Is there a history of philosophers trying to prove each other wrong? — Athena

The most pointed attempt I know to “prove someone wrong” would be Austin’s reading of Ayer in “Sense and Sensibilia” which we read through here. But even there, Ayer is just a straw man of the argument for “sense data” that Austin uses to actually figure it out, not just prove Ayer “wrong”—it is actually fair and (somewhat) understanding. The most generous and in-depth reading that I know of (while still a complete reversal) has to be Wittgenstein’s examination in “Philosophical Investigations” of his own earlier positions. Austin is waaay more readable though (plus it’s only like 70 pages).

Is there a history of philosophers trying to prove each other wrong? — Athena

I think the entire history of philosophy is self-referential and defined against itself. Even someone seemingly unique like Descartes or Wittgenstein are working within and against an established framework. But I would specifically think of Kant and Hume, Marx and Hegel, Hobbes and Locke, and Ayers and Austin (and Austin/Derrida) as examples of direct conflict.

And I think here even there is too much focus on finding something “wrong” and dismissing what someone says, instead of working harder to understand, treating it as if there might be more to it than immediately registered.

I do not understand your post. Isn't what against the forum rules? — Athena

Using AI is either explicitly against the rules, or is simply frowned upon, for the same reasons as using a summary of a topic, such as Wikipedia. Original thought or primary texts are preferred (though this includes one philosopher reading another, like Heidegger on Nietzsche).

I also think @bongo fury was making a joke, in bringing you up short and then apologizing.

Edit: from the Guidelines:

“AI LLMs are not to be used to write posts either in full or in part (unless there is some obvious reason to do so, e.g. an LLM discussion thread where use is explicitly declared). Those suspected of breaking this rule will receive a warning and potentially a ban.

AI LLMs may be used to proofread pre-written posts, but if this results in you being suspected of using them to write posts, that is a risk you run. We recommend that you do not use them at all”

@Joshs @Wayfarer @frank @Ludwig V @Punshhh

Do you think we can discover something new by changing the perspective in this way? — Astorre

I think the opportunity is there. We might take a moment to investigate the specific differences of the individual cultural grammar apart from their relation to, say, in opposition to, the idea of “is” as essence (say, “fixed” vs “moving”). I feel like we may be skipping over that step to jump into a theoretical philosophical discussion that perhaps has more to do with its relation to “essence” than the grammatical/cultural independence. That we might be taking them as justification of something we’ve already decided, or want, or are forced into, rather than evidence of something we may not yet understand, something surprising, unthought before.

@Joshs @Astorre

Your chair, of course, is not a picture. One might point out that it is difficult to interpret it as anything else, so that case is different. As against that, who knows what puzzle pictures of a chair might be created? There is a not dissimilar issue, however, and that is the description under which we recognize it. It is a chair, but it is also furniture, carpentry, wood, a luxury and so forth. — Ludwig V

I take Wittgenstein’s use of the duck/rabbit picture specifically only for him to have a simple, uncluttered, obvious case (like the builders) to draw out how an “aspect” works (analogously as it were, and not literally to only this type of case), which is different than when we discuss “interpretation” as only between options, and perhaps only in certain cases, like in taking an action from the way we interpret something first. I do think your examples are aspects of a chair: as regarding its beauty, and then perhaps only in its relation to the room; and, separately, regarding it as an example of finesse in carpentry; but, also, as a frivolous expense—bourgeoisie; or, becoming aware of it’s possible place in dance choreography.

I realized it was important to see that these are not aspects of the chair (necessarily), but that, in perceiving an aspect, we are regarding the chair as…. Much as we might perceive someone writhing in pain on the ground as a drain on taxpayer’s dollars, or we perceive someone as having a soul (and thus treating them as if they do).

This is to point out that an aspect is not an essential, constitutional part of a chair. Wittgenstein’s modern “essence” of something is the criteria we would use to even consider it one. This also speaks to how we “recognize” it as one, which in this sense would be: (the means by which we judge) differentiating it from something else, say, what we might mistake it for.

For our current purposes, what comes to be important about something for society (forming the criteria for it), here, in the “Western” case, may be more “fixed” or identified with the thing it is said to “be”. “She is a lawyer” is perhaps to necessarily associate them, equate them, and so maybe limit them as only that. Whereas what is done with she:lawyer (which I have claimed may be only to point them out from others, i.e. that person**) is not to necessarily associate them with the kind of person we take lawyers to be. This is not to say that the grammar is actually determinative in this way (even if not as I claim hypothetically), though the strong correlation in the case of “is” framing the picture of “essence” as metaphysical (though whether chicken or egg came first), begs that question, even perhaps to be possibly researched further.

Mir ist kalt," which translates to "Me is cold," where "me" is the dativ case, as in "Give ME the book." This is far closer to "cold is upon me" than "I have cold." — Dawnstorm

**My understanding is that in English this dativ form only remains to point out (identify) the (indirect) object, such as “I gave them flowers”, but nowadays in English we would normally say “I gave flowers to them”.

Calling (some individual) someone out, as a function, is like pointing at them, then simply saying, “lawyer”, as an attribution. And maybe this is like perceiving someone as something, just an aspect of them rather than making it an essential part of their identification. As if we did not control all of Marx’s means of production of the other, so they would not have to answer for all other lawyers, judged as if it were also all of what they are (allowed to be).

Wanted to thread this back to the OP

seeing as aspect" is inherent in perception. …The duck-rabbit can be seen in two ways. But there is a third way, which is neutral between those intepretations and allows us to say that those two interpretations are interpretations of the same picture. I mean the description of the picture as a collection of marks on paper. — Ludwig V

I’m suggesting that to perceive something (about something) is (the same as) to become aware of an aspect of it, regard it as something, as evidenced by the fact that when we say we perceive something, we are pointing out an aspect of a thing. This would mean there is no need for something called “perception” that happens (like vision does), of which seeing aspects is “inherent”.

I’m not sure we would say that seeing the picture as marks on a page is an aspect of it (as it is so generally an aspect of any drawing), or maybe it is, as is our becoming aware of the truth of it, the trick of it, both together as you say. Also, I would think that sometimes a rose is just a rose. In other words, I’m not sure seeing a chair, even recognizing or identifying a chair, would count as perceiving an aspect of it; as if each time we regard it as a chair. I’m not sure whether @Astorre’s pointing out that some countries recognition of a thing’s “presence” is just as mundane as this, but, in contrast to equating a thing with something specific (with “is”), the difference in perspective at least points out that there is at times the occurrence of something surprising us (perhaps our letting a thing surprise us).

When we are offended, what is the best way to handle this — Athena

Thank you for making the effort to try to humanize this group of logicians. I would suggest not looking at it as handling your being offended, but that someone else has done something wrong, say, impugned your character, said something vulgar, etc., and that the appropriate response to each wrong may be different but would probably be specific based on the type of act, possibly also informed by the situation (demonstrated by recent suggested responses to newly-recognized ills). Deciding “what” your response will be based solely on your level of offense may leave you with just self-righteousness and being indignant instead of realizing that what is actually appropriate is an accusation, or reprimand, or refusal of that treatment, or being an ally, or calling HR. Just coming in hot also doesn’t really leave room for a mistake on your part, or the possible mitigating circumstances, excuses, acts of reconciliation, etc. that are baked into calling someone out.

I also believe there are appropriate virtues for philosophers: patience, open-mindedness, being more curious than rushing to judgment, being rigorous but fair, not generalizing, allow for disagreement but don’t find it first before acknowledging common ground, don’t take your annoyance with an issue out on anyone who seems to bring up something similar, don’t attack the weakest part of an argument, try to understand their terms and what interest they have in their point… pretty sure we’ve got these written down somewhere.

I’ll just reply to this via message. I apologize for the “theory” dig; I was just jealous you were being taken seriously I think. I do admit that, in being made to work so hard to explain what I was talking about, I didn’t take the time to address that a debate about ends is inevitable and has its place, and so probably came off as condescending or judgmental or dismissive (or unintelligible it turns out). I thought I turned it about, but the ship has sailed. I would just say publicly that I was not pitting an assumption of “rationality” against the individual, or the personal, or participants. I also don’t take Wittgenstein to be talking about justification or a system or basis of intelligibility (as if it were not an ongoing responsibility). Thus I was not assuming mutual understanding was assured (as if what I was saying was “right”, or simply “common sense”), but I was not assuming (immediate) disagreement. Thanks.

saying [someone with [lived experience] “should not” [have any decision-making authority] or are unimportant, is perhaps to say they do not or should not have value (in deciding), which flies in the face of considering how they might or do in this case if we imagine the board is considering adding lived experience as a criteria for appointment. ( — Antony Nickles

There is absolutely no basis to say the bolded without first giving a reason why, Nothing is valuable tout court. What is it valuable for? I can only surmise you want lived experience to be informative. About what??? — AmadeusD

I should have said “as we are imagining”, but I thought I made it clear that what the board wants was to add another member, and we were considering the criteria they would use, the traditional ones and what would be the criteria to judge how lived experience would have value for the board, how they would decide whether to choose the new member based on it.

Yep, but what you missed from my quote was "now" that I/we have addressed that squarely several times . I can't see why you would run the same stuff when it's been dealt with. — AmadeusD

Yes, you’ve been very generous. The question would be whether we learned anything about what lived experience is, what it applies to (maybe only certain kinds of situations), what not (in comparison to the value from the other criteria), the pitfalls (appearing discriminatory), its corruption (just image), etc. to make a judgment in this case (whether to add it as a criteria here, in this example, or as it might equally apply elsewhere, in other similar contexts). We didn’t get as far as I would have liked (still things to clarify to find out how/when/where/if lived experience is valuable), but I’ve been kinda browbeat on this (e.g. “You're focused on something utterly incoherent”). If this doesn’t help understand the value of the method, I haven’t done my job. I’m sorry if you didn’t get anything out of it, but I stilI appreciate your participation.

Lost my temper here.

My guess is that both of you do not think that moral error is possible (which includes ideological error), — Leontiskos

I feel like I should take issue with the presumption, but the question itself is too broad for me to answer. Nevertheless (stepping in front of the loaded question), what is an example of an error that is moral, say ideological? As, say, opposed to a political one, like dictatorship? which seems hard to call an “error”. Dewey (as I discuss here) will call intolerance a “treason” to democracy, which would cast one out of the polis, not be “wrong” or a mistake.

I am going to point out some of the grammatical problems first, because these seem to be present throughout. What does "it is" refer to? What does "these" refer to? It's hard to follow what you are saying. — Leontiskos

And what I suggest is not to understand the other’s “experience”, which has been philosophically pictured as ever-present and always “mine”, which manifests as the desire to remain misunderstood (or be clear on its face), or be special by nature (always unique). But it is also used as a justification to ignore the human altogether in only recognizing fixed standards for knowledge and rationality. I take these as a general human desire to avoid responsibility to answer for ourselves and to make others intelligible. — Antony Nickles

“It” being “the idea of one’s ‘experience’ as unique”, in that it also creates the idea of irrational as individual, emotional (relative to a person). And “these” would be: both these errors.

<We must move beyond fixed standard for knowledge and rationality — Leontiskos

I said, “to ignore… in only recognizing fixed standards”, and this would be preset (created) requirements, not “any standards”, and also in the sense of desiring them to be (as philosophy does) applied generically, uniformly, without any context (or across all). And, anticipating the next bit, I am specifically not talking about errors in logic or grammar I might make here, as it were, philosophically.

I still can't critique them because my critique involves a "fixed standard for [...] rationality." — Leontiskos

you aren't allowed to appeal to fixed standards — Leontiskos

And here, as I have said (quite a few times now), I am not trying to cut off argument or dismiss anyone (not saying “can’t critique” or “aren’t allowed”), only suggesting we find out if our (any) assumptions are getting in the way of seeing things clearly. I think the presumption here—which I am starting to take personally as an accusation based on my desire and repeated efforts to be intellectually forthright and honest (also admitting errors and my own assumptions)—is that I actually do have a position and am either trying to cut off all others philosophically (theoretically as it were), or I am merely being slippery, or trying to hide, which I mentioned above to @AmadeusD, would be the whole point of looking at actual criteria in a case: to investigate them together to sort them from our assumptions, which we all have, and are, categorically, unrealized. Isn’t this what anyone is against, being judged prematurely, say, based on an inappropriate standard?

I am, of course, abandoning that effort here in order to avoid cutting off discussion or appearing dismissive (of anyone), as has been pointed out. If we can get past the skepticism of my “intentions” or the presumption of my goal, I don’t mind discussing the philosophy.

But sometimes we [identify things], as one might say, unconsciously or unaware of the process. In these cases, it is a bit of a moot point whether we should really say "we" identify the specimen. It certainly isn't under our control, in the way that it is when we consciously identify something. — Ludwig V

I agree that how it is done absolutely depends on what you are identifying. And we don’t talk about it because (with most things) we are all trained, told, (but usually just) pick up, our practices (like identifying), but we (like philosophers) are able to stop and reflect on the ways we can tell one thing from another, or we all in any case can ask (and answer) “How are you identifying that Meadowlark? By its feet or wing markings?” Or even, how is identifying different than seeing or perceiving?

You seem to be thinking of witnessing as a preliminary step to the processes involved in perception — Ludwig V

No, I was specifically responding to @Punshhh’s bringing up the sense of mystical witnessing; I believe you’re thinking of the other use, like being a witness to a murder. There is the religious sense also of “bearing witness”, which, even if you couldn’t testify like at trial about the murder, Job and Arjuna could, as it is in this sense, be the testimony of having “felt” or “witnessed” “the power of” God.

Having said all that, there is a paradox inherent in the idea that perceiving something as the result of a process. How do we conceive of the first step in the process? — Ludwig V

Well these words all sound like they are the same thing, but I am thinking of perceiving in its sense of regarding something in a way (like a person as pitiable), or becoming aware of a new aspect of it, which will depend on the thing of course but also where we start with it, our education, our presumptions, etc., or, as Wittgenstein calls it, our “attitude” to it, our (dis)position in relation to it. “All of a sudden, I perceived her entirely differently…” I’m not sure if @Astorre would consider this similar at all to other conceptions of how things “are” (for us), apart from the equating of “is”.

(Philosophically, perception was treated like vision, but some personal version of everything we all had, though, as I said, I don’t really see it as relevant to our discussion here. Though it is the title of literally eight other discussions)

The Italians and Spanish in their use of "being" are able to distinguish between, as you say, a fundamental characteristic of a person's identity (Latin esse) and a person's temporary, transient mood (Latin stare). — RussellA

I wonder if this is similar to Wittgenstein’s seeing someone as something, seeing them as an “aspect”. This would not be essential, but also not temporary, as “He’s angry”, but “Be careful, he’s a grump.” And an important part of this is we are not just seeing them differently, but treating them as that, or switching our regard as we become aware of something else. “No, be kind to him, he’s in grief.”

Redo

@Leontiskos

I can't understand Antony's intention — AmadeusD

It was to try to offer a different way than just a philosophical framework which tends to overlook things based on the terms we bring to something.

if the other party doesn’t appear to agree with you, they must need to reevaluate their whole approach so let’s talk about that instead of whatever thing we both disagree with — Fire Ologist

I was literally not arguing; how can I “disagree”!? And 3/4 of this discussion is y’all and @Joshs bashing on about theories on how we approach things!

We do understand these things, and we do not need to reinvent the wheel. — AmadeusD

I did/do apologize for insinuating that anyone didn’t understand what they were talking about, or that I was trying to slander anyone’s judgment.

You have to make a proposition: Lived experience is a valuable aspect of a person's exploitable wisdom. — AmadeusD

And I will leave y’all to that, because I hadn’t even figured out: “valuable” how?

The veil of ignorance, I suspect, is at play…. I just think Antony is importing (maybe unconsciously) plenty of goals which he/they (others, not a gender joke) implicitly carry, without these base discussions. — AmadeusD

Now I get it. Y’all think I’m trying to sandbag you, or set a trap, etc. If anyone is bringing “implicit” “unconscious” goals—as like implicit premises—the idea would be to realize that, to get a chance to become aware of that, just like a logical error or a contradiction. My whole idea was to come at it open-minded and then figure out what the terms and stakes are. If I realize I have presumptions, prejudgments, a preconceived idea of “rational”, an axe to grind, etc., I could then separate what I am bringing from looking at what is the case here. Thus the idea of jointly brainstorming the criteria so that we keep each other honest to sort out the grounds, yes, on which we might actually (ultimately) disagree. If we assume disagreement, we’re just picking sides and fighting to see whose sword is sharper; I’m good.

If you're talking about how we decide on goals, that's really not what this thread or discussion are about. But it would explain the disconnect. — AmadeusD

I see; sorry I wasted your time with all this.

I think there is some ambiguity around the word perceived. — Punshhh

In philosophy, historically, it is taken as a technical term almost, where our identity is tied to the fantasy that we each (always) “perceive” uniquely (created from/with the idea of “appearance”), which opens a huge can of controversial worms, which I think we need not get into here.

I was thinking of it meaning something is noticed, — Punshhh

As I take “seeing” to be basically the same as noticing something—but not just as (immediate, ever present) vision. And maybe seeing is more about focusing on, pointing out, differentiating, etc. and to “perceive” is more seeing it as something. “Do you see that tree?” “The birch?” “No the pine” but then (so?/why?), “What about it?” “It’s beautiful.” “What? I don’t see (perceive) it’s beauty (see it as beautiful).” All that is to say, being present is perhaps to let, or wait for, more to strike us before we judge a thing to be what it is (by our ordinary criteria), as wording a thing is a kind of violence, closing that off.

In the example I gave the person witnessing the inconceivable is taken out of themselves, — Punshhh

This immediately made me think of Stanley Cavell’s discussion of Thoreau’s use of “ecstasy” in Senses of Walden (p. 100+) , as being “beside yourself”, as if we are two (some would speak of the “God in us”), different than (or beyond) self-consciousness (not just seeing ourselves, listening to our ego), but not as separable, but an activity (edit: or perhaps receptivity) between the two, as @Astorre says:

In Russian, being is present without fixation; in Kazakh, it becomes through a process ("болу"); and in Chinese, it manifests as a temporary presence (有) or the potential of emptiness (无), integrated into the flow of Dao — Astorre

@Astorre @frank @Wayfarer @Joshs

Don’t you mean perceived, rather than identified.
To be perceived, something merely needs to be witnessed, this does not require identification.
— Punshhh
If you don't identify the object you perceive, how do you know what you have witnessed? — Ludwig V

PI #371 Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. -Wittgenstein

We “identify” based on the criteria (even habitual, unaware) of a specific shared practice (the kind of object), which is different than vision, the biological mechanism. Identification also having to do with which aspect, what you are looking at (on the object) as evidence, and the other criteria for identification (perhaps particular to this kind/type of object), not to mention how “seeing/perceiving” itself works (not immediately, wholey), instead involving focus (where we are looking), that we are usually telling someone else what we see, etc.

So something is witnessed before the mind then processes the sensory information. — Punshhh

But isn’t the whole idea of witnessing that it is without an object? “To be perceived, something merely needs to be witnessed.” @Punshhh But we are not witnessing “something” (even less, some “thing”), and thus not even proceeding to “perceiving”, in terms of “seeing”, and so, far from identifying, right @Ludwig V? Thus the only criteria is “being present” (not, visually), being able to be present, which some would argue is a skill (being able to let go of the desire to identify or even see, much less word), or something we can become lost to. Which makes “awe” more than just a “feeling”, and the reason for the Leviathan’s and Vishnu’s appearance (beyond the embodiment in Krishna); in order to, in that sense, snap Job and Arjuna “out of it”, say, their desire for reasons. All that is to say that we do not witness, say, the mysterious, all the time, or automatically (as part of vision), and particularly not before we “see” something or identify it. However, now I (just) realize why people suggest “putting God first”, which is also not to say, “all the time”, but when we don’t know how to proceed (thus needing to “pray on it”), or to say, “be present”, letting go of, and so allowing more in, than your reasons and goals first (ego). Thus, as Heidegger suggests, in thinking, "Useful is the letting-lie-before-us, so (the) taking-to-heart, too"

a broader theory of error or understanding/assessing… is not only found elsewhere, but is actually the basis for almost all bad/evil acts of judgment whatsoever — Leontiskos

And so, never ending… great.

In these terms, my point was that the ad hoc assumption of—inherently to prove legitimacy/not legitimate up front—say, the desire for, a framing of irrationality/emotion, is endemic in philosophy and humanity, and gets in the way of a broader practice of assessment. I should have qualified this with the recognition that there are mistakes (to be) made (bad means), and I do think it is important to sort the wheat from the (general) chaff. And here it seems there is some distinction to be made between (general) bad means separate from certain goals or criteria, and those intrinsic in the value(ing) of certain criteria, and, recognizing there are costs to meeting most goals, is the juice worth the squeeze (and what that is, and if avoidable, able to be mitigated, etc)

@Leontiskos @AmadeusD @Number2018 @frank @Count Timothy von Icarus @Joshs @Fire Ologist

I’ll leave the below here unfinished—investigating with @AmadeusD the criteria of lived experience—and, then, @Fire Ologist’s suggestion of other existing, related criteria in this scenario. I did also respond in a way where I folded some things into wider concerns we already have, which would avoid an arbitrarily narrow judgment, and other shifts in consideration.

I hope it helps in the way of clarifying what the interests are, and to have clearer field to judge whether these criteria still continue, or have ended, or should.

*[Experience] is a consideration of one's abilities in the present with recourse to statistical evidence supporting that claim of ability). — AmadeusD

Could we (accept it would be to) say: experience is a (present) demonstration of skills and abilities (anything else?) supported by, evidenced by, let’s just say: a history of those. I mean it could be quantified statistically for certain things, sales?! But would it be for all? And then this might help with the criteria for lived experience, as it would also be supported by “a history”, but of some different kind.

*Experience is literally experience of success in a given field. — AmadeusD

Legit. Hard to argue with setting a goal and achieving it, or whatever success looks like in a particular field. In contrast, some lived experience I brought up might look like a life of failing, having come up against maybe institutions or situations and not being able to achieve the goals they set out, not been able to set their own goals.

*Usually, [experience is judged on] extremely specific criteria which are necessary to assess one's potential. — AmadeusD

I could see why we’d want this (prediction, and…), but I’ve been in some interviews were they say things like, “fit” (maybe that’s just with me). And this maybe only applies for a specific job/tasks, but as to potential: as an interest, judged by a demonstration of past performance as an indication of future performance (or is not, as my mutual fund says, qualifying it as not guaranteed). So one question might be, what is someone’s lived experience “performing”? and does specificity play a part?

*[Lived experience] (in practice) categorically ignores any metric. — AmadeusD

And this brings up the question whether specificity (always) plays a part in the experience or other criteria for our board, throwing in “success” maybe. A metric sounds like a certain kind of measure, and it would be dodging this to say “not everything is measurable” (though we don’t always judge with “specific” criteria, say, like what a yard is), but there are other criteria for our board where the metric is not, say, personal, like “fit”, but I want to say, looser, like influence, or connections (which we have yet to get into). Now, if lived experience does avoid any “metric” (a predetermined ruler), are there other kinds of criteria for it than, say, a judgment of my personality, like “fit”.

*[One criteria for] adding "lay people" for the purpose of lived experience [may be to make the public feel] as if there's some "authenticity" in the decision making process, or "representation". — AmadeusD

Absolutely, as I said, for some kind of image, perhaps in the same way they might add a celebrity, but even that has some related value, say, to bring attention, or draw in a certain demographic. Of course to say it is a necessary criteria, or as the only criteria, is, as I said, a bit cynical of what other value we are considering, as @Fire Ologist said, “internally”, say, to the board’s decision-making process.

[lived experience could be valued as] a "lay person's perspective" but they are essentially ancillary to any decision making processes; — AmadeusD

I see what you are getting at, as part of where we stopped was their value for “perspective”, but we might not call this just support in a decision, or maybe just certain types of decisions, but maybe this is, like I said, just like an attorney, who gives advice which does not need to be heeded. Though they might just not be granted certain authority, maybe of a final kind, but saying they “should not” or are unimportant, is perhaps to say they do not or should not have value (in deciding), which flies in the face of considering how they might or do in this case (or what case), if we imagine the board is considering adding lived experience as a criteria for appointment.

[Lived experience may matter] where there is a direct, measurable relationship between this person's membership of some class (demographic?) and their ability to report an aggregate opinion of that class to the committee (or board, whatever). This seems problematic in plenty of ways, but at least has a basis to move from. — AmadeusD

(I didn’t get to this.)

I don't think there is any value [to a local], other than to get directions. You could consult Google. — AmadeusD

(I didn’t get to this either, but I think it is in the same category as the one above.)

It’s goals are chosen and driven more by affect/emotion than by rational analysis. — Fire Ologist

This seems like either a premise or a conclusion rather than a criteria, so I’m not sure what the criteria itself would be for the board; someone emotional could be to say someone passionate, and we imagine someone angry, but we also say that about someone who has accomplished a lot, been doing it for a long time, “demonstrated commitment” maybe.

this might be a sort of sabotage move where you hire a board member you know will annoy the current white chairman of the board — Fire Ologist

That seems like a tactic (not a criteria), but we have been presuming that the board are all of the same mind, so maybe the criteria would be “someone who shakes things up”, as I kind of revolution, an upending.

As I said, I don’t consider these as drawn all the way out, so my comments are only to provisionally get at what is at stake in this, and not (hopefully) arguments for or against- though I’m sure @Leontiskos will point out how they are if that is the case—as the process is meant to be fair and is based on acceptance.

But in truth, we don't need more examples; we're already overwhelmed by an abundance of facts and cases. — Number2018

I was going to develop the example I brought up and that @AmadeusD and @Fire Ologist responded to, but I will defer to your lead, as @Leontiskos has rightly pointed out I should.

you have effectively derailed the thread from the topic of the OP. — Leontiskos

You may be right about this; I had thought we were getting somewhere, but getting to what counts for woke, much less to judge if it has ended, has been harder than I considered.

“People often make premature judgments, but no one is doing that here.” — Leontiskos

I must apologize for this; it was a joke, in bad taste, which I thought was clear, as you seemed hell-bent on assuming that, in not attacking your argument, I was attacking you, your character, or your ability to judge at all. Poorly done on my part.

Of course I was saying judgment was being made prematurely, but not any particular judgments, other than the assumption of the rational-irrational/emotional dichotomy, which, as I said, is how I got started, and then of course suggesting that we look at the criteria (rationality) as a means for understanding those interests (feelings), which I did hope held some promise (to see their life and/or death).

“He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing… It was sheer thoughtlessness” - Arendt

I have read Arendt; I take her to be making a point about all of us: that, most of the time, we do not give thought to what we are doing, to the implications and consequences of our actions. We do this thing like everyone else does, and we never turn our attention to ask what effect it has, etc., in a sense: to ask, why we do it.

rationality is not separate or universal but is embedded within specific configurations of embodied and affective dynamics — Number2018

So, if we can examine the “configurations” of each “specific” practice (what we do), embedded within it are the rationality for each, as the way in which we would be said (our criteria) to embody them (to meet having done it) and our (as a society) interests (feelings about something) in doing them.

I finally get it (I think). You are looking for woke criteria. You are saying to the Board “we need to appoint a new member and want to make sure we are being woke, enlightened, in our selection, so, how do we make a woke selection? — Fire Ologist

I thought I was speaking Klingon. Yes. How do we tell? What matters to (in judging) it being “woke”? I just didn’t want it to be aaaallllll the criteria (in aaalll the situations), so I picked, what I thought was, one. Was it not one?

Philosophy deals not with an object, but with its concept. — Astorre

We’ve been reading the Blue Book here, and one of Wittgenstein’s main themes, and first, is that thinking of something else (like feelings) as an object, treating them as an object, copying the framework analogously, is a major source of problems in philosophy.

Being does not demand confirmation; it simply is present. — Astorre

Then I’m taking “is” as a claim, to be verified or justified, different than something… self-evident? or something that doesn’t work like a claim? Maybe accepted until mistaken, and then just corrected.

Maybe the Russian says that person (is a) doctor, not to make a claim that they are a doctor (to be proven with a license), but to identify them, like pointing to that particular individual (singling them out, Cavell says), that one:doctor, as if doctor is not another noun (that they are equated with), but a modifying adjective.

"Mountain exists." "Бар" (bar) is not "is" in the sense of being; "бар" is "that which exists"—a fact proven by presence. "Тау бар" means "The mountain is present." — Astorre

In Russian, being is present without fixation; in Kazakh, it becomes through a process ("болу"); and in Chinese, it manifests as a temporary presence (有) or the potential of emptiness (无), integrated into the flow of Dao — Astorre

Thought of just as: the mountain is present (to us) compared to existing (apart from us), casts it in a Cartesian light you are obviously not suggesting. But there is the sense were we are present to the mountain, as in, we are aware of it, now focused on it, perhaps even, in its “mountain-ness” (channeling later Heidegger).

If Western languages prompt us to ask what a table is, Chinese emphasizes its use (用, yòng)—its role in a specific situation. — Astorre

The Western tradition, relying on the copula "is," built an ontology of presence, in which the question of being became a question of its essence. — Astorre

Wittgenstein will ask what is essential (to us) about a table, in looking at how we measure, say, that this, here, has fulfilled the role of a table.

Again, very interesting, congratulations. Of course this is to just tease the meat of the findings, but I find the research/evidence does allow for an astounding perspective, particularly how the classic philosophical framework is seemingly baked into the language.

). What is uncertain about the topic of this thread, wokeness? — Leontiskos

Let’s assume that I am uncertain about what woke is (it seems not far from the truth); think about the criteria you would explain to me so I would be able to tell it from something else I would know that is close to it and/or opposite to it (as we were doing with work experience vs lived experience).

There is very little uncertainty of how to proceed — Leontiskos

I am not questioning that you do not know how to proceed, as if, in this Discussion; what I am suggesting would be a situation in the world where the people involved do not know how to decide how to proceed.

Thus the importance to imagine a context in which people are trying to decide what to do where the value of those criteria (above) for deciding what to do, in that situation, is up for grabs. I thought lived experience was a woke thing, but I am more than willing to admit I don’t know what I am talking about, or I picked the wrong context. Without this, or an attempt at getting clear about the criteria in the example I set out, I’ll just respond to @AmadeusD and you can follow along, or not.

Well done; very interested to mull over. It reminds of the later Heidegger text "What is Called Thinking?" in which the Greek translation of that question is eventually taken in English to be: "Useful is the letting-lie-before-us, so (the) taking-to-heart, too", so the evidence can be fruitful.

Or do we allow men and women to compete together and name the victor “The Chairperson”. — Fire Ologist

I’m pretty sure the criteria is… coolness (surfer coolness)?, but I’m not sure “Chair of the Board” or “Board Chair” meets it (confusing objects?), nor “President of the Board” or “Board President” (who likes presidents? What are they deciding for the surfboards?).

A similarity in the two is that both a surfer and a board can decide to hang 10. — praxis

Boom! Nice.

if you want us to talk about a board, then you have to tell us why. — Leontiskos

I assumed that considering using lived experience as a criteria for appointment to a board would be something that would at issue here. As I said, feel free to chose a different example that involves indecision on how to move forward. Having a situation only matters in that we would have existing criteria for doing something, but that there is either something happening that we haven’t considered or new criteria being suggested, etc. that make us uncertain as to how to continue, but, from where we are (lost). I am suggesting that, instead of assuming we understand the criteria and the interests they reflect, we actually investigate a situation with this uncertainty to use the criteria as a way in…

If you were my Zen master then you could just tell me to do something and I would do it, no questions asked. — Leontiskos

Again, I did try to explain the reasons/benefit (which you did go through?) of the method (tied up with what that even is); but the idea was to, for now, put a pin in the philosophical discussion, in the hope that trying an example would help see why do it, to understand the philosophical reasons to do it. As a courtesy I will say in summary (though I will not argue it here, as I have spelled it out in length above), wanting to first decide what we are going to do, or imposing criteria for how to decide that, is to skip over examining, in a sense, how the world works. Now, as I said, I think aaaallll the objections have not resolved whether that is a good idea (as I did not anticipate all of them in my explanations, nor explain well it appears), much less even an agreement on understanding it (though there were some times that parts of it were close), so, yes, barring your review of the above (and perhaps even after that), I am simply asking for a good faith effort to try. But I can understand your skepticism and reticence in the effort. (Is guilting someone coercion?)

where we must all make decisions about the thing at stake. — Leontiskos

And my suggestion is to look at the criteria for judging in a particular case (not justifications for x) to find out what is at stake (what is essential about it), as if we don’t yet know, and so would be trying to decide what to do blind (even about a goal).

BTW - I do appreciate the effort, and I am working on a response. I think you gave us a lot to think about. I thought I might give @Leontiskos and @Fire Ologist, or others, a chance to give some more input on the criteria we are discussing.

I guess I’m saying it needs more structure (in my eyes) to ensure it is even related to wokeness — Fire Ologist

Does it help to say the board is considering adding lived experience as a criteria for appointment to the board?

As far as limiting the scenario ahead of time, the idea is to allow the investigation of criteria to drive the boat. Now we could of course say, in this scenario, a certain company, etc., leads a board to other criteria than we have drawn out, or more to the point, criteria x is qualified by certain aspects of the world.

I did suggest a pin in the philosophy. What I would say is we might not see the benefit, not having really gotten anywhere yet, to get to a point where we can judge it or compare it, but you certainly can investigate the relationship between goals the board might have to the criteria suggested, or others we have overlooked, such as…

Do they make someone young… a board member? — Fire Ologist

And is this the same as, or how different, than lived experience, or just for a skill (social media), or like a celebrity…

Am I getting us anywhere? — Fire Ologist

It’s a start, so thank you.

Nope

@Leontiskos @AmadeusD @Number2018 @frank @Count Timothy von Icarus @Joshs @Fire Ologist

you need to cash this out. — Fire Ologist

Literally the first thing you say? No attempt to humor me? I mean, at least @AmadeusD gave it a go, and there is nothing there worth discussing/exploring? All right, maybe just not your cup of tea.

I can’t even begin to balance Board criteria without just discussing the particulars. — Fire Ologist

Adding details in order to clarify how certain criteria work can be helpful. It shows how our words are connected to the world in a way. I suggested lived experience might be important in a certain way if the board was doing work that affected that lived place. So sure, feel free to suggest how certain criteria would require certain situations, or vice-versa., etc.

Now in this post here, the method now becomes doing three things… — Fire Ologist

I love the energy, but why the hurry? is there nothing of interest so far?

So we have some criteria and underlying bits. Now let’s talk… — Fire Ologist

So the discussion of criteria seems done and clear to you?

Is there a way to promote inclusion… — Fire Ologist

Is there a way to promote equity… — Fire Ologist

Is there a way to promote diversity… — Fire Ologist

I don’t even think we’ve gotten what we have mapped out, and you want to add three more new criteria? Again, I applaud the ambition. If everyone wants, we can shift to one of these other criteria (just one please), but I hate to throw out our efforts so far. But, if another is more interesting, or would be easier to draw out in a more appropriate situation, I’ll concede.

Let’s just pick something important, say what and how that is the case, and see what criteria emerge in the process, — Fire Ologist

We can also abandon the experiment, if that’s what this means; or just try it out. Your call.

A board hires someone who will best contribute to their goals — Leontiskos

Okay, but how they decide (what is important in deciding) is based on criteria. Contributing to their goals is one criteria (do we have a goal that each other criteria satisfy? “Our goal is to have someone with work experience” How is that saying something different?). There are no more? I have suggested some; I would think a discussion would involve more than just ignoring those; more to my hope, adding to the process—maybe pointing out how my explanation doesn't take into account something about the criteria, etc. I mean, I thought @AmadeusD did well.

This is a thread about wokeness. Why do you want me to pretend I am surfing? — Leontiskos

Appointing someone to a board based on "lived experience" is not relevant? As I said, any other examples are fine by me. (except surfing, though I know there's a joke in there somewhere)

@Leontiskos @AmadeusD @Number2018 @frank @Count Timothy von Icarus @Joshs @Fire Ologist

After the following flat dismissals:

But the rest seem illegitimate — AmadeusD

The rest is window dressing — AmadeusD

[what the different criteria are for work experience vs lived experience] seems... perhaps... not a reasonable question to ask. — AmadeusD

I can't see it being useful otherwise. — AmadeusD

@AmadeusD decides:

The scenario doesn't really move us toward anything helpful, — AmadeusD

Reeeally…

[Experience] is a consideration of one's abilities in the present with recourse to statistical evidence supporting that claim of ability). — AmadeusD

Experience is literally experience of success in a given field in the former. — AmadeusD

Usually, [experience is judged on] extremely specific criteria which are necessary to assess one's potential. — AmadeusD

[Lived experience] (in practice) categorically ignores any metric. — AmadeusD

[lived experience could be valued as] a "lay person's perspective" but they are essentially ancillary to any decision making processes; — AmadeusD

[Lived experience may matter] where there is a direct, measurable relationship between this person's membership of some class (demographic?) and their ability to report an aggregate opinion of that class to the committee (or board, whatever). This seems problematic in plenty of ways, but at least has a basis to move from. — AmadeusD

. [One criteria for] adding "lay people" for the purpose of lived experience [may be to make the public feel] as if there's some "authenticity" in the decision making process, or "representation". — AmadeusD

I don't think there is any value [to a local], other than to get directions. You could consult Google. — AmadeusD

This is a laundry list of proposed criteria (even some about lived experience!) that we had not yet made explicit or examined. And I would offer there is “meat” here to develop, clarify, compare, etc. that would be valuable to get clear about before judging how the board would go forward and what that looks like here.

Surely it would make more sense to find an issue and discuss why lived experience might be helpful there — AmadeusD

(emphasis added)

You're certainly more likely to find an example that could be agreed on. — AmadeusD

I took it that people take issue with appointing people to boards based on lived experience. I would concede to suggestions from the group for agreement on a different example as long as it is a situation (not an “issue” abstracted from any sense of a possible context) about how to decide what to do in a particular case, i.e, with competing, say old vs new, criteria.

Can you point me to the post where you provide reasons for why we ought to take a step back? — Leontiskos

My first post was to get at why “rational/irrational” gets in the way, and to suggest a way around that, but I think I did such a poor job of it, not expecting confusion in the right places, that I think it better to just see what I am doing in, participate in the method of, the example and maybe hold off of on the larger philosophical issues; or we could just read every discussion you and I have ever brought up. ;)

@Leontiskos @AmadeusD @Number2018 @frank @Count Timothy von Icarus @Joshs @Fire Ologist

Yes. Instead of talking about something, we end up talking about how to talk. — Fire Ologist

So maybe it’s just better to pin this and take a look at my post above as an example of the method.

We never conclude something together. — Fire Ologist

Always a risk/possibility, and this creates the desire to agree beforehand on/use, terms that will ensure we agree (or be judged irrational, etc.), say, “logic” or whatever. Also, I did say, even if we end up disagreeing, we can at least have a better, more explicit understanding of the terrain (learn something about our society).

It’s all back-office paperwork. — Fire Ologist

Ouch, philosophy is doomed.

I think it’s unconscious. — Fire Ologist

Not unconscious, unexamined, yet to be reflected on, taken from implicit never-think-about, to made explicit, drawn out in assumptions, implications, distinctions, etc. Who actually thinks about what makes an accident different than a mistake? (@Banno)

In this thread Antony Nickles has been saying something like, "Before we argue, let's talk about our interests": — Leontiskos

3. The interests are our skin in the game of achieving the goal, not in carrying out the criteria. Criteria do not care how you feel, they care about what you want to achieve. — AmadeusD

I would suggest perhaps we look at, engage in, the process I am suggesting, using the example, because I’m not sure I can (possibly) clear this up abstractly. I am not suggesting an argument about interests (first), but an investigation to uncover them, in our society, in a particular practice, so this is also not our interests (the ones arguing) but a look at, investigate, make explicit, our shared (current) criteria which encapsulate/reflect, not justify, our society’s interests in those criteria—not that they are the (rational/irrational) arguments for the criteria or for making a particular decision based on them.

The problem with this idea is that human action is always goal-directed. — Leontiskos

This is a whole ‘nother can of worms, but, in what I would call a moral moment, call it a crisis of criteria, we don’t know what to do, so this is perhaps jumping to a conclusion and then arguing to justify it, or, worse, arguing about how we justify it. I am merely suggesting a philosophical practice.

Presumably he wants to take a step back because he thinks it is a good idea to do so, and therefore his argument must communicate to others why it is a good idea to do so — Leontiskos

I have tried to explain this, make an argument for it; maybe the desire for a specific kind of answer is getting in the way? In any event, I don’t have a compelling reason to make you do it, as it is voluntary, as is continuing despite an inclination to stop (move to decide we cannot agree), as is the acceptance of the description of the criteria. Perhaps if we try, this might be easier to understand.

@Leontiskos @AmadeusD @Number2018 @frank @Count Timothy von Icarus @Joshs @Fire Ologist

This is to start a separate thread than the boardroom example above (of method) to address any philosophical clarifications separately.

The means to see what the possibly unexamined interests are is to articulate the goals while we lay out the criteria these goals are articulated in/with.. — Fire Ologist

I would hope this is clearer given the example, but I am suggesting looking at the existing and proposed criteria used in a particular situation (not, criteria for an abstract goal), which will take some work to flesh out (not being clear as in, even uncovered yet, much less drawn out in terms of how they work, i.e., considerations, implications, distinctions, etc.), and then we can try to imagine what the various interests might be, in seeing how those current and proposed criteria reflect what matters to each.

As I take this quote of @Number2018 to reiterate: “ “Events of decision that we experience as rational choices, seemingly without the motive force of affect to move them, envelop the complex of the pre-cognitive and micropolitical processes of the event-based situation. The ‘rational’ aspects of the event— judgment, hypothesis, comparative evaluation of alternatives, decision— were mutually included in the event along with all the other co- operating factors.” (Massumi, ‘The Power at the end of the Economy’, pg. 47) (my emphasis). The “‘rational’ aspects of the event”, the particular criteria in a situation, he says “envelop” and “include”—I would say reflect (as OLP claims)—“all the co-operating factors”, which are the interests in those (“mutual”, or shared societal) criteria for judgment, in that particular event.

This might be overly coarse, but I take the other option to be claiming/attributing/assuming a certain goal first and then perhaps treating “interests” as justifications for the goal, or motivations for the goal. Whatever that may be, I take it as the classic philosophical discussion to first determine what is right or what ought to be done, which can lead to setting the requirement (criteria, basis) ahead of looking at the criteria of a particular case, and abstractly arguing for what is to be considered “rational”, and thus “irrational”, (which can leads to/come from, a desire for things like universality, completeness, certainty, etc., as discussed above, because all criteria include our desires/interests, even “rationality”). Again, I take this difference as a matter of analytical philosophy, and not as some kind of proxy for woke/not woke (although there is, as we have discussed, the theme in philosophy of: not reflected upon yet, fully thought through, etc. which I can see now as possibly analogous, though I wouldn’t take as equating the discussions).