Indirect Realism and Direct Realism

Luke

None of these quotes state or even suggest that the naive realism position is that their perceptions have the same physical constituents as the perceived object. They say only that it seems that way, or that our perceptions are shaped by those objects.

Michael

They say only that it seems that way — Luke

The first quote says that it seems to be that naive realism is correct; specifically "visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property."

It doesn't say that naive realism just claims that things seem to be a certain way. You're misreading the quote.

or that our perceptions are shaped by those objects. — Luke

"... where this is understood in a constitutive, rather than merely a causal, sense."

None of these quotes state or even suggest that the naive realism position is that their perceptions have the same physical constituents as the perceived object. — Luke

As well as the aforementioned, there's also "for the naive realist, insofar as experience and experiential character is constituted by a direct perceptual relation to aspects of the world, it is not constituted by the representation of such aspects of the world" and "what is fundamental to experience is something which itself cannot be explained in terms of representing the world: a primitive relation of presentation."

Naive realists claim that it is the distal objects themselves, not mental representations, that are the constituents of experience.

And I'll add another from The Disjunctive Theory of Perception:

It follows that on a naïve realist view, the veridical perceptions and hallucinations in question have a different nature: the former have mind-independent objects as constituents, and the latter do not.

NOS4A2

↪Michael

Naive realists claim that it is the distal objects themselves, not mental representations, that are the constituents of experience.

It’s a weird formulation and I’d be wary of any direct realist who accepts it.

I refute it because “distal objects” are constituents of the world, not of experience. So are we. Experience isn’t some realm in which objects, distal or mental, are its parts. Experience is an act where the “distal objects” that we experience are acted upon in a certain way. In this sense “experience” evokes a relationship rather than a realm. They are constituents of this relationship, and this relationship just so happens to be direct.

Michael

Experience is an act where the “distal objects” that we experience are acted upon in a certain way. — NOS4A2

This isn't what naive or indirect realists mean by "experience". They are referring to a particular kind of mental state with phenomenal character. These are, we now know, what occur when the appropriate areas of the brain are active, e.g. the visual and auditory cortexes.

Take this:

Disjunctivists and their opponents agree that veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations have something in common, in so far as they agree that such mental events should be grouped together as being perceptual experiences. They also agree that there are differences to be marked between them, hence the different labels for them. However, they disagree when it comes to specifying what these commonalities and differences consist in.

...

Some disjunctivists claim that veridical perceptions have a phenomenal character that hallucinations cannot possess. For example, according to one version of naïve realism (what we might call ‘naïve realism about phenomenal character’), when one veridically perceives the world, the mind-independent items perceived, such as tables and trees and the properties they manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one’s conscious experience, and hence determine its phenomenal character.

...

The disjunctivist may insist that in a case of genuine perception, even if the objects of perception are distal causes of the subject’s experience, they are also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it. So the occurrence of the relevant brain processes won’t be sufficient to produce the kind of mental event involved in perception, unless further non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of that kind of mental effect also obtain.

It's not clear to me that your account addresses anything of relevance. It simply uses the term "experience" to refer to a causal chain of events that connects some distal object to the body and then asserts (without really any meaning) that this connection is "direct". As it stands it's not something that either naive or indirect realists will disagree with; it simply redefines the words used.

NOS4A2

↪Michael

This isn't what naive or indirect realists mean by "experience". They are referring to a particular kind of mental state with phenomenal character. These are, we now know, what occur when the appropriate areas of the brain are active, e.g. the visual and auditory cortexes.

The jargon of it all is largely nonsensical. We can’t experience states of the brain and its activity or else we’d be able to describe with some degree of accuracy what is actually going on in there.

Instead we’re left to experience the residual effects of brain activity insofar as they may reach and affect the senses, which is very little. We might feel a headache but cannot say what the body is doing to cause it, for example. A mental state is the portrayal of a bodily state as given by a being whose senses look away from the body. That’s why its description is always one of grasping, and in that sense, forever naive. It is the loose and often inaccurate feeling of a bodily state according to the tiny amount of information provided to the senses.

Mww

You sense sensations, then? — NOS4A2

Mmm…….no.

At any rate, it’s closed system. — NOS4A2

Metaphysically, yes, downstream from that which is not physiologically conditioned; scientifically, yes, downstream from nerve endings.

NOS4A2

↪Mww

Metaphysically, yes, downstream from that which is not physiologically conditioned; scientifically, yes, downstream from nerve endings.

And what lies downstream?

Mww

And what lies downstream? — NOS4A2

Speculative metaphysics, a complete, logically consistent, sufficiently explanatory theory on the one hand, scant but progressive empirical knowledge on the other.

Michael

or else we’d be able to describe with some degree of accuracy what is actually going on in there. — NOS4A2

That's precisely what we are doing when we describe the pain we feel and the colours we see and the voices we hear when we dream or hallucinate.

We might not be able to describe it in neurological terms (e.g. "such and such neurons are firing"), but then that's why I'm not entirely convinced by eliminative materialism and am open to property dualism.

Even if you disagree with "perception" being the appropriate word to use for dreams and hallucinations, surely you have to accept that when we describe what's going on when we dream and hallucinate we're describing what's happening to/in us and not what's happening elsewhere in the world. The indirect realist simply argues that the same can be true of veridical experience because veridical experience, hallucinations, and dreams are all of a common kind – mental states with phenomenal character – that differ only in their cause (which is not to say that we can't also talk about their cause).

Janus

A perfect example of the difficulties with language: to impute dualism to actuality is metaphysically disastrous, re: whatever is just is, Aristotle’s A = A, but when actuality is qualified by “mind-independent”, a dualism is automatically given.

An overly-critical analyst might even go so far as to assert there is no such thing as “actuality” without an intelligence affected by it, the repercussion being non-dualism is impossible, from which follows A = whatever I think it is. — Mww

Yes, if we think of reality as mind-independnt dualism is a given—in our thinking. But then our thinking is inevitably dualistic anyway. I think it follows that our thinking cannot grasp reality. we can only, dualistically, grasp at it with our thinking, but it escapes from our mental hands like a puff of air.

I agree there is no such thing as a mind-independent "actuality", that can be grasped without an intelligence, or in other words there is no such thing as a grasping of actuality without an intelligence, and I think there really is no grasping of actuality at all —it is beyond the grasp of intelligence.

Respectfully, I submit that our intelligence is dualist in its logical structure, and language merely represents the expression of its employment, so our mindsets are at least that far apart. — Mww

Our conceptually mediated intelligence is dualist in its logical structure—I agree. I think even in animals there must be a proto-conceptual division between self and other, but it is underlying, not consciously articulated. But then that might just be my anthropomorphizing dualistic intelligence at work. Once anything is re-cognized, once it becomes a gestalt that stands out from its environment, perhps we have the beginnings of dualism.

Anyway….historically we’ve noticed between us the pitfalls of OLP, so in that respect, we’re not that far apart. — Mww

Yes, the intellectual poverty...!

NOS4A2

↪Michael

At best we're describing the activity of the body from the perspective of the body, an organism who is forever peering outward, towards the world, and never inside towards what is actually occurring in there. The best introspection and subjectivity can provide is a partial or blind view of oneself, wholly limited by our own lack of a sensual field.

But because our senses point outwards towards the world, we can come to understand much more about what goes on out there, simply because it provides us with more information. Dreams, on the other hand, occur while we're asleep. The senses aren't as fully integrated into cognitive processing as they would while we're awake, and with our eyes open. So not only are our faculties hindered during during dreams and hallucinations, accounts of what are actually going on are severely limited in both scope and data. This is more than enough for me to say, no, they are not of a common kind.

Banno

The definitive footnote: it can only be said what is seen is the shoe iff there is already extant experience of that particular distal object... — Mww

We can never see shoes unless we have already seen shoes: a Transcendental Argument that leads to an infinite regress such that we never see shoes.

And yet, beyond all reason, we see shoes.

Something here is amiss.

Mww

↪Janus

All good.
—————

….we never see shoes. — Banno

Correct. We see things. Undetermined things. Through metaphysical systemic functionality, we cognize representations of those perceived things, in this case as “shoes”. Nothing is lost in conventionally saying we see shoes, insofar as merely saying stuff takes no account of, thus has no appreciation for, the origin of what is said.

However speculative it may be, there’s nothing amiss with the system, hence no infinite regress. And no idiotic homunculus argument, the proverbial red-headed stepchild of the ill-informed.

Luke

↪Michael

To clarify, when you say that, according to naive realism, perceptions and perceived distal objects have the same physical constituents, do you take this to mean that perceptions and the perceived distal objects are identical?

Michael

To clarify, when you say that, according to naive realism, perceptions and perceived distal objects have the same physical constituents, do you take this to mean that perceptions and the perceived distal objects are identical? — Luke

You'll have to ask naive realists for specifics of what they mean; I can only quote what they say, which is that the relation between conscious experience and distal objects is more than just causal and is non-representational, using the term "constituent", which means "being a part".

So, distal objects and their properties are literal component parts of conscious experience; in the same sense, perhaps, that the red paint is a literal component part of a painting.

creativesoul

So, distal objects are literal component parts of conscious experience; in the same sense, perhaps, that the red paint is a literal component part of a painting — Michael

No.

In the sense that an apple pie is part of a dinner party.

Michael

↪creativesoul

How is that any different?

creativesoul

I'll leave you to think about it.

creativesoul

...our perceptions are shaped by those objects. — Luke

That's what I'm saying; earlier pointing at the need to unpack the phrase.

He didn't listen.

creativesoul

Red cups are necessary elemental constituents of seeing red cups. The red cup has a reflective outer layer. The color we talk about is not inherent to the cup, but the outer layer is, so the cup inherently reflects/refracts the wavelengths we've named "red". The cup will reflect those wavelengths if we all die tomorrow.

Seeing red cups that are not there is malfunctioning biology. The red cup is not a part of hallucinations. Hence, the difference between hallucinations and veridical experience is whether or not distal objects are constituents thereof.

Luke

To clarify, when you say that, according to naive realism, perceptions and perceived distal objects have the same physical constituents, do you take this to mean that perceptions and the perceived distal objects are identical?
— Luke

You'll have to ask naive realists for specifics of what they mean — Michael

I'm surprised at this response. You've been dismissing my version of non-naive direct realism, claiming it to be a species of indirect realism, for at least the past 20 pages on this very basis. For example:

This is the very point I am making. Non-naive direct realism is indirect realism given that they both accept that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of experience — Michael

Now you are not sure about the specifics of the naive realists' position?

I can only quote what they say — Michael

Are you quoting naive realists, though?

which is that the relation between conscious experience and distal objects is more than just causal and is non-representational, using the term "constituent", which means "being a part". — Michael

In case you're interested, I queried ChatGPT about this:

Reveal

User
Is naive realism the view that perceptions have the same physical constituents as the perceived objects?

ChatGPT
Yes, that's correct. Naive realism, also known as direct realism or common-sense realism, is the philosophical view that perceptions have the same physical constituents as the perceived objects. In other words, according to naive realism, when we perceive an object, our perceptual experience is directly caused by the object itself, and the properties we perceive (such as color, shape, texture) are inherent qualities of the object.

Naive realists argue that perception provides direct and unmediated access to the external world, meaning that our perceptual experiences accurately reflect the properties of external objects. They deny the existence of mental representations or intermediaries in perception and maintain that our perceptual experiences are immediate and reliable sources of knowledge about the world.

However, critics of naive realism, such as indirect realists and representationalists, argue that our perceptual experiences are mediated by mental representations or sense data, which may not always accurately reflect the properties of external objects. This philosophical debate raises questions about the nature of perception, the relationship between our minds and the external world, and the reliability of our perceptual experiences.

User
is naive realism the view that perceptions and perceived objects are identical?

ChatGPT
Naive realism, also known as direct realism or common-sense realism, is not necessarily the view that perceptions and perceived objects are identical. Instead, naive realism posits that perceptions directly represent external objects as they are, without the need for any intervening mental representations or intermediaries.

In other words, naive realism suggests that when we perceive an object, our perceptual experience is caused by the object itself, and the properties we perceive (such as color, shape, texture) are inherent qualities of the object. However, this does not imply that perceptions and perceived objects are identical.

Naive realists argue that perception provides direct and unmediated access to the external world, meaning that our perceptual experiences accurately reflect the properties of external objects. They deny the need for mental representations or intermediaries in perception and maintain that our perceptual experiences are immediate and reliable sources of knowledge about the world.

However, critics of naive realism, such as indirect realists and representationalists, argue that our perceptual experiences are mediated by mental representations or sense data, which may not always accurately reflect the properties of external objects. This philosophical debate raises questions about the nature of perception, the relationship between our minds and the external world, and the reliability of our perceptual experiences.

User
How can perceptions and the perceived objects have the same physical constituents without being identical?

ChatGPT
Perceptions and perceived objects having the same physical constituents without being identical can be understood through the lens of naive realism, which posits that perceptions directly represent external objects as they are, without the need for any intervening mental representations or intermediaries.

In naive realism, perceptions are considered to be caused by the physical properties of external objects interacting with our sensory organs. When we perceive an object, our sensory experience is a result of the object's physical properties (such as color, shape, texture) interacting with our sensory organs (such as eyes, ears, skin). As a result, the perceptual experience shares the same physical constituents as the perceived object in the external world.

However, while perceptions and perceived objects may share the same physical constituents, they are not necessarily identical. This is because perceptions are subjective experiences that occur within the mind, whereas perceived objects exist independently in the external world. Perceptions are influenced by factors such as individual differences, cognitive biases, and contextual factors, which can affect how we perceive and interpret the physical properties of external objects.

In summary, while perceptions and perceived objects may share the same physical constituents, they are distinct entities: perceptions are subjective experiences within the mind, while perceived objects are external entities in the physical world. Naive realism suggests that perceptions provide direct and unmediated access to the external world, but it does not imply that perceptions and perceived objects are identical.

User
you say that naive realism posits that perceptions directly represent objects as they are. Isn’t this a form of representationalism?

ChatGPT
You raise an insightful point. While naive realism does emphasize that perceptions directly represent external objects as they are, it is indeed a form of representationalism, but with a key distinction.

Representationalism, in general, is the philosophical view that perception involves mental representations or intermediaries that stand between the mind and the external world. According to representationalism, we do not directly perceive external objects, but rather mental representations or images of those objects that are generated by our senses.

Naive realism, on the other hand, is a form of representationalism that maintains that these mental representations or intermediaries faithfully represent the external objects themselves. In other words, while naive realism acknowledges the existence of mental representations in perception, it argues that these representations accurately reflect the properties of external objects without distortion or interpretation.

So, while both naive realism and representationalism acknowledge the role of mental representations in perception, naive realism distinguishes itself by asserting that these representations directly correspond to external objects as they are, without the need for interpretation or mediation. However, this view has been subject to criticism, particularly from indirect realists, who argue that mental representations can be influenced by factors such as perceptual illusions and cognitive biases, leading to a departure from the external reality they represent.

User
How can naive realism be a form of representationalism if it rejects the need for any representation?

ChatGPT
You're correct; I misspoke. Naive realism is actually a form of direct realism, not representationalism.

Direct realism, including naive realism, posits that perception provides direct access to the external world without the need for mental representations or intermediaries. In other words, according to naive realism, when we perceive an object, our perception directly corresponds to the external object itself, rather than to a mental representation of it.

Thank you for catching that mistake. It's essential to clarify that naive realism stands in contrast to representationalism, which posits that perception involves mental representations or intermediaries that stand between the mind and the external world. In representationalism, perceptions are thought to be representations or images generated by the mind, whereas in naive realism, perceptions are believed to directly represent external objects as they are.

User
How can perceptions represent objects as they are without any representation?

ChatGPT
You're correct; my previous statement was imprecise. Let me clarify:

Naive realism, also known as direct realism, posits that perceptions directly represent external objects as they are, without the need for mental representations or intermediaries. However, this view doesn't entirely reject the idea of representation but rather suggests that our perceptions themselves are representations of the external world.

In naive realism, perceptions are considered to be caused by the physical properties of external objects interacting with our sensory organs. When we perceive an object, our sensory experience is a result of the object's physical properties (such as color, shape, texture) interacting with our sensory organs (such as eyes, ears, skin). As a result, the perceptual experience is believed to directly correspond to the external object itself, without the need for mental intermediaries.

So, while naive realism doesn't explicitly posit the existence of mental representations or intermediaries in perception, it implies that our perceptions themselves act as representations of the external world. This view suggests that our perceptual experiences accurately reflect the properties of external objects, providing us with direct and unmediated access to the external world.

User
in this context, how can the naive realist’s perceptions have the same physical constituents as their perceived objects without being identical to them?

ChatGPT
In the context of naive realism, perceptions are considered to have the same physical constituents as their perceived objects because they are believed to directly represent the external world. However, this does not imply that perceptions and perceived objects are identical.

Naive realism suggests that when we perceive an object, our perceptual experience is caused by the object's physical properties interacting with our sensory organs. As a result, the perceptual experience shares the same physical constituents as the perceived object in the external world. For example, if we perceive a red apple, the redness we experience is caused by the light reflecting off the surface of the apple and entering our eyes, stimulating our visual receptors in a certain way.

However, while perceptions and perceived objects may share the same physical constituents, they are not necessarily identical. Perceptions are subjective experiences that occur within the mind, whereas perceived objects exist independently in the external world. Perceptions are influenced by factors such as individual differences, cognitive biases, and contextual factors, which can affect how we perceive and interpret the physical properties of external objects.

In summary, naive realism suggests that perceptions accurately represent the physical properties of external objects, providing us with direct access to the external world. While perceptions and perceived objects may share the same physical constituents, they are distinct entities: perceptions are subjective experiences within the mind, while perceived objects are external entities in the physical world.

Michael

Are you quoting naive realists, though? — Luke

Martin, Fish, and Allen are naive realists, I'm unsure if Nudds is or if he's just explaining naive realism, and the two SEP articles give overviews of the various positions without the authors commenting on their personal position.

Some more quotes from two naive realists:

Naïve realism is the view that the conscious character of experience in genuine cases of perception is constituted, at least in part, by non-representational perceptual relations between subjects and aspects of the mind-independent world. — French and Phillips 2020

[N]aïve realists hold that ... [t]he conscious visual experience you have of the oak has that very tree as a literal part. — French and Phillips 2023

Moliere

Weekends and laziness put a delay on my reply, but I finally thought of something.

See, for me I do not see why it would not be the case for the brain to have the same experiences if the sensory inputs were the same. I don't think a body would matter either as long as the sensory inputs mimicked those it would have had from a body. — Apustimelogist

There's three kinds of possibility I want to distinguish: Logical, metaphysical, and a third kind that I'm having a hard time naming but "actual" works.

I have no argument for the logical possibility of the BiV.

But metaphysically it seems that the argument for indirect realism requires a distinction between an internal and an external world, or something similar. Every articulation seems to posit at least three metaphysical kinds: ipseity, mediation, and world. Somehow ipseity is given priority to world in the articulating of indirect realism.

Keeping with the notion that direct realism is the negation of indirect realism, the argument need only deny ipseity, mediation, or world. "Mediation" is what I choose to target. In a direct world "mediation" is covered by "activity" -- it's only by acting within a world that mediation can occur at all. In place of internal/external I'd put forward part/whole. We are a part of the world, and there is no thing which mediates between ipseity and world, or between part and whole. Rather, we directly interact with the world as a part of it -- the world interacting with itself, in the broad view.

In terms of actual possibility, though, that only requires us to take a survey of our knowledge at the moment, and our ignorance of the brain and experience and all that seems to justify doubt that were some scientist of consciousness to claim they have a brain in a vat which is experiencing I'd simply doubt it without more justification. It's entirely implausible that we'd stumble upon how to do that given the depth of our ignorance.

creativesoul

It follows that on a naïve realist view, the veridical perceptions and hallucinations in question have a different nature: the former have mind-independent objects as constituents, and the latter do not.

Yup.

[N]aïve realists hold that ... [t]he conscious visual experience you have of the oak has that very tree as a literal part. — French and Phillips 2023

Yup.

when we describe what's going on when we dream and hallucinate we're describing what's happening to/in us and not what's happening elsewhere in the world. The indirect realist simply argues that the same can be true of veridical experience because veridical experience, hallucinations, and dreams are all of a common kind – mental states with phenomenal character – that differ only in their cause (which is not to say that we can't also talk about their cause). — Michael

That's yet another place in reasoning where the indirect position goes wrong. All experience is experience, of that we can be certain. It doesn't follow from that that there are not differences between veridical, hallucinatory, and illusory experiences. It certainly does not follow that veridical experiences are the same as hallucinations and dreams. That is to willfully neglect the difference between them.

Another issue is the unstated but mistaken presupposition at work here. Distal objects do both, cause and become and/or 'act' as necessary elemental constituents of veridical experience. Those are not mutually exclusive roles when it comes to how physiological sensory perception works. Moreover, it is only after those things have happened that the biological machinery is primed and ready(so to speak) act as if red cups are being perceived once again, even though they're not.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Circling back to where I left you to think about the difference between a dinner party and a painting. Dinner parties are experiences. Paintings are not. That's one difference. Dinner parties consist of guests, hosts, food, drink, conversation, furniture, etc. If apple pie is served, then it is a constituent of that dinner party. It's not a mystery. It's very straightforward. Some parties may include and/or directly involve a painting. If the party includes a conversation about a particular painting on the wall, then that painting is also a constituent of that party. Anyone involved and/or listening to the discourse is having an experience that includes the painting, and the paint as constituents thereof.

In short, portraits are not experiences. Dinner parties are.

This is the third time I've pointed out the issue with your analogy. It's false. Continuing to use it is a textbook example of a non sequitur, strawman, red herring, misunderstanding, and/or perhaps deliberate misattribution of meaning to the term "constituent". Very unhelpful.

creativesoul

Measuring is an interesting act to consider here. If all constituents of experience exist only in the head and never distal objects, then what exactly is happening when we begin measuring the size of the red cup? We're certainly not measuring things that exist in the brain. The same question can and ought be asked about measuring the reflected wavelengths of the visible spectrum. Do we measure things in our brain, or do we measure light being reflected off the cup, neither of which are in our brain?

Michael

Distal objects do both, cause and become and/or 'act' as necessary elemental constituents of veridical experience. — creativesoul

Conscious experience occurs in the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, therefore distal objects are not constituents of conscious experience.

AmadeusD

There's three kinds of possibility I want to distinguish: Logical, metaphysical, and a third kind that I'm having a hard time naming but "actual" works. — Moliere

Empirical works well here too - Chalmers has a great discussion in his explanation of Supervenience in The Conscious Mind.

Moliere

↪AmadeusD

I could just be cribbing from him. I read that book forever ago.

"Empirical" works for me. Mostly I just mean -- what would I believe, given what I know? A very limited case of "possible", but one we use.

creativesoul

Conscious experience occurs in the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, — Michael

What is below does not follow from what is above.

...therefore distal objects are not constituents of conscious experience.

.

frank

↪Michael

What would qualify as a constituent of experience? I'm drawing a blank.

Indirect Realism and Direct Realism

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