I thought I understood what you meant by objective and subjective, so let me clarify it as I've understood it from our past conversations. I assumed that what was 'mind-independent' was essentially the thing in itself. We had spoken about that and I agreed with you that know one can know what the thing in itself is, it can only represent it within its mind. This is what I thought you meant by 'mind-dependent'.

This seems to fit as you revise truth to be objective. As I understood it it would be when a person has a representation of a thing in itself that happens to correspond with the thing in itself. This correspondence is not mind-dependent, as it is not the mind trying to represent the correspondence. The correspondence is a thing in itself.

If I had the above correct, there is nothing objective we can ever reference with any clarity besides, "the thing in itself" But:

You cannot come to know something objective according to your terminology. Objectivity is mind independent. Meaning that its existence is what is without any mind ever attempting to correspond to it.

I disagree. We come to know what is objective through reasoning and observance. We intuit that there is stuff which exists without us trying to think about them and that is what is objective. — Bob Ross

But we can't if I understood it correctly. Reasoning and observance are all subjective representations of the world. What we can conclude are reasoning and observance that seem to correspond with the thing in itself. An active representation of this could be called 'knowledge'. But even knowledge cannot know truth, as truth is an objective thing in itself. We can only at best, represent it correct? Meaning intuition is subjective. The only thing we can know about objectivity through our subjective reasoning, is that we can never know what the thing in itself is.

Once any attempt at correspondence is made, it is now subjective, or mind dependent

No. The claim or statement is trying to express something objective. Of course, we only approach the limit of what objectively is out there; but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist nor that we don’t have good reasons to believe it does — Bob Ross

I agree that we approach the limit of what is objective, or mind-independent by basically using 'lack'. A thing in itself is the thing that we attempt to identify, but it is defined by the fact that it is always a representation and never an actual understanding of what it is in itself.

"An object exists independently and we can come to know that object truthfully".

This just begs the question by invoking “truthfully”; as truth is the correspondence of thought (subjectivity) with reality (objectivity). — Bob Ross

I wouldn't say its begging the question. We can also take correspondence of thought and not know it truthfully. For example, we may believe that a particular apple is healthy, but we're unaware that there is a small rotten piece inside that contains nasty bacteria. We only know when we don't correspond to reality when it demonstrates our correspondence doesn't work. But to know a correspondence doesn't work, that correspondence must be tested. We have plenty of things we subjectively know and believe that are not true, we simply haven't put it to the test yet or misinterpreted the results.

Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross

Therefore, we can refine P2 to mean:
Moral facts are judgements that a particular state of reality is preferable over another possible state of reality, and that these judgements are true.

Moral facticity is not just what you described there. If a fact is a statement that corresponds to reality such that what it purports thereof is and ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory’, then a moral fact is a statement which accurately purports a state-of-affairs about reality that in virtue of which makes the moral judgment true (and thusly a fact). This means that there are states-of-affairs, if there are moral facts, that do inform us how reality ought to be, which violates P1. — Bob Ross

But Bob, if something is permissable, omissable, or obligatory, then this can be simplified to what 'should' or 'should not' be. Within the language that implies states of affairs. Morality is about comparing states of affairs and deciding which one is permissable, omissable, or obligatory. If you eliminate states of affairs, or make "reality" the combined set of all states of affairs, then you ALSO eliminate morality. To state something moral is by definition to state, "Reality in this state is better than in this state."

If P1 does not address states of reality, then you cannot have morality. Your true P2 should be "Morality is the claim that reality in one state is permissable, omissable, or obligatory over comparative states of reality". While P1 can indicate that any particular state alone cannot demonstrate morality, it doesn't negate the fact that morality is an act of comparison. If you cannot compare, you have no morality.

A potential state of reality in the sense of what could possibly happen due to the current state does not inform us of what ought to be either. You could tell me “this ball will probably hit this other ball” and I would not know from that claim anything normative, although I would know something about the next potential state of reality. — Bob Ross

That's simply untrue. As soon as you compare states of reality you have a moral choice. That's the only way something is permissable. To be permissable it must be the case that we can change the state to something else that is not permissable.

If for example a baby is about to get shot, you have time to decide what the future reality will be. You could shoot the shooter first. Step in front of the baby. Dive Hollywoodesque in slow motion to move the baby out of the way. These choices come about because we have in our head at a minimum two outcomes. Dead baby or living baby in a future state of reality. What is permissable? We only know this by comparing the two outcomes.

If I was a being that was born into a reality without time where a baby lay dead, then yes, this slice of reality alone cannot tell me what is morally permissable. In this only, I completely agree with P1. It is only after experiencing multiple states of reality and comparing them can we come to conclusion that some states of reality 'should' exist over others. Morality does not exist in a stateless non-comparative state. It only exists in a stateful comparison analysis.

Lets translate this into simpler terms:
1. Moral judgements are made by subjects (minds)
2. Moral judgements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one moral judgement corresponds with reality.

#1 here is not a summary of prong-1 (of the thesis). Prong-1 is moral cognitivism, which is the view that moral judgments are truth-apt statements (i.e., propositions) and not that moral judgments are made by subjects.

#2 is also false. Moral judgments expressing something subjective is not the same thing as judgments being expressions of subjects. Again, this is a conflation between statements and judgments being subjective and whether or not they express something objective/subjective.

#3 True! (: — Bob Ross

Ah, I see with point one. To more accurately reflect this I would change
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]
into
1. True moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]

This would then follow with:

2. True moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]
I would tweak this once again to, "We can make subjective moral judgements that are true."

#2 is also false. Moral judgments expressing something subjective is not the same thing as judgments being expressions of subjects. Again, this is a conflation between statements and judgments being subjective and whether or not they express something objective/subjective. — Bob Ross

If truth is objective, then yes, true moral judgements are not subjective. We of course cannot know if they are true because we cannot, as subjects, know what is objective. It is a correspondence that happens despite our beliefs or observations as what is objective is completely independent from minds (subjects). The tweak I made I think makes this more clear.

3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].

Taken as a thesis and not a proof, this is fine. This still does not negate that there is not really anything meaningful stated here. Replace, 'true moral judgements' with 'true statements' and its still the same thing. So my criticism of this lacking any meaningful weight still holds for me.

As we can see, all this argument notes is that we can think say or do things, and maybe they correspond with reality. This indicates nothing that should be done.

It indicates what moral properties subsist in or of and what their nature is. Of course it doesn’t indicate what should be done, because it isn’t a normative ethical theory. That’s what I was trying to convey in the other thread! Metaethical theories should not be conflated with normative theories! — Bob Ross

Lets simplify this further. You set up some definitions and propositional assumptions without a conclusion. That's not a normative theory. A theory has a conclusion with proof. No one cares about normative or metaethical as concepts except scholars with too much time on their hands. Did you come up with a theory of morality that is meaningful and useful to others? That's all that matters. It is a trap in philosophy I've seen many brilliant people fall into over the years. To focus on terminology and miss the one true point: usefulness and applicability. Take my advice here as an equal: eliminate any words or phrases that does not make your arguments as simple and clear as possible. Use George Orwells six points of writing. It is an ongoing battle for myself as well, but it is the way to make clear and meaningful arguments. An insistence on a normative and metaethical separation is missing the trees in the forest. You didn't do anything meaningful in your setup.

But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds.

I think you are trying to step outside of morality, but I say that action implicitly concedes that morality exists. You cannot go and eat a sandwich without implicitly, in action, conceding it is morally permissible to do. You can say “morality doesn’t exist”, but your actions do not match your words. — Bob Ross

There is nothing implicit about it though. For something to be permissible, there is an implication that something is not permissible. Does that mean that not eating a sandwich implicitly concedes it is impermissible? Action simply implies something has been done. The question of whether that action should have been committed or not is morality. If you state that all actions are permissible, then no actions are impermissible. In which case, there is no question of how we should act, and thus no morality.

Depends on what you mean. It certainly answers what the nature of morality is and what moral properties subsist in or of and answers various metatethical concerns underpinning normative ethics. — Bob Ross

I don't see that at all. Basically what you've done is set up basic definitions.

1. There is truth, definitions of objective, subjective.
2. We are subjects. What we say, do, think, comprehend, etc is subjective.
3. What is objective is mind-independent. Truth is mind-independent, therefore objective.
4. Morality is what is permissible. You have not given a clear example of what is permissible with any proof. Only that we can make moral judgements, and if they correspond with reality, or what is objective, its true.
4. Because we are subjects, morality is subjective.
5. Except that this is true for any statement, word, or concept in existence because of the way you've defined subjective. Making this statement meaningless and getting us no where closer to understanding or solving the question of morality.

No. Moral cognitivism is that moral judgments are statements that are truth-apt. Whether or not any of them are true needs a different argument because it is a different claim. — Bob Ross

Again, I can replace 'Moral cognitivism' with any phrase I want. "Claims about dogs are statements that are truth-apt." Any statement is truth-apt Bob. If you claim there is truth, and that statements which are true are those that correspond with reality, that's all you need. If its true, its 1+1=2. We don't call it "Cognitive number theory vs non-cognitive number theory". We call it math.

I only say this because I think you're brilliant Bob. I do not mean to say this as talking down to you, but with great respect as I see your amazing potential. Yes, we must understand the names to be successful in the philosophical world. I understand. But don't get caught up in naming math. DO math. Because you can while so many can't. Let them worry about naming it. While I disagree with your repurposing of subjective and objective for the reason's I've given, the underlying concept as I've understood it from your previous writings makes sense. That's the math. Math is what changes the world and allows humanity to achieve great things. I don't care what you call it. Neither should you.

With all due respect, you are though! It doesn’t matter what terms you call them. At the end of the day you are claiming that “morality is objective” without providing any justification for it; or the justification you have given doesn’t prove it is objective — Bob Ross

It is perfectly fine that what I describe fits normative and metaethical within your head. I do this often in philosophy, translating terminology into my own, but then translating it back out into the language of the speaker where I can. I do not want to have a debate about what normative and metaethical are. As I've mentioned in prior discussions, I find words like this often unintentionally hide clarity, especially when they are introduced by someone else. First lets see if you understand the terms as given, then lets see if more vocabulary or other ethical theories are needed for comparison.

But I'm glad we can just agree to get to the point because I want to have some fun thinking about something new Bob! Let me repost the argument once more so we can continue. I'll flesh out points I think you had some questions about.

1. Good is what "should" be.
2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.
3. If there is a reason for something, that reason may also have a reason for why it 'should' be.
4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?
5. As this is a binary, only one can be correct.

Note on 4: You seemed to imply that number 4 wasn't a given. I'll walk through it.

Lets say I say, "I should help a person in need." Why? "Because I want to alleviate their suffering." Why? "Because suffering is bad." Why? I could go on like this for some time, but at one point there will be the question, "Why should they exist?" We can give a lot of human reasons why they should exist, but this again will drill down into, "Why should humanity exist?" We can give the reason, "We like existing," but we're not asking a personal opinion.

We're asking why it should be beyond our own opinions. We're looking for the calculus of the universe. Gravity does not need our opinions, it is a measurable and repeatable event. Same with the question of morality. What measurable and repeatable event can demonstrate that humanity should exist? The question of 'should' is not a human one. It is an existential one.

Of course, this then leads into the question, "Why should a calculus exist? Why should there be anything measurable?" Whatever the answer there, we finally get into the prime question, "Why should anything exist?" To simplify this further, we get down to the idea of an Aristotelian atomic existence versus the idea of complete nothingness. Should there be something, or nothing? At this point, there is no other reducible option, nothing prior to reference. For without answering this question first, no other 'should' question has an answer. It is the base to build the house, the floor for our legos. :)

With that, I attempt the next set.

6. Attempt to claim that 'nothing' is what should be.
7. If it were the case that nothing should be, and it were possible to find a reason, this reason must exist.
(I'll rewrite the above to be clearer, but kept the original for reference)
7 Revised: If it were the case that nothing should be, there must be a reason.
8. There can be no reason to explain why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' if there is nothing.
9. Therefore it is not possible to claim that it is good for nothing to exist through any reason. This leaves the binary that existence is what should be. — Philosophim

I did note that this binary only exists if morality exists at an existential level. If of course morality does not exist at this level, this binary does not exist. For our purposes, we're going to assume morality exists. As well, just because we've proven one side of the binary false, it does not mean we haven't shown that the other side of the binary is not also false.

9. Attempt to claim that 'something' is what should be.
10. If it is the case that existence should be, there needs to be a reason behind it.
11. For there to be a reason, there must be existence.
12. Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be. It is the prime reason upon which all other moral questions are built upon.
13. Thus, "Should existence be?" The answer is yes. If it is not, then nothing should be and there is no morality. But this leads to a contradiction. — Philosophim

I'll let you take it from there Bob. Keep the vocabulary simple. Do not introduce other moral theories. Even remove the idea of objective and subjective if it helps. Simply take the terms as given and see if the conclusions hold water.

After reading I think this all comes down to the terms subjective and objective. Now that I've seen your definition, its necessary they be included in your 'pre-requisites' section

This is already in the OP under ‘Brief Exposition of a Correspondence Theory of Truth’, which, I would say, is where it should be: — Bob Ross

My apologies! I reskimmed and missed it. Your argument is dense, so I did not retain it after I had finished reading your OP the first time. That's on me. :)

You are saying the same thing I am saying, but less refined. I say there is no such thing as an objective statement because all statements are subjective, you are merely predicating that subjective statement with ‘objective’ if it is true in virtue of corresponding to some mind-independently existing state-of-affairs. — Bob Ross

If you wish to define subjective this way, that's fine. But if this is true, what's the point of the word? If all statements are subjective, why not just say "statement"? "Subjective statement" is redundant at that point as there is no contrast. The term subjective is only uniquely useful in contrast with an "objective statement". If you eliminate the vocabulary of objective statement, then you may as well eliminate the term "subjective statement" as well.

Finally, the elimination of these terms does not eliminate the original concepts they embodied. There is still the question of making a statement in regards to utilizing only your personal viewpoint, or making a statement that can be logically agreed upon by all potential viewpoints. But if this is your choice, that is fine. I'll re-examine your argument using what you've provided.

‘trueness’ is the property ascribed to statements of which what they allege of (refer to about) reality correspond/agree with reality with respect to that specific regard — Bob Ross

What you've done here is make trueness subjective. I did read your other post, and your conclusion that truth is a merge of the two doesn't fit. Either something is mind independent, or mind dependent. This is the clear binary you've created. A statement is mind-dependent. I see your intention is to say, "I'm taking this objective thing, having a subjective stance about this objective thing, and if the two correspond, this is true." Really, this is the same as saying you take an object and subjectively identify it in a way that corresponds with reality. I have no issue with this. But to say that it is neither objective nor subjective is false. To be mind independent is to be free of any mind. To be mind dependent is to have at least an iota of mind in there. :) It is still mind dependent, as without a mind, you cannot make a true statement.

A statement from a mind that is true = Subjective
A statement from a mind that is false = Subjective

I have no problem with this as long as the definitions are consistent and logically flow. This is again the problem of 'everything is now subjective' and it devalues any meaning to the term. I'm addressing this now as it will become relevant soon.

Addressing P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.

(Me) In very simple terms, this doesn't work because you forgot the possibility of different states of reality.

(You) I don’t think comparing potential states of affairs (of reality) helps get around P1. P1 is the claim that it doesn’t matter what is the case about reality at all when it comes to what ought to be: what ought to be is despite what is. — Bob Ross

If the intention is, "What ought to be is despite what is", I agree. This assumes that what is could be something different, which is a core consideration of a moral statement.

I would just say that objectivity is that which exists mind(stance)-independently and we come to know it subjectively because we are subjects—what tool can we use that isn’t ultimately contingent on us observing it? — Bob Ross

You cannot come to know something objective according to your terminology. Objectivity is mind independent. Meaning that its existence is what is without any mind ever attempting to correspond to it. Once any attempt at correspondence is made, it is now subjective, or mind dependent. You can say 'an object' exists independently, and we can come to know that object subjectively. Again, since subjectivity is simply the act of a mind, or a subject, trying to know the object, we can eliminate the word subjectivity and simply state "An object exists independently and we can come to know that object truthfully". Nothing is lost by removing the term subjectivity when it is a redundant term.

I read the rest of your comments and think I understand what you are going for now, so I'll restart from my original critique again. As always, please correct me when I'm off!

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist. — Bob Ross

Now that I believe I much better understand your approach to subjectivity, I do not understand how you arrived at your conclusion here.

P1 is fine with the clarification that it means "What ought to be is despite what is". This implicitly includes states. For example, reality now vs reality one minute later. There is nothing within the current state explicitly which states it should be some other state. That is for us to judge when comparing this state with another possible state.
P2 is also fine. But lets clarify what you stated in your own terminology.

(

Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross

Therefore, we can refine P2 to mean:
Moral facts are judgements that a particular state of reality is preferable over another possible state of reality, and that these judgements are true.

These two statements alone do not lead to your conclusion that moral facts cannot exist. We're missing some steps! All you've done is create definitions. These definitions do not lead to this conclusion. P1 does not lead to any conclusions about P2. You would need to prove that P2 is false before you reached your conclusion. As is, P2 is merely a definition without an assertion of its truth or falsity.

If I had to guess what you were originally going for, I think you were neglecting potential states as part of the moral consideration and simply noting that reality at any time/state could not indicate what it should be in the next state. I understand the intention this way, but it doesn't work because morality does not only consider the current state of reality.

But perhaps the above is irrelevant if we look at your next argument.

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross

Lets translate this into simpler terms:

1. Moral judgements are made by subjects (minds)
2. Moral judgements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one moral judgement corresponds with reality.

The problem is this isn't anything meaningful. I can replace "moral judgements" with the word statements, and statements meaning "Any thought, word, belief, or expression".

1. Statements are made by subjects
2. Statements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one statement corresponds with reality.

Of course, we haven't actually proved number 3 with our setup. The only real conclusion we can make is:
"Either at least one statement is true, or none are true."

I believe you prove that at least one statement is true if you amend the language of the subject to be self-referential, which is fine.

As we can see, all this argument notes is that we can think say or do things, and maybe they correspond with reality. This indicates nothing that should be done. It does not address states of reality as they should be. It does not indicate any criteria as to what defines morality. Is what "should" be done central to the individual, or is there something universal we can all agree on with logic? This is again a problem when you reduce "subjective" to meaning, "Any statement by a subject".

As a comparison with my knowledge theory, if you recall I noted that all knowledge starts with a discrete experience. Which means that all knowledge, language, etc. comes from an experiencer, or a subject. I did not belabor that point. Its very quickly addressed and moved on from because its just a starting point to fix problems from. The idea that you need a subject to think or say anything is a given. The idea that subjects are what consider any moral question is also a given. What can we logically conclude about morality from that starting point? Is there a logic that we must all rationally agree upon which leads to a morality everyone can logically ascertain? Or is morality simply what each individual wants, an expressed desire for singular or cultural ego?

Let me address the remaining points where relevant.

Moral cognitivism is the metaethical position that moral judgments are truth-apt
P1: If moral non-cognitivism is true, then ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’ is not a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.

P2: ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’ is a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.

C: Therefore, moral non-cognitivism is false. — Bob Ross

Let me break this down further:

1. Moral cognitivism is the idea that there are true moral judgments
2. Assume moral cognitivism is false, that there are no moral judgements which are true.
3. I have the moral statement: "When I am drunk, I shouldn't drive and instead call a taxi."
4. Holding to point 2, this moral judgement is not true.
5. But point 3 is true.
C: Therefore moral cognitivism is true.

The problem is point 5 has not been proven to be true. A logically valid and intelligible conditional statement may very well not be true. What is true is a correlation with reality. A logically valid and intelligible conditional has not been proven to always be true.

But, you then attempt to prove that there is at least one moral judgement that is true. And if that is the case we can replace point 3 with that true statement and the argument will work.

P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’.

P2: People do not ‘lie down and starve to death’.

C: Therefore, some moral judgments must be true. — Bob Ross

Here was my original statement and your reply.

P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’. — Bob Ross

(Me)This statement is a contradiction. If there are no moral judgements, then there is nothing one has to do. Therefore one would not have to 'lie down and starve to death'.

(You) Not quite. I was claiming that doing something entails at a minimum the concession that it is morally permissible; so if one can’t even agree that it is permissible to do X, then they can’t do X because they don’t affirm that it is permissible. I think you would have to contend with the collapse of morals into actions to say that one can do something even if they don’t find it morally permissible. — Bob Ross

But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds.

Alright, a rather long one from me! I'm still off for the holidays so I have time on my hands. I'm enjoying the exploration Bob, keep at it!

Why P2 and P1 are true is irrelevant to my point, as I can grant those: this argument has no metaethical claims in it. I am almost certain now that you are conflating normative judgments with metaethical judgments. — Bob Ross

Bob, this has nothing to do with the argument. I'm not conflating anything. When the author is not using vocabulary that you then introduce, then you say the author is not meeting the standards of that vocabulary you have introduced, you are committing a straw man fallacy. I am not using metaethical or normative claims in the argument. If you want to see it that way in your own head, that's fine. From my viewpoint, its unnecessary vocabulary that is leading you to misunderstand the simplicity of the argument.

I would say, if I accepted this as a moral subjectivist, that the shorthand ‘something should be’ and ‘nothing should be’ are both moral statements which express something subjective and when evaluated relative to myself I do believe that ‘something should be’ and do not believe ‘nothing should be’. — Bob Ross

Yes, and there is nothing wrong with that. For the clarity of the conversation, lets us also understand 'subjective' in the normative view, not your own interpretation. Meaning a subjective moralist would be one who believes that what is moral is based on one's personal benefit, or even collective subjective culture. But then I would ask, "Why should someone's personal benefit matter?" This leads to: "Why should humans even exist?" And finally we arrive once again to, "Why should anything exist?" All claims of morality lead to this ultimate question Bob. It is the eternal "Why" from a child until we finally get to the point where there is nothing prior. :)

Even going down the chain to its ultimate point, you'll also notice I added a very subjective viewpoint as an option in my last post. "Does morality exist?" You can decide it doesn't. This leads to consequences however that I don't think anyone truly believes in. I suppose the real question is, "Does objective morality exist?" If you say no, then of course we're left with either subjective morality or existential nihilism. The argument is not proving that objective morality exists. Its simply proving that all moral questions boil down to this binary, and proving what objective morality must be if it does exist. Lets make sure we're on the right page of for 'objective' as well. We're using the normative definition. To simplify, objective means that any human using logic and deductive evidence must come to the same conclusion regardless of their individual viewpoint of the world. Subjective and objective claims are all things a subject makes, not an object. The word 'object' has nothing to do with them.

To enter the discussion, you do not have to agree that objective morality exists, you simply have to assume it does. If it does, what logically would it be, and how would it build? So going forward in this discussion, simply assume objective morality exists. We really can't continue to discuss until that happens. Don't worry, it doesn't mean you agree with it personally, we're just exploring the logical consequences if this is the case.

Avoiding contradictions, as a normative judgment, is not necessarily a judgment that expresses something objective. For example, by contrast to my view, I accept that ‘one ought to abide by the law of noncontradiction’ but I reject that that judgment is expressing something objective. — Bob Ross

First, lets remove 'normative judgements'. I'm not using that vocabulary in my post. My argument is that within a binary argument in which one option must be false while the other is true, proving one option as false necessarily makes the other true. If an objective morality exists, then this is the binary we are left with.

You have to provide an argument for why I should accept not ‘there should be existence’ but that that moral judgment is expressing something objective. — Bob Ross

And this sums up why we're having difficulty. My point here is not to argue that there is an objective morality or argue against a subjective morality. Its taking an objective morality as assumed, then logically piecing together what that would be if true. Go with that and I think we'll have some fun exploring this Bob.

This is too vague: what do you mean by ‘morality exists’? That there is at least one true moral judgment? That moral judgments are propositional? That they express something objective? — Bob Ross

That there is an objective measure of what should be.

I had concluded this long ago, and it suddenly came back to me. This is 'the choice'. Do you decide that morality exists, or not? If not, then we are done

This seems like your argument collapsed into moral non-objectivism — Bob Ross

Its a little more than that. It is a choice between moral nihilism and moral objectivity. I believe that subjective morality also descends into moral nihilism, but lets not have that discussion here. I think we're having that discussion in another of your threads. To keep the discussion on track here, we'll just use the assumption of, "What if there was an objective morality? What would that logically look like?"

Alright, so assuming that there is an objective morality (It doesn't mean you agree!), lets look at the rest of the argument and see if it has any merit. Great points as well Bob. If we need to revisit at some point whether we need to see if a subjective morality can exist as a viable alternative, I will gladly revisit it. Its just out of the scope of the argument at this time and not what I really want to explore at this time.

After reading I think this all comes down to the terms subjective and objective. Now that I've seen your definition, its necessary they be included in your 'pre-requisites' section. If you do not define them specifically, then people are going to assume they are the traditional definitions of subjective and objective. The argument won't go anywhere because they'll think you mean the normative terms, not your revisions.

Can you clarify what the (stance) means as well?

As is, your statements about subjective and objective veer wildly from their original intent. The terms objective and subjective generally refer to statements. Thus there is an objective statement and a subjective statement. When you state the term objective means "that which is mind independent", what is 'that'? Is it existence?

Even further, this begs the question that your definition of subjective and objective are true. Why do we need to redefine these terms? Is it so you can use the word 'subjective', even though it would have nothing to do with the original meaning of the term subjective? This would be a widely misinterpreted argument to give to others if you've deviated strongly from the terms' original meaning without very carefully clarifying what you mean.

If you mean to simply clarify the difference between an object and a subject, this can be done without changing the meaning of the original words. An object can make no objective or subjective judgements. Only a subject can. The reason we have the terms objective and subjective are to give meaning to the judgements a subject makes. When you make objective and subjective as 'not a subject' vs 'a subject' it just changes the entire meaning of the terms. If you want to make that argument, I would suggest making the argument with subjects and objects and not use the terms objective or subjective at all to ease confusion and clarify the argument.

I'll wait for you to clarify the exact intent of your use of subjective and objective. Your argument may very well be correct if I understand the meaning behind your terminology. Once I understand, I'll re-examine your argument with that in mind and see if I reach some different conclusions.

Certainly, let me see if I can break it into a simple and clear logic statement Bob.

1. Good is what "should" be.
2. If something 'should' be, there is a reason for it.
3. If there is a reason for something, that reason may also have a reason for why it 'should' be.
4. All chain of reasoning reduces down to the final question, "Should existence be, or not"?
5. As this is a binary, only one can be correct.

6. Attempt to claim that 'nothing' is what should be.
7. If it were the case that nothing should be, and it were possible to find a reason, this reason must exist.
7. There can be no reason behind why nothing should be, as there is 'no reason' behind 'nothing'.
8. Therefore it is not possible to claim that it is good for nothing to exist through any reason. This leaves the binary that existence is what should be.

But, you may not be satisfied with this, as we need to examine the other binary.

9. Attempt to claim that 'something' is what should be.
10. If it is the case that existence should be, there needs to be a reason behind it.
11. For there to be a reason, there must be existence.
12. Existence is, and has no prior reason for being besides the fact that it is. As such, it is the foundational good. It is the prime reason behind all questions of what should be. It is the prime reason upon which all other moral questions are built upon.
13. Thus, "Should existence be?" The answer is yes. If it is not, then nothing should be and there is no morality. But this leads to a contradiction. What should be for morality to exist? Existence.

Now let me address your points to see if I can continue to clarify this.

I would like to point out that the answer to this is subjective (by my lights) and if it isn’t then I would need to know how you know that moral properties subsist in something mind-independent and what that is. — Bob Ross

It is not subjective because it is necessary to avoid a contradiction in the question of morality, and necessary for morality to exist.

1. It is entirely possible to affirm that ‘nothing should exist’ without presupposing that anything exists, and I am not sure why you think this is false. Saying ‘nothing should exist’ entails that there shouldn’t be anything, and this certainly does not presuppose anything existing. — Bob Ross

No, I am stating it is not possible to affirm that 'nothing should exist' without a reason existing. 'Nothing' cannot justify that existence should not be.

Just because we cannot claim “nothing should exist” without accepting a contradiction it does not follow that there are any moral properties which are reducible to existence nor that any exist (mind-independently) at all. — Bob Ross

Yes, the moral property is, "There should be existence". Remember, the question is a binary. Should there, or should there not be existence?

I don’t think this is good epistemology: if you have two exhaustive options, A and B, and A cannot be justified as true, then it is not justified thereby to affirm B as true. B needs support for why it should be regarded as true or A needs to be demonstrated as false. — Bob Ross

You are correct. I've been approaching this a binary with an implicit argument. But its really not. I'll make that explicit not. First, let us clarify that this is a question of total nothingness. Should there be at least one thing, or only nothing.

A. Only nothing should be. - If this is true, then 'Something should not be'.
B. Something should be - If this is true, then 'Only nothing should be' is false.

Here's the implicit I am now making explicit because there is a second binary.

A. Morality exists
B. Morality does not exist

If morality does not exist, then the original binary is irrelevant. Neither nothingness nor somethingness should exist. The first binary only has relevance with the implicit notion that "morality exists".

So the question of "Should there exist at least something, or only nothing" implicitly has the assumption that morality exists. If we say, "Yes," then the foundational basis for morality is existence, because existence should exist for morality to be. But if the answer is no, then there is no morality.

I had concluded this long ago, and it suddenly came back to me. This is 'the choice'. Do you decide that morality exists, or not? If not, then we are done. There is no justification for anything, including the existence of yourself. There is only existential nihilism. But of course, if you do not end yourself, then you are saying you 'should' exist. In which case you are claiming there is morality. In which case, the only logical foundational basis for this morality is that there should be existence.

If however you do choose that morality exists, then logically, the only conclusion is that existence should be. For without existence, morality cannot exist.

I'm glad for your pointed questions, as this had brought back an issue that needed to be addressed. Hopefully this clarifies the initial set up a bit more.

what if you were thinking about opening a factory that you knew would kill 1,000 people a year from the pollution, do you think that’s permissible to do? Does it depend on how many people you think will be saved from whatever you are manufacturing? — Bob Ross

Yes, it does depend on how many people are saved, and a host of other factors. How many get sick? Does this sow distrust and chaos in society? There are a ton of factors.

At the end of the day I'm weighing the life of one child vs the lives of every other human being on this planet. The benefit vs cost is overwhelming in the case of torturing the child. Now, if we could also have humanity live and not torture a child? Sure. Just like if we could get the benefits we do in producing things minus the pollution. Or be able to eat animals without enacting any suffering on them at all.

Its not that we don't wish for a better situation, but the situation as given is the horrible outcome we must pick vs the even more horrible outcome of the elimination of the entire human race. This of course is all tantamount to "What is good?" Without an answer there, its just opinion vs opinion.

The multiple meanings of words suggests to me that people have suppled various meanings to the words rather than the word supplying various meanings to them. — NOS4A2

This is true. A word without any meaning is simply a noise. Once meaning is applied to a word, then communicated to others it becomes part of a shared language between the two. If this expands out, this can become part of the shared language of many people like slang. Eventually it can be recognized as a valid word with definitions as part of a full blown language.

The context or “use” may hint at your intention, your meaning, but the meaning itself is not present in the word, context, or use itself. — NOS4A2

If context is the involvement of people's intentions, environment, culture and state of being, I'm not sure what's left after its elimination. Perhaps what you are intending is that a person's intention to use a word is not necessarily understood by another. Which is fine. There is the meaning as intended to be conveyed, the meaning as the other person accepts the conveyance, and the meaning as both understand and misunderstand each other.

Lets approach this as an engineer would. What do you mean by "better"? Do we want a language to be terse or verbose? The former is easy to learn but lacks nuance, while the later is more difficult to learn but has more fine tuned expression.

Should a language be strictly enforced or lax? The former creates a very strict and uncreative language while the later allows creative evolution.

If you can clearly define what is better, then you can determine if there is a better language for those parameters. Of course, claiming something is better does not prove that it is better either. Just some things to consider before there can be a clear answer.

The basic question is this: are words more than their symbols? — NOS4A2

Absolutely. You do not need an inner monologue to conclude this. First, there are many words that have multiple meanings through definition alone.

The word 'crane' can mean a bird, or it can mean a machine that you use to lift heavy objects. What this logically leads to is the meaning of the word is based on 'context'. Context is based on the environment, your previous words, and conveyed intentions. With context, we can take the word crane and use it for something it was never intended to, like a pun or a person's name.

"Crane was so good at operation, it was is the crane flew."

First, I love original attempts at proof of God arguments! Well done. Lets see if it holds.

1. Any simulation of a world either operates mechanically in physical space (e.g., in a computer) or is the result of information processing in a mind (e.g., a programmer’s mind).

Can you clarify what simulation means? How does this contrast with reality? The idea of a simulation entails an emulation of what is real correct?

For now, the only thing I can conclude is that you are currently claiming that "Our current reality is a simulation of the world."

2. The success of digital physics and the holographic principle imply that physical space is an emergent 3D representation of information processing.

So far you haven't declared what physical space is, we're assuming this is a simulation. That means we have to add an adjective for this statement to still be clear. "...imply that simulated physical space..."

With this, you're still good.

3. Quantum cognition and decision theory have shown that information processing in a mind exhibits quantum principles known to underlie the emergence of physical space.

Once again, add "simulated physical space" because you have not yet declared what non-simulated space would be.

4. From (2) and (3), the information processing from which physical space is emergent is scientifically indistinguishable from the information processing that occurs in a mind.

As long as we retain "simulated physical space", this seems fine.

5. Restating (1) in terms of (4), our world is either scientifically indistinguishable from the result of information processing in a mind, or it is the result of information processing in a mind.

Finally we have to add, "our simulated world..." and this holds.

6. Therefore, our world is the result of information processing in a mind, this mind we call God.[/quote]

Finally you can state: "Therefore, our simulated world is the result of information processing in in a mind, this mind we call God."

We can call it God if we want, but the mind could also be called a "human" or "computer". So, very cool idea, but as you can tell without first contrasting what a simulation is vs what a non-simulated world is, its mostly circular. I've done a couple of "Prove God" posts in my past if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8924/a-fun-puzzle-for-the-forums-the-probability-of-god/p1
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Hello Bob, I'm happy to explore morality with you on multiple fronts here, as its a very deep topic and requires a lot of consideration from all possible sides. This is a good breakdown of your theory and seems very well written and clear. However, I see some issues with a few of the statements. Lets start at the top.

First, I agree with your pre-requisite to Meta-ethics section! Its good grounds to start and needed for the discussion. If I were to say one thing, it is to go back and clearly define what you mean by objective and subjective as well. Onto the discussion!

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist. — Bob Ross

In very simple terms, this doesn't work because you forgot the possibility of different states of reality. If we took a frozen snapshot of existence, or how things are, without any other comparisons; you would be correct. But if we have seen multiple states of existence, we can compare different states and claim, "That state of reality is superior to this state of reality."

Lets flesh out your statement so that its conclusion can be true.

P1: The way reality is at any moment, in isolation of any other consideration of other potential states of reality, does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be. This requires a consideration of states of reality in comparison to the current state of reality.
C: Therefore, if we consider a state of reality in isolation of all other potential states of reality throughout time, moral facts cannot exist.

And I would agree with this. But lets include other potential states of reality.

P1: The way reality is at any moment, in isolation of any other consideration of other potential states of reality, does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: But, if we include other potential states of reality, we can compare them to declare that one state is better over another.
P3: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: We do not have the criteria yet for "what is better" so cannot determine at this time if it is objective or subjective.

So I do not see the original conclusion: "Therefore, moral facts cannot exist." once you introduce comparative potential states of reality. Still, lets continue onto your argument for subjective morality, as the above argument is simply a clarification of what must be considered when addressing morality, and does not make any claims to whether moral claims are subjective or objective.

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross

Lets agree with points 1 and 2 and see if it necessarily leads to your conclusion.

First, this is really going to come down to your definition of what is objective and subjective.

"Something is subjective if it is dependent on a mind (biases, perception, emotions, opinions, imagination, or conscious experience).

Something is objective if it can be confirmed independent of a mind."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)

I think these are fairly uncontroversial and straight forward definitions, so lets start here.

Lets now go back to your definition of truth which I agree with:

‘truth’ is the ‘correspondence/agreement of thought with reality’ — Bob Ross

Now, is truth subjective, or objective? If it is subjective, then it cannot be determined independently of a mind. If it is objective, then it can be confirmed independently of a mind.

If truth is merely the correspondence of thought with reality, then it needs no mind. Truth is simply a 'state'. "Thought is in correspondence with reality". If we were able to be aware of this, we might call it knowledge. But truth does not require knowledge. Truth is simply a state of being that is unconcerned if there is an observer there to realize it.

Thus truth is best described as "objective'. With this, we can now examine your conclusion.

3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].[/quote]

If there is a true moral judgement, then it must be an objective moral judgement. If moral judgements are subjective, and only subjective, your conclusion does not follow. For there to be a true moral judgement, a moral judgement must be objectively in line with reality. But if there is a moral judgement that is in line with reality, it is objectively true, not subjectively true. The subjects opinion to the matter is irrelevant.

But, can we salvage the intent of your theory? Lets try.

(Subjectivity and objectivity continued from the wiki citation)

"If a claim is true exclusively when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being, it is subjectively true. For example, one person may consider the weather to be pleasantly warm, and another person may consider the same weather to be too hot; both views are subjective. The word subjectivity comes from subject in a philosophical sense, meaning an individual who possesses unique conscious experiences, such as perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires, or who (consciously) acts upon or wields power over some other entity (an object).

If a claim is true even when considering it outside the viewpoint of a sentient being (how ?), then it is labelled objectively true. Scientific objectivity is practicing science while intentionally reducing partiality, biases, or external influences. Moral objectivity is the concept of moral or ethical codes being compared to one another through a set of universal facts or a universal perspective and not through differing conflicting perspectives. Journalistic objectivity is the reporting of facts and news with minimal personal bias or in an impartial or politically neutral manner."

Lets examine the idea of 'subjective truth'. Person A states, "Its hot" while person B states, "Its cool". From their perspectives, this is true. But how is it true? How is it 'in correspondence with reality" if we've claimed truth is objective?

Its because we've left out the implicit information within their statements.

Person A: From my subjective experience, I feel its hot.
Person B: From my subjective experience, I feel its cold.

These are both subjectively true, because it is objective. The feelings of a subject in reference to itself are objectively true. What one's subjective experience entails, is objectively true. We have a non-truth when this happens:

Person A: From my subjective experience, I feel its hot, therefore I will claim it is hot for everyone else.
Person B: From my subjective experience, I feel its cold, therefore I will claim it is cold for everyone else.

At this point, the conclusion is not objectively true. Its a subjective belief.

How do we tie this then back into a subjective morality? Lets examine your claim about subjective morality:

Within moral subjectivism, the moral judgment is a belief which is the upshot of one’s psychology and it is proposition which is indexical—e.g., ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun’ is a moral judgment, and the belief about the belief attempts to determine the truth of the claim: either I believe one ought not to torture babies for fun or I don’t. — Bob Ross

Bob Ross: From my subjective viewpoint, I believe moral judgements are based on psychology, therefore all moral judgements are based on psychology.

As we can see, this is a subjective claim, and not objective. Just because you personally believe moral judgements are based on psychology, this does not make it true objectively or subjectively. While you could create a subjective truth by simply claiming, "From my subjective viewpoint, I believe moral judgements are based on psychology.", it is your claim that this is a truth that all people must objectively conclude about morality that makes it objectively and subjectively false.

I also wanted to address a couple of your points/counterpoints, but not go too long on this initial reply.

For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that we have good reasons to believe that some of the truth-apt (cognitive) moral judgments we have are true and thusly binding. — Bob Ross

Your own definition of truth counters this statement. Your definition of truth indicated no necessity that a person have knowledge or justification of something being true. A true moral judgement simply needs to be in correspondence with reality. The only thing you can state with your definition of truth is:

"For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that our moral judgement corresponds to reality."

Another point:

P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’. — Bob Ross

This statement is a contradiction. If there are no moral judgements, then there is nothing one has to do. Therefore one would not have to 'lie down and starve to death'.

Finally:

P1: If there are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective, then they must be an expression of something subjective. — Bob Ross

Except that if something is true, it is in correspondence with reality objectively. The subjective knowledge or lack of knowledge is irrelevant. Therefore if there are true moral judgements, then they are objective.

Thank you for your patience Bob. I'm back from vacation!

I am assuming you affirm #1 and #3, but I am inquiring about #2. You still have not provided what ‘goodness is’ in the sense of what those moral properties subsist in or of or are reducible to. E.g., is goodness identical to ‘well-being’, ‘happiness’, ‘existing’, ‘psychological approval’, ‘societal approval’, ‘conative emotions’, etc. ? — Bob Ross

Goodness is simply material existence and its expressions. It has nothing to do with culture, intention, emotions, and would be whether humanity had opinions about it or not.

If you claim ‘goodness’ is identical to ‘what should be’, but where do properties of ‘what should be’ subsist in or of? E.g., are they identical to ‘well-being’, <...>, etc.? — Bob Ross

No, remove humanity from the equation for now. This is about morality first from a foundational level of pure existence. I can build up to human morality, but without the foundation established first, anything we say about human morality will fail.

Moreover, I think ‘existence is good’ is pretty vague: is it ‘existing is good’, ‘preserving existence is good’, or/and ‘creating more existence is good’ (I’ve read you claiming things similar to all three)? For now, I will continue using ‘existence is good’ because the worry I am expounding isn’t really contingent on getting that clarification. — Bob Ross

"Existence is good" is the foundational morality. That's the material existence as a concept. Think of this like a dot on a line. A dot contains no mass, no attributes, or anything but the representation of a point in an infinite plane. When we introduce another dot, we have the existential expression of that dot compared to another dot. The most basic is "a distance of five dots". We now have a dot as relational to another dot. It has a length now and a comparative mass. It is now the expression of existence, not simply the material. With expressions of existence through relation, there now comes the question of, "How should existence express itself?" This is the question of morality.

First we must have the foundational good of existence itself. Then we need an expression of existence between another existence. Now we can ask the question "Why should one expression of existence manifest itself over another potential expressed existence?"

If the property of goodness is being predicated of ‘existence’, then ‘the good’ is not ‘existence’ because it is not identical to it: so what it is? — Bob Ross

It is the necessary logical foundation for good. It is the end result we come to when we ask the question, "Why should X exist?" This is because it all reduces to the ultimate question of "Why should anything exist?" This leads us with the binary of existence, or non-existence. I cannot justify non-existence as what should be without there being existence to make the justification. I cannot justify existence without there being existence to make the justification. As the justification of existence being better is a contradiction, the only remaining conclusion is that existence is necessary for me to state that anything 'should' be, and is the foundational good. The foundational good is not a question of the expression of existence in relation to another existence, but the fact of there being existence instead of nothing.

Can we build from here to questions of morality within humanity? Absolutely. But we must settle the foundation first. If it helps to see where we are going, simply see if you can justify that non-existence is preferable to no existence at all. If you cannot, then what I've stated is the only alternative, and what we have to build on.

So, I merely created a thought experiment taking this to its extreme: what if, right now, we had to perpetually torture a child (and I will let you use your imagination on what exactly is done to them) to prevent the immediate annihilation of the entire human species: is, at the very least, it morally permissible to do it, then? — Bob Ross

Absolutely yes. We torture our and kill our food every day for our own survival. Yet I still eat to live. I torture bugs beneath my feet that I accidently step on in the grass and leave them to slowly die from a crushed exoskeleton. Does that mean I stop walking? No. We throw pollution up into the air that kills thousands of animals and even people every year. Many don't die, but simply become perpetually sick. Yet this pollution saves hundreds of thousands more from death and suffering.

You don't have to go to extremes. Just look how we live today.

Something to consider is that logic and metaphysics require a linguistic or numerical representation. These things can be defined incorrectly but be 'correct' while using this poor definition that has no basis in reality. So one could have an incorrectly defined logic but a correctly defined metaphysics that matches to reality.

Good points Bob, this is what I need to hone the idea down.

The first issue I have is you are claiming ‘existence is good’, where ‘is good’ is predication, and do not seem to offer any account of (1) why it is good nor (2) what goodness actually is. — Bob Ross

Certainly. The initial idea of good is what should be. So we go down the line. Should humanity exist? Animals? Minerals? Until finally we get to the most regressive question of all. Should there be existence at all?

We are then faced with a binary. To exist, or not to exist, that is the question! But I realized something at that point. "Should" is not a possible word at that point. Should implies some other factor behind why something happens. But there is no underlying reason for existence being. It simply is. We are at the foundation level of an issue. And a foundation issue has nothing underneath it to support it. It is the support upon which everything else rests. Morality has often been about how we should set the state of existence, but it has ignored the foundation. Is existence itself good?

Thus the question of what should be, comes to a foundation issue. Either existence should be, should not be, or simply is. If it should be, then there must be an underlying reason why it should be. But there is no underlying reason behind existence. There is no other to point to. It either is, or it isn't. Should existence not be? Once again, that would imply there is something behind that reason, some other that notes it should not be. But that too would be an existence.

So what are we left with? What is. The foundational good. By existing, we have something that underlies all 'shoulds'. Morality is how we can judge relative good. And what is that relative good based on? What is. Existence.

I know you don’t like ‘isms’, but I am being careful not to attribute claims which are not directly implied of your view. If I do make that mistake, then please let me know. — Bob Ross

Its not that I dislike isms per say. I dislike them if they are not clearly and consistently used in a useful manner for discussion. In case you haven't noticed, there is a pattern in all of my philosophy. Foundationalism. There comes a point in every question in which a foundation must be reached. That foundation has no other reason for its being, because it is the foundation. It is the recognition and proof that it is a foundation which allows us to then build upon it. The discrete experience. The notion that there is no external reason for existence being.

When faced with a foundation, we cannot use certain methods that do have foundations behind them. The idea of 'should' rests on there being a foundation that provides the 'why'. I'm noting that in the question of what should be, we come to the foundation of existence itself. I call it "good", but it is really the foundational good. It is what all 'shoulds' reference, but itself needs no underlying reference for why it should be. It simply is.

This of course is difficulty to wrap one's head around. There is on first glance the notion of 'choice'. After all, we still want to say it should or shouldn't be. But we can't ask that question of a foundation. It is where all questions of 'should' come from. It is not that I am completely satisfied with how its worded or approached either. As I noted, this is a much more exploratory idea than my other work. Basically in the chain of "why should something be", I arrived at this foundation which had no 'should' prior.

I call it "good" because what else can I call it? To say it is not good means it should not be. And yet there is nothing behind it that states it should be either, it simply is. Thus the foundational good.

I'm heading out for the holidays and won't be online again until Monday at minimum next week. Sorry Bob if this didn't address everything, but I'm out of time. I look forward to answering more questions then!

P1: If there is something instead of nothing, then there should be something.

P2: there is something instead of nothing.

C: TF, there should be something. — Bob Ross

No. I am saying there is something instead of nothing. I say that existence is what is good. If existence is what is good, then the more existence there is, the more good there is.

I say "there should be an apple on that table" and you go "ahhh, but there has never been an apple on a table, and we cannot even ask the question 'should there be an apple on that table' without there first having been an apple on at least one table!". — Bob Ross

No, it is more that for us to discuss whether there should be an apple on that table, an apple must first exist and a table must first exist. The relation is a "should", the apple and the table in isolation are what exist.

. We cannot say, "should" they exist, because that would imply some other existence that dictated that they should or should not be

I don’t see why this would be true. The question ‘should they exist’ is despite whether there is anything that could exist more fundamentally than them: it could be the case that there is nothing more fundamental than a quark and it be immoral that they exist—no? — Bob Ross

No, because you would need to give a reason why it is immoral for a quark to exist. If the quark is the only existence, what other existence dictates that it is immoral? The discussion of what the quark does in its expressed existence is the moral issue. And the only way for a quark to express its existence is for there to be something else that exists that it can relate too.

just like how I can validly ask ‘should this baby have been tortured for fun’ even if there is no actual way in which reality could have been such that the baby wouldn’t have been tortured for fun. What is is despite what ought to be. — Bob Ross

This was a little wordy and too far out there. Lets try to focus on the fundamentals. Why is existence good?

Likewise, it seems like you are saying existence dictates what is good, which would imply that it is not itself predicated as good but rather is identical to 'the good'. It seems to be a standard of morality for you, but then you also say it isn't because there is nothing factual which makes it 'the good'. I am sort of confused about that. — Bob Ross

I do not want to say identical. I want to say an attribute of existence is its goodness. It is in relation to other existence, that is of course also existence itself, that we can state there are varying degrees of goodness. If you are having trouble understanding this, reread the parts where I cover expressed and potential existence.

You seem to be saying that what should be the case is tied to what is actually the case. — Bob Ross

What should be the case is completely dependent on what is the case.

I totally agree that normative judgments cannot exist without something factual to judge about, but I am failing to see how the normative judgments themselves are grounded in something factual, including how existence is non-subjectively good — Bob Ross

Because the foundation of good is what is. How it can express itself is what is. How it should express itself is the second step of what is good. Is there a better term for this? I don't know.

By my lights, something that ought to be the case is a separate consideration from how things are currently arranged or how they exist. — Bob Ross

True. The situation is thus: X is good. Therefore more X is more good. Thus we should have more X.
Perhaps the language would be better if I stated this:

Existence is good. Morality is the question of how we should obtain the most existence possible.

To me, if ‘existence is good’, I would say that is true subjectively and if it is not, then I am not sure how that is the case (yet). — Bob Ross

Actually, yes, you can claim that existence is bad. You can claim, as an existence, that nothingness is better than existing. All of my previous philosophy is tying in here now Bob. We as people can label any 'thing' anything we want. The question is whether that label works in application.

If existence is bad, then existence should not be. Which means we should work to destroy all of existence including ourselves. Do we have any justification that existence is bad? We cannot use any other existence to compare to, as we are speaking about any existence. Perhaps we could find a situation of relational existence which is bad, but when compared to nothing, there is 'nothing' which implies that existence itself is bad.

In other words, feel free to propose that non-existence is good, then see if you can reasonably apply it.

You are essentially saying (as far as I understand) that we need something to exist to create prescriptions, therefore there is a true moral judgment that states ‘existence is good’. In other words: — Bob Ross

What I'm trying to do is answer the foundational question: "Why should there be something over nothing?" That has to be answered first before we discuss about how individual existences should express themselves in relation to others.

The answer is there should be something over nothing, because there is. Because without something, there is no question of what should be. To have nothing, is to have no morality. Nothing cannot imply that it should 'be'. Only existence can. Without existence, there is no good. Therefore it is better for there to be something rather than nothing. Therefore as a fundamental, existence is good.

I don’t think it is true that ‘existence is good’ because morality presupposes existent entities: I just don’t see how that inference is being made. — Bob Ross

Then presuppose there is no existence. Can that be good? If so, how and why? The question of this fundamental is difficult to grasp because it is foundational. We cannot look to something beyond existence itself to justify why it should exist. We can only relate it as something vs nothing.

My point is not to make a case for nothingness being good: I am merely pointing out that, to me, it isn’t incoherent to claim this because I don’t see why normative claims presuppose that existence is good. — Bob Ross

But you must when the only question is whether it is good for there to be existence, or good for there to be nothing. It isn't incoherent to make any claim. It is whether one can justify that claim in application. Can you justify that nothing is good, while something is not? If you cannot, then we take what little justification we can that 'something' is good and see if we can build something else from that.

I’m sure there are plenty of people out there who still believe in quaint notions like ‘foundational good’. I wouldn’t say they are simply wrong. I would say that if you delve into the presuppositions such a notion relies on you recognize that what appears as eternal is only eternal within the context of a relative cultural context. — Joshs

Please relate this to the OP. Its not a 'quaint notion', its a step by step process. Please demonstrate why it is incorrect.

Isn't the point that morality grows out of a sense making process? — Tom Storm

No. I think this is getting too far away from the topic as well. Please relate it to what is posted. This is not an abstract discussion, this is a discussion about the specific post.

This isn’t self-interest, its shared interest, which is not simply the sum of selfish drives. — Joshs

Then what if two separate cultures or civilizations want different things? Are we saying the victor is in the right? No, this is still not a very good argument, just nice language.

To say we prefer coherence over chaos is a kind of circularity. The sense of identity disintegrates in chaos and incoherence, so of course we perceive existence as ‘good’. — Joshs

Read the post again. I am not saying existence is preferred. It has nothing to do with our preferences. I'm saying existence is the foundational good.

Deviations from accepted patterns constitute a threat. When we have developed harmonious ways of relating-of speaking and acting--we place a value on this way of life. Whatever encroaches upon, undermines, or destroys this way of life becomes an evil..centripetal forces within groups will always operate toward stabilization, the establishment of valued meaning, and the exclusion of alterior realities.

This again is nothing more than self-interest. This is not an argument for why humanity ought to even exist apart from its own desire from the reasoning you've given.

Let me put forth an argument that life is centered around a central ‘ought’. What distinguishes living from non-living things is that the latter predict and maintain a pattern of interchange with an environment under continuously varying conditions. This means that their function is normative in character. The organism has goals and purposes which it either meets or fails to meet. Human cognitive-affective functioning, including our moral oughts , are elaborations of the basic normative oughts characterizing living self-organization. Moral oughts are designed to protect and preserve certain ways of life. — Joshs

First, I agree that from the foundation I've developed here, we can come to know and justify that life is highly moral, while intelligent life is some of the most concentrated morality in existence. The difference between my point and yours, is I have a foundation which reasonably leads up to this. Your basis is self-consistent functioning. But isn't that inherently a self-interest? If I can murder a few people to continue to have self-consistent functioning, why not then? Your basis is self-interested without asking if morality can exist apart from human kind. You've given no other foundation of why people should exist besides the fact that you want them to. I'm noting morality extends beyond human self-interest.

For cognitive beings like ourselves it is not existence which is moral but intelligible forms of social interaction. The use of truth-apt propositional logic is one particularly narrow way to attempt to achieve moral intelligibility, at the expense of a more expansive and effective understanding of the moral. — Joshs

This is an opinion, not a foundational claim. Read the rest of my post with the understanding of finding morality as a basis of reality, not just a human centric position.

is ‘goodness’ grounded in some mind(stance)-independent feature in reality (i.e., is it objective) or not? Is there a moral fact-of-the-matter that makes ‘existence good’--or is it just good because you believe it to be, desire it to be, or something similar? — Bob Ross

Great question. The question or morality starts from, "should" there be something at all, and arrives at the conclusion that it is the wrong question to start with. The answer is "there is something instead of nothing". We cannot even ask the question, "should" something be, without there first being something. That's the foundation. In the case of material existence, what "should" be, starts with "what is".

The understanding here is that you must remove all expressions of existence. We are talking about the smallest entities of existence, not their combination. For example, pretend that the smallest block of existence is a quark. We cannot say, "should" they exist, because that would imply some other existence that dictated that they should or should not be. But if there is no existence, there is nothing to dictate such a thing. There is nothing that comes in front of quarks. There is either the existence of quarks, or no existence at all.

Would you agree that the fundamental question of ‘what should be’ is separate from the foundational ‘idea of good’? — Bob Ross

From the idea that existence as a base is good, then we can enter into the next question, "How should existence express itself?" The answer is of course, that which makes the most existence. Is this separate? If I invent the concept of 1, 1, then 2 as 1+1, each is an evolution of understanding from the primary foundation of 1. Addition cannot be understood or have any use without the foundation of the number 1. Thus you have numbers, then adding numbers to create more numbers. You have good, then doing something with good to create more good.

This seems like any other normative question to me: is there a moral or normative fact-of-the-matter that you are using to determine the answer to “should there be anything, or not?”? — Bob Ross

No. Hopefully I clarified it earlier, but such a question of "should" cannot be asked without there first being a foundation of "is". This is done at the most basic level. This is like asking, "Should oneness exist". It is the base upon which we use to discuss if we should add or subtract one. Addition must have numbers. What "should" be must have an "is" underlying it. The issue of what should be done, or morality, is the addition and subtraction of existence. To add and subtract without existence is impossible.

Imagine there actually is nothing: no universe, no world, no you, no me, etc. This wouldn’t change the fact (if it is a fact) that ‘it is wrong to torture babies for fun’; and it seems like, just upon my initial read here of your quote, that morality is about what is foundationally because the foundational claim of morality is what is: is that correct? It seems like you are saying that it would be perfectly unintelligible whether ‘it is wrong to torture babies for fun’ if nothing existed. — Bob Ross

This is one of the reasons, yes.

For example, I think it is perfectly intelligible to say "nothingness should be, rather than there being something": remove the linguistic limitations (e.g., nothingness should be still seems to linguistically presuppose existence, etc.) and I think it is clear that one can intelligibly convey that nothingness is morally better than existence, even if I don't actually agree with the proposition. — Bob Ross

Certainly, its perfectly intelligible to say such a thing. But is there a reason behind the claim? I'm very open to someone claiming this as long as they can back it.

I don't believe there should be a limit at all. The concern for me is the floor for everyone else. Can the society at large afford state of the art technology 5-10 years after its release? Can everyone reasonably buy a home? Is money's influence in political decisions minimized and capped? That's much more important than one individual's success.

Well, assuming I have understood you, I think you are looking for an objective answer. — ssu

And after seeing my conclusions, do you think it is objective or subjective?

Wouldn't morality be in the end a subjective issue? Something that either is right or wrong, is usually something that a subject has to decide. — ssu

Did you read the entire post? Please comment in terms of what I've expressed in the post and we can discuss. This is not a post about the issue in abstract. For example, do you think the morality I've posited is objective or subjective?

Hello Bob! I'm glad the idea is an interesting exploration for you. This has been difficult to write without it exploding into something less manageable than an initial forum post, so please continue to ask the pointed questions and critiques I know you have.

However, I also sort of get the notion that you may be saying the first good is existing, and 'the good' is thereby distinct from existence itself. So perhaps I am wrong on #1. — Bob Ross

Another way of thinking about key point #1 (that I described) that I just thought of, in terms of what I am thinking you are saying, is that existence is identical to 'the good'; but re-reading it I suspect I may have misunderstood and you are merely predicating the property of 'goodness' to existence — Bob Ross

Predication seems closest. The idea of good here is foundational. The fundamental question of what should be is the question of existence itself. Should there be anything, or not? In a universe of nothingness, if a lone atom appeared, should that exist or not? The question of "should" of course cannot exist with there being something. Meaning the foundational claim of morality is not what "should" be, but what is. The "should" of morality only comes afterwards. What should be as I note later, is the expression of that material existence. Thus the foundation of morality is "is", and then logically leads to "ought".

1. Existence is the good; and
2. The good/right action is the one of which its consequences maximize the good. — Bob Ross

Just a clarification of 2, intent or actions can be part of the equation, but are unnecessary. It is the results over time compared to the potential expressions of material existence which we can evaluate greater or lesser good.

I am interpreting, so far, your use of 'time ticks', probability, and the like as merely measuring units and tools for maximizing the good. — Bob Ross

Correct.

Reserved

Well Bob, I've been holding onto a moral theory I've had for a while, I guess its time to get cracking on it! Give me a week and I should have something.

1. True statements can only exist as cognitive content — Sirius

Lets change this real quick: Known statements can only exist as cognitive content.

Truth is what exists whether we know it or not. Lets say you didn't know that the heart pumped blood through your body. Does it make it untrue? No. Lets say you are educated and know that the heart is "the source of thoughts". Does that make it true? No. Knowledge and truth are not the same thing. Knowledge is your best reasoned approximation of what appears to be true, but it is not truth itself.

Your second point in general works as long as you understand that it is knowledge which needs a mind, not truth. Your third point is irrelevant because knowledge is what we can grasp, and it is unknown that we can grasp any one truth, let alone an infinite truths.

Nice try though! A good approach that is only marred by the common mistake of thinking that truth and knowledge are the same thing.

Agreed, science pursues knowledge. Knowledge is our most logical way of being concurrent with truth, but cannot assert that it is truth itself.

You may be interested in reading this then: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Also a follow up here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1

Fantastic post. I have had countless discussions and debates with people over the years and can throw my two cents into the ring.

1. People are not innately rational beings. We're innately rationalizing beings.

What does this mean? It means that most of us have a conclusion that we want, and look for reasoning that leads to that conclusion. It takes less effort and makes us feel happy and smart. No one likes to be wrong. Everyone likes to be right. Therefore the path of least resistance for our own emotional well being is to justify what we already want.

2. Being rational is not innate to most people and can be emotionally unsatisfying. It takes training, discipline, and ethics.

Being rational often does not feel good. Being rational will expose you more often to how wrong you are than how right you are. It does not let you feel superior to others. It does not make you feel smart. All of that is status and ego, and a rational person understands those are irrelevant to an argument. It can cut out a lot of entertaining thoughts as you need to look at data or take rigorous steps. Its so EASY not to be rational. Instead of admitting to being wrong in an argument, you can use techniques to skirt around someone's rationality and defend your rationale. A lot of people rationalize that they are rational, but are doing so because it gives them a sense of feeling good about themselves. Thus, when an actual rational argument is presented that breaks their rationale on something, they become hostile. Its because they don't care about rationality, they care about their ego and sense of self as a "smart" person being threatened.

3. It is easy to rationalize and be convincing to others as good rationalizing persuades emotionally, which is more powerful than unemotional rationality.

Basically because we're all rationalizing creatures by default, its easy to get away with not being rational. You'll always find some people who agree with your points if you're entertaining or connect emotionally with another person in your argument. You can get a feeling of intellectual superiority, though it is undeserved. Its so much easier to fake being rational and convince people than actually be rational and convince people.

So to sum, we're not special rational beings, we're rationalizing animals that with work and effort, have the capacity to be rational. This capacity is incredibly difficult, as it must overcome ego, desire for status, and plenty of other emotions that we want for our own self-benefit. Being rational will not win you friends or applause. It will often times be met with silence, anger, or dismissal. Its so much easier and fun to be great at rationalizing while basking in the illusions of our own superiority.

Now, lets couple this with philosophy. Philosophy is loaded with words, phrases, and theories that are havens for rationalizers. We sort broad definitions that allow subjective interpretation between different groups of people. We even allow much philosophy to be "untestable" which basically means its a logic game of imagination. Unlike science which requires data and repeatability, many aspects of philosophy are subjective, and therefore fall into the, "I'm right because I believe this" trope.

Because philosophy can also be confusing and unclear in its definitions, it can make people feel intelligent by stringing a group of words together that sound smart. After you take the careful effort to dissect the word play, you can find nothing was said at all. As most people are untrained to be rational in philosophy, the default is for people to rationalize in philosophy, especially on these boards.

This causes people to create identities such as, "I'm a Hegelian Idealist," or other general nonsense that gives them a feeling of being smart and "rational". One can start to get a sense of having special knowledge over regular people. "After all, those materialists are the general masses who have never thought of this at all!" But its all a trap of ego.

Its not that rationality can't win after a long and protracted battle. Of course, if a rational argument does win in philosophy, its no longer philosophy. Its now something provable and testable, and often becomes a science. Philosophies goal is to destroy itself ironically, and there are a lot of people who don't want to see that. So much of philosophy that is floating around is the unprovable mistakes of the past that have made no progress to solving real problems of today, but can be fun to think about. That's my take on it anyway.

So, if people like this emerge and write about it, would we even be aware they exist, would we even consider their work? — Skalidris

Well, this hit home a bit. The answer is, "No." I'm academically trained in philosophy, and have come up with a few original works. I've spoken with professors about them and most get angry when I've come up with something new that solves a problem. I remember discussing an issue in philosophy of science that the community had wrestled with for a while, and presented a solution that just used logic, and did not reference other philosophers, on a white board to him during his office hours.

I would say I'm a polite and non-aggressive person. He had a few questions, I followed up with answers, then he went quiet for a minute. After thinking about it, he, with barely contained anger in his voice said, "Well, that was a nice chat." Surprised I said, "Oh, uh, thank you." then left. A few seconds after I left I heard the door slam behind me.

I became enamored with Epistemology during my graduate school days. When I would present my ideas for Epistemology, professors would always tell me that I needed to write it pulling in another philosopher somehow. When I told them I formed it on my own, and didn't use other philosopher beyond the initial problem set, they would tell me I needed to reference at least 5 different philosophy articles for a viable paper. Of course then it was too long. I had to write papers that I wasn't passionate about, compare philosophers I didn't care about, for conclusions that ultimately didn't matter or change the field in any way.

So I left after I graduated and did not pursue a professorship. I realized then that academic philosophy was a celebration of its own failures. It constantly forced its acolytes to re-examine philosophy that had long been disproven and was absolutely anathema to free thought. And it makes sense. Solutions in philosophy become fields they are no longer philosophy. Most professors have been ground into churning out papers for publication to keep their job, not to actually further human progress. Its become a game at this point.

I did wonder if I could take my ideas to the public. I went to philosophy forums for years until I found this one. Here at least I get a few people who look at my work. But even then, most don't read carefully, aren't interested in really engaging in something new, and are more interested in telling you their opinion on things without really being interested in what you're saying.

I've tried posting variations of this https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 several times to get discussion going. I've had one person in all the years I've tried actually deeply engage with it. The only other person who seemed to appreciate it was someone who was new to philosophy. What's funny is I'm pretty sure I have the solution to Epistemology. I use it in my own life, and it basically solves all of the major epistemological problems of the day while introducing a way to finally evaluate inductions. But alas, most people either aren't patient enough to read the whole thing, or are not curious enough to really engage with it. I have no need to advertise to the world or try to convince people who aren't taking it seriously. Its there for those who care. Most do not.

So, philosophy is mostly a place for hobbyists. Here people look for semi-reasonable ways of looking at the world in a creative way that fits in with their world view. Most are not here to solve actual problems or come up with real solutions. It is an emotional haven for people, not a rigorous attempt to solve real world problems.

It doesn't bother me much at this point. I've long left the field professionally. I see that the world of AI is where epistemology is being taken serious. There the problem will be solved. Eventually philosophy really will have nothing left to contribute to the world beyond entertainment.

I read through your first two posts. — wonderer1

By two posts, did you mean the two posts of the actual argument, or the first post on how to approach the argument and the first post of the argument? This is important because the topic of induction is the last post of the argument and essential to read if you have issues with induction.

I'm afraid I am skeptical of your account of inductive reasoning, or at least it doesn't seem to fit well with the way I see my cognitive processes working. — wonderer1

As noted in the intro, that is not how to approach a paper like this. Its ok to have an intuition or feeling of disagreement, but you need to post what specifically is wrong in the writing of the paper, and some logic or argument as to why what I've expressed is wrong. From you statement, I don't know specifically what your issue is with my notion of inductive reasoning, as I do not even use the phrase "inductive reasoning". Is it that you have an issue with what I've written, or simply misinterpreted what I've written? I can't tell unless you point it out clearly.

I read the article you linked and did not see how this applied to the argument. Again, point out the idea that you disagree with so that way I know specifically what the issue is, and how you're interpreting it. Then contrast this with a point in the article so I can see where you believe another approach would work better.

But the problem is, how do you distinguish the model from the world? How can you, on the one hand, look at 'the model', and, on the other 'the real world'? That already assumes a perspective outside the model - that you're able to compare one with the other. But if your experience-of-the-world IS the model, and you're inside it, then how do you step outside it to compare it with the world itself? — Wayfarer

A very important question. The answer is that we have at some point in our lives, attempted to apply our model of reality to reality, and failed. At its most simple, its the contradiction of reality to our beliefs. The fact that contradictions exist to our model, show us that there is a model, or viewpoint of the world that we have, and something else that we have to model around. For it doesn't matter if I believe that a eating a rotten apple is healthy, the reality of illness will follow. If it were the case that there was nothing underlying to model on, then there would never be any contradictions to the models we create.

The solution then is to create models that are not contradicted by the "the world itself" or "reality'. If you can create as the foundation of your model, something which cannot be contradicted by reality, then you can use that as a base to build a structure of identities and applications that gives us the best models possible with which to apply to reality. Of course, none of those models can ever claim anything more than that they are not contradicted by reality, and cannot point to the "thing in itself" specifically apart from the model. This is because this is the way we function and know. To say we can know something outside of the very means we use to have knowledge, is impossible.

But the question we're considering is a question of a different order, because it concerns the nature of experience itself, not a specific question about a particular subject. That's what distinguishes it as a philosophical question, not a scientific one. — Wayfarer

Correct. I give the full answer to this question in the OP I linked. It all starts with coming to the realization that people can discretely experience, and what people can discretely experience is known. Demonstrating how this is known, I then show how we can apply this discrete experience to reality to see if our application can stand without contradiction. I think you'll really like it Wayfarer.

What about words like worldview, cultural subjectivity, formulation of problems, perspective, frame of reference, bias, set of presuppositions, paradigm? — Joshs

That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about using specific, clear, and unambiguous words in your discussions so that the debate can remain about the topic of the debate, and not about a word in the debate where possible.

Hello Wayfarer! We have disagreed in the past on many of your posts, but this is well written and sensible. I am almost entirely in agreement with the underlying concept I believe you are trying to convey. Where I think you run into conflict is your use of vocabulary to describe certain concepts as you are stuck in the philosophical models of those who have come before you. In our evolution of concepts and models, we of course must start with what we are given, and often times we try to evolve the meaning of the original concept and model to our new understanding. So I will pose a couple of questions for you about your word choice.

First, the idea of a "mind created world". The issue is that you have to explain what you mean, because culturally, this word 'create' in the phrase is seen as meaning that the mind literally creates the world. Of course you're not claiming that. But if you have to clarify the phrase, perhaps a new phrase would work better? For example, a "mind modeled world" We don't really "create" the world, we model it. The only creation is the model, not the world itself. The mistake is thinking our models ARE the world. They are merely the way we understand it.

You'll get a lot less pushback and people will be able to understand what you're saying without you needing to counter an initial normative pushback. The "model" is the "ideal" of idealism. So where does this leave "the thing that is modeled"? A very simple cultural word that needs no clarification is, "the physical". Now I know you have an emotional reaction to this, but you are already evolving out of the white picket fence of philosophical terminology. Terminology is merely a model. It is an invention of some guy somewhere, that can have cultural or personal attachment beyond what the model is trying to convey. Like it or not, "the physical" is a culturally relevant term which can reach a wide audience and quickly conveys what you want to. Like you refined idealism to fit into our underlying sensibilities about the world, so we can do with physicalism.

So humor me for a minute. The ideal is our model of the physical, or the real. We cannot understand the physical without the ideal. And I believe when this is conveyed to others clearly, almost everyone comes to agree with the underlying concept, even the physicalists, whether they use the same words or not to convey it. The real question is how we marry the ideal and the real. Because currently your definition of idealism is an accurate descriptor that "we model the world". But it does not tell us which models of the world are better than others.

Just as you tweaked and clarified that idealism does not mean we are a solipsistic existence, do you not find it charitable to allow physicalism to be " a model that the physical is the fundamental upon which we apply our models", while naturalism to be "a model that only natural laws and forces, as depicted in the natural sciences, are ideals we can objectively match to the real"? The debate can be less about debating specific semantics and "gotchas" about broad general theories which have been messily cobbled together from multiple philosophers over centuries, and instead using the underlying cultural and general understanding of those words to tackle the truly important underlying concept, "A methodology that allows us as accurate of a match between the ideal and real as possible".

If you are interested, I would love to hear your input on such a discussion: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 You have the intelligence and background to give this a serious discussion, and you may find the epistemological approach I use overlaps much of what you are trying to convey.

Why only, "through logical limitations and consequences"? Could you elaborate?

I'd be more inclined to say, that we can only know the world through our nature, and the nature of other people, including the imaginitive thinking of our intellectual ancestors who managed to point the way towards having a more accurate view of nature, and... and... and...

Is that contradictory? — wonderer1

I appreciate the question, but I do not want to distract from Bob's thread. Bob understands the reference I am pointing to, as we have discussed many times. If you are interested in exploring what I mean, feel free to read and ask me questions in this thread here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

“Logical”, “model”, “representation”. I just want to point out that these concepts get their sense from to a particular sort of metaphysical foundation. If we shifted to a different metaphysics, — Joshs

The problem is for me that the word "metaphysics" is a non-descriptive and generic filler in most conversations. "A different metaphysics" just shows that it seems to be a word that is conveniently used to lump a lot of ideas that are not the same together. Similar words like this are "tree" and "good". They can be useful words, but in philosophical conversation in which we are trying to come to an objective solution to a problem, these words have so much cultural subjectivity loaded into them that their meaning become debates within a debate.

When having a discussion that needs clarity, we should remove such words where possible to focus on the true issue we wish to discuss. As such, it is best to just point out the specific idea that is in one of the many "different metaphysics", and point that out instead of using the word as a whole in any meaningful argument.