Thank you for your patience Bob. I'm back from vacation!

I am assuming you affirm #1 and #3, but I am inquiring about #2. You still have not provided what ‘goodness is’ in the sense of what those moral properties subsist in or of or are reducible to. E.g., is goodness identical to ‘well-being’, ‘happiness’, ‘existing’, ‘psychological approval’, ‘societal approval’, ‘conative emotions’, etc. ? — Bob Ross

Goodness is simply material existence and its expressions. It has nothing to do with culture, intention, emotions, and would be whether humanity had opinions about it or not.

If you claim ‘goodness’ is identical to ‘what should be’, but where do properties of ‘what should be’ subsist in or of? E.g., are they identical to ‘well-being’, <...>, etc.? — Bob Ross

No, remove humanity from the equation for now. This is about morality first from a foundational level of pure existence. I can build up to human morality, but without the foundation established first, anything we say about human morality will fail.

Moreover, I think ‘existence is good’ is pretty vague: is it ‘existing is good’, ‘preserving existence is good’, or/and ‘creating more existence is good’ (I’ve read you claiming things similar to all three)? For now, I will continue using ‘existence is good’ because the worry I am expounding isn’t really contingent on getting that clarification. — Bob Ross

"Existence is good" is the foundational morality. That's the material existence as a concept. Think of this like a dot on a line. A dot contains no mass, no attributes, or anything but the representation of a point in an infinite plane. When we introduce another dot, we have the existential expression of that dot compared to another dot. The most basic is "a distance of five dots". We now have a dot as relational to another dot. It has a length now and a comparative mass. It is now the expression of existence, not simply the material. With expressions of existence through relation, there now comes the question of, "How should existence express itself?" This is the question of morality.

First we must have the foundational good of existence itself. Then we need an expression of existence between another existence. Now we can ask the question "Why should one expression of existence manifest itself over another potential expressed existence?"

If the property of goodness is being predicated of ‘existence’, then ‘the good’ is not ‘existence’ because it is not identical to it: so what it is? — Bob Ross

It is the necessary logical foundation for good. It is the end result we come to when we ask the question, "Why should X exist?" This is because it all reduces to the ultimate question of "Why should anything exist?" This leads us with the binary of existence, or non-existence. I cannot justify non-existence as what should be without there being existence to make the justification. I cannot justify existence without there being existence to make the justification. As the justification of existence being better is a contradiction, the only remaining conclusion is that existence is necessary for me to state that anything 'should' be, and is the foundational good. The foundational good is not a question of the expression of existence in relation to another existence, but the fact of there being existence instead of nothing.

Can we build from here to questions of morality within humanity? Absolutely. But we must settle the foundation first. If it helps to see where we are going, simply see if you can justify that non-existence is preferable to no existence at all. If you cannot, then what I've stated is the only alternative, and what we have to build on.

So, I merely created a thought experiment taking this to its extreme: what if, right now, we had to perpetually torture a child (and I will let you use your imagination on what exactly is done to them) to prevent the immediate annihilation of the entire human species: is, at the very least, it morally permissible to do it, then? — Bob Ross

Absolutely yes. We torture our and kill our food every day for our own survival. Yet I still eat to live. I torture bugs beneath my feet that I accidently step on in the grass and leave them to slowly die from a crushed exoskeleton. Does that mean I stop walking? No. We throw pollution up into the air that kills thousands of animals and even people every year. Many don't die, but simply become perpetually sick. Yet this pollution saves hundreds of thousands more from death and suffering.

You don't have to go to extremes. Just look how we live today.

Something to consider is that logic and metaphysics require a linguistic or numerical representation. These things can be defined incorrectly but be 'correct' while using this poor definition that has no basis in reality. So one could have an incorrectly defined logic but a correctly defined metaphysics that matches to reality.

Good points Bob, this is what I need to hone the idea down.

The first issue I have is you are claiming ‘existence is good’, where ‘is good’ is predication, and do not seem to offer any account of (1) why it is good nor (2) what goodness actually is. — Bob Ross

Certainly. The initial idea of good is what should be. So we go down the line. Should humanity exist? Animals? Minerals? Until finally we get to the most regressive question of all. Should there be existence at all?

We are then faced with a binary. To exist, or not to exist, that is the question! But I realized something at that point. "Should" is not a possible word at that point. Should implies some other factor behind why something happens. But there is no underlying reason for existence being. It simply is. We are at the foundation level of an issue. And a foundation issue has nothing underneath it to support it. It is the support upon which everything else rests. Morality has often been about how we should set the state of existence, but it has ignored the foundation. Is existence itself good?

Thus the question of what should be, comes to a foundation issue. Either existence should be, should not be, or simply is. If it should be, then there must be an underlying reason why it should be. But there is no underlying reason behind existence. There is no other to point to. It either is, or it isn't. Should existence not be? Once again, that would imply there is something behind that reason, some other that notes it should not be. But that too would be an existence.

So what are we left with? What is. The foundational good. By existing, we have something that underlies all 'shoulds'. Morality is how we can judge relative good. And what is that relative good based on? What is. Existence.

I know you don’t like ‘isms’, but I am being careful not to attribute claims which are not directly implied of your view. If I do make that mistake, then please let me know. — Bob Ross

Its not that I dislike isms per say. I dislike them if they are not clearly and consistently used in a useful manner for discussion. In case you haven't noticed, there is a pattern in all of my philosophy. Foundationalism. There comes a point in every question in which a foundation must be reached. That foundation has no other reason for its being, because it is the foundation. It is the recognition and proof that it is a foundation which allows us to then build upon it. The discrete experience. The notion that there is no external reason for existence being.

When faced with a foundation, we cannot use certain methods that do have foundations behind them. The idea of 'should' rests on there being a foundation that provides the 'why'. I'm noting that in the question of what should be, we come to the foundation of existence itself. I call it "good", but it is really the foundational good. It is what all 'shoulds' reference, but itself needs no underlying reference for why it should be. It simply is.

This of course is difficulty to wrap one's head around. There is on first glance the notion of 'choice'. After all, we still want to say it should or shouldn't be. But we can't ask that question of a foundation. It is where all questions of 'should' come from. It is not that I am completely satisfied with how its worded or approached either. As I noted, this is a much more exploratory idea than my other work. Basically in the chain of "why should something be", I arrived at this foundation which had no 'should' prior.

I call it "good" because what else can I call it? To say it is not good means it should not be. And yet there is nothing behind it that states it should be either, it simply is. Thus the foundational good.

I'm heading out for the holidays and won't be online again until Monday at minimum next week. Sorry Bob if this didn't address everything, but I'm out of time. I look forward to answering more questions then!

P1: If there is something instead of nothing, then there should be something.

P2: there is something instead of nothing.

C: TF, there should be something. — Bob Ross

No. I am saying there is something instead of nothing. I say that existence is what is good. If existence is what is good, then the more existence there is, the more good there is.

I say "there should be an apple on that table" and you go "ahhh, but there has never been an apple on a table, and we cannot even ask the question 'should there be an apple on that table' without there first having been an apple on at least one table!". — Bob Ross

No, it is more that for us to discuss whether there should be an apple on that table, an apple must first exist and a table must first exist. The relation is a "should", the apple and the table in isolation are what exist.

. We cannot say, "should" they exist, because that would imply some other existence that dictated that they should or should not be

I don’t see why this would be true. The question ‘should they exist’ is despite whether there is anything that could exist more fundamentally than them: it could be the case that there is nothing more fundamental than a quark and it be immoral that they exist—no? — Bob Ross

No, because you would need to give a reason why it is immoral for a quark to exist. If the quark is the only existence, what other existence dictates that it is immoral? The discussion of what the quark does in its expressed existence is the moral issue. And the only way for a quark to express its existence is for there to be something else that exists that it can relate too.

just like how I can validly ask ‘should this baby have been tortured for fun’ even if there is no actual way in which reality could have been such that the baby wouldn’t have been tortured for fun. What is is despite what ought to be. — Bob Ross

This was a little wordy and too far out there. Lets try to focus on the fundamentals. Why is existence good?

Likewise, it seems like you are saying existence dictates what is good, which would imply that it is not itself predicated as good but rather is identical to 'the good'. It seems to be a standard of morality for you, but then you also say it isn't because there is nothing factual which makes it 'the good'. I am sort of confused about that. — Bob Ross

I do not want to say identical. I want to say an attribute of existence is its goodness. It is in relation to other existence, that is of course also existence itself, that we can state there are varying degrees of goodness. If you are having trouble understanding this, reread the parts where I cover expressed and potential existence.

You seem to be saying that what should be the case is tied to what is actually the case. — Bob Ross

What should be the case is completely dependent on what is the case.

I totally agree that normative judgments cannot exist without something factual to judge about, but I am failing to see how the normative judgments themselves are grounded in something factual, including how existence is non-subjectively good — Bob Ross

Because the foundation of good is what is. How it can express itself is what is. How it should express itself is the second step of what is good. Is there a better term for this? I don't know.

By my lights, something that ought to be the case is a separate consideration from how things are currently arranged or how they exist. — Bob Ross

True. The situation is thus: X is good. Therefore more X is more good. Thus we should have more X.
Perhaps the language would be better if I stated this:

Existence is good. Morality is the question of how we should obtain the most existence possible.

To me, if ‘existence is good’, I would say that is true subjectively and if it is not, then I am not sure how that is the case (yet). — Bob Ross

Actually, yes, you can claim that existence is bad. You can claim, as an existence, that nothingness is better than existing. All of my previous philosophy is tying in here now Bob. We as people can label any 'thing' anything we want. The question is whether that label works in application.

If existence is bad, then existence should not be. Which means we should work to destroy all of existence including ourselves. Do we have any justification that existence is bad? We cannot use any other existence to compare to, as we are speaking about any existence. Perhaps we could find a situation of relational existence which is bad, but when compared to nothing, there is 'nothing' which implies that existence itself is bad.

In other words, feel free to propose that non-existence is good, then see if you can reasonably apply it.

You are essentially saying (as far as I understand) that we need something to exist to create prescriptions, therefore there is a true moral judgment that states ‘existence is good’. In other words: — Bob Ross

What I'm trying to do is answer the foundational question: "Why should there be something over nothing?" That has to be answered first before we discuss about how individual existences should express themselves in relation to others.

The answer is there should be something over nothing, because there is. Because without something, there is no question of what should be. To have nothing, is to have no morality. Nothing cannot imply that it should 'be'. Only existence can. Without existence, there is no good. Therefore it is better for there to be something rather than nothing. Therefore as a fundamental, existence is good.

I don’t think it is true that ‘existence is good’ because morality presupposes existent entities: I just don’t see how that inference is being made. — Bob Ross

Then presuppose there is no existence. Can that be good? If so, how and why? The question of this fundamental is difficult to grasp because it is foundational. We cannot look to something beyond existence itself to justify why it should exist. We can only relate it as something vs nothing.

My point is not to make a case for nothingness being good: I am merely pointing out that, to me, it isn’t incoherent to claim this because I don’t see why normative claims presuppose that existence is good. — Bob Ross

But you must when the only question is whether it is good for there to be existence, or good for there to be nothing. It isn't incoherent to make any claim. It is whether one can justify that claim in application. Can you justify that nothing is good, while something is not? If you cannot, then we take what little justification we can that 'something' is good and see if we can build something else from that.

I’m sure there are plenty of people out there who still believe in quaint notions like ‘foundational good’. I wouldn’t say they are simply wrong. I would say that if you delve into the presuppositions such a notion relies on you recognize that what appears as eternal is only eternal within the context of a relative cultural context. — Joshs

Please relate this to the OP. Its not a 'quaint notion', its a step by step process. Please demonstrate why it is incorrect.

Isn't the point that morality grows out of a sense making process? — Tom Storm

No. I think this is getting too far away from the topic as well. Please relate it to what is posted. This is not an abstract discussion, this is a discussion about the specific post.

This isn’t self-interest, its shared interest, which is not simply the sum of selfish drives. — Joshs

Then what if two separate cultures or civilizations want different things? Are we saying the victor is in the right? No, this is still not a very good argument, just nice language.

To say we prefer coherence over chaos is a kind of circularity. The sense of identity disintegrates in chaos and incoherence, so of course we perceive existence as ‘good’. — Joshs

Read the post again. I am not saying existence is preferred. It has nothing to do with our preferences. I'm saying existence is the foundational good.

Deviations from accepted patterns constitute a threat. When we have developed harmonious ways of relating-of speaking and acting--we place a value on this way of life. Whatever encroaches upon, undermines, or destroys this way of life becomes an evil..centripetal forces within groups will always operate toward stabilization, the establishment of valued meaning, and the exclusion of alterior realities.

This again is nothing more than self-interest. This is not an argument for why humanity ought to even exist apart from its own desire from the reasoning you've given.

Let me put forth an argument that life is centered around a central ‘ought’. What distinguishes living from non-living things is that the latter predict and maintain a pattern of interchange with an environment under continuously varying conditions. This means that their function is normative in character. The organism has goals and purposes which it either meets or fails to meet. Human cognitive-affective functioning, including our moral oughts , are elaborations of the basic normative oughts characterizing living self-organization. Moral oughts are designed to protect and preserve certain ways of life. — Joshs

First, I agree that from the foundation I've developed here, we can come to know and justify that life is highly moral, while intelligent life is some of the most concentrated morality in existence. The difference between my point and yours, is I have a foundation which reasonably leads up to this. Your basis is self-consistent functioning. But isn't that inherently a self-interest? If I can murder a few people to continue to have self-consistent functioning, why not then? Your basis is self-interested without asking if morality can exist apart from human kind. You've given no other foundation of why people should exist besides the fact that you want them to. I'm noting morality extends beyond human self-interest.

For cognitive beings like ourselves it is not existence which is moral but intelligible forms of social interaction. The use of truth-apt propositional logic is one particularly narrow way to attempt to achieve moral intelligibility, at the expense of a more expansive and effective understanding of the moral. — Joshs

This is an opinion, not a foundational claim. Read the rest of my post with the understanding of finding morality as a basis of reality, not just a human centric position.

is ‘goodness’ grounded in some mind(stance)-independent feature in reality (i.e., is it objective) or not? Is there a moral fact-of-the-matter that makes ‘existence good’--or is it just good because you believe it to be, desire it to be, or something similar? — Bob Ross

Great question. The question or morality starts from, "should" there be something at all, and arrives at the conclusion that it is the wrong question to start with. The answer is "there is something instead of nothing". We cannot even ask the question, "should" something be, without there first being something. That's the foundation. In the case of material existence, what "should" be, starts with "what is".

The understanding here is that you must remove all expressions of existence. We are talking about the smallest entities of existence, not their combination. For example, pretend that the smallest block of existence is a quark. We cannot say, "should" they exist, because that would imply some other existence that dictated that they should or should not be. But if there is no existence, there is nothing to dictate such a thing. There is nothing that comes in front of quarks. There is either the existence of quarks, or no existence at all.

Would you agree that the fundamental question of ‘what should be’ is separate from the foundational ‘idea of good’? — Bob Ross

From the idea that existence as a base is good, then we can enter into the next question, "How should existence express itself?" The answer is of course, that which makes the most existence. Is this separate? If I invent the concept of 1, 1, then 2 as 1+1, each is an evolution of understanding from the primary foundation of 1. Addition cannot be understood or have any use without the foundation of the number 1. Thus you have numbers, then adding numbers to create more numbers. You have good, then doing something with good to create more good.

This seems like any other normative question to me: is there a moral or normative fact-of-the-matter that you are using to determine the answer to “should there be anything, or not?”? — Bob Ross

No. Hopefully I clarified it earlier, but such a question of "should" cannot be asked without there first being a foundation of "is". This is done at the most basic level. This is like asking, "Should oneness exist". It is the base upon which we use to discuss if we should add or subtract one. Addition must have numbers. What "should" be must have an "is" underlying it. The issue of what should be done, or morality, is the addition and subtraction of existence. To add and subtract without existence is impossible.

Imagine there actually is nothing: no universe, no world, no you, no me, etc. This wouldn’t change the fact (if it is a fact) that ‘it is wrong to torture babies for fun’; and it seems like, just upon my initial read here of your quote, that morality is about what is foundationally because the foundational claim of morality is what is: is that correct? It seems like you are saying that it would be perfectly unintelligible whether ‘it is wrong to torture babies for fun’ if nothing existed. — Bob Ross

This is one of the reasons, yes.

For example, I think it is perfectly intelligible to say "nothingness should be, rather than there being something": remove the linguistic limitations (e.g., nothingness should be still seems to linguistically presuppose existence, etc.) and I think it is clear that one can intelligibly convey that nothingness is morally better than existence, even if I don't actually agree with the proposition. — Bob Ross

Certainly, its perfectly intelligible to say such a thing. But is there a reason behind the claim? I'm very open to someone claiming this as long as they can back it.

I don't believe there should be a limit at all. The concern for me is the floor for everyone else. Can the society at large afford state of the art technology 5-10 years after its release? Can everyone reasonably buy a home? Is money's influence in political decisions minimized and capped? That's much more important than one individual's success.

Well, assuming I have understood you, I think you are looking for an objective answer. — ssu

And after seeing my conclusions, do you think it is objective or subjective?

Wouldn't morality be in the end a subjective issue? Something that either is right or wrong, is usually something that a subject has to decide. — ssu

Did you read the entire post? Please comment in terms of what I've expressed in the post and we can discuss. This is not a post about the issue in abstract. For example, do you think the morality I've posited is objective or subjective?

Hello Bob! I'm glad the idea is an interesting exploration for you. This has been difficult to write without it exploding into something less manageable than an initial forum post, so please continue to ask the pointed questions and critiques I know you have.

However, I also sort of get the notion that you may be saying the first good is existing, and 'the good' is thereby distinct from existence itself. So perhaps I am wrong on #1. — Bob Ross

Another way of thinking about key point #1 (that I described) that I just thought of, in terms of what I am thinking you are saying, is that existence is identical to 'the good'; but re-reading it I suspect I may have misunderstood and you are merely predicating the property of 'goodness' to existence — Bob Ross

Predication seems closest. The idea of good here is foundational. The fundamental question of what should be is the question of existence itself. Should there be anything, or not? In a universe of nothingness, if a lone atom appeared, should that exist or not? The question of "should" of course cannot exist with there being something. Meaning the foundational claim of morality is not what "should" be, but what is. The "should" of morality only comes afterwards. What should be as I note later, is the expression of that material existence. Thus the foundation of morality is "is", and then logically leads to "ought".

1. Existence is the good; and
2. The good/right action is the one of which its consequences maximize the good. — Bob Ross

Just a clarification of 2, intent or actions can be part of the equation, but are unnecessary. It is the results over time compared to the potential expressions of material existence which we can evaluate greater or lesser good.

I am interpreting, so far, your use of 'time ticks', probability, and the like as merely measuring units and tools for maximizing the good. — Bob Ross

Correct.

Reserved

Well Bob, I've been holding onto a moral theory I've had for a while, I guess its time to get cracking on it! Give me a week and I should have something.

1. True statements can only exist as cognitive content — Sirius

Lets change this real quick: Known statements can only exist as cognitive content.

Truth is what exists whether we know it or not. Lets say you didn't know that the heart pumped blood through your body. Does it make it untrue? No. Lets say you are educated and know that the heart is "the source of thoughts". Does that make it true? No. Knowledge and truth are not the same thing. Knowledge is your best reasoned approximation of what appears to be true, but it is not truth itself.

Your second point in general works as long as you understand that it is knowledge which needs a mind, not truth. Your third point is irrelevant because knowledge is what we can grasp, and it is unknown that we can grasp any one truth, let alone an infinite truths.

Nice try though! A good approach that is only marred by the common mistake of thinking that truth and knowledge are the same thing.

Agreed, science pursues knowledge. Knowledge is our most logical way of being concurrent with truth, but cannot assert that it is truth itself.

You may be interested in reading this then: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12098/a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary/p1

Also a follow up here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12847/if-a-first-cause-is-logically-necessary-what-does-that-entail-for-the-universes-origins/p1

Fantastic post. I have had countless discussions and debates with people over the years and can throw my two cents into the ring.

1. People are not innately rational beings. We're innately rationalizing beings.

What does this mean? It means that most of us have a conclusion that we want, and look for reasoning that leads to that conclusion. It takes less effort and makes us feel happy and smart. No one likes to be wrong. Everyone likes to be right. Therefore the path of least resistance for our own emotional well being is to justify what we already want.

2. Being rational is not innate to most people and can be emotionally unsatisfying. It takes training, discipline, and ethics.

Being rational often does not feel good. Being rational will expose you more often to how wrong you are than how right you are. It does not let you feel superior to others. It does not make you feel smart. All of that is status and ego, and a rational person understands those are irrelevant to an argument. It can cut out a lot of entertaining thoughts as you need to look at data or take rigorous steps. Its so EASY not to be rational. Instead of admitting to being wrong in an argument, you can use techniques to skirt around someone's rationality and defend your rationale. A lot of people rationalize that they are rational, but are doing so because it gives them a sense of feeling good about themselves. Thus, when an actual rational argument is presented that breaks their rationale on something, they become hostile. Its because they don't care about rationality, they care about their ego and sense of self as a "smart" person being threatened.

3. It is easy to rationalize and be convincing to others as good rationalizing persuades emotionally, which is more powerful than unemotional rationality.

Basically because we're all rationalizing creatures by default, its easy to get away with not being rational. You'll always find some people who agree with your points if you're entertaining or connect emotionally with another person in your argument. You can get a feeling of intellectual superiority, though it is undeserved. Its so much easier to fake being rational and convince people than actually be rational and convince people.

So to sum, we're not special rational beings, we're rationalizing animals that with work and effort, have the capacity to be rational. This capacity is incredibly difficult, as it must overcome ego, desire for status, and plenty of other emotions that we want for our own self-benefit. Being rational will not win you friends or applause. It will often times be met with silence, anger, or dismissal. Its so much easier and fun to be great at rationalizing while basking in the illusions of our own superiority.

Now, lets couple this with philosophy. Philosophy is loaded with words, phrases, and theories that are havens for rationalizers. We sort broad definitions that allow subjective interpretation between different groups of people. We even allow much philosophy to be "untestable" which basically means its a logic game of imagination. Unlike science which requires data and repeatability, many aspects of philosophy are subjective, and therefore fall into the, "I'm right because I believe this" trope.

Because philosophy can also be confusing and unclear in its definitions, it can make people feel intelligent by stringing a group of words together that sound smart. After you take the careful effort to dissect the word play, you can find nothing was said at all. As most people are untrained to be rational in philosophy, the default is for people to rationalize in philosophy, especially on these boards.

This causes people to create identities such as, "I'm a Hegelian Idealist," or other general nonsense that gives them a feeling of being smart and "rational". One can start to get a sense of having special knowledge over regular people. "After all, those materialists are the general masses who have never thought of this at all!" But its all a trap of ego.

Its not that rationality can't win after a long and protracted battle. Of course, if a rational argument does win in philosophy, its no longer philosophy. Its now something provable and testable, and often becomes a science. Philosophies goal is to destroy itself ironically, and there are a lot of people who don't want to see that. So much of philosophy that is floating around is the unprovable mistakes of the past that have made no progress to solving real problems of today, but can be fun to think about. That's my take on it anyway.

So, if people like this emerge and write about it, would we even be aware they exist, would we even consider their work? — Skalidris

Well, this hit home a bit. The answer is, "No." I'm academically trained in philosophy, and have come up with a few original works. I've spoken with professors about them and most get angry when I've come up with something new that solves a problem. I remember discussing an issue in philosophy of science that the community had wrestled with for a while, and presented a solution that just used logic, and did not reference other philosophers, on a white board to him during his office hours.

I would say I'm a polite and non-aggressive person. He had a few questions, I followed up with answers, then he went quiet for a minute. After thinking about it, he, with barely contained anger in his voice said, "Well, that was a nice chat." Surprised I said, "Oh, uh, thank you." then left. A few seconds after I left I heard the door slam behind me.

I became enamored with Epistemology during my graduate school days. When I would present my ideas for Epistemology, professors would always tell me that I needed to write it pulling in another philosopher somehow. When I told them I formed it on my own, and didn't use other philosopher beyond the initial problem set, they would tell me I needed to reference at least 5 different philosophy articles for a viable paper. Of course then it was too long. I had to write papers that I wasn't passionate about, compare philosophers I didn't care about, for conclusions that ultimately didn't matter or change the field in any way.

So I left after I graduated and did not pursue a professorship. I realized then that academic philosophy was a celebration of its own failures. It constantly forced its acolytes to re-examine philosophy that had long been disproven and was absolutely anathema to free thought. And it makes sense. Solutions in philosophy become fields they are no longer philosophy. Most professors have been ground into churning out papers for publication to keep their job, not to actually further human progress. Its become a game at this point.

I did wonder if I could take my ideas to the public. I went to philosophy forums for years until I found this one. Here at least I get a few people who look at my work. But even then, most don't read carefully, aren't interested in really engaging in something new, and are more interested in telling you their opinion on things without really being interested in what you're saying.

I've tried posting variations of this https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 several times to get discussion going. I've had one person in all the years I've tried actually deeply engage with it. The only other person who seemed to appreciate it was someone who was new to philosophy. What's funny is I'm pretty sure I have the solution to Epistemology. I use it in my own life, and it basically solves all of the major epistemological problems of the day while introducing a way to finally evaluate inductions. But alas, most people either aren't patient enough to read the whole thing, or are not curious enough to really engage with it. I have no need to advertise to the world or try to convince people who aren't taking it seriously. Its there for those who care. Most do not.

So, philosophy is mostly a place for hobbyists. Here people look for semi-reasonable ways of looking at the world in a creative way that fits in with their world view. Most are not here to solve actual problems or come up with real solutions. It is an emotional haven for people, not a rigorous attempt to solve real world problems.

It doesn't bother me much at this point. I've long left the field professionally. I see that the world of AI is where epistemology is being taken serious. There the problem will be solved. Eventually philosophy really will have nothing left to contribute to the world beyond entertainment.

I read through your first two posts. — wonderer1

By two posts, did you mean the two posts of the actual argument, or the first post on how to approach the argument and the first post of the argument? This is important because the topic of induction is the last post of the argument and essential to read if you have issues with induction.

I'm afraid I am skeptical of your account of inductive reasoning, or at least it doesn't seem to fit well with the way I see my cognitive processes working. — wonderer1

As noted in the intro, that is not how to approach a paper like this. Its ok to have an intuition or feeling of disagreement, but you need to post what specifically is wrong in the writing of the paper, and some logic or argument as to why what I've expressed is wrong. From you statement, I don't know specifically what your issue is with my notion of inductive reasoning, as I do not even use the phrase "inductive reasoning". Is it that you have an issue with what I've written, or simply misinterpreted what I've written? I can't tell unless you point it out clearly.

I read the article you linked and did not see how this applied to the argument. Again, point out the idea that you disagree with so that way I know specifically what the issue is, and how you're interpreting it. Then contrast this with a point in the article so I can see where you believe another approach would work better.

But the problem is, how do you distinguish the model from the world? How can you, on the one hand, look at 'the model', and, on the other 'the real world'? That already assumes a perspective outside the model - that you're able to compare one with the other. But if your experience-of-the-world IS the model, and you're inside it, then how do you step outside it to compare it with the world itself? — Wayfarer

A very important question. The answer is that we have at some point in our lives, attempted to apply our model of reality to reality, and failed. At its most simple, its the contradiction of reality to our beliefs. The fact that contradictions exist to our model, show us that there is a model, or viewpoint of the world that we have, and something else that we have to model around. For it doesn't matter if I believe that a eating a rotten apple is healthy, the reality of illness will follow. If it were the case that there was nothing underlying to model on, then there would never be any contradictions to the models we create.

The solution then is to create models that are not contradicted by the "the world itself" or "reality'. If you can create as the foundation of your model, something which cannot be contradicted by reality, then you can use that as a base to build a structure of identities and applications that gives us the best models possible with which to apply to reality. Of course, none of those models can ever claim anything more than that they are not contradicted by reality, and cannot point to the "thing in itself" specifically apart from the model. This is because this is the way we function and know. To say we can know something outside of the very means we use to have knowledge, is impossible.

But the question we're considering is a question of a different order, because it concerns the nature of experience itself, not a specific question about a particular subject. That's what distinguishes it as a philosophical question, not a scientific one. — Wayfarer

Correct. I give the full answer to this question in the OP I linked. It all starts with coming to the realization that people can discretely experience, and what people can discretely experience is known. Demonstrating how this is known, I then show how we can apply this discrete experience to reality to see if our application can stand without contradiction. I think you'll really like it Wayfarer.

What about words like worldview, cultural subjectivity, formulation of problems, perspective, frame of reference, bias, set of presuppositions, paradigm? — Joshs

That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about using specific, clear, and unambiguous words in your discussions so that the debate can remain about the topic of the debate, and not about a word in the debate where possible.

Hello Wayfarer! We have disagreed in the past on many of your posts, but this is well written and sensible. I am almost entirely in agreement with the underlying concept I believe you are trying to convey. Where I think you run into conflict is your use of vocabulary to describe certain concepts as you are stuck in the philosophical models of those who have come before you. In our evolution of concepts and models, we of course must start with what we are given, and often times we try to evolve the meaning of the original concept and model to our new understanding. So I will pose a couple of questions for you about your word choice.

First, the idea of a "mind created world". The issue is that you have to explain what you mean, because culturally, this word 'create' in the phrase is seen as meaning that the mind literally creates the world. Of course you're not claiming that. But if you have to clarify the phrase, perhaps a new phrase would work better? For example, a "mind modeled world" We don't really "create" the world, we model it. The only creation is the model, not the world itself. The mistake is thinking our models ARE the world. They are merely the way we understand it.

You'll get a lot less pushback and people will be able to understand what you're saying without you needing to counter an initial normative pushback. The "model" is the "ideal" of idealism. So where does this leave "the thing that is modeled"? A very simple cultural word that needs no clarification is, "the physical". Now I know you have an emotional reaction to this, but you are already evolving out of the white picket fence of philosophical terminology. Terminology is merely a model. It is an invention of some guy somewhere, that can have cultural or personal attachment beyond what the model is trying to convey. Like it or not, "the physical" is a culturally relevant term which can reach a wide audience and quickly conveys what you want to. Like you refined idealism to fit into our underlying sensibilities about the world, so we can do with physicalism.

So humor me for a minute. The ideal is our model of the physical, or the real. We cannot understand the physical without the ideal. And I believe when this is conveyed to others clearly, almost everyone comes to agree with the underlying concept, even the physicalists, whether they use the same words or not to convey it. The real question is how we marry the ideal and the real. Because currently your definition of idealism is an accurate descriptor that "we model the world". But it does not tell us which models of the world are better than others.

Just as you tweaked and clarified that idealism does not mean we are a solipsistic existence, do you not find it charitable to allow physicalism to be " a model that the physical is the fundamental upon which we apply our models", while naturalism to be "a model that only natural laws and forces, as depicted in the natural sciences, are ideals we can objectively match to the real"? The debate can be less about debating specific semantics and "gotchas" about broad general theories which have been messily cobbled together from multiple philosophers over centuries, and instead using the underlying cultural and general understanding of those words to tackle the truly important underlying concept, "A methodology that allows us as accurate of a match between the ideal and real as possible".

If you are interested, I would love to hear your input on such a discussion: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 You have the intelligence and background to give this a serious discussion, and you may find the epistemological approach I use overlaps much of what you are trying to convey.

Why only, "through logical limitations and consequences"? Could you elaborate?

I'd be more inclined to say, that we can only know the world through our nature, and the nature of other people, including the imaginitive thinking of our intellectual ancestors who managed to point the way towards having a more accurate view of nature, and... and... and...

Is that contradictory? — wonderer1

I appreciate the question, but I do not want to distract from Bob's thread. Bob understands the reference I am pointing to, as we have discussed many times. If you are interested in exploring what I mean, feel free to read and ask me questions in this thread here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

“Logical”, “model”, “representation”. I just want to point out that these concepts get their sense from to a particular sort of metaphysical foundation. If we shifted to a different metaphysics, — Joshs

The problem is for me that the word "metaphysics" is a non-descriptive and generic filler in most conversations. "A different metaphysics" just shows that it seems to be a word that is conveniently used to lump a lot of ideas that are not the same together. Similar words like this are "tree" and "good". They can be useful words, but in philosophical conversation in which we are trying to come to an objective solution to a problem, these words have so much cultural subjectivity loaded into them that their meaning become debates within a debate.

When having a discussion that needs clarity, we should remove such words where possible to focus on the true issue we wish to discuss. As such, it is best to just point out the specific idea that is in one of the many "different metaphysics", and point that out instead of using the word as a whole in any meaningful argument.

This is my fault, as I have been using the “world in-itself” terminology to refer to whatever exists beyond one’s experience, but I actually distinguish the “world in-itself” from “the absolute”: the former is actually a product of the model wherein organisms are thought to represent the world, and the latter is whatever exists completely sans anything we gain from our experience. — Bob Ross

Not a worry. We can only communicate within the model, so you must use a model. This is a fine way to use the model to describe the unknowable existence that we model on.

The subtle difference, and contention I would have with your above quote, is that we cannot know, independently of evidence gathered from our experience (which is constrained by our possible forms of experience), that we represent objects in a space and time that transcends us: takeaway the forms of our experience (namely space and time that doesn’t transcend us) and it equally unintelligible that there is some “thing” out there. In other words, some “thing” being out there is a part of a model itself as well. — Bob Ross

Yes, it is a subtle difference, but I believe I understand and agree that we cannot know and communicate anything apart from the model. The model is the creation of an identity, and the application of that identity without contradiction. The way we can "know" the absolute, is truly as that which contradicts, or does not contradict the model we create. Its lack of contradiction does not mean the model captures the absolute, only that it can exist within, as a part of the absolute. The removal of most of the model leaves us with "things-in themselves" of which we are "things-in-ourselves" as well. The entire removal of the model leaves the absolute, of which we are a part of as well. It is of course very tricky to communicate the notion of something which exists outside of the model, as we are limited to thinking and communicating within the model, so I hope my words are read as in accord with your statement, and not against.

To build off of this, I would say that our “discrete experience” of the objects, such as blades of grass, says nothing about what may exist in the world which transcends our possible forms: not even that there is a blade of grass—irregardless of what we label it. — Bob Ross

Absolutely. It is only through the proper application of these discrete experiences that we can determine whether these are allowed to exist without contradiction within the absolute. The discrete experiences are of course always allowed to exist. It is their application which may or may not be contradicted, but this contradiction is for the model, not an expression of what the absolute is apart from the model.

Hello Bob. I've noted before I generally do not use philosophical terms such as 'metaphysics' in discussions, because as you can see from the many replies, no one can agree what they actually mean. Instead, a direct statement of the intent and argument suffice for thought, and you have written a good one.

Metaphysics is indistinguishable from the human imagination because it claims knowledge of that which is beyond the possible forms of experience (namely, space and time) which can never be empirically grounded. However, it is perfectly possible to limit traditional metaphysical claims to the possibility of experience, such that we only attempt to provide a map of what to experience--but this is no longer metaphysics: instead, it is pragmatic modelling of possible experience. — Bob Ross

Perfect. Regardless if someone else has a different view of metaphysics, this notion is correct.

If one takes away the possible forms of their experience and we do not accept claims indistinguishable from the imagination (no matter how plausible), then there is nothing intelligible left: there is nothing to be said about the world in-itself. — Bob Ross

Again, correct. We can only know of the world in-itself through logical limitations and consequences. Namely, some "thing" must be there. But beyond that, everything is a model we create that attempts to represent what is there. Knowledge is the the logical application of our representations for our best chance at matching to the consequences of its existence. But such an existence can only be known as the representations we hold, as we only know how the thing in-itself impacts the world, not what it truly is to exist as itself unobserved.

If you recall the idea of "discrete experience", we part and parcel reality as we wish within our own minds. I can view a field of grass, a blade of grass, or a piece of grass. I do not even need to call it "grass". It is the applications of these identities in practice which determine their usefulness in representing how a thing in-itself impacts the world in a way that is not-contradicted by its existence.

Just wanted to chime in at how I thought this was a really great post!

Absolute Truth comes from Plato, in short there is a Truth out there that isn’t relative. He explains this in his dialogues. — Isaiasb

Right, my point was that regular truth isn't relative either. That's knowledge or beliefs. Truth is what reality is, whether we believe it or not.

This had a lot going on here, but it seems at the end of the day you think that one needs to believe in a God for absolute truth. Perhaps people who don't have a grasp of what truth means do, but truth is fairly simple. Truth is what "is". Its what exists despite our beliefs and actions that would deny it. Eat rat poison, and it won't matter how much you believe its a miracle pill.

So in your words, what do you mean by "Absolute truth" then? Isn't truth just true? Truth isn't relative or much cares about us really. It is absolute in that sense, but it doesn't much care about having an adjective about it either.

@Caerulea-Lawrence

My apologies again that I missed this! For whatever reason, I seem to miss your replies. If you're still around, I'll do my best to give some meaningful conversation back.

The measurable 'time' when we felt 'indistinguishable' from the rest, is a much bigger part of our history than the time of the conscious, self-recognized thinker. — Caerulea-Lawrence

True. I believe what you're talking about is the "Emergence of the I". At the end of the day we are at its most basic, a combination of matter and energy like everything else in the universe. And yet, with a certain combination, an ability to discretely experience, and "I" emerges. If this "I" did not exist, the matter and energy of the universe would still be. But "I" would not exist. Being an "I" is a pre-requisite for knowledge, so we cannot know what things are like before the "I" exists.

Your claim works well as it is, so why 'complicate it'? Well, like I postulate, our 'lives' have been spent mostly as simple consciousnesses or impulses. And so I wonder if this basic tenant of these two experiences would do better if contrasted with their opposites: The 'simple, interconnected subconscious' and the 'indistinguishable whole'. — Caerulea-Lawrence

No, this is not a complication. This is seeking, questioning, and exploring! As I noted, we discretely experience. We do not know why. This is necessary to understand what the I is, and how it can know. What you're asking is, "What makes up the I? How does the I function?" As much as I would love intuition to have the answer, it is neuroscience that will answer this.

Think of a car for example. You don't need to know how a car works to use it if its functioning properly. With experience and intuition, you can learn to drive it in new and masterful ways. But no amount of intuition can tell us how the car works itself. It can't teach us that combustion generates a magnetic field which rotates the drive shaft. We can even study our car and get a general idea of how it works, but we won't really understand it fully without breaking it down, testing, and studying in depth.

It is not that your questions are invalid or uninteresting. It is that your questions cannot currently be answered by philosophy. We can speculate, and have fun doing so, but without the underlying science of the brain, its all hypotheses. This paper attempts not to speculate, but to answer. And in regards to the "I", I think its done well. That being said, I can most certainly speculate with you and see if we can come up with outlooks that fit within our sensibilities and wonder at the world!

Somehow I see that there could be an 'indiscrete experience' as a complementary piece here. And this circles back to what I said about the category "irrational". I guess the reason is that the most 'out there' beliefs, border or cross the border to the 'indiscrete experience'. When they bleed into our conscious mind, they aren't fully 'translated', so to speak. — Caerulea-Lawrence

This is fantastic. Yes, to conclude an irrational belief there must be something else besides logic at work. If you applicably know your belief is incorrect, but insist on it, you are being driven by something else unconscious. Lets speculate as to what that can be, and if it is useful to us.

One of the things I did not have space to cover was that all four types of inductions, including irrational ones, are all useful tools. Probability is useful for predicting odds of known outcomes. Possibility is essential for us to believe that the world will continue as we know it in the next tick of experience. Plausibility incites our wonder and curiosity about the world to discover new things. But what about irrational inductions?

Recall that knowledge, whether distinct or applicable, must be deductive. Lets break down two useful terms of deductions. Validity and soundness. Validity is a deduction that is correct in form.

A necessarily leads to B. Assume that you have A. Therefore deductively, you have B. This is valid.

Soundness is when all of the premises and conclusions of your deduction are true. Take our valid argument above, but discover that while we applicably knew that A existed, new information shows us that we were mistaken. Therefore the deduction might have been valid, but not sound.

One can hold applicable knowledge that is valid, and seems to be sound. Yet there is an old question in epistemology, "How do I know, that what I know, is actually true?" The answer is, "You can't". Meaning that we can hold a deduction that is both valid and appears to be sound from everything we can observe, but in the end is false.

This is where irrational beliefs come into play. While our conscious mind may see that certain claims seem valid and sound, there may be something in our unconscious that we are processing that cannot quite be verbalized. The ability to not be completely bound to logic in these cases, can be quite useful. As always, inductive beliefs carry an element of risk to them, and if used irresponsibly or unintelligently, can be detrimental. But used responsibly, they can be incredible boons.

For instance, lets think about someone in a precarious situation. Everyone in their life has declared them to be worthless. They've been abused, mistreated, and miserable. This is what they applicably know. The probability they will continue to be abused is near 99%. The possibility is there. The plausibility is there. The idea that life could get better with the information they have is completely irrational. And yet in this case, this is the belief that will save them.

The encapsulation of knowledge and an inductive hierarchy does not address morality. Morality being what we "should" do, despite what we know. I have not yet written my take on morality, but it is nearing the time. I hope this was something to think about that also addressed your idea!

Thanks Bob, I think I fully understand all of your points by now, and you mine. I think its just a different outlook on the word usage, but in general, the underlying concepts we're both trying to describe seem the same. I'll catch you in another conversation later!

As long as this isn't an attempt to disregard the underlying physics, its fine. The problem generally isn't that people want to talk about mind apart from the underlying physics. Its the fact that they think it allows them to ignore or refute the underlying physics.

Thank you for waiting Bob, the weeks have recently been filled so I have not been able to respond quickly to you. Excellent, I think we've tied the issue down now!

Ahh, I see. So I am using ‘things-in-themselves’ in the traditional way: they are whatever exist as themselves and are never directly perceived by us. The tree-for-you is a representation of the tree-in-itself, and they don’t necessarily match 1:1 (e.g., the tree-in-itself does not have green leaves, but the tree-for-you does). — Bob Ross

I believe this has been the source of our contention. I knew from your initial post that we had a slightly different take on some small thing. My view on "things-in-themselves" is both the way you view it, and the way you see me viewing it.

Now you can see why truth as a subjective concurrence with reality doesn't work for me. What is true about the thing-in-itself is something which is beyond my ability to know. The thing-in-itself as perceived by me is a representation that cannot exist without me. That is what I believe/know the thing in itself as. It is truth that this is a representation only. It is not necessarily true that my representation is an accurate assessment of the thing-in-itself. It is true that the thing-in-itself exists.

As you can see, I'm using the language of truth outside of my own subject. My concurrence of belief or representation is irrelevant. But I can also use truth within my subject, which I agree with you on. My major point is that your use of truth either disregards are eliminates the colloquial understanding of "truth outside of our subject". If you wish to delineate the two, I would add some adjective to truth to mark the difference, but I would not simply eliminate truth as describing a situation that does not require our subject.

And truly, I think this is it. If its the case that your redefinition of truth is only for the reasons you've described, then it is semantics. My point is that I feel you're going to get a strong push back from others, and you're making truth unnecessarily complex. If you feel that its not, then I have heard your points, and you have heard mine. Good discussion Bob! I will try to get back soon on replies going forward.

Hello Bob, I've had a busy weekend, but I'm back to answer!

I think our conversation has narrowed now to language. Again, you're using the fact that we reference things through language to indicate that truth requires a subject. Let me take your second post as an example.

"Its real that the universe would exist without me".

1. "Its" is referencing a thought (i.e., a claim); and
2. "real" is signifying the reality of what is referenced as "its".

And yet we've already established that what is real does not depend upon a subject. As I noted earlier, this argument that truth requires a subject is just the nature of a subject using language to describe objects. That's just grammar. That doesn't have any impact on the intent of what the word is conveying.

Bob, very simply does the thing that we reference still exist despite us not seeing it? Not the word "thing". Not the concept of us thinking about a "thing". Not our relation to the "thing". Does the "thing itself that we are referencing" exist apart from a subject?

Gettier arguments don’t demonstrate your theory of truth: it is compatible with both of ours. — Bob Ross

Here is a breakdown of the normative idea of truth under JTB from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Something’s truth does not require that anyone can know or prove that it is true. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: truth is a matter of how things are, not how they can be shown to be. So when we say that only true things can be known, we’re not (yet) saying anything about how anyone can access the truth. "
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#TrutCond

Although I know you think it is the crux of our conversation and I will continue to converse about it, I want to disclaim again that our metaphysical differences (with respect to ontology) are irrelevant. — Bob Ross

Then I have no idea and see no value in defining truth as you do. Why are you defining it this way Bob?

I’ve already explained the benefits: it is more parsimonious and captures what we mean (implicitly) by truth better. — Bob Ross

But its not. I've listened to you trying to understand your viewpoint, and it is neither of those things. It dose not capture implicitly what I mean by truth. It upends a traditional notion of truth. Perhaps I am outside of the norm. Regardless, surely there must be some other benefit in defining it this way despite these reasons.

What is true does not care about our opinion or observations

That’s false. — Bob Ross

Then you agree with me. If I observe or have an opinion that I believe is true, yet you tell me that it is false, then you are telling me truth does not care about my opinion or observation. Your definition of truth does not lead to parsimony, but contradiction.

It is true that I saw an orange ball today, but not that an orange ball exists outside of observation, as color does not exist as a property of the ball in reality (even under your view). — Bob Ross

It is true that something exists which you observed to be an orange ball. There is the truth of your observation "seeing orange" and the truth of the light which entered into your eyes. Yes, if you as a subject did not exist, then the truth of your subjective experience would not exist. That does not mean that the objective reality that was necessary for you to have that subjective experience from, is not true.

This insistence that there cannot be a tree in a forest if no one is around only has teeth as a grammatical note

I am not sure why this would be true. I am not arguing that a tree doesn’t fall (literally as a material object) beyond conscious experience because language is dependent on subjects: that’s a horrible argument. — Bob Ross

But this is how you are coming across, intentional or not. I understand that you want this outcome, but your claims don't lead to this outcome. I am trying to give you all the benefit I can in this, but I do not see any other claim when you state:

(Me)A tree is a combination of matter and energy.

(Bob) A tree, as a tangible object, is the representation; and not the thing-in-itself — Bob Ross

when I am pointing out the thing-in-itself in the context of the conversation. We both understand that yes, all words that represent things in themself, represent things and are not the things in themselves. But if I have not been clear enough from the context of the conversation, I am not referring to the "tree" as a representation of the thing in itself. This is the denotation, the finger point, to the thing in itself that is necessary to exist. The truth of that thing in itself's existence does not depend upon myself as a subject.

I think that about covers your points, let me know if I missed anything.

I already shared the definitions as per the Webster dictionary, and, as one more, a simple Google search (which gives colloquial definitions at the top) defined ‘truth’ as ‘that which is true or in accordance with fact or reality’ in the second definition. So I don’t see how you can rightly claim that my definition is not circling around in the colloquial ecosystem as a predominant notion. — Bob Ross

Yes, and I disagreed with your interpretation, and noted looking to the Gettier argument's idea of truth gives the normative view of truth. My point however, is not to debate with you here. Its to note a potential problem I see you having when conveying your idea to others. Language is purely invented by us. I'll be the first to say, "Yeah, lets use a new definition." I'm just not personally convinced I should here.

If people accept your definitions, then its fine. I just think you'll have a difficult time doing so. As such, its really in the realm of opinion, and can only be tested by pushing your theory out to other people to see what they think. The definition change doesn't matter to me as much as the concept. I'm just not seeing why the definition change (in my opinion) is useful to your concept.

I also would like to point out that your use of ‘subjective’ truth is absolutely not the common notion of that term. People tend to mean by ‘subjective truth’ that it is relative to the subject, or a whimsical opinion, and not ‘the experience of a subject’ which is also ‘objective true’. I agree, though, that people use ‘objective truth’ in the sense of something independent of opinion, factual, or independent of desires, thoughts, etc. — Bob Ross

No, my point was that I invented a phrase that took common language and conveyed a notion of what it was that was easy to understand. It was also an attempt to convey what you seem to be saying in a more concise manner. You didn't have to question what I meant by it. By all means disagree with its use. If you noticed as well I noted, "Subjective truth is also objective". Which taken at face value is contradictory. But because we're familiar with the terms, and their context didn't deviate too much, it was easy to communicate and understand.

My major point Bob, isn't necessarily an issue with most of the concepts. Its how you're conveying them. Your use of truth seems to conflict with a core of what I believe most people see truth to be, what is real despite our beliefs. Now, you also agree with this notion, but with vocabulary that seems overly complicated and wordy to convey the same point. Which is why I've been asking why bother changing the vocabulary at all. What do we gain out of this? And I think the only thing I can spot is that you want to say truth is not material reality, which I will get to later.

But before I continue, to sum:

1. The idea that truth is redundant with reality and therefore should have its definition changed is an opinion. At worst truth is a synonym with reality. At best, it has a little more context in relation to beliefs. Many people use these terms interchangeably, and many of these people are philosophers. Considering we may invent terms however we wish, the question is whether your statement of redundancy is enough to turn people off of its use. I'm doubtful, and for my part, no.

2.

2. Does not completely capture its colloquial usage (e.g., saying “bob’s claim is true” makes less sense if ‘truth’ is ‘reality’, as it is implying that it is true in virtue of the fact that bob’s claim corresponds with reality—but ‘true’ no longer relates to correspondence under your definition).

This is the general understanding of truth as referred to in JTB. Truth is true irrelevant of your justification, or correlation to it. What is true does not care about our opinion or observations. Again, you may disagree that this is the general understanding, and this is fine. For myself, I have not seen a compelling case in removing the word truth as something which exists independently of subjects.

I can say, "Its true that the universe would exist without me."
…
"Its true that there are things existent outside of our thoughts".

“Its” refers to a claim, and so this sentence makes no sense without it. So I don’t think you have provided examples here of an expression of something that is true which is not being related to thought (implicitly or explicitly). — Bob Ross

The expression of grammar in language is not an argument. We are talking about an adjective of a noun. "The dog is red." "The dog is red is true". We are stating that the combination of language descriptors is not a mistake, but a correct assessment. Again, this argument against truth applies to any word Bob. You need to demonstrate why this argument for truth being purely a relation of us to objects is different from any other descriptor of a thing.

No. The point was that the correspondence theory applies to everything, including what pertains to subjective operations in reality. There is no ‘subjective’ vs. ‘objective’ truth distinction under my view, because I don’t think it makes sense. The subjective truth as “my experience” is subsumed under absolute truth and is no different, in its nature as ‘truth’, as this objective truth that you mentioned (viz., reality doesn’t care about my thoughts about my thoughts, which also fits your definition of ‘objective truth’ but since it is just about my thoughts it is also ‘subjective’ truth—and now we have even more redundancies and unnecessary turbidity). Positing them both makes it sound like there are two natures to truth, or types of truth: which is false. There is only one truth. — Bob Ross

Agreed. That was indeed my point. Subjective and objective truths are simple divisions of identity to convey a concept. "Subjective truth" is a colloquial term to get a concept across without difficulty. Of course, this concept does not hold water as truth is truly objective. We're just using "subjective" to quickly summarize the notion of "The truth of your experience." This of course can apply to the truth of others experience, and finally, to the truth beyond experience. Summed all together, these individual concepts both with experience, and outside of experience, is truth.

We may have to, as I think this is the crux.

I think it is completely irrelevant, as it simply depicts our metaphysical differences (which we are both aware of at this point) that do not affect in any way our definitions of truth. — Bob Ross

I think its absolutely the crux, because I can see no other reason why you would argue for the notion of truth in such a way. There is zero gained utility in it beyond minor personal preference, unless you have issue with the general idea of "things in themselves".

A tree is a combination of matter and energy.

A tree, as a tangible object, is the representation; and not the thing-in-itself. So I disagree here (assuming you mean that reality herself contains such a tangible tree). — Bob Ross

Lets say that I'm walking along a road and I see a pole with a flat board and some lines on it that look like writing. We both agree this is real. I point to "it". I say, "That". Does "that" exist even if I haven't seen it? Yes. Does my definition or conception of "that" exist if I don't experience it. No. You seem to be implying, intentional or not, that if I don't exist, "That" doesn't exist either as real. That "That" is not true. Not the language, concepts, and descriptors, but that "That thing in itself" is not true.

Because Bob, if there are no subjects, then no language or descriptor exists. But we have to use that language, and descriptors to describe an existence where there is no subject. This insistence that there cannot be a tree in a forest if no one is around only has teeth as a grammatical note. And again, these teeth apply to the totality of language; truth has no special place. It does not negate that fact that yes, there's still that thing in itself that we would have called a tree falling in what we would have called a forest.

Saying the same thing about ‘truth’? No. About reality being independent of our observance: yes. About reality as a material world being independent of our observance: no. — Bob Ross

No one ever said reality had to be a material world. Reality and truth are simply what is. Call it material or whatever you want personally. I can just as easily state "Truth is independent of a subject," and I doubt most people on this forum would bat an eye. Of course all words are dependent on subjects viewpoints of the world. But that doesn't suddenly make the former statement wrong.

And finally to circle back on the real main point, even if we are to shuffle the grammar around and make truth a completely separate concept from what is "real", we've solved none of the problems we still have with knowledge. "How do I know that what I know is true?" It sounds like the grammar shuffle is more of a need to let people capture truth. But then "How do I know that what I claim is true, is real?" Its just an extra intermediary with the same end problem.

A quick google search. Journalist and UFO researcher Jaime Maussan is the one who's claimed that a third of the DNA is "unknown". Lets see the history of our researcher eh?

In 2015, Maussan claimed that a mummy discovered in Peru Near Nazca Lines, was that of an alien. However, as per a fact check by Snopes.com, the claim was found to be false. According to their report, the mummified corpse was of a human child. Due to these reasons, Maussan is considered to be a hoax promoter.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/two-non-human-alien-corpses-unveiled-in-mexico-congress-who-is-ufologist-jaime-maussan-101694597362929.html

Basically, this is another fraud. Someone who's already been caught lying so blatantly once should not be trusted. I await the test results that will conclude this is another hoax.

What is real is "What is". How do we know what is real? That is the question epistemology has been trying to answer for centuries.