Not all discussion requires argument. I like to think we've helped one another in some way.

If it weren't for you and other folks like you, Idah been arguing with myself. I appresheeightcha.

:wink:

Nice stuff recently!

Are they seeing Cypress trees or are they seeing the way the Cypress trees appear to them? Are they smelling fresh ground Kona coffee, or the way fresh ground Kona coffee smells to them? Are they tasting cauliflower, or the way cauliflower tastes to them? — creativesoul

We're not smelling our subjective individual conscious experiences. We're not tasting the way coffee appears/interacts to/with our biological machinery. Our sense of taste is equivalent to the way the world appears to our tastes.

If it were the case that the object of our rational attention was the way the world appeared to us, then we would already be knee deep in metacognitive content. For we cannot be captured by the way the world appears to us until we draw a distinction between the world and how we see it. Until then...

We're captured by the world.

Terms of evolutionary progression.  

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?
— creativesoul

I think it is right as you have done to distinguish words within exclamation marks to refer to thoughts and language and words not in exclamation marks to refer to things in the world. — RussellA

:smile:

creativesoul, excuse my answering a question to you. — Banno

I've not a single issue with that.

Imagine an organism with a peculiar sex difference; the males' eyes and the females' eyes are, relative to the other, upside down such that what the males see when standing is what the females see when hanging upside down, and vice versa.

The way the males see the world is very different to the way the females see the world (with respect to its orientation).

Imagine also that this organism is intelligent with a language. Both males and females use the same word to describe the direction of the ground and the same word to describe the direction of the sky.

And we can add to this by imagining differences in size (e.g. that one of the sexes has a magnified vision relative to the other) and colour (not to mention smell and taste).

The way they navigate and talk about the world is the same, and yet the way they see (and smell and taste) the world is very different. The appearance of the world is a mental phenomenon. It is the appearance of the world that is the immediate object of their rational consideration. — Michael

The last claim makes no sense to me. It leads to all sorts of nonsense.

Are they seeing Cypress trees or are they seeing the way the Cypress trees appear to them? Are they smelling fresh ground Kona coffee, or the way fresh ground Kona coffee smells to them? Are they tasting cauliflower, or the way cauliflower tastes to them?

What sits between the lemon and the creature's smelling?
— creativesoul

A necessary relation, and some means by which it occurs. (??) — Mww

Hey M!

Causal. Biological machinery(physiological sensory perception).

I'm curious how you would fill out your answer.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist must agree that the thought of "trees lining the banks" must be in the mind, otherwise how would the mind know about trees lining the bank in the first place. — RussellA

Must we? I find trouble with your manner of putting things. :yikes: The aforementioned notion of mind is hard at work here. I suspect we work from several incompatible notions.



How we arrive at knowledge of trees lining the banks is irrelevant to the question asked. "The thought of 'trees lining the bank'" is also irrelevant.

Your target is whether or not "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if there are Cypress trees lining the banks. Thus, asking how we "know about trees lining the bank in the first place" focuses upon knowledge(and mind building). That's a great conversation. I'd love to have it one day, just not this one. I'm not asking how we know about cypress trees lining the banks of rivers. I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that there is something in the world causing us to perceive "trees lining the bank", as both believe in Realism.

I perceive quoted phrases like the one directly above via biological machinery. Our eyes are imperative to doing that successfully. I suppose I could learn braille and rid myself of such ocular dependency, but I digress...

We need not know the meaning of "trees lining the banks" in order to see trees lining the banks. We need not know how we come to know that there are trees lining the banks in order for there to be trees lining the banks. We cannot come to know that there are trees lining the banks if there are not. <----that speaks to your earlier question.

The question is whether or not - during the all times when we are looking at Cypress trees lining the banks - if we are directly perceiving the world as it is - if there are indeed Cypress trees lining the bank. I say we are and there are.

The Indirect and Direct Realist differ in what the something is in the world that is causing us to perceive "trees lining the bank".

For the Direct Realist, in the world are trees lining the bank regardless of there being anyone to observe them, in that, if you look at the world you will perceive exactly the same thing as me.

I wouldn't say it like that; not here at this juncture anyway. I know better. That context is far too broad. We need to get more specific if we want to arrive at a scenario where two people perceive exactly the same thing.

You and I are most certainly working from very different notions of "mind" and "perception". Acknowledging that seems necessary here. Helpful, hopefully, in some way. 

This means that if we are both looking at the same trees lining the bank, we will both be perceiving the same thing.

I agree with that exactly as it is stated, but deny the rest...

This means that I will know what's in your mind at that moment in time.

"Perceiving the same thing" might mean that to you, but not me. Cypress trees are not in the mind.

For the Indirect Realist, in the world is something regardless of there being anyone to observe it. As what I perceive is a subjective representation of the something in the world, we may not be perceiving the same thing.

You cannot believe that the Cypress trees along the banks of Mississippi delta backwaters only exist within your mind.

I would not say that I cannot know what is in your mind when we're looking at the same thing. Sometimes I can. Sometimes not. Rather, I'm stating that what we're looking at is not always exactly nor is it always only - what's in our mind - while we're looking at it.

I think your notion of "mind" is suspect.

As I have never believed it possible to know what someone else is thinking, I am an Indirect rather than Direct Realist.

You've always held false belief then. It is sometimes possible. AS best I can tell, that is not a litmus test for whether one ought be either a direct or indirect realist.

Because you have the concept of a bald cypress before looking at the river bank, you perceive a bald cypress.

As I don't have the concept of a bald cypress, all I perceive is a mass of green with some yellow bits.

I'm befuddled how that could make much sense of anything in the world.

You figure the tree stops being a directly perceptible entity that has existed long before you ever came across it simply because you've never seen one? You seem to be conflating your knowledge of what you're looking at with what you're looking at.

Did the bald cypress exist before anyone looked at it? You know that a mass of green with some yellow bits is a bald cypress, but I don't know that...

Nor need you in order for you to be looking at one.

So how can a bald cypress exist in the world independently of any mind to observe it, if the bald cypress only exists as a concept in the mind?

It couldn't if that were the case. Problem is - they do. Therefore, they do not only exist as a concept in the mind. The Mississippi river delta waterway does not reside within your mind. Those Cypress trees lining the backwater banks do not either. To drive the point home, I could break a small limb off and thwack you with it. I certainly need not extract anything from within your mind in order to successfully do so.

If that doesn't change your mind nothing will.

You and I can look at the same river. We both see the same river at the same time.
We can both isolate a heron to the exclusion of all else. What on earth grounds the objection to saying that we are not seeing things as they are, at that time? Is the heron not this or that species? Is it not sitting atop a remnant of past logging operations? Are the trees lining the banks not bald cypress? Is that not an alligator gar, right over there-------> Is that not an old flat tire still on its rim? Is the distance between the gar and the tire not whatever it is?

We could also be focusing upon the heron's beak. Look, a bit of mud is caked alongside it. Is that somehow not the way the heron is - in part at least? Is the mud not caked alongside its bill?

Are those things in our mind? I would not think a direct realist would arrive at that.

There's a notion of mind there that not all direct realists hold.

If person A directly saw an object as it really is, and person B looking at the same object also saw the object as it really is, then person A would know what was in person's B mind — RussellA

Whence the need for omniscience?

What sits between the lemon and the creature's smelling?

Touche' :razz:

It's not about punctuation use...

↪creativesoul Correct. But I'm unsure what else to say, — AmadeusD

May I suggest Davidson's Anomolous Monism or his paper in the early 70's or late 60's, "Mental Events" which has a very basic argument, undeniable really, that you may find of interest. It's quite germane to this topic.

Pomo authors like Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida often get blamed for the excesses of wokism and cancel culture, when in fact the repressive moralism coming from these movements is attributable to such doctrines as Critical Race Theory, and figures like Franz Fanon and Antonio Gramsci. These approaches are heavily influenced by Marx and psychoanalysis, which are put into question by pomo writers like Foucault and Derrida.
— Joshs

:ok: Very well put. Actors such as JBP and Shapiro are doing a disservice to their own cause when they bring up Derrida and Foucault, all the while the people they want to fight are seldom named — some might say they are poisoning the swamp, but realistically they are just ignorant... — Lionino

The irony...

It's Critical Theory, not 'Critical Race Theory'. You should read it.

We accept that heat death and eternal expansion will happen, we accept that quantum fluctuations will form significantly more Boltzmann brains than normal observers have ever existed, but we don't accept that we are most likely one of these Boltzmann brains. Although I'm unsure how to justify this. — Michael

Show that Boltzmann brains are not equivalent to normal human observers.

Greetings. Sorry for the delay. They'll likely come often. Life and all.

I really appreciate all your interest. Perhaps this could be the beginning of a worthy discussion. Few, if any, other things pique my interest as much as meaningful human thought, belief, and/or experience.

I've become unsatisfied with the terms in the OP. An acceptable terminological framework will be capable of making sense of the evolutionary progression of human minds. It should also have the capability to bridge the divide between the simplest and the most complex sorts of meaningful human experience. It should be readily amenable to an evolutionary timeline. Where there has never been human thought and belief, there could have never been meaningful human experience.

Most all of this speaks to some of the changes that asked about earlier. Sure, the terms "thought" and "belief" are not always used in synonymous fashion. We cannot always exchange them freely and expect to retain whatever sense we had been making. So, the distinction between thought and belief needs to be drawn and maintained, even if they are much the same thing at their core.

Galuchat poked around at an issue as well. That issue was a result of implementing "objects of physiological sensory perception". The terminological framework is incapable of making enough sense of the evolution of the human mind/meaningful human experience while in utero.

I've found that the subject/object dichotomy is incapable of properly accounting for all meaningful human experience. Not all meaningful human experience is accurately described in such language. Some directly perceptible things are not objects in the sense of existing independently of a subject, but rather are contained within the biological boundary separating the creature and not the creature.

I do believe all experience shares a core set of common denominators. My thoughts regarding human thought and belief have been evolving at a rather brisk pace in the past few years.

I am convinced that biological structures are key. They operate autonomously long before we become aware of it. Dennett's little robots/machines fits here. It is tricky, but I like to believe that an adequate terminological framework will satisfy us by its use. I would hope so anyway. Although I'm not in complete agreement with Dennett, I would not be surprised if his aim hits its mark. The accuracy will not be displayed by only his published works but those he inspired as well. His aim is/was towards a better understanding of the human mind.

So, to answer any questions regarding if my stance has shifted...

I still agree with the basic idea that gave rise to the opening post. Replace "thought and belief" with "meaningful experience". Generally, all meaningful human experience consists in very large part of correlations being drawn between different things by the individual at that time.

So, I still maintain that at conception there is no meaningful human experience. The biological machinery at that time is grossly underdeveloped and as a result is insufficient for drawing meaningful correlations between different things. Although, I think it undeniable that correlations are drawn in utero. If all meaningful human experience consists of correlations being drawn between different things, and all experience is meaningful to the individual, then meaningful experience is limited to and/or enabled by the biological machinery providing the means. Practicing this helps eschew anthropomorphism, which has run amok.

Talking as if memories are distinct entities, things that can be stored, seems mistaken to me.
— creativesoul
Memories are stored, are they not? In the brain, in some physical manner. — Patterner

Well, we say that memories are stored. It is common parlance. It's a useful but very misleading analogy. I suppose what I'm getting at with this point is that it is as a result of how memories emerge and 'persist' that we can know it is impossible to reconfigure them without also reconfiguring everything that they are existentially dependent upon. That includes far more than just the biological material/structures of the human brain.

So, it's not even a possibility. Logical possibility perhaps, but what else would have to be the case in order for that to happen? It does not follow from the fact that we can imagine some possible world in which Boltzmann brains could emerge, that this world is that one.

Talking as if memories are distinct entities, things that can be stored, seems mistaken to me. Without a tree there is no memory of one. Our memories of trees are existentially dependent upon trees, regardless of their meaningful content, regardless of their veracity. Our memories of trees cannot be reconstructed in any other manner other than series of physical and mental events from whence they emerged.

If it gets a few more folk to learn a bit of philosophy of language it might be for the greater good. — Banno

:point:

I believe the idea is that, if you are a BB, no, you have not been chatting with anyone for any amount of time. Rather, you, a BB, have existed for only a moment. The gigantic number of particles needed just happened to drift into the exact arrangement needed to give you all the "memories" you have, which only seem to have taken place over long periods of time.

All nonsense. But a very fun idea. — Patterner

Regarding the idea...

What would it take to even be able to physically reconfigure a normal human observer? All the necessary parts. What do all normal observers have in common such that that's exactly what makes them normal human observers? That's a matter of necessary elemental constituency and existential dependency. There's a bit of work involved there.

Or...

I don't know for sure, but my impression of Witt leads me to think that ideas such as Boltzmann Brains would count as bewitchment.

Given that the sheer number/quantity of particles necessary for reconfiguring me involves reconfiguring everything that I am existentially dependent upon(everything that effected/affected me either directly or indirectly), and I am a normal human observer.

Normal human observers have been affected/effected and/or otherwise influenced, whether directly or indirectly, by all sorts of things. Some of those things are external to us, some of those things are parts of us, some of those things are a combination thereof.

You'd need to recreate the entire universe according to a strict determinist(causal) account. Boltzmann Brains are supposed to come from that... aren't they? Do they presuppose that all it takes to recreate an observer is to recreate and rearrange just the biological components?

Hume's influence on the academic/philosophical/scientific community at the time caused Kant to awaken from dogmatic slumber. He said as much himself in the forward, or at the beginning of the CPR...

Right?

:yikes:

I don't think anyone would claim that Kant's CPR was caused by Hume. — AmadeusD

Kant did.

I do wonder if his inability to understand speech acts is related to his extreme individualism. — Banno

I think he plays, purposefully for the sake of playing... an agent provocateur. He cannot believe everything he writes.

The Boltzmann brain problem is that given that our scientific theories entail the eventual formation of an exceptionally large number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours, it is exceptionally probable that the Big Freeze has happened and that we are Boltzmann brains having the illusory experience of being normal observers before the Big Freeze. — Michael

How do you get from

"given that our scientific theories entail the eventual formation of an exceptionally large number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours"

to

"it is exceptionally probable that the Big Freeze has happened"

The Boltzmann brain problem is that given that our scientific theories entail the eventual formation of an exceptionally large number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours... — Michael

That's not the only possibility entailed by our scientific theories.




How long does instantaneous existence last? I've been chatting with Banno for over a decade. Jeep/Wayfarer too. Sam 26 even longer.

The probability of our being a normal observer is 100%. Here we are.

... The Big Freeze has not happened.
— creativesoul

You're begging the question. — Michael

Proudly.

I'm stating the case. If you reject the brute fact that we are normal observers, then all bets are off.

Boltzmann brains don't involve disembodied cognition. Cognition embodied much differently than ours for the most part, but not disembodied. — wonderer1

Thanks for that. I'll take your word for that. I shouldn't get involved in some of this, I've neither the time nor the knowledge to be said to "know enough" to join in such discourse.

There's much of this stuff I outright reject due to some other commitments I have.

For those interested in the topic - and it has many uses, in and outside of philosophy... — Banno

Given politics, the power of the spoken/written word seems rather important.

This also seems to rely on disembodied cognition as a logical possibility. Logical possibility alone does not warrant belief/assent.

What about all of the scientific evidence in favor of embodied cognition and/or against disembodied cognition?

1. The universe will succumb to the Big Freeze
2. The time between the Big Bang and the Big Freeze is finite
3. The time after the Big Freeze is infinite1
4. The probability of a Boltzmann brain with experiences like ours forming via quantum fluctuation or nucleation within a finite time is non-zero

5. Given (1) and (2) the number of normal observers is finite
6. Given (3) and (4) the number of Boltzmann brains with experiences like ours is infinite1
7. Given (5) and (6) we are infinitely more likely to be a Boltzmann brain than a normal observer1

The current scientific evidence supports (1)-(4), and (5)-(7) are rational deductions. — Michael

The probability of our being a normal observer is 100%. Here we are.

I'm not sure how (6) follows from (3) and (4). The Big Freeze has not happened. If (6) is rejected, then so too is (7).

ChatGPT doesn't reason. It basically just repeats what it's read elsewhere. — Michael

Chomsky called it glorified plagiarism, or words to that effect/affect.

Solipsism is a philosophical idea. It is a language construct.
— creativesoul

The idea that all ideas boil down to language... — Lionino

Who said that?

Never a good sign when one neglects to address what was written in lieu of something that was not.

The issue of solipsism only gets raised because we cannot be, as with many other things, absolutely certain it is not the case. — Janus

I am.

that discussion performatively, if not logically, presupposes the existence of a mutually experienced world external to the body
— Janus

Where there has never been language use, there could have never been any discussion such as this one. It does not matter if one believes that or not.
— creativesoul

That still does not defeat solipsism... — Lionino

Solipsism is a philosophical idea. It is a language construct. Language constructs are existentially dependent upon shared meaning; shared meaning... more than one mind. It is impossible for solipsism to be true.

...what I said before to Banno applies to language too:
In the case that I think there is no world, it follows that I believe that everything around me is merely a projection of my mind (or simply is my mind). If I also believe that I am here discussing for a purpose, it could very well be that I believe that I am interacting with the very contents of my mind
— Lionino — Lionino

Solipsism is a philosophical idea. All philosophical ideas are existentially dependent upon language use. Language use... shared meaning; shared meaning... more than one mind... solipsism... more than one mind.

:smile:

:insert shaka:

What of it? — Michael

It's odd to me when one exclaims that they are more likely to be a philosophical tool for thinking than a human whose thinking and/or using the tool.

That's what.

The argument is valid:

1. There are far more long-lived Boltzmann brains than long-lived humans
2. I am long-lived
3. Therefore, I am more likely to be a Boltzmann brain than a human — Michael

It is impossible for a human to not be a human.

That the discussion in this thread pressuposes a belief in a real world outside our minds, my comment is a rebuttal exactly to that claim.
— Lionino

I would say that it might not logically presuppose the existence of a world... — Janus

All discussion is existentially dependent upon language use. Language use requires shared meaning. Shared meaning is existentially dependent upon a plurality of creatures drawing the same correlations between the same things(or close enough). Solipsism, and discussions about it, both depend upon a plurality of language users.

Where there has never been language use, there could have never been any discussion such as this one. It does not matter if one believes that or not.

Hey Mww. Care to pick this back up?

:cool:

Go there! It's more interesting than most stuff on here currently.