

Yes, it's as if I asked Wittgenstein how to get to Paris and rather than say that he didn't know, responded with innumerable questions, such as: Is my Paris better than your Lyon? Why does Paris exist? Why is it that Paris is north of Lyon? When did you first want to go to Paris? Who is the Parisian most influential in ballet? Which Parisian can make the best fruitcake?

All well and good, but what one really wants is "take the Eurostar leaving St Pancras at 10.31 tomorrow".

Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy did wrote that the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, not for any definite answer, but for the sake of the questions themselves as they open the mind to possibilities greater than we previously imagined.

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.

Yes, the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, but not asking questions for the sake of asking questions without any underlying direction. But rather it is broader than that, as in questioning theories developed by such questions. For example: What value does the theory of Referentialism have? Does Wittgenstein's theory that the meaning of words is their use in language help our understanding of the nature of language?

There is a quantitative difference between asking questions for their own sake and questioning theories.

There are similarities between Indirect Realism and the meaning of a word is its use in language

I wrote "Yes, as private sensations such as pain drop out of consideration in the language game, as with the beetle in PI 293, objects in the world also drop out of consideration in the language game, as it is the use of objects we are interested in, not the object in itself."

When someone says "bring me a slab", what is the meaning of the word "slab"? Referentialism is initially easier to understand, in that the "word "slab" corresponds with a slab in the world, and someone can literally point the slab out to you. The theory is problematic, however, with words such as unicorn or pain.

Then how does Wittgenstein's alternative theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language work?

In PI 293 is the analogy of the beetle that drops out of consideration in language. This allows us to talk about "pain" without either me knowing your pain or you knowing my pain. The word "pain" in language doesn't refer to any private sensation of pain, but does refer to pain behaviour, in that we never attribute pain to a rock because rocks never exhibit pain behaviour. If a rock did start to exhibit pain behaviour, then we would probably start to attribute pain to them.

Similarly, when we talk about "slabs" in language, the slab in the world has dropped out of consideration in the language game. This is the position of the Indirect Realist, which, according to the Wikipedia article on Direct and Indirect Realism is the view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. We can only ever perceive a picture of a slab, we can never directly perceive the slab itself.

As in language, the word "pain" directly refers to pain behaviour and only indirectly to the cause of the pain behaviour, the word "slab" directly refers to the representation of a slab and only indirectly to the cause of the representation of a slab

There are other examples of cause being conflated with effect. As regards the senses, if I see the colour green, I name its cause as being green. If I hear a grating noise, I name its cause as being grating. If I smell an acrid smell, I name its cause as being acrid. If I feel something silky, I name is cause as being silky. If I taste something bitter, I name its cause as being bitter. As regards objects and their use, a hammer hammers. A pincer pinces. Rain rains. Water waters.

It is the case that in cognition the unknown cause is named after the known effect. Rather than saying "I see your pain behaviour", this is replaced by the figure of speech "I see your pain", conflating the unknown cause "pain" with the known effect "pain behaviour". Similarly, rather than saying "I see a representation of a slab", this is replaced by the figure of speech "I see a slab", conflating the unknown cause slab with the known effect of a representation of a slab.

We directly perceive representations, which have been caused by unknown things in the world. We can give a particular perception a name, such as "slab". By conflating cause with effect, we can then say that the unknown cause in the world is also a slab. The word "slab" gets its meaning from naming a particular perception in the mind, not from naming an unknown thing in the world.

In this sense, the meaning of a word does not come from naming an object in the world, but does come from naming our perception of an unknown something in the world.

This is not “vagueness”. It is a realization that there is no general explanation of “meaning” or “solution” to skepticism. He comes at it from multiple angles to understand how the desire for purity affects different areas of our lives. — Antony Nickles

He does test hypotheses, but you may be confusing the role of the “interlocutor” who represents and expresses the embodiment of the desire for purity (what motivated the Tractatus and the picture of the world that created). — Antony Nickles

I don’t say this to imply there isn’t something clear, specific, rigorous, etc. But just that narrowing it down to positions and statements that we can tell someone misses the point that he is doing something by a certain method which you must participate in to have it become meaningful to you. — Antony Nickles

Taking a few references at random, it does not seem to be the case that it is the reader's problem that they have difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein's writings, but rather the responsibility lies with Wittgenstein himself.

As Wittgenstein himself wrote in the Preface to PI
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination

SEP - Ludwig Wittgenstein
Furthermore, a central factor in investigating Wittgenstein’s works is the multifarious nature of the project of interpreting them; this leads to untold difficulties in the ascertainment of his philosophical substance and method.

Philip Cartright's article on Philosophical Investigations
All I can say is that I’ve been studying Wittgenstein on and off for over twenty years and I still sometimes find myself falling into the same old traps. It is a comfort, however, to realise that Wittgenstein himself seems to have had a similar problem. Again and again in his later works he complains about how hard it is “to keep our heads above water” (§106) and only days before his death he commented “I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again; now her spectacles, now her keys” (On Certainty, §532).

IEP - Ludwig Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and history of analytic philosophy, but he has become rather unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti-scientism stance, because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also because he has been little understood.

Masahiro Oku Osaka University, Japan
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is notoriously difficult to understand.

Try the same with the word "unicorn". If the word "unicorn" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no unicorn in the world then there would be no word "unicorn" in language. Since there is the word "unicorn" in language, then there must be a unicorn in the world. This is the absurd consequence of your argument. — Luke

The word "unicorn" in language cannot refer to something in the world, as no unicorns exist in the world. But rather, the word "unicorn" refers to other words in the language, as in "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead"

It remains a fact that if the word "unicorn " in language depends on its existence on the fact of there being a unicorn in the world, then the word "unicorn" would not exist. However, this is not the case, as the word "unicorn" in language depends on its existence on other words within the language.

Wittgenstein opposes Augustine's theory of Referentialism, which he describes in in PI 2. He sets out his theory that meaning is use in language in PI 43. He proposes that Referentialism is an incomplete theory, in that whilst it may be able to explain the meaning of a word such as "slab" it is not able to explain the meaning of a word such as "slab!". His theory that meaning is use in language, he believes, can, however, explain the meaning of both "slab" and "slab!"

Within his theory that meaning is use in language, in the sentence "bring me the slab", the word "slab" is not being used, as it would be in Referentialism, in naming a slab in the world, but is being used in the sense of meaning is use in language

It would not make sense for Wittgenstein to be in opposition to Referentialism, but then use the word "slab" to name a slab in the world. His own theory that meaning is use in language is more than adequate, he believes (using "believes" as a figure of speech, as who knows what Wittgenstein really believed), to explain that the meaning of "slab" is its use in language, not as naming a slab in the world.

Yes, this accords more or less with what I said here — schopenhauer1

Yes, as private sensations such as pain drop out of consideration in the language game, as with the beetle in PI 293, objects in the world also drop out of consideration in the language game, as it is the use of objects we are interested in, not the object in itself.

Can’t it mean physically pointing to an object? — schopenhauer1

PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Philip Cartright in a blog on PI makes the case that although Wittgenstein appears to write that the word "slab" gets its meaning from pointing at a slab, this is not promoting an Augustinian Referentialism.

The word "slab" has a use in the language game because the object slab has a use in the world. If there was no use for an object such as a slab in the world, then it wouldn't be given a name in language. Even if an object doesn't have a actual present use, it will be named as long as it has a potential future use.

I can learn the names of objects that have no actual present use, on the proviso that there is an understanding that they have a potential future use.

In a sense, the word "slab" is not pointing to a slab, as in Referentionalism, rather it is pointing to either an actual or potential use that is borne by the slab, as in "meaning is use".