1. God is ultimate reality.

2. Truth is absolute, although our limited ability to perceive the whole truth at once explains why it can appear relative. We can know absolute truths by at least two means:

a) genuinely irrational truth implodes upon itself and cannot be (or, at the very least, cannot be recognised).
b) we cannot simply decide to do anything we please and hence, there is an absolute beyond our individual preferences and perceptions that determines what we can or cannot do.

3. Morality is absolute, with the need for discernment. It is wrong to deny the truth but it might be less wrong to lie to a murderer on the hunt for innocents. When one discerns the level of a moral decision, they do it in relation to the absolute standard which is the highest goal: God, from whence they come.

4. We came from God and we are here to overcome our fallen nature; to learn to Love Him and our fellow man so that we can be purified. Where we are going is the life that He has prepared for us, and the details of this life will depend on each person and how He judges them.

I hope this counts as an appropriate set of answers and if you have any questions, by all means fire away.

Hope you are doing well.

As to the matter of truth...
I've decided to keep it, whilst including a section comparing it to knowledge. Allow me to explain... It's unwise to drift too far away from our common-sense understanding of things in order to be clear and when all is said and done, what the model reveals is actually closer to the dictionary definition of truth than it is with knowledge. Truth is "that which is the case" and the model reveals what the case is by revealing what it allows. Admittedly, there are two qualifications: first, we do not technically have direct access to the truth (maybe). Instead we have knowledge of the truth (although, if there is no access to it whatsoever, we might ask how we can speak meaningfully of it in the first place). Second, when we "access" the truth we do not access the entire thing. We may come to know some part of the complete truth, but not the whole and therefore, the possibility is open for us to have presumptions based on the parts that we currently know, and for these to require revision when we come to know more.

In brief, the model will be described as a model for searching for truth because that is it's function. When we distinguish belief, knowledge and truth (or "reality") we are framing the model such that must test, access and therefore "find" truth in order to form knowledge. Attempting to side-skirt this conclusion would actually make the argument less coherent and more complicated.

As to the writing...
Your message came in good time. Thank you; it had a sobering effect. I was attempting to write a fourth draft of the work and make it very thorough but the thing was fast becoming very dense, dry and wordy.

On the other hand, I listened plan that I'd made a while back and noted that in that I'd recognised that this work should not and would not be for a layman because the work regards someone who is formally searching for truth. In short, on the one hand the work could be too over-complicated if I either try to make it extremely thorough or extremely clear (which is also ironic because I'm a Wittgensteinian and know that nothing can be so clear as to not be misunderstood).

In any case, the work should be aimed at our level or just below is. My plan it to write as if I am explaining the idea to someone like yourself or a young philosophy student as if for the first at - say - a meal or on a long walk, whilst not missing any of the major points.

My next post to you will be about a final piece I need to think through which is how the model allows for the choice between models.

Best Regards

No worries mate, thanks for letting me know.

[In referece to the second post]

the main thing that I would like to know is whether the argument is valid/rigorous or not. There were some additions in that passage compared to the first draft.

Just a couple of points/questions quickly...

To the first post:
Doesn't your counter-argument run the risk of making the concept of "truth" convoluted by assuming that when we claim access to truth we claim access to truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

To claim that something is true does not necessarily entail that we deem it to be certainly true or objectively true or eternally true etc. Now, I believe that such truths exist but the simple claim that truth is "accordance with reality" appears to be basically tautological and need not bring these other assumptions in which appear to confuse the issue.

Also, this was not an essential point for the first post. Aside from this issue, what are your thoughts on it? Is it cogent?

To the second post:
Admittedly, I've flip-flopped on this a bit. I have two problems to deal with: what the argument is and how to convey it and I don't really have the mental room to solve both problems at the same time, at least not optimally. Also, it's true that I want my argument to appeal to the layman but I've since decided that should probably come later and that I should appeal to the philosopher first. After all, if the argument does not get past the philosopher but gets to the layman that would feel like a kind of lying. And so, it seems worth making a rigorous version of the argument first and then condensing or simplifying it later once the work earns the confidence to do so. Also, when I talk about appealing to the philosopher I'm not talking about all philosophers at all levels. What I'm trying to do is write the argument so that it is i) rigorous, thorough and as airtight as possible, and ii) so that it can be understood by anyone with a nominal understanding of philosophy (much like you and I or better educated laypeople).

In light of that, what is your opinion of the second post?

Also, as a side note I thought I would throw this your way...

It's a passage that I've just written up near the outset of my second draft which might help to clarify the foundations of the argument:

---------

"How do we know before we know how to know?" This is the question that is trying to be answered and positing the question itself provides the first axiom that the argument starts from. That axiom is that there is a search for knowledge. If there was no search, we would not be searching for knowledge even about knowledge itself. This axiom is contingent in one sense and necessary in another. It is contingent in the sense that merely asserting that there is a search does not necessitate that there must be a search. A man might be searching for knowledge at a given time, and he might not. As such, the argument does not progress from the axiom that there must be a search for knowledge. Instead, the argument progresses from the axiom that if there is a search for knowledge, the rest of the argument is entailed. The axiom is necessary in the sense that it necessarily follows from the search. This claim is as clear as a tautology: if there is a search for knowledge, it necessarily follows that we must recognise the axiom that there is a search for knowledge. This axiom is the necessary underpinning for all epistemology and proto-epistemology.

This is an important point to make a clarification in light of this previous claim. The claim being made is that the axiom that there is a search for knowledge is necessary for epistemology or proto-epistemology, but not for all knowledge as-such. This is because epistemology entails the study of knowledge which is distinct from simply knowing something. The study of knowledge entails that knowledge is sought, even if the knowledge sought is simply knowledge about the structure of knowledge - even those parts of it that we come to know without seeking. That is to say, some means of attaining knowledge might be passive, but to seek an understanding of those passive elements is active. A man may, for example, know that a tree is green by passively receiving the image of one as he walks, but for that same man to know how he knows that the tree is green, he must seek knowledge. Moreover, once the man inquires whether the tree is green or not he is searching for knowledge. This proto-epistemological model is not concerned with how the man passively receives knowledge of the green tree, but is only concerned with the fundamentals that are entailed once he asks any questions of his knowledge, whether that be a given subject of knowledge such as the tree or the very structure of knowledge itself. By extension, this proto-epistemological model is concerned with all inquiries as such. Once we ask how we know something, a search is commenced. This does not limit the scope of this argument - this is the largest possible scope that it can cover because none who ever make an inquiry are not searching for knowledge; they are attempting to discern whether what they might believe does or does not accord with reality. Hence, an active search is taken as the basic axiom of the model because a method of discernment is irrelevant to anyone who would not and does not actively discern, by definition.

Therefore, we have the fundamental axiom of proto-epistemology: that there is a search for knowledge.

Discovered a fragment of the argument today which is worth throwing your way... please note that I am no longer focusing on how the argument is directly normative/ethical (although whether it is in any respect is still to be seen). Instead, I am trying to reflect on the direct connection between the knowledge-seeking model and our decision-making.

Also note: "true belief" = knowledge
This follows from the argument because knowledge = "belief that accords with reality"

"Reality, by its very nature, demands that we live in accordance with it - we cannot do otherwise. What we can do is choose whether our beliefs are in accordance with it or not. Whether they are or not and what does or does not accord with reality is what is revealed by the search for knowledge.

To choose that our beliefs not be in accordance with reality requires that we divorce our beliefs from our decisions because all decisions must bend to reality, whereas all beliefs need not and so, if decisions are based on belief, only those decisions based on true belief will be made (or indeed can be made). If we choose to have beliefs that are not even potentially true but explicitly not true, no decisions based upon these beliefs can be made because these are decisions that reality does not allow by definition.
Therefore, if we choose to not have true beliefs (knowledge) we must divorce our beliefs from our decisions.
Therefore, if we choose to not divorce our beliefs from our decisions we must have true or at least potentially true beliefs (knowledge)."

The general movement of the thinking is towards the argument that, like the search for knowledge itself, acting upon our beliefs is not something that is necessarily given, but a choice and therefore a contingency. However, if this choice is made, like the choice to search for knowledge, it is another basic axiom that leads directly to the search itself and, therefore, necessitates the model.

--------

On a slightly unrelated note:

We can use the application of knowledge to help us find the answer, but the process of knowledge itself, does not give us the answer. So it is not that we don't use the process of knowledge to find the answer, its just the definition of knowledge is not the whole story. — Philosophim

Was probably your best insight in your last set of comments and makes me think that you might be coming to understand my philosophy better than I do.

All the best.

Thanks for the engagement. This is to chime-in to say that I am currently working on this problem. Also, I am currently trying to update the initial draft that I wrote in order to improve its structure and clarity. I'll definitely proceed with the discussion but don't want to rush anything and so I don't know how long I'll be - just wanted to give the heads-up.

The argument has undergone much development since the OP and some of the structure, including some of the definitions, have changed. I would like to engage but if you want to proceed constructively I suggest that you read this brief/draft of the argument which was linked to above.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZLiQgp2pJTbxbvMXppGuwTF8ZrkUTPHmYD6EgmLPXLY/edit?usp=sharing

It is then perhaps worth reading through the discussion between myself and @Philosophim that comes after the link

Hmm... this is complicated (which is unsurprising)... but this is good because it's giving me an idea of just what the model can or cannot do.

A few thoughts come to mind when reading this which I would like to note down quickly...

1.

If we have concluded that the knowledge is the best means of making decisions that do not contradict with reality, seeking knowledge when pursuing one's goals seems like a better choice then not. — Philosophim

But a decision that "contradicts reality" simply cannot be made. That's what the model reveals: that some courses of action are not allowed by reality. More specifically, some sets of actions or goals are not permitted by reality.

It's as if reality says: "If you want to become a mafia boss you can commit crime. Indeed, you should commit it if that is necessarily entailed by the definition of you goal." However,

"If you want to be a mafia boss you cannot be an honest man at the same time."

Of course, the issue is kind of like us going up to reality and asking "But what should I want!?" and reality throws up its hands.

2.

And that leads to the big question again, "What goals should a person pursue in life?" That sounds like an entirely different topic from knowledge. — Philosophim

Not if the question is "How do I know what goals a person should pursue?" ...

3.

And perhaps this is because a goal is not a belief. It is a motivation. — Philosophim

I'm still not sure about this...
The model does not equate goals with beliefs. Instead, it recognises that goals contain implicit beliefs. The goal "To pursue X" is not a belief. But without the belief that "X can be pursued" why would one have the goal? Come to think of it, perhaps this is where the model is becoming too loose because its an added assumption, not a necessary conclusion. The assumption is that someone would not pursue a given goal unless they believed that the goal could at least be pursued, if not attained. My intuitions are hammering me with this, but this cannot be proven. Then again, I wonder: how could someone possibly pursue a goal if the don't believe that it can be pursued? Not if they don't know that it can be simply don't believe that it can...?

4. "Ethics" could be the wrong term, but the fact that the model is practical seems to be important.

It may well be the case that we have exhausted this topic already and need to move on, but I'd like to mull it over first before hand and make sure we're clear about what we can solidly build. And so, if you have any thoughts, comments or retorts for these thoughts in the mean time it would be great to hear them.

But let me clarify what I mean by belief as well. A belief is an assertion that reality is a particular way. While in English we might say, "I believe I can reach my goal, we can also say, I don't believe I can reach my goal. The belief is not in the goal, but whether one can obtain, or not obtain one's goal. The outcome is what we can know, the motivation to seek that outcome is the goal. — Philosophim

Right, that's cleared things up and okay - I think I now agree that the argument has over-reached itself.

A belief can be about a goal, which is why the inter-goal applicability part applies because our beliefs about which goals can be compatible can be right or wrong, but this is not the same as saying that a belief is a goal. And yes, you have the model correct.

What we can determine from pursuing goals is that particular outcomes are false. So let us say my goal was to walk 1,000 miles in a day. I attempt it, and fail. I know that on that day, with what I prepared and did, I did not meet my goal that day. But what if I try something else? Maybe train for a month, or drink water more frequently then I did last time. The result is true or false based on all the circumstances one made in pursuit of the goal on that particular attempt. It does not mean that if you try another way, you will not meet the goal. — Philosophim

Agreed.

Okay, so let me back-track and try to explain where I am coming from with this approach and what my intuition is saying...

The model that I've presented appears to have a direct connection to ethics because a concern for what we are tying to do in the world or for what decisions we are trying to make is woven directly into the logic of the model. Use of the model or the process of searching for knowledge reveals which sets of goals can be pursued and which cannot. The model does not dictate which courses of action we must take, but application of the model reveals what courses of action/decisions reality does or does not allow.

In so far as this becomes prescriptive, it becomes prescriptive based on a contingency; If you seek to achieve this or that end, either the end cannot be attained at all or you should choose particular sub-goals or particular courses of action in order to attain it. Now, of course, it is not as if that will all be revealed from the outset and it might not be the case that one knows a particular goal can be pursued until they try to pursue it. In any case, this is inter-woven with the search for knowledge because it is the process of searching which reveals these things for us; which reveals knowledge about our goals.

And so, this appears to be as far as the model goes: it cannot tell us what we should do as-such, but can reveal what we should or should not do given particular core motivations.

That is, with one exception: of course, the model entails or necessarily assumes the search for knowledge itself. It would therefore follow that we should make certain decisions if the search is to take place at all (such as the decision to maintain the search).

And, as has already been mentioned, the goal of knowing what decisions or courses of action reality does or does not allow also entails the search for knowledge.

What are your thoughts on all of this?

A good weekend to you too.

Interesting criticisms... On the one hand, I think that I agree that I might be blending goals too closely with knowledge, but on the other I disagree with some of the claims that you've made...

Let's start with:

A goal isn't really a belief. Its an objective someone wants to reach. — Philosophim

Are you sure? Let's think about that. Now, I agree with you that knowledge as-such is not a goal, but what of the idea of positing a goal to be pursued if one does not believe that the goal can be attained? We can either say that a goal is a belief or at least based upon a belief: the implicit belief that the goal can be pursued. Now, like any belief, the goal is a working hypothesis - one knows that they can pursue a goal in so far as it is non-contradictory and in so far as the can, in fact, pursue it.

You've stated that

A goal does not start out with any idea that the goal can, or cannot be obtained. — Philosophim

But what if one knew - using the model - that a given goal could not be pursued? Can a goal start out with the belief that it cannot be pursued? Now, admittedly, one might know that a goal cannot be pursued and still persist in pursing it, but we would simply conclude that, despite being better equipped to navigate reality, such a person would have failed to use this equipment.

This is why the model is important. A goal is not the same as a belief, but goals are based upon beliefs and because beliefs are tested by the model, the belief that a given goal can or cannot/should or should not be pursed are tested in the same basic way.

The mafioso example was used to show that conflicting sets of models cannot be pursued. If the mafioso had pursued knowledge as-such prior to the mere pursuit of power, he might have recognised this and prioritised one path over the other. The question of which he would choose is a question of core motivations, but if he was - at his core - motivated by fulfilment instead of masochism he should have chosen the honest path and application of the model reveals this.

Admittedly, at this point the argument only goes as far as to argue that the model can reveal what sets of goals one should have in reference to their hierarchy of goals or even their primary goals. However, it does not yet give an argument for which primary goal we should have as opposed to another. The only thing that is worth adding to this is that the model will reveal that not all primary goals are possible because some simply cannot be pursued.

And so, I stand by my previous conclusions...

If one is looking to better their decisions the search for knowledge is entailed because this reveals the means to attain goals, including knowledge of which goals can be hierarchically arranged; and

If one is looking to find knowledge, this will make one better equipped to pursue their goals.

Of course, you may still be unconvinced by this and if so I would like to hear your thoughts.

All the best

Good, really good. This is a great place to be.

First of all, it's interesting that you say:

I agree with you on a personal and intuitive level. — Philosophim

Large chunks of what I'm doing have been a matter of allow leaps of intuition and then filling out the spaces in between and so it would be interesting see if you can unpack why your intuitions seem to agree with the idea that there is a common thread connected to logic...

Anyway, the main topic for discussion should be the second problem, then. It appears that you are satisfied that the argument can solve the first problem and re-stating why might be tantamount to beating a dead horse, whereas the second needs some further unpacking.

---

Why should we search for knowledge and how is ethics connected to the model of proto-epistemology?

Given the model, we should search for knowledge if we want to be better equipped to pursue our goals.

The process of discerning knowledge requires us to discern what models of belief can or cannot be applied to reality. It follows that some models of belief will accord with reality and some will not. Some models of belief will allow us to proceed through reality towards our goals, some will not. Therefore, the very basic proto-epistemological process is a process of discovering what reality does or does not allow and, therefore, what we can or cannot do.

Now, we have established that the search for knowledge allows us to better pursue our goals; allowing us to find what does or does not allow us to achieve them. However, this does not yet tell us which goals we should or should not have to begin with. This is where an appeal to the inter-goal applicability comes in. Just as the model allows us to discover which means do or do not facilitate the attainment of particular goals, it allows us to discover which goals we can or cannot pursue as-such. After all, if one's belief that a given goal can be pursued cannot be put into action, that belief is not applicable and is therefore not knowledge. Therefore, if we are seeking knowledge the process of discovery will rule out those goals that cannot be pursued. Therefore, the process should whittle-down our goals to only those goals that can be pursued.

But the question remains: of those goals that we know can be pursued, how do we determine which ones should be pursued?

Consider this example:
A mafioso gangster has the goal of being corrupt and unlawful for the purpose of making money. He is able to purse both of these goals and so we find that both of the goals:
a) to make money; and
b) to break the law
are compatible. If knowledge is also of interest, the mafioso would conclude that these goals are not contradictory and are mutually-applicable. Therefore, his belief that he can pursue both counts as knowledge.

However, the mafioso also finds that there are times when he is prompted to be an honest man; perhaps before an ignorant wife, perhaps before the local priest, or perhaps before his innocent daughter when she asks him whether he is a murderous, unjust criminal. The mafioso knows that his honestly will cost him dearly in these relationships or in his work...

Therefore, the mafioso discovers that has can goals which are incompatible:
a) to make money whilst breaking the law,
b) to be an honest man; and
c) to maintain the respect of his family
are three goals that cannot be pursued together. They are mutually non-applicable and so the belief that all three can be pursued together is non-knowledge.

By such a process the mafioso can learn which goals or even set of goals he can or cannot pursue in life. Deciding between them would require a recourse to higher-priority goals. The mafioso cannot be honest and a criminal. Which is more important to him? His wealth and power or his relations?

Choosing between these options is a question of considering which avenue either closes or opens up a goal-set that allows one to pursue their higher-order goals...

Pursuing crime might allow the mafioso to pursue money, power and easy women but exclude his options for pursuing an honest life and genuine, loving relationships. As a more abstract example, we might posit that a man can choose a set of goals that will lead to ultimate misery and another that will have a higher chance of leading to fulfilment.

As of yet, this argument cannot determine whether a man should desire fulfilment over misery 0 perhaps a man is a masochist. What it can do is give us a should based on a contingency... if the man wants, say, fulfilment the search for knowledge will determine that he should adopt particular sets of goals at the exclusion of others.

One more thing...
As was mentioned initially, it follows directly from the logic of the model that it maximises our ability to interact with reality; or, you could say "to navigate reality", or you could say "to make the best decisions within it" in light of our goals and motivations.

It therefore appears that there are two initial axioms that entail the search for knowledge and, therefore, the model:

If one wants to search for knowledge, the model is entailed and one is better equipped to make decisions.

Likewise,

If one wants to make the best decisions, the search for knowledge is entailed, as is - by extension - the model.

So, I got to thinking about what problems the theory is trying to solve. You might not have known, but I released a book about a year ago when I was trying to tackle my philosophical problems:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Practically-True-Tony-Lowe-ebook/dp/B07Y6GDJ16/ref=sr_1_2?dchild=1&keywords=practically+true&qid=1603622262&sr=8-2

(You don't need to read it)

I bring it up because there were a number of issues that I was attempting to break into with this book which the model that we have been discussing was eventually borne out of. However, having come so far with it I had almost forgotten what the problems were that I was trying to solve. Having reached this point it has come time to reconsider these problems. There are basically two key problems that the model that I am presenting is attempting to solve, and I will include a sketch of their solutions below:

Problem 1:
Epistemology is convoluted and long-winded from the outset. If one wanted to know how they search for knowledge, there is precious little that one can offer as an initial foundation.
A new student of philosophy might be presented with a number of epistemological theories and be encouraged to consider some of their problems, but will not be taught how to choose between these theories or how to recognise when a problem has or has not been solved. Indeed, to do so would require that the student knows something about knowledge; namely, how to tell a good theory of knowledge from a bad one. However, if epistemology is the study of knowledge itself, the questions becomes "how do I know how to know before I know how to know?"

Answer 1:
By making an appeal to the search for knowledge as a search we find that there are basic, proto-epistemological standards that must be adhered to from the outset, which provides a foundation for advanced epistemology to be built upon. Of course, adherence to logic/reason alone might provide the foundation for proto-epistemology, but logic/reason alone does not justify itself. For this to function as a foundation, a simultaneous appeal must be made to a general concern for goals and for the search for knowledge in particular.

Problem 2:
Epistemology is not "practical", at least not directly. It is divorced from questions of ethics; that is, there is a separation between it and questions of how we choose and live until some work is done to connect epistemology to the field of ethics. For this reason, one might conclude that there is a disconnect between questions of how we know what we know and why we do what we do.

Answer 2:
The model can be made to argue that there is an intimate connection between ethics and epistemology. One does not quite "lead" onto the other but the two are entwined from the outset. This follows directly from the state of our proto-epistemology.

And so, if you are still happy to proceed it seems that it could be useful for us to discuss whether the argument that I have made either does or is able to solve these two problems and to what extent. This allows us to work into the "direct implications" stage of the overall project. What do you think?

That's pretty funny... my initial reaction was to be incensed by this, thinking "But if it's logical and all of the arguments follow necessarily from their axioms, it must be true! and so, what are you talking about?"

But then it occurred to me...

No, I don't agree it is the truth. What I can agree from your model, is that your model is something that can be known. — Philosophim

Which is all the the model is intendent to do. Indeed, that's all that it can do. To posit that it can be the truth at this juncture is absurd. As you say:

we can never claim that such knowledge is "the truth" with certainty, but that is "the truth" with rationality. — Philosophim

Moreover, I agree with you. The degree to which this model will be convincing to people will depend on a range of things, from semantics to levels of intelligence and even if it was understood perfectly by all, time alone might lead to a dilution of our understanding.

Now, for what it's worth, I do think that there is a thread within the model that makes it stable across time and context (which is related to logic), but we are far away from demonstrating that yet.

What's more, it appears that what I cannot and should never seek out is a perfect model of the truth. Instead, what I am aspiring to develop is the best model for proto-epistemology that can be managed. Even if "the best" never equates to "perfect".

And so, this a good place to be.

For the progression then...
I had previously envisioned that my entire argument would progress through 3 major parts:
1. The foundations (which we have now completed),
2. The direct implications, and
3. Advanced implications and eventual justification for Christianity.

If all has gone well and the model at least holds its own weight, perhaps now we can move onto some of the direct implications which open up the relevance of the argument.

Fantastic.

And so, before we proceed it is worth double-checking to be sure whether you agree with the argument.

It's good to know that you have concluded that I have created a model that we have apparently ironed all of the kinks out of, but I would also like to stress that what I am trying to establish is not just one model to be chosen from many, but the truth. That is to say, I have argued that it is true that if we search for knowledge, all that I have argued about the necessity of consistency and applicability necessarily follows; it is true that these are the basics of our proto-epistemology - provided that we are searching for knowledge, we cannot have a proto-epistemology which removes any of these elements.

Do you agree with this?

because we cannot create a model for finding knowledge which is not sought
— TVCL

I had to read this a couple of times, and I want to make sure I understand what you're stating. If I understand correctly, you are stating knowledge is an active process. Because we have to consider things such as applicability and consistency, this requires our active faculties. This is versus taking beliefs without question or consideration. — Philosophim

No, my apologies - I really could have phrased this line better. I was trying to make a clear point by stating a tautology. What I should have said was:

"We cannot create a model for seeking knowledge which is not sought."

Of course, the argument that I'm trying to make rests on the assumption that one is doing epistemology or at least trying to search for knowledge (or even search for truth). If no one is searching for knowledge, the whole discussion about how we know anything becomes void by default because even having the discussion necessarily entails that we are trying to search for knowledge (after all, we would be searching for knowledge about knowledge).

It's for this reason that I have designated the search for knowledge as the keystone or initial axiom for proto-epistemology. That might seem odd because of course it is not necessary that one would search, it is only contingent. However, it is necessary that there should be a search if we are to do any epistemology. And so, the Search is the starting point of all of epistemology - this is the point from which all else follows. I risk sounding like a broken record, but this is a point that can't be stressed enough. Hopefully, I have demonstrated this by now.

As for the rest of your comments, you're right on the money. You appear to have understood my argument well. Yes, goals are not a type of knowledge per-se, but they are always necessarily relevant to knowledge and knowledge is always judged in relation to them. However, goals are independent of knowledge in so far as one can choose or aim to pursue knowledge as a goal to a limited extent. However, reality is independent of both one's goals and one's knowledge and nothing in the argument suggests that the goals that one chooses allows them to dictate reality. At best, they can choose or limit which parts of reality they have access to.

I think however once knowledge is discovered, it is something one decides to integrate into future goals, but it is not a goal itself. Often times in pursuing our goals we are shown that they are impossible to reach. Either that, or we learn something we never event considered, and it opens up new possibilities for us. While the goals may change, the ever present undertaking of the process of knowledge remains with us. Do we decide to continue to apply it in every case? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. And I think this is perhaps what you are trying to imply? — Philosophim

Yes. If by "The Process of Knowledge" you mean the heuristic or argument that I have presented, this is well summarised.

Let's move onto the question you posed, then:

The question perhaps here is what is the justification for deciding to use the process of knowledge in some cases versus not others. — Philosophim

From everything that has been said, and if we are in agreement, it follows that the justification for deciding to use the "process of knowledge" would be to have one's knowledge in accordance with reality. But not only this, but to ensure that one's goals were also in accordance with reality to the best possible extent.

Another point of clarity could come from tightening the connection to Christianity. According to Christianity, God can judge because He is such a being who does know the complete causal chain that you alluded to and the point at which one's choices tarnished that chain. However, the problem that you are referring to does not seem to be aimed at God but the lay Christian who would otherwise judge.

However, Christians are not commanded to judge ("judge not lest ye be judged")... we are instructed to help and check each other, to help one another abide by the rules, but God alone can judge a man's Heart (and mind and will). At most, we are told that there will be a point when Christians "will judge angels and men" but this will presumably be when we attain capacities that we do not - as of yet - understand.

This is looking good. Not because we appear to be in 100% agreement, but because the issues appear to be thinning out and most of the core logic appears to be stable. Most of this appears to be an issue of semantics or clarity...

So there are some really good things with goals. I think they are a great way to start a search for knowledge. I just don't think they are a necessary precursor to knowledge, or work as an end. — Philosophim

To be clear (and perhaps what I should emphasise more) is that I agree; goals are not a necessary precursor to knowledge, but they are a necessary precursor to/component of the search for knowledge - the argument that I am trying to make is not concerned with how any or all knowledge comes to be known, only that knowledge which is sought. We can discuss that further if you like but the simple idea is that it seems to be the only type of knowledge worth discussing because we cannot create a model for finding knowledge which is not sought (how does one seek knowledge passively? Isn't that a contradiction?)

So far, I can decide whatever goals I want. Which also means I can throw out whatever goals I find contradictory, so long as there is consistency in my set of information. — Philosophim

You can throw out almost any goal that you want, but if you are searching for knowledge you cannot throw out the goal of being consistent. Beyond that we really are free to choose which goals we want, but not so free that this allows us to pursue any set of goals. This is what inter-goal applicability will determine.

What this leaves us with is a web of beliefs that are are not contradictory if we throw out evidence we don't like that fits our end goal. — Philosophim

Of course. People are allowed to lock themselves off from contradictory information. Would you and I do that? Probably not. Why not? Because hopefully we want to have the optimum match between our beliefs and reality that we can manage. One can close themselves off from contradictory information but they also cut themselves off from being in accordance with large swathes of reality - these potential consequences are the prerogative of each individual thinker.

If you think this allows anyone to claim that anything is knowledge, I will once again draw your attention to the question of the exact thing that is trying to be achieved...
In the Flat Earth example, is the person's goal:
a) To prove that the earth is flat?
b) To discover whether the earth is flat or not?
c) To simply believe that the earth is flat?

What the person actually knows about the shape of the earth will depend on which one of these they are trying to achieve. I might have rushed this retort and so if you'd like me to expand upon it, by all means let me know.

Finally - some useful remarks on the structuring. I will keep them in mind.

Thank you.

All the Best!

I cannot see where 'usefulness' enters the picture. A thing is useful only if we use it, such that usefulness is not a property of information or things. A hammer is not useful if we only have a screw. — FrancisRay

This at the fulcrum of the argument: we need logic to do all knowledge/truth seeking, but why would we use logic if it was not useful?

This is a nicely presented, well made argument. Welcome to the Forum.

I vibe with this.

Hello my friend, good to hear from you.

Thank you for giving my work your time. I hope that your week went well and that you've had the chance to enjoy your weekend.

What I'd like to do is tweak the draft, highlighting my changes and then run it passed you and see if it corrects for your concerns.

First, I'd like to check whether I completely understand your criticisms.

To begin with, I'm not sure whether "goal" needs to be defined because I'm not attempting to use it in an especially philosophical way; I'm using the basic dictionary definition (the result or achievement toward which effort is directed; aim; end)...

Goals are the journey's start, and as such, they are not a criteria for evaluating knowledge itself. If a contradiction happens within your goals, you have to decide to throw something out. But there is nothing within the goals that you've put forward at this time that clarifies which contradictions we should throw out. — Philosophim

I'm not sure about this. Goals are the start of the journey and the end. A goal sets the initial context for the test of applicability, but the test of applicability only passes once a goal can be pursued. Therefore, because applicability is a test for knowledge, the given goal is also a test for knowledge (or a "criteria for evaluating knowledge itself.")

As for the rest of your point regarding goals, you're right - something is amiss and it does need expansion, especially in light of your flat earth example.

Okay, so here's the idea: the model applies on a meta-level in that it not only concerns intra-goal applicability (as has been shown) but in inter-goal applicability too. What I mean is that consistency and applicability do not only tell us what beliefs we can regard as knowledge but which goals we can or cannot have (after all, how do we know that we can pursue a given goal? Answer: in the same way that we know anything else...)

And so, let's say that you're mapping a hierarchy of goals. First of all, you already have the goal-map of pursuing knowledge and so, if my argument thus far holds you adhere to applicability and consistency as standards for regarding knowledge. Now, you believe that all kinds of things can be your priorities and all kinds of things can be regarded as secondary but the question is: how do you know?

The answer is: you throw out those goals that are contradictory and inapplicable with applicability being applied to the goal itself.

It's pretty simple if we look at the example: you find that going into space (proving curvature) voids the primary goal of proving that the earth is flat. Now, we can model this:

Goal
“To prove that the earth is flat"
Belief
“That Space travel can be a sub-goal of this"
Effect
“Space travel disproves that the earth is flat"
Outcome
“I cannot pursue space travel if I want to prove that the earth is flat (the two goals cannot be mutually pursued)"

[Verdict]
The belief that "I can have space travel as a sub-goal of proving that the earth is flat" is not knowledge.

By such means we can discover which goals can be pursued, can compliment each other and can be arranged hierarchically, and which ones cannot. The idea is that the criteria of applicability and consistency follow from the initial goal of searching for knowledge and that this acts as a keystone for everything else.

Now, let's look at this issue:

As an example, lets say that I have it as my primary goal to prove the Earth is flat. Lets say I encounter a contradiction to this by having a lesser goal of "Going into space". So I do, and it "appears" that the Earth is curved. So I just say, "This is a contradiction to my main goal, so I'm just going to invalidate this lesser goal." — Philosophim

Yes. You find that this is what you are forced to do by Truth/"Reality" if you are pursuing knowledge. This does not prove or disprove that the earth is flat (as of yet undecided by this argument), but reveals what you can or cannot do. If you cannot determine that the earth is flat by looking at it from space, perhaps you have to revaluate what you mean by "earth" or, hey, maybe you have a goal that cannot be pursued...

Okay, so the next point:

"Provisional knowledge". A good breakdown showing that knowledge is provisional. But I wouldn't classify a "provisional knowledge" and "final knowledge". — Philosophim

A little confused here. I never mention "final knowledge" in the draft and am not sure why it is a point of issue.

The unfalsifiability section just needs a second pass to clarify the idea you're positing. It seems like you're implying what is "unfalsifiable" is based on context. Like the unicorn, it is a belief that has been constructed with a context that we cannot apply. If we could somehow create a context in which it could be applied, it would no longer be falsifiable. — Philosophim

I was going to respond to this by saying "exactly" but I know that doesn't clarify much. As such, could you re-phrase or expand the issue with this section?

In the beginning, you note how you will explain how we can know definitions once the theory is explored. You don't follow up on this at the end. — Philosophim

Good point. Perhaps I'll do a "Definitions Part 1 & 2"

Finally,

I understand this is a draft, so won't be commenting on the order of things. — Philosophim

Out of interest (and if you have time) could you comment on the order of things? My aim is to make this as clear as possible and so your thoughts on structure could be useful.

Anyway, its great to be getting back into the swing of things. I don't want to start overplaying my thanks but understand that you have it in droves. I'll try to keep my responses regular but please understand that due to my current workload I must relegate philosophy to the weekends when I have the right amount of time and energy to dedicate to it.

Take care and I look forward to your reply.

*Try this link instead

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZLiQgp2pJTbxbvMXppGuwTF8ZrkUTPHmYD6EgmLPXLY/edit?usp=sharing

Here is the result of our discussion thus far: revised, re-formulated and condensed:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aF6uYKp3-Q8ee3X-8QDuBg17cc1cuMi9hdvwUengjdY/edit?usp=sharing

Fantastic. This has been an invaluable means for testing, strengthening and clarifying the core argument. You have my sincere thanks for your commitment to philosophy as a discipline and for the attention that you have given to my work specifically. I wish you all the best as you develop your approach too. I saw that you opened it up to the forum which was good to see. You have my apologies for having received so much help from you and for not returning it in equal measure; please understand that given my alternative commitments, I have a limited amount of time to dedicate to philosophy and have the need to focus almost all of it into my own work given its subject and scope.

Looking forward, my plan is to hone and a condense the argument to the point where I can present it to academia with the view of getting further constructive criticism from there, with the eventual view of putting the work into a book or extended essay. Given the conversation we've had, along with the work that was done before this, all of the fragments of the argument seem to be there. What's needed now is to bring them together and give them some polish. There is more to say about where the argument might/does go, but clarifying the core in this way seems to be the most sensible approach.

For this reason, at this stage it appears best for me to take the argument away and write it up in a structured fashion. As of tomorrow I am starting a new career with less free time in which case, I don't know whether I can work on it every day, every week or once every month... What I might ask - if your still willing - is to double-check the "chapters" of my argument as and when I complete them with the understanding that this may be over a period of some time. How does that sound to you?

Good stuff.

It occurred to me that the solution to this is quite easy; you can appeal to the hierarchy of one's goals and conclude that one cannot believe in a genuine contradiction.

In my last post I think that I was trying to be clever by keeping the flow of the argument, but you're right; we cannot do with genuine contradiction. We can make an argument that we can walk with our hands if walking might not require use of our feet, but if use of our feet is entailed by the criteria of the goal, walking with anything else will not be applicable: we must walk with our feet.

Here we have an instance of when certain beliefs can be demonstrated to be inapplicable the moment that the goal is posited (which is something that you essentially said in an earlier post). If the goal is to walk we can discard all beliefs that posit not using our feet in order to achieve this goal. This is because any belief like this is tantamount to the belief that "I can use my feet without using my feet" which is illogical and must be discarded as mere belief, not knowledge. We already recognise the primacy of non-contradiction, but allow me to re-justify this by arguing that the reason for why this is explicitly justified by the overall argument is because we have goals, but these are not in isolation and form into a hierarchy, with higher priority goals being implicit in lower priority ones.

Recall that earlier on in the argument I explained that adherence to logic must be a primary goal when we search for knowledge because without it, we are simply unable to do the search; anything that comes to be known can self-destruct without adherence to logic because, basically, if A is not A, Knowledge is not Knowledge and Searching is not Searching.
Therefore, in effect, being illogical is intellectual paralysis.
Therefore, if there is to be a search at all, adherence to logic is required throughout.
Therefore, whilst we are searching for knowledge, all beliefs are judged in relation to goals and goals contain the implicit goal of adherence to logic (non-contradiction).

And so, when we re-examine the goal the matter is actually quite different...
Goal: To walk, meaning movement with my feet (which adhering to logic)
Belief: "I can walk with anything except for my feet"
Effect: Cannot be done
Outcome: Cannot be done
Verdict: The Belief is not Knowledge

To hammer home the point, the only way that it could be knowledge given the criteria of the goal is if we mean something else by "walk" but if not, this argument hopefully demonstrates argument demonstrates the point.

This has been a drawn out explanation to reach a conclusion that I think we both see, but it felt useful for the sake of clarity (my own and perhaps yours too) and useful to demonstrate what I have meant the various times that I've mentioned a "false goal"...

At times I have referred to a false goal, meaning a goal which is inherently unachievable.

"To walk, meaning movement of my feet without using my feet" is a false goal.
Indeed, all such contradictory goals are false goals.
This is because the only belief that can count as knowledge in relation to it is "The means cannot achieve the goal" or simply "This cannot be done" (which translates to "reality does not allow this"). All other beliefs about how to achieve the goal must be un-applicable by default and there be merely belief, not knowledge.

I find this interesting because the argument uses the axiom that we test knowledge in relation to our goals, but this extension seems to explain that what goals we can or cannot have in the first place also tells use something about what we can or cannot know.

Anyway, that should square the problem presented in your post. This hasn't felt like the most streamlined way of giving an answer but hopefully the argument has been made clearly. If not, let me know if you see any issues and we can do some tidying.

As for definitions, they function on the same principles as knowledge in general; a given definition is known based upon what a person or people are trying to achieve, with an implicit adherence to logic. As it goes, this is largely technical and we can skim over it for the moment. We can explore it later, but let's sort out one thing a time.

Looking forward to your response.

Fantastic! Great, I think that we're making progress. I've got a few responses to make which might clarify I few points...

The problem with this example is the word "walk" is defined as using feet. You aren't confirming that using your feet allows you to walk, because that's part of the definition of walk. — Philosophim

No, in fairness this is kind of what the example was going for. Applicability is applicability. It might seem tautological to conclude that we walk using our feet but the idea is that we can discover that a definition is applicable to itself and this still provides knowledge (even if it is only trivial). If we considered the alternative and found that we could not in fact walk with our feet but must do so with our hands, this would challenge our knowledge about our definitions.

Consider this:
Goal: "I want to walk with my feet and by "walk" I mean use my feet to move"
Belief: "I can do this by using my hands"
Outcome: "I can do this by using my hands"

Now, if this were to be the case it would reveal something very strange about reality indeed and we might need to revise our beliefs and definitions, but the model would still apply. As it so happens, reality does not seem to allow this and so it's all good.

At this point, we've said, 2+2=4 because there are a set of definitions that tell us 2+2=4. That really doesn't prove anything except that a bunch of definitions say certain conclusions should happen — Philosophim

That's partly why I wanted to have this part of the discussion. So far, you appear to have presumed that applicability is always about proving something external to beliefs or definitions (which is understandable). This can be the case, but does not always have to be so. Applicability can also be "internal" to definitions. In the example that I have given, we find that "2" is, essentially, applicable to itself which, again, is tautological but it is still knowledge.

Thus you could know the definition that 2+2 = 4, but you won't know if that belief is knowledge within your mind/empiricism/etc. until you apply it for yourself within the scope of the potential application. — Philosophim

If it is contradicted when it is applied, then we know the belief is false. If it is not contradicted, then it is "knowledge". This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it. — Philosophim

Exactly!

Look, it's all about what a person's goals are, right?

If one is merely trying to determine whether arithmetic can be organised in particular ways in their mind, this will shape exactly what part of reality their applications are being applied to (namely, that of the mind) and so, their knowledge is that arithmetic applies to their goals whilst being kept in the mind. Thus, the "test" that 2+2=4 is simply that 2+2=4 (and that logic is adhered to).

However, once their goal is to marry arithmetic to something beyond itself such as physical reality or the relation of objects, the "test" for 2+2=4 is no longer the definition of terms, but whether 2 objects and 2 objects gives us 4 objects...

Internal tests for applicability might have different criteria to external ones and it always depends on what one is trying to acheive.

This is why when you say:

This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it. — Philosophim

We should have the answer to the issue about falsifiablility...
2+2=4 remains un-falsifiable whilst it remains internal (assuming that we adhere to logic) and this is not because it can never be "tested" per-se, but because the test for the claim is always based in its definitions, and because the definitions are always mirror-images of themselves they can never contradict each-other. Therefore, we're essentially concluding that it is un-falsifiable not because it can never be tested but because the test for applicability is so engineered that it can never be wrong. And so, one can know that 2+2=4. But as you noted, this is different from the knowledge that 2 objects and 2 objects gives 4 objects.

Now, when we apply this to the "revolution example", whilst it remains un-falsifiable it technically amounts to the knowledge that "So long as it is knowledge that remains solely in my head, I can know that the revolution will occur (or will not occur)" - this may seem contradictory, but reality does allow it (perhaps like it allows the knowledge that "chocolate tastes nice" and "chocolate does not taste nice" to be known by two separate individuals). However, just as the external application of 2+2=4 makes it newly falsifiable, so too does our conclusions about the revolution. Therefore, our beliefs about the revolution may be falsifiable in one sense and not in another and it depends upon what is trying to be achieved. In any case, the model still appears to hold without contradiction.

This is a great point to have reached. You seem to have summarised my previous post very well. I can't be certain whether this has answered all of your concerns from your penultimate post and so please re-frame them if you still have them. But in any case, this is looking really good.

To clarify, what you are saying is that a belief that has not been contradicted is 'potential knowledge'. A belief that has been contradicted is a 'belief'. But if knowledge is what has not been contradicted, and potential knowledge is what has not been contradicted, is there a difference? — Philosophim

No, "knowledge" is just "potential knowledge" I'm taking this from your advice in your previous posts... we cannot go so far as to say that we have "truth". Knowledge is belief that accords with reality and at this point in the argument we only have beliefs that accord enough with reality to not be excluded on the basis of contradiction or non-applicability. If a belief is consistent and applicable it is knowledge but, technically, this is only "provisional" because we have no means of knowing whether reality will not contradict a given piece of knowledge later (as of yet). And so, we could either consider if "provisional knowledge" or say that "all knowledge that we have is technically provisional".

Can you do me a favour? I think there is an important logical point in your post that you seem to have a better grasp of that I do. Last night, I thought through what "applicability" means which is a key concept in the argument. Being clear about it might give you a clearer take on the relevance of "testing" or "fallibility" within the argument. Your points are probably still relevant but do you mind if I present this idea first and then ask you to re-frame the questions/criticisms above in light of it?

Okay, so applicability...

We say that a belief is excluded as knowledge when it is either inconsistent(contradictory/illogical) or inapplicable.

What does applicability mean?

A belief is applicable when it can be utilised in service of a given goal.

Example 1:
a) Goal: "I want to make gold."
b) Belief: "I can make things its gold by touching them."
c) Outcome: "Touching things does not make them into gold"
d) Conclusion: The belief "I can make things into gold by touching them" is not knowledge.

Example 2:
a) Goal: "I want to walk"
b) Belief: "I can do so using my feet"
c) Outcome: "Using my feet allows me to walk"
d) Conclusion: The belief "I can walk using my feet" is knowledge.

This is how the progression works (if broken down; it may often by that more than one step may happen at once):

Goal -> Belief -> Effect -> Outcome...
Belief serves goal = belief provides knowledge.
Belief does not serve goal = belief does not provide knowledge.

Example 3: (consider the progression):

Goal
To know how 2 makes 4
->
Belief
That 2+2=4
->
Effect
Adding 2 to 2 makes 4 (assuming adherence to logic and numeracy)
->
Outcome
Belief is applicable because 2+2 can make 4
->
Verdict
The belief provides knowledge

Hopefully, the way that the process applies to the abstract further helps to clarify why it is distinct from science. The idea of things constantly being "tested" is due to the fact that we are always living. It is not so much that goals or applicability determine reality (and therefore knowledge) but that the way that we "test" or attempt to determine reality will be by seeing what beliefs are or are not congruent with it, and which beliefs these will be always depends on what goals we are trying to achieve. Reality might be the overall picture behind knowledge, but goals are always the [small] frame that we see it through (and logic stops it from being too blurry).

Let me know your thoughts.

---

Finally, I wanted to leave you with a thought/question: is 2+2=4 a falsifiable belief?

An additional thought occurred to me...
Remember that goals set the criteria for knowledge but that these criteria can be more precise depending on what is trying to be achieved (including the kind of knowledge). For example, if science did in fact require falsifiable claims, there is no reason why un-falsifiable claims cannot be excluded in the search for scientific knowledge. Specific branches of enquiry can have specific criteria for specific ends.

What has been argued for in the post above is what we start out with in the non-specific search for knowledge, in light of which consistency and applicability are the criteria of criteria (if you get what I mean). So long as the more specific criteria that come after them do not contradict these two basic criteria, there is no reason that these more specific criteria cannot be put to use for various ends.

You raised 3 particularly interesting points/questions that I would like to answer in no particular order...

My only concern is that you will be critiqued by a lot more than them in this particular instance. And this is what I truly meant by airtight. If you fight to make it airtight, you will likely fail, but your failure will be difficult to identify, and arguably irrelevent. If you do not make it airtight, you will assume you can let things slide, but you will misjudge on this and leave yourself open to holes you never thought of. — Philosophim

Excellent, we are in agreement here - this is the point that I would like to strengthen the argument to. An interesting side-point is that we cannot technically judge nor have demonstrated the point at which we could say that a given criticism is irrelevant. This appears to be intuited and - surprise surprise! - this will be in relation to what we are implicitly trying to achieve (how far do we aim to take the enquiry?) which in fact brings me on to me next point...

What will your theory serve? Who will it save? Just something to consider. — Philosophim

Please note here that all that I stated in my previous post about my approach is not an accident of preference, but follows from the logic of the epistemology that I am describing. "What will your theory serve?" Those who seek knowledge. That aim is the cornerstone contingency from which all else follows. What I am trying to establish is that once the search is on, all else follows; this is why I build up from the axioms that this contingency brings into the argument. Once there is a search, there are a number of things that we have to accept and adhere to if the search is to be maintained (such as the presumption of doubt/lack of omniscience, relevance to goals, adherence to knowledge and the like) and it has yet to be demonstrated that these axioms are not necessary if the search is commenced. Now, these axioms and the argument that stem from them must be recognised if the argument is to be maintained as well as commenced. At any point, someone can stop searching for knowledge - they have that choice. My inference now and a place that this argument will eventually lead is that once this search is stopped, all else falls apart.

Allow me a brief example in the meantime...
I have [hopefully] established that once we search for knowledge we must regard knowledge in so far as it can be applicable to reality and not contradictory and so, the moment one searches they have to regard their beliefs in relation to their reason and goals. The moment they do away with the search, these criteria fall away; or vis-versa such that once one discards their use of reason or has no concern whatsoever for their goals and how they are achieved, they can no longer search for knowledge. Logically, this has to be the case. "What," you might ask "if someone is no longer rational?" to which I would reply: "Exactly! such people are no longer of relevance - they simply cannot be." Nor can those people who do not search or want to avoid the search to the best of their ability. I recognise that people have that option that they are free to take. In a sense the argument that I am presenting, indeed is appears that epistemology itself is binary; like a light-switch... whenever one searches for knowledge, the entire argument turns "on" and at any point the search, along with the argument, can be turned "off".

Now, one appeal that is actually contained within my argument is to the consequences of giving up the search for knowledge and all that this entails... if knowledge is always measured to some degree in relation to what we are trying to achieve and someone outright rejects the search, it follows that one would be much worse off in making decisions in their lives if they don't know anything.

How is provisional knowledge separate from just a belief? — Philosophim

Great question. There is actually a logical knot that is tangled up here. Let's pull it apart...

They are separate because belief is potential knowledge and knowledge accords with reality. Beliefs are excluded when they are inconsistent or inapplicable. All that remains is [provisional] knowledge.

If a belief is falsifiable it cannot be shown not to accord with reality. Therefore, we must conclude that it does accord with reality. Therefore, an un-falsifiable belief is knowledge.

From this, we have two legs of an answer:
1) Knowledge is all such beliefs that have not been shown to be either inconsistent or inapplicable. Ergo, belief and knowledge are different.
2) All beliefs that remain un-falsified (not shown to be illogical or inapplicable) are knowledge (not Truth)

As argued in the previous post, un-falsifiable beliefs would be knowledge, not belief, only in so far as they are truly un-falsified or un-falsifiable. For example, assuming that "The revolution will eventually come" is un-falsifiable such that it only remained in one's head then yes, they could be said to know it. But the moment that this belief was applied to - say - a finite time frame, it becomes falsifiable and is [provisional] knowledge until it is contradicted (now, of course, with a complex claim like this, the point at which it is "contradicted" might depend on more than the mere assertion, or even the point at which the revolution does not come, such as the integrity of the arguments underlying the claim itself).

A final point about your mention of science...
I can see the comparison that you're drawing but have to disagree. The argument that I am progressing and the method in use are closer to mathematics than to science. Indeed, I would argue that the argument is what would/does justify science (or would even justify a religion for that matter). Which is apparently analogous with science is not the base theory but the criteria that it reveals for seeking knowledge which involves testing beliefs. One of the main differences is that I have not yet made one appeal to data/empiricism/observation to support the argument. Now, these will play a role but that will be because using empirical data works for particular goals, not because all knowledge requires empirical data.

Does that make sense? If I need to clarify any points that I have made please let me know.

... and a great response. Thank you, there is some helpful stuff here.

To begin my response I will start by stating that I understand where you are coming from when you suggest the distinction between the goal and its hypothesis. On the one hand, I agree that the distinction will be useful in clarifying my approach and use this when re-writing the argument. On the other, it appears that your rationale for suggesting the distinction may misunderstand the argument and so allow me to address this...

When you speak about goals, you imply that it is how we approach the goal which is just as important. If I want to fly by using my arms, then it would be silly to approach that goal without using my arms. — Philosophim

I'm not sure where this implication came from (not that it wasn't present), but in response to it, allow me to make my position on goals clear...

In the scheme of epistemology, the goal is defined as "the end" as this is primary because it lays out the criteria by which a given enquiry (including the search for knowledge itself) will be satisfied. If this were not the case we would have to posit a search for knowledge that does not reference a goal which appears to be impossible because the search itself is a goal. This would be so even if the parameters of the goal are yet to be explicit. Indeed, it appears that much of the work of the last few posts has been to say "Okay, we know that there must be a goal and that it sets parameters, but what exactly is the goal and, therefore, what are these parameters?"

The approach to the goal is secondary. The approach is a question of testing what works within the parameters. This is why I would contend with the arms example. There is nothing in my approach that determines how this goal should be approached. We presume the use of arms but the reasons for this remain un-demonstrated. Instead, once the goal is set we have multiple options for the approach. E.g. "I want to fly by using my arms..."

We [can] test what works in relation to this goal by:
a) ... by using my feet
b) ... by using my nose
c) ... by using my arms

As odd as it sounds, there is nothing in the argument itself to say that one cannot fly by using their arms by using their feet. This is absurd, but the reason that we find it to be absurd is that we find that we cannot put this approach into practice for the achievement of the goal. If we could achieve the goal by using our feet it would, in fact, not be absurd. Of course, this is a special case because the various approaches appear to present a contradiction, which reveals the place of logic in the scheme more than it does the importance of the approach... if the goal is meant exactly how it is stated with no room for contradiction, then we can exclude all approaches that are illogical because we are unable to posit them, let alone put them into effect.

Hopefully this explains why I will take your advice and use the term "hypothesis" but I will use this to refer to the approach, but not the goal itself. Goals hold a primary position in the epistemology precisely because they set "the end" of the endeavour (and all of its component parts).

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Now this assumes that knowledge is something which could be changed at a later time if new information arises that contradicts your claims. That is fine, but that would be knowledge itself, not provisional. — Philosophim

A point well made and taken. You're right - this is what the approach entails. Perhaps when I come to clarify this work I will make a point of stating that the knowledge gleaned by the point is "knowledge" but is uncertain or open to future revision or possibly not Truth etc.

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If we do not have this restriction, then someone could introduce a non-falsifiable belief, and state because it is not contradicted by reality, it is therefore provisional knowledge per your definition. — Philosophim

I'm fine with this, and this may actually speak to the difference between our approaches too. Let me explain...

One could claim that about an unfalsifiable belief, but to what extent? If a belief is divorced from its effects and the belief is unfalsifiable, it is [provisional] knowledge.
However, any belief that has an effect is falsifiable because the test for the belief the relation of the effect to an aim and we see this once the effect comes up against reality.

Sophists can pick us up on this point, but I don't mind. One thing that I would like to do with my approach is is this: instead of fighting the sophists, I would like to leave them to it. If they do not follow the argument or want to slip out of it, they can. But in so doing it would seem that they are left with islands of knowledge which are entirely within their own heads.

Consider this discussion:

Sophist: "Due to your argument, I am a Marxist; true Marxism has never been proven not to work. Therefore, I provisionally know that Marxism works."

Response: "Provisional indeed. Until such such a time that it is put into effect... so long as it remains a mere idea in your head, it remains unfalsifiable and is provisional knowledge. However, at the point when it is put into effect, or a component part can be, we will discover what reality does or does not allow and it will become falsifiable."

The takeaway is that all kinds of beliefs can be unfalsifiable if we divorce beliefs from their effects. In relation to this, there may be two kinds of philosophers: those who do philosophy with a kind of solipsism such that their ideas are always divorced from their applications and decisions, and those who do it with sophistry such that they can always find a loop-hole or clause that allows them to slip through an argument. Such people could treat the argument like so:

Me: "If we search for knowledge, all else follows..."

Sophist: "Ah! But what if we don't search?"

Me: "This word is defined like so..."

Sophist: "Ah! But how do we know that the word is so defined? Because you define it with other words? What about them?"

Me: "Beliefs not contradicted by reality are provisional knowledge."

Sophist: "Ah! And so I have removed my beliefs from their effects and made them unfalsifiable, and I have provisional knowledge."

My overall strategy in dealing with these people or approaches is not to fight them; not to guarantee, beyond doubt that such-and-such must be accepted. Instead, it is to recognise that contingencies are always left open. I make necessary deductions and arguments but hopefully this explains why I use so many contingencies in my work before moving to necessities (and, in all fairness, this is not merely a preference - this appears to be how we have to approach epistemology). Incorporating the contingencies into the structure appear to be required to give it enough "flex" to stand the storms of madness... other approaches that attempt to do away with all contingency and have only necessity appear to be more airtight and rigid, but also more brittle. Doing epistemology is like holding a bar of soap; if held with too firm a grip, it slips away... and so, perhaps it is best to make that grip firm, whilst allowing for the gaps around the edges...

This is not a criticism of a single argument that you have presented . Your observations about definitions are a case in point; the choice of words and approach to how we understand them really is important for developing an argument. The difference would be between yourself, who understands that there is a reasonable point at which the demand for definitions ceases and one who would push that demand in order to break the argument. You approach this in a spirit of constructive criticism.

Likewise, you're doing your own thing with your approach. I understand that we have our different approach to different ends, but if my discussion here would say anything to you I might use it as a word of caution against seeking knowledge structures that are perfectly "airtight". Within my own schema, this might be revealed as a "false goal" depending upon how you seek to pursue it.

Good timing. I just got the last part of my argument down last night with the view of writing it up today. It took some revision but I'll copy my final thought progression up verbatim. Some points are not explained in their entirety but this omission is made under the assumption that the underlying arguments are already understood. Please tell me if this is not the case...

[Beginning]
Once we begin the search for knowledge a number of axiomatic criteria come into being:

• The distinction between the 3 definitions,
• Goals as criteria
• Logic as criteria
• Faith that knowledge/(truth?) must exist or can be pursued
• One's lack of omniscience/the existence of doubt

a) Once we accept that we lack omniscience and search for knowledge, the 3 definitions follow.

b1) In establishing the 3 definitions and commencing the search, goals and logic as criteria for what we regard as knowledge are implied.
b2) Goals and logic are implied as criteria for determining whether a belief is in accord with a standard beyond itself such that it will or will not be regarded as knowledge. This is because the argument itself requires the use of logic to progress and progress in necessary relation to an aim (the search itself). Likewise, goals are required for logic and logic is required for goals (see the discussion vis-a-vis the heuristic). Therefore, if we do not assume logic and goals to be criteria by which we determine whether beliefs accord with reality such that they are knowledge, the entire endeavour becomes void.

c) After the 3 definitions are established, the question is: how do we determine whether a belief accords with reality such that it becomes knowledge?

d) We already have logic and goals to serve as basic criteria for determining what reality is because they reveal how beliefs are or are not limited in their capacity to relate to our aims (including their ability to relate to other beliefs, depending on the goal). This does not allow us to say what knowledge or reality are (positively), but it does allow us to exclude what we must not regard as knowledge or reality; logic and goals do not tell us what we know, only what we cannot know.

e) Applying these criteria, we are left with:
i) beliefs that cannot be regarded as knowledge.
ii) beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge.

f) We might use additional criteria to logic and goals to determine reality, but these criteria cannot contradict these two basic criteria and must build upon them (this may be the task of in-depth epistemology proper).

g) Once a belief accords with logic and one's goals, it has not been demonstrated that it does, in fact, accord with reality but it has been demonstrated that it does not contradict reality, such that reality allows it.

h) At such a point when reality contradicts a belief once a belief is either illogical or ineffective, that belief must be regarded as not knowledge. Therefore, all beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge (allowed by reality) can be regarded as provisional knowledge until they are contradicted.

i) In relation to (g) and (h):
Knowledge yet to be contradicted by reality can only be regarded as provisional because no argument has been made to state what reality is, only what it does not allow. As such, and lacking direct knowledge of reality, we cannot say that a given piece of knowledge will never be contradicted by reality. As such, what comes to be regarded as knowledge is not "That which has been demonstrated to accord with reality" but "That which has been demonstrated to not be contradicted by reality."

Extra:
- A belief is defined as a position that has the potential to be knowledge. Does this not match the description above?

- No. The description above describes knowledge (provisional) as "That which has the potential to accord with reality". This is one step forward in the progression of the argument in relation to belief.

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In response to your most recent post...

Do I know that I believe there is a red ball in front of me? — Philosophim

Firstly, this introduces experience as an element which informs beliefs. That experience informs beliefs cannot be demonstrated, but if this is rejected we are to assume that we hold no beliefs (positions) that are informed by experience. Therefore, to allow for this contingency, that experience informs beliefs is adopted as an additional axiom.

What's more is that to know that I hold the belief must mean that the belief that I hold the belief itself must accord with reality. From the discussion above, we conclude that we are able to treat a belief as provisional knowledge when reality is not contradicted such that reality allows it. Therefore, if the mere holding of the belief is allowed we can know that we have the belief.
(In addition, the knowledge that I have X experience follows the same logic. If I experience pink elephants I must know that I am having the experience. What is merely belief and not knowledge at such a juncture is the belief about what the experience is indicative of; for example, I know that I experience pink elephants but merely believe that they can be interacted with in a physical manner).

And then:

a belief can or cannot be put into effect. To me that means you are applying your belief to reality. — Philosophim

[see the discussion above]: Once logic is applied, we discard all contradictory beliefs and non-knowledge. Once goals are related to, we discard all beliefs that are ineffective as non-knowledge. what remains are consistent, effective beliefs which are regarded as provisional knowledge because they have not been excluded and accord with reality such that they are allowed by it. These beliefs are only provisional knowledge because it is not demonstrated that reality will never contradict them. This is essentially the conclusion to this section of the argument.

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In response to your argument...

Of course, I have not addressed your arguments about discrete experience in here and this is because they were not needed to get the argument to this point. However, if you think that they can intersect with the argument above/are required for it or can build off from it, please do say.

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In any case, that's all for now. Do let me know your thoughts on anything or everything that has been addressed.

All the best.

Right, now I've hit a bit of a speed-bump and would like to get your thoughts/assistance on it.
Allow me to back-track the line of thought first...

[This does not follow on directly from the discussion above but comes shortly after]

Note: 'Reality' need only be 'external' to the belief

Q: is there a way that we can determine whether a belief accords with a standard that is external to that belief?

An external standard is a constraint because if no constraint existed, a belief could be anything.

Yet, a belief can be anything. In the respect that can believe anything. The question is whether any belief can be knowledge...

But we cannot believe anything, can we?
For example, can we believe that food is poison?
Answer:
a) if one simply wants to hold this belief as an idea in their head (possibly); but
b) not if one seeks to put this belief into effect - to act upon this belief and satisfy their hunger without dying.

Therefore one's aims constrain what beliefs one can or cannot hold.

However, this discussion above established the need to determine whether a held belief does or does not accord with reality and is therefore knowledge, not that we need to determine whether a belief can be "held" or not in the first place. Otherwise, we may conclude that "all beliefs that can be held are knowledge."

To try an pull this back...
We know that a belief is not in accord with an external standard (reality) if that belief cannot be put into effect because it reveals that something beyond the belief itself constrains the belief such that the effect of the belief is limited.

However, consider the question: "What if I believe that my beliefs are limitless?"

The problem here is that the discussion thus far holds the effect of the belief as being limited (only that the effects are), not that the belief itself is limited. To extend this argument to beliefs, we would have to conclude that beliefs are their effects.

Do you see the issue?
We can determine that the effects of a belief hit an external standard but not that the belief is subject to an external standard, but positing that a belief hits an external standard is required to bridge the gap between belief and knowledge because the argument above requires that we recognise when a belief is either confirmed or constrained. How do we bridge this gap whilst keeping the logical flow of the argument?

What are your thoughts?

Right Sarge, reporting from the front.

Still working on processing the arguments but his a milestone and thought I would share some of the findings...

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We begin with posting a search for knowledge - this sets our aim. In relation to this goal, we find that we must define our terms, not least the term "knowledge". This prompts the three definitions of belief, reality and knowledge as you have addressed them. What's more, the logic for why these three definitions are required can be justified in relation to the goal, as follows:

To posit a search for knowledge, one must distinguish between three things:
a) a position that has the potential to be knowledge (here called "belief");
b) a standard that provides the measure for knowledge, independent of a position that may or may not accord with with this standard (here called "reality); and
c) the status of the potential position when it is in accordance with the independent standard (here called "knowledge")

The distinction between all three definitions is required (and, therefore, all three definitions are required) because if we only had the first two; if we only had "belief" and "reality" there would be no need to search for knowledge. One's position would have no potential to be in line with the independent standard that measures it, one's position would be in accordance with that standard by default. In plain speaking, one's belief could never be wrong or right - it would only even be right if one's beliefs always reflected reality. In this sense, one would only ever possess knowledge and, in effect, all three definitions would blur into one; there would be no difference between the position one takes and between what is the case and, therefore, belief, reality and knowledge would be one and the same.

To assume such a position requires an assumption of omniscience which a search for knowledge denies. This is because if belief and reality are one and the same, one's belief is never potentially false, it is always right (knowledge). This presumes omniscience because one must assume that there can never be anything that demonstrates that their belief is false. To know that nothing could ever falsify one's belief, one would have to know all things because only then could they be sure that nothing could or would contradict their current belief.

Therefore a match between belief and reality requires omniscience.
Therefore, if one does not presume that they are omniscient, they must make a distinction between belief that matches reality and belief that might not.
Therefore, to separate them for the purpose of the enquiry, we call the latter 'belief' and the former 'knowledge'
All three terms must be distinguished if the search for knowledge is to occur, because omniscience nullifies the search for knowledge.

Moreover, to stress the point, reality must be posited if there is to be a search because the lack on omniscience requires us to posit a standard external to mere belief by which its potential for knowledge can be judged.

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On Definitions...
The previous discussion justified the three distinctions, but it did not justify the given definitions. For example, it did not justify why "reality" is the term that we know means "the independent standard" or such like.

[in response] we do not, in fact, strictly know the definition of "reality" at this point (for example). All that we know is that we have a need for the three definitions in order to pursue our task and have opted for "reality" in order to serve this purpose. However, it might turn out that there is a better/('truer'?) definition that serves the purpose. The hope is that, whilst a perfect term is lacking, "reality" associates closely enough with the understanding of the common reader well enough to convey the augmented definition in order to convey the argument that it may be repurposed such (assuming that a word is ever really "repurposed" or taken away from a truer position).

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At this juncture, we have established that we must presume a lack of omniscience and posit three things:
a) a position that has the potential to be knowledge (here called "belief");
b) a standard that provides the measure for knowledge, independent of a position that may or may not accord with with this standard (here called "reality); and
c) the status of the potential position when it is in accordance with the independent standard (here called "knowledge")

Therefore, in order to pursue the aim, we must determine the standards by which we judge whether a given belief accords with reality and is therefore knowledge.

Of course, this brings us back to the heuristic.
The basic standards that we use to determine knowledge are consistency (being how far beliefs adhere to knowledge) and applicability (being how far beliefs allow the pursuit of goals).

Note: we should not assume "perfect" accord between belief and reality at this point.

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Final note...
It occurred to me that if this work was fully-fashioned, it could be split into 4 main sections, each of which inter-relate to one-another and either one of which could be taken as the starting point as it may not in fact be the case that any one of these were "primary". My thoughts on this are not set, but taken from a leap of intuition. These four sections would be:

"Knowledge"

"Definitions"

"Logic"

"Goals"

Here is an example of how a given section is inter-related:
"Logic" relates to...
"Definitions" because contradictory definitions are useless; we assume logic when we use definitions.
"Knowledge" because non-contradiction becomes a requisite of knowledge
"Goals" because our goals are a necessary requirement for the adoption of logic AND because contradictory goals cannot be pursued.

but isn't that essentially a religious rationale then, — ChatteringMonkey

No... not necessarily. Although, it may depend on how broadly we define "religion". The case that I was/am trying to make is that one need not appeal to a given religion such as Hinduism or Christianity in order to accept the logic of the OP. The idea would be that one need not have faith in a given religion to recognise the possibility of life after death. If the logic of the OP works, one might have to posit the existence of a 'soul' to explain the possibility, but I'm not sure if that alone makes it religious.

If you mean by "strictly know", knowing with absolute certainty, then yes we do not know... but I don't think that is a standard science or I should necessarily aim for, as it probably is an impossible standard to attain. — ChatteringMonkey

That's fair enough, but that isn't quite the argument. The argument is not that we cannot know about subjective consciousness with absolute certainty, it's that we might not have any knowledge of it at all outside of our own direct, personal experience of consciousness. In that regard, it is unlike other scientific conclusions that we make based on good but incomplete data.
Consider the matter in this way:
Let's say that you put a man in a machine that maps his body down to the atom. Now, you stab the man in the hand, exciting the signals there that go up to the brain. Now, let's say that you track this signal minutely from the nerves in the hand, through the body, to the neurons in the brain... the question is: at what point could you say that you have observed the conscious, subjective experience of "pain" and have not simply tracked an biological-electrical process?

Right, so, I've got a jumble of things to present to you today...

First of all, your work is a treat to read - especially now that we've had a bit of a discussion. High quality thinking - very well done.

There are some bumps in it and so, as you requested, I thought I'd bring them to your attention.
The first one was your definition of Reality as "What results independently of a belief" - I'm inclined to agree but the counter occurred: "This presumes that belief cannot dictate reality. Why not?" It seems that you can answer this within your framework but it may be worth pressing you to do so explicitly.

And then, there was a question about what you mean by a "Will" or "Sureness" when you define Belief. This can be nit picky, but as it goes, I get your drift anyway.

Other than that, the whole foundation that you lay and connections you draw between Belief, Reality and Knowledge were tight and cogent.
One note: if knowledge is belief in something which is co-existent with reality and requires that the belief is not contradicted, it would appear that knowledge is provisional. That is, we have knowledge up to the point that the knowledge we have is contradicted.

Now, admittedly, by the end of your first piece I got off of the boat. You began to make a number of appeals to the subjective function of one's psyche. These were lucid in places, but it began to drift over into psychology enough for it to feel as if the tread and relevance of our more direct concerns were being lost. Moreover, it begins to raise far more questions far too quickly to keep pace with.

And so, that being said, the work is great. What I'd like to do is take it away from a week (or two) and think it over, in an attempt to try and splice it with my own. it appears that we're drawing two halves of the same foundation and so it would be good to draw them together and see what that allows us to stand on. How does that sound to you?

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Switching gears now,

It occurred to me that in light of what we have discussed; the attempts that we can make in epistemology and our limits, we may have a number of puzzle pieces that might allude to what we can or will eventually achieve. Here are some of these puzzle pieces:

1. Contradictions are nonsensical.

2. Our goals shape our enquiries.

3. Attempts at epistemology always leave a "hole" in the theory.

4. Definitions cannot be incontrovertible.

5a. The attempt to make epistemology "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable.

5b. Likewise, the attempt to define epistemological terms and make them "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable

Conclusion (a): we cannot create a foundation for epistemology that is so solid that it is beyond doubt or misunderstanding.

Conclusion (b): we cannot conclude that "anything goes" when it comes to our enquires. For example, we cannot make contradictory claims if we want them to make sense.

And so, I wanted to get your thoughts on these pieces - do you agree or not? Otherwise, are there any that you would like to add?

Looking forward to reading your thoughts.

but it isn't clear to me why you wouldn't just call 'life as awareness', consciousness. Why the need for an additional concept for life when we already have a word for essentially the same thing? — ChatteringMonkey

This is where we might be tripping over one-another because this is essentially what I'm trying to say. But you have my apologies if I've not made my writing or intentions clear enough. I'm using the definition of life as consciousness. The idea behind using "life after death" in the OP is simply because when I hear people commonly refer to life after death, they do not imply that their biological life continues after death but that there will be a continuation of their 'mind' or their 'soul' at some point, even if this requires a new body. In brief - when they say that there will be "life after death" they imply that conscious awareness will occur again at some point after their current, biological life has come to an end. Hopefully this explains the rationale for my use of terms.

As to the latter part of your comment; I'd like to make a recommendation and do so without be factitious of meaning disrespect (it be hard to convey tone properly over forums). The recommendation is that you have a further look at the Hard Problem of Consciousness, if you are so inclined. The idea that:

as far as we know, consciousness only occurs in biological life. — ChatteringMonkey

might not be what it seems. We may not, in fact, strictly know that consciousness either occurs in biological life or only occurs in biological life. We presume that it does because we see physical behaviours that we assume are connected to consciousness, but we lack a scientific way of getting a metric for measuring the subjective experience of what it is "like" for a subject to be conscious. Without which, we may be unable to demonstrate where consciousness does or does not occur.

Respectfully, I'm not sure whether the position requires an assumption of panpsychism and we may be speaking at odds if two definitions of life are being conflated.

The biological definition of life accounts for biological process, but says nothing about whether life is present for the subject. For example, if a fly is biologically alive but is devoid of consciousness, in what sense could the fly regard itself as alive? Or, another way to put it is that if you or I were biologically alive, but our consciousness came to a final end, in what sense would you or I, as subjects, know that we are alive? This is why we can remove consciousness from the definition of biological life but, when we do so, we are merely describing a process and an organism becomes just as "alive" in some sense as an engine.

Moreover, panpsychism posits that mind is more fundamental than matter to the extent that it permeates the entire universe. Admittedly, the OP leaves that possibility open but it does not appear to be an assumption that is required for the OP. It could well be the case - as you hold - that matter is more fundamental and that conscious life must arise from biological life. The case being made is simply that this is an open question and we cannot presume that - say - conscious life will come to a Final End once our biological life does.

I'm conceiving of life as conscious awareness, in the sense that a subject can only know that it is "alive" if it has conscious awareness which may be related to biological life, but not the same as if. Consider for example how you and I, for example, were living organisms in-utero but life as we know it did not begin until some time after birth.

Admittedly, this isn't an exact definition, but life as conscious awareness is used in contrast the conception of non-life in which many commonly presume that there will non-consciousness after death. Admittedly, even in biological life we are at time consciousness and then non-conscious but what I am arguing against is that this non-consciousness will be final at the point of biological death and that conscious awareness will not occur again afterwards.

Does that make sense? That might have been a bit messy.

Which is why I would put my money on consciousness arising out of and ending with our biological life. — ChatteringMonkey

As for this, I cannot knock you for that. The certainty has been far from demonstrated and so this remains a bet which is as likely as the alternative. For my own part, I hold off being sure for the reasons explained above.